Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed
by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion
was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he
was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent
Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect
[being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that
petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to
protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such
failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the
accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance.
This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with
the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he
continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the
slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good
standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar
for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to
discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala
of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny
such motion, but he also appointed him counselde oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on
November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the
volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A
motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as
counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on
February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11,
1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of
the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that
counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are
ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is
denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964,
he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to
prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de
oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June
14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964
July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11,
1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this
case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its
instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have
to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no
incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his
task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served
by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has
already rested its case." 6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being
appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a
surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more
manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is
understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those
enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State,
the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered
without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of
course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to
attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly
he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel
de oficio must be fulfilled." 8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de
oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its
officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when
negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal
cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that
he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to
the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he
must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to
render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a
bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of
the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its
importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard
by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented
that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic.
For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.
Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put
matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good
faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate
future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been
set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel
with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the
profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal
practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Petition, Annex B.
2 Ibid, Annex C.
3 Petition, pars. 3-9.

4 Petition, Annex C.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid..
7 L-31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.
8 Ibid, 186. Cf. People v. Apduhan, L-19491, Aug. 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798; People v.
Solacito, L-29209, Aug. 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 61; People v. Serafica, L-29092-93, Aug.
28, 1969, 29 SCRA 123; People v. Englatera, L-30820, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 245;
People v. Aguilar, L-30932, Jan. 29, 1971, 37 SCRA 115; People v. Estebia, L26868, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 90; People v. Flores, L-32692, July 30, 1971, 40
SCRA 230; People v. Alincastre, L-29891, Aug. 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 391; People v.
Valera, L-30039; Feb. 8, 1972, 43 SCRA 207; People v. Francisco, L-30763, June
29, 1972, 45 SCRA 451; People v. Espia, L-33028, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 614;
People v. Esteves, L-34811, Aug. 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 680; People v. Simeon, L33730, Sept. 28, 1972, 47 SCRA 129; People v. Daeng, L-34091, Jan. 30, 1973, 49
SCRA 221; People v. Ricalde, L-34673, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 228; People v.
Martinez, L-35353, April 30, 1973, 50 SCRA 509; People v. Silvestre, L-33821, June
22, 1973, 51 SCRA 286; People v. Busa, L-32047, June 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 317;
People v. Alamada, L-34594, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 103; People v. Andaya, L29644, July 25, 1973, 52 SCRA 137; People v. Duque, L-33267, Sept. 27, 1973, 53
SCRA 132; People v. Saligan, L-35792, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 190; People v.
Bacong, L-36161, Dec. 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 288.
9 4 Phil. 298.
10 Ibid, 300.
11 L-26868, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 106.
12 Ibid, 109-110, Cf. Javellana v. Lutero, L-23956, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 717;
Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, Sept. 5, 1967, 21 SCRA 1.
13 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950).
14 Cf. United States v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1902); United States v. Palisoc, 4 Phil.
207 (1905); United States v. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426 (1912); United States v. Laranja,
21 Phil. 500 (1912); United States v. Ramirez, 26 Phil. 616 (1914); United States v.
Labial, 27 Phil. 82 (1914); United States v. Custan, 28 Phil. 19 (1914); United States
v. Kilayco, 31 Phil. 371 (1915); United States v. Escalante, 36 Phil. 743 (1917);
People v. Abuyen, 52 Phil. 722 (1929).
15 Cf. Article IV, Section 19.
16 Section 20.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6252

October 5, 2004

JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant,

vs.
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are
impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and
requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to
those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint
was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office under Section 27 of Rule 1382 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and
1.033, Canon 54, and Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of
the complainant in this wise:
"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in
notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details
of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the
notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client
and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his
client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by
several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter
disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats."6
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,7 Atty. Rafanan filed his
verified Answer.8He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were
attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence
Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a
notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other
government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before
government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither
did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the
affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial
register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 1129 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option
to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was dutybound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary
investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the
ends of justice." Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent
averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very
essential to the ends of justice."
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the
hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the
assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next
scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support
of his allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint
Affidavit11 of the two police officers who had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him,
because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter
before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set
the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were
sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only
complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the
Notice only on June 8, 2001.13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer of respondent.
The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15 It also received complainants
Letter-Request16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its
Order17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after
which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainants Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file
any.
The IBPs Recommendation
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-200317219 approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated
specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such

certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP
Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the
recommendation20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a warning
that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to
1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to
certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue
and date as part of such certification.21 They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and
to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded."22Failure to
perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.23
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into
their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as
follows:
"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization
is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument."
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their
office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They
are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,25 which are dictated by public
policy and are impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the
Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the
entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for
affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar
practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not
apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the
Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away
with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the
bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit
of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits
relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against
the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to "certify that he has
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and
Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with
the certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance
and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.27 It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with
such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their
solemn oath to obey the laws.28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or
justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by
respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
the importance of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the
end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.30 Considering the nature of the infraction and the
absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an
affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of
Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client."
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

"Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument
and the like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel."
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,31 except only in
certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.32
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their
relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts
as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and
defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested
witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of
the lawyers who testify for their clients.
"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke
unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they
cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and
if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be
neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the
lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful."33
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels
for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely
have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.34
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor
of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the
latters life and liberty are at stake.35 It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded
full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those
reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if
they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus
expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to
present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that
the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except by due process of law.36
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it
pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence
and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit,
complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies
during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation
which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.37 Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary
investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from
the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless
and expensive prosecutions.38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be
followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting
employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential
witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become
essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the
active prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is
not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be
equated with liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent
that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the
police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar
infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales*, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*

On leave.

Records, pp. 1-4.

"Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice."
2

"CANON 1 x x x
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any mans cause."
"CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing
legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as
in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the
law and jurisprudence."
4

"CANON 12 x x x
Rule 12.07 A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him."

Annex A, Notice of Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors; Report, pp. 1-2.

Records, p. 13.

Id., pp. 14-18.

"Sec. 3. Procedure. x x x
"(a) x x x. The affidavits shall be sworn to before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and
supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counteraffidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as
provided in paragraph (a) of this section x x x."
10

Records, pp. 54-55.

11

Joint Affidavit of PO3 Ronaldo S. Gamboa and PO2 Nicasio A. Yambot; records, p. 68.

12

Records, p. 57.

13

See Registry Return Receipt attached to Notice of Hearing.

14

Records, pp. 59-63.

15

Id., pp. 65-67.

16

Id., p. 74.

17

Id., p. 88.

18

Id., pp. 92-100.

19

See Notice of Resolution; records, p. 103.

20

The investigating commissioner recommended that "respondent be reprimanded and

fined P1,500.00 for violating Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
21

251 of the Revised Administrative Code.

22

246 of the Revised Administrative Code.

23

249 of the Revised Administrative Code; Protacio v. Mendoza, 395 SCRA 10, 17,
January 13, 2003.
24

383 SCRA 498, 504, July 2, 2002, per Bellosillo, J.

25

Vda. de Bernardo v. Restauro, 404 SCRA 599, 603, June 25, 2003; Maligsa v. Cabanting,
272 SCRA 408, 414, May 14, 1997; Arrieta v. Llosa, 282 SCRA 248, 253, November 28,
1997.
26

Canon 1 of the CPR.

27

Canon 5 of the CPR.

28

Alitagtag v. Garcia, 403 SCRA 335, 341, June 10, 2003.

29

Ibid.

30

Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, supra.

31

Per 20 of the Rules of Court.

32

Per 24 of the Rules of Court.

33

Vicente J. Francisco, Legal Ethics (1949), p. 203 (citing Williams, Legal Ethics, p. 53; and
Warvelle, Legal Ethics, p. 119).
34

Philippine National Bank v. Uy Teng Piao, 57 Phil. 337, October 21, 1932.

35

Canon 5 of the Canons of Professional Ethics; 20 (i) of Rule 138, Rules of Court.

36

Lames v. Lascieras, 89 SCRA 186, 189, March 30, 1979.

37

Manuel R. Pamaran, Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated (1998), p. 161 (citing Tandoc
v. Resultan, 175 SCRA 37, July 5, 1989).
38

Ibid.

39

Manubay v. Garcia, 386 Phil. 440, 443, April 12, 2000.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6672

September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment
of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and
expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached
"respondents" calling card:6
Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M01
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar

Tel: 362-7820
Fax: (632) 3627821

Grace Park, Caloocan City

Cel.: (0926)
2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
1av vphi1

(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of
the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,9 found
that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule
8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he
contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers
as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent
in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a
lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession
in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to
which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any mans cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same
persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed
to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03
and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
1avv phi1

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should
not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service,
good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied
having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos "referrals." Furthermore,
he never denied Labianos connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent
violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is
handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he
is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money
to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the
subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement
which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty
of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise
of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labianos calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used
to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to
finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers,
thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.

However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04
and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one year effective
immediately from receipt of this resolution. He isSTERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Complaint dated February 1, 2005. Rollo, pp. 1-7.

Overseas seafarers Cenen Magno, Henry Dy, James R. Gregorio and Noel Geronimo. Id.,
pp. 2-3, 9-14.
3

Id., p. 9.

Involved benefits and disability collection cases. Id., pp. 2-3.

Complaint, Annex "D." Id., pp. 12-14.

Complaint, Annex "A." Id., p. 8.

Answer dated April 26, 2005. Id., pp. 20-23.

Resolution dated August 15, 2005. Id., p. 24.

Report and recommendation penned by Commissioner Lolita Quisumbing dated March 2,

2006. Id., pp. 106-111.
10

Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 8.02 provides:

A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.

11

Rule 1.01; Canon 2; Rule 2.03; Canon 3; Rule 3.01; Canon 7; Rule 7.03; Canon 8; Rule
8.01; Canon 9; and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rollo, p. 110.
12

Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 27 provides:

Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do.The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (emphasis supplied)

13

In Re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1933).

14

Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 7th Edition (2002), p. 109.

15

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. See supra note 12.

16

Supra note 13.

17

Agpalo. Supra note 14, p. 72.

18

McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 US 107, 64 L Ed 481, 40 S Ct 306 (1920).

19

Or evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion

even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise (Portuguez v. GSIS Family
Savings Bank, G.R. No. 169570, 2 March 2007, 517 SCRA 309; Bautista v. Sula, A.M. No.
P-04-1920, 17 August 2007, 530 SCRA 406; ePacific Global Contact Center, Inc. v.
Cabansay, G.R. No. 167345, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 498). Moreover, in In re:
Improper Solicitation of Court Employees Rolando H. Hernandez, Executive Assistant 1,
Office of the Court Administrator, A.M. No. 2008-12-SC, 24 April 2009, the Court adopted the
OCAs evaluation which relied on the sworn statements to support its conclusion that illegal
acts were committed by respondents in this case.
20

Supra note 14, p. 101.

21

Rollo, pp. 96-97.

22

Agpalo, supra note 14, p. 240 citing comments of the IBP Committee that drafted the CPR,
p. 90.
23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Supra notes 10 and 12.

26

State Bar v. Kilpatrick, 874 SW2d 656 (1994, Tex). In this case, the lawyer was disbarred.

27

Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378.

28

Id., p. 408.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase
of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your
animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can
execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans
although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to
him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help
and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in
his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next
month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions
or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in
particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me
any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence
here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back
home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer
and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will
exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see
me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on
every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of
documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary
public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are
in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I
would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public.
Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any
of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to
live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in
your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection
with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court
and would charge only three pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21
of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar.
In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act
No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28
of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective

advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or
circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local
custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business
by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by
indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and
all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is unprofessional
for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any
other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for
like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the
bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials,
physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant
or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of
any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a
crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney
was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of
jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The
reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a
business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so
would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
Peoplevs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results
in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should
be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal
of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of

the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go
further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there
are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be
distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced
the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions
OSTRAND, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient punishment.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Nonquota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which
this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish
the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities
in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all,
to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name,
it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.

More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question
are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce
is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a
man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is
not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers
do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed
by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of

modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is

merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own

commercial advertisement which announces a certainAtty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice
of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned
to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly
on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities
of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in
the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet
to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our
laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses
of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render

effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the
law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law
accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of
the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations
field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge
and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of
it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that]
a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider

his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice
of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of
the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining,
with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent
particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where
the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that
only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between
an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the
Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53
A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby ConcepcionRichard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution
to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as
to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there
exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A

PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most

the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person
in a particular situation in their publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment
against defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270
[1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It
is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The

courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to
an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside

of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.],
pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice
of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of

documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;

evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage
or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign
country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law.
That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and
be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the CunetaConcepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for

the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and
only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now,
if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who
have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study,
have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to
advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the

construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice
of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards
or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of
Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the
use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position,
and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus
to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal byproduct of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the

opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an
initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in
our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides,
even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to
show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical

advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light
of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General
for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on the left
side of "The Legal Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which were published in a
newspaper of general circulation.
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated December 10,
1991, Rollo, 328.
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal Affairs, 1,
10; Rollo, 209, 218.
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on Bar
Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29, Rollo 414-416, 425-427.
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman, Committee on
Lawyers' Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del Rosario, President, 56; Rollo, 241-242.
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty. Mariano
M. Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105-106.
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-371.

10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free

Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty. Barbara Anne
C. Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.
12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.
14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode
Island Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.
16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).
20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.
21 Rollo, 130-131.
22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.
23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
24 Phil. Ass'n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al.,
42 SCRA 302 (1971).
25 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 863, 864.
26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.
27 Lowell Bar Ass'n. vs. Loeb. 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and
Client 64, 865.
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974) and Shayne, The
Paralegal Profession, Oceana Publications, 1977, Appendix II and III; Rollo, 116-117.
30 Illustrations:

(a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular fouryear prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of
Court);
(b) An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to
appear for the Government of the Philippines in a case in which the government has
an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138,id.);
(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the purpose of
conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
(d) A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, who
is appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities where members of
the bar are not available (Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);
(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine Patent
Office (now known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer)
in trademark, service mark and trade name cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in
Trademark Cases);
(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations Commission or
any Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party to the case; (2) he
represents an organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present
written proof that he is properly authorized; or (3) he is duly-accredited members of
any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of Procedure
of the National Labor Relations Commission);
(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a case falling
under the Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
(h) Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the studies of law
in a reputable university or school of law is deemed sufficient qualification for
appointment (Sec. 233, Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145.
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. of New York vs.
U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.

38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).

39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: "Marriage license promptly
secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free
for the poor. Everything confidential.".
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.
41 Op. cit., 80.
43 * * * Missing * * * .
44 Op. cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930);
A.B.A. Ops. 53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941), 241 (Feb. 21,
1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952). .
45 Supra, Fn 2.
46 Id., 810, 825.
47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the American Bar
Association Journal, January, 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs.
Bayot, supra, Fn 38.
49 U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil. 968
(1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No. 902-A
and Sec. 121, Corporation Code.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO,, Petitioner, v. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY.
ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue
of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 5324333/521-2667.1
crlwvirtual ibr ry

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court,
called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs.
Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve
separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of
P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed
that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin
and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3

c rlwvi rtua lib rry

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.4
crlwvirtua lib rry

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of
law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7
crlwvirtua lib rry

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the
IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
crlwvirt ualib rry

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr.,
Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was
consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence
and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be
a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The
gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients.16
crlwvirtuali br ry

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he
caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts
indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again
after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of
the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment
of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also
the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people,
who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to
be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as

well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of
calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
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Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. Forthat reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a
lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the
profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt
of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

Endnotes:
1

Rollo, p. 13.

Id., pp. 14-15.

Id., p. 9.

Id., pp. 21-57.

Id., p. 60.

Id., p. 62.

Id., p. 72.

Id., p. 75.

Id., p. 73.

10

Id., p. 109.

11

Id., p. 110.

12

Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, 18 December 1989, 180 SCRA 246, 253.

[13 Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 174.
[14 Agpalo R., LEGAL ETHICS, p. 12 [1997].
[15 Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002.
[16 Agpalo, supra, at pp. 13-14, citing In re Sycip, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10; Pineda E.L. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
ETHICS, p. 58 [1999].

[17 Rollo, Vol. II, p. 41.

[18 Id., p. 110.
[19 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.
[20 Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, at p. 61.
[21 Id., p. 65.
[22 Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 407.