G.R. No.

L-26816 February 28,

1967

preliminary or final injunction

PABLO
DE
JESUS,
ENGRACIA DE JESUS and
MANUELA
DE
JESUS,
petitioners,

upon the factual averments

hereinafter to be recited. The
problem cropped up because
petitioners' motion to

vs.

dismiss the complaint and to

dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction upon the above
grounds, in that case filed by

HON.
GREGORIO
N.
GARCIA, Judge of the City
Court of Manila, Branch I
THE SHELL COMPANY OF
THE PHILIPPINES, LTD.,
MAXIMA DE Jesus and
SALVADOR BARRIOS,
respondents.
Feria, Feria, Lugto & La'O for
petitioners.
Salvador
respondents.

Barrios

for

principal individual respondents

against them in the city court,1
was denied, and their motion to
reconsider rejected.
The pivotal disputed allegations
of the verified complaint below
are these: Ten persons,2 among
whom are
petitioners and respondent,
Maxima de Jesus, are coowners of six (6) parcels of land
running along Espaa P.

SANCHEZ, J.:
Before us upon an original
action
of
certiorari
and
prohibition,
are
two
jurisdictional
issues:
first,
jurisdiction over the
subject matter; and second, the
power of the City Court of
Manila to issue a writ of

Campa and Adelina Streets in

Sampaloc,
Manila.
Administratrix thereof and coowners
attorney-in-fact
is
Maxima
de Jesus. Her stipulated
compensation is 10% of the
rentals. The monthly receipts
signed by each co-owner, for

his/her rental share, is in a form

reproduced in the complaint as
follows:
RECEIVED from Mrs. Maxima
de Jesus Barrios the sum
of .................. as my share, in
the rental collected for
this month, on the properties of
which I am a co-owner. Ten per
cent (10%) of said rentals had
been
previously deducted as agreed
upon
by
me,
for
her
administration fee together with
her expenses concerning
a collector and an Attorney that
she may employ to INCREASE
rate, prevent arrears, and eject
stubborn

from P850.00 to P3,500.00

during the first ten (10)
years and to P4,000.00 for the
subsequent five (5) years. Shell
pays the rentals by issuing a
check for P3,500.00 in
the name of Maxima de Jesus
who, in turn, distributes the
shares of her co-owners.
Petitioners' monthly shares on
the basis of P3,500.00 monthly
rentals are:
Manuela de Jesus 9/54 of
P3,500.00 P 583.33
Pablo de Jesus 9/54
P3,500.00 P 583.33

of

Engracia de Jesus 10/54 of

P3,500.00 P 684.14

tenant. 1 wph 1 . t
P1,850.80
Lessee of the property is Shell
Company of the Philippines,
Ltd. The original lease contract
was dated August 23
and 29, 1953. This lease was
renewed by instrument executed
on January 10, 1966, where
under, through the
efforts of Maxima de Jesus, the
monthly rentals were increased

Petitioners (defendants below),

in October, 1966 so the
complaint further avers
sought to unjustly deprive
Maxima de Jesus of her 10%
compensation.
And,
to
fraudulently
escape
such
obligation, they surreptitiously

instructed Shell not to pay their

share in the rentals through said
Maxima de Jesus but directly to
them.

Juzgado se sirva expedir una

inmediata orden de interdicto

As against Shell, the complaint

states:

prohibitorio preliminar a la
pagadora compaia demandada,
para que se abstenga de cambiar
la presente

... Pero ahora la compania

demandada esta vacilando si va
a cambiar esa FORMA DE
PAGO, para seguir

FORMA DE PAGO, ...; y,

despues
de los
tramites
judiciales correspondientes, que
el Hon. Juzgado se sirva

dicho
aviso
de
los
3
demandados individuales, de
que ella pague directamente a
ellos sus "shares" de

dictar sentencia declarando

definitivo el mismo interdicto
prohibitorio, y condenando a los
3 demandados

P1,850.80 mensuales dejando a

la
demandante
fraudulentamente privada y
despojada de su 10% de

individuales Manuela de Jesus,

Engracia de Jesus y Pablo de
Jesus a pagar dicho 10% de
compensacion,

compensacion que asciende a

P185.08 mensuales.

deduciendolo de sus P1,850.80

de "shares" o participaciones
respectivas en la renta mensual,
de acuerdo

G.R.
No.
L-26816
hp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/j
uri1967/feb1967/gr_l26816_1967.html
1 of 5 11/26/2014 2:38 AM
The complaint winds up with
the prayer:
POR
TANTO,
pedimos
respetuosamente
al
Hon.

con la presents forma de pago. x

x x x3
Upon the foregoing complaint
filed on October 3, 1966, the
respondent judge, on a P500.00bond, issued ex-parte,
on October 4, 1966, a writ of
preliminary injunction, which
reads:

It is hereby ordered by the

undersigned Judge of the Court
of Manila City that, until further
orders, you, the
said The Shell Co. of the
Philippines, Ltd. and all your
attorneys,
representatives,
agents, and any other
person assisting you, refrain
from modifying the present
"FORMA DE PAGO"; The
Shell Co. of the
Philippines, shall pay the
monthly rentals with check to
be issued in the name of
Maxima de Jesus alone, who
shall cash and distribute the
amount of same, among the ten
co-owners, previous deduction
of ten per cent

this Court, we issued, on

application, a cease-and-desist
order bearing date of November
18, 1966.
1. As starting point, we have the
rule-long in standing and
frequent in application that
jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only
by the Constitution or law. It
cannot be fixed by the will of
the parties; it cannot
be acquired through, or waived,
enlarged or diminished by, any
act or omission of the parties.
Neither is it
conferred by acquiescence of
the court.4 Constitutionally
viewed,
apportionment
of
jurisdiction is vested in

(10%) thereof.
On the same date, October 4,
1966, in obedience to the writ
of preliminary injunction, Shell
delivered to Maxima de

Congress.5 Congress may not

delegate that power.6 We may
not even look to the Rules of
Court in search of

Jesus the sum of P3,500.00,

covering the October, 1966
rental.

jurisdiction
jurisdictional
boundaries. For indeed, the
constitutional authority of the
Supreme Court on this

The jurisdictional question

having been brought direct to

point is circumscribed in the

zone properly denominated as

the promulgation of
concerning pleading,

"rules

practice, and procedure in all

courts and the admission to the
practice of law";7
and,
consequently to
determine the "means, ways or
manner
in
which
said
jurisdiction, as fixed by the
Constitution and acts of
Congress, shall be exercised".8
Rules of Court must yield to
substantive laws9 of which
jurisdiction is a
segment. A mistake in statutory
jurisdiction
may not be
corrected by executive fiat, "but
by legislation".10
Well may we profit from the
wise pronouncement in Manila
Railroad Co. vs. AttorneyGeneral, supra, at
pages 529-530, thus: "Certain
statutes confer jurisdiction,
power, or authority. Others
provide for the
procedure by which that power
or authority is projected into
judgment. The one class deals
with the powers of

the court in the real and

substantive sense; the other with
the procedure by which such
powers are put into

statutes. Absent a statutory

grant, neither convenience nor
assumed justice or propriety of
the exercise

property per agreement. By

this she hopes to pay herself, as
against her defendant coowners, the 10% of

action. The one is the thing

itself ; the other is the vehicle
by which the thing is transferred
from the court to

thereof in a particular class of

cases
"can
justify
the
assumption of jurisdiction" by
said courts.12

the latter's share in the monthly

rentals (P1,850.80 from October
1966, to December 31, 1975;
and P2,074.07

the parties. The whole purpose

and object of procedure is to
make the powers of the court
fully and

3. Jurisprudence teaches that the

averments of the complaint,
taken as a whole, are what
determine the

from thence to December 31,

1980). A careful and considerate
examination of the complaint
below as a

completely available for justice.

... The purpose of such a
procedure is not to restrict the
jurisdiction of the

nature of the action, and

therefore,
the
court's
jurisdiction.13

whole brings to the fore the fact

that plaintiff Maxima de Jesus
asks that these defendants
comply faithfully

court over the subject matter,

but to give it effective facility in
righteous action. ..."

But just exactly what does

Maxima de Jesus desire in her
complaint below? In plain
language, she asks of the

2. And now we come to the

jurisdictional area allocated to
inferior courts. A rule, the
validity of which is

court to compel two sets of

defendants to toe the line: Shell
to continue with the previous
manner of payment

recognized, is that jurisdiction

of an inferior court will not be
presumed; "it must appear
clearly from statute or

(forma de pago) of rentals by

means of a check drawn in her
favor alone; and the dissenting
co-owners to pay

it will not be held to exist."11

Such jurisdiction cannot be
broadened
upon
"doubtful
inferences" drawn from

her the 10% of the rentals as

compensation to which she
claims she is entitled as
administratrix of the

with
their
respective
commitments. Implicit, too, in
the complaint is the demand
that her said co-owners
recognize her as administratrix.
It is in the context just recited
that plaintiff's action below
comes within the
concept of specific performance
of contract. And in this posture,
we express the view that
jurisdiction resides
G.R.
No.
L-26816
hp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/j
uri1967/feb1967/gr_l26816_1967.html

2 of 5 11/26/2014 2:38 AM
in the court of first instance.
For, specific performance the
subject of the litigation "is
not capable of
pecuniary estimation".14
A case with factual environment
similar to the present is
Manufacturer's
Distributors,
Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong,
L-21285, April 29, 1966. There,
plaintiff sued defendant in the
City Court of Manila to accept
delivery of
74,500 pieces of plastifilm bags,
balance of 100,000 pieces
ordered by defendant, which the
latter for no
justifiable reason refused to
accept. The prayer of the
complaint is that defendant be
ordered to pay plaintiff
P3,376.00, total value of the
100,000 pieces of plastifilm
bags. Defendant moved to
dismiss. Ground: The
subject matter of the litigation is
"specific performance" and,
therefore, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the

court of first instance. The City

Court
upheld
defendant,
dismissed the complaint. And
the Court of First

such payment would be but an

incident or consequence of
defendant's liability for specific
performance.

Instance affirmed. Before this

Coat, plaintiff contended that
"the subject of the litigation was
the 100,000

If no such liability is judicially

declared, the payment can not
be awarded. Hence, the amounts
sought

pieces of plastifilm bags

contracted for by defendant at a
total price of P3,376.00, and,
therefore, it was

do not represent the value of the

subject of litigation.

language, "entonces se podra

repetir igual demanda por ese
mes".15 Reasons there are
which will stop us

This Court there lifted from

Mebane Cotton Breeding St'n
vs. Sides, 257 SW 302; 21
C.J.S., 59, note, the

from giving our imprimatur to

this advocacy. Courts will be
swamped with her complaints.
Multiplicity of suits is

following, which
illuminating:

obnoxious to the administration

of justice. Besides, the breach
of contract charged against
defendants below

susceptible
of
pecuniary
estimation". This Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Jose B.
L. Reyes, ruled that the
City Court of Manila had no
jurisdiction, and declared:
That plaintiff's complaint also
sought the payment by the
defendant of P3,376.00 plus
interest and
attorney's fees, does not give a
pecuniary estimation to the
litigation, for the payment of
such amounts
can only be ordered as a
consequence of the specific
performance primarily sought.
In other words,

is

indeed

The Court has no jurisdiction of

a suit for specific performance
of a contract, although the
damages
alleged for its breach, if
permitted, are within the
amount of which that court has
jurisdiction.
It will avail respondents nothing
when they say that what they
seek is to prevent Maxima de
Jesus from being
defrauded
of
her
10%
compensation to only P185.08,

covering the October, 1966

rental; and that should
defendants below insist in
defrauding her of her share
corresponding to any other
month, in respondents'

is total and indivisible. Monthly

rentals will have to run through
a number of years. There is an
unqualified
refusal to perform the contract.
Such refusal goes to the entire
contract. It is treated as a
complete breach.
Therefore, but one action
specific performance may be
presented. For that action may
not be split;

successive actions may not be

maintained.16 Especially is this
principle true in the case before
us. For,
nowhere in the complaint filed
on October 3, 1966, is there an
averment that at the time
jurisdiction was
sought in the City Court, the
October, 1966 rental was
already due and payable. As a
matter of fact, in Annex

cognizance of a case for final

injunction. On the
contrary, such authority is
expressly granted by statute to
courts of first instance in the
exercise of their

February 1, 1912; Act 3764,

effective November 26, 1930;
Act 3881, effective November
14, 1931; and the present

injunction against Shell. .

court to issue the disputed writ

of preliminary injunction earlier
transcribed.

averment in paragraph 13
appears: "SHELL has to pay the
monthly rentals of P3,500
within the first ten (10)

sum
of
P185.08,
her
compensation for the month of
October, 1966. Nonetheless, the
city court remains

days of each contract month."

without jurisdiction. This is

because the sum of money
action may not be divorced
from the injunction suit.

4. Nor does the law grant the

city courts power to take

first instance. Expediency and

convenience so demand.19
6. Where much space was
devoted by counsel for the
parties herein is on the question
of the power of the city

5. But let us assume that what

plaintiff below claims, as
against her co-owners, is but a
judgment for the small

of contract is primarily sought.

Result: The city court has no
jurisdiction over the subject
matter.17

also carry this provision, viz:

Act 2131, effective

original jurisdiction.18 And the

city court is without jurisdiction
to hear and determine the case
for final

2 of respondents' answer before

this Court, which is Shell's
answer to the complaint below,
the following

Nothing in the statute books

would confer jurisdiction on
city courts over actions where
specific performance

action then is indivisible. And,

the city court's jurisdiction must
yield to the jurisdiction of the
higher court of

Both of them are the subject of

only one complaint. For, really,
without a mandatory injunction
to Shell to issue
the checks in plaintiff's favor,
the certainty of collecting her
alleged compensation becomes
problematical. The

Historically speaking, the 1901

original organic act of courts in
the Philippines (Act 136 of the
Philippine
Commission) was silent on the
power of the city (Justice of the
peace)
court
to
issue
preliminary injunction. Neither
did the old 1901 Code of Civil
Procedure (Act 190) grant this
power to said court. When a
later statute, Act 2041 of
the
Philippine
Legislature
(1911), did empower said court
to issue preliminary injunction,
its exercise was limited to
cases involving forcible entry.
And, subsequent legislation's

3 of 5 11/26/2014 2:38 AM

Judiciary Act
amended.

of

1948,

as

To
be
sure
temporary
injunctions could also be issued
in cases other than forcible
entry; but then only municipal
courts in provincial capitals are
privileged to grant the same,
and solely in the absence of the
district judge.20
In Piit vs. de Lara, 58 Phil. 765,
766-767,21
this Court was
asked to rule on the question of
whether a justice of the
peace may issue a writ of
preliminary injunction in an
illegal detainer suit. The answer
was "No". Because the law
limits the issuance of such writ
only to forcible entry cases. We
then ruled out the preliminary
injunction in the illegal

detainer case as in excess of his

jurisdiction.

the
subject
matter;
in
consequence, it is powerless to

petition for certiorari and

prohibition; the preliminary

The strong point on which

respondents herein root their
argument is Section 2 of Rule
58, which reads:

grant an ancillary remedy

therein. Second, the first
sentence of Section 2 should be
read in context. The last

injunction we issued herein is

declared
final;
and
the
respondent court is directed to
dismiss Civil Case No. 153460,

SEC. 2. Who may grant

preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be
granted by the judge of any

sentence of the quoted statute,

namely, that injunction "may
also be granted by the judge of
a Court of First Instance

entitled "Maxima de Jesus,

asistida de su marido Salvador
Barrios, Demandantes versus
Manuela de Jesus,

court in which the action is

pending, or by a Justice of the
Court of Appeals or of the
Supreme Court. It may

in any action pending in an

inferior court within his
district", emphasizes the point
that the city court, except in the

Engracia de Jesus, Pablo de

Jesus, y The Shell Company of
the
Philippines,
Ltd.,
Demandados". Costs against

also be granted by the judge of

a Court of First Instance in any
action pending in an inferior
court within his

cases where it is specifically

authorized by statute, cannot
grant preliminary injunction.
Third, as adverted to

respondents other
respondent judge.

than

SINGSON
SAWMILL

ISABLEA

district.

elsewhere in this opinion,

absent an explicit and precise
grant of jurisdiction in the city
court, no amount of

They place the accent on the

phrase "any court in which the
action is pending." Argue
respondents: Since the case
is pending in the city court, it
has jurisdiction to issue
preliminary injunction. This
ratiocination
suffers
from
infirmities.
First, we have ruled that the city
court has no jurisdiction over

expensive construction would

give such court that jurisdiction.
At any rate, the party plaintiff is
not without speedy
remedy. He may seek injunctive
assistance from the court of first
instance.
Upon the view we take of this
case, we hereby grant the

VS

the

FACTS:
Isabela Sawmill was
formed by partners Saldajeno,
Lon and Timoteo. S withdrew
from the partnership and after
dissolution, L and T continued
the business still under the
name Isabela Sawmill. The
partnership is indebted to
various creditors and that
Sheriff sold the assets of Isabela
Sawmill to S and was
subsequently sold to a separate
company.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Isabela
Sawmill ceased to be a
partnership and that creditors
could no longer demand
payment.
RULING:
On
dissolution,
the
partnership is not terminated but
continues until the winding up
of the business. It does not
appear that the withdrawal of S
from the partnership was
published in the newspapers.
The appellee and the public had
a right to expect that whatever
credit they extended to L and T
doing business in the name of
Isabela Sawmill could be
enforced against the properties
of said partnership. The judicial
foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage executed in favor of S
did not relieve her from liability
to the creditors of the
partnership.
It may be presumed that S
acted in good faith, the
appellees also acted in good
faith in extending credit to the
partnership. Where one of the 2
innocent persons must suffer,
that person who gave occasion
for the damages to be caused
must bear the consequences.

As cited by the CA, this Court,

in the case of Singson v. Isabela
Sawmill,16 held that:

SPS. RICARDO BEMBO and

NICOLASA
BEMBO,
petitioner,

In determining whether an
action is one the subject matter
of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court
has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of
pecuniary
estimation,
and
whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue
is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal
relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated
in terms of money, and are
cognizable by courts of first
instance [now Regional Trial
Courts]. 17

vs.

.R. No. 116845 November 29,

1995

orders of default, finding that

they had been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Hence this
petition filed by the

spouses Ricardo and Nicolasa

Bembo for a review by
certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals' Third

1993, at 2 o'clock in the

afternoon. Although the order
directed the clerk of court to
"notify
the
parties
and
counsels,"

Division.
COURT OF APPEALS and
THE
PANGASINAN
DEVELOPMENT
BANK,
respondent.

The records show that the

pretrial
conference
was
originally set on September 1,
1993 but that it was reset on

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners, spouses Ricardo and
Nicolasa Bembo, brought this
case for declaratory relief in the
Regional Trial Court

October 1, 1993 by the trial

court to allow petitioners to
amend their complaint. The
pretrial conference scheduled
on

(Branch 41) at Dagupan City.

Upon their motion, the court
declared private respondent
Pangasinan Development

October 1, 1993 was again

reset, however, as petitioners'
counsel had to undergo medical
examination in Metro

Bank as in default for failure of

its representative and its counsel
to appear at the pretrial
conference held on

Manila. The new date set was

October 27, 1993. Again, no
pretrial was held on October 27,
1993, as the presiding

December 6, 1993. However,

upon petition of private
respondent, the Court of
Appeals' Third Division set
aside the

judge, Hon. Erna Falloran

Aliposa, was in Manila
attending the World Law
Conference.
On November 9, 1993, she
issued an order stating this fact
and setting "the hearing of this
case" on December 6,

it appears that only the latter

were given notice. None was
sent to the parties themselves.
On December 6, 1993, Judge
Deodoro J. Sison proceeded
with the pretrial conference as
scheduled. As neither
private respondent nor its
counsel was present, the judge,
upon motion of the petitioners,
declared private
respondent as in de fault and
authorized petitioners to present
their evidence ex parte on
December 27, 1993.
Private respondent moved for a
reconsideration.
Private
respondent's counsel explained
that their absence at the
pretrial conference was due to
the fact that on December 3,
1993, he had been told by Judge
Aliposa that a new
date for the pretrial would be set
in view of the fact that she had
been detailed to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati

and Judge Deodoro J. Sison, the

pairing judge who would take
over, would "adjust his hearing
schedule." Counsel

(1979) and that the notice sent

to counsels issued on November
9, 1993 was for a "hearing" and
not a pretrial.

G.R.
No.
116845
hp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/j
uri1995/nov1995/gr_116845_19
95...

further alleged that as he had to

attend the hearing of other cases
in another branch of the RTC,
he did not appear

The appellate court cited the

policy of the law to discourage
judgments by default (Citibank,
N.A. v. Chua, 220

1 of 2 11/26/2014 3:34 AM

on December 6, 1993 for the

pretrial conference on the case.
He said he had advised his
client's representative that

SCRA
75,
77
[1993]),
especially since it found the
defense of private respondents
to be prima facie meritorious.

it was not necessary for the

latter to go to the court on that
day because of what Judge
Aliposa had told him

Hence this petition. Petitioners

contend that the appellate court
erred in holding that no notice
of the pretrial had

(counsel).

properly been made, because

the order of the trial court
referred to a "hearing" and no
copy of the order had been

As
its
motion
for
reconsideration was denied,
private respondent filed a
petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals.
The appellate court gave due
course to the petition, noting
that no notice of the pretrial had
been sent to the parties
themselves as required by
Pineda v. Court of Appeals, 67
SCRA
228
(1975)
and
Patalinhug v. Peralta, 90 SCRA
50

Indeed, in its motion for

reconsideration (Annex "P",
Rollo, p. 52), private respondent
averred:
1. The hearing of the aboveentitled case has been set on
December 6, 1993, during the
time of Judge
Erna Falloran-Aliposa, who was
detailed to Makati;
2. The last day Judge Aliposa
presided over Branch 41, was
December 3, 1993, on which
date the

given to the parties themselves.

Petitioners contend that, in fact,
private respondent's reason for
his failure to attend

undersigned asked her about the

hearing of his cases in the
succeeding week. The latter told
him that

the pretrial on December 6,

1993, as stated in his motion for
reconsideration of the order of
default, was not lack of

we would be notified as his

pairing Judge, Hon. Deodoro J.
Sison, would have to adjust his
hearing

knowledge of the pretrial, but of

excusable neglect.

schedule.
3. Believing in good faith that
there would be no hearing of the

above-entitled
December 6,

case

on

1993 as Judge Sison also has to

adjust his calendar, as he had
also cases to hear in Branch 40,
the
undersigned counsel did not
appear on said date, as he would
first wait for the other setting
the next
hearing;
4. He, likewise, advised his
client not to appear, although
the manager of the bank who
was authorized
to appear for the bank alleged
that she did not receive any
notice of hearing;
5. The undersigned counsel was
surprised when he received the
order of this Honorable Court
declaring the defendant as if in
default and allowing the
plaintiff to present their
evidence on December
27, 1993.
6. The non-appearance of the
undersigned counsel and his
client on December 6, 1993 was
due to, as

stated above, excusable neglect;

Moreover, the sufficiency of the
written notice of pretrial is
irrelevant where the evidence
shows that the counsel and
the parties actually knew of the
pretrial. Here, the private
respondent admitted that a copy
of the order of November
9, 1993, resetting the pretrial
conference on December 6,
1993, had been served on him
and that he notified private
respondent of this date although
he advised private respondent
that it was not necessary for the
latter to be in court
because of what counsel had
been told by the judge. It would
be sheer technicality to insist
that there was lack of
proper notice to private
respondent and counsel under
these
circumstances.
(Cf.
Arcilla v. Arcilla, 138 SCRA
560
[1985])
Nor was the notice given
defective for referring to a
"hearing" rather than to a

pretrial. As this Court, through

Justice,
later Chief Justice, Fernando,
said in Trocio v. Labayo, 53
SCRA 97, (1973) in rejecting a
similar contention: "No
merit attaches to the contention
of petitioner that the notice as to
the hearing scheduled for
October 14 should
specify that it was for a pretrial.
A hearing as known to the law
is not confined to a trial but
embraces the several
stages of a litigation. It does not
preclude pretrial."
Indeed, there was no reason to
suppose that the hearing
scheduled on December 6, 1993
was for anything other
than a pretrial. The holding of a
pretrial conference had been the
subject of several previous
notices to the parties
and their counsel, and private
respondent never pretended that
it did not know that what had
been scheduled was a
pretrial.

The discretion and authority of

the respondent court to declare
private respondent in default
after it failed to appear

pretrial would be postponed on

account of the change of judges,
he could have inquired from the
court as the more

at the pretrial is clear from 2 of

Rule 20 of the Rules of Court,
and the Court of Appeals,
without a clear showing of

prudent course, instead of

assuming that the pretrial
conference would again be
postponed. This was necessary

grave abuse of this discretion,

should not have annulled the
default order.

since he had been told of the

possibility of postponement
merely by the judge formerly
trying his case.

The trial court could certainly

not be faulted for declaring
private respondent as in default.
Although he had been
advised by Judge Aliposa to
wait for further orders from
Judge Sison, who was taking
over the trial of the case,
private respondent's counsel
was not justified in assuming
that no hearing on his case
would be held as previously

The trial court acted within its

discretion and correctly held
private as in de fault, and it was
error for the appellate
court to issue the writ of
certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
granted and the decision
appealed from is REVERSED,
with costs against private
respondent.

scheduled, especially since he

did not receive any notice of
any new date.
Indeed, he knew that the pretrial
was scheduled on December 6,
1993. If he thought there was a
possibility that the

SO ORDERED

[HOW JURISDICTION IS
CONFERRED
AND
DETERMINED]

DE LEON vs. HON. COURT

OF APPEALS
(245 SCRA 166) Facts: Jesus
Jalbuena entered into a verbal
lease contract with Uldarico
Inayan, for one year renewable
for the same period. Inayan was
allowed to continue with the
lease from year to year. Corazon
Jalbuena de Leon is the
daughter of Jesus and the
transferee of the subject
property. Inayan ceased paying
the agreed rental and instead,
asserted dominion over the
land. When asked by De Leon
to vacate the land, he refused to
do so, prompting De Leon to
file a complaint before the RTC
for "Termination of Civil Law
Lease; Recovery of Possession,
Recovery of Unpaid Rentals
and Damages. Inayan claimed
tenancy dispute thus the lower
court issued an order adopting
the procedure in agrarian cases
but still rendered decision
Declaring the lease contract
between plaintiff and defendant
as a civil law lease, and that the
same
has
already
been
terminated due to defendant's
failure to pay his rentals from
1983 up to the present.On
appeal to the CA, Inayan raised
the sole issue of jurisdiction and
alleged that the lower court,
acting as Court of Agrarian

Relations, had no jurisdiction

over the action. The CA, at first
affirmed the trial court's
decision, but when an MR filed
by Inayan it then set aside its
earlier decision and dismissed
the civil case for want of
jurisdiction. In its amended
decision, the appellate court
held that petitioner's complaint
below was anchored on
accin interdictal
, a summary action for recovery
of physical possession that
should have been
brought
before the proper inferior court.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC
then acting as a court of
agrarian relations employing
agrarianprocedure
had
jurisdiction to try the suit filed
by De Leon?- Held: Yes.
Jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter is conferred
only by the Constitution or by
law. It is determinable on the
basis of allegations in the
complaint. In order to determine
whether the court below had
jurisdiction, it is necessary to
first ascertain the nature of the
complaint filed before it. A
study of the complaint instituted
by petitioner in the lower court
reveals that the case is, contrary
to the findings of the respondent

appellate court, not one of

unlawful detainer.
Not being merely a case of
ejectment, the regional trial
court p PNB v Pineda (Civil
Procedure)
G.R. No. L-46658 May 13,
1991
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK, petitioner, vs. HON.
GREGORIO G. PINEDA, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal,
Branch
XXI
and
TAYABAS
CEMENT
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
The Arroyo Spouses obtained a
loan of P580K from PNB to
purchase 60% of the subscribed
capital stock, and thereby
acquire the controlling interest
of Tayabas Cement Company,
Inc. (TCC). As security for said
loan, the spouses executed a
real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land known as the La
Vista property.
TCC filed with petitioner bank
an application and agreement
for the establishment of an 8

year deferred letter of credit

(L/C) for $7M in favor of Toyo
Menka Kaisha to cover the
importation of a cement plant
machinery and equipment.
Upon
approval
of
the
application and opening of an
L/C by PNB in favor of Toyo
Menka Kaisha for the account
of TCC, the Arroyo spouses
executed a surety agreement.
The imported cement plant
machinery
and
equipment
arrived from Japan and were
released to TCC under a trust
receipt
agreement.
Subsequently, Toyo Menka
Kaisha made the corresponding
drawings against the L/C as
scheduled.
TCC, however, failed to remit
and/or pay the corresponding
amount
covered
by
the
drawings. Thus, pursuant to the
trust receipt agreement, PNB
notified TCC of its intention to
repossess
the
imported
machinery and equipment for
failure of TCC to settle its
obligations under the L/C. PNB
foreclosed the real estate
mortgages executed by the
spouses Arroyo in TCCs favor.
PNB contends that the sale of
La Vista was made to satisfy not
only the amount owed by the
spouses on their personal loan

but also the amount of expenses

owed by said spouses as
sureties of TCC. The Arroyos
oppose
the
foreclosure,
contending
primarily
that
repossession of the imported
machinery and equipment by
PNB amounted to dacion en
pago that extinguished their
obligation as surety to TCC.
Thus, in May, 1976, PNB filed
with the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City, Branch V a
petition for mandamus 9 against
said Diana Dungca in her
capacity as City Sheriff of
Quezon City to compel her to
proceed with the foreclosure
sale of the mortgaged properties
covered by TCT No. 55323 in
order to satisfy both the
personal obligation of the
spouses Arroyo as well as their
liabilities as sureties of TCC.
DECISION
COURTS:

OF

LOWER

* CFI - Quezon: petition was

granted and Dungca was
directed to proceed with the
foreclosure
sale
of
the
mortgaged properties covered
by TCT No. 55323 pursuant to
Act No. 3135 and to issue the
corresponding
Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale.

Before the decision could attain

finality,
TCC
filed
on
September 14, 1976 before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig, Branch XXI a complaint
12 against PNB, Dungca, and
the Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of Bacolod City seeking,
inter alia, the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to
restrain the foreclosure of the
mortgages over the La Vista
property and Hacienda Bacon as
well as a declaration that its
obligation with PNB had been
fully paid by
reason
of
the
latter's
repossession of the imported
machinery and equipment.
* Court of First Instance of
Rizal,
Branch
XXI
:
respectively granting private
respondent Tayabas Cement
Company, Inc.'s application for
a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the foreclosure sale of
certain properties in Quezon
City and Negros Occidental and
denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof.
* CFI - Rizal (motion for
reconsideration
by
PNB):
denied.
Petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the repossession of the
machinery was tantamount to a
dacion en pago that absolved
Arroyo spouses as surety?
Held:
1. NO.
There was no dacion en pago.
Dation in payment takes place
when property is alienated to
the creditor in satisfaction of a
debt in money and the same is
governed by sales. Dation in
payment is the delivery and
transmission of ownership of a
thing by the debtor to the
creditor
as
an
accepted
equivalent of the performance
of
the
obligation.
The
repossession of the machinery
and equipment in question was
merely to secure the payment of
TCCs loan obligation and not
for the purpose of transferring
ownership thereof to PNB in
satisfaction of said loan. Thus,
no dacion en pago was ever
accomplished.
PNB took possession of the
imported
cement
plant
machinery
and
equipment
pursuant to the trust receipt
agreement executed by and
between PNB and TCC giving

the former the unqualified right

to the possession and disposal
of all property shipped under
the Letter of Credit until such
time as all the liabilities and
obligations under said letter had
been
discharged.
PNBs
possession of the subject
machinery and equipment being
precisely as a form of security
for the advances given to TCC
under the Letter of Credit, said
possession by itself cannot be
considered payment of the loan
secured thereby. Payment would
legally result only after PNB
had
foreclosed
on
said
securities, sold the same and
applied the proceeds thereof to
TCCs loan obligation. Mere
possession does not amount to
foreclosure for foreclosure
denotes the procedure adopted
by the mortgagee to terminate
the rights of the mortgagor on
the property and includes the
sale itself.
The transfer of ownership to
extinguish
a
pre-existing
obligation is the essence in
dation in payment, therefore it
is not a consensual contract, but
a real contract and novates the
original debt relationship into a
consummated sale.
2. DOCTRINE OF
INTERFERENCE

NON-

Another reason for striking

down the writ of preliminary
injunction complained of is that
it interfered with the order of a
co-equal and coordinate court.
Since Branch V of the CFI of
Rizal had already acquired
jurisdiction over the question of
foreclosure of
mortgage over the La Vista
property and rendered judgment
in relation thereto, then it
retained jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other coordinate
courts over its judgment,
including all incidents relative
to the control and conduct of its
ministerial officers, namely the
sheriff thereof. The foreclosure
sale having been ordered by
Branch V of the CFI of Rizal,
TCC should not have filed
injunction proceedings with
Branch XXI of the same CFI,
but instead should have first
sought relief by proper motion
and application from the former
court which had exclusive
jurisdiction over the foreclosure
proceeding.
This
doctrine
of
noninterference is premised on the
principle that a judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction
may not be opened, modified or
vacated by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction.ossessed

jurisdiction to try and resolve

the case
FRANCISCA
GUTIERREZ,
MONICA GUTIERREZ, JOSE
GUTIERREZ
and
SPS.
ERNESTO BEN and ADELA
BAJIT, Petitioners, v. COURT
OF APPEALS, Hon. ROMULO
E. ABASOLO, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge, RTC, First
Judicial Region, Br. 47,
Urdaneta,
Pangasinan,
EUGENIA
GUTIERREZ,
AURELIA
GUTIERREZ,
LEONILA
GUTIERREZ,
ARNEL GUTIERREZ, and
FLORA
GUTIERREZ,
Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL
LAW;
ACTIONS; RES JUDICATA;
CONSTRUED. Res judicata
literally means "a matter
adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment."
It also refers to the "rule that a
final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on
points and matters determined
in the former suit."cralaw
virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; A BAR TO

THE REOPENING OF A
MATTER
JUDICIALLY
DETERMINED; REQUISITES.
For res judicata to operate as
a bar to the re-opening of a
matter
already
judicially
determined
by
competent
authority,
the
following
requisites must concur: (1) the
former judgment or order must
be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be,
between the first and second
actions, identity of parties,
subject-matter and cause of
action.
3. ID.; COURTS; MAY
AMEND AND CONTROL ITS
OWN ORDER. It is within
the power of the court to amend
and control its order to make it
conformable with law and
justice (Sec. 5, Rule 135).
4. ID.; ACTIONS; TRIAL;
DEFINED. Trial includes all
proceedings from the time when
issue is joined, or, more usually,
when the parties are called to
try their case in court, to the
time of its legal determination.

5. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF

COMPLAINT; FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE RULES
OR ANY ORDER OF THE
COURT, VALID GROUND.
A complaint may be dismissed
for failure of the plaintiffs "to
comply with the rules or any
order of the court" under the
provision of Rule 20 of the
Rules of Court. In this case,
there was non-compliance by
the plaintiffs with the order of
the court to appear at the
scheduled pre-trial.
6. ID.; ID.; FINAL AND
EXECUTORY ORDER, NOT
SUBJECT
TO
MODIFICATION. On the
holding that the challenged
order of April 28, 1987,
"modified or rectified" the order
of August 4, 1986, we find that
this could not have been done
legally. The earlier order was
already final and executory and
therefore could no longer be
amended by the second order.
No appeal had been taken by
the plaintiffs from the order of
August
4,
1986,
notwithstanding
that
the
dismissal was "with prejudice."
That order was served on them
on September 5, 1986, more
than six months before the
petitioners invoked it in their
motion to dismiss the second

case on March 17, 1987. On

that date, it was no longer
possible to revise the meaning
of that order by considering the
dismissal
as
"without
prejudice."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
7. ID.; JURISDICTION; A
COURT OF COMPETENT
JURISDICTION MAY NOT
BE OPENED, MODIFIED OR
VACATED BY ANOTHER
COURT OF CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION. A judge of
a branch of one court should not
annul the order of a judge of
another branch of the same
court (meaning the same
judicial district) because both of
them are judges of the same
category who act coordinately
and independently of each other
except of course, if the
second judge acts in the place of
the first judge in the same
proceedings. The power to
open, modify or vacate a
judgment is not only possessed
by, but is restricted to the court
in which the judgment was
rendered. It is regarded as an
elementary principle of high
importance
in
the
administration of justice that the
judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not
be opened, modified, or vacated
by any court of concurrent

jurisdiction. (30-A, American

Jurisprudence 605)
8. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA;
APPLICATION
THEREOF
MAY NOT BE EVADED BY
SIMPLY
INCLUDING
ADDITIONAL PARTIES IN
THE LATER CASE. A party
may not evade the application
of the rule of res judicata by
simply including additional
parties in the subsequent case or
by not including as parties in
the later case persons who were
parties in the previous suit
(Anticamara v. Ong, L-29689,
April 14, 1978, 82 SCRA 337).
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PARTY
CANNOT BY VARYING THE
FORM OF ACTION ESCAPE
ITS APPLICATION. A party
cannot, by varying the form of
action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case,
escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same
cause of action shall not be
twice litiga.R. No. 88643 July
23, 1991
HON. ARIEL C. SANTOS, as
Labor Arbiter of the National
Capital Region, petitioner,
vs.

HON. WILLLAM BAYHON,

as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, NCR,
BRANCH
XXIII,
Manila,
ATTY.
NICOLAS GEROCHI, JR.,
ATTY.
MARJORIE
DOCDOCIL,
PRISCILLA
CARRERA, respondents.
Jose Espinas for petitioner.
Nicolas A. Gerochi, Jr. for
respondent and on his own
behalf.
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:p

On November 6, 1985, a
decision was rendered by Labor
Arbiter Ceferina Diosana in
NLRC-NCR Case No.
1-313-85 entitled, "Kamapi vs.
Poly-Plastic Products and/or
Anthony Ching," in favor of
Kamapi. The decision was
affirmed in toto by the National
Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on August 18, 1987.
After the decision had
become final and executory,
Kamapi obtained a writ of
execution against the properties,
consisting of machineries

In this petition for certiorari

with
preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining
order, Labor Arbiter Ariel C.
Santos

and equipment, of Poly-Plastic

Products or Anthony Ching.
However, respondent Priscilla
Carrera filed a third party

(herein petitioner) questions the

jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court to issue a writ of
preliminary junction to

claim alleging that Anthony

Ching had sold the machinery
and pieces of equipment to her.
Nevertheless, the public

prevent the enforcement of the

writ of execution in a labor
case, and said Judge's order
dated May 31, 1989 citing

auction sale proceeded on

March 29, 1988. It was
conducted by Deputy Sheriff
Jaime Pambuan in the presence
of

him (petitioner) for indirect

contempt and ordering his arrest
for disobeying the injunction.

Carrera and her counsel after

the judgment creditor had

posted an indemnity bond of

P115,000 in favor of the
deputy sheriff to answer for any
damage that he may incur
should it be found later that the
third-party claim is valid
and lawful.
On April 4, 1988, Carrera filed
in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Civil Case No. 8844154) her claim to the levied
properties and obtained a
temporary restraining order
enjoining
Labor
Arbiter
Diosana and NLRC Deputy
Sheriff
Pambuan from issuing a
certificate of sale over the
levied properties.
On April 12, 1988, Diosana
inhibited herself from hearing
Carrera's third-party complaint.
The case was re-raffled
and assigned to Labor Arbiter
Ariel Santos.
During the hearing of the thirdparty claim by Labor Arbiter
Santos on April 26, 1988,
Carrera's counsel, Atty. Nicolas

Gerochi, Jr., submitted a xerox

copy of the alleged deed of sale
but the petitioner asked to see
the original. Atty.

On April 22, 1988, Judge

William Bayhon of RTC,
Manila, issued an order
enjoining
Labor
Arbiter
Ceferina Diosana

declaring Santos guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of
indirect contempt, ordering his
immediate arrest, sentencing
him to seven (7) days in jail,
and to pay a fine of P1,000

Gerochi brought to the May 9,

1988 hearing the supposed
original
copy
but
upon
comparison, it was found to be
not

and sheriff Jaime Pambuan

from enforcing the writ of
execution against the properties
claimed by Camera pending

the original of the xerox copy

that was presented by Atty.
Gerochi. On May 11, 1988,
Labor Arbiter Santos issued an

the determination of the validity

of the sale made in her favor by
the judgment debtor PolyPlastic Products and

order declaring the xerox copy

of the deed of sale fictitious and
allowing the execution to
proceed against the

Anthony Ching.

of Priscilla Camera. Santos

forthwith elevated the matter to
this Court for review on the
ground that Judge Bayhon's

On May 13, 1988, Atty. Gerochi

filed in Civil Case No. 8844154
an urgent omnibus motion
praying that herein

arrest order dated May 31, 1989

is a nullity because Art. 254 of
the Labor Code prohibits the
issuance of an

G.R.
No.
88643
hp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/j
uri1991/jul1991/gr_88643_199
1.html

injunction or restraining order

'in any case involving or
growing out of labor disputes . .
. except as otherwise

1 of 2 11/26/2014 4:05 AM

provided in Articles 218 and

264 of this Code."

properties
Products.

of

Poly-Plastic

Santos and Pambuan filed a

motion to dismiss the civil case
on the ground that the RTC did
not have jurisdiction
over the labor case, for
exclusive jurisdiction is vested
in the NLRC (Art. 255, Labor
Code) and no injunction or
restraining order may be issued
by any court or entity in a labor
dispute.

petitioner be cited for indirect

contempt for disobeying the
order of the court dated April
22, 1988 and to order his

with subsidiary imprisonment in

case of insolvency. He further
ordered the return of the
machineries and equipment

Article 218 speaks of the power

of the Commission to issue an
injunction due to a labor
dispute, while Art. 264

arrest.
On May 31, 1989, Judge
William Bayhon issued an order

refers to the power of the same

Commission to issue injunction
in case of strikes or lockouts.

Petitioner alleges further that

Judge
Bayhon
has
no
jurisdiction to cite petitioner for
contempt, for the case grew out
of a labor dispute.
Respondents, on the other hand,
claim that Judge Bayhon has
jurisdiction over the third party
claim for respondent
Carrera was never a party in the
labor dispute between Anthony
Ching (judgment debtor) and
the members of the
Kamapi (judgment creditors),
and she had no employeremployee relationship with any
of them.
The petition has no merit, for
the power of the NLRC to
execute its judgments extends
only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the
judgment
debtor
(Special
Servicing Corp. vs. Centro La
Paz, 121 SCRA 748).
The general rule that no court
has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments
or decrees of another
court with
coordinate

concurrent or
jurisdiction

possessing equal power to grant

injunctive relief, applies only
when
no third-party claimant is
involved (Traders Royal Bank
vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 133 SCRA 142). When a
third-party, or a stranger to the
action, asserts a claim over the
property levied upon, the
claimant may vindicate his
claim by an independent action
in the proper civil court which
may stop the execution of the
judgment on property
not belonging to the judgment
debtor. The following rulings of
this Court are apropos:
When the sheriff, acting beyond
the bounds of his authority,
seizes a stranger's property, the
writ of
injunction, which is issued to
stop the auction sale of that
property, is not an interference
with the writ oil
execution issued by another
court because the writ of
execution
was
improperly
implemented by the

sheriff. Under that writ, he

could attach the property of the
judgment debtor. He is not
authorized to levy
upon the property of the third
claimant. (National Mines and
Allied Workers Union vs. Vera,
133 SCRA
259.)
There is no question that the
writ of execution was issued
against the judgment debtors
(the Former
Owner) in Civil Case No. Q29325, Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court)
Branch IV of
Quezon City. However, what
was levied upon by the Sheriff
are the properties allegedly
owned by the
New Owners of the TML
Garments, Inc. This fact of
ownership was claimed by the
New Owners or

Civil Case No. Q-29325; that

they were not
summoned to appear before the
court; that they did not
participate in any manner in the
proceedings
before the court and that the
decision of the court a quo did
not include them as judgment
debtors who
should pay the judgment debt,
and therefore to compel them to
pay the obligation incurred by
the
former
owner
of
TML
Garments, Inc., without due
process of law will amount to a
deprivation of their
property, Wellsettled is the rule
that a writ of execution can only
be issued against one who is a
party to
the action and not against one
who, not being a party in the
case, has not yet had his day in
court.

petitioners herein in their

Motion to Intervene before the
trial court. Petitioners contend
that they were

(New Owners/Management of
TML Garments, Inc. vs.
Zaragoza, 170 SCRA 563.)

not
the
original
parties
impleaded as co-defendants in

If the disputed property did not

belong to the judgment debtor

in NLRC Case No. 7-2577-84,

it could
not be validly levied upon by
the sheriff for the satisfaction of
the judgment therein. (Pealosa,
et al. vs.
Hon. Villanueva, et al., 177
SCRA 778.)
Consequently, the Regional
Trial Court of Manila had
jurisdiction
to
stop
by
injunction the National Labor
Relations
Commission's sheriff from
proceeding with the auction sale
of the property claimed by the
private respondent, to
satisfy the claims of the labor
union against the Poly-Plastic
Products.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.ted.
OBLEA V. CA
244 SCRA 101
FACTS:

Melencios and Wicos co-owned

a parcel of land. This was
allegedly bought by Esteban
from a certain Ramos, the
alleged
administratix
of
Melencio and Pura Melencios
estate. Oblea was leasing then a
building on the subject lot and
eventually bought it from
Estebans son. Esteban then
filed an ejectment case to which
he won. The registered owners
then sold
the land to Oblea and they
instituted an action for quieting
of title against Esteban.
HELD:
An action for quieting of title
before the RTC doesn't divest
the MTC of its jurisdiction to
hear the case for ejectment.
Further,
the
subsequent
acquisition of ownership of the
property is not a supervening
event that will bar the execution
of the judgment in a case of
unlawful detainer.
.R. No. 117389 May 11, 1995
ROMEO V. OBLEA and
RAMON
S.
MELENCIO,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and
JUAN
S,
ESTEBAN,
respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals dismissing the
petition for certiorari
and prohibition and denying the
prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the order of 6
April 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Br. 27, which
lifted and cancelled the
temporary restraining order
issued by
Judge Lydia B. Hipolito of the
Municipal Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Br. 9. 1
The controverted lot, designated
as Lot 1, Block 2, was formerly
a part of a mother lot covered
by TCT No. 26604 of
the Register of Deeds of
Cabanatuan City, containing an
area of 83,325 square meters
and registered in the names
of Manuel Melencio (1/3), Pura
Melencio (1/3) and Wilfredo
Wico and Mariabelle M. Wico
(1/3). Subsequently, TCT
No. 26604 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof TCT No. 65031 was
issued in the name of petitioner
Ramon S.
Melencio who became a coowner with Pura Melencio and
the Wicos by virtue of a deed of
sale executed in his
favor by his now deceased
father Manuel Melencio.

On 6 June 1958 subject lot was

bought by private respondent
Juan S. Esteban from Mauricio
Ramos who claimed
to have acquired the property
from Ursula Melencio, the
alleged administratrix of the
estate of Manuel and Pura
Melencio. 2
Meanwhile, petitioner Romeo
V. Oblea leased a building
located on the subject lot from a
certain Marius Esteban, an
alleged
son
of
private
respondent Juan S. Esteban.
Oblea eventually bought from
Marius the lot on which the
building stood.
3 As a
consequence, on 4 July 1991
Esteban filed an ejectment suit
against petitioner Oblea in the
Municipal Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City docketed as
Civil Case No. 10588. On 3
April 1992, the case was
decided by Judge Romeo G.
Mauricio in favor of Esteban
and
against petitioner Oblea who
was ordered to vacate the
premises and pay rental arrears
from January 1983, as well as
litigation expenses and
attorney's fees in the total sum
of P8,000.00.
On appeal, the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City
rendered judgment on 26 March
1993 modifying the MTC

decision by ordering Oblea to

pay rentals only from 2 March
1988, but sustaining the MTC in
other respects.
On 3 June 1993, the registered
owners 4 sold the disputed lot to
petitioner Oblea. Afterwards,
Oblea together with Ramon
Melencio,
Pura Melencio and Wilfredo
Wico and Mariabelle Wico filed
before the Regional Trial Court
an action for quieting of title
against Esteban, docketed
as Civil Case No. 1536. They
contended that the deeds of sale
executed by Mauricio Ramos in
favor of Juan Esteban and by
Ursula Melencio in
favor of Mauricio Ramos were
a nullity.
The ejectment case, Civil Case
No. 10588, was in the meantime
appealed to the Court of
Appeals by way of petition
for review, which petition was
dismissed by the appellate court
on 2 July 1993. Upon remand of
the records to the
court of origin, and on motion
of Esteban, the prevailing party,
MTC Judge Hipolito directed
execution and issued
the corresponding writ to
enforce the final and executory
judgment in the ejectment suit.
The execution was however
thwarted
when
petitioners
Romeo Oblea and Ramon

Melencio filed another petition

before the Regional Trial Court
of
Cabanatuan
City
for
certiorari and prohibition with
application for a temporary
restraining
order
and
preliminary
injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No.
1676-AF. On 22 November
1993 the
Executive Judge thereof issued
a temporary restraining order to
stop the enforcement of the writ
of execution issued
by Judge Hipolito. On 6 April
1994 however Judge Adriano I.
Tuason, Acting Presiding Judge
of Br. 27, lifted and
canceled the restraining order
earlier issued, thus paving the
way for the execution of the
judgment in the ejectment
case.
Undeterred by the reversal,
petitioners elevated their case to
the appellate court which on 27
September 1994
dismissed their appeal, the
reason being that the eviction
case had long become final and
executory and that the
various actions taken by
petitioners
were
merely
designed to delay execution.
We agree with respondent Court
of Appeals.
The
main
argument
of
petitioners is that in view of the
subsequent
sale
of
the

controversial lot to them on 3

June
1993, and under the mistaken
notion
of
"doctrine
of
supervening event," they have
acquired a better right of
possession and ownership.
Hence, they argue that with this
"supervening
event,"
the
judgment evicting them can no
longer be enforced.
The argument is untenable. It
must be stressed that the sole
issue in an action for unlawful
detainer is physical or
material
possession,
i.e.,
possession de facto and not
possession de jure. This is
settled doctrine. Resultantly, the
pendency of an action for
quieting of title before the
Regional Trial Court does not
divest the city or municipal trial
court of its jurisdiction to
proceed with the ejectment case
over the same property. The
subsequent acquisition of
ownership by petitioners is not
a supervening event that will
bar the execution of the
judgment in said unlawful
detainer case, the fact remaining
that when judgment was
rendered by the MTC in the
ejectment case, petitioner
Oblea was a mere possessor of
the subject lot.
Similarly,
the
fact
that
petitioners instituted a separate

action for quieting of title is not

a valid reason for defeating
the execution of the summary
remedy of ejectment. On the
contrary., it bolsters the
conclusion that the eviction case
did not deal with the issue of
ownership which was precisely
the subject matter of the action
for quieting of title
before the Regional Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City. 5 With the
finality of the decision in the
ejectment case, execution in
favor of the
prevailing party has become a
matter
of
right;
its
implementation mandatory. It
cannot be avoided. 6
In fine, the Court of Appeals did
not commit reversible error in
upholding the order of 6 April
1994 which lifted the
temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of
the writ of execution in favor of
private respondent
Esteban. Simply put, the
petition is a desperate attempt
on the part of petitioners to
unduly prolong the litigation of
an issue which has been settled
and should have been long laid
to rest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED.
Costs
against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.