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DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
Assessing the Global Response
2006
2006
Contents
Preface
PREFACE
Morton H. Halperin
Overview
OVERVIEW
3 In addition to the two editors, research was undertaken by analysts at the two institutions:
Ana Echage and Susanne Gratius at FRIDE; Jeff Stacey, Muthoni Kamuyu and Elizabeth
Marquez for DCP. We also benefited from the input of expert reviewers, to whom we wish
to express our gratitude (a full list can be found in the appendix). Angel Alonso Arroba of
DCP provided invaluable assistance as production coordinator.
4 R. G. Herman and T. J. Piccone, Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy
Trends 1992-2002, Washington: Democracy Coalition Project, 2002.
5 See, e.g., A. Sen, Development as Freedom, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1999; M.H. Halperin,
J. Siegle and M. Weinstein, The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity
and Peace, New York: Routledge Press, 2005.
coups, for example, while democratic donors are linking development and
trade assistance to benchmarks for democratic behavior. On the other
hand, the DCP survey also concluded that democratic states routinely put
economic and security interests ahead of a desire to promote democracy
and human rights when such interests were seen to be in conflict.
This same delicate balance between genuine and purely rhetorical commitment has also been uncovered through the detailed monitoring of
European democracy strategies carried out by FRIDE. The first comprehensive assessment of European democracy promotion policies reveals that
EU member states and the European Commission have increased resources
available for political reform support; have in some cases used democracyrelated conditionality; and have revised aspects of their conceptual
approaches to democracy-building. At the same time, it highlights examples of persistent support for autocrats, institutional shortcomings and an
acknowledged need to understand better how policies play out in relation
to complex political trends in individual target states.6
This shared concern with deepening the study of concrete case studies
of democracy promotion against this rapidly changing backdrop was what
motivated DCP and FRIDE to join forces to prepare this new volume.
The books overarching aim is to assess six years after the Warsaw
Declaration and in the wake of more recent democracy commitments
from individual governments and regional bodies such as the European
Union, the African Union and the Organization of American States
how far the democratic community has fulfilled its own promise to accord
the goal of democratic change greater priority. What strategies of democracy promotion have been favored? How different have been the
approaches adopted by the various members of the Community of
Democracies? Are there clear cases of democratic states acting in a manner
inimical to democracy? In which circumstances has the international community found it easiest to influence democratic development, and in
which has it most struggled to gain traction?
Rather than taking a broad scope, the purpose here is to assess democracy promotion strategies in detail in relation to a selected number of
countries supposedly on the receiving end of international democracy
promotion efforts. By digging deeper into these dramatic stories of democratic development, we seek to draw some conclusions about the inherent
challenges democracy promoters face as they seek to influence events on
10
OVERVIEW
the ground. There are some notable successes, but also a string of failures
that demonstrate how difficult it can be for external actors to assist reformers working for peaceful political change.
As the seven cases illustrate, the policy dilemmas - for all the players
involved - are real and complex. Should the international community continue humanitarian aid to Burma even if it means bolstering the autocrats
in power? Should the EU continue to open the door for Turkeys accession
even when European public opinion currently appears so opposed? Should
the United States take the lead in confronting Hugo Chvez, or Great
Britain in challenging Robert Mugabe, even though it gives these elected
autocrats an excuse to rally their supporters against the hegemons of the
West? Should local civil society groups take aid from governments labeled
as enemies of the state? The tradeoffs are messy, and getting messier. With
the Bush Administrations full-bodied embrace of ending tyranny in our
time as the centerpiece of its national security strategy, the very notion of
democracy promotion has become laden with the baggage of staring down
the superpower.
The volume approaches the topic from a transatlantic perspective in
part as a reflection of the DCP-FRIDE collaboration, but also because the
main actors driving international cooperation for democracy are the
United States and the members of European Union. However, the chapters
also look closely at the role of other actors, particularly those newer to the
democracy promotion arena certain member states of the African Union,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of
American States and the United Nations to help us draw a more comprehensive picture of the state of democracy promotion. While a critical
assessment of governmental behavior was the primary focus of the book, a
key concern was also to consider what role civil society can play in working across borders to stimulate democratic change. The analysis then led
us to make a number of specific recommendations to policymakers on
steps they can take now to address the evident shortcomings of multilateral responses to date.
The seven case studies were carefully selected to represent different
types of regime from different regions. In (arguable) order of democratic
optimism, these case studies are:
Ukraine, as a case of dramatic democratic revolution in 2004, close to
the heart of a unified and free Europe;
Turkey, as a case of less dramatic, protracted and still incomplete
democratization, intricately intertwined with the prospect of
European Union accession;
11
12
OVERVIEW
policy options before them, have democratic states, alone and together,
condemned fraudulent elections or accepted the results, or both? Have
they assisted democratic reformers through financial aid and training, or
focused their aid on other priorities? Have they seriously used the incentives of economic and trade packages to encourage democratic reforms or
let governments off the hook?
To assist comparison, the research carried out for this book was structured around a common investigative framework for each case study. A set
of questions was drawn up to guide research on each of the seven countries,
at the level of both secondary source research and the collecting of primary
source material, in particular through interviews with policy-makers, analysts and civil society representatives. The views expressed by the different
authors were not necessarily fully shared by the entire research team or
indeed the editors; but each case study was crucially made to conform to
the same structure, comprising:
a Background overview of recent political events in the
country concerned;
a detailed factual account of the International Response to
these changing events;
a more analytical section Assessing the International
Response;
and a final section of Recommendations for future policies.
Country Synopses
Burma: For over 15 years, a variety of efforts has been made to force the
military junta to accept the results of elections they lost to a party led by
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Nonetheless, the regime
appears more isolated and entrenched than ever. More recently, however,
a new dynamic is unfolding in which Burmas ASEAN neighbors are collaborating to demand a transition to democratic rule. In addition, the
United States, the United Kingdom and other countries are pushing for
action by the United Nations Security Council. To break the stalemate, a
concerted strategy is needed to authorize the UN Secretary General and his
envoy to serve as a credible intermediary between the opposition and the
junta that would lead to a power-sharing agreement and the eventual
departure of the military from the scene, even if it means offering some
tangible incentives. A tighter international sanctions regime, tolerated by
China and coupled with this kind of top-level intervention, would build
on ASEANs new-found voice and help spur the kind of collective action
needed to find a negotiated transition package.
13
14
OVERVIEW
15
Yemen: Formal democratic reforms implemented in the early and mid1990s ensured Yemen a reputation as one of the most notably reformist
of Arab states. However, international support for such democratic
potential was limited and undercut by other strategic considerations.
Indeed, the international community of democratic states has been relatively inactive as Yemens reform commitments have remained at the
rhetorical level. Intensified international attention has been paid to
Yemen as a result of post-September 11, 2001 counter-terrorist concerns.
This attention has revitalized some European and US political reform initiatives in Yemen, but has also imbued the perspective on democracy promotion with a strongly short-term security slant. On the verge of failed
state status, non-democratizing and desperately poor Yemen provides a
salutary lesson to the international community of how an apparently
encouraging case of formal reform commitment can slide into an acutely
worrisome situation. Western states should take advantage of possible
entry points to provide assistance on governance reforms, while ensuring
that security co-operation with the Yemeni government does not undercut the prospects for democratization.
Zimbabwe: This once promising southern African state is mired in economic and political ruin thanks to the policies of Robert Mugabe, a former
hero of the independence movement now building a legacy of autocracy
and despair for his country. While Europe and the United States have
complained about Mugabes behavior, they have failed to win over
Zimbabwes African neighbors, a division which Mugabe has effectively
exploited. With the opposition under threat and internally divided, there
is little hope at present that the international community, even if it were to
get its act together, could move the 81-year old Mugabe out of power. His
reign will come to an end at a time of his choosing. Nonetheless, given the
financial crisis, much more could be done to put pressure on Mugabe to
ease restrictions placed on independent media and civil society. In addition, democracy promoters must turn their attention to a post-Mugabe era
by working closely with democracy and human rights advocates in and
outside of Zimbabwe to prepare themselves for a transition scenario.
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OVERVIEW
17
ther study, at least they offer an appropriate tool to deny certain privileges
to specific offenders without harming their victims.
4. Coordination of democracy assistance among relevant actors both
within and among governments remains highly underdeveloped. This is a
consistent theme in all the chapters and deserves more attention. The primary locus of activity should be in the country of concern, where
embassies can coordinate action in real time, as in the case of Ukraine.
What is lacking is a counterpart mechanism in capitals that would facilitate greater collaboration. The European Union by its nature is ahead of
other multilateral organizations in this regard. Other regional organizations concerned with democracy promotion need to develop in-house
expertise and other tools both to respond to and prevent crises or backsliding in democratic governance. Where no regional organization is relevant,
as in Asia or the Middle East, the Community of Democracies should step
in to provide guidance and support to countries which have chosen the
democratic path. As for policymaking within governments, much more
work needs to be done to convene regular inter-agency meetings with all
relevant agencies, including defense, finance and law enforcement departments, to ensure a unified approach.
5. The timeliness of international responses can be a critical factor in
tipping the balance in favor of democratic reformers. Democracy promoters should engage, therefore, on two levels: first, with an eye to the longterm work of patiently helping to build the values and infrastructure of
democracy, and second on the shorter timeframe needed to react when a
window of opportunity opens for historic change, e.g., the sudden death
of a leader, flawed elections, or the eruption of street protests. In order for
the latter to function effectively, the infrastructure for the former must be
in place, i.e., democratic states need to have a cadre of experienced professionals and technocrats available to seize the opportunities with discretion,
speed and skill.
6. In most cases of political stalemate and inertia, the international
community can play a useful role as a third party guarantor of dialogue and
negotiation among competing factions. Often this is best done quietly,
though there may be occasions that demand more overt efforts. The international community, including seasoned experts in conflict prevention and
mediation, needs to take more initiative to offer political actors a forum for
democratic dialogue before fighting erupts.
7. Key importance in many cases lies in moving away from a primary
focus on direct US and European efforts towards a greater engagement of
regional actors. The case studies offered here demonstrate the potential
18
OVERVIEW
that exists for Latin American states to play a more influential role in relation to Venezuela, ASEAN states in relation to Burma, southern African
states in relation to Zimbabwe and West African states in relation to Togo.
Some changes have been forthcoming in such regional actors erstwhile
stances of non-intervention, although significant caution remains on their
part. It is unlikely that without efforts to strengthen such regional action,
Western governments will themselves have significant impact in many
challenging cases of democratic shortfalls. Efforts at this level remain an
under-developed dimension of international democracy promotion and
should receive greater attention within multilateral bodies, such as the
Community of Democracies.
8. International reactions have often been strong in times of dramatic
change, and useful support has often been provided where political developments have clearly begun to move in a democratic direction. Responses
have been less effective to incremental reversals in democratic rights, or in
relation to the vexed question of carving out credible strategies where
(semi-) authoritarian leaders are able to gain (even flawed) electoral legitimacy as a base for their subsequent dismantling of democratic checks and
balances. The election of Hamas in the Palestinian elections is just one of
many examples that point to the urgent need for greater vigilance of antidemocratic actions of nominally legitimate rulers. The international community of democracies needs to be more alive to such cases to complement
the traditional focus on dramatic points of rupture or media-targeted
instances of egregious human rights abuses.
9. The international communitys response to post-transition challenges remains less than impressive. The cases studied here of Ukraine and
Turkey, in particular, suggest that the much-repeated warning that international actors should not scale down their efforts once formal transition has
or has largely taken place is one that still needs to be fully heeded. A
tendency persists to mark down as success stories cases where challenges
to democratic quality remain acute, and even sometimes more difficult to
address in the fractured domestic political landscapes that commonly beset
the aftermath of democratic transition. At such junctures, intensified
efforts are urgently required at just the moment when some international
actors begin moving their focus away from democracy support. The fact
that so many countries can labor for many years after transition without
approaching the consolidation of stable and high quality democracy calls
for this salutary lesson to be incorporated more systematically into international democracy promotion planning.
19
10. Much more could be done to link development assistance to standards of democratic accountability and transparency in the receiving country. The trend is, finally, moving in the right direction, as evidenced by the
increasing demands from the multilateral development banks for progress
against corruption and other good governance benchmarks. The
Millennium Challenge Account promulgated by the current US administration is another positive example of the way in which development aid
can be used as an incentive to mobilize support for improvements in rule
of law, civil society consultation and political reforms. A global approach
along these lines would be the logical next step to engender support for a
grand bargain in which development assistance is dramatically increased in
exchange for tangible progress on democratic governance.
11. While debates amongst the international community of democratic governments have rightly focused on the macro-level questions of diplomacy and political dialogue, the case studies here reveal that much remains
to be done in fine-tuning democracy assistance projects at the micro-level.
While these are rarely the subject of high-profile attention, the shortcomings of existing on-the-ground support can undermine the efficacy of overall international democracy promotion efforts. The cases offered here highlight a number of such weaknesses in democracy assistance aid projects:
their limited funding levels; the fact that they often come on stream too
late in the day to impact on finely balanced domestic political dynamics;
their overly technical nature in many contexts; and their failure to embrace
a broad range of actors that include those groups with strongest local legitimacy. More rigorous debate is warranted on these questions within multilateral bodies.
The case studies that follow offer a range of recommendations related
to each of the seven individual countries. The general observations suggested here represent cross-cutting concerns pertinent to the broad design of
democracy promotion strategies. As the international debate for and
against democracy promotion intensifies, this volume seeks to contribute
to and inform the elaboration of policies better able to give substance to
the founding spirit of the Community of Democracies.
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Chapter 1
Burma1
Crippled for years by a military junta that refuses to accept the results of
elections won by Aung San Suu Kyis National League for Democracy
(NLD) in 1990, Burma represents one of the worlds most difficult democracy promotion challenges. After years of international condemnation,
sanctions, and ineffectual special envoys, hardliners remain in control,
leaving the international community searching for new options for effecting a genuine transition to democracy. Suu Kyi remains an international
icon of the freedom movement, even as her ability diminishes to wrest
Burma free of the juntas increasingly desperate maneuvers to stay in control. This chapter charts the extensive array of measures adopted by the
international community against the Burmese regime since 1990, and
argues that a new approach should be adopted by the community of democratic nations. This should build on the momentum of the 2005 HavelTutu Report,2 and tackle the controversial issue of a transitional powersharing arrangement as a realistic way out of the current stalemate.
Background
After a 1962 military coup, economic and political conditions in Burma
steadily deteriorated until March 16, 1988, when students led protests in
the capital city of Rangoon. These began as a small riot in a tea shop, but
soon metastasized into a full-blown protest against the status quo. The
government responded with force, killing dozens and inadvertently sparking sustained protests throughout the spring. The calls for regime change
culminated in a massive uprising on August 8, with the movement finding
1 Principal author, Dr. Jeffrey Stacey, Political Science Department, Tulane University.
2 Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma, September 20,
2005. Commissioned by Vaclav Havel and Bishop Desmond Tutu; prepared by DLA Piper
Rudnick Gray Cary LLP (hereafter Threat to the Peace). Jared Genser, the reports coordinator, argues that recent UN Security Council activity regarding Burma has opened up a new
window of opportunity absent for 15 years. J. Genser, Burmas Road to Peace, Far Eastern
Economic Review, December 2005, p. 2.
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CHAPTER 1
a leader in Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of former nationalist leader
General Aung San. Suu Kyi became famous after speaking to a rally of
nearly half a million democracy supporters at Shwedagon Pagoda in
Rangoon on August 26.
On September 18, a military junta deposed General Ne Wins Burmese
Socialist Program party and established the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC). The SLORC declared martial law and
used the armed forces to impose control throughout the country, a process
which left 3,000 dead and caused 10,000 to flee into the hills of the border with Thailand. This coup merely replaced one set of military officers
with another.3
The SLORC would bring a number of changes to Burma, including
opening up the resource-rich country to foreign direct investment (FDI)
and altering the name of the country to Myanmar.4 However, the new
junta remained as oppressive as its predecessor, and committed a number
of human rights abuses including torture, forced labor, abuse of women,
enforced disappearances, and summary execution. Seeking to quell the
possibility of further uprisings, the army placed Suu Kyi under house arrest
on July 20, 1989.
In response to growing international pressure and believing it would
win, in May 1990 the SLORC held national parliamentary elections.
Although Suu Kyi herself was unable to participate in the elections, her
National League for Democracy (NLD) party won 392 of the 485 seats up
for election. The SLORC, however, refused to call the parliament into session and jailed several activists, including many of those elected to parliament. Some elected members of parliament fled the country, establishing
a government in exile that continues to work for restoration of democracy
in Burma.
Suu Kyi won international acclaim in 1991 when she was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize, an event that raised her profile as a leading champion
for democracy and human rights and helped provide a substantial boost to
the legitimacy not only of her leadership of the Burmese opposition, but
also to the cause for which she has labored incessantly since the mid 1980s.
The SLORC has remained intransigent in their view that Suu Kyi and her
party lack legitimacy.
BURMA
23
5 More recently, the Mon state ethnic group has pulled out from the National Convention
talks and the regime arrested Hkun Htun Oo and other Shan leaders on February 9, 2005.
Fighting flared again in April 2006 between the military and the Karen ethnic group.
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CHAPTER 1
closed NLD offices. Suu Kyi was also granted permission to travel around
the country.
The tenuous understanding between Suu Kyi and the SPDC ended in
May 2003 when a group of government-sponsored paramilitaries attacked
her caravan of supporters outside the northern village of Depayin. In the
bloodiest confrontation in the country since 1988 what has come to be
known as Black Friday scores of Suu Kyis supporters were injured and
over one hundred killed (most estimates range between 75 and 150).
While Suu Kyi herself managed to escape the massacre, she was detained
and imprisoned at Insein prison. Many NLD offices were forcibly closed
that day, and over 100 democracy activists were arrested. Universities, colleges, and schools were also closed to prevent protest. Although the
regime released Suu Kyi from prison for medical reasons, she remains
under house arrest.
In August 2003 General Khin Nyunt, formerly in charge of Burmas
intelligence community, became the prime minister, with the official title
of Secretary One. Khin Nyunt was widely seen as a quasi-moderate within the regime, a soft hardliner, and in the eyes of the international community, someone with whom better relations could be conducted. In producing a new regime plan, Khin Nyunt promised to hold a National
Convention in 2004 to draft a new constitution as part of a road map for
constitutional and political reform. In May 2004 the NLD decided to
boycott the convention due to the SPDCs refusal to release Suu Kyi. The
convention continued without the NLD but debate was severely restricted
and the ruling junta demanded a continued leadership role for the military
in any constitution.
In October 2004 Khin Nyunt was removed from office in a power play
by a rival faction led by junta leader General Than Shwe. He was then
replaced by Lieutenant General Soe Win, part of the younger generation
of hardliners, who was involved in the May 2003 attack on Suu Kyi. Khin
Nyunt had been viewed as a threat, especially once he expanded the powers of military intelligence and shifted control of cross-border trade from
regional military commanders to a group of border security agents that he
controlled. Than Shwe sided with the regional military commanders and
succeeded in consolidating his power. In order to ensure that there would
be no repercussions from Khin Nyunts supporters, the military intelligence organization that he commanded was also dismantled.
Despite removing Khin Nyunt from office, the SPDC claims to be continuing to pursue his road map. After suspending the National
Convention in March 2005, the junta announced plans to reconvene the
BURMA
25
body in October; by spring 2006 this had still not occurred. Additionally
the SPDC continues to organize public rallies for junta-sponsored groups
such as the War Veterans, the Fire Brigade, and the Union Solidarity and
Development Association (USDA) - each of which regularly denounces the
internal and external destructionists and praises the juntas policies.
In perhaps its most bizarre and foreboding move yet, in November
2005 the SPDC surprised the world and its Southeast Asian neighbors by
announcing the relocation of Burmas capital from Rangoon to Pyinmana,
a small, remote underdeveloped town nearly 400 miles to the north.
Apparently, the move was based in part on the astrological inclinations of
the top generals, while some speculated that it was part of the regimes
attempt to inoculate itself from an American invasion as well as to keep a
lid on future ethnic rebellions. The SPDC ended 2005 by announcing it
was extending the terms of Suu Kyis house arrest for another year.
With civil society quiescent if barely extant, ethnic groups almost coopted (via the recent ceasefires and their participation in the National
Convention), and NLD members constantly harassed and imprisoned (if
not killed or run out of the country), a hollowing out of Burmese society
has been achieved by the regime.6 The military is effectively the only game
in town. With ongoing violence, increased drug trafficking, the spreading
of disease, and growing numbers of internally displaced persons and
refugees, Burma represents an acute case of authoritarian stasis.
6 D. Steinberg, Civil Society and Legitimacy: the Basis for National Reconciliation in
Burma/Myanmar, mimeo, October 10, 2004, p. 6.
7 This narrative section detailing the various international responses draws liberally from four
sources, in addition to news reports: Myanmar: The Military Regimes View of the
World International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 28, Brussels, December 7, 2001; Threat
to the Peace, op. cit.; Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns, Volume 1, Altsean Burma,
November 2004; and Ready Aim Sanction, Special Report, Altsean Burma, November
2003.
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CHAPTER 1
8 Japan was the only country to officially recognize the SPDC, though in part because it was a
way out of a diplomatic hard place viz. at the Japanese emperors funeral not recognizing
the new regime would have placed the SPDC next to the PLO in the seating arrangements
(other countries did not need to re-recognize the regime).
BURMA
27
9 Executive Order 13047 Prohibiting New Investment in Burma, May 20, 1997.
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CHAPTER 1
10 UN mediation efforts began with the appointment in 1998 of Special Envoy Alvaro De
Soto. De Sotos mission, however, proved stillborn when a U.S. newspapers disclosure of
his efforts prompted a considerable backlash from the SLORC. De Sotos plan was to
trade aid to Burma through the World Bank for dialog with the NLD, release of political
prisoners, and access for the Red Cross.
11 The basis was a UN General Assembly resolution that authorized the Secretary General to
appoint a second Special Envoy. UN General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, A/RES/59/263, December 23, 2004.
12 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights (61st Session, Agenda
Item 9), Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any
Part of the World Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, E/CN.4/2005/L, April 29,
2005.
BURMA
29
nounce that there were serious doubts as to whether the UN would be able
to play a productive role and facilitate the reconciliation consistently called
for in various UN resolutions. Razali resigned in January 2006.
Under continued pressure from the international community, Suu Kyi
was released from house arrest in May 2002. Several international delegations visited Burma in the aftermath, including Professor Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro, the UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on
Myanmar, and the International Labor Organization (ILO) High Level
Team. Pinheiro has achieved little in the way of dialogue (though perhaps
minimal success in the area of access for the Red Cross) and his saga in
broad terms mirrors Razalis in its result. Than Shwe refused to meet with
Pinheiro on a number of his trips, and on a visit during April 2003
Pinheiro left promptly after finding listening devices while he was interviewing prisoners at Insein prison. The SPDC imposed an active ban
against further visits in November 2003. Pinheiros report concluded
human rights had deteriorated even further and called for reduced restrictions on political parties and early prisoner release.
International pressure on Burma continued with the EU extending its
existing sanctions to target more people linked to the economic and political activities of the SPDC. The EU responded to Suu Kyis re-arrest by
publishing the list of 153 persons affected by its visa ban, freezing the assets
held abroad by those on the list, and banning the export of equipment
from the EU that could be used for internal repression or terrorism. Other
countries, such as Thailand, called for greater efforts to support the SPDC
if it were to begin to move toward reconciliation with the NLD.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has adopted a vigorously
critical stance against the regime. ILO efforts to eliminate the SPDCs
forced labor practices including through various restrictions on business
activities have achieved a modicum of success. In late 2000 the SPDC
made public a stiffer ban of forced labor in response to threatened sanctions from the ILO, specifically a boycott by international trade unions
(beyond the official review Burma had been placed under). Two years
later, the regime permitted an ILO Liaison Officer to begin working in
Rangoon and steadily thereafter marginal additional progress has been
achieved, notably just ahead of ILO Governing Body meetings. The ILO
again threatened action against Burma when the regime sentenced three
people to death in early 2004 for seeking contacts with the ILO, succeeding in having one sentence commuted to life imprisonment and three-year
sentences imposed for the other two individuals.
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CHAPTER 1
Black Friday
The event that spurred the most negative international response was Black
Friday in May 2003. The harshest reaction came from the US, which
passed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act after the SPDC refused
to engage in talks with the opposition and once again imprisoned Suu Kyi.
The act placed an import ban on Burmese products, froze all assets of the
SPDC and senior SPDC officials, expanded the visa ban on SPDC officials, prohibited any remittances to Burma, and pledged support for
democracy activists. Later the law was changed to allow educational materials and works of art to be taken into Burma.
The EU called for the immediate release of Suu Kyi, the prosecution of
those responsible for the attacks, and further reconciliatory dialogue, and
urged the UN and ASEAN to continue to exert influence on the situation.
Moreover, it moved to extend the scope of the visa ban and asset freeze,
strengthen enforcement of the arms embargo, reiterate the suspension of
non-humanitarian aid, suspend development programs, and withdraw all
military personnel of EU member states. Japan, which prior to 2003 had
been moderately engaged with the SPDC and had been providing significant amounts of aid, toughened its rhetorical opposition to the holding of
political detainees and placed a moratorium on new bilateral aid (except
for humanitarian projects), although existing aid projects were continued.
In the only country-specific statement of its kind, the Community of
Democracies Convening Group called for Suu Kyis immediate release after
the Depayin Masacre and appealed to the military authorities to re-establish democracy.13 This followed earlier efforts to give Burma a special place
on the Community of Democracies agenda at the latters Warsaw and
Seoul meetings when foreign ministers heard a direct videotaped appeal
from Suu Kyi to use your freedom to defend ours.14
ASEAN, which rarely criticizes its members internal affairs and has no
democracy mandate, issued a sharp rebuke of Suu Kyis detainment and
13 Declaration of the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies on the Situation
in Burma, June 17, 2003, available at http://www.cdemo.cl/cdemoing/pdf/BURMA.pdf.
14 In her videotaped appeal presented in Warsaw, she said: We would like to urge the peoples of the free world to work harder towards bringing true democratic progress everywhere. We would like to see action, rather than words. There have been many words supporting democracy, and we are duly grateful for them, because we do not underestimate
the power of words. But words need to be backed up by action by action that is united
and that is focused on essentials. Only by such action will we be able to realize our democratic aspirations. Available at
http://www.ncgub.net/Daw%20Aung%20San%20Suu%20Kyi/Community%20of%20De
mocracies%20Conference%20-%2026%20June%202000.htm.
BURMA
31
called for the latters release during its annual meeting. Additionally the
nine foreign ministers in attendance at the meeting informed their
Burmese counterpart Win Aung that they wanted Suu Kyi released as soon
as possible. In the lead up to the October 2003 ASEAN summit, Thai
Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai and Indonesian Special Envoy Ali
Alatas visited Burma for talks with the junta to press for the release of Suu
Kyi. These two parties were concerned that the upcoming summit would
be overshadowed by Burmas domestic issues. In June 2004 Malaysian parliamentarians also formed a committee of members of parliament to press
for democracy in Burma (Malaysia had been the prime sponsor of Burmas
entry into ASEAN). The committee was composed of both government
and opposition members, including several individuals close to Prime
Minister Abdullah Badawi. Announced less than a week after Khin
Nyunts visit to Malaysia, the committee urged Burma to hold free and fair
elections and release all political prisoners.
Burmas first official participation in an Asia-European summit
(ASEM) was scheduled for October 2004. Prior to this meeting some EU
leaders, and particularly Tony Blair, threatened to boycott the summit if
Burma sent a representative. EU foreign ministers agreed to Burmas participation at a level below head of state/government; they further agreed
that additional sanctions against Burma would be put into effect if the
SPDC failed to release Suu Kyi and open the National Convention to
NLD participation in advance of the ASEM meeting. When this did not
take place, Blair sent a deputy in protest, and French President Jacques
Chirac, while in general opposed to further sanctions, did not attend a
welcoming ceremony for the Burmese representative. In late October, the
EU Council revised the Common Position to extend the visa ban to all
those in the Burmese military holding the position of brigadier general or
higher and prohibiting EU companies from investing in Burmese stateowned enterprises.
Although not as influential as events under UN and ASEAN auspices,
the decision of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
to cancel an $87 million program in Burma was a notable measure. The
August 2005 decision, made without engaging the regime in discussion or
negotiation, was a direct response to the SPDCs new restrictions on travel and the import of medical supplies (direct pressure from the US also
played a prominent role). Although members of the democracy promotion NGO community were supportive of this move, diplomats in
Rangoon and humanitarian NGOs opposed it, arguing that they continue
to be able to operate usefully and independently of the government.
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The UN decided to search for replacement funds for fighting the three
diseases, and in December the EU decided to quadruple its humanitarian
assistance to Burma (to roughly $10 million). This aid was to target primary health care and malaria control, as well as water and sanitation services in the central dry zone of Burma. Officially, the EUs humanitarian
arm ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office) claimed
that the decision was unrelated to the Global Funds contrary decision to
cancel funding; however, this claim was widely disbelieved. ECHO
opened an office in Rangoon better to assess needs and monitor projects.
Burma was scheduled to assume the rotating chair of ASEAN in 2006.
The EU and US promised to boycott the ASEAN summit if Burma did
not make efforts to transition to democracy and release Suu Kyi. Fearing
a Western boycott, and concerned about worsening relations with the EU
and US, many member nations of ASEAN, including Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia and the Philippines, expressed discomfort over Burma taking the
organizations chair. Burma bowed to pressure from these nations and
relinquished the chair in July 2005. The alphabetically rotating chair then
passed to the Philippines, although ASEAN released a statement saying
that once Burma was ready to take up its turn as ASEAN chair, it would
be allowed to do so.
It was unclear how relinquishing the ASEAN chair affected the SPDC.
On one level, SPDC officials argued that the United States and EU had
played right into our hands, by giving them the option of deferring the
ASEAN chair instead of releasing Suu Kyi. Additionally, turning down the
chair prevented the SPDC from having to confront the foreign press who
would be covering ASEAN meetings. Conversely, there was evidence that
the regime was looking forward to the high profile role so as to garner
greater regional and international respect; government investment had
already commenced to prepare for the summit, including a considerable
amount of work at the capitals airport.
The final months of 2005 witnessed ASEAN adopting an even more
critical posture. Ahead of the 2005 summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian
Prime Minister Abdullah publicly called for an ASEAN delegation to visit
Burma, while Philippine President Arroyo made similar suggestions.
ASEANs chairman, Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid, expressed a
need to visit Suu Kyi and see direct evidence of reform in Rangoon, while
Malaysian cabinet minister Nazri Aziz compared the SPDC to the Hitler
and Stalin regimes. In addition, a group of parliamentarians in the
ASEAN Parliamentary Caucus called for ASEAN to expel Burma if its
BURMA
33
human rights situation had not improved after a year, further demanding
the Secretary General to report back regularly to ASEAN members.
Although the December 2005 summit itself did not include Burma
on its formal agenda, the gathered heads of government discussed the
countrys situation for an hour over an informal dinner on the eve of the
summit. What resulted came as a surprise to some: demands that the
SPDC begin taking real steps toward democracy, fully implement its road
map, and release Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners. Various leaders spoke candidly to Prime Minister Soe Win of the SPDC. Indeed,
Burma acted with surprising alacrity by inviting ASEANs chair,
Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid, to visit Rangoon, leaving open
the possibility of a meeting with Suu Kyi. Syed Hamid was quoted by
Reuters as saying The road map must have not only the road; there must
be some signs along the way. There must be a timeline that they must
work on. Three months later, Syed Hamid arrived in Rangoon and met
with junta officials but was denied a visit with Suu Kyi and left a day earlier than scheduled.15 He was scheduled to brief ASEAN foreign ministers on his findings during their April 2006 summit in Bali. At the East
Asian summit immediately following the ASEAN summit, a Korean foreign ministry official said Korea told Burma directly that good relations
depended on further democratization.16 And Kofi Annan announced
afterward that the UN welcomed the invitation to Rangoon and that he
would personally be in touch with Syed Hamid.
Burmas other neighbors China, India and Thailand have consistently operated as enablers of the regime. China is the SPDCs staunchest
ally, although at times it has encouraged reforms. China supplies the
regime with arms, conducts significant trade with Burma, and protects it
in international forums, while maintaining a substantial on-the-ground
diplomatic presence in the country. Thailand also has regional interests in
Burma, particularly in quelling unrest and other problems across the
sprawling border the two states share. Thailand has supplied the SPDC
with substantial trade and aid, while tightening its border against displaced
persons and refusing to interfere in the regimes internal affairs. India has
recently embraced the SPDC to protect its regional interests in Burma, not
15 Hamid noted that Burmas neighbors can only continue to defend the regime internationally if they can report back that there is progress towards reform. BBC News, Malaysian
FM Cuts Off Burma Trip, March 24, 2006.
16 Korea has provided some $120 million in aid since President Kim Dae Jung reinitiated
Korean aid to Burma.
34
CHAPTER 1
least for border security reasons, naval interests, and a growing sense of
competition with Chinese influence in the region. India has supplied substantial trade and aid to the regime, including arms, and despite being the
worlds largest democracy, has not been supportive of the pro-democracy
movement in Burma.
Numerous individuals and groups, frustrated by the inefficacy of disparate efforts to influence the SPDCs behavior, have been calling on the
UN, and particularly the Security Council, to take more concerted action.
Support for specific action in the Security Council has come not only from
the NLD and the Burmese government in exile, but also from various parliamentarians from around the world and several Nobel laureates.
Momentum since 2005 has in particular coalesced around the Havel-Tutu
report, Threat to the Peace, which in turn has galvanized even greater
support at government (US, EU, Australia) and UN levels. The HavelTutu report asserts that Burma clearly meets the threat to international
peace and security criterion for Security Council action.17
Further suggesting that the tide appears to have begun turning against
Burma at the UN, in December 2005 the US delegation lined up the necessary nine votes, and in fact even a tenth, in favor of placing Burma on
the Security Councils agenda. US Ambassador Bolton opted to wait to
push for formally placing Burma on the agenda in deference to Chinese
and Russian willingness to accept a proposal for the Security Council to
hear an informal report on Burma behind closed doors. The briefing took
place, with the Secretary General present, on December 16, 2005.
By early 2006 all eyes were on ASEAN and the UN. At the UN there
is wide expectation that the US will push for a formal Security Council
debate on Burma by mid-2006. If this were to succeed without sustaining
a veto from one of the permanent members, the ground would be laid for
a Security Council resolution; overcoming Chinese and Russian opposition
is the key in this regard. Momentum at the UN positively affected
ASEANs recent movement on Burma, including the March 2006 ASEAN
delegation visit to Rangoon. A positive development in either of these
supranational bodies will likely have a similarly positive effect on the other.
In sum, the international community has undertaken a wide range of
activities in recent years in response to the political crisis in Burma, particularly in the wake of an intensified internal crackdown in 2003. The US
has taken the lead, with Canada and the EU also active in adopting criti-
BURMA
35
cal measures. Japan has been somewhat less active and critical. Most significant has been ASEANs recent, if cautious, move beyond its traditional
staunchly non-interventionist approach. The willingness of several states
to take the Burma issue to the UN Security Council is also noteworthy.
However, much like the special envoys to the SPDC, such efforts still need
much further development before they have any prospect of putting significant pressure on the Burmese regime.
36
CHAPTER 1
BURMA
37
Zimbabwe, and North Korea whose educated leaders have deftly played
their weak hands against the international community Than Shwe and
his cadre have merely grade school educations. Being ill informed to this
degree is precisely what makes the regime not only unfathomable but also
unpredictable. It is thus incumbent on the international community to
find a way to relate to the regime on its level.
While the international democracy community is fairly united and
efforts related to bringing Burma before the UN Security Council have
been extensive, building up significant diplomatic momentum in the
process, prospects for the success of traditional pressure approaches look
bleak. Even if the regimes critics, for instance, were to gain all they seek
in the UN forum - including a strong resolution, unanimity on the
Security Council, punitive sanctions, and an active diplomatic role for the
Secretary General - it is unlikely that this would suffice to kick-start a transition to democracy in Burma. Indeed, it would seem that current efforts
by the active members of the international community are on something
of a road to nowhere.
On this level it would appear that efforts of local reformers, Suu Kyi
and the NLD have been somewhat hindered by the international communitys response. US influence has waned.21 In response to the 2003 tightening of sanctions, Than Shwe and his cadre have turned away from the
West and concentrated on promoting ties and friendship with China and
others in the region. In essence Americas punitive measures have backfired, engendering nearly the diametrically opposite effect of what was
intended. Even among lower-ranked, more pragmatic officers there has
been a revival of the bunker mentality that sees Burmas interests being best
looked after by going it alone. The EU, Canada, and Japan are being tarred
with the same brush, partly because each too has broken links or strengthened sanctions since 2003, and partly because they are viewed as allies of
the US. Relations with Japan have also cooled, significant in light of
Japans erstwhile closeness to the Ne Win regime and talk of its special
relationship with the SLORC.
Despite the antipathy elicited by sanctions, the SPDC has not entirely
closed the door to external influence. In fact, its leaders harbor a deepseated wish to be accepted as equals by the developed countries.22 It is the
current regime that has taken steps toward opening up Burma, particular21 Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward? International Crisis
Group, Asian Report No. 78, April 26, 2004, p. 8.
22 Regimes View of the World, op. cit., p. 12.
38
CHAPTER 1
BURMA
39
his departure Malaysias dissatisfaction with Rangoon has grown, and it has
been pivotal along with Indonesia in altering ASEANs approach to
Burma. India would seem most pliable to alter its cooperative stance with
the regime; indeed, India operates a two-track approach of officially cooperating with the SPDC at the government level while allowing Indian
groups and individuals to criticize the regime. India is highly concerned
about an alliance between Burma and China, which mitigates prospects for
change; however, India is a close American ally and could respond to
strong US pressure.
The key to external action, however, still resides among Burmas fellow
members of ASEAN. ASEAN states exerted significant influence to deny
Burma its role as ASEAN rotating chair in 2006, while pressing Burma to
show progress in resolving the domestic deadlock ahead of assuming the
organizations chair. ASEAN evidently was embarrassed by Burmas inaction and how its addition to ASEAN, rather than bolstering the regional
body, has instead engendered alienation from the West. ASEAN governments unexpectedly strong stance against the SPDC at their December
2005 summit in Malaysia bodes well. The fear was that ASEAN would
revert to upholding its long-cherished non-interference principle after the
Burma chair episode; on the contrary, ASEAN has moved further along the
spectrum toward greater interference. That host country Malaysia individually, and in concert with its peers, has taken such a strong public stand
against the SPDC is significant - a sharp U-turn from the days when former Prime Minister Mahathir championed the SPDC at every turn.
According to the ASEAN Secretary General, Ong Keng Yong, and
Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah, the additional pressure applied to
Burma came directly from US and EU pressure on ASEAN, though certainly informal movement against Burma on the UN Security Council
also played a role. In regional terms, evidence also points to ASEAN displeasure with the junta not having consulted its neighbors ahead of the
move to Pyinmana and the announcement of additional detention time
for Suu Kyi. ASEAN appears to have learned from the defunct Bangkok
process, 26 for having lowered its expectations of the SPDC it is now having greater success by telling Rangoon in less equivocal terms that it must
deliver. Even this influence has only been modest, however, and evi26 The Bangkok Process was the ASEAN diplomatic attempt to influence Rangoon in the
early 2000s. Initiated and led by Thailand Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the mission was a traditional ASEAN attempt to deal with a problem in the ASEAN way, i.e.
through quiet internal diplomacy. The mission came to nothing, however, when the
SPDC sent Thaksin away essentially empty-handed.
40
CHAPTER 1
Recommendations
A more comprehensive approach by the international community composed of carrots and sticks is needed to help facilitate a long-awaited democratic transition in Burma. The fact that sanctions have failed does not
mean that pressure on the Burmese regime is inappropriate. Sanctions
need to be made smarter and counterbalanced by a series of more prominent incentives.27 As one analyst notes, removing sanctions and increasing engagement will not return the NLD to power, shared or otherwise.28 An effective strategy will need to come from an increased
ASEAN role, probably to a greater extent than American and European
measures. At the same time, it is contended here that qualitatively different approaches should be considered as a means of breaking Burmas political deadlock. In particular a transitional power-sharing arrangement with
some incentives for regime officials to step down, combined with innovative forms of transitional justice, could produce the necessary stimulus to
unblock political change.
27 As argued by the International Crisis Group: [i]n the absence of any external pressure at
all for change, it is highly unlikely that any change at all will occur The international
community should take whatever opportunity is presented to encourage whatever progress
is possible. That means developing a new policy approachcontaining elements of the
present sanctions approach of the West and engagement policy of the region, but more
productive than either. Sanctions or Engagement, op. cit., p. 37.
28 A. McCarty, Burma/Myanmar: Reconciliation without Capitulation, mekongeconomics.com, March 31, 2004, p. 4.
BURMA
41
29 In 1988 when Suu Kyi stated that there would be no trials for junta members, the effect
on them was the opposite of what the NLD intended: instead of being reassured, the
regime took issue with the topic being mooted. There is growing consensus in the NGO
community that prosecution is not viable, as well as a view that further efforts are needed
to assure the regime that the offer from the NLD is credible.
30 M. A. Nalepa, The Problem of Credible Commitments in Transitions to Democracy,
unpublished mimeo, November 30, 2005; J. D. Fearon, Comments on the Ex Ante/Ex
Post Problem in Transitional Justice, unpublished mimeo, October 15, 2005.
42
CHAPTER 1
BURMA
43
44
CHAPTER 1
that understands little other than force and fear is likely to take a retired
US general in this role more seriously, particularly one that with UN backing tells Than Shwe and his cadre that there is a way out. Moreover, the
SPDC is obsessed with prestige, very much wanting to be taken seriously
by the West instead of just sanctioned unendingly. An American general
sitting down with them would offer something previous UN envoys have
been unable to: the very prestige they crave. One not very well known
indicator that such a move could prove effective is that the SPDC has privately reached out to Washington and London on several occasions, only
to be spurned.35 Another option would be a four-member contact group
(UN, US, ASEAN, EU) led by the UN envoy.
Organize roundtable talks between the regime and the opposition to promote power-sharing.
The UN envoy should broker roundtable talks between the SPDC and the
broadly defined opposition movement, including not only the NLD but
also representatives from different ethnic groups. The Polish example in
this regard offers a standard to work from. The SPDC is simply not going
to relinquish power without playing a role in what transpires thereafter and
equally not without at least being a part of any transitional government
that would rule until the results of fresh elections are implemented. Suu
Kyi and the NLD are on record as offering to govern jointly with the
SPDC, and the UN would offer third-party credibility for this commitment. Ongoing talks, taking cues from similar sort of talks in Northern
Ireland, would also offer an opportunity for the regime over time to move
beyond its present view of the NLD as thoroughly lacking in legitimacy.
Any governance solution in Burma will not be achievable without a significant role for the many and varied ethnic groups inside the country.
Already NCUB and other ethnic leaders participate in the SPDCs
National Convention talks, and interestingly the regime takes them more
seriously than the NLD - wishing to highlight non-NLD leadership in
society and due most of all to the numerous and successful ceasefire negotiations the regime has brokered with the main ethnic groups. A peaceful
and prosperous future Burma is more likely with a government that allows
for ethnic groups to achieve their interests alongside the Burmans.36
35 The regime has consistently lobbied Washington policy-makers, from hiring public relations firms to burnish its image to hosting senators and others on visits to Rangoon. In
particular, the SPDC has pressed aggressively for US resumption of anti-narcotics aid.
36 Sanctions or Engagement, op. cit., p. 13.
BURMA
45
37 Amnesty and golden parachutes may be the only possibility of overcoming the predilection
of every Burmese regime since independence for the militarys retention of veto power over
critical aspects of the state. D. Steinberg, Myanmar: The Roots of Eco Sanctions or
Engagement, op. cit., p. 24.
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CHAPTER 1
BURMA
47
with Burma. However, it is likely that China will begin to push the SPDC
to get its act together, not only due to bilateral problems but also to a
desire China may have to avoid being isolated in the UN.
The flurry of activity running up to and surrounding the December
2005 ASEAN summit may be a harbinger, as ASEAN parliamentarians
continued to pressure their governments to oppose Burma, and the leaders
took several key steps at the summit to place further pressure on the SPDC
(with episodic evidence that the regime will substantively respond). A
thorough diplomatic and sanctions phalanx is achievable if China and
ASEAN in particular are persuaded to back the UNs approach; gaining
Indian and Australian assistance would further augment such an endeavor.
The above recommendations are intended to be realistically achievable,
for the stakes are high; they stem from carefully weighing what it would
take for the international community to help initiate a democratic transition inside Burma that to date has been lacking. Given how firmly the
regime is entrenched in power, it would appear that some creative
approaches are called for. With an absence of effective internal pressure on
the authoritarian Burmese junta, perhaps no nation state around the world
is riper for a stepped-up role from the international community. The welfare of the Burmese people depends on it.
49
Chapter 2
Togo1
The stalled democratic transition in Togo presents a promising example of
the influence the international community can have in reversing a military
coup, while simultaneously offering a lesson in its abject failure to change
underlying power balances. In February 2005, after years of a militarybacked autocracy led by President Gnassingbe Eyadema and supported
by France the dictator collapsed of a heart attack, affording the frustrated political opposition a rare chance to change the status quo. Instead, the
military unconstitutionally seized power and placed Eyademas son, Faure
Gnassingbe, in the presidential palace. The international community,
notably led by African regional organizations, rejected the coup and
demanded a transition in accordance with Togos constitution. While the
diplomatic intervention worked to force new elections, the rules of the
game were slanted already in favor of the ruling elite and Gnassingbe was
allowed to secure the presidency through flawed elections. The international community failed to hold Togo accountable to international standards that safeguard democratic governance, particularly during pivotal
periods prior and subsequent to the April 2005 presidential elections.
Peace in Togo remains fragile and political competition marred by the
legacy of military influence and ethnic divisions. The international community can now do much more to ensure that the positive steps it took to
reverse the coup are translated into a longer-term strategy to help Togo
make the transition towards a multiparty democratic system. These measures should include: a truth and reconciliation commission supported by
African institutions and religious leaders; support for repatriation of
refugees; major security sector reforms to put the military under democratic civilian control; support to Togolese civil society; and pressure to carry
out important constitutional reforms.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
In 1967 Lieutenant Colonel Gnassingbe Eyadema seized control of government. Eyadema immediately abolished political parties and established
himself as the sole political power in Togo. For 38 years, Eyadema appointed members of his ethnic group the Kabye to key posts in the military,
economic institutions and the civil service and effectively used his influence over the military to stave off any serious opposition to his regime.
Furthermore, Togos favorable economic position, rewarded with loans and
debt relief from the international financial institutions, allowed him to
consolidate power by regularly increasing the salaries of the military and
civil service.2 Meanwhile, civil society was unable to organize itself and
remained significantly underdeveloped and compromised by its lack of
political neutrality.3
In 1990, Benins successful national conference and transition to
democracy sparked a wave of similar political transition processes throughout Francophone Africa, including Togo. Twenty years into Eyademas dictatorial rule, overt challenges to his regime, including protests and a general strike, led to the establishment of a sovereign national conference in
Togo in 1991. However, this failed to usher in a democratic transition.
Despite harassment from the government, the Togolese national conference drafted an interim constitution calling for a one-year transitional
regime with Joseph Koku Koffigoh as prime minister and limiting
Eyademas powers as president. However, the transitional government was
short lived as the army reacted against the transitional legislatures vote to
dissolve the ruling Rally of Togolese People (RPT) party in November
1991. The army staged a siege, captured Prime Minister Koffigoh and
brought him to the Presidential palace. The government was temporarily
dissolved. Eyademas call for peace led to the eventual release of Koffigoh.
He was re-appointed prime minister of a second transitional government
in January 1992.
After Eyademas government and the opposition agreed to a new constitution in the fall of 1992, the army invaded the legislative chambers and
held the legislature hostage for 24 hours. In retaliation, the opposition
declared a general strike that shut down Lom for nine months. In January
2 J. Seely, State Bargaining Power and Transition to Democracy in Benin and Togo, Paper
No. 397 presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, 2000, pp. 17-18.
3 West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), Togo Presidential Elections, West African
Civil Society Forum Elections Observation Report 2005, pp. 10.
TOGO
51
1993, Eyadema declared the transition had come to an end and re-appointed Koffigoh as prime minister. This action led to a series of public demonstrations and reprisals by the army during which over 300,000 Togolese
fled to Benin, Ghana and the interior of Togo.
Eyademas decision to hold presidential elections on August 25, 1993
came as a result of French and Beninese political pressure, which is detailed
in the following section. Concerns regarding electoral fraud, however, led
the opposition to boycott the elections and Eyadema was re-elected with
90 percent of the vote. In 1994, opposition parties won a majority of seats
in parliament, in generally free and fair legislative elections. Even though
the Action Committee for Renewal (CAR) party led by Yawovi Agboyibo
had won more seats, Eyadema named Edem Kodjo, a former member of
the Eyadema government and head of the Togolese Union for Democracy
(TUD) a smaller opposition party as prime minister. Consequently,
Agboyibos CAR pulled out of the coalition government, forcing Kodjo
and the TUD to ally with Eyademas RPT.
The RPT continued to gain strength in the parliament, causing Kodjo
to resign in 1996 and leaving Eyadema once again in full control of the
government. Presidential and legislative elections in 1998 and 1999 were
fraudulent. Subsequent elections were delayed as the opposition refused to
participate due to a high probability of electoral fraud. Meanwhile
Agboyibo leader of CAR remained imprisoned for an alleged 2001
libeling of the prime minister. Although Eyadema freed Agboyibo in
March 2002, the political impasse continued. Eyadema then replaced the
electoral commission (CENI) with seven magistrates, who were selected to
oversee the elections that had been re-scheduled for October 2002. In
protest to this action, the opposition boycotted the elections. Eyademas
RPT easily won control of the parliament, which subsequently amended
the constitution and allowed Eyadema to run for unlimited terms.
Moreover, Eyadema began preparations to ensure that his son, Faure
Gnassingbe, would succeed him. In 2002, two constitutional amendments
were passed: the first one prevented people who lived in Togo for less than
twelve consecutive months from running as presidential candidates; and
the second lowered the minimum presidential age requirement from 40 to
35. The purpose of the first amendment was to bar Gilchrist Olympio,
leader of the Union of Forces for Change (UFC) party, who lived in France
in exile, from running for president. The second amendment sought to
pave the way to transfer power to Faure Gnassingbe. Eyadema ran for reelection in June 2003, and won 57 percent of the vote. The opposition
made accusations of fraud, but their charges could not be verified as inter-
52
CHAPTER 2
national bodies opted against sending election monitors because they did
not want their presence to legitimize the elections.
Events took a dramatic turn when President Eyadema died unexpectedly of heart failure on February 5, 2005. According to Article 65 of the
Togolese Constitution, the speaker of the National Assembly temporarily
assumes the presidency upon the death of the president and new presidential elections are to be held within 60 days of the presidents death. Upon
Eyademas passing, however, the army sealed Togos borders, thereby preventing Fambare Ouattara Natchaba speaker of the National Assembly
and a member of the small Tchokossi ethnic group who happened to be on
an official trip to Belgium at the time from returning to Lom to assume
the presidency. Instead, on February 6, the army appointed Eyademas son,
Faure Gnassingbe, as president of Togo, and the parliament controlled by
the governing party immediately altered the Constitution to allow
Gnassingbe to serve out the remainder of his fathers term (that is, until
2008). National and international condemnation forced Gnassingbe to
turn over the presidency on February 26 to Abass Bonfoh, his hand-picked
speaker of the National Assembly. Gnassingbes decision to relinquish the
presidency to Bonfoh marked yet another constitutional contravention, as
the presidency should have been assumed by the previous speaker of the
National Assembly, Fambare Ouattara Natchaba.
The obvious task before the Togolese government at this time was to
hold presidential elections. The date for the elections became a contentious
issue because of the lack of clarity of Article 65. Togos Constitution states
that if the President dies, the electoral body must be convened within 60
days to choose a new leader.4 The interpretation of this clause caused confusion between RPT and the political opposition. Both sides could not
agree whether the clause stated elections had to be held in 60 days or
whether they were supposed to be announced within 60 days from when
the presidency was vacated. At the urging of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), it was decided that the count for the 60
days would begin after the date Mr. Bonfoh assumed the presidency.
On March 3, 2005, Bonfoh announced that new presidential elections
would be held on April 24, 2005, within the 60 days mandated by Article
65 of the Constitution. Sensing the possibility of fraud in an election to
be arranged in such a short span of time, and with little opportunity to
mobilize its forces for a fair campaign, the opposition quickly but unsuc4 West African leaders to aid new Togo rulers, Afrol News, March 1 2005,
http://www.afrol.com/printable_article /15817.
TOGO
53
cessfully urged the postponement of the election. In addition, the opposition faced the challenge of building a united front against RPT. This was
because Gilchrist Olympio decided to run regardless of the fact the constitution barred him from doing so.5 To improve their chances of winning,
opposition forces decided to rally behind Emmanuel Bob-Akitani, vice
president of Gilchrist Olympios UFC, who had run against Eyadema in
2003. Faure Gnassingbe announced that he would compete in the election
as the RPT candidate.
While the candidates campaigned, the government launched a tenday initiative to update voter registration logs. Over 450,000 new voters
were registered, 100,000 names were stricken from the record and two
million voters received new identification cards.6 Three and a half million voters were registered for the April 24 elections, which were held at
5,300 polling stations across the country. The opposition, however,
reported cases in which their supporters did not receive identity cards and
were therefore not able to register. Further accusations were made that
the only people allowed to register were voters who were not of age to
vote in the 2003 elections.
As a result of these accusations, demonstrations broke out in the capital on April 6, with protesters blaming France, ECOWAS and the entire
international community for ignoring issues of electoral fraud. The protestors and the opposition also demanded more time to allow for voter
registration and identity card distribution and continued their call for the
postponement of the elections. The protests spread to the interior of the
country and, on April 8, police opened fire on a demonstration in
Tabligbo, killing one person and injuring others. ECOWAS attempted
to hold peace talks to curtail the violence; however, the opposition
refused to participate, claiming the meeting would be futile unless the
election was postponed.
Two days prior to the elections Minister of the Interior Francois Boko
predicted civil war. Anticipating significant violence he then took refuge in
the German Embassy. On election day, in the pro-Gnassingbe north, voter
turnout was over 90 percent, while in the opposition south it was as low as
5 In the words of Leopold Gninivi, the leader of the Democratic Convention of the African
People party (CDPA), an opposition party, Gilchrist announcing his candidacy worried
us. Togo: ECOWAS says no elections before 24 April, Olympio plans to stand, UN
Integrated Regional Information Network, March 3, 2005,
http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=45909.
6 Togo: Police shoot dead opposition protestor, UN Integrated Regional Information
Network, July 14, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org.; WACSOF, op. cit. p. 9 .
54
CHAPTER 2
44 percent. Many irregularities were reported during the elections, including: intimidation of voters, attempts to stuff ballot-boxes in precincts
where opposition monitors were not granted access, violent seizure of
uncounted ballots in Lom by armed soldiers and an absence of monitors
during the vote counting and collation process.7 Faure Gnassingbe was
announced winner of the election on April 26, 2005, with 60.22 percent
of the vote; Bob-Akitani received 38.19 percent.
In an effort to discourage electoral violence, regional governments led
by Nigerias President Olusegun Obasanjo pressured Gnassingbe to meet
with opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio, which led to an agreement to
form a government of national unity.8 (Bob Akitani did not attend the
meeting because of a sudden decline in his health.) The gesture, however,
did not ease tensions in Togo. Opposition protests erupted to condemn
the outcome of the election. Protests degenerated into violence as
Gnassingbes supporters bussed in from the north clashed with opposition forces. As the violence spread, attacks on nationals from France,
Lebanon, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger began. Some of these attacks led
to the death of Malian, Nigerian, and Burkinabe nationals.
The Togolese League of Human Rights (TLHR) estimated there were
800 fatalities caused by the violence between March 28 and May 5, 2005.
There were also reports that 4,345 people were injured. Official numbers
from a commission appointed by Gnassingbe suggested that 100 people
had been killed and 2,000 injured. As many as 40,000 people (mostly after
the elections) fled the violence, crossing the Togolese borders into Benin
and Ghana. Despite the violence, Gnassingbe declared his intention to
form a government of national unity. This proposal was promptly rejected by Olympio, who countered with a demand for new elections by 2007.
On May 19, 2005, two weeks after Gnassingbes inauguration, the
main opposition parties including Olympio met with Gnassingbe in
Abuja, Nigeria to discuss a government of national unity. The opposition
set forth the following three conditions before it would agree to participate:
the government must cease harassment of opposition supporters, allow the
safe return of those who had fled the country and compensate the victims
of violence; open a full investigation into allegations of electoral fraud; and
agree to a dialogue facilitated by the international community to shape
the transitional power-sharing arrangement.
7 WACSOF, op. cit., p. 12.
8 Togo: Talks on forming government of national unity end in failure, UN Integrated
Regional Information Network, July 14, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org.
TOGO
55
9 Togo: President pledges quick parliamentary polls, but is the country ready, UN
Integrated Regional Information Network, October 25, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org.
10 Ibid.
11 Global News Wire Latin America, Africa, Asia News Wire September 1, 2005.
12 Commission d enquete: rapport en Septembre,August 29, 2005, http://www.republicoftogo.com/.
56
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we lived through, unless the dispute over the election is settled?13 As the
constitution stipulates that the parliament cannot be dissolved until its full
term is completed, in 2007, an earlier timetable might prove impossible.
On February 2, 2006, the government announced its decision to hold
a national dialogue in Ougadougou.14 The governments decision roused
the opposition and Togolese civil society in and outside of Togo and
prompted communiqus that referred to the framework as a guide for further dialogue. The communiqus also indicate a deficit in public confidence for the process primarily because no facilitator has been identified to
mediate the dialogue. The government has stated that its decision for not
appointing a facilitator is based on the failure of the Lom Framework and
the Ouagadougou Accord, which were both brokered by international
facilitators. 15 To ease tensions surrounding the dialogue the Community of
SantEgidio held discussions with the government and some opposition
parties.16 The opposition parties involved pulled out of the discussions
because they were not sufficiently inclusive of all of Togos political stakeholders, and demanded a dialogue that includes the EU, the Catholic
Community of SantEgidio, the UN, and the AU.17 In April, however the
dialogue resumed in Lome.18
Reforms to Togos broadcasting and press code to reduce penalties for
slander and defamation and protect freedom of expression were adopted in
October 200519 and have been well-received by advocacy groups as an
13 Togo: President pledges quick parliamentary polls, but is the country ready, UN
Integrated Regional Information Network, October 25, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org.
14 Rendez-vous a Ouaga, February 2, 2006, http://www.republicoftogo.com.
15 Communique relative a la reprise du dialogue inter Togolais, February 15, 2006,
http://www.iciLome.com; and
J. Viana, Communique de la D.T. F. Relatif au dialogue inter Togolaise: Dialogue au Togo
la Proposition de la DTF, February 18, 2006, http://www.iciLome.org.
16 Le dialogue parallele de SantEgidio qui complique la crise togolaise, March 8, 2006,
http://www.iciLome.com.
17 Communique de presse sur le dialogue national et la mediation SantEgidio, March 8,
2006, http://www.iciLome.com.
18 Le president du Parlement invite a la reprise du dialogue politique, April 11, 2006,
http://www.iciLome.com; and Dialogue: lheure dune nouvelle generation dhommes
politques, XINHUA, April 26, 2006, http://www.jeuneafrique.com ; and Togo : outward calm belies continuing problems ,IRINnews.org, April 26, 2006, http://www..irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=53020&SelectRegion=West_Africa; and Dialogue: possibilite de former un nouveau gouvernement et dappeler a la reprise de la cooperation Togo,
April 26, 2006, http://www.jeuneafrique.com.
19 II souffl un vent de libert sur le Togo, August 26, 2005,
http://www.republicoftogo.com.
TOGO
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58
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25 J. Seely, op. cit, p. 30; Quoted in P. Robinson, The National Conference Phenomenon in
Francophone Africa, in Comparative Studies in Society and History, July 1994, p. 589.
26 J. Seely, op. cit, p. 34.
27 J. Walker, The Relationship Between Africa and the European Union: Sanctioning Politics
and the Politics of Sanctions: The EU, France and Development Aid in Togo, London
School of Economics, 2003, p. 5.
28 Relations between Togo and Germany, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de.
TOGO
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states that the EU may suspend aid if any ACP member state fails to promote democratic principles.32
The 22 engagements set forth in the EU-Togo Agreement require the
Togolese government to democratize its political system, which includes:
establishing a national dialogue with civil society and opposition parties;
releasing political prisoners held on the basis of their opposition to the government; guaranteeing all political parties equal access to the media and
public funds; committing to the holding of parliamentary elections in
accordance with the Lom Framework; reforming the electoral code; establishing an internal Commission on Human Rights; reforming the judiciary to ensure its independence; bringing the broadcasting and press code
up to international standards; ensuring that military and security forces
receive training on human rights protection; and guaranteeing justice in
the form of prosecution of known human rights violators.
Complementing the EUs decision to engage Togo, in 2003, France
reaffirmed its commitment to promoting democracy. It provided 1 million
euros in aid under the Fonds de Solidarite Prioritaire (Priority Solidarity
Fund), a poverty reduction initiative aimed at promoting socio-economic
development and consolidating democracy.33 On November 14, 2004, the
EU expressed some satisfaction with the actions taken by the Togolese government and announced that it would partially resume aid to Togo. This
decision came as a result of the release of around 500 political prisoners
and steps taken to reform the broadcasting and press code. Despite these
steps, the EU expressed its overall concern regarding the slow progress
made on human rights. In sum, in the years prior to 2005, the EU had on
several occasions adopted punitive measures against Togo, several times
partially resumed co-operation, and defined a detailed plan of democratic
reform as a pre-condition to full EU-Togo partnership.
TOGO
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62
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TOGO
63
Mathieu Kerekou of Benin and President Omar Bongo of Gabon were all
involved in facilitating the meeting between Olympio and Gnassingbe that
took place in Abuja, on May 19, 2005, to discuss a government of national unity. Shortly after the Abuja meeting, the AU Peace and Security
Council met in Addis Ababa and decided to send a special envoy to Togo
to facilitate dialogue between the government and the opposition.
On May 27, 2005, the African Union Commission appointed
Kenneth Kaunda, former president of Zambia, as special envoy of the
African Union to Togo, and gave him a mandate to facilitate dialogue
between the Togolese political parties. Mame Madior Boye, former prime
minister of Senegal, was appointed head of the AU Observer Mission and
charged with the mandate of assessing the political, social, security and
humanitarian developments, as well as the human rights situation.
However, the envoys never reached Togo as AU Chairman and Nigerian
President Obasanjo repudiated their appointment, claiming Alpha Oumar
Konare, Chairperson of the AU Commission, did not consult with him
on this issue.36
Between 1999 and 2002, the UN leadership had been critical of the
Eyadema regime, particularly with regard to the two constitutional amendments designed to protect the government. UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan issued several strong statements condemning these amendments for
failing to create a climate for political consensus or fair elections.37 In
2005, Annan issued similarly strong statements condemning the unconstitutional succession of power by Faure Gnassingbe.38 In addition, the UN
Secretariat supported the Abuja dialogue between President Gnassingbe
and the opposition in an effort to stem electoral violence.
In addition to facilitating dialogue, a delegation from the UN Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was sent to Togo,
in June 2005, to investigate human rights abuses associated with the 2005
presidential elections. The eleven-day mission also received a mandate to
make recommendations for national reconciliation and repatriation of
refugees. The OHCHR mission concluded that between 400 and 500 people died during the period in question and found evidence of other gross
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TOGO
65
41 Ibid.
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42 http://www.usaid.gov.
TOGO
67
43 AU Reiterates Support for West African Efforts to End Togo Crisis, Voice of America,
February 25, 2005.
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TOGO
69
sentatives of the West African Civil Society Forum were denied access to
the polls as observers.47 This action clearly contravenes international standards in electoral conduct. Nonetheless, the US, EU, UN, AU and
ECOWAS stood aside and allowed the breach to occur, thereby missing
an opportunity to use financial leverage or influence to make the electoral
process equitable. The overall quality of response from the international
community was poor in this instance and clearly was inconsistent with
democratic principles.
The EUs efforts to use the incentive of a 40 million euro aid package
to condition the implementation of reforms in the area of justice, human
rights and elections48 has had a mixed effect. For example, recent EU,
French, German and British consultations with relevant Togolese parties
regarding the broadcasting and press code have contributed towards making some tangible progress in terms of consolidating democracy. EU aid
conditionalities have proved successful in coaxing the Togolese government
to move the country towards a democratic path. The EUs role in promoting democracy serves as an example of how important a large, financiallycapable, third party intervener can be to promoting democracy.
Aid conditionalities have often given regimes that are determined to
protect the status quo the opportunity to appease donor community
demands and ensure economic aid continues to flow, while simultaneously protecting themselves locally. President Gnassingbes tendencies in this
regard are demonstrated by the composition of his cabinet and the
National Commission of Enquiry, as well as the governments inadequate
response to the UN OHCHRs report. The impact of EU aid conditionalities on these issues remains an open question.
French national policy in Togo paints a similarly mixed picture. French
participation in brokering the Ouagadogou Accord and the Lom
Framework Agreement was appropriate in terms of its efforts to open
Togos political system and move the country towards democracy. Yet these
agreements ultimately failed, mainly because of internal factors associated
with Eyademas stronghold on the military, which was supported by
France. Frances lack of intervention in Togos first transitional government, its brief and soft suspensions of economic and military aid, denial of
human rights violations in Togo during the 1998 presidential elections and
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Recommendations
The EU, as the leading international actor in democracy promotion in
Togo, is placing considerable emphasis on legislative elections, electoral
reform and power sharing as a means to promote more equitable and open
systems of governance. It makes sense that these issues are at the forefront
of the EUs agenda as a means to resolve the longstanding political deadlock. It is important, however, that the EU and other like-minded actors
remain keenly aware that elections are not the only measure of democracy.
While elections generally signal the genesis of democratic change, in a case
like Togo, it is imperative to approach future elections cautiously given
Togos 38-year history of repression and manipulated elections.
Furthermore, it is evident that the democratic legitimacy of the current
Togolese regime remains fragile. Complicating matters further, a war
TOGO
71
49 Les refugies desertent le camp d Agame apres de violents heurts avec villageois, February
17, 2006, IRIN, Cotonou, Benin, http://www.iciLome.com.
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TOGO
73
74
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Guinea-Bissau, and the ongoing civil strife in Cote dIvoire. It is foreseeable that rising frustrations will continue to fester, which could lead to a
civil war in Togo. The lack of attention paid to rising frustrations during
the 1990s in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau created some of the
most gruesome wars ever witnessed in the modern era. Togo presents an
opportunity to prevent a potential repeat of history.
Given the militarys position in Togo under Eyadema, it is likely that
the military will continue to expect similar support from President
Gnassingbe. Military grievances ranging from ethnic marginalization to
compensation, which have played out destructively in surrounding states
like Liberia and Sierra Leone, have not occurred in Togo largely due to an
intricate system of patronage between the state and the military.
Consequently, the military has become closely associated with Togolese
political institutions to the point where the boundaries between the two
are extremely blurred. This state of affairs has given the military the upper
hand, making it difficult to mount sufficient leverage to begin the process
of security reform. Until demarcations between political and military
institutions in Togo are clearly defined, democracy will not take root in any
meaningful way.
French involvement in its former African colonies has been motivated
by the desire to promote French cultural, military and financial presence as
a means to access natural resources. Considering that Togo receives considerable French military assistance, it would be safe to assume that the
issue of security sector reform in Togo could encounter French resistance.
After all, security sector reform would alter an economic and political policy that has served French interests well since Togos independence. The
involvement of a mixture of European governments and US organizations
could potentially dilute French opposition to security sector reform in
Togo. An added benefit of such pressure could cause France to re-think its
military cooperation policies throughout Francophone Africa. It is a wellknown fact that French military aid has been used to prop up dictators,
some of whom have created significant instability, war, and civil strife.
TOGO
75
One of the primary goals of the international community has been the
resolution of the political deadlock between the RPT, UFC and other
opposition parties. The approaches undertaken by the international community, specifically the EU and France, have focused more on political parties and less on civil society. The presence of political parties is vital for
ensuring accountability in governance but equally vital is a unified depoliticized civil society. If the intent is to narrow political divisions in Togo
and foster an environment conducive to building democracy, the international community should invest resources aimed at addressing the weak
position of civil society in Togo.
In such a highly politically-charged environment like Togo, WACSOFs
position as a sub-regional NGO could serve as a neutralizing force for what
might be a volatile process of de-politicizing Togolese civil society.
Furthermore, WACSOFs familiarity with Togolese civil society and the
fact that the organization consists of some of West Africas most prominent
civil society leaders would work to the benefit of an EU-WACSOF partnership in terms of identifying reputable civil society organizations to take
the lead in building Togolese civil societys capacity.
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react to one later on. The most logical issue to address during this period
is Article 65 of the Togolese Constitution and the law preventing members
of the opposition and other Togolese nationals living in exile from running
as presidential candidates.
Under Eyadema, Togo was willing to live in isolation for twelve years.
An unprecedented opportunity has presented itself in the partial willingness of his son, President Gnassingbe, to respond to the international community. Recently, the international community employed a variety of
diplomatic tools to bring democratic change to Togo; however, it has faltered. It behooves the international community to reassess the approaches
it has chosen thus far to push Togo towards full democratization. The EU,
Africas democratic governments and other like-minded actors should be
mindful that assisting Togo in its democratic journey requires an unshakable commitment to reverse the asymmetry between governance and security, specifically with regard to political institutions and the military. A
commitment of this kind requires a shift in priorities, with less of a focus
on elections, more of a focus on security reform and civil society capacitybuilding, and a long-term commitment to a democratic Togo.
77
Chapter 3
Turkey1
Turkey is commonly exhibited as an inspiring example of how a powerful
external incentive, such as the prospect of membership to the European
Union (EU), can play a major role in propelling democratic change. Few
would doubt that the EU has played a significant causal role in Turkeys
process of incremental democratization. In particular, since Recep Tayyip
Erdogans Justice and Development Party (AKP) won power in 2002,
Turkey has inched towards democratic consolidation. The acceleration
and deepening of democratic reform occurred as the EU took a number of
steps that opened up and then rendered apparently more imminent the
prospect of Turkey joining the European club. Relative to the other cases
studied in this volume, Turkey is a case in which a qualitatively different
democracy promotion tool has been available: the carrot of admission to
the EU club of democracies, far more meaningful for and intrusive of
domestic politics than any other regional organization. On balance, this is
a case where the international community has firmly upheld its commitment, expressed for example in the inaugural Warsaw Declaration of the
Community of Democracies, to support democratic governance.
While the EU-Turkey relationship has been widely analyzed, such
assessments have adhered overwhelmingly to a single-track argument:
namely, that Turkeys reform process cannot be separated from the evolution of EU policy, and that the achievement of EU membership remains
crucial to the continuing momentum of Turkeys democratic deepening.
While largely in agreement with this standard assertion, this chapter offers
some variance to the assessment. Approaching the subject primarily from
a democracy promotion perspective rather than as a more general EU foreign policy project leads to some notable conclusions: democracy promotion per se has not in an obvious sense been the primary goal of European
efforts; ambivalence has pervaded the United States efforts to deepen dem-
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ocratic quality in Turkey; and it remains unclear how far external influences have actually embedded a democracy-deepening dynamic in Turkey.
Turkey is not quite as straightforward a case of democracy promotion success as might appear to be the case, and thus provides a mixed set of
insights for the international community of democracies.
Background
The reform process undertaken by Turkish governments during the last
decade is of undeniable significance. The extent of change has taken
Turkey into the category of an essentially democratic state, albeit one still
short of full consolidation. The reach of democratic reform has entailed
an important shift in the political culture and institutional structure of the
country. Likewise, in the economic sphere, Turkey has made fundamental progress and can be regarded as a functioning market economy,
although with the firm need to maintain recent economic stabilization
and reform achievements.
During the 1990s, democratization efforts in Turkey suffered from
short-lived coalition governments, weak political leadership, a severe financial crisis, a strong influence of the military in politics and a heightened
security environment that was aggravated by the struggle against the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), as well as an uneasiness over an Islamic
resurgence in Turkish politics. While some reforms were implemented,
there were few signs of any profound change of political perspectives within the Kemalist elite. Changes were introduced to address basic human
rights issues, but without fundamental reform of military-dominated
power structures or to Turkeys state-centric strategic culture.
In 1997, the Turkish military eased out of power the Islamist-oriented
government of Necmettin Erbakan; the Constitutional Court then
banned the Islamist Refah party. The undramatic and gradualist manner
in which the military reasserted its control was widely dubbed Turkeys
post-modern coup. In the wake of this coup, the right-wing, antireform MHP (Nationalist Action Party) gained strength, winning a place
in a new coalition government. In 1999, a new government led by Blent
Ecevit more openly acknowledged existing democratic shortfalls. The
Ecevit government enacted two important constitutional reform packages,
changed numerous laws and regulations and revised the Civil Code that
dated back to the military government in 1928. Changes brought about
by over 30 constitutional amendments included the abolition of the death
penalty; the removal of military officers as judges in the State Security
Courts; the first steps towards widening broadcasting rights and education
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79
in languages other than Turkish; a slightly reduced role of the militarydominated National Security Council; some improvements regarding
freedom of thought and expression; an expansion of the rights of religious
minorities; and a lifting of emergency statutes in parts of the southeast
region of the country.
Reforms were carried out at a faster pace and attained broader coverage when the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP)
came to power in late 2002. Until then, Turkish political life had been
dominated by mostly unstable coalition governments, sometimes holding
power for as little as three months. In the November 3, 2002 general
elections, the AKP won a landslide victory and acquired an absolute parliamentary majority, receiving more than one-third of all votes cast and
363 of 550 parliamentary seats. A change in the constitution resulted in
the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan previously banned from politics
to parliament, a prerequisite for his becoming prime minister on March
14, 2003. Its absolute majority in parliament allowed the AKP quickly
to pass through parliament laws, regulations and a series of political
reform packages.
After 2001, nine major reform packages introduced vital changes to the
constitution and a swathe of laws and regulations. In May 2003, a Reform
Monitoring Group was established involving officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which introduced a system of sanctions for
those in the bureaucracy, security services and judiciary who continued to
block reforms.2 It was widely argued that reform had been sufficient to
change Turkeys underlying political culture and challenge many issues that
had until recently been taboo.3
Important legal changes adopted by the Erdogan government, in June
2003, provided for international observers at elections; authorized media
broadcasts in Kurdish; lightened restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly; scrapped the heavily criticized anti-terror law; and repealed an article
that allowed leniency for honor killings. Most significantly, the AKP government pushed through measures to reduce the political role of the military: many of the National Security Councils (NSC) executive functions
were downgraded to merely advisory input; the number of civilian seats on
the NSC was increased to nine, against the five held by military officers;
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parliamentary scrutiny over the military budget was strengthened, and was
used in 2004 to reduce defense expenditure; and military representation in
a number of civilian bodies was reduced. An eighth reform package, in
2004, also enhanced the independence of key media outlets.
Despite Turkeys remarkable progress in adapting legislation to
European standards, deficiencies in the implementation of legislation have
been and continue to be a major challenge. Moreover, substantial legal
shortcomings remain, especially in relation to safeguarding fundamental
freedoms and human rights, particularly freedom of expression, womens
rights, religious freedoms, trade union rights, cultural rights and the further strengthening of protection against torture and ill-treatment.4
Nevertheless, even after eight successive harmonization packages, the
Turkish military retained significant powers and influence. The armed
forces continued to enjoy a formal, constitutionally mandated role to protect the secularism of the state. The Supreme Military Council remained
exempt from judicial review, with the army resisting more strongly the
prospect of subordination to civilian courts because of the AKPs hold on
power. The civilian defense ministry still did not exercise the same primacy over security policy as in fully democratic states, with meetings of the
NSC attracting intense media coverage and debate as crucial determinants
of policy. In addition, a large proportion of economic contracts still originated with the military.
The eruption of Kurd-related violence, in June 2004, emphasized the
limitations of democratic reform. Violent attacks carried out by the PKKsuccessor, the Kurdistans Peoples Congress (or Kongra-Gel) were met
with clampdowns by the army. Incidents of such violence increased
throughout 2005 and were, it was alleged, met with increasing human
rights abuses on the part of security forces. Notwithstanding the influence
of a more democracy-oriented new leadership from the armed forces, the
latter still sought to limit the pace and reach of reforms. In the middle of
2004, the army helped ensure that government proposals purporting to
give graduates of religious schools equal status in access to universities
were dropped.5 A new penal code adopted in June 2005, strengthening
penalties against honor killings and torture, also prescribed prison sen-
TURKEY
81
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6 The Barcelona process being the initiative created in 1995 to manage economic, political
and cultural relations between the EU and the states of the southern Mediterranean, including Turkey, Israel, Malta, Cyprus and eight Arab partners.
TURKEY
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84
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TURKEY
85
86
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15 S. Cagaptay, Where goes the U.S.-Turkish relationship? Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2004.
16 Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkeys Progress
towards Accession, October 6, 2004, Brussels, COM(2004)656.
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87
zens and against Turkey receiving its full entitlement of cohesion and agricultural funds. The summit saw the UK, Italy and Belgium lining up
against France, Austria and Denmark, the latter group pushing most
strongly for safeguards and qualifications. Given the additional conditions
appended to the deal with Turkey, after December 2004, it was no longer
convincing for the EU to argue that it was merely holding Turkey to the
same benchmarks as previous applicants.
As 2005 progressed, it was the EUs own internal crisis that exercised a
major impact on policy towards Turkey. The rejection of the EU draft constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands was widely attributed, in
part, to popular opposition to Turkish accession. In the summer of 2005,
a Eurobarometer poll showed that a clear majority of EU citizens opposed
Turkish entry. A poll commissioned by the German Marshall Fund
revealed that only 22 percent of Europeans favored Turkeys accession.17
The impact of terrorist attacks on European soil (in Madrid and London)
and in Istanbul, and the growing debates about immigration and integration, were seen by many as factors contributing to the strong public mood
against Turkish accession.
As the moment of decision on accession negotiations approached, the
focus on democracy was also increasingly overshadowed by issues related to
Cyprus. Greece had threatened to block eastern European states accession
to the EU if the Greek part of the island were not also admitted, apparently in contradiction to the long-held EU line that only a united Cyprus
should be accepted into the Union. Once the divided island was admitted
to the EU in 2004, tensions inevitably increased. Ankara pressed for
explicit clarification that its obligation to extend the 1963 association
agreement and 1995 customs union to new entrants, including Cyprus,
did not amount to formal recognition of Greek Cyprus as a sovereign state.
Additional spin-offs from differences over Cyprus raised further obstacles.
Turkey fretted that it would be obliged to open its ports and airports to
Cypriot craft as a result of the opening of accession negotiations; and that
it would no longer be able to prevent a Greek Cypriot application to join
NATO. The former question was eventually solved through a rendezvous clause, providing for the issue to be revisited one year after talks
opened. On the latter issue, it once again took senior-level US intervention, this time to dissuade the Greek Cypriot government from seeking to
use the changed situation to its advantage in relation to NATO.
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TURKEY
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90
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22 T. Diez and B. Rumelili, Open the Door, World Today 60, no. 8, issue 9, 2003, p. 35.
TURKEY
91
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24 F. Hakura, Europe and Turkey: The End of the Beginning, Open Democracy,
October 5, 2005.
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93
ing an ideal and perhaps unique opportunity to correct the often-witnessed macro-micro divide in Western democracy policies (a term capturing the disconnect between political-level diplomacy and the elaboration of democracy aid projects).
Recognition of these lessons is important not only for future steps in
Western democracy efforts in Turkey, but also as Turkeys role in the wider
region attracts greater attention. The West appears keen to begin using
Turkey as a model to convince skeptics of the feasibility of Arab democratization. Care is warranted here. Many Turks are wary of being portrayed
as an Islamic model, which they fear will strengthen the role of Islam in
Turkey and weaken Turkeys ties to the West. Moreover, Turkeys potential as a model for Middle East reform is limited by its image in the
region, which for many Arabs is tarnished by the countrys imperial past,
its non-Arab profile and its strong ties to Israel. This will be a future lesson to bear in mind with regard to this apparently successful case of
democracy promotion.
Recommendations
To a greater extent than the other case studies examined in this volume, in
Turkey the broad parameters of democracy strategy are already established,
with the detailed negotiations over EU entry conditions now underway.
Turkey has been granted the reward of accession talks its government,
political elite and many Turkish citizens craved for so long. It is consequently locked into a formal, bureaucratic process that will determine in
very precise ways a range of institutional and governance reforms. This
does not mean, however, that important additional steps are not required
in both European and, the so-far limited, US policies. Intensive debate preceded the decision to open EU entry talks in October 2005, but Turkey has
since largely disappeared from the front pages of the international media.
However, far from a less engaged posture now being warranted, intensified
efforts are required in a number of areas if Turkeys reform process is not to
risk reversal. The EU and other members of the international community
of democratic states should consider the following recommendations:
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97
Chapter 4
Ukraine1
The evocative images of the Orange Revolution that unfolded on the
streets of Kiev at the end of 2004 suggested a successful case of democracy
promotion. Within the context of this volume, Ukraine indeed offers a
range of positive lessons for international democracy strategies. It appeared
to be a case where low-level civil society and governance support did spill
over into democratic transition; where Western governments mobilized
effectively and unequivocally in democracys favor at the crucial point of
election-related crisis; where support for democracy eventually trumped a
geostrategic indulgence of Russia; and where notable coordination
occurred between different international actors. This chapter argues, however, that the strategies pursued by the European Union (EU) and United
States were far from being models of proactive and extensive democracy
promotion. Serious doubts are warranted over the extent to which the
international community maximized its potential influence in Ukraine
both before and after the 2004 Orange Revolution. With Ukraines parliamentary elections in March 2006 handing a plurality of votes to antiOrange, pro-Russian forces, Ukraine is a case that underscores the importance of responding expeditiously and in significant fashion to breakthrough transition opportunities.
Background
Unlike in other central and eastern European states, independent statehood in 1991 did not lead to democratization in Ukraine. When Leonid
Kuchma was elected president in 1994, he promised political and economic reforms. In practice, the ensuing years witnessed a gradual embedding
of acute presidentialism. Parliamentary elections in 1998 saw some degree
of political competition but no direct challenge to Kuchma. Presidential
elections the following year were marred by vote rigging, state manipula-
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2 T. Kuzio, The Oppositions Road to Success, Journal of Democracy 16, no. 2, 2005, p. 120.
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8 A debate over how far the government should reverse and redo privatizations fraudulently
executed by the Kuchma regime crippled the governing coalition and ultimately led to its
breakdown.
9 S. Wagstyl and T. Warner, Off Colour: a Regions Democratic Dreams depends on Righting
the Orange Revolution, Financial Times, October 24, 2005, p. 11.
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104
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106
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The alleged threat that the Action Plan would be withheld was not,
however, a publicly stated policy in the run-up to the December 2004 elections. Pre-election intimidation constant media attacks on Yushchenko,
his apparent poisoning, threats made to students that they would lose their
accommodation if they voted for Yushchenko26 did not elicit specific
punitive reaction from international actors. Rather, at this juncture, comment centered on the infamous suggestion by European Commission
President Romano Prodi that Ukraine had as much chance of joining the
EU as New Zealand. It was reported there was much discontent amongst
Yushchenkos supporters and liberal reformers that the EU had let them
down.27 One diplomat acknowledged that several EU member states
remained cautious to be seen supporting reformists for Russia-handling
reasons. Officials admitted that it was the pace of domestically-driven
events that obliged them soon to stake out less equivocal positions.
US strategy was widely seen as more sensitive than EU policy to
Kuchmas broad strategic maneuvering. US concerns intensified over the
paucity of democratic reform. The Gongazde murder was said by the
administration to have had a particularly detrimental impact on USUkraine relations.28 The blocking of Radio Liberty broadcasts, in February
2004, also attracted critical US attention. The USAID rule of law project
was withdrawn due to deteriorating political conditions. However, it was
Kuchmas sale of weapons to Saddam Hussein that senior US officials
deemed most influential in taking relations to a nadir.29 It was argued that
the US saw the potential of political change in Ukraine at this stage much
more than did European governments in terms of such reform helping to
weaken Russia.30 It was similarly asserted that the US used its influence
mainly to advance its own geostrategic objectives, rather than help Ukraine
move closer to the EU.31 Overall funding to Ukraine from the US
Freedom Support Act declined after 2001, while the share of funds
accounted for by democracy assistance increased from one-fifth to one-
26 For an overview, see A. Karatnycky, Ukraines Orange Revolution, Foreign Affairs 84, no.
2, 2005.
27 K. Barysch and C. Grant, Ukraine should not be part of a great game, Open Democracy,
December 7, 2004.
28 Testimony of Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasion Affairs
before the House International Relations Committee, May 12, 2004, p. 3.
29 Ibid., p. 3.
30 K. Barysch and C. Grant, op. cit.
31 K. Wolczuk, Ukraines European Choice, CER Policy Brief, 2004, p. 4.
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third.32 Frustration with Ukraines political atrophy had led many policymakers in Washington to propose cutting back funding more radically,
until lobby groups mobilized to press for a continued commitment to
democracy funding. On one occasion seating arrangements at a NATO
summit had to be changed to move President Bush away from Kuchma.
At this point, US relations with Kuchma were described as being in a
holding pattern.33 US trade sanctions were imposed, but in relation to
technical intellectual property rights concerns, not on democratic grounds.
Reflecting such geopolitical primacy, Kuchma bought crucial breathing
space with Washington when he agreed to send troops to Iraq as part of
coalition forces in 2003, which was widely seen as lessening incipient US
criticism. Including military aid, Ukraine remained in this period the
third or fourth largest recipient of US external assistance. In the run up to
the December 2004 elections, Yushchenko promised that as president he
would bring troops home from Iraq; in reality, Kuchma had himself
already committed to a phased scaling down by the time of the election,
thereby lessening this as a point of difference in Washingtons eyes. A key
aim for the US was to use NATO leverage to push Kuchma (unsuccessfully) to include benchmarks on civilian control of the military in Ukraines
NATO action plan. Like the EU, the US declined proactively to back the
Our Ukraine opposition movement. One assessment was that throughout
the post-independence period the priority focus at the geostrategic level
was not on democratization but rather on de-nuclearization.34
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36 A. Guillemoles, Mme la Neige etait Orange: La rvolution ukrainienne, Paris: les Petits
Matins, 2005, pp. 75-77.
37 T. Kuzio, The Oppositions Road to Success, Journal of Democracy 16, no. 2, 2005, p.
127.
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38 International Centre for Policy Studies, Political Commentary, no. 26, August 2005, p. 10.
39 Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Testimony before the
House International Relations Committee, July 27, 2005, p. 5.
40 Cited in R. Shepherd, Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Community: A Strategic Dialogue,
in J. Forbig and R. Shepherd (eds), Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: Strengthening
European and Transatlantic Commitments, Washington: German Marshall Fund, 2005, p.
25.
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41 Stefan Batory Foundation, Will the Orange Revolution bear fruit? EU-Ukraine relations in
2005 and the beginning of 2006, Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2005, p. 13.
42 Olli Rehn, intervention at the Finnish Institute for International Affairs, October 21,
2005.
43 European Commission, The EUs relations with Ukraine, September 12, 2005,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm.
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46 International Centre for Policy Studies, Political Commentary, no. 26, August 2005, p. 8.
47 Statement by External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commission
Press Release IP/06/255, March 2, 2006.
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48 K. Smith, The Outsides: the European Neighbourhood Policy, International Affairs 81,
no. 4, p. 773.
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Recommendations
Ukraine provides lessons for the design of external actors policies prior to
democratic revolutions, when semi-autocrats previously willing to implement some reforms seek desperately to cling to power by reversing the
reform momentum. Ukraine does not represent a complete success story in
this sense, and the efficacy of the international communitys policies could
have been far greater before the autumn of 2004. At the same time, the
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50 H. Nemyria, Ukraine and the European Union: A Fresh Start? in Forbig and Shepherd,
op. cit, p. 39.
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Chapter 5
Venezuela1
Once a democracy promoter itself,2 Venezuela has now become a new target for international democracy promotion efforts. Until 1998, when
Hugo Chvez Fras first won the presidential elections, Latin Americas
most important oil exporter had been seen as a relatively stable representative democracy and welfare state. Today, Venezuela is an example of a
reverse transition away from liberal democracy, albeit one undertaken by
electoral means. Under Chvez, Venezuela has become one of the most
prominent cases of political change towards leftist semi-authoritarianism.
This chapter outlines the limited success of international responses to this
decline in democratic quality. During the first stage of the Chvez government (1999-2002), some international actors concentrated their efforts on
supporting the opposition movement; after 2002, external actors engagement focused on the use of multilateral instruments to promote dialogue
and elections. While neither approach has succeeded in avoiding
Venezuelas drift away from representative democracy, it is argued here that
the latter strategy could facilitate stronger, more effective efforts to reduce
polarization between the government and anti-Chavistas.
Background
President Hugo Chvez represents a return to politics in uniform,
though achieved through elections rather than a military coup. The
Chvez military-civil political project is based on the triad of strongman,
plus army, plus people.3 This shift has taken place in a context of what
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4 Since the October 2004 elections, nine of Venezuelas 23 states are governed by retired officers; the military participates in Chvezs cabinet and coordinates several development projects.
5 See S. Ellner and D. Hellinger (eds), Venezuelan Politics in the Chvez Era: Class,
Polarization & Conflict, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 215ff.
6 Ibid., p. 20.
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For four decades (1958-1998), Venezuela then the worlds fifth largest
oil exporter stood out as one of the regions more stable varieties of representative democracy with a strong bureaucratic welfare state. Political
power alternated through democratic elections between the two main
political parties (Accin Democrtica (AD) and Comit de Organizacin
Poltica Electoral Independiente (COPEI)), which produced a corporatistclientelist system based on the distribution of oil profits between loyal
party followers, trade unions and business organizations. This pact, based
on the so-called Punto Fijo political party agreement, excluded the communists and the military. The corporatist system began to weaken when
oil revenues were reduced and the burden of debt services restricted the
continuity of clientelist policies. Social exclusion and poverty were the
consequences of the severe crisis that culminated in the violent 1989
Caracazo riots.
The eroding of the Punto Fijo agreement opened the way for the
empowerment of former Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chvez. In this sense,
Chvez was not the cause, but the consequence of the crisis of Venezuelas
liberal democracy. Chvez entered politics by non-democratic means,
attempting to wrest power through two (failed) military coups in 1992.
After spending two years in jail, Chvez was freed by then President Rafael
Caldera. Despite the attempted coups, Chvez was permitted to stand as
a presidential candidate and won power in December 1998, through a fair
and transparent process.
In short, the gradual decline of representative, clientelist and elitist
democracy prepared the ground for Chvezs self-made Bolivarian
Revolution supported, at least in its initial stages, by the masses of poor
urban and rural citizens (poverty affects nearly 70 percent of the
Venezuelan population). Chvezs time in office can be divided into two
main periods: first, the construction of the Bolivarian state between
1999 and 2002; and second, a concentration of power and a Chvez
Revolution after 2002. A failed military coup against Chvez, in April
2002, was the most important factor in strengthening the presidents hold
on power. The holding of the recall referendum in 2004 modestly reduced
the polarization between chavistas and anti-chavistas. Both stages of chavismo have been highly influenced by changes in the price of oil,7 the main
source of state revenue and public employment.
7 Oil accounts for 80 percent of export earnings and more than half of state revenues.
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8 According to an article written by Chvez in the mid-1990s, his Bolivarian project implies a
holistic reconstruction of the state and the political system based on legitimacy and sovereignty. See H. Chvez, Pacto de Punto Fijo: el fin, Rebelin, Caracas, December 13,
2004.
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11 Declaration against Violence, for Peace and Democracy, February 18, 2003; and May 29,
2003.
12 The role of Smate in the domestic political game is somewhat ambivalent. Although it
sees itself as an NGO or as a consultancy dedicated to improving democratic conditions,
according to local observers Smate is also perceived as a (non-registered) opposition party.
13 This followed a large internal debate that threatened to divide the party.
14 Nearly 50 percent of the Venezuelan voters are qualified as ni ni , neither for Chvez nor
for the opposition.
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tions produced a government majority strong enough to raise the possibility of amending the 1999 Constitution in order to allow Chvez to run
again for the presidency in 2012.
Once he had consolidated his power at home and was backed by high
oil revenues (GDP increased by 17.3 percent in 2004), Chvez gradually
began to implement his policy of twenty-first century socialism, both in
and outside of the country. Based on a close alliance with Cuba the two
countries signed an agreement to exchange Venezuelan oil for Cuban doctors and teachers the government created several social missions
(misiones) in the poor areas of Venezuela in order to alleviate poverty15 and
to win votes and support for the president. According to local observers,
the missions supposedly a proposal made by Fidel Castro were one of
the main reasons for Chvezs victory in the recall referendum. In order
to promote the political empowerment of the poor, the government also
began to create local committees to organize infrastructure (water, land,
housing) in the barrios.16 On the economic front, Chvez implemented
agrarian reforms that included expropriations and land occupation, limited and conditioned foreign investment in the oil sector17 and threatened
to suspend several contracts with international oil firms (particularly the
US company, Exxon). Furthermore, following the Smate case, the government proposed a new law that would restrict external funding of
national NGOs.
Abroad, Chvez promoted his anti-imperialist integration project,
ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for America), announced full Mercosur
membership, launched the regional oil-initiative Petrosur, created the alternative television channel Telesur, signed several weapons deals (with Russia
and Spain) and openly supported leftist movements or parties in Latin
America, particularly in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua and Mexico.
Oil was the main instrument for Hugo Chvezs regional power ambitions:
Venezuela offered preferential oil conditions to the Caribbean states,
including Cuba; agreed with Argentina and Brazil to create the new oil
15 The most successful of the thirteen missions have been Barrio Adentro, with the presence
of Cuban doctors in poor areas of Venezuela, and Mercal, aimed at the creation of statesupported popular markets. All of the missions are criticized strongly because of state
bureaucracy and control, lack of transparency (the missions for the most part are managed
by former military personnel and ministry officials) and high levels of inefficiency.
16 Local empowerment is beginning to conflict with Chvezs idea of power concentration.
17 Foreign investors must engage in joint ventures with PDVSA, which has a majority of at
least 51 percent. Furthermore, foreign companies have to invest part of their profits in a
social fund created by the government.
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company Petrosur; and made a pact with the Andean countries to establish
Petroandino, a common energy market. Oil-based strategic alliances with
Russia, China and Iran were also pursued.
International Responses
18 Sixty percent of Venezuelan oil exports go to the United States, which purchases between
12 14 percent of its oil imports from the Andean country.
19 See statement by P. T. Reeker, deputy spokesman, Venezuela, Change of Government,
April 12, 2002.
20 Press Releases Archive of the US Embassy in Venezuela, 2002.
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21 According to the British newspaper, The Observer, Otto Reich, Elliot Abrams and John
Negroponte had been closely linked to the golpistas. The Observer, London, April 21, 2002.
22 See M. Sullivan, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy, CRS Report for the
Congress (updated April 1, 2005), Washington, D.C., p. 8.
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prominent on the EUs political agenda for Latin America. Despite the
countrys increasing political problems, the European Union still treats
Venezuela as part of the group-to-group, EU-Andean Community dialogue, which focuses mainly on non-political issues such as integration,
drugs control, development aid and trade. Apart from the individual relations maintained by its member states, the EU has not established any
channel for bilateral dialogue with Venezuela and even development cooperation is mainly part of the Commissions package for the Andean
Community. Although the European Commission has a country strategy
paper for Venezuela, the focus of this strategy is on economic and social policy. Political problems, such as violations of human rights, civilian insecurity, prison conditions or the role of the military in politics are mentioned,
but not addressed in any concrete way by political reform aid projects.23
Despite limited economic interests (Venezuela accounts for only 0.3
percent of EU exports, and the EU for less than 10 percent of Venezuelan
exports),24 EU member states have insisted on maintaining positive relations
with Chvez. EU governments, particularly those of Germany, France and
Spain, have received the Venezuelan president on several occasions. Due to
the engagement of British, French, Spanish and other European oil companies in Venezuela from 2000 on, European foreign investment has become
even more significant relative to US investment flows.
Before Chvez came to power and during the first years of his presidency, Germany Venezuelas main trading partner in Europe was the most
active EU member state in Venezuelan politics and the only one really
engaged in democracy promotion. Its activities have been channeled by
the main German political foundations, which have been important actors
in Venezuelan domestic policy. Particularly before 1999, and for at least
two decades, German political foundations worked in Venezuelan politics
and could be said to have been complicit in the deterioration of the democratic system. Before the rise of Hugo Chvez, the social democratic
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) established a strong alliance with the
trade unions and the AD (the traditional social democratic party), while
the Christian Democratic-oriented Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS)
maintained close ties with the conservative COPEI and the business organization Fedecmaras. After 1998, the FES decided not to work so closely
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France adopted a much clearer position against the coup attempt and
can be considered a clear supporter of Hugo Chvez. In an official statement, the French government immediately condemned the failed coup.
According to a French government official, the electoral processes under
Chvez were acceptable and reflected the sociological reality of the country. Close French-Venezuelan relations are based on common political
interests and personal ties. Indeed, the French government has shared in
some of Chvezs challenge to US dominance. The political alliance with
Chvez is also linked to the personal interest of Prime Minister
Dominique de Villepin, who studied at the Lycee Francais in Caracas.
The French government has received the Venezuelan president on six
occasions. Bilateral cooperation has been particularly strong in oil, transport, medicine and social projects; moreover, close political and aid relations have mirrored growing economic interests. After the United States,
and due to the presence of Total, France has become the second largest foreign investor in Venezuela.
In terms of domestic political debate, it was in Spain where Chvezs
election had the greatest impact. Similar to Spains relations with Cuba,
Venezuela has been used more as a platform for internal Spanish party
struggles rather than for foreign policy objectives. Within the EU, Spain
was the only country to recognize the interim government of Pedro
Carmona. Under the 1996-2004 premiership of Jos Mara Aznar, Spain
openly expressed its support for the opposition and distanced itself from
the Chvez government.28 Although the Venezuelan president made an
official visit to Spain in February 2000, and Jos Mara Aznar signed a
bilateral trade accord in Caracas in July 1999, political relations between
the two governments were tense and reached their most critical moment
during the coup attempt.
For the first time ever, on April 12, 2002, Spain issued a common
statement with the United States, clearly in favor of the oppositions coup
attempt. According to press reports, the US-Spanish statement was based
on a previous pact between Aznar and Bush. The then Mexican Foreign
Minister Jorge Castaeda explained that the Spanish and US ambassadors
in Venezuela tried to convince several European and Latin American governments to join the declaration. Furthermore, Castaeda affirmed that
one day after the military coup failed, on April 13, 2002, US and Spanish
Ambassadors Charles Shapiro and Manuel Viturro, respectively, met with
28 In a recent interview in Quito, Ecuador, Jos Mara Aznar considered Chvez a huge risk
for democracy in the Americas. El Nuevo Herald, Miami, November 23, 2005.
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38 See Press Release of the US State Department, Washington, D.C., July 24, 2002.
39 US government officials openly criticize the concentration of power, arms purchases and its
alliance with Cuba; meanwhile Chvez threatened to cut oil supplies to the United States
several times.
40 With this argument, the chavistas began to buy arms and create a popular defense system
similar to that of Cuba.
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ernment to monitor national dialogue with the opposition. Political leadership within the Tripartite Working Group (the involvement of three
institutions was a requirement imposed by Chvez) was personally
assumed by the OAS Secretary General Gaviria.
In a joint statement on September 13, 2002, the Tripartite Group
(OAS, UNDP and the Carter Center) stated that they understood that
Venezuelas problems can and should be solved by Venezuelans within the
framework of the Constitution and the law. During their first mission to
Venezuela, government officials and opposition representatives signed a
Declaration of Principles for Peace and Democracy in Venezuela, setting
the ground for negotiations between the parties under the international
umbrella of the Tripartite Mission. Direct negotiations between the government and opposition started on November 8, 2002; however, the
process was soon interrupted by the general strike that began on December
2 and ended at the beginning of February 2003.
In the middle of the general strike, Brazilian President Lula da Silva
decided to create the Group of Friends of the OAS Secretary General for
Venezuela and to mediate in the internal crisis. On an initial visit to
Venezuela, the six countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Spain and the
United States) sought to achieve conciliation between the parties, end the
strike and get the parties to return to negotiations. When the Tripartite
Group also intervened, the opposition finally ended the general strike and
returned to dialogue with the government. Under the umbrella of the
Tripartite Group, in February 2003, the parties signed a first pact on peaceful conflict resolution. At the end of May, in a second agreement, government and opposition decided to convoke a recall referendum on Chvez,
if the opposition were able to mobilize the necessary support (20 percent
of registered voters).
In close cooperation, OAS and Carter Center engagement focused on
the recall process and its three different stages: collection of signatures, verification and confirmation of the results.41 Indeed, the OAS-Carter
Center-UNDP tripartite mission was the most important external intervention in the process that led to the celebration of the referendum on
August 15, 2004, which initially had been rejected by the Chvez government. OAS, UNDP and Carter Center efforts were strongly backed by the
six nations included in the Group of Friends. In particular, coordination
between Brazil and the United States, and the pressure they exerted on
41 See T. Piccone, op.cit., 2005; and M. Kornblith, op. cit., pp. 124-138.
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their respective allies the Chvez government and the opposition was
essential in securing the national pact.
Although the outcome of the referendum reinforced Chvezs position,
the celebration of the popular consultation itself met the demands of the
opposition for a chance to unseat Chvez. However, the results of the referendum, as well as the fairness and transparency of the process, were questioned by the opposition. A second audit carried out by the OAS and the
Carter Center confirmed Chvezs clear victory,42 despite continuing
doubts expressed within Venezuela over technical procedures.
The Group of Friends President Lula da Silvas first foreign policy initiative was immediately recognized by the Chvez government as a neutral partner. The Group advocated a peaceful, democratic, constitutional
and electoral outcome of the political crisis. Despite differences between
Brazil and Chile, on the one hand, and the US and Spain, on the other, the
consensus-building process within the group was a helpful exercise in
reaching a negotiated solution to the political polarization and an agreement between the different external actors. The support of the six states in
the Group also strengthened the credibility of OAS and Carter Center
activities in Venezuela.43 After the celebration of the referendum, the Carter
Center closed its office in Caracas. Nonetheless, in its final report on the
recall referendum, the Carter Center affirmed that the consultation
reflected the divisions in the country and that it alone could not solve
the underlying differences within society.44 The Carter Centers engagement has been criticized by part of the opposition for working too closely
with the Chvez government.
The UNDP commenced a range of activities in Venezuela in 2002,
immediately after the failed military coup. According to a UNDP representative, the polarization between government and opposition was the
cause of high levels of political violence. Before the mediation process, the
regional UNDP office carried out a series of interviews with different
actors in Venezuela (opposition, church, government, NGOs), and concluded that the polarization process was the main obstacle to the countrys
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45 Organization of American States, Observaciones preliminares de la OEA sobre las elecciones parlamentarias en Venezuela, (press release), Washington, D.C., December 6, 2005.
46 European Union, Declaration by the Presidency, on behalf of the European Union, on the
situation in Venezuela, Brussels, December 9, 2002.
47 European Commission, Unin Europea despliega Misin de Observacin Electoral en
Venezuela para las elecciones legislativas, (press statement,) Brussels, November 15, 2005.
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The result was, at the least, ambivalent. On the one hand, the presence
of 160 EU observers (40 of them long-term) headed by a Portuguese member of the European Parliament (MEP), Jos Albino Silva Peneda, strengthened transparency and fairness of the electoral procedures. On the other
hand, the extremely low participation rate and the oppositions withdrawal, reduced the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections. Although the
chavistas tried to use the presence of EU observers to improve their international image, the mission criticized both the opposition and the government in its report.48 Surprised by the withdrawal of opposition parties
four days before elections,49 the EU stated that the elections did not contribute to reducing divisions in Venezuelan society and thus, represented a
lost opportunity. The EU mission also, however, criticized the composition of the CNE, which gave a favorable advantage to the government.
According to EU officials, the elections had a negative impact on both sets
of political actors: it was suggested that they were a huge failure for the
government and a suicide for the opposition. According to official statements, the mission was successful in contributing to an increase in the
acceptance and visibility of EU engagement in Venezuela. However, the
criticism of the conditions surrounding the elections implicitly acknowledged the limited impact of the EUs own electoral observation.
Aside from two small projects of 1.2 million euros in the framework of
the multi-annual human rights program in the Andean Community,50 the
EU has not financed long-term initiatives on human rights and democracy in Venezuela. According to European officials, in the framework of its
social cohesion policy towards Latin America, the EU has been interested
in supporting Chvezs missions in poor areas. However, the Chvez government has been reluctant to accept foreign assistance, including aid from
the European Commission.
After the failed military coup, Spain continued to be a key player in EU
policy towards Venezuela. Similar to the shifts in its relations with Cuba,
Venezuela has been used as an instrument for domestic battles between the
two main political parties, the conservative Popular Party (PP) and the
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social democratic Socialist Party (PSOE). This was evident after March
2004, when then Prime Minister Aznars PP lost elections to PSOE. While
Aznar had encouraged opposition forces in Venezuela particularly
Smate, Fedecmaras and COPEI new PSOE Prime Minister Jos Luis
Rodrguez Zapatero built stronger relations with the chavistas rather than
with the opposition parties (although for historic reasons, the PSOE had
closer relations with the AD). This change of policy under the Rodrguez
Zapatero government had a strong impact on relations between Spain and
the United States.
After March 2004, there were several reciprocated visits between
Spanish and Venezuelan ministers and a series of bilateral agreements were
signed. Additionally, Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos caused
controversy when he accused the Aznar government of having directly
supported the 2002 golpistas. In part, the Spanish policy of rapprochement to the Venezuelan government reflects the conviction that it is easier to monitor respect for human rights and democracy through an open
dialogue with Chvez rather than by isolating his government. In this
sense, the Spanish approach towards Venezuela is part of a foreign policy
based on dialogue and multilateralism, which is favored by the Rodrguez
Zapatero government. However, the current Spanish policy towards
Venezuela probably has more to do with the bitter polarization between
the PSOE and PP than with foreign policy positions per se. Rodrguez
Zapatero used his privileged position with the chavistas to mediate primarily in regard to the tense relations between Colombia and Venezuela, and
not on the democratic shortcomings within Venezuela. In March 2005,
the Spanish and Brazilian governments organized a special summit in
Venezuela with Presidents Chvez and Uribe to improve relations between
the neighboring states.
The most controversial issue for Spain, in this case, at home and abroad
was a weapons deal with Venezuela. Negotiations for this deal began in
March and were concluded on November 28, 2005, when Spanish Defense
Minister Jos Bono traveled to Caracas and signed an agreement with
Hugo Chvez for the sale of twelve transport aircraft and eight coastal
patrol ships worth over 1.3 million euros.51 US Ambassador to Spain
Eduardo Aguirre had warned the Spanish government not to sign the deal
because the sale could be a destabilizing factor in the region.52 The agree-
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tion between the government and opposition. This has been the principal
focus of the OAS, Carter Center and UNDP, which have established themselves as neutral, external mediators in the conflict. Unlike national actors,
neither the OAS nor the Carter Center needs to defend economic or other
interests in Venezuela.
It could be argued that the international communitys primary focus on
tempering polarization has trumped any concern with democracy per se;
despite the 2003 national pacts, democratic space in Venezuela has continued to narrow. However, it could be countered that promoting consensus
and strengthening moderates on both sides is an essential step towards creating conditions that are more favorable to an eventual and smooth emergence of high quality democracy. After all, US and Spanish overt support
for the opposition failed to bring about democratic change in Venezuela,
and indeed has probably been prejudicial to democratic dynamics. The
agreement between the government and opposition to solve the crisis in a
peaceful manner by holding the recall referendum was a significant step
forward; it is very likely that Venezuela could have descended into civil war
without the engagement of multilateral organizations and the Group of
Friends.
Although criticized by sectors of the opposition as non-impartial actors,
the Carter Center and the OAS assumed an important role as neutral
mediators in the political conflict. It should also be pointed out that, in
Latin America, Venezuela is one of the prime examples of multilateral
democracy promotion backed by the most important national states
(Brazil, Spain and the United States) and regional organizations (OAS and
Rio Group). In particular, the shift in US policy towards a multilateral
approach, after the coup attempt, paved the way for a peaceful solution to
the conflict.
Aside from Spain, which used Venezuela as a platform for domestic
rather than foreign policy, the EU has not been an important political
actor. One reason for this is that development assistance plays a minor role
in Venezuela and European democracy efforts generally derive their influence from aid resources. Furthermore, the EUs minor role can be attributed to the fact that Venezuela has no prominent bilateral relationship with
the EU, but is treated in the framework of relations with the Andean
Community, which is focused on sub-regional integration. However, the
EU can indeed be considered an impartial although passive player, while
the US acted more as a spoiler by taking the side of the opposition and
avoiding dialogue with Chvez.
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53 See M. Falcoff, The Chvez Challenge. Venezuelas Leader is a Regional Nuisance, American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, August 29, 2005.
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needs a new political pact between all political and social actors, including
the military. In this sense, the approach of the OAS and the Carter Center
to mediate between the government and opposition and promote dialogue
and capacity-building for peaceful conflict resolution in Venezuela, has
been more appropriate than EU and US policy. Thus, the EU and the US,
in particular, should change the focus of their engagement in Venezuela.
Although the EU has been more focused on national reconciliation and the
US on democratic deficits, the policies of both partners towards Chvezs
government have been aimed at the holding of elections and the strengthening of the opposition movement.
Recommendations
The principal argument of this chapter is that the international community should redirect democracy promotion strategies in Venezuela from an
electoral to a bilateral and multilateral dialogue approach. The main lesson to draw from the August 2004 referendum is that electoral promotion
is no longer a viable strategy for a democratic (re)transition in Venezuela.
As one expert points out, for Chvez, elections are instruments to be used
at the service of a personality cult and it is a bitter irony that elections
have served so often and so well to promote the ambitions of a group and
a political project that opposes democracy.54 The international community (and particularly the United States) should accept the fact that political
opposition in Venezuela is weak and lacks legitimacy. Recognizing that
Venezuelas problems derive less from electoral conditions than they do
from political polarization and an increasingly seized and militarized
state, the international community needs to change the focus of its democracy promotion strategies. The following recommendations are outlined
for international actors in this regard.
VENEZUELA
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include a long-term approach towards the construction of a new democratic and social consensus between all political parties and organized civil society. A long-term engagement for consensus-building will be necessary to
overcome mutual mistrust and increase confidence between both political
groups and their followers in order to stop ongoing democratic decline in
Venezuela and to foster national reconciliation. Such engagement would
require strong (diplomatic and financial) efforts by the international community for confidence-building, peaceful conflict resolution, institutionbuilding measures and new formulas for power-sharing.
Aside from its own bilateral relations with Venezuela, the EU should
be a more active political partner in these multilateral fora. As an important third party actor, the EU as a whole, and not only Spain should
join the OAS and other multilateral efforts in promoting a permanent,
national dialogue in Venezuela. EU officials themselves lament the lack
of an active EU role in multilateral initiatives, particularly within the
framework of the OAS. Political engagement by the EU in Venezuela
would also increase the visibility of European activities more generally in
Latin America, an aspiration recently expressed by the European
Commission. The United States should continue to prioritize its engagement through multilateral organizations and, particularly, the OAS. In
Latin America, multilateral efforts for democracy promotion have generally proved to be more successful than unilateral pressure or overt support
for opposition forces.
These various multilateral initiatives should lead to further efforts to
promote regular channels of dialogue between the government and opposition. There is a need for deepened consensus between political parties
and other organizations opposed to Chvez, on the one hand, and the government, on the other. At the same time, actors such as the Carter Center
and the OAS need to demonstrate that their (correct) focus on tempering
political polarization is translated into a strategy capable of meaningful
democratic gains, and does not unwittingly appease or give further succor
to semi-authoritarianism.
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VENEZUELA
149
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the only viable strategy in Venezuela seems to be the promotion of regular contacts with, as well as between, the main political and social actors
of the country. After the December 2005 parliamentary elections, the
government may be more inclined to a consensus-building policy with
other political and social actors. It will be difficult for Chvez to promote
his model of participatory democracy, having won the elections with a
minority support of less than 25 percent of Venezuelan citizens. This
might encourage national dialogue on the main national themes, following a suggestion made by Foreign Minister Al Rodrguez. The recently
started dialogue between the government and the Catholic Church (traditionally opposed to Chvez), as well as closer contacts with the countrys
main business organization, Fedecmaras, are hopeful signs for a necessary
process of national reconciliation. The international community should
support these efforts and try to extend the governments agenda to the
political level.
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Yemen1
Yemen provides a cautionary tale on how to handle a breakthrough
moment in transitional democracies. A little more than a decade ago the
country was portrayed as one of the brightest hopes for democratic reform
in the Arab world. After the north and south unified at the beginning of
the 1990s, Yemen enjoyed many of democracys formal trappings, including multi-party elections and a relatively open civil society. Responding to
this apparent breakthrough, the West gradually increased its aid allocations. Western support for democracy, however, was modest and did not
prevent a steady deterioration in Yemens political liberalization. A particular challenge in this case related to articulating a successful democracybuilding strategy in the context of pervasive poverty. In the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, some Western donors transitioned from providing poverty reduction and economic aid to a priority
focus on security cooperation. A raft of new Western reform initiatives
accompanied this heightened attention; however, it was essentially concerned more with stabilization than democratization. This chapter argues
that the European Union (EU) and the United States failed to provide sufficient support for Yemen during its initial attempts at democracy; when
they did intensify their political reform strategies after 9/11, such efforts
were slanted towards security considerations and could be characterized as
too little, too late. In the case of the US, counter-terrorism efforts took
primacy, while the EU and some of its member states sought to avert the
countrys descent into failed state status.
Background
When the (northern) Yemen Arab Republic and the (southern) Peoples
Democratic Republic of Yemen joined to form the Republic of Yemen in
1990, the newly unified state held a constitutional referendum in which
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2 International Crisis Group, Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile State,
ICG Middle East Report no. 8, January 8, 2003, p. 4.
3 J. Schwedler, Yemens Aborted Opening, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 4, October
2002, p. 48.
4 J. Schwedler, op. cit., p. 49.
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153
tions gave the norths General Popular Congress (GPC) nearly 40 percent
of parliamentary seats, with the remaining share divided between the
souths YSP and the Islamist Yemeni Assembly for Reform or Islah (a
coalition of tribal and Islamist groups seen as allied to the north). Islah,
having won more seats than YSP, was brought in as a junior coalition
partner and given several cabinet portfolios, despite a previously agreed
YSP-GPC power-sharing agreement, which stipulated that regardless of
electoral results they would form a coalition government. Aggravating
matters further, Islah was seen as close to the GPC elite, as it was formed
by many long-time supporters of Saleh. The chair of Islah, Sheikh
Abdallah al-Ahmar, also heads the Hashid tribal confederation, of which
Salehs Sanhan tribe is a member. The YSP complained that the transitional agreement was not being honored, while the GPC accused the YSP
of plotting the secession of the south.5
Hostilities between the north and south culminated in a three-month
civil war in 1994, which concluded with the defeat of the souths army, as
well as the fragmentation and exile of its leadership. The GPC and Islah
divided up cabinet positions and parliament re-elected Saleh as president;
in a demise of power-sharing, the YSP was excluded from the new governing coalition.6 Since then, discriminatory state policies towards the south
have been a threat to the countrys stability (the south complains that it
produces 60 percent of the national income but receives fewer benefits
than the northern governorates). Thereafter, the GPC moved gradually to
consolidate its control over the executive branch and restrict pluralism.7
Islahs participation in government contributed to increased conservatism.
The Islamist party managed to change the wording of the constitution to
have Islamic law defined as the sole rather than principal source of law.8
In 1995, Islah held nine ministerial positions, which represented the peak
of its influence.
Parliamentary elections in 1997 were marred by irregularities and boycotted by the YSP. The GPC won 60 percent of the seats in parliament.
Dominating all branches of government, the GPC was in a position to sup-
5 Ibid.
6 International Crisis Group, Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile State,
ICG Middle East Report no. 8, op cit., p. 5.
7 F. Burgat, Yemen: Between the Sanaa Declaration and the Old Formula of Arab Politics,
Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 2, Issue 3, March 2004.
8 J. Schwedler, op. cit., p. 50.
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press future competition and further embed its dominance. In 1999, the
first presidential elections gave Saleh an overwhelming victory, with a
reported 96 percent of the vote. He faced no genuine opposition candidate, only a GPC placeman. No other candidate managed to win the support of the 31 members of parliament needed to be eligible to run in the
elections. The only real opposition candidate from the YSP was thus
not permitted to run as the YSP had no representation in parliament.
Indeed, increasingly it was recognized that the main de facto constraint on
the regime came simply from the lack of economic and military resources
needed to exercise full authority and control of state territory.9 Despite
Salehs coalition-building skills, tribal conflicts over declining resources and
benefits from development projects led to constant skirmishes. In general,
the government receives allegiance from the people in exchange for material benefits or government posts and public patronage is used to reinforce
negotiated consensus. The tribes closely connected to the president tend
to be over-represented in the army and security forces and, since unification, the post of prime minister has traditionally gone to someone from the
oil-rich, southern Hadramawt governorate.
Saleh continued to consolidate power through a 2001 constitutional
referendum which extended parliamentary terms from four to six years and
presidential terms from five to seven. The president was also granted new
powers to dissolve parliament, while the presidentially-appointed consultative council almost doubled in size and was given the power to vote jointly with parliament on any legislative matter of the presidents choosing.10
Despite the close relationship between its leadership and President Saleh,
Islah has been highly critical of these constitutional amendments and has
opposed the government openly on this issue since then.
Parliamentary elections in 2003 continued to show irregularities. The
GPC maintained an advantage through its chairing of national and local
election commissions; privileged access to public media, transportation,
jobs and services; and pro-government publicity paid for with state
resources.11 Opposition parties, including Islah and the YSP, joined forces
and agreed not to challenge one another directly in these elections. The
electoral outcome gave the GPC 225 seats, Islah 46 and the YSP only seven.
YEMEN
155
12 Freedom House, Yemen Country Report, Freedom in the World, 2005, p. 705.
13 US Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2004
2005, Washington, US Department of State, March 28, 2005.
14 G. D. Johnsen, Salihs Road to Reelection, Middle East Report Online, January 13, 2006.
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15 http://www.yementimes.com/newsarticle.php?a=20_2005_12_26_2
YEMEN
157
16 http://www.yobserver.com/cgi-bin/yobserver/exec/view.cgi/1/8913
17 http://yementimes.com/newsarticle.php?a=20_2005_12_22_3
18 ARD, Inc., Democracy and Governance Assessment of Yemen. Final Report,
Washington: USAID, 2004, p II.
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to fulfill their mandates. While Yemens civil society has become one of the
freest in the Arab world, in practice it remains beholden to patronage networks and competing family, clan and tribal structures. Moreover, Yemen
has a poverty rate of 40 percent and is the only Arab state with Least
Developed Country (LDC) status; such persistent poverty hinders Yemeni
citizens political participation.
19 International Crisis Group, Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile State,
ICG Middle East Report N. 8, op. cit., p. 57.
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159
20 G. C. Gambill, Explaining the Arab Democracy Deficit, Part II: American Policy,
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol. 5, nos. 8-9, August-September 2003.
21 European Commission Council Communication, Strengthening the EUs Partnership
with the Arab World, Brussels, December 2003.
22 Official Journal of the European Communities, Cooperation between the European
Community and the Republic of Yemen, November 1997.
23 European Parliament, Note on the Political and Economic Situation in Yemen, op. cit.,
p. 10.
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24 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action in the Middle East: A SixYear Progress Report, report released by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
Washington: US Department of State, December 6, 2002.
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27 This situation refers to one in which a CIA-operated, unmanned aircraft fired a missile at a
car killing an al Qaeda suspect allegedly traveling with four members of the Aden-Abyan
Islamic Army and an American citizen.
28 International Crisis Group, Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile
State, ICG Middle East Report no. 8, op. cit., p. 25.
29 Dibble also testified to Congress that health, education and agricultural assistance had
increased as well. Philo Dibble, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs, hearing before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives
One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, August 19, 2004.
30 U.S. Agency for International Development, Press Release, May 2, 2003.
31 Amnesty International, The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security, Amnesty
International, September 23, 2003.
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163
32 www.arabicnews.com /ansub/Daily/Day/040902/2004090216.html
33 European Parliament, Note on the Political and Economic Situation in Yemen, op. cit.,
p. 6.
34 US State Department, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Yemen,
Washington: US State Department, September 2004.
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YEMEN
165
have now denied the link to the fight against terror.36 Training on human
rights standards and civilian control of the military has been included
within International Military Education and Training assistance and the
Defense Departments Counter-Terrorism Fellowships.
After the US decision on the Millennium Challenge Account, the
World Bank announced that it was reducing its aid to Yemen by 34 percent because of the worsening of the regimes performance indicators. The
World Banks three-year envelope, based on 2004 indicators, has decreased
from 410 million dollars for 2003-2005 to 280 million dollars for 20062008. The World Bank indicators, widely used by the donor community,
include, among other things, institutional and reform performance, portfolio performance and a governance discount factor. The World Bank criticized in harsh terms the governments performance in implementing
agreed reforms and explained that the reduction was due to a failure on the
part of the government to meet minimum standards of transparency, efficiency and improvement of the investment environment and its deficiency in fighting corruption.
From the EUs perspective, given the absence of major trade and economic interests, the reasons for seeking to enhance engagement in Yemen
are of a security nature, with the overarching rationale being to prevent
Yemen from becoming a failed state37. In response to the 2003 elections,
the EU commended Yemens government for continuing the process of
democratization. Bilateral relations were strengthened in 2003 with the
decision to launch a political dialogue at the Yemeni governments request.
The EU argued that this political dialogue was the main instrument used
to approach political reform issues. An initial meeting took place in July
2004, and was reported to have focused significantly on democratization.
At the second EU-Yemen Political Dialogue Meeting, held on September
21, 2005 in Brussels, the EU suggested that further forward momentum
was shown by the publication of the governments first annual human
rights report (covering 2004). At the same time, some important points of
concern were raised, including human rights issues, the death penalty,
prison conditions, the judicial system, upcoming elections and independent election observers and press freedoms. It has been agreed recently that
quarterly meetings will be held in Yemen, as well as bi-annual meetings
with President Saleh.
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YEMEN
167
respect for human rights were formally included as funding priorities for
the first time in the 2002-2006 strategy. A separate NGO support program managed by the European Commission committed 5.3 million euros
between 2002 and 2005.
The Commissions 2005-2006 aid program reduced the priority areas
to two: poverty reduction and strengthening pluralism and civil society.
The number of projects was reduced and the budget allocation was 27 million euros, the reduction justified in terms of a lack of absorptive capacity.
Under the proposed 2007-2013 budget, tentative yearly allocations to
Yemen have been set at 1520 million euros a year. The EU strategy highlighted as signs of progress the establishment of a Ministry of Human
Rights and Yemens ratification of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. A commitment was made to increase support for presidential and local elections in 2006. For 2005-2006, 500,000 euros were
allocated from the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR), with a focus on training for the internal security forces.
In terms of bilateral European aid, Germany and the Netherlands have
continued to be the largest donors. Both states have preferred to fund
projects in cooperation with the government of Yemen rather than through
independent channels. For example, since 2003, Germany has been
involved in the establishment of the anti-corruption commission within
the presidential office and in providing technical assistance to the governmental Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA). The
Netherlands has chosen to channel its human rights program through the
Ministry of Human Rights. The 2005 budget for the German development agency (GTZ) was 9.5 million euros, double what it was in 1990; for
2006, a slight decrease to 8 million euros was planned, linked to the new
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) governments efforts to cut spending.
The Dutch government set a budget ceiling of 20.7 million euros in 2004,
and in 2005 allocated 1 million euros to governance issues.
The UKs Department for International Development (DfID) has
recently broadened its program in Yemen with commitments in 2005 of
6 million pounds (8.5 million euros) and a projected 10 million pounds
(14.6 million euros) for 2006, including 3 million pounds (4.4 million
euros) for the first phase of a project on security and judicial reform and
1 million pounds (1.5 million euros) to the Supreme Election and
Referendum Commission. Through the UK Foreign Office, an additional 2 million pounds (3 million euros) were forthcoming, in 2005, for
eleven projects ranging from professional training for women to journalist and district court training. The increased funding can be attributed to
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YEMEN
169
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43 Quoted in D. Finkel, US Ideals Meet Reality in Yemen, Washington Post, December 18,
2005.
44 United Nations Development Program, 2005 Human Development Report, UNDP,
http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm?c=YEM
YEMEN
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reminder of how donors can fund political reform programs over a sustained period of time that do not merely fail to deepen democracy but in
fact proceed against a background of democratic deterioration at the political level. Both the US and EU have chosen to carry out relatively peripheral reform activities that have not addressed the heart of the problem of
decreasing contestation and increasing repression.
In contrast to the US focus on security, the EU has traditionally devoted more of its efforts to development aid, advocating poverty reduction as
a top priority. However, this focus has achieved no better results in the
field of political reform. European policies have been predicated on the
acceptance of the Yemeni governments stated will to democratize. Even
when democracy-related concerns have been raised, blame has rarely been
attached to the government; frequently, complaints are couched in statements like, the government is encouraging reconciliation but an active
opposition, inside and outside of Yemen, and harassment by security forces
are making this problem more difficult.45 This has been shown to be inadequate as an international response to Yemens plight.
Recommendations
It remains to be seen whether donors intensification of the focus on political reform has arrived too late for Yemen, more than a decade on from the
end of its civil war. While a 9/11 effect has attenuated the neglect of the
international community, it has not completely corrected it. Attention
seems to have been redirected from other parts of the Arab world towards
Yemen, but the degree of commitment is still insufficient. The presidential election in September 2006 will prove a genuine test of both Yemens
and the international communitys genuine commitment to democracy.
More effective international actions, as detailed in the recommendations
that follow, will be required at this pivotal moment if the Community of
Democracies is not to bear silent witness to a further atrophy of Yemens
one-time democratic potential.
YEMEN
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commitment to the cause of Yemeni reform, and this would include greater
aid allocations. In 2003, Yemen received 243 million dollars in ODA, representing 2.2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), a huge decrease
from the 8.4 percent received in 1990. Additional interest in Yemen
should not be limited to election times or to the latest democracy and governance conference organized in Sanaa.
YEMEN
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create a new body after its conference, but the extent of the independence
of this body is not clear. This is a point where pressure is necessary from
the international community to ensure current plans for change take a
democratic path.
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Chapter 7
Zimbabwe1
Zimbabwe, like the case of Burma, presents one of the most dramatic
examples of an intransigent ruler determined to fend off increasingly persistent international demands for democratic reforms. Even as all political,
economic and social indicators point toward potential ruin of what was
once one of southern Africas more promising post-colonial states, Robert
Mugabe continues tightening the screws on the political opposition and
thwarting international efforts to force him to transition out of power.
Cloaking himself as the liberator of Zimbabwe from the heavy hand of
neo-colonial rule, Mugabe has outmaneuvered both domestic and foreign
critics who remain divided and weak. Regardless of when or how the 81year old autocrat departs the scene, Zimbabwe will face a long uphill climb
toward consolidating democracy and repairing the economic damage
wrought by their erstwhile leader. The international community, if it is
serious about democracy promotion, should prepare the way now by
ensuring a post-Mugabe democratic Zimbabwe has the resources and priority it needs to succeed.
Background
Zimbabwe, a country with extensive natural resources and an agricultural
sector that once exported large quantities of corn, tobacco and cotton,
faces a severe crisis due to politically-motivated mismanagement of the
economy.2 Zimbabwes economy, with one of the worlds highest inflation
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rates at over 700 per cent,3 collapsed at an alarming 5 per cent in 2004
and is headed toward a major humanitarian crisis if the government is
unable to find the funds necessary to import adequate supplies of food,
fuel and power. Overseeing this precipitous decline stands President
Robert Mugabe, one of Africas independence heroes turned autocrat.
Mugabe, a former rebel leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU), came to power in February 1980 in the first post-independence
elections in the former white-controlled British colony then known as
Rhodesia.4 While these elections were found by the British government
and the United Nations to be free and fair,5 ZANU had promised to return
to war if it did not win the election.6
Mugabe promised early on to lead the nation in a process of reconciliation and reconstruction by integrating the armed forces, reestablishing
social services and education in rural areas, resettling an estimated one million refugees and displaced persons who had fled during the guerilla uprisings, and redistributing land. To this end, Mugabes first cabinet was comprised of members of his own ZANU party, the rival Zimbabwe African
Peoples Union (ZAPU) party, including Mugabes personal rival Joshua
Nkomo, and independent white members of parliament and senators.7
Tensions between the two factions worsened, however, leading to widespread violence and human rights abuses by the army with as many as
20,000 civilian deaths. During this time, Nkomo and his followers denied
connections with the dissidents and, out of desperation for the violence to
stop, negotiated an eventual merger of ZANU and ZAPU in 1989.
The 1990 elections, which saw voter turnout decline to 54 per cent,
resulted in an overwhelming victory for the newly merged ZANU party
which won 117 of 120 seats. International observers declared balloting fair
but noted that the campaign itself was neither free nor fair.8 Not satisfied
with a de facto one-party state, Mugabe proposed single party rule in
September 1990, but his gambit was strongly opposed by members of his
4 Independence was granted on April 18, 1980 and Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, named after
the Great Zimbabwe ruins, built between 1100 AD and 1400 AD by the ancestors of the
modern day Shona.
5 Ozias Tungwarara, Deputy Director, Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project,
personal correspondence, January 18, 2006.
6 J. Chikuhwa, A Crisis of Governance: Zimbabwe, New York: Algora Publishing, 2004, pp. 91.
7 Under the original Zimbabwean Constitution the legislature was divided into two bodies
a 120-seat House of Assembly and a 40-seat Senate. The Senate was abolished when the
Constitution expired in 1990. At that time a single legislative body, the National Assembly,
was created. The Senate was re-established in 2005.
8 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, op. cit.
ZIMBABWE
179
own party and the proposition was taken off the table shortly after it was
proposed.9 Constitutional amendments in 1991 would strengthen government control restoring corporal and capital punishment, and denying
judicial recourse in cases of compulsory purchase of land by the government. Mugabe also maintained control of the media, the security forces,
and a large parastatal sector. Formal political opposition to Mugabe was
limited after the 1990 elections; however, discontent was growing due to
widespread corruption, nepotism and economic mismanagement. After a
series of student and labor union protests against the government in the
mid-1990s, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a new opposition party, was formed in 1999 in response to worsening economic and
human rights conditions.
The first serious contest for the opposition came in February 2000
when a referendum was held on a draft constitution that would permit
Mugabe to seek two additional terms in office, grant government officials
immunity from prosecution, and authorize government seizure of whiteowned land.10 The constitutional referendum was soundly defeated, largely due to grassroots campaigning efforts by the MDC, heavily supported
by white farmers. Less than two weeks after the electoral defeat, the government responded by sanctioning violent expulsion of white farmers
from their land by an informal organization of war veterans, many of
whom were too young to have participated in the war for independence.
While Mugabe denied responsibility for the occupation and resulting violence, he publicly supported both the land invasion and violence, having
already threatened violence against farmers who refused to give up their
land. It is widely acknowledged that Mugabe and ZANU-PF artificially
created this crisis to make land reform a more pressing issue in the
months preceding the 2000 parliamentary election. In April 2000 the
parliament amended the constitution stating that white farmers could
seek compensation for seized land from the former colonial power, and
9 Mugabe: Freedom Fighter Turned Autocrat, BBC News, May 10, 2000,
http//news.bbc.co.uk.
10 Land tenure had long been a contentious issue in Zimbabwean politics. During the
minority white government, approximately 6,700 white farmers owned over 40% of the
land in Zimbabwe. Under the Lancaster Agreement land reform was to have taken place
on a willing seller-willing buyer basis. However, despite goals to resettle 75,000 families
within five years of independence, less than 40,000 were resettled by 1988. Mugabe and
ZANU-PF continued to stall on promises of sweeping land reform well into the 1990s
while using financial support for land reform from the World Bank and UK to award land
to party elites. Chikuhwa, op. cit., pp. 246-249.
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in mid-May a law was passed allowing for more farm seizures without
compensation.11 These efforts were only partially successful as the MDC
experienced a significant victory in the June 2000 parliamentary elections.
Despite electoral irregularities, localized violence, and government intimidation of opposition supporters, the MDC gained 57 of the 150 seats in
the National Assembly.12
ZANU-PF, however, maintained a majority of the seats in parliament
and used its power to push through legislation aimed at limiting further
opportunities for MDC victory. In 2001, for example, parliament passed
the Broadcasting Service Act.13 The act made the state-run Zimbabwe
Broadcasting Corporation in effect the only legal electronic broadcaster in
Zimbabwe.14 Parliament also broadened the Miscellaneous Offences Act,15
originally introduced under white rule in 1964, to allow police to make
arrests at their discretion for almost any perceived offense.16 In addition,
the Public Order and Security Act was enacted, which made it illegal to
criticize the president, publish a false statement that could endanger the
nations economy or security or threaten public trust in the government,
and hold a public gathering without giving authorities a four-day warning.
It also allowed police strictly to regulate public gatherings as well as stop
meetings that they judged a danger to public order.17
It was in this highly restrictive context that presidential elections were
held in March 2002. In addition to the laws cited above, the regulatory
environment was in constant flux as new legislation governing the administration of the elections was being introduced and contested in court right
ZIMBABWE
181
up to the elections.18 For example, until nine days before the election it
was illegal for any civic organization to conduct voter education, leaving
the government-appointed Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) in
control.19 Additionally, the voter registration process disenfranchised many
voters, as was evidenced in the large number of voters turned away at the
polls. This partially stemmed from confusion in the registration process
when the rolls were re-opened for supplementary registration after the
original closing date, a move that was not publicized well enough to allow
all parties to inform their supporters.20 Furthermore, campaigning by the
opposition MDC was made difficult by the Public Order and Security Act
which made it nearly impossible for the opposition to hold political meetings, while ZANU-PF campaigning was largely unaffected. Access to
state-run media was also limited for the MDC in spite of guidelines set by
the Broadcasting Services Act, and coverage was heavily biased towards the
ZANU-PF.21 Of greatest concern, politically-motivated violence took
place throughout the country, including murder and torture perpetrated
mainly by youth and war veterans groups thought to be sanctioned by
ZANU-PF against MDC party members, supporters, and those suspected
of being opponents of the ruling party. Police and party leaders did little
to deny claims of violence.22
There were many complaints of unfair activity on the polling days as
well. The majority of election monitors and supervisors selected by the
ESC were civil servants, with a large number coming from the army and
police forces. In contrast, many local and international observers had difficulty receiving credentials. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network
reported that only 400 of its observers were credentialed, less than onehundredth of the list they had submitted in advance of the election.23
Additionally, many observers from the European Union, including those
from Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, and the UK, were not
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allowed into the country.24 Information regarding polling station locations was not well publicized and in many urban areas the number of
polling stations decreased nearly 50 per cent from the 2000 election.
Notably, many of these decreases took place in MDC strongholds, particularly in the capital city of Harare. The lack of a suitable number of
polling stations significantly slowed down the voting process, leading to
an extension of the election period. However, thousands of citizens were
still unable to vote, even after waiting in line for three days. Meanwhile,
the number of rural polling stations increased and mobile polling stations,
which are difficult to monitor and observe, were deployed. In regards to
the rural vote, some questions have been raised concerning the validity of
the officially reported numbers of registered voters and of voter turnout as
these numbers failed to match reports issued by observers.25 In the end,
Mugabe easily defeated the MDC challenger Morgan Tsvangirai by a 56
to 42 per cent margin. The MDC issued a court challenge to Mugabes
victory that has yet to be adjudicated.
Immediately after the elections, the ZANU-PF-controlled parliament
passed the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, creating a
government-appointed Media and Information Commission (MIC). The
MIC was entrusted with regulating the media, including accrediting journalists and publishers. Under this act, foreign journalists who were not
working for specified time frames with the permission of the MIC were
banned from the country, foreigners with permanent resident status were
prohibited from working without the permission of the MIC, and
Zimbabwean journalists and publishers were forced to register with the
MIC.26 The government then used this law to attack the Daily News, the
only independent print newspaper in Zimbabwe, which had attempted to
challenge the law in the court system. The paper was shut down in 2003
by order of the Supreme Court, after its presses had been bombed and several of its executives, editors, and reporters had been detained by the government.27 In addition to the media restrictions, widespread violence and
intimidation were reported during the by-elections in 2002 and 2003.
Furthermore, MDC leaders Morgan Tsvangirai, Welshman Ncube, and
24 H. Sanomat, Finnish election monitors not let in to Zimbabwe yet, February 13, 2002,
http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020213IE7.
25 Zimbabwe Election Support Network, op. cit.
26 Human Rights Watch, op. cit.
27 M. Glaser, Zimbabwes Daily News Fights Closure with Online Publication, Online
Journalism Review, October 22, 2003, http://www.ojr.org/ojr/glaser/1066860746.php.
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28 Full text of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections can be
found at http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/political_affairs/index.php.
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185
34 Results of the 2005 Senate Elections and Gutu North Parliamentary By-election,
Zimbabwe Election Support Network, 2005.
35 Zimbabwe: A Year in Brief 2005, UN Integrated Regional Information Network, January
12, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org.
36 B. Unendoro, Tribal Rivalry May Split ZANU-PF, Institute for War and Peace
Reporting, March 21, 2005,
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=239371&apc_state=heniacr2005.
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37 K. Vollan, op.cit.; Africa damaged by Mugabe poll, CNN, March 15, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/03/15/zimbabwe.africa/; U.S. Agency for
International Development, Elections and Political Processes: Success Stories, March 17,
2005, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/elections/ss1.html.
38 This agreement states that one of the objectives of relations between the EU and the
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries is promoting institutional reforms and development, strengthening the institutions necessary for the consolidation of democracy, good
governance and for efficient and competitive market economies; and building capacity for
development and partnership. Article 20, Cotonou Agreement.
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189
51 M. Wines, Tough on Togo, Letting Zimbabwe Slide, The New York Times, April 10,
2005.
52 Africa damaged by Mugabe poll. CNN, March 15, 2002,
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/03/15/zimbabwe.africa/.
53 M. Ibenzi, Highlights of 2005, The Zimbabwean,
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/viewinfo.cfm?id=543.
54 K. Vollan op.cit.; see also Sokwanele Civil Action Support Group, Mauritius Watch
Summary, March 2005, http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/mwatch_sokwanelespecialreport_30march2005.html.
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action, other than renewal of current measures, was taken by Western and
Commonwealth actors in the wake of the 2005 elections. However, the
Zimbabwean press has stated that US and UK influence was crucial in a
March 2006 decision by the IMF to continue the suspension of
Zimbabwes voting rights and access to the general resources of the Fund.55
The suspension was enacted due to arrears in Zimbabwes payments to the
IMF since 2001. While the IMF had considered a compulsory expulsion
of Zimbabwe, its payment in full of obligations owed to the General
Resources Account led the Managing Director to withdraw his request for
expulsion. Zimbabwe continues to owe US$119 million to the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)-Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF)
Trust Fund.56
Amid growing pressure from the G8, President Mbeki called for
reforms in Zimbabwe including in areas of freedom of the press, freedom
of assembly, and rule of law in response to the elections.57 Mbeki also
hinted that future economic aid to Zimbabwe, including a loan offer
from South Africa to assist in addressing Zimbabwes current economic
slump, could depend on Mugabes willingness to pursue reform, including working with the MDC to draft a new constitution and hold new
elections. In 2005 alone, Zimbabwe required nearly $1 billion in aid to
fund imports of food, fuel and electricity, and to pay off debt owed to the
International Monetary Fund in order to prevent expulsion from the
IMF. With China declining to provide a $500 million loan that Mugabe
requested in August 2005, Mugabe may eventually be forced to meet
Mbekis demands. However, as of this writing, Zimbabwe was still refusing South Africas loan offer.58
Unlike the OAU, which was the primary regional organization
responding to the 2002 election, the African Union (AU) was created with
a set of goals that include the promotion of democratic principles and
55 M. Huni, Zimbabwe: U.S., UK block IMF Funds, The Herald, March 10, 2006.
http://allafrica.com/stories/200603100233.html; IMF Executive Board Upholds Sanctions
Against Zimbabwe, IMF Press Release 06/45, March 8, 2006, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr0645.htm.
56 IMF Executive Board Upholds Sanctions Against Zimbabwe, IMF Press Release 06/45,
March 8, 2006.
57 In the lead up to the 2005 G8 Summit in Scotland Tony Blair was under pressure from
Members of Parliament to urge action from Mbeki. Hoey Insists Mbeki barred from G8,
The Zimbabwean, June 24, 2005, http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/24-june-2005/katehoey.html.
58 Zimbabwes Commonwealth Suspension Extended, The Independent, December 8,
2003. http://www.royalafricansociety.org/reports_publications/articles/independent_8-12.,
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The UN Secretariat became more active in the wake of the housing crisis caused by Mugabes Operation Murambatsvina. The report submitted by the Secretary Generals Special Envoy Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka
condemned the operation, noting that it was implemented in an indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering.63
The report also stated that the international community should encourage the government to prosecute all those who orchestrated this catastrophe and those who may have caused criminal negligence leading to alleged
deaths, while implicating the entire government as responsible.64 This
report opened up an avenue for continued pressure by Western nations,
including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, to
push for action by the Security Council. The UNSC held an official private meeting in July 2005, despite the disagreement of some UNSC members about whether the issue fell within the scope of the UNSC. The body
was briefed by Special Envoy Kajumulo Tibaijuka who presented her findings and recommendations and answered questions. The United Nations
is also participating in the construction of shelters for those left homeless
by the operation.65 UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan
Egeland, traveled to Zimbabwe in December to negotiate the construction
of housing for those left homeless by the operation.66 Additionally, Kofi
Annan announced plans to travel to Zimbabwe in spring 2006 to survey
the situation personally.67
For years leading up to the current land crisis, the United Kingdom had
been the most prominent advocate for protecting the rights of minority
white landowners. The UK provided nearly 50 million pounds as well as
technical assistance during the 1980s and 1990s to support land reform
efforts. After most of this funding had been spent, proposals were issued
for a new round of funding, resulting in a 1998 Land Conference in
Harare. At this point the British government stated that it would be glad
to support further land reform efforts provided that they met agreed upon
criteria including, transparency, respect for the rule of law, poverty reduction, affordability and consistency with Zimbabwes wider economic inter-
63
64
65
66
67
UN condemns Zimbabwe slum blitz, BBC News, July 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
Ibid.
Security Council Report, op. cit.
Ibid.
Kofi Annan due in Zimbabwe in March, Mail and Guardian Online, January 6, 2006.
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ests.68 Progress continued to this goal until 2000 when bilateral relations
soured due to Mugabes land reform efforts government-backed, violent expulsion of white farmers from their land.69
Currently, the British government is signaling a willingness to normalize relations with Zimbabwe. Recently appointed British Ambassador, Dr.
Andrew Pocock has stated, the commitment of the British government to
the people of Zimbabwe is profound, but before we build bridges, we
need to do a lot of work to lay the foundation.70 Many of those bridges
to improving bilateral relations will rely on Zimbabwes response to international concerns, which the UK has played a leading role in shaping.
According to a spokesperson for the British government in Harare, these
include the issues raised by the UN report on Operation Murambatsvina
and adherence to the principles agreed to at the 1998 Land Conference.71
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of democracy, even though many African nations and regional organizations have made commitments to the promotion of democracy.
Zimbabwe, and until recently South Africa, have spoken out against
Western actors trying to impose their will on African peoples, and even
democratically-oriented groups have criticized the West for failing to
understand the needs of African democracy.
While the West pushes for liberal democratic reforms, some African
leaders claim the need for a different style of democracy, one shaped to
conform to cultural tradition and the needs of a developing economy. This
split is not a new development, but results from years of distrust and
resentment, mostly due to negative colonial experiences under oppressive
white democracies. Thus, when Western governments, NGOs and international organizations provide funding, training, and support for democracy-building activities based on an American/European model, African
governments balk, while those who do accept aid, often opposition parties,
are portrayed as tools of oppressive neo-colonial powers. Although the
negative experience that many African countries had under colonialism
cannot be discounted, African leaders such as Mugabe regularly employ the
rhetoric of African democracy to defend their de facto elected dictatorships. Additionally, many African leaders avoid calling attention to
Zimbabwes crisis out of fear that their own governments - many of which
are quasi-democratic at best - will be scrutinized more carefully by domestic and international actors alike.
Despite its stated commitments to democracy, the AU seems content to
watch the action from the sidelines most likely out of deference to Mugabe,
who is the last remaining leader from the days of African nationalist struggles. Similarly, respect for national sovereignty and deference to Africas
wish to take care of its own problems has hindered action by the UN
General Assembly.
Western responses to the crisis in Zimbabwe, while well-intentioned,
have been generally ineffective in promoting democratization. Western
sanctions have not appeared to influence Mugabe and his ZANU-PF
party in any visible way; nor has it brought Mugabe and the ZANU-PF
any closer to abandoning their anti-democratic practices. Conversely,
Mugabe and his allies have used the sanctions to their advantage by characterizing Western actors as imperialists with designs of continuing to
exert their influence over Africa. Similarly, Mugabe has twisted Western
support for democratic reform into backing for the MDC in the eyes of
his supporters, suggesting that a vote for the opposition is a vote for a
return to colonialism. Perhaps the only positive result of Western action
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provide candidates for the parliamentary election, the MDC began campaigning late in the game, making the already difficult campaign even
more problematic. The party finally did split on the issue of providing
candidates for the 2005 Senate elections and only fielded candidates in the
Matabeleland provinces. There is no evidence to suggest that this rift will
be easily overcome and it is possible that the MDC could split into multiple parties. This development could present serious difficulties for further
democratization efforts, as the MDC was the only viable opposition party
in Zimbabwe.
African responses have fared little better, although it is perhaps too early
to judge the effectiveness of South Africas recent attempt to tie offers of
financial assistance to political reform. Mugabe still refuses to agree to
South African terms of political and economic reform in exchange for
financial assistance. With South Africa traditionally being a strong supporter of Zimbabwe and the Mugabe regime, it is possible that Mugabe
suspects that South Africa will lift its reform requirements if economic collapse leads to an even more severe humanitarian crisis. It is also possible
that Mugabe expects that recent attempts at engaging China may produce
more fruitful results in the future and will not require democratic reforms.
Regardless of Mugabes assumptions, it is clear that his refusal to accept the
conditions attached to South African aid could have an impact on his ability to rule. Without access to the food, fuel, and power that foreign aid
would supply, Mugabes ability to govern Zimbabwe may decline due to his
inability to provide spoils for his supporters.
The UN and AU have been much more active in the wake of Operation
Murambatsvina, but the exact impact of their actions remains questionable. It is clear that the report of the Special Envoy to Zimbabwe gave
Western nations more leverage to bring the discussion of the human rights
crisis to the UN Security Council; however, opposition by China and
Russia will hinder any meaningful action there. The results of Kofi
Annans planned visit, or pressure by African nations, may influence China
and Russia to abstain, but that remains to be seen. The result of the AUs
winter 2006 meeting was disappointing to the international democracy
promotion community and the continued refusal of the AU ministerial
body to address the crisis in Zimbabwe remains of great concern - both in
regards to the bodys continued failure to live up to its democratic commitments and the increased legitimacy that its action would lend to worldwide democracy promotion efforts in Zimbabwe.
Healing the divide between Africa and the West is crucial for any effective multilateral democracy promotion policy in Zimbabwe. While South
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Recommendations
The first step for the international democracy promotion community is
better to articulate the goal that it is pursuing. Currently different actors
seem to be pursuing a range of different, sometimes competing, aims
which results in less effective action than a united front. These include
Mugabes abdication of the presidency, a new constitution written in collaboration with the MDC, reform of the electoral process, repeal of the
Public Order and Security Act, holding of a free and fair election, and even
an MDC-controlled government. The actions taken by the international
community should be informed by a single goal: building a genuinely
democratic opposition capable of challenging ZANU-PF, and creating a
dialogue between ZANU-PF and the opposition, with the intention that it
will lead to the creation of a new constitution and free and fair elections.
Policies adopted and actions undertaken by the international democracy
promotion community should all have a clear connection to the pursuit of
this goal. Additionally, governments and multinational bodies working
toward this aim should coordinate their activities at all possible levels to
increase the effectiveness of their policies and programs.
The international community must become committed to constant
vigilance and consistent action in Zimbabwe. This means that government
and nongovernmental actors should monitor progress and setbacks in the
field and that governments should be prepared to act in the event that
undemocratic laws, such as the Public Order and Security Act, are passed
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or strengthened (as they have when election results are declared fraudulent). Similarly, any democratic opening must be seized upon. This is an
important lesson from recent experience when the international community failed to engage in serious action during the 2000-2002 period until
after the moment had begun to pass. Governments, NGOs, and multinational bodies should be prepared to offer technical assistance well in
advance of elections, whether it be to help facilitate the implementation of
pro-democracy policies or to assist in civic education, legislative training
and development, formation of professional political parties, voter registration, independent media development, training of local election monitors
and ensuring a free and fair campaigning environment. Should the goal of
constitutional transition be achieved, the international community must
play a role in that transition as well, serving as a third-party guarantor that
power-sharing agreements are respected and that the new government
comes to power via a process that is free, fair, and non-violent. This will
require both a commitment on the part of governments and the political
will of their citizens to support continued involvement in Zimbabwe.
In considering more specific recommendations, any effective policy
solution must bear in mind the political and economic landscape of
Zimbabwe. Mugabes poor relations with the West suggest that he is
unlikely to respond to incentives to change that come from Western governments led by unholy men. For such incentives to work, Mugabe
would have to completely change his own domestic image and would risk
seeming weak when faced with the might of a former colonial power. This
shift is unlikely, as it would equate him with the opposition MDC party,
which Mugabe and ZANU-PF characterize as puppets controlled by
Western imperial powers. Thus, change in Zimbabwe requires a widespread, unified African response, led by South Africa and other African
democracies, including demands for reform and offers of incentives. With
the MDC crippled, perhaps permanently, a strong, democratic party must
emerge to compete with ZANU-PF for a transition to democracy to occur.
This will require engagement of Zimbabweans at the grassroots level and
in exile, something which has been made extremely difficult with restrictions on free speech, press and assembly. The international community
must be prepared to enact measures that can circumvent Zimbabwes antidemocratic practices, such as providing external space and support for
party building. Finally, policy solutions must take into account and be prepared to take advantage of the current economic crisis in Zimbabwe.
Given Mugabes desperate need for external aid, further targeted sanctions
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73 While the Guidance Note states that the IMFs judgments should not be influenced by
the nature of a political regime of a country, nor should it interfere in domestic or foreign
politics of any member, the IMF does support the use of conditionality when governance
issues have a direct macroeconomic impact. There is little argument that Mugabes corrupt
economic policies have had a substantial impact on Zimbabwes macroeconomic stability.
Full text of the IMF Guidance Note can be found at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm.
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ing but not limited to a ban on exported goods and financial services, on
imports, and on investment in Zimbabwe. While attempts to ensure that
this would not cause a humanitarian crisis would be necessary, weakening
the Zimbabwean economy would remove some of the power that Mugabe
wields vis--vis the parastatal sector which dominates the economy, limiting
his powers of patronage. It would also strengthen the offers of aid for
reform, such as that being offered by South Africa. The difficulty of this
approach is the growing importance of China in Africa as evidenced by its
relationship with the Sudanese government through its oil purchases and its
stated interest in Zimbabwes chrome and platinum deposits.75
A sanctions regime that could more easily by-pass the Chinese would
be an even stricter round of targeted sanctions aimed at party elites, instead
of just government officials, and the families and known associates of elites
and party members. This could include limiting where wives of ZANUPF elites could travel to shop or children of government officials could
attend schools. Countries that currently have a sanctions regime in place
should also seek to end Zimbabwean individuals investment in firms
under their jurisdiction and any business activities between firms under
their jurisdiction and the ruling elite of Zimbabwe.
75 Report Puts Pressure on Zimbabwe, BBC News, July 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
203
Appendix
Burma
Principal author: Dr. Jeffrey Stacey, Tulane University.
Maureen Aung-Thwin, Director, Burma Project/Southeast Asia
Initiative, Open Society Institute, United States.
Dr. David I. Steinberg, Director, Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University, United States.
Dr. Thaung Htun, Representative for UN Affairs of the National
Coalition Government of the Union of Burma.
John Bradshaw, Director, Freedom Investment Project, Open Society
Institute, United States.
Togo
Principal author: Muthoni Kamuyu, Democracy Coalition Project.
Dany Komla Ayida, Reagan Fascell Fellow, National Endowment for
Democracy, United States.
Pascal Kambale, Advocacy Director, Africa Governance Monitoring and
Advocacy Project (AFRIMAP), Open Society Institute, United States.
Grant Godfrey, Senior Program Officer, Central and West Africa,
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, United States.
Turkey
Principal author: Richard Youngs, Fundacin para las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Dilogo Exterior.
Senem Aydin, Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies, Belgium.
204
Ukraine
Principal author: Richard Youngs, Fundacin para las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Dilogo Exterior.
Michael Emerson, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy
Studies, Belgium.
Andre Gerrits, Department of European Studies, Amsterdam University,
Netherlands.
Venezuela
Principal author: Susanne Gratius, Fundacin para las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Dilogo Exterior.
Christian Freres, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales,
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain.
Yemen
Principal author: Ana Echage, Fundacin para las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Dilogo Exterior.
Gerd Nonneman, Department of Politics and International Relations,
Lancaster University, United Kingdom.
Robert Springborg, Director, London Middle East Institute, School of
Oriental and African Studies, United Kingdom.
Sheila Carapico, Department of Political Science, Richmond University,
United States.
Zimbabwe
Principal author: Elizabeth Marquez, Democracy Coalition Project.
Akwe Amosu, Senior Policy Analyst for Africa, Open Society Institute,
United States.
Ozias Tungwarara, Deputy Director, Africa Governance Monitoring and
Advocacy Project (AFRIMAP), Open Society Institute, South Africa.
Thandi Henson, Coordinator, African Women in Developing Countries,
South Africa.