G.R. No.

L-6913

November 21, 1913

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO DE LA PEA, administrator of the estate of Father Agustin de la Pea, defendan

FACTS : In 1898, Fr. Agustin Dela Pena deposited in his personal account a sum of money entrusted to
him for the construction of a leper hospital. Thereafter, Father De la Pea was arrested by the military
authorities as a political prisoner. While under detention, Fr. Dela Pena made an order on said bank in
favor of the United States Army officer under whose charge he was then for the sum thus deposited in
said bank. The arrest of Father De la Pea and the confiscation of the funds in the bank were the result
of the claim of the military authorities that he was an insurgent and that the funds thus deposited had
been collected by him for revolutionary purposes. The money was taken from the bank by the military
authorities by virtue of such order and was turned over to the Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Father de la Pea is liable for the loss of the money under his trust?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
By placing the money in the bank and mixing it with his personal funds De la Pea did not thereby
assume an obligation different from that under which he would have lain if such deposit had not been
made, nor did he thereby make himself liable to repay the money at all hazards. If the had been forcibly
taken from his pocket or from his house by the military forces of one of the combatants during a state of
war, it is clear that under the provisions of the Civil Code he would have been exempt from
responsibility. The fact that he placed the trust fund in the bank in his personal account does not add to
his responsibility. Such deposit did not make him a debtor who must respond at all hazards.
There was no law prohibiting him from depositing it as he did and there was no law which changed his
responsibility be reason of the deposit. While it may be true that one who is under obligation to do or
give a thing is in duty bound, when he sees events approaching the results of which will be dangerous to
his trust, to take all reasonable means and measures to escape or, if unavoidable, to temper the effects
of those events, we do not feel constrained to hold that, in choosing between two means equally legal,
he is culpably negligent in selecting one whereas he would not have been if he had selected the other.
The court, therefore, finds and declares that the money which is the subject matter of this action was
deposited by Father De la Pea in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation of Iloilo; that said
money was forcibly taken from the bank by the armed forces of the United States during the war of the
insurrection; and that said Father De la Pea was not responsible for its loss.
p. 58 OT

G.R. No. 2038

January 13, 1906

A.M. ESSABHOY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SMITH, BELL & CO., defendants-appellants.

F:
The defendants, warehousemen Smith, Bell & Co., agreed to store the plaintiffs rice in a bonded
warehouse. Smith, Bell & Co. stored 40, 000 bags of rice in a bonded warehouse and the remaining
10,000 bags in a warehouse not bonded. Articles delivered into a bonded warehouse immediately upon
arrival in Manila can be shipped out of the country from such bonded warehouse without the payment
of duties. Articles delivered into a warehouse not bonded must, however, pay duties whether they are
shipped out of the country or not. By reason of this fact certain customs duties were levied upon it,
which the defendants paid. The amount thereof was $6,000.55, United States currency. The defendants
refused to deliver the rice to the plaintiff unless they were repaid this amount of $6,000.55. The
plaintiff, in order to get possession of his rice, was obliged to and did pay under protest to the
defendants this amount, securing the ice and reshipping it to Japan. He then brought this action to
recover the amount so paid by him under protest.
Issue: W/N plaintiff was not bound defendants for such payment
Held: Plaintiff was not bound to reimburse them for such payment. Generally, a warehouseman is
entitled to reimbursement for the expenses which he incurs in the performance of his contract. For
expenses which he incurs in violation of his contract he is not entitled to reimbursement. The payment
of these duties was an expense which Smith, Bell & Co. did not incur in the performance of their
contract. They incurred it by reason of their violation of the contract, and consequently they were not
entitled to reimbursement.
The plaintiff having been compelled, in order to get possession of his property, to pay an unlawful
demand made by the defendants upon him, and such payment having been made under protest, the
latter have in their hands money which does not belong to them, but which belongs to the plaintiff. In
such cases the law imposes upon them the obligation to repay it.

G.R. No. 4015

August 24, 1908

ANGEL JAVELLANA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE LIM, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

F:
Defendants executed a document in favor of plaintiff-appellee wherein it states that they have
received, as a deposit, without interest, money from plaintiff-appellee and agreed upon a date when
they will return the money. Upon the stipulated due date, defendants asked for an extension to pay and
binding themselves to pay 15% interest per annum on the amount of their indebtedness, to which the
plaintiff- appellee acceded. The defendants were not able to pay the full amount of their indebtedness
notwithstanding the request made by plaintiff-appellee. The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiffappellee for the recovery of the amount due.
ISSUE: Whether the agreement entered into by the parties is one of loan or of deposit?
HELD: The document executed was a contract of loan. Where money, consisting of coins of legal tender,
is deposited with a person and the latter is authorized by the depositor to use and dispose of the same,
the agreement is not a contract of deposit, but a loan. A subsequent agreement between the parties as
to interest on the amount said to have been deposited, because the same could not be returned at the
time fixed therefor, does not constitute a renewal of an agreement of deposit, but it is the best evidence
that the original contract entered into between therein was for a loan under the guise of a deposit.
p. 63 OT