VI.

USE OF WORDS AND PHRASES

A. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (When the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish)

Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate

Court (G.R. No. L-72005, May 29, 1987)

Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is
intended to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover in the
action. Under Section 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution be returned
unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is only then that "payment of the judgment shall become
charged on such counterbond."
The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed reproduced as part of
the counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied
for the payment of the judgment." Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited
its application to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the
payment of any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is
that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe
charged against such a counterbond.
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle
that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The rule requires
that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion
from the operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated.16
For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think
it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. 17

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling
reason apparent in the law to justify it.18 TV

Juanito Pilar v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995)

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a

statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "noncandidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days
after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that
candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have
either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the
obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on
Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the
application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77

Phil. 636 [1946]).

People v. Hon. Judge Antonio Evangelista et al. (G.R. No. 110898, February 20,
1996)

Private Respondent argues that there should be a distinction between meritorious

appeals and unmeritorious appeals for purposes of probation.
Cecilio de Villa v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991) - When the
law does not make any exceptions, courts shouldnt make any.
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar
account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the
case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are
within the coverage of said law.
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the
law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling
reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]).

B. Ejusdem Generis (Where general words of a particular, and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned

Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Pedro M. Jimenez (G.R. No. L14787, January 28, 1961) - General Terms limited by Special Terms
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December
4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank,
maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section
2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation
or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner
brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for review.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange
used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and
flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the
Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund.
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors"
as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the
preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based,
apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general

terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the
general language will be limited by the specific language which
indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by
Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion,
applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the
items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In
the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is
preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food
products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately
following it do not belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer"
and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food
products because they are used in the farming and poultry industries,
respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine
than food or food product, for, as matter of fact, vitamins are among
those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the
appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is
among those listed preceding the term in question, includes not only
those intended for slaughter but also those for breeding purposes.

Republic v. Hon. Eutropio Migrinio et al. (G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990)
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is
[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. v.
Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954), citing Black on Interpretation
of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys
a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to
the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the
close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government
official or employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must
be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his
wife.

People v. Hon. Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. et al. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61, January 28,
1980)
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial
court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It
is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory

construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato

Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 104950).

Misael P. Vera et al. v. Hon. Serafin R. Cuevas et al. (G.R. Nos. L 33693-94, May
31, 1979)
Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not
apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying terms
"skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the
text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause
"all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed
totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the
specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem
generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by
the particular terms they follow in the statute.
Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the
"Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of the Board
of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from
which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other hand, is
any milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated concentrated,
powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has been added or which has
been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat so
that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or
skim milk." The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled
milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the
latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely
assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.

C. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius (The express mention of one person, thing or
consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.)

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R.

No. 147749, June 22, 2006)
The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax
Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of
rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts,
whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the
factory or by the miller himself.
The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the
interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the
exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the
exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said

materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMCs situation was

not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% millers
tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
SPMCs proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the scope of the
exemption clause. The rule is that the exemption must not be so
enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that the
State has granted in express terms all it intended to grant and that,
unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute, the favor
would be intended beyond what was meant.19
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it
applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not
expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything
that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a
meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very
language of the statute cannot be placed therein.20 The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its
meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.21
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive
interpretation.22 Its application in this case is consistent with the
construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.
To allow SPMCs claim for tax exemption will violate these established
principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.

Parayno v. Jovellanos et al. (G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006)

The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the
municipality, the party making them.10 Respondent municipality thus could not
find solace in the legal maxim of ejusdem generis11 which means "of the same
kind, class or nature." Under this maxim, where general words follow the
enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will
apply only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those
enumerated.12 Instead, what applied in this case was the legal maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of others.13 Hence, because of the distinct and definite
meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not
insist that "gasoline service station" under Section 44 necessarily included
"gasoline filling station" under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a
"gas service station" did not automatically embrace those in a "gas filling station."

D. Noscitur A Sociis (Associated words explain and limit each other.)

Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, et al. v. Sec. Juan Flavier, et al. (G.R. No. 106719,
September 21, 1993)
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the
suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to
"suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word

"suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.

removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word
"suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh,
75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
E. Use of Negative and Affirmative Words

Manolo P. Fule v. The Honorable Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-79094, June 22,
1988)

The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on

January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on
August 8, 1985, provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or
admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used
in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by
him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee
vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]).

F. Use of Permissive and Imperative Words

Purita Bersabal v. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador (G.R. No. L-35910, July 21, 1978)
The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known
as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031
provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of
the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts:
Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with
oral argument if so requested ... . (Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It
cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda
is optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the
parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the
memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the
Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the
submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses not to submit
the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative
but to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and records
transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other words, the Court

is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an

appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court's
mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence
and records transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is permissive
only and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon
vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The
implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the
appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records
transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or
brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.
Moreover, memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are not essential
requirements. They may be submitted and/or made only if so requested.

Jenette Marie B. Crisolog v. Globe Telecom, Inc., et al. (G.R. No. 167631,
December 16, 2005)
It is on this score that the Court is inclined to concur with petitioners
argument that even if the remedy resorted to was wrong, the Court may
refer the case to the Court of Appeals under Rule 56, Section 6,
paragraph 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides: "(A)n appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from
the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the
Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action." This despite the
express provision in Section 5(f) of the same Rule, which provides that
an appeal may be dismissed when there is error in the choice or mode
of appeal.
Both Sections 5(f) and 6 of Rule 57 use the term "may," denoting
discretion on the part of the Court in dismissing the appeal or referring
the case to the Court of Appeals. The question of fact involved in the
appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant a referral of this case to
the Court of Appeals for further appropriate proceedings.

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R.

No. 117188, August 7, 1997) The word must is not always imperative.

The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this case
states:
Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. - Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1) month
after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code.
Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imposition of duty which must be enforced.
However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be
consistent with an ecercise of discretion. If the language of a statute, considered as a
whole with due regard to its nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended to use
the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning.

The legislative deliberations of the Corporation Code reveals that it was not the intention
of Congress to automatically dissolve a corporation for failure to file the By-Laws on time.
Moreover, By-Laws may be necessary to govern the corporation, but By-Laws are still
subordinate to the Articles of Incorporation and the Corporation Code. In fact, there are
cases where By-Laws are unnecessary to the corporate existence and to the valid
exercise of corporate powers.
The Corporation Code does not expressly provide for the effects of non-filing of By-Laws.
However, these have been rectified by Section 6 of PD 902-A which provides that SEC
shall possess the power to suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the
franchise or certificate of registration of corporations upon failure to file By-Laws within
the required period.
This shows that there must be notice and hearing before a corporation is dissolved for
failure to file its By-Laws. Even assuming that the existence of a ground, the penalty is
not necessarily revocation, but may only be suspension.
By-Laws are indispensable to corporations, since they are required by law for an orderly
management of corporations. However, failure to file them within the period prescribed
does not equate to the automatic dissolution of a corporation.

Munoz v. COMELEC et al. (G.R. No. 170678, July 17, 2006)

While Section 9, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides
that "when an action or proceeding involves a question of law and fact
which is similar to or common with that of another action or
proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or
proceeding bearing the lower docket number," however, this rule is
only permissive, not mandatory. We have consistently held that the
term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an
option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty
which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right,
he must comply with the conditions attached thereto,14 which in this
case require that the cases to be consolidated must involve similar
questions of law and fact.
In the case at bar, the consolidation of SPC No. 04-087 with SPC No.
04-124 is inappropriate as they do not involve similar questions of law
and fact. SPC No. 04-087 assails the inclusion of the 26 ERs by the
MBC on the ground that these were incomplete, contained material
defects and were prepared under intimidation, issues which are proper
for a pre-proclamation controversy under paragraphs (b) and (c) of
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, SPC
No. 04-124 is a petition for the annulment of petitioner's proclamation
for allegedly being prematurely done, in violation of Section 36(i) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 666915 which instructs the board of
canvassers "not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by
the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it
on appeal by the losing party; [a]ny proclamation made in violation
hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns/certificates
will not affect the results of the elections." In fine, SPC No. 04-087
pertains to the preparation of the ERs which is a pre-proclamation
controversy, while SPC No. 04-124 refers to the conduct of the MBC in
proclaiming the petitioner without authority of the COMELEC.

Mere pendency of the two cases before the same division of the
COMELEC is not a ground for their outright consolidation. The
discretion to consolidate cases may be exercised only when the
conditions are present. In any event, the records are bereft of evidence
that the parties agreed to consolidate the two cases or that the
COMELEC First Division had granted the same.
G. Use of Conjunctive and Disjunctive Words

And Conjunctive To Connect

Or Disjunctive To express an alternative
And/Or Either Conjunctive or Disjunctive Butter and Eggs v. Butter or
Eggs

H. Computing Time

PNB v. Court of Appeals (222 SCRA 134, May 17, 1993)

It must be conceded that Article 17 is completely silent as to the
definition of what is a "week". In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G.
3139 [1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p.
660), this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of
seven consecutive days a definition which dovetails with the ruling
in E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al. (38 Pac. Rep. 900
[1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Twelfth Ed.,
1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on th Civil
Code, 1990, p. 46). Following the interpretation in Derby as to the
publication of an ordinance for "at least two weeks" in some newspaper
that:
. . . here there is no date or event suggesting the exclusion of the first
day's publication from the computation, and the cases above cited take
this case out of the rule stated in Section 12, Code Civ. Proc. which
excludes the first day and includes the last;
the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as
sufficient advertisement for the second week because the period for the
first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969
while the second week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until
April 10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969 was
both theoretically and physically accomplished during the first day of
the third week and cannot thus be equated with compliance in law.
Indeed, where the word is used simply as a measure of duration of time
and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven
consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it
begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing Derby).
Certainly, it would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969 as
reckoning point in line with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the
New Civil Code, for the purpose of counting the first week of
publication as to the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969 because this

will have the effect of extending the first week by another day. This
incongruous repercussion could not have been the unwritten intention
of the lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was enacted. Verily, inclusion of
the first day of publication is in keeping with the computation in
Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals (125 SCRA 122 [1983]) where this
Court had occasion to pronounce, through Justice Guerrero, that the
publication of notice on June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968 satisfied the
publication requirement under Act No. 3135. Respondent court cannot,
therefore, be faulted for holding that there was no compliance with the
strict requirements of publication independently of the so- called
admission in judicio.
I. Use of a Proviso

ALU-TUCP v. NLRC et al. (G.R. No. 109902, August 2, 1994)

Petitioners next claim that their service to NSC of more than six (6)
years should qualify them as regular employees. We believe this claim
is without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of
petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does
not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project employees.
10
The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted
above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1)
year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual
employees, not to project employees.
In the case of Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
11
this Court ruled that the proviso in the second paragraph of Article
280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who
fall within the definition of said Article's first paragraph, i.e., project
employees. The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the
provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof,
unless the clear legislative intent is to restrict or qualify not only the
phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions of
the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such intent is
observable in Article 280 of the Labor Code, which has been quoted
earlier.

VII. Presumptions
A. Against Unconstitutionality

Aris Inc. v. NLRC et al. (G.R. No. 90501, August 5, 1991)

= All laws are presumed constitutional.
Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be
divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party

who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by the
prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however,
is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of
statutory origin 18 and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute.
The law may then validly provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to
the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party.
Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction.
The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof
is left to the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order.
Lim v. Pacquing et al. (G.R. No. 115044, January 27, 1995) and Guingona et al. v.
Reyes et al. (G.R. No. 117263, January 27, 1995)
It will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties in this case if
this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of constitutionality of
PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view, become the very lis mota in
resolving the present controversy, in view of ADC's insistence that it
was granted a valid and legal franchise by Ordinance No. 7065 to
operate the jai-alai.
The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are
presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this
Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked.
There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has
been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative
powers).

Lim et al. v. People et al. (G.R. No. 149276, September 27, 2002)

= Increasing penalty of estafa committed by bouncing checks

When a law is questioned before the court, the presumption is in favour of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not an argumentative one.
B. Against Injustice

Salvacion v. Central Bank (G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997)

Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426,
as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this
petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for

mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief. 2 However, exceptions to this rule have been
recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for
mandamus. 3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans
are good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece
the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went
with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said
American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was
detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to
escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the
child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for
damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount
could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she
had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and
knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could
not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable
law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment
and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated
by the trial court in its decision.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved
by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article
10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions
that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs.
Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).

Alonzo et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court et al. (G.R. No. L-72873, May 28,
1987)
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct
interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked,
interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,

provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents'
pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in
1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing
our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance,
thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to
make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this
case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing,
of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. So we have done in this case.
C. Against Implied Repeals

Berces, Jr. v. Guingona, Jr. et al. (G.R. No. 112099, February 21, 1995)
The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative
Order No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders
that are intended to be repealed (cf . I Sutherland, Statutory Construction 467
[1943]).
If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, it is
through implication though such kind of repeal is not favored (The Philippine
American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American Management
Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a presumption
against implied repeal.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence
of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior
law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of
the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v.
Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). There must be such a repugnancy between the
laws that they cannot be made to stand together (Crawford, Construction of
Statutes 631 [1940]).

We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 68 of R.A.
No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent
a decision from becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to
construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the
execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the
reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed
order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.

Mecano v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992)

There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 10
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two
statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent
and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or
harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law
cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. 11
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not
cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code.
There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in
the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law,
the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness
benefits under Section 699, and still others.

Republic v. ICC (G.R. No. 141667, July 17, 2006)

It is a rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly
and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent with each other that they cannot coexist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature
cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and
interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing
statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible,
seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their
validity and co-existence.14
Here, there does not even appear to be a conflict between Section 40(g)
of the Public Service Act, as amended, and Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925.
In fact, the latter provision directs petitioner NTC to "continue to
impose such fees and charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable
costs and expenses for the regulation and supervision of
telecommunications entities." The absence alone of the word

"authorization" in Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 cannot be construed to

mean that petitioner NTC had thus been deprived of the power to
collect such fees. As pointed out by the petitioner, the words
"authorization, supervision and/or regulation" used in Section 40(g) of
the Public Service Act are not distinct and completely separable
concepts which may be taken singly or piecemeal. Taken in their
entirety, they are the quintessence of the Commission's regulatory
functions, and must go hand-in-hand with one another. In petitioner's
own words, "[t]he Commission authorizes, supervises and regulates
telecommunications entities and these functions... cannot be considered
singly without destroying the whole concept of the Commission's
regulatory functions."15 Hence, petitioner NTC is correct in asserting
that the passage of R.A. 7925 did not bring with it the abolition of
permit fees.
However, while petitioner had made some valid points of argument, its
position must, of necessity, crumble on the fourth issue raised in its
petition. Petitioner itself admits that the fees imposed are precisely
regulatory and supervision fees, and not taxes. This necessarily implies,
however, that such fees must be commensurate to the costs and
expenses involved in discharging its supervisory and regulatory
functions. In the words of Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act itself,
the fees and charges which petitioner NTC is authorized to collect from
any public service or applicant are limited to the "reimbursement of its
expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or regulation of public
services." It is difficult to comprehend how the cost of licensing,
regulating, and surveillance could amount to P1,190,750.50. The CA
was correct in finding the amount imposed as permit fee exorbitant and
in complete disregard of the basic limitation that the fee should be at
least approximately commensurate to the expense. Petitioner itself
admits that it had imposed the maximum amount possible under the
Public Service Act, as amended. That is hardly taking into
consideration the actual costs of fulfilling its regulatory and supervisory
functions.

GSIS v. City Assessor of Iloilo City et al. (G.R. No. 147192, June 27, 2006)
The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed; the intention to
revoke must be clear and manifest.12 RA 8291 made no express repeal
or abrogation of the provisions of RA 7160, particularly Section 234 (a)
thereof.
Repeal by implication in this case is not at all convincing either. To
bring about an implied repeal, the two laws must be absolutely
incompatible. They must be clearly repugnant in a way that the later
law (RA 8291) cannot exist without nullifying the prior law (RA
7160).13
Indeed, there is nothing in RA 8291 which abrogates, expressly or
impliedly, that particular provision of the LGC. The two statutes are not
inconsistent on that specific point, let alone so irreconcilable as to
compel us to uphold one and strike down the other.

The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws in a way that will form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.14 The legislature is presumed to have known existing
laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting laws.15 Thus,
the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended Section 234 (a) to
run counter to Section 39 of RA 8291.
D. Against Ineffectiveness

Legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render them
operative and effective.

E. Against Absurdity

Ursua v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996)

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does
not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under
which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which
the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature
in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid
all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences.

F. Against Violations of International Law

-

VIII.

The Philippines as a democratic and republican state adopts the generally

accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations.

Intrinsic Aids

= Analogy of Person: Examine his physical body (Intrinsic); Research on his

background (extrinsic)

Miriam Defensor Santiago et al. v. Comelec et al. (G.R. No. 127325, March 19,
1997)
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for
a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy

of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly

propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II
(National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative
and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not
based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and
character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted
or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It
is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a
law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.

Eugenion v. Drilon et al. (G.R. No. 109404, January 22, 1996)

P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but
such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the
situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be
enforced. On this point, a leading authority on statutory construction
stressed:
The intent of a statute is the law. . . . The intent is the vital part, the
essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting
a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the
true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. . . . In construing
statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the trite intent of the
legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the
context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and
objects of the legislature.1 (emphasis supplied.)
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law
must favor the weak and the disadvantaged, including, in this instance,
small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with
no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless
citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of
"unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers", and such intent is
nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble.

People v. Echavez, Jr. et al. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1980)

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities

or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.

The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
IX.

Extrinsic Aids
Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. (G.R. No. L-28329,
August 7, 1975)
Vera et a. v. Cuevas, et al. (G.R. Nos. L33693-94, May 31, 1979)
PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations et al. (G.R. No. L-43760, August 21, 1976)
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. et al. v. International
Communications Corp. (G.R. No. 135992, January 31, 2006)
De Villa v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991)
NAPOLCOM v. De Guzman, Jr. et al. (G.R. No. 106724, February 9, 1994)
CASCO Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez (G.R. No. L-17931, February
28, 1963)

X. Strict and Liberal Interpretation

Differentiate: Strict v. Liberal Interpretation

A. Penal Statutes

Centeno v. Villalon, et al., GR No. 113092, September 1, 1994

People v. Walpan Ladjaalam y Milapil, GR Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000
B.

Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court et al., GR No. 69344, April 26, 1991
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders Inc. v. Department of Finance
Secretary, et al. (GR No. 108524, November 10, 1994)
C.

XI.

Labor and Social Legislations

Ramon Corporal v. Employees Compensation Commission and GSIS, GR No.

86020, August 5, 1994
Maria E. Manahan v. Employees Compensation Commission and GSIS, GR No. L44899, April 22, 1981
D.

Tax Laws

Election Rules

Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al., GR No. 110170, February 21, 1994

Prospective and Retrospective Statutes

Balatbat v. Court of Appeals et al., GR No. 36378, January 27, 1992

Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC et al., GR No. 104215, May 8, 1996
Co v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 100776, October 28, 1993
Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 79060, December 8, 1989
Briad Agro-Development Corporation v. Dela Cerna, GR No. 83225, June 29, 1989

XII.

XIII.

Conflicting Statutes
Philippine National Bank v. Cruz, et al., GR No. 80593, December 18, 1989
Lopez, Jr v. Civil Service Commission et al., GR No. 87119, April 16, 1991
Gordon v. Veridiano II et al., GR No. L-55230, November 8, 1988
City of Manila v. Teotico et al., GR No. L-23053, January 29, 1968
Arenas v. City of San Carlos et al. GR No. L-34024, April 5, 1978
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, GR Nos. 120865-71,
December 7, 1995
Leynes v. COA et al., GR No. 143596, December 11, 2003
Statutory Construction and the Constitution
Self-Executing Provisions
Prohibitory Provisions
Special Provisions
Suprema Lex