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ELECTION LAW PRE-BAR HANDOUT

Atty. Jocelyn Arro-Valencia


2013 BAR Examination Coverage for Election Laws
A. Suffrage
B. Qualification and disqualification of voters
C. Registration of Voters
D. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings
E. Political Parties
a. Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political parties
b. Registration
F. Candidacy
a. Qualification of candidates
b. Filing of certificates of candidacy
i. Effect of filing
ii. Substitution of candidates
iii. Ministerial duty of COMELEC to receive certificate
iv. Nuisance candidates
v. Petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy
vi. Effect of disqualification
vii. Withdrawal of candidates
G. Campaign
a. Premature campaigning
b. Prohibited contributions
c. Lawful and prohibited election propaganda
d. Limitations on expenses
e. Statement of contributions and expenses
H. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers
a. Composition
b. Powers

I. Remedies and jurisdiction in election law


a. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
b. Petition for disqualification
c. Petition to declare failure of elections
d. Pre-proclamation controversy
e. Election Protest
f. Quo Warranto
J. Prosecution of election offenses
THEORY OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY - Section 1, Article 11 of the
Constitution:
The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them. A democratic and republic government derives all its powers, directly or
indirectly, from the people who represents the sovereign power of the state.
SUFFRAGE

Means by which people express their sovereign judgment. (Nolasco v.


Comelec 275 SCRA 763).

Right and obligation of qualified citizens to vote in the election of


certain national and local officers of the government and in the decision
of public questions submitted to the people.

It is both a right and a privilege. Right because it is the expression of


the sovereign will of the people. A privilege because its exercise is
conferred only to such persons or class of persons as are most likely to
exercise it for the purpose of the public good.

Suffrage as a duty is in the nature of a public trust and constitutes a


voter a representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the
privileged bestowed should be exercised not exclusively for the benefit
of the citizen or citizens proferring it but in good faith and with
intelligent zeal for the general benefit and welfare of the State. (Cipriano
Abanil v. Justice of the Peace Court of Bacolod, Negros Occidental et.
al. 70 Phil. 28 (1940)).

SCOPE OF SUFFRAGE: FORMS OF POPULAR INTERVENTION

Sec. 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec is vested


with the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
1)

Election is the means by which the people choose, through the use
of the ballot, their officials for definite and fixed periods and to whom
they entrust, for the time being as their representatives, the exercise of
powers of government (Garchitorena v. Crsecini 39 Phil. 258 (1918)).
In ordinary dialect or understanding, elections refers to the conduct of
the poles listing of votes, holding of electoral campaign, act of
casting and receiving the ballots from the voters, counting them, and
making the election returns and proclaiming the candidates. . .it refers
to the entire and complete electoral process. (Carlos v. Angeles 346
SCRA 571 (2000) )

2)

Plebiscite Generally associated with the ratification process.


Plebiscite is required a. Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, with reference to the

voting to determine whether the voters in the country are in favor


of or against the ratification of the Constitution or an amendment
thereto and
b. Sec. 10, Art. X, in connection with the voting to determine

whether the voters in the political units affected agree to a


proposed creation, division, merger, abolition or boundary change
of a political unit.
RA No. 6735, otherwise known as The Initiative and Referendum Act,
under Section 3, Par (e), defines plebiscite as the electoral process by which
an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
Padilla Jr. v. Comelec 214 SCRA 735, the Comelec resolved to approve the
conduct of the plebiscite in the area or units affected for the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, Majority of the electorates in the units
affected rejected the creation of Tulay-na-Lupa.
Petitioner Gov. of Camarines Norte in a Special Civil Action for Certiorari, seek
to set aside the Plebiscite asserting that it was a complete failure and that the

results obtained were invalid and illegal because the Plebiscite as mandated by
Comelec Res. No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or
units affected (which is the 12 barangays and should not have included the
mother unit of the Municipality of Labo.)
HELD: With the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, more
specifically, Art. X, Section 10, the creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of the boundaries of any political unit shall be subject to the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a Plebiscite in the POLITICAL UNITS
AFFECTED was held to mean that residents of the political entity who would
be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to
vote in the said Plebiscite or the plurality of political units which would
participate in the Plebiscite. The Court reiterated its ruling in Tan v.
Comelec 142 SCRA 727 (1986), that in the conduct of a Plebiscite, it is
imperative that all the constituents of the mother and daughter units affected
shall be included.
Sanidad v. Comelec 181 SCRA 529, the Supreme Court declared as
unconstitutional the restriction imposed by Comelec on media relative to
discussing on air and print the features of the plebiscite issues in the creation of
the autonomous region for the Cordilleras and held that plebiscite are matters of
public concern and importance and the peoples right to be informed and to be
able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be best served by access
to an unabridged discussion of the issues.
City of Pasig v. Comelec/Municipality of Cainta Province of Rizal, Sept. 10,
1999, the issue raised was the propriety of the suspension of the plebiscite
proceedings pending the decision of the boundary dispute between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig. The City of Pasig passed an
Ordinance creating barangays Karangalan and Napico. The Municipality of
Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscite due to the pending
case before the RTC of Antipolo for the settlement of the boundary dispute and
that the said activities await the decision of the RTC on the matter.
That Comelec suspended the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of
Brgy. Karangalan but rendered the creation of Napico as moot as the same has
already been ratified in the plebiscite held for the purpose. The SC held that the
creation of Napico cannot be considered as moot and it is most proper that the
plebiscite be declared null and void in view of the pending boundary dispute

between Pasig and Cainta which presents a prejudicial question and must be
decided first before the plebiscite for the proposed barangays be conducted.

Jurisdiction over controversies involving Plebiscite Issues - Ma. Salvacion


Buac/Antonio Bautista v. Comelec/Alan Peter Cayetano and some
Intervenors, G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004, a petition for certiorari and
mandamus was filed by petitioners Buac and Bautista assailing the October 28,
2002 en banc resolution of the Comelec which held that it has no jurisdiction
over controversies involving the conduct of plebiscite and the annulment of its
results.
The facts show that in April 1988, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the
ratification of the Taguig Cityhood Law (RA No. 8487) proposing the
conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a city. Without completing the
canvass of 64 other election returns, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC)
declared that the NO votes won and that the people rejected the conversion of
Taguig to a city. The PBOC was however ordered by the Comelec en banc to
reconvene and complete the canvass which the board did and in due time issued
an Order proclaiming that the negative votes prevailed.
Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to annul the results of the plebiscite
with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. Cayetano intervened and
moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Comelec. He claimed that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election
protest and that the jurisdiction to hear a complaint involving the conduct of a
plebiscite is lodged with the RTC.
Comelec 2nd division initially gave due course to the petition ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case. It treated the petition as akin to an election protest
considering that the same allegations of fraud and irregularities in the casting
and counting of ballots and preparation of returns are the same grounds for
assailing the results of an election. It then ordered the Taguig ballot boxes to be
brought to its Manila Office and created revision committees to revise and
recount the plebiscite ballots.
Intervenor Cayetano, in an unverified motion, moved for reconsideration of the
Comelec Order insisting that it has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition
contesting the results of a plebiscite.

In a complete turnaround, the Comelec 2 nd division issued an Order granting the


Motion for Reconsideration. It dismissed the petition to annul the results of the
plebiscite and ruled that Comelec has no jurisdiction over said case as it
involves an exercise of QJ powers not contemplated under Section 2(2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.
On appeal, the Comelec en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2nd division. It held
that the Comelec cannot use its power to enforce and administer all laws
relative to plebiscites as this power is purely administrative or executive and not
QJ in nature. It concluded that the jurisdiction over the petition to annul the
Taguig plebiscite results is lodged with the RTC under Section 19(6) of BP 129
which provides that the RTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or body exercising judicial or
QJ functions. Hence, the petition before the SC.
The SC held that the key to the case is its nature, which involves the
determination of whether the electorate of Taguig voted in favor of or
against the conversion of the municipality of Taguig. The invocation of
judicial power to settle disputes involving the conduct of a plebiscite is
misplaced. Judicial power as defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution as the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
The instant case assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite
does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial power. There is
no plaintiff or defendant in the case for it merely involves the ascertainment of
the vote of the electorate on whether they approve or disapprove the conversion
of their municipality into a highly urbanized city.
In referring to Article IX-C, Section 2(1), the SC said that the said provision is
explicit that Comelec has power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall. To enforce means to cause to take effect or to cause the
performance of such act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or
operation, a plan or measure which entails all the necessary and incidental

power for it to achieve the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful, free and
credible elections (HOPE FRECRE). The SC was surprised that for the first
time, Comelec yielded its historic jurisdiction over a motion for reconsideration
which was even filed out of time, thus rendering it without jurisdiction to
entertain the same.
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM are lawmaking powers that belong to
the people and have been described as the people power features of our
Constitution (Asked in the 2000 BAR).
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides that Amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein.
Section 32, Article VI of the Constitution provides that Congress shall, as
early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum and the
exceptions therefrom, where the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by Congress or local
legislative body after the registration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10%
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.
To carry out these provisions, Congress enacted RA 6735, an Act Providing
for a System of Initiative and Referendum. Initiative under RA 6735 is
defined as the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose.
RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 also provides for a local
initiative defined as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. Sec. 126
thereof provides for a local referendum defined as the legal process whereby
the RV of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any
ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
Indirect Initiative is exercised by the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.

Santiago, et. al. v. Comelec, et. al., 270 SCRA 106 (336 SCRA 843), the
controversy brought to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of Initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed a petition with the Comelec to amend the constitution,
specifically to lift the term limits of elective officials, by peoples initiative.
Atty. Delfin asked the Comelec for an order: (1) to fix the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country (2) to cause the necessary publications
of said Order and the said petition in newspapers of general and local
circulation and (3) instruct the municipal election registrars in all regions in the
Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing station at
the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
The Comelec issued an Order granting the petition. Santiago filed this special
civil action for prohibition raising among other grounds that RA 6735 does not
provide for peoples initiative to amend the constitution considering that the
same is still pending with the Senate of which she is the author. The petition of
Atty. Delfin was not validly initiated as it failed to comply with the signature
requirement for initiating an initiative. The Comelec never acquired
jurisdiction over the petition as jurisdiction is acquired only after its filing
the petition being the initiatory pleading.
The SC gave due course to the Petition on the legal premise that the
Constitution recognizes only two (2) methods of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, viz (1) by Congress upon a vote of of all its members and (2) by
constitutional convention.
The SC interpreted Sec. 2 of RA 6735 which provides that the power
of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approved or reject, in whole or in part the Constitution, laws, ordinance
or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. It
held that the inclusion of the word constitution here is neither germane nor
relevant to said action which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, ordinances and resolution. Therefore, the people are

not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approved or reject, in whole
or in part the Constitution, through the system of initiative.
The SC further declared that Comelec cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. The
power of Comelec to issue rules and regulations (QJ power) is limited only to
what is provided under
(a) Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution and
(b) by a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfied the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
Raul Lambino, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006 the
issue on initiative to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution was again at
issue. FACTS: Raul Lambino and Enrico Aumentado with other groups,
gathered signatures for an initiative to propose amendments to the 1987
Constitution. In August 2006, the Lambino group filed a petition asking the
Comelec to conduct a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments proposed
in their initiative petition, in accordance with Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7
of RA 6735. The petitioners claim that their initiative petition was supported by
the signatures of 6M+ individuals, constituting at least 12% of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters. They further claimed that the provincial and city Comelec officials had
already verified the 6.3M signatures. However, the Comelec denied the petition
on the ground that there is no valid enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution, relying on Santiago vs. Comelec (336 SCRA 843
(1997)) which declared RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause
on proposal to amend the Constitution. The advocates of the proposed
amendments then filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and mandamus
(under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court) to set aside the Comelec Resolution
dismissing the petition and to order the Comelec to give due course to their
petition.
HELD: (1) the initiative petition failed to comply with the requirements of the
Constitution. For the petition to be valid, two essential requisites must be
complied with, namely: (a) the people must author, and thus sign, the entire
proposal; no agent or representative can sign on their behalf; and (b) as an

initiative upon a petition, the proposed amendments must be embodied in the


petition itself.
The rationale for the second requisite is that the signature requirement would be
rendered meaningless if the person affixing his signature has not first seen and
understood what it is that he is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for
fraud. On-compliance with the above mentioned requirement is fatal to the
initiative petition. For sure, the great majority of the 6.3M people who signed
the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing, as the proposed amendments were not stated in the signature sheets.
They were not apprised of the nature and effect of the proposed amendments,
among which are substantial changes as follows:
1) the term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus
member of the Parliament may be re-elected indefinitely;
2) The Interim Parliament whose membership comprised of present
members of Congress can decide when to call the parliamentary
elections. Thus, leaving them the absolute discretion to determine
their term limits.
3) That within 45 days from the ratification of proposed changes, the
interim Parliament may further propose revision or amendments to the
Constitution.
Furthermore, a peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only
to an amendment to the Constitution and not revision. Article XVII of the
Constitution speaks of three modes of proposing amendments to the
Constitution: a) by direct congressional action (3/4 votes of all its members), b)
through a constitutional convention, and c) through a peoples initiative. The
first and second modes, as provided in Section 1 of Article XVII, apply to both
amendment and revision, but the 3rd mode applies only to amendments. The
distinction between the first two modes and the third was intentional as shown
by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVISION AND AMENDMENT. Revision
broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of power or the system of checks and
balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of
the Constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that

adds, reduces, deletes, without altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
On the second pivotal issue of revisiting the ruling of the Court in Santiago vs.
Comelec, the Court held that an affirmation or reversal of the same will not
change the outcome of the case. The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling
involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can
resolve on some grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the wellsettled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of the statute
if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.
NOTE: In the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, however, the Court
noted that a majority of the justices voted to declare RA 6735 sufficient law for
a peoples initiative on the Constitution, effectively abandoning Santiago v.
Comelec.)
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec 252 SCRA 492 (1996), an
action for certiorari and prohibition was brought to the SC seeking to nullify the
ruling of the Comelec and Resolution No. 2848 denying petitioners plea to stop
the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the SB of Morong Bataan.
In this case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan on April 1993,
passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its
absolute concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) as
required by Sec. 12 of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992). On September 5, 1993, the SB submitted the Kapasyahan to the Office
of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondent Garcia, et. al. filed a petition
with the SB of Morong to annul PK Blg. 10, Serye 1993 and therein proposed
for amendments to the said law. The SB acted upon the petition and
promulgated PK Blg. 18, requesting Congress to amend certain provisions of
RA 7227 and informed respondents that the other matters in the proposed
amendments were already submitted to the Office of the President.
Not satisfied and within 30 days from submission of their petition, respondent
resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC of 1991. On June 18, 1996
Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 adopting a calendar of activities for local
referendum to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Bldg. 10.

Petitioner SBMA seeks to nullify the Order of Comelec denying petitioners


plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the proposition
to recall the Kapasyahan as it was proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes an amendment of a national law. ISSUE:
whether Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating and implementing its Res. No. 2842 which govern
the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal PK
Blg. 10 and
whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the
powers of the people of Morong to enact (whether such initiative
seeks the amendment of a national law.
In this case, the SC was compelled to distinguish Initiative from Referendum.
To begin with, the process started by Garcia et. al., was an Initiative but
respondent Comelec made preparations for a referendum. In the body of the
Comelec Resolution No. 2842, the word referendum is repeated at least 27
times, but initiative is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as
a referendum, the counting of votes was entrusted to a referendum committee,
the documents were called referendum returns and so forth. As distinguished,
initiative is a process of law making by the people themselves without the
participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives while
referendum consists merely with the electorate approving or rejecting what has
been drawn up or enacted by the legislative body by simply indicating yes or no
in the ballot.
In initiative, there is a need for the Comelec to supervise the process closely, its
authority therein extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but
also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper
form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the
electorate. Care in this activity must be exercise that no petition embracing
more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate, although two or
more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
As to the second issue, SBMA insists that the creation of the SSEZ is now a fait
accompli for the benefit of the entire nation and Morong cannot unilaterally
withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions for such concurrence as this
would effectively render nugatory the creation of the SSEZ. The SC agreed

with the contention of Garcia that the position of SBMA is premature and
conjectural because at this point the resolution is just a proposal. If the people
should reject it during the referendum, then there is nothing to declare as illegal.
A writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility as
courts may decide only actual controversies and not hypothetical questions or
cases.
3) RECALL under RA 7160 and as held in Angobung v. Comelec 269
SCRA 246 (1997), recall is the mode of removal of a public officer by the
people before the end of his term of office which shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official
subject of such recall belongs.
The mode of initiating recall against a public elective official is now limited to a
petition commenced only by the registered voters in the local unit concerned.
Section 70 and 71 of RA 7160 is now amended by RA 9244, otherwise
known as An Act Eliminating the Preparatory Recall Assembly as a Mode
of Instituting Recall of Elective Local Government Officials.
Section 70 of RA 7160 now reads as follows: The recall of any elective
provincial, city, municipal or barangay official shall be commenced by a
petition of a registered voter in the LGU concerned and supported by the
registered voters in the LGU concerned during the election in which the local
official sought to be recalled was elected subject to the following percentage
requirements:
At least 25% in the case of an LGU with a voting population of not more
than 20,000
At least 20% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of at least
20,000 but not more than 75,000: Provided, that in no case shall the
required petitioners be less than 5,000.
At least 15% in the case of local government units with a voting
population of at least 75,000 but not more than 300,000: Provided
however, that in no case shall the required number of petitioners be less
than 15,000; and
At least 10% in the case of local government units with a voting
population of over 300,000 thousand: Provided however, that in no case
shall the required petitioners be less than 45,000.

DATE OF RECALL Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall with the
appropriate local office of the Comelec, the Comelec or its duly authorized
representative shall set the date of the election or recall, which shall not be later
than 30 days upon the completion of the procedure outlined in the preceding
article, in the case of the barangay, city or municipal officials, and 45 days in
the case of provincial officials.
The official sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly
registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and like other
candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon. (Sec. 71)
EFFECTIVITY OF RECALL recall shall become effective only upon the
election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate who
received the highest number of votes cast during the election in recall. Should
the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes,
confidence in him is thereby affirmed and he shall continue in office. (Sec. 72).
LIMITATIONS ON RECALL an elective official may be subject of recall
elections only ONCE during his term of office exclusively on the ground of
LACK OF CONFIDENCE. The recall cannot be undertaken within one (1)
year from the date of the officials assumption of office or within one (1)
immediately preceding a regular election. (Sec. 74)
In Paras v. Comelec 264 SCRA 49, Paras, incumbent punong brgy sought to
bar the recall proceedings against him citing Sec. 74 (B) of RA 7160 that it was
barred by the scheduled SK elections. The SC settled the issue and held that the
SK elections is not considered a regular local elections for purposes of recall
under Sec. 74. The term regular local elections is construed as one referring to
an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled up by the electorate. It is confined to the
regular elections of elective national and local officials.
Manuel Afiado et al., v. Comelec 340 SCRA 600, the SC passed upon the
issue on whether or not an elective official who became City Mayor by legal
succession can be the subject of a recall election by virtue of a PRA resolution
which was passed or adopted when the said elective official was still the ViceMayor. During the May 11, 1998 elections in Santiago City, Joel Miranda
became the substitute candidate for his father, Jose Miranda, for the position of

Mayor. Joel emerged as the winner over his opponent Antonio Abaya and he
was later proclaimed with Amelita Navarro as Vice-Mayor.
On May 13, 1998, defeated Abaya filed with the Comelec a Petition to Declare
Null and Void Substitution with prayer for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or TRO which later was amended seeking to declare the
certificate of candidacy of the father of Joel, as null and void. The Comelec
ruled that the certificate of candidacy of Jose Miranda was invalid, hence,
he cannot be validly substituted by his son Joel, as a mayoralty candidate.
After Joels motion for reconsideration was denied by the Comelec, Joel went to
the SC via a special civil action of certiorari.
While the petition of Joel was pending with the SC, the PRA of Santiago City
convened on July 12, 1999 and adopted a Resolution calling for the recall of
Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro for loss of confidence. While the PR Resolution
was under evaluation with the Comelec, then VM Navarro on September 9,
1999 filed a petition which sought the nullification of the PRA Resolution.
After the SC denied with finality the petition of Joel in September 28, 1999
(substitution was invalid), VM Navarro assumed and took oath as new mayor of
Santiago City by virtue of the law on succession on October 11, 1999.
Since the Petition for recall and opposition filed thereto was still pending with
the Comelec, a petition for mandamus was filed to compel Comelec to resolve
and deny Navarros opposition and in effect give due course to and implement
the said PRA resolution. On March 31, 2000, respondent Comelec denied due
course the PRA resolution as moot for the reason that the assumption by legal
succession of petition as the new mayor of Santiago City is a supervening event
which rendered the recall proceedings against her moot and academic.
TYPES OF ELECTIONS
I Regular Elections a regular election is an election held on such dates
established by law at regular intervals. (OEC 13, 21, 29 and 37) Whether
national or local, it refers to an election participated in by those who possess the
right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered
voters.

II Special elections on the other hand, is an election not regularly held but
which is conducted

to supply a vacancy in a particular office before the expiration of


the full term for which the incumbent was elected. Sec. 4 of RA
7166 provides that , in case a permanent vacancy shall occur in
the Senate or House of Representative at least one (1) year before
the expiration of the term, the Comelec shall call and hold a special
elections to fill the vacancy not earlier than 60 days nor longer than
90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case
such vacancy in the Senate, the special elections shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections. (Article
VI, Section 9, Constitution).

Article VII, Sec. 10 of the Constitution, in case a vacancy occurs


in the offices of the President and Vice-President, a special election
cannot be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the
date of the next presidential elections.

In cases were a postponement and failure of elections are declared


by the Comelec in accordance with Sections 5,6,7 of BP 881).
Lucero v. Comelec 234 SCRA 280 (1994); Borja v. Comelec 260
SCRA 604 (1996).

In fixing the date for special elections the Comelec should to see to it that: 1)
it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the
postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect;
2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in the failure to elect.
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
Article V Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines NOT otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least 18 years of age
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six (6) months in the immediately
preceding the elections. No literacy, property or other substantive requirements
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Section 2. The Congress shall provide for a system of securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system of absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates
to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed
to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
WHO MAY REGISTER (RA 8189, (An Act Providing for the General
Registration of Voters providing for a System of Continuing Registration
which took effect on June 11, 1996)
Registration of voters is a means of determining who possess the qualifications
as a voter and regulating the exercise of the right of suffrage. Why is it
essential? Registration is essential to enable a qualified voter to vote in any
election or any form of popular intervention.
How is Registration done Registration refers to the ACT of accomplishing
and filing of a sworn application for registration (Voters Registration Record
VRR) by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality
wherein he resides and including the VRR in the book of RV upon approval by
the Election Registration Board (Sec. 3(a)).
REGISTRATION IS EXTENDED TO: DOMESTIC AND OVERSEAS
VOTERS
FOR DOMESTIC VOTERS GOVERNED BY RA 8189 The Voters
Registration Act
(Sec. 9 clarified the provisions in the Omnibus Election Code as to when the
residency and age requirements should be attained)
Section 9 Who may Register All citizens of the Philippines NOT
otherwise disqualified by law who are at least 18 years of age, who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein
they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections.

Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country


solely by reason of his occupation, profession, employment in private or public
service, educational activities, work in the military or naval reservations, within
the Philippines, service in the AFP, or confinement or detention in government
institution in accordance with law, shall NOT be deemed to have lost his
original residence.
Any person who, on the day of registration may not have reached the
required age or period of residence but, who on the day of election shall
possess such qualifications, may register as a voter.
Meynard Sabili v. Comelec/Florencio Librea 670 SCRA 670 (2012) The
Court have held that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than the place where one is elected,
does not constitute loss of residence. Section 117 of the OEC provides that
transfer of residence to any other place by reason of ones occupation,
profession employment in private and public service, educational activities
work force, the constabulary or national police force, or confinement or
detention in government institutions in accordance with law is not deemed as
loss of residence.
The Court ruled that there is nothing wrong in an individual changing
residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove
with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election
law purposes for the period required by law.
Sec. 11 Disqualifications:
Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
imprisonment for not less than one (1) year.

Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court
or tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the
duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the
anti-subversion and firearms law, or any crime against national security
in accordance with law.

Insane or incompetent as declared by a competent authority.

WHEN DISABILITY REMOVED

Plenary pardon or amnesty those sentenced by final judgment. Article


IX-C, Section 5 provides that the President cannot, without the favorable
recommendation of the Comelec grant pardon, amnesty, parole or
suspension of sentence in cases involving violation of election laws and
violation of election rules and regulations.

Expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence


Official declaration by the proper authority that the insanity or
incompetency no longer exist.

Residency Requirement:
Romeo A. Jalosjos v. Comelec Dan Erasmo, Sr. 670 SCRA 572 (2012)
Residence The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the
position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least (1)
year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only
intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in
such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. There is no hard
and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance with residency requirement
since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence
had laid down the following guidelines:

(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;


(b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new
one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The Comelec concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil
since he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance
alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held
that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his
residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live
there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To

insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two
things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile.
Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales and Orlando Balbon,
Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010). In this case, following the conversion of Puerto
Princesa (Mitras domicile of origin) from a component city to a highly
urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial officials, Mitra
abandoned his domicile in Puerto Princesa and acquired a new one in Aborlan
which is within the LGU where he intended to run. Mitra bought the old
Maligaya Feedmill and used the second floor as his residence.
In considering the residency issue, the dwelling where a person permanently
intends to return to and to remain his or her capacity or inclination to decorate
the place, or the lack of it, IS IMMATERIAL. Comelec gravely abused its
discretion when it determined the fitness of a dwelling as a persons residence
based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when
the law is replete with standards that can be used. Comelec used wrong
considerations in arriving at the conclusion that Mitras residence is not the
residence contemplated by law.
Assitio vs. Aguirre 619 SCRA 518 Residence as used in the law prescribing
the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is DOCTRINALLY
SETTLED to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention inferable from a persons acts, utterances and
activities. Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer, one
must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) bonafide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and (3) acts which correspond to said purpose. Same ruling in earlier case
of Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300. Requisites when new
domicile is acquired by choice.
ILLITIERATE AND DISABLED VOTERS Illiterates or disabled are referred
to as a persons who cannot by themselves prepare an application for registration
because of their physical disability and/or inability to read and write. (Section 3
(e))

Section 14. Procedure for illiterate applicants (those who cannot read and
write) assisted by the election officer or any member of an accredited
citizens arm. The election officer shall place such illiterate person under oath,
ask him the questions and record the answers given in order to accomplish the
application form in the presence of the majority of the members of the Board.
The accomplished form shall be subscribed by the applicant in the presence of
the Board by means of thumbmark or some other customary mark and it shall be
subscribed and attested by the majority of the members of the Board.
Procedure for disabled voters the application for registration of a
physically disabled person (ex. blind, no hands, senior citizen, mute) may
be prepared by any relative within the 4 th civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity or by the election officer or any member of an accredited citizens arm
using the data supplied by the applicant.
NOTE: Common to both procedures, the fact of illiteracy and disability shall
be so indicated in the application.
HOW TO REGISTER
Section 8 System of Continuing Registration of Voters/Creation of Election
Registration Boards
A qualified voter personally files an application for registration DAILY
with the office of the election officer during regular office hours. The
ERB are authorized to act on all applications for registration .
LIMITATION: No registration shall be conducted during the period starting
120 days before a regular elections and 90 days before a special elections.
Sec. 15 Election Registration Board There shall be in each city and
municipality as many as ERBs as there are election officers therein.
Composition Election Officer (EO) as chairman and as members, the public
school official most senior in rank and the local civil registrar (LCR), or in his
absence, the city or municipal treasurer (MT).

In case of disqualification of the EO, the Commission shall designate as acting


EO who shall serve as chairman of the ERB. In cases of the non-availability of
the LCR or the MT, Comelec shall designate any other appointive civil service
official from the same locality as substitute.
Restrictions to appointment No member of the board shall be related to each
other or to any incumbent city or municipal elective official within the 4 th civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity. If in succeeding elections, any of the newly
elected city or municipal officials is related to a member of the board within the
same degree, such member is automatically disqualified to preserve the integrity
of the ERB.
Every registered party and such organizations as may be authorized by
the Comelec shall be entitled to a watcher in every registration board.
Sec. 17 Procedure for hearing of applications.
Date of hearing posted in the city or municipal bulletin board and EO
office at least 1 week before date of hearing
If objected to, EO shall receive evidence. Physical presence of
applicant in this case is mandatory to rebut evidence presented in
opposition thereto
If no objection to application, physical appearance not required and will
be duly informed in writing

Applications for registration shall be heard and processed on a quarterly


basis. Board shall convene on the 3rd day of Monday of April, July,
October and January of every calendar year except in an election year to
conform with the 120 days prohibitive period before election day.

Section. 21 Publication of Action on Application for Registration


SECTION 12. Change of Residence to another City or Municipality Any
registered voter who has transferred residence to another city or municipality
may apply with the EO of his new residence for the transfer of his registration
records. The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the
requirements of notice and hearing and the approval of the ERB in accordance
with this Act. Upon approval of the application for transfer, and after notice of

such approval to the EO of the former residence of the voter, said EO shall
transmit by registered mail the voters registration record to the EO of the
voters new residence.
Section 13. Change of Address in the Same City or Municipality Any voter
who has changed his address in the same city or municipality shall immediately
notify the EO in writing. If the change of address involves a change in precinct,
the Board shall transfer his registration record to the precinct book of voters of
his new precinct and notify the voter of his new precinct. All changes of
address shall be reported to the office of the provincial election supervisor and
the Commission in Manila.
Sec. 27 DEACTIVATION is a process wherein the registration record of a
voter is removed by the ERB from the corresponding precinct book of
voters and places the same in an inactive file properly marked and dated in
indelible ink and after entering the cause for deactivation which are as follows:

Those who are disqualified by virtue of a final judgment, insane and


incompetent persons as officially declared.

Any person who failed to vote in the two (2) successive preceding
regular elections as shown by his voting records.
Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the court.
Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
For purposes of the above the Clerks of Court of the MTC, MTCC, RTC
and SB shall furnish the EO of the city or municipality concerned at the end of
each month a certified list of persons who are disqualified by virtue of a final
judgment, with their addresses.
For those who lost their citizenship, insanity and incompetency, the
Comelec may request a certified list of such persons from the government
agencies concerned.
Sec. 28 REACTIVATION is a process whereby a voter whose registration
records has been deactivated files with the election officer a sworn application
for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit by stating therein
that the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist.

PERIOD TO FILE Any time but not later than 120 days before a regular
election and 90 days before a special election. Upon approval, the Board, shall
retrieve the registration records from the inactive file and include the same in
the corresponding precinct book of voters.
REQUIREMENT: Local heads or representatives of political parties shall be
properly notified of the approved applications.
Sec. 29 CANCELLATION is a process wherein the Board cancels the
registration records of those who have died as certified by the local civil
registrar who shall submit each month a certified list of persons who died
during the previous month to the election officer of the place where the
deceased is registered.

PETITION FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION.


Remedies of persons whose application for reactivation, inclusion or correction
has been disapproved or those who intend to exclude a voter from the list of
voters.
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 Voters inclusion/exclusion
proceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a voter shall be included in
or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law
and the facts presented to show possession of these qualifications. As
distinguished from the procedure in certificate of candidacies (petition to deny
due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy) on the other hand, the
denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false
representation of a material fact (Sec. 78).
Sec. 33 JURISDICTION The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts
shall have original jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of
voters in their respective cities or municipalities.
(By express provision of
Article IX-C, Section 2 (3) of the Constitution, the Comelec shall decide all
questions affecting elections, except the right to vote. This question is a
justiciable issue which finds redress in the judiciary. (Pungutan v. Comelec 43
SCRA 1 (1972).

Again in Panlaqui vs. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 - It is not within the
province of the RTC in a voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take
cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a
material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the
misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was an intension to
deceive the electorate in terms of ones qualifications for public office. The
finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency
requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render him
ineligible.
WHERE TO APPEAL Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial
Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court
within five (5) from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall
become final and executory. Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal
within ten (10) days from the time it is received and the Regional Trial Court
decision shall immediately become final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Domino v. Comelec 310 546 (1999). Except for the right to remain in the list of
voters or for being excluded thereform for the particular election in relation to
which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion proceeding,
even if final and unappealable does not acquire the nature of res judicata.
Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on
the voters political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to
be registered as a voter in any other election.
Sec. 34 Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the list WHO MAY FILE: any
person whose application for registration
Has been disapproved by the Board; or
Whose name has been stricken out from the list;
Whose name was not included in the precinct list of voters
Who has been included therein with a wrong or misspelled name (after
the Board disapproves its application for reinstatement or correction of
name) may file with the court.

PERIOD TO FILE: Any time except 105 days prior to a regular election or 75
days prior to a special election. The petition should be supported by a
certificate of disapproval of his application and proof of service of notice upon
the Board. MTC shall decide within fifteen (15) days after its filing.
If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters, the
Board shall place the application for registration previously disapproved in the
corresponding BV and indicate in the application for registration the date of the
order of inclusion and the court which issued the same.
Section 35 Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the list WHO MAY
FILE: any registered voter, representative of a political party or the Election
Officer.
PERIOD TO FILE: Any time except 100 days prior to a regular election or 65
days prior to a special election. Supporting documents shall be proof of notice
to the Board and to the challenged voter. MTC shall decide within ten (10)
days.
If the decision is for exclusion, the Board, shall remove the voters
registration record from the corresponding BV, enter the order of exclusion
therein.
Akbayan v. Comelec March 26, 2001 The petition for exclusion is a
necessary component to registration since it is a safety mechanism that gives a
measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and the
like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand, serves as the purpose of
securing the voters substantive right to be included in the list of voters.
The bone of contention of petitioners in this case in praying for a 2-day special
registration of new voters for the May 14, 2001 elections which was denied by
the Comelec on account of operational impossibility, undermined their
constitutional right to vote and caused the disenfranchisement of around 4M
Filipinos of voting age who failed to register before the registration deadline set
by the Comelec.

As ruled, the right of suffrage is not absolute, as in the enjoyment of all other
rights, it is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute and other repositories of law.
Procedural limitation must undergo the process of registration, in addition to
the maximum requirements set by the Constitution under Section 1, Article V,
the act of registration being an indispensable precondition and essential to the
right of suffrage and election process. Referring to Section 8 of RA 8189, the
law is explicit that no registration shall however be conducted during the
period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a
special election.
Sec. 35 of RA 8189 on the hand speaks of the prohibitive period within which
to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent list of
voters. Thus if the special registration of voters will be conducted, then the
prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to
a later date, if not, then no one can challenge the voters list which is violative of
the principles of due process and would open the registration process to abuse
and seriously compromise the integrity of the voters list and that of the entire
election.
OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTERS RA 9189 Absentee Voters Act of
2003
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is
qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law,
who is abroad on the day of the elections.
Section 5 Disqualification:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with
Philippine laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and
who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
(c) Those who have committed and are convicted by a final judgment by
a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not
less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been
found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the
Revised Penal Code, such as disability not having removed by

plenary pardon or amnesty; Provided, however, That any person


disqualified to vote upon the expiration of five (5) years after service
of sentence; Provided further, That the Commission may take
cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals
only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and
processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of
judgments;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in
the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she
has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return
shall be caused for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia;
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or
incompetent by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as
verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service
establishments concerned, unless such competent authority
subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
Macalintal v. Comelec 405 SCRA 614 (2003) The execution of the affidavit
itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section
5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to
go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it
serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile
of origin. The affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in the host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the
affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall
remain.
Right of Suffrage of Duals (Overseas Absentee Voters) under RA 9189.
Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 162759, August 6, 2006. Petitioners are dual citizens having retained or reacquired Philippine Citizenship
under RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.

As such, they sought registration and certification as overseas absentee voters


under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, in order to vote
in the May 2004 elections. However, the Philippine embassy in the US advised
them that per Comelec letter dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no
residence requirement as prescribed by the Constitution. Petitioners sought a
clarification from the Comelec which thereafter, expressed the opinion that
dual citizens under RA 9225 cannot exercise the right of suffrage under the
Overseas Absentee Voting Law because said law was not enacted for them,
hence, they are considered regular voters who have to meet requirements
of residency, among others.
HELD: Section 1 of Article V of the Philippine Constitution prescribed
residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote.
On the other hand, Section 2 thereof, authorizes congress to devise a system
wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an
exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to
vote.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law (RA 9225), requiring duals
to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before
they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225, in implicit
acknowledgement that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under
Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as granted to an absentee voter under
RA 9189 which aims to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos,
who, save for the residency requirement exacted of an ordinary conditions, are
qualified to vote as ruled in Makalintal vs. Comelec 405 SCRA 614
Cordora v. Commission on Elections 580 SCRA 12 (2009) Cordora
concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of
Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails because
Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Residency, for the purpose of
elections laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place
and the intention to return there permanently, and is not dependent upon
citizenship.

POLITICAL PARTIES, PARTY LIST AND CITIZENS ARM


Article IX-C, Sec. 1 (5), authorizes the Comelec under the Constitution
to Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the
Commission on Elections.
Section 60 of the OEC/Section 1, Rule 32 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure provides that any group pursuing the same political ideals may
register with the Comelec. HOW? by filing a verified petition with its Law
Department duly verified by its President and Secretary-General, or any official
duly authorized to do so under its Constitutions and by-laws.
Before Comelec takes action, the Comelec shall first verify, through its field
offices, the status and capacity of the petitioner and the veracity of the
allegations in the petition. (Sec. 4, Rule 32). After the verification process, the
Petition will be published with the Notice of Hearing.
Once registered the political party is issued a Certificate of Registration (Sec. 7)
(1) acquires juridical personality (2) public is informed of the partys existence
and ideals (3) it identifies the party and its officers for purposes of regulation by
the Comelec. For purposes of the electoral process that an organization be a
political party.
Limitations on Registration
Religious sects are prohibited to be registered for the purpose of the
electoral process which is made in the spirit of separation of church and
state and intended to prevent churches from wielding political power.

Does not extend to organizations with religious affiliations or to


political parties which derive their principles from religious beliefs.
Those who seek to achieve their goals through unlawful means

Those which refuse to adhere to the Constitution

Those which are supported by any foreign government (Sec. 2(5)


Article IX-C)

Cancellation of Registration (Sec. 8) Upon verified complaint of any


interested party, or motu propio by the Commission, the registration of any
political party, coalition of political parties or organizations under the party-list
system may be cancelled after due notice and hearing on the following grounds:
(a) Acceptance by the political party, coalition of political parties, or
organizations or any of its candidates, of financial contributions from
foreign governments and/or their agencies for activities related to
elections.
(b) Violation of laws, rules or regulations relating to elections,
plebiscites, referenda or initiative.
Untruthful statements in its petition for registration
(d) The said political party, coalition of political parties or organization
has become a religious sect or denomination, is pursuing its goals thru
violence or other unlawful means, is refusing to adhere to or uphold the
Constitution of the Philippines, or is receiving support from any foreign
government;
(e) Failure to comply with applicable laws, rules or regulations of the
Commission
(f) Failure to field official candidates in the last two preceding elections
or failure of their candidates to obtain at least five (5) per centum of the
votes cast in the last two preceding elections.
Jurisdiction of Comelec over Inter-Party Disputes/Power to Register
Political Parties
Luis LokinJr./Teresita Planas v. Comelec/CIBAC 674 SCRA 538 (2012)
In Atienza v. Comelec (612 SCRA 961 (2010), it was expressly settled that the
Comelec possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary
tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and
register political parties. The Court, therein cited Kalaw v. Comelec and

Palmares v. Comelec which uniformly upheld the Comelecs jurisdiction over


intra-party disputes: As ruled in Kalaw v. Comelec, the Comelecs powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for the acts. The Court also declared in another case that the
Comelecs power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the Comelec
may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it,
as an incident of its power to register political parties.
Liberal Party vs. Commission on Elections 620 SCRA 393 (May 6, 2010),
the SC distinguished REGISTRATION and ACCREDITATION of a
political party. The root of this petition before the SC is the Nationalista PartyNationalista Party Coalition (NP-NPC) petition before the COMELEC for
registration as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant minority party.
While the Comelec En Banc claimed jurisdiction over the registration of
coalitions and has in fact decreed NP-NPCs registration, the Comelec
however did NOT rule on the accreditation aspect. The registration of a
coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two
separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other.

Section 2(5), Article IX-C and Rule 32 of the CRP regulate the
registration of political parties, organizations or coalition of political
parties. Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by Comelec
Resolution No. 8752, Section 1 of which states that the petition for
accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the Commission who shall
docket it as an SPP (DM) case. This was the manner the NP-NPC was
docketed.

Registration of political parties is a special proceeding assigned to a


Division for handling under the CRP. No similar clear cut rules is
available to a petition for accreditation as a dominant party.

Registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be
made. Accreditation is the next natural step to follow after registration.
When the Comelec En Banc, resolved the registration of the NP- NPC the case
is terminated and ripe for review by the SC via a Petition for Certiorari. The
issue with respect to accreditation is a separate issue which is treated in a
separate proceedings.

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, represented by its Chairman Edgardo


J. Angara v. Comelec, et. al. 423 SCRA 665, (the Comelec misapplied equity
in this case). LDP informed the Comelec by way of Manifestation that only the
Party Chairman or his authorized representative may endorse the COC of the
partys official candidates; that Rep. Butch Aquino was on indefinite force
leave and in the meantime Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was designated
Acting Secretary General.
Aquino in a comment alleged that the Party Chairman does not have the
authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General and that the
Manifestation filed has no basis praying that Comelec disregards the same.
Comelec issued an order requiring the parties to file verified petition. Pending
resolution, a Certificate of Nomination of Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP candidate
for President was filed with the Comelec which was signed by Rep. Aquino as
LDP Secretary General
Comelec issued a Resolution granting the petition with LEGAL EQUITY for
both Petitioner and Oppositor (Angara Wind and Aquino Wing). ISSUE:
Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion in issuing the subject
Resolution. RULING the only issue is simply Who as between the Party
Chairman and the Secretary General has the authority to sign certificates
of candidacy of the official candidates of the party. Yes Comelec acted with
grave abuse of discretion. While it has jurisdiction to rule upon questions of
party identity and leadership as an incident to its enforcement powers. It well
within its competence to inquire into which party officer has authority to sign
and endorse certificate of candidacy of partys nominees. And to resolve the
issue raised, the Comelec need only to turn to the Party Constitution and
election laws. The Comelec Resolution is INDECISION in the guise of equity.
It chose not to because of its irrational fear of treading, as Aquino contends, on
unchartered territories but which have long been chartered by jurisprudence.
Comelec divided the LDP into wings both having authority to nominate
candidates for every elective position. Consequently, Comelec planted seeds of
confusion among the electorate who are apt to be confounded by two candidates
from a single political party. This was not only a disservice to the opposition
but to the voting public as well as its Resolution facilitated, rather than
forestalled, the division of the minority party.
Damasen vs. Tumamao 613 SCRA 49 (2010) the discretion of accepting
members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a purely internal matter,

which the Court cannot meddle in. The reason behind the right given to a
political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in
the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in
the election (Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160 Rule on Succession and as held in Navarro
v. CA 672 SCRA 355 (2010). Damasen was not a bonafide member.
Tumamao was husband of the VM who died).

PARTY LIST
R.A. 7941, otherwise known as An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List
Representatives through the Part-List System. The party-list system is a
mechanism of the proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the HR from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, registered with the Comelec, to enable Filipinos belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them. (Sec. 2)

Party-list representation shall constitute 20% of the total number of


representatives by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural minorities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector (Sec. 11 and Art. V, Sec. 5(2) 1987
Constitution)
Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on elections 621 SCRA 385 (June 22, 2010), the
SC ruled that Comelec cannot issue rules and regulations that provide a ground
for the substitution of a party-list nominee NOT written in R.A.7941.
Sec. 8 provides Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each
registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the Comelec not
later than 45 days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5),
from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who
have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not
include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for
an elective office in the immediately preceding election. NO change of names
or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall
have been submitted to the Comelec except in cases (1) where the nominee
dies, or (2) withdraws in writing his nomination, (3) becomes incapacitated
in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the
list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the HR who are nominated in
the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
CIBAC (Citizens Battle Against Corruption) thru its President Emmanuel
Villanueva manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections and submitted their list of 5 nominees
(Villanueva, Lokin (herein petitioner), Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna and Galang). The
list was later published in the newspapers of general circulation. Before the
elections, Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees whereby it withdrew the nominations of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Borje. The amended list included
Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje. Subsequently, Villanueva transmitted to
Comelec the signed petitions of more than 81% if the CIBAC members in order
to confirm the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang.

Based on the Party-List Canvas Report, it showed that CIBAC was entitled to a
second seat, hence, the counsel of CIBAC filed with the Comelec sitting as
National Board of Canvassers, a request to proclaim Lokin as the 2 nd nominee
which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. Since Comelec failed to
act on the filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of
the list of nominees and the petitions of the more than 81% of CIBAC members,
Villanueva filed a petition to confirm the said certificate with the Comelec
which was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. In the meantime, Comelec as NBC
partially proclaimed several party lists as having won which included Cibac.
The Secretary General of CIBAC informed the Secretary General of the HR to
formally swear Lokin into office but which was denied in view of the pendency
of E.M. No. 07-054 which approved the withdrawal of the nominations of
Lokin et. al. and the substitution of Borje. Cruz-Gonzales was proclaimed as
the official second nominee.
Lokin brought before the SC via Mandamus to compel respondent Comelec to
proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Also, in another
petition, Lokin assailed Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 (Rules and Regulations
Governing the filing of Manifestation of Intent to Participate and submission of
Names of Nominees under the Party-List) and its resolution in E.M. No. 07-054.
The Comelec asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in
law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as representative and her
assumption of that office; that Lokins proper recourse was an electoral protest
filed in the HRET, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being
raised by Lokin. CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing
a petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both
petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of
CIBAC.
ISSUES: a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy. The
Court has jurisdiction. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an EP nor an
action for QW, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is
seeking to be seated as second nominee of CIBAC. Although an EP may
properly be available to one part-list organization seeking to unseat another
party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning
party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokins
case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby
wants to unseat another nominee of the same party list. Neither does an action

for QW lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the RP, or some other case of disqualification.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the
Comelec to seek the review of its resolution in accordance with Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption
of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by
Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, which provides for the review of the
judgments, final orders or resolution of the Comelec and the Commission on
Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in
accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the SC within the limited period of 30
days. The Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins certiorari
and for mandamus.
(b) Both actions, certiorari and mandamus did not violate the rule against forum
shopping even if the actions involved the same parties, because they were based
on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.
Comelec gravely abused its discretion in promulgating Section 13 of Res.
No. 7804 as it expanded the exceptions under Sec. 8 of RA 7941 Section 8
enumerates only 3 instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee. The enumeration is
exclusive.
Abayhon vs. HRET et. al 612 SCRA 375/Palparan Jr. vs. HRET et. al.
These two cases were consolidated and jointly resolved as it both concerns the
authority of the HRET to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the
party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
Abayhon is the 1st nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list that won a seat in the
HR during the 2007 elections. Palparan on the other hand was the 1st nominee of
Bantay party-list. A petition for QW was filed with HRET against the party-list
groups and its nominee claiming that it was not eligible for a party-list since it
did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Abayhon is the
spouse of an incumbent congressional district representative and likewise does
not belong to the UR and marginalized. Petitioners also claim that Abayhon lost
her bid as party-list rep called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections
of May 10, 2004. Palparan also was alleged to have committed various human

rights violations against the marginalized sectors (Bantay represents the victims
of communist rebels, CAFGU, security guards and former rebels.)
Abayhon and Palparan postures that the Comelec already confirmed the status
of the party list as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization, that HRET
had no jurisdiction over the petitioner for QW since the petitioners collaterally
attacked the registration of the party-list organization, a matter that fell within
the jurisdiction of the Comelec. That it was the party-list that was taking a seat
in the HR and not them, being only its nominees. All questions involving their
eligibility as nominee, were internal concerns of the organization. The HRET
dismissed the petition against party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over
nominees who both filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this special civil
action for certiorari alleging that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.
The Court made reference to Sec. 5(1) of Article VI (which identifies who the
members of that House are. The HR shall be composed of not more than
250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly the members of the HR are two kinds. . .1) those who shall be
elected from legislative districts and 2) those who shall be elected through a
party-list system. From the point of view of the Constitution, it is the party-list
rep who are elected into office, NOT their parties or organizations. These
representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that
the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the
voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list
reps belong.
Once elected, both the district reps and the party-list reps are treated in like
manners. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments.
They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their
legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitations of 3 years for a max of 3 consecutive terms. The party list system
act itself recognizes party list nominees as members of the HR (Sec. 2, RA 7941
Declaration of Policy The State shall promote proportional representation in
the election of reps in the HR through a party-list system of registered national,

regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will


enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and UR sectors x x x
x to become members of the HR .
The Court held that initially, the authority to determine the qualifications of a
party-list nominee belongs to the organization and to choose five from among
the aspiring nominees to comply with the law. But where an allegation is made
that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to
become its party-list rep in the lower house and enjoy the secured tenure that
goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Hence, pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI, the HRET being the sole judge of
all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of
the HR, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
The HRET was correct in dismissing the QW and retaining authority to rule on
the qualifications.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Comelec 619 SCRA 585


(DELISTING) The Comelec may motu propio OR upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove, or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
IF It: (a) fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections; OR (b) fails to
obtain at least 2% of the votes casts under the party-list system in the 2
preceding elections for the constituency in which it was registered (Section
6 RA 7941). The word OR is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things enumerated. A party list group
or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately
thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is not
covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an
unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. This
case abandoned the Minero vs. Comelec G.R. No. 177548 May 10, 2007.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. Comelec 646 SCRA 63 (2011)
Comelec removed PGBT in the list of qualified parties vying for a seat
under the party-list system of representation in violation of the status quo
order of the Supreme Court. An equally important aspect of a democratic
electoral exercise is the right of free choice of the electorates on who shall
govern them the party-list system affords them this choice, as it gives the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors the opportunity to participate in
governance. Comelec was cited for contempt by the Court.

Effect of removal by Comelec of PGBI in the list: As it was the Comelec


itself which prevented PGBI from participating in the 10 May 2010 party-list
elections when it deleted PGBI, with grave abuse of discretion, from the list of
accredited party-list groups or organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it
to the list despite the Courts directive, PGBI should, at the very least, be
deemed to have participated in the 10 May 2010
Amores vs. HRET et. al 622 SCRA 593 (2010) Amores via a petition for
QW with the HRET questioned the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as rep of CIBAC. It was alleged among other
things, that Villanueva assumed office without a formal proclamation by the
Comelec, disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since at
the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was
already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of RA
7941 and that his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least 6
months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the
new sector under Section 15 of RA 7941.
The HRET dismissed the petition as it found the petition to be filed beyond the
10 days reglementary period, that the age qualification for youth sectoral
nominees under Section 9 of RA 7941 applied only to those nominated as such
during the first 3 congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or
until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as
representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi sectoral organization, is
not. As regards the shift of affiliation, it was held that Section 15 did not apply
as there was no resultant change in party list affiliation.
ISSUES: (1) whether the petition for QW was dismissible for having been filed
unseasonably; and (2) whether Section 9 and 15 of RA 7941 apply to
Villanueva. As to the first issue, the SC found grave abuse of discretion on the
part of HRET. The Court overlooked the technicality of timeliness and rules on
the merits since the challenge goes into Villanuevas qualifications, it may be
filed at anytime during his term. Also date of proclamation was not clear. As
to the second and more substantial issue, the Court made reference to Section 9
of RA 7941 which provides that in case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the
election. The youth sectoral rep who attains the age of 30 during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.

The Court did not find any textual support on the interpretation of HRET that
Section 9 applied only to those nominated during the first 3 congressional terms
after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998. A cardinal rule in
statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only room for
application. The distinction is nowhere found in the law. When the law does
not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
Respecting Section 15 of RA 7941, the Court likewise found no textual support
for HRETs ratiocination that the provision did not apply to Villanuevas shift
of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector as there was no resultant change in party list affiliation.
Section 15 reads Change of Affiliation: Effect Any elected party list rep
who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of
office shall forfeit his seat; Provided, That if he changes his political party
or sectoral affiliation within 6 months before an election, he shall not be
eligible for nomination as party-list rep under his new party or
organization.
The wordings of Section 15 is clear as it covers changes in both political party
and sectoral affiliation and which may occur within the same party since multisectoral party-list org are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list
system. A nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party
will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the
change has been effected at least 6 months before the elections. Sec. 9 and 15
apply to Villanueva.
As regards the contention that Villanueva is the 1st nominee of CIBAC, whose
victory was later upheld, is NO moment. A party-list orgs ranking of its
nominees is a mere indication of preference , their qualifications according to
law are a different matter.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Comelec 618 SCRA 32 Ladlad is an
organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals or transgendered individuals. They applied for registration with
Comelec in 2006 and its accreditation was denied on the ground that the org had
no substantial membership. Ladlad in 2009 again filed a petition for
registration which was dismissed by Comelec on moral grounds.

The SC ruled that moral disapproval is not a sufficient governmental interest to


justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation to the party list system. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
RA 7941. The SC found that Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec 342 SCRA 244, the SC provided for
the four unique parameters of the Filipino Party-list System which are as
follows
The 20% allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the HR, including those
under the party-list;
The 2% threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a
seat in the HR;
The 3-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum three seats, that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats;
The proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number
of votes..
In this case, following the May11, 1998 national elections which is the first
election for party-list representation, the Comelec en banc proclaimed 14 parties
and organizations which had obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system which constitute a total of 25 nominees short of the
52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the house. The PAGASA files with the Comelec a Petition to proclaim the full number of party-list
representative provided by the Constitution. They alleged that the filling up of
the 20% membership of party list representative in the House, as provided under
the Constitution, was mandatory. Nine other party list organizations filed their
respective motions to intervene seeking the same relief as that sought by PAGASA on substantially the same grounds.

The Comelec, contrary to its rules and regulations governing the said
elections, instead proclaimed the other 38 party-list organization
notwithstanding its not having garnered the required 2% votes. RULING: Sec.
5(2) of Article VI which states that the sectoral representation shall constitute
the 20% is not mandatory as it merely provides a ceiling for party-list in
congress. And, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by
the 3-seat per party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. Comelec was
held to have abused its discretion in disregarding an act of Congress.
In Bagong Bayani Labor Party v. Comelec 359 SCRA 698 (2001) (also
reiterated the ruling in Veterans), at issue is the Omnibus Resolution of the
Comelec which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties and
which the SC remanded to the Comelec for the latter to determine evidentiary
hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list elections complied with the requirements of the law. The SC ruled
that the party-list organizations or parties must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5 of RA
7941 and the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must
be Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties.
In remanding the case to Comelec the SC laid down the following
guidelines
The PP, sector or organization must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other
words, it must show through the Constitution, articles of
incorporation, by-laws, history, platform of government and track
record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
While major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy enabling Filipino citizens belonging to the M and U to be elected
to the HR.
The religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. In
view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Humabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court

notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may
not be represented in the party-list system.
Furthermore, the
Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered. The prohibition was explained by a member of the
Constitutional Commission in this wise The prohibition is on any
religious organization registering as a political party.
It must not be disqualified under the ground enumerated under Section

6 of RA 7941 (not a religious sect or denomination or association


organized for religious purposes, advocates violence or unlawful means
to seek its goal; a foreign party or organization; receives support from
any foreign government, fails to comply with laws rules or regulations
relating to elections, declared untruthful statement in its petition, it has
ceased to exist for at least one (1) year, it fails to participate in the last 2
preceding elections or failed to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under
the party list system in the 2 preceding elections for the constituency in
which it was registered)
The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by the government (referring to
MAD of Richard Gomez). It must be independent of the government.
The participants of the government or it officials in the affairs of a
party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but
also deleterious to the objective of the law; to enable citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be
elected to the House of Representatives.
The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law, its

nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads


qualifications of Party-List Nominees No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, a RV, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, a bona-fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the elections
and is at least 25 years of age on the day of the election.
Not only the candidate party must represent the M and U sectors, so also
must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

In Partido Ng Mangagawa (PM) and BUTIL Farmers Party v.


Comelec, et. al., the Petition before the SC involves the formula for computing
the additional seats for winners in party-list elections and whether or not
Comelec, as the National Board of Canvassers for the party-list system, could
be compelled by the SC to mechanically apply the formula stated in its Comelec
Resolution reiterated in the Bagong Bayani cases in the determination of
qualified party-list organization and in the proclamation of their respective
nominees.
In the earlier case of Veterans Federation Party vs. Comelec the SC came up
with a simplified formula in the computation of additional seats for party-list
which was reiterated in the other cases of Bagong Bayani, Bayan Muna, etc.
With this development, PM and Butil filed with the Comelec a petition to retabulate the party-list votes and immediately proclaim their respective second
nominees to the HR. The Comelec however failed to resolve the substantive
issued and re-tabulate the votes despite the lapse of time. Hence, the petition
seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel Comelec to mechanically
apply the formula in the case Veterans Federation Case.
The simplified formula in the Veterans case was reiterated and the four (4)
inviolable parameters of the party list system under the Constitution and RA
7941 are still the (1) 20% allocation (2) the 2% threshold (3) the 3 set limit and
(4) the proportional representation _ the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007, 523
SCRA 1 - Petitioners reacting on an emerging public perception that the
individuals behind the party-list groups do not, as they should, actually
represent the poor and marginalized sectors. Petitioners, wrote a letter to the
Comelec requesting that the complete list of the nominees of all parties who
have been accredited pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 7804 prescribing
rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate
and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of
representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections be published. The
Comelec vehemently did not accede to the request of the petitioners, it based its
refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on
Section 7 of RA 7941 (more specifically the last sentence which states: the
names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list..

The Comelec believe that the party list elections must not be personality
oriented. Abalos said under RA 7941, the people are to vote for sectoral parties,
organizations, or coalitions not for their nominees.
ISSUE: whether or not the disclosure of the names of the nominees are covered
by the Right of Public to information.
HELD: The Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party list groups. No national security or like
concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the partylist groups in question. The last sentence of Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch
the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute nothing in RA 7941 that prohibits
the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than
the Certified list the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec
obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an
absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The need for
voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The
ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in
the assailed resolution of the Comelec.
Banat et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. 178271/12972 2009 which abandoned the
matter of computation held in the Veterans Party case intention was to fill the
20% and party list were ranked according to the votes cast for party-list and
even those who did not reach the 2% were given seats in the second round of
the ranking. Those who garnered 2% automatically takes a seat in the first
round.
ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES
For President and Vice-President No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least 40 years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years
immediately preceding such election.

There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications


and term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President.
He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President (Article
VII, Section 2 and 3, Constitution)
For Senator No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and, on the day of election, is at least 35 years of age, able to
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
than 2 years immediately preceding the elections. (Article VI, Section 3,
Constitution)
For Members of the House of Representatives No person shall be a
Member of the HR unless he is natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of election, is at least 25 years of age, able to read and write, and except
the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than on year immediately
preceding the election. (Article VI, Section 6, Constitution)
Local Government Officials An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; able to read and write Filipino or any other local language
or dialect.
Common to All Offices - Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service
for the full term for which they were elected.
RA No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) Section 36(g)
provides that all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both
in the national and local government shall undergo mandatory drug tests.
Comelec issued Resolution No. 6486 on 23 December 2003 implementing
9165. Publication of the results will be published. But the resolution does not
indicate whether or not candidates who test positive for drugs will be allowed to
assume office if they win.)

CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
Section 73, BP 881/Omnibus Elections Code (OEC) , par. (1) Certificate
of Candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective office unless he
files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed therein. Sinaca v.
Mula 315 SCRA 266, it is the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole
world of the candidates political creed or lack of political creed.
Section 73 (3) BP 881 (Effect of filing multiple certificates of candidacy)
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filed in the same
election (requirement to run for elective office), and if he files his certificate
of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.
Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy - However, before the expiration of
the period for the filing of the certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed
more than one certificate of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one
certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires
to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or
offices.
Pilar v. Comelec 245 SCRA 759 (1995) The withdrawal of a certificate of
candidacy does not extinguish ones liability for the administrative fine imposed
by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166, which requires every candidate to file a true
statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections.
Villanueva v. Comelec 122 SCRA 636 (1983) the withdrawal of a certificate
of candidacy not made under oath produces no legal effect; for all intents and
purposes, the withdrawing candidate remains a candidate.
Go v. Comelec 357 SCRA 739 (2001) Where affidavit of withdrawal filed.
There is nothing that mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed
with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was
filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the Comelec, the
office of the regional election supervisor concerned, the office of the provincial
election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs,
or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.

EFFECTS: FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY


Sec. 66 BP 881/OEC. An appointive official is considered resigned upon the
filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. The forfeiture is automatic and the
operative act is the moment of filing which shall render the appointive official
resigned (Nicolasora v. CSC 1990 case and PNOC v. NLRC, May 31, 1993),
where the provision of Sec. 66 is applicable also to GOCC and can constitute as
a just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the
Labor Code.
Sec. 67 OEC An elective official running for a position other than the one he
is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, is
deemed resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Section 67 has
been repealed by Section 14 of RA 9006 (The Fair Elections Law), a
candidate holding an elective position whether national or local running for
office other than the one he is holding in a permanent capaci is considered
resigned only upon the expiration of his term..
Sinaca v. Mula 315 SCRA 266 (1999) The provision of the election law
regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same,
as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered
mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely
directory.
SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDACY
Section 77 BP 881. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal
of another. After the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or
is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not
later than mid-day of the date of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day
of election day, said certificate may be filed with the board of election
inspectors in the political subdivisions where he is a candidate or, in the case of

candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
A valid certificate of candidacy is an indispensable requisite in case of
substitution of a disqualified candidate under Sec. 77. Under said provision,
the candidate who dies, withdraws or is disqualified must be an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party and the substitute
candidate must be of the same political party as the original candidate and must
be duly nominated as such by the political party.
Rulloda vs. Comelec G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003 The absence of a
specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections
cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive
construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed,
there is more reason to allow substitution of candidates where no political
parties are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations
reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
Meynard Sabili v. Comelec/Florencio Librea 670 SCRA 664 (2012). It is not
required that a candidate should his own house in order to establish his
residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality
even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. What is of central concern
then is that the person identified and established a place in the said City where
he intended to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time.
Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales and Orlando Balbon,
Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010). In considering the residency issue, the dwelling
where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain his or her
capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, IS
IMMATERIAL. Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it determined the
fitness of a dwelling as a persons residence based solely on very personal
and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards
that can be used. Comelec used wrong considerations in arriving at the
conclusion that Mitras residence is not the residence contemplated by law.

Coquilla vs. Comelec 385 SCRA 607 A former Filipino citizen (not having
the status of an alien resident) cannot be considered a resident of the Philippines
and in the locality he intends to be elected prior to his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
The term residence is to be understood NOT in its common acceptation as
referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal
residence, that is, the place where the party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of
origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition
of a new domicile (by choice.)
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec 248 SCRA 30 (1995). it is the fact of
residence, not a statement in the certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render the candidate ineligible.
Perez v. Comelec 317 SCRA 640, the qualifications of Rodolfo Aguinaldo
former governor of Cagayan was at issue when he filed his certificate of
candidacy as member of the HR for the 3 rd district of Cagayan in the 11 May
1998 elections. The Court reiterated the meaning of residence as the place
where the party actually or constructively has his permanent home where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain, while domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purpose of election law. And, the fact that a person
is a RV in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district.
Torayno Sr., vs. Comelec 337 SCRA 574, the issue in this case is the
residence qualification of Vicente Emano who filed his certificate of candidacy
for Mayor of Cagayan de Oro. Court explained that the purpose of the
residence as required by Constitution and the law as a qualification for
seeking and holding public office, is to give candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with the needs, difficulties and aspiration, potentials for growth and all
matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies. On the part of the electorate,
to evaluate the candidates qualification s and fitness for the job they aspire for.
In this case Emano, cannot be deemed to be a stranger or newcomer when he

ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor having garnered a margin
of 30K votes.
Papandayan, Jr. vs. Comelec 381 SCRA 133. Domicile connotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. The requirements in order to acquire a new
domicile by choice are: (a) an intention to remain there; (b) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

ACTIONS TO CHALLENGE CANDIDACY OF A CANDIDATE OR


DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE
1) Sec. 12 of the 0EC
any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent (when we say incompetence, the same may refer not only
to mental illness, disease or physical disability but also to other causes
which may include minority or lack of residence requirement)
any person who has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion
for any offense for which carries a penalty of more than 18 months
for a crime involving moral turpitude
The disqualification is removed by
plenary pardon or granted amnesty
upon declaration by a competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed
expiration of a period of 5 years from his service of sentence unless
of course within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
2) Sec. 68 of the OEC
those guilty of giving money or material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt voters or public official performing electoral functions;

those who have committed terrorism to enhance his candidacy


those who have spend in the election campaign more than that required
by law (Php10/RV/Php5.00)
NOTE: Section 68 deals with a petition to disqualify a candidate for other
violations of the election code as specified in said section, and against a
candidate who is a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. That
section does not specify a period within which to file the petition.
In Codilla vs. De Venecia 393 SCRA 634, it was held that the power of
Comelec to disqualify candidates is limited to the enumerations
mentioned in Section 68 of the OEC. Elements to be proved are as
follows:
the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given
money or other material consideration and
the act of giving material consideration or money should be for the
purpose of influencing, inducing or corrupting the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions.

3) Sec. 69 Petition to Abate a Nuisance Candidate the Comelec, may


motu propio or upon verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that it is filed in
contemplation of a nuisance candidate or cancel the same if already filed. This
is an exception to the ministerial duty of the Comelec and its officers to
receive a certificate of candidacy under Section 76 of the OEC.
WHO IS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE
one who files his certificate to put the election process in mockery or
disrepute
contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of
surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. (in the appreciation of
ballots, when two candidates with the same name or surname and only
the name or surname is written, will be considered stray vote and will not

be counted for either of the candidate unless one of the candidate with the
same name or surname is an incumbent equity of the incumbent rule)
by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bonafide intention to run for office, thus would prevent
the faithful determination of the true will of the people.
(Bautista vs. Comelec 298 SCRA 480)
Who can file a petition to declare a candidate a nuisance candidate shall be
filed by any registered candidate for the same office within 5 days from the
last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. (As amended by Section
5 of RA 6646
4) Sec. 78 OEC Petition to Deny due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 (contents of the COC) of the OEC is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than 15 days before election.
Who may file by any person through a verified petition
On What Grounds the candidate made material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy. Section 78 deals exclusively with a petition
to deny due course to a COC on the ground that a material
representation in the contents of the certificate under Sec. 74, is false.
(pertains to a candidates eligibility or qualification such as citizenship,
residence or status as a registered voter Maruhom vs. Comelec 594
SCRA 108)
Period to File Within 25 days from the last day for the filing of the certificate
of candidacy.
Jurisdiction Comelec sitting in a division.
Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Comelec and Arnielo S. Olandria 640 SCRA 473
(2011) - To emphasize, a petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be
premised on Section 12 and 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the
other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be

grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that


is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate,
the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78
is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus in
Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is
disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77, but a
person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. (also
ruled in Fermin v. Comelec 574 SCRA 782)
Munder vs. Comelec 659 SCRA 254 (2011)
Jurisprudence has clearly established the doctrine that a petition for
disqualification and a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy, are two distinct remedies to prevent a candidate from entering an
electoral race. Both remedies prescribe distinct period to file the corresponding
petition, on which the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections over the case
is dependent.
Fernando V. Gonzalez vs. Comelec, et. al. 644 SCRA 761 (2011)
- In
order to justify the cancellation of CoC, it is essential that the false
representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction
imposed by Section 78 would affect the substantive rights of the candidate the
right to run for the elective post for which he filed the CoC. Material
representation refers to qualifications for elective office (interpreted to refer to
statements regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of
natural-born Filipino status); Aside from the requirement of materiality, the
false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible; it must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualification for
public office. (also ruled in Salcedo II v. Comelec 312 SCRA 447 (1999))
Two remedies available for questioning the qualifications of the
candidate: Distinction between the two proceedings under Section 78 and
Section 253 under B.P. 881, thereof (1) Before elections under Section 78
and (2) After elections under Section 253. The only difference between the
two proceedings is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office
are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be
initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for QW under Section 253 may

be brought on the basis of two grounds (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within 10 days after
proclamation of the election results. Under Section 253, a candidate is
ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he
lacks any of the qualification for election office.
Clearly, the ONLY INSTANCE where a petition questioning the qualifications
of a candidate for elective office can be filed before election is when the petition
is filed under Section 78 of the OEC.
Period for filing a petition under Section 78 In Loong v. Comelec 216 SCRA
760 (1992), the Court categorically declared that the period for filing a petition
for cancellation of candidacy based on false representation is covered by Rule
23 and NOT Rule 25 allowing the filing of a petition at any time after the last
day for filing of CoCs but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a
procedural rule that cannot supercede Section 78 of the OEC.
A petition filed under Section 78 must not be interchanged or confused with one
filed under Section 68 In Fermin v. Comelec 574 SCRA 782 (2008), the
Court stressed that a petition which is properly a Section 78 petition must
therefore be filed within the period prescribed therein, and a procedural rules
subsequently issue by Comelec cannot supplant this statutory period under
Section 78.
Jurisdiction Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath
and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, the
jurisdiction of the Comelec over election contests relating to his election,
returns and qualifications ENDS and the HRET own jurisdiction BEGINS.
In Perez v. Comelec 317 SCRA 641 (1999) the Court does not have
jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private respondent who was
already a Member of the HR at the time of the filing of the petition for certiorari
considering that by statutory provision (Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the HR.
Procedure in filing Motion to Suspend Proclamation: The suspension of
proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter which the Comelec

Second Division can dispose of motu propio. Section 6 of RA No. 6646


requires that the suspension must be upon motion by the complainant or any
intervenor.
Second Placer Rule- It is well-settled that the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
Exceptions to the Second Placer Rule The exception to the second placer
rule is predicated on the concurrence of the following (1) the one who obtained
the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is FULLY
AWARE in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless case their votes
in favor of the ineligible candidate. These facts warranting the exception to the
rules are not present in the case at bar.
Ashary M. Alauya (Clerk of Court, Sharia District Court, Marawi City vs.
Judge Casan Ali L. Limbona 646 SCRA 1 (2011) - Partisan political
activity The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity
as the candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an elective post. No
officer or employee in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign. The act of the Judge in filing a
certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative in the May 1998 elections
without giving up his judicial post violated not only the law, but also the
constitutional mandate.
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Luis Bautista/Robelito Picar/Wilma
Pagaduan 678 SCRA 267 (2012) - Remedy of a person who fails to file the
petition to disqualify a certain candidate within the twenty-five (25)-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the OEC is to file a petition for QW within 10 days
from proclamation of the results of the election as provided under Section 253
of the OEC.
Renunciation of foreign citizenship to be valid under Section 5(2) of RA 9225
The language of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez
v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008), the Court declared it s categorical and
single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run fo any
elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to
a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the CoC. The Court

also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of
the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal
terms that affiant is renouncing foreign citizenship.
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 Voters inclusion/exclusion
proceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a petition shall be included
in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law
and the facts presented to show possession of these qualifications. On the other
hand, the COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether
there is a false representation of a material fact. The false representation must
necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but to a material fact or
those that refer to a candidates qualification for elective office.
NOTE: In Fermin v. Comelec G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369,
December 18, 2008, the SC clarified that Section 5 (Procedure in cases of
Nuisance candidates) and Section 7 (Petition to Deny Due Course To or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under RA 6646, did not in any way amend
the period for filing Section 78 petitions. While Section 7 of the said law
makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the
denial of due course to the COCs of nuisance candidates (then chief Justice
Davide in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120265,
September 18, 1995 248 SCRA 400, explains that the procedure hereinabove
provided mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6
which does not provide for a procedure but to the effects of disqualification
cases, (but) can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act
on nuisance candidates, the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25day period for filing Section 78 petitions is changed to 5 days counted from
the last day for the filing of COCs.
The clear language of Section 78 cannot be amended or modified b y a
mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically
intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction
that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the
Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. Noteworthy in Loong v.
Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992), which upheld the 25-day period for filing
Section 78 petitions, was decided long after the enactment of RA 6646. Hence,
Section 23, Section 2 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure is contrary to the
unequivocal mandate of the law. Following the ruling in Fermin, the Court
declared that as the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a

COC may be filed at anytime not later than 25-days from the time of the
filing of the COC.
In Justimbaste v. Comelec 572 SCRA 736 (2008) Material
misrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy refers to the falsity of a statement required to be entered therein as
enumerated in Section 74 of the OEC. Concurrent with materiality is a
deliberate intention to deceive the electorate as to one qualification making
reference to Salcedo II that in order to justify the cancellation of the COC under
Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein
pertained to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would
affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post
for which he filed the COC. There is also no showing that there was an intent to
deceive the electorate as to the identity of the private respondent, nor that by
using his Filipino name the voting public was thereby deceived.
Disqualification under the Local Government Code R.A. 7160
A candidate for an elective office may likewise be disqualified on the
following grounds
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence. (Sec. 40)
(Qualifications of local elective candidates under the LGC was asked
in the 1999 Bar)
NOTE: The 1st ground for disqualification consists of two (2) parts, namely: (1)
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude,
regardless of the period of imprisonment; and (2) those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense, OTHER THAN one involving moral turpitude,
punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment, within 2 years after serving
sentence.
Sec. 40 of RA 7160 limits the disqualification to two (2) years after service of
sentence. This should now be read in relation to Sec. 11 of RA 8189 which
enumerates those who are disqualified to register as a voter. The 2 year
disqualification period under Sec. 40 is now deemed amended to last 5 years
from service of sentence after which period the voter will be eligible to register
as a voter and to run for an elective public office.

Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance


to the Republic

Fugitives from justice in criminal and non-political cases.

In Marquez, jr. vs. Comelec and Rodriguez 259 SCRA, it was held that
fugitives from justice refer to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment. The SC ruled that when a person leaves the territory of a state not his
own, homeward bound and subsequently learns of the charges filed against him
while he is in his own country, does not outrightly qualify him as a fugitive
from justice if he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state.
When Rodriguez left the US, there was yet no complaint filed and warrant of
arrest, hence there is no basis in saying that he is running away from any
prosecution or punishment.
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative charge
In Rodolfo Aguinaldo vs. Comelec, it was held that a public elective official
cannot be removed for administrative conduct committed during a prior term as
his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting of the right to remove him therefore.
Grego v. Comelec 274 SCRA 481, the Court ruled that Sec. 40 of RA 7160
does not have any retroactive effect. In this case a Deputy Sheriff was removed
for serious misconduct in 1981. He run in 1992 & 1995. His removal in 1981
cannot serve as basis for his disqualification. Laws have prospective effect.
Those with dual citizenship. The relevant cases under this provision are the
cases of
Mercado v. Manzano & Comelec G.R. No. 135083 May 25,
1999
Aznar v. Comelec 185 SCRA 703
Cirilo Valles v. Comelec & Lopez G.R. #138000 August 9,
2000

In Aznar, it was ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmea was holder of
a certificate stating that he is an American citizen did not mean that he is no
longer a Filipino & that an application for an ACR was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano & Comelec, it was held that the fact that respondent
Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the BID & was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of
candidacy for Vice-Mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his nationality
before the termination of his American citizenship.
Valles v. Lopez, the Court held that the mere fact that Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an ACR are not act constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the lost of citizenship, the
same must be express (Com. Act 63, Sec. 1). Referring to the case of Aznar, an
ACR does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones
citizenship. Similarly, her holding of an Australian passport as in the Manzano
case, were likewise mere acts of assertions before she effectively renounced the
same. Thus, at the most, Lopez had dual citizenship she was an Australian
and a Filipino, as well.
In reconciling the disqualification under Sec. 40 of RA 7160. The Court
clarified and as ruled in the Manzano case dual citizenship as used in the LGC
and reconciled with Article IV Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance (Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law.) In recognizing situation in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state (jus
sanguinis for the Philippines where the child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of his/her place of birth as opposed to jus
soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth),
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to
citizens with dual allegiance.
The fact that Lopez had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her
from running for public office. For candidates with dual citizenship, it is
enough that they elect Phil. Citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of

candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing
of the certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship
effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
In the Certificate of Candidacy, one declare that he/she is a Filipino citizen and
that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Lopez v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008) The ruling in Valles in 2000 has
been superseded by the enactment of RA 9225 in 2003. RA 9225 expressly
provides for the condition before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship
may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions xxx (2) Those seeking elective
public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
AASJS Member-hector G. Calilung vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No.
160869, may 11, 2007, the SC took the opportunity to set parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance considering that it only made a distinction between
dual allegiance and dual citizenship in Mercado vs. Manzano.
FACTS: Following the implementation of RA 9225 An Act Making the
Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire foreign Citizenship Permanent,
amending for the purpose CA 63, as amended, petitioner filed a petition against
respondent DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong who was tasked to implement
laws governing citizenship. He prayed for a writ of prohibition to stop
respondent from implementing RA 9225. he avers that RA 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
that states Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law. He contends that the Act cheapens the
Philippine citizenship since the Act allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship
without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance

because said law allows natural-born citizens to regain their Philippine by


simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.
The Constitution however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the
national interest.
HELD: The intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do away with the
provision in CA 63, which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. RA 9225 allows
dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On
its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, Section 3, RA 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not
there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of RA 9225. (Note: Section 5, Article
IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance.)
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Luis Bautista et. al. 678 SCRA 267
(2012) - Renunciation of foreign citizenship to be valid under Section 5(2) of
RA 9225 The language of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 is free from any
ambiguity. In Lopez v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008), the Court declared it
s categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen
cannot run fo any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she
personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing
the CoC. The Court also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held
that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed
before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in
clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing foreign citizenship.
Frivaldo v. Comelec 174 SCRA 245 (1989). Frivaldo was proclaimed
governor elect of the Province of Sorsogon and subsequently assumed office. A
disqualification was filed against him by the League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the US in 1983, which he admitted but which he undertook only
to protect himself against then President Marcos. The SC found Frivaldo
disqualified for not having possessed the requirement of citizenship which
cannot be cured by the electorate, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
this case, that the candidate was qualified.

Republic v. dela Rosa 232 SCRA 785. The disqualification of Frivaldo was
again at issue. Frivaldo opted to reacquire his Philippine citizenship thru
naturalization but however failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement
of publication, thus, the Court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the
naturalization of Frivaldo. He was again disqualified.
In Frivaldo v. Comelec 257 SCRA 72 (1996), Frivaldo later reacquired
Philippines citizenship and obtained the highest number of votes in 3
consecutive elections but was twice declared by the SC to be unqualified to hold
office due to his lack of citizenship requirement. He claimed to have reacquired his Filipino citizenship thru repatriation. It was established that he
took his oath of allegiance under the provision of PD 725 at 2pm on 30 June
1995, much later than the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
The Court held that the the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that of residence and age, as
Sec. 39 of RA 7160 specifically speaks of qualification of elective officials,
not candidates thus, the citizenship requirement in the local government code
to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, the Court held that the
repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his
application on 17 August 1994 and being a former Filipino who has served
the people repeatedly and at the age of 81, Frivaldo deserves liberal
interpretation of the Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

3 term limit or having served 3 consecutive terms.

Article X, Section 8, 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160


provides No local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
In Laceda Sr., vs. Limena & Comelec 571 SCRA 603 the Court held that
the rationale behind Section 2 of RA 9164, like Section 43 of RA 7190 (Local
Government Code) from which the 3-term rule was taken, is primarily intended

to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for
office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials
from running for the same office after a term of 9 years.
The case of Laceda Sr. involved a similar question in Latasa vs. Comelec 417
SCRA 601 where the Court held that where a person has been elected for 3
consecutive terms as municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of
such 3-year term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without
the city charter interrupting his term until the end of the 3-year term, the
prohibition applied to prevent him from running for the 4th time as city mayor
thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the terms. Comelec did not err
nor commit any abuse of discretion when it declared Laceda disqualified and
cancelled his COC.
Adormeo v. Comelec & Talaga, Jr. G.R. No. 147927 04 February 2002 and
citing Borja v. Comelec 295 SCRA 157 and Lonzanida v. Comelec 311
SCRA 602, it was ruled that the term limit for elective local officals must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Thus, two (2) conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur:
that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post; and
that the has fully served the three (3) consecutive terms.
In this case, respondent Talaga, Jr., was elected mayor of Lucena City in
May 1992. He served the full term, was re-elected in 1995-98 but lost in the
1998 election to Tagarao. In the recall elections of May 2000, Talaga, Jr. won
and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until 30 June 2001. Talaga Jr. filed
his certificate of candidacy for the same position in the 2001 elections which
candidacy was challenged by petition Adormeo on the ground that Talaga, Jr. is
already barred by the 3-term limit rule.
Adormeo contends that Talagas candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution which states that the term of office of local elective officials shall
be three (3) years and no such official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms citing the case of Lonzanida v. Comelec To further support
his case, he adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas who stated that in
interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be

considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive
terms allowed.
The Comelec en banc ruled in favor of Talaga which reversed the ruling of the
1st division and held that 1) Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms
because he did not win the 11 May 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only
as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in
the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the
3-term disqualification rule and finally 4) that he did not fully serve the 3
consecutive term. His loss in the 11 May 1998 elections is considered an
interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. ISSUE:
Was Talaga disqualified to run for Mayor of Lucena City in the 14 May 2001
elections?
In holding the qualifications of Talaga, the Court reiterated its ruling in Borja
that the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position
considering that the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by the defeat in
the 1998 elections which is considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service. The Court further held that the comment of Fr. Bernas is
pertinent only to member of the HR there being no recall elections
provided for members of Congress.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec and Lu 28 311 SCRA 602 (July 1998), Lonzanida
was elected and served 2 consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales, prior to the 08 May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections,
Lonzanida ran for the same elective post and was again proclaimed winner. He
assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995
was contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest
before the RTC of Zambales which rendered a decision declaring a failure of
elections rendering the result for the office as null and void. The office of the
mayor was then declared vacant. Both parties appealed to the Comelec and on
13 Nov. 1997, it resolved the election protest filed by Alvez in his favor after
determining that Alvez garnered the plurality of votes. The Comelec issued a
writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post to which he obeyed and
Alvez assumed for the remainder of the term.
Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor in the 11 May 1998
and his opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him for the same post.
ISSUE: Whether Lonzanidas assumption of office from May 1995 to March

1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying
the 3-term limit for elective local government officials. It was held that
Lonzanida is still qualified to run for mayor and held that the 2-rquisites for the
application of the 3-term limit is wanting. First, petitioner cannot be considered
as having been elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office.
Another issue raised in Lonzanida is that the Comelec already lost
jurisdiction over the disqualification case when he was proclaimed as
winner and that jurisdiction is already with the RTC for QW. The SC
reiterated its ruling in Trinidad v. Comelec 288 SCRA 76 (1998) that pursuant
to Sec. 6 of RA 6646, the proclamation nor assumption of office of a candidate
against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the Comelec does
not divest the Comelec of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and resolve it
on the merits. (Also ruling in Dizon v. Comelec 577 SCRA 589).
Borja v. Comelec 295 SCRA 157 (1998), the SC ruled on the issue on whether
a VM who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of the 3-term limit. The SC upheld the decision of the Comelec that
succession for the expired term is not the service contemplated as would
disqualify the elective official from running for the same elective post. The
purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the
number of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not
serving a term for which he was elected as he was simply continuing the service
of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to his
expiration. (Asked in the 2001 BAR)
In applying said policy, the following situations (tenures in office) are
NOT considered service of term for purpose of applying the 3-term limit
officer fills up a higher office by succession/operation of law
officer is suspended from office (failed to serve full term/involuntary)
officer unseated, ordered to vacate by reason of an election protest case
officer serving unexpired term after winning in the recall elections;

In Ong vs. Alegre 479 SCRA 473 A petition for disqualification was filed
against Francis Ong for having violated the 3-term limit rule for having served
as mayor of San Vicente Camarines Norte in the May 1995, 1998 & 2001
elections. The controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term
wherein the election protest filed by Alegre was promulgated after the term of
the contested office has expired.
The question for consideration is whether or not the assumption of Francis Ong
as Mayor from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full
term service in the context of the consecutive term limit rule. The Court
declared that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, service for the
full term and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the 3term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than 3-consecutive
terms.
The Court debunked the claim of Francis Ong that he was only a presumptive
winner in view of the ruling of the RTC that Alegre was the real winning
candidate in the light of his being proclaimed by the MBOC coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the 3-term rule. Lonzanida from which Ong sought refuge is
not applicable in view of the involuntary relinquishment of office before the
expiration of his term. (Same ruling in Rivera III vs. Comelec 523 SCRA )
Aldovino Jr., vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 234 (2009) Article X, Section 8 both
by structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits
his stay in office to 3 consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no
less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The
provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, NOT in the
context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the power of the
elective position. The voluntary renunciation it speaks of refers only to the
elective officials involuntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this
office. It does not speak of the temporary cessation of the exercise of
power or authority that may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them. Quoting Latasa the law contemplates
a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office
and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular government unit.

DISQUALIFICATION CASES (EFFECTS)


Sec. 72 of the OEC and Section 6 of 6646 states: any candidate who been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voter for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and is voted for
and received the winning number of votes in such election, the Comelec shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION PROPAGANDA
Election period is 120 days - 90 days before the date of the election and 30
days thereafter. Campaign period for Pres., VP and Senators starts 90 days
before the date of the election, 45 days for members of the HR and local
candidate and 15 days for barangay official, which excludes the day before and
the day of the elections.
Prohibited Activities Section 80 BP881 Election campaign or partisan
political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party or association of persons, to
engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political convention
or meetings to nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the
commencement of the campaign period and 45 days for President and VicePresident.
RA 9006 (Fair Election Law), Section 3. Election propaganda whether on
television, cable television, radio, newspapers or any other medium is hereby
allowed for all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations participating under the party-list elections and for all bona fide
candidates seeking national and local positions subject to the limitation on
authorized expenses of candidates and political parties, observance of truth in
advertising and to the supervision and regulation by the Comelec.

Requirements for Published or Printed Broadcast Election Propaganda.


RA 9006 now allows paid political advertisements for print and broadcast
media provided the said advertisement shall bear and be identified by
reasonably legible or audible words Political advertisement paid for
followed by the true and correct name and address of the candidate or
party for whose benefit the election propaganda was printed or aired.
Free of charge if broadcast is given free of charge the radio and television
station, it shall be identified by the words airtime for this broadcast was
provided free of charge by followed by the true and correct name and address
of the broadcast entity. Provided that said print, broadcast donated shall not be
published or printed without the written acceptance of the candidate or political
party which acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and
submitted to the Comelec.
Guidelines whether by purchase or donation Print advertisements shall not
exceed page in broadsheet and page in tabloids 3 x a week per newspaper,
magazine or other publications during the campaign period. (Section 6, RA
9006).
Television/Radio Advertisements nation candidates/registered political party
shall be entitled to not more than 120 minutes of TV advertisement and 180
minutes of radio. Local candidates not more than 60 minutes of TV
advertisement and 90 minutes of radio.
Comelec Time and space print space, Comelec shall pay just compensation
(PPI ruling) in at least 3 newspapers of general circulation which Comelec shall
allocate free of charge to the national candidates. Broadcast network (radio and
TV) free of charge to Comelec. (Section 8, RA 9006)
Limitations In Broadcasting of Election Accounts Comelec shall ensure
that radio and television or cable television broadcasting entities shall not allow
the scheduling of any program or permit any sponsor to manifestly favor or
oppose any candidate or political party or unduly or repeatedly referring to or
including said candidate and/or political party in such program respecting,
however, in all instances the right of said broadcast entities to air accounts of
significant news or news worthy events and views on matter of public interest.

Restrictions on Media Practitioners any mass media columnist,


commentator, reporter or non-air correspondent or personality who is a
candidate for any elective office or is a campaign volunteer for or employed or
retained in any capacity by any candidate or political party shall be deemed
resigned, if so required by their employer, or shall take a leave of absence from
his/her work as such during the campaign period. Any media practitioner who
is an official of a political party or member of the campaign staff of a candidate
or political party shall not use his/her time or space to favor any candidate or
political party
No movie, cinematography or documentary portraying the life or
biography of a candidate shall be publicly exhibited in a theater, television
stations or any public forum during the campaign period or those portrayed by
an actor or media personality who is himself a candidate.
RA 9006, Section 5 Election surveys refers to the measurements of opinions
and perceptions of the voters as regards a candidates popularity, qualifications,
platforms or matter of public discussion in relation the election, including
voters preference or candidates or publicly discussed issues during the
campaign period. The person or entity who publishes a survey is required to
include the following information:
Name of the person, candidate, party or organization who commissioned
or paid the survey;
Name and address of the person or polling firm from who conducted the
survey
Period during which the survey was conducted, methodology used,
including the number or individual respondents and the areas from which
they were selected and the specific questions asked
Margin of error of the survey.
The survey together with the raw data gathered to support the conclusions
shall be available for inspection, copying and verification by the Comelec, or by
the registered political party or any Comelec accredited citizen arm.
Posting of Campaign Materials political parties and party-list groups may be
authorized by the Comelec common poster areas for their candidates in not
more than 10 public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the
like, wherein, candidates can post, display or exhibit election propaganda. The

size of the poster areas shall not exceed 12 x 16 feet or it equivalent. With
respect to independent candidates, may likewise avail of this but the difference
is merely on the size which shall not exceed 4 x 6 feet or its equivalent.
(Section 9, RA 9006)
RA 9189, Section 15 Regulation of Campaign Abroad The use of campaign
materials, as well as the limits on campaign spending shall be governed b the
laws and regulations applicable to the Philippines.
BP881, Section 95 Prohibited Contributions. No contribution for purposes of
partisan political activity shall be made directly or indirectly by any of the
following:
(a) Public or private financial institutions: Provided, however, That
nothing herein shall prevent the making of any loan to a candidate or
political party by any such public or private financial institutions
legally in the business of lending money, and that the loan is made in
accordance with laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of
the business;
(b) Natural and juridical persons operating a public utility or in
possession of or exploiting any natural resources of the nation;
(c) Natural and juridical persons who hold contract or sub-contract to
supply the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or
instrumentalities, with goods or services or to perform construction or
other works;
(d) Natural and juridical persons who have been granted franchises,
incentives, exemptions, allocations or similar privileges or
concessions by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
(e) Natural and juridical persons who, within the one year prior to the
date of the election, have been granted loans or other
accommodations in excess of 100K by the government or any of its
divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities including government
owned or controlled corporations.
(f) Educational institutions which have received grants of public funds to
no less than 100K;
(g) Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines;

(h) Foreigners and foreign corporations.


It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive any contribution
from any of the persons or entities enumerated herein.
ABS-CBN 323 SCRA 811, the SC defined exit polls as a specie of electoral
survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the
purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially
asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after
they have officially cast their ballots. An absolute prohibition is unreasonably
restrictive because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for
election days of the elections, but also for long term research. The concern of
Comelec of a non-communicative effect of the exit polls which is disorder and
confusion in the voting centers does not justify a total ban of the exist polls.
Comelec should instead set safeguards in place for those who intends to conduct
exit polls.
Section 5.5 of RA 9006 (Fair Elections Law) provides for the
requirements for the taking of an exit polls:
pollsters shall not conduct their survey within 50 meters from the polling
place whether said survey is taken in a home, dwelling place and other
places;
pollsters shall wear distinctive clothing;
pollsters shall inform the voters that they may refuse to answer; and
the result of the exit polls may be announced after the closing of the polls
on election day, and must clearly identify the total number of
respondents, and the places where they were taken.. Said announcement
shall state that the same is unofficial and does not represent a trend.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATION vs. COMELEC 357 SCRA 496 This case
involved the issue on election surveys. SWS is a private non-stock, non-profit
social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including
economics, politics, demography and social development, and thereafter,
processing, analyzing and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other
hand, Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation, which features newsworthy items of
information including election surveys
Petitioners brought this action

for prohibition to enjoin the Comelec from enforcing par. 5.4 of RA 9006
which provides, Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election
The term election surveys is defined in par. 5.1 of the law as follows
Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of
the voters as regards a candidates popularity, qualification, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including voters
preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign
period.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels
and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them
directly. Kamahalan also states that it intends to publish election survey
results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001. HELD: Par. 5.4
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech,
expression and the press. It is invalid because it imposes a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression and it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING
In Francisco Chavez v. Comelec et. al. G.R. No. 162777 31 August 2004,
Chavez brought before the SC a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as taxpayer and citizen asking the
Court to enjoin the Comelec from enforcing Section 21 of its Resolution No.
6520 dated 06 January 2004. (Sec. 32 provides: All propaganda materials such
as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing
the picture or name of a person and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public
office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print
media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these
implementing rules; otherwise, he and the said radio station, print media or
television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning
in violation of Sec. 80 of the OEC)

Chavez on various dates entered in formal agreement with certain


establishment to endorse their products and pursuant thereto, 3 bill boards were
set up on some strategic areas in Metro Manila. Subsequently on 30 December
2003, Chavez filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator. On
06 January 2004, Comelec issued Resolution No. 6520 which contained Section
32. Comelec directed Chavez to comply with the said provision and replied
how he may have violated the assailed provision. Another letter was sent
seeking exemption from the application of Section 32, considering that the
billboard adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as
paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
Comelec replied by informing him to remove or cover the said billboards
pending the resolution of the Comelec on his request for exemption. Aggrieved,
Chavez sent to the SC via a petition for prohibition seeking the said provision as
unconstitutional based on the following grounds
It was a gross violation of the non-impairment clause
An invalid exercise of police power
In the nature of an ex post facto law
Contrary to the Fair Elections Act
Invalid due to overbreadth
As to the 1st issue is Section 32 of Comelec Resolution No. 6520 an invalid
exercise of police power? Petitioner argues: the billboards (even if it bears his
name) do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit for
such candidacy from the electorate; they are mere product endorsements and not
election propaganda. Prohibition is not within the scope of power of the
Comelec.
RULING police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morale, peace, education, good
order or safety of the general welfare of the people. The primary objective of
the provision is to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing
field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between
popular or rich candidates, on one hand and lesser-known or poorer
candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity. This is a valid reason for the exercise of police power as held in
the Philippines Press Institute v. Comelec case.

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contract or agreements to endorse
certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his
name and image to these products. However, when he filed his COC for
senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political
character because the same directly promoted his candidacy. If subject
billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and
image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity
to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other
candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to
endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual
intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing
the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign
period. This, without doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against
premature campaigning..
Section 32 neither violated the non-impairment clause as this must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources
one may have at his disposal, is a vital interest to the public. The SC has
stressed that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order.
This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the
contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the
genera; welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause.
Which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
On the issue that Sec. 32 of the Comelec Resolution is in the nature of an ex
post facto law. Not ex post facto the offense as expressly prescribed in Section
32, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days
after the effectivity of the said Resolution. If the candidate for public office
fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be
liable under Section 80 of the OEC for premature campaigning. Nowhere is it
indicated in the said provision that it shall operate retroactively.
On the issue that the provision was a violation of the Fair Elections Act as
billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda. It was ruled that
the provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only
regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much

as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich


candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account
of their resources and popularity. Comelec was only doing its duty under the
law (Sec. 3 and 13 of the Fair Elections Act on lawful propaganda)
Section 80 of the OEC provides it shall be unlawful for any person, whether
or not a voter or candidate or for any party, or association of persons, to
engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during
the campaign period.
Penera v. Comelec 599 SCRA 609. The issue on premature campaigning was
raised. Facts show that Penera and Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica in the last May 14, 2007 elections. Andanar filed before the Office of
the Regional Election Director, Caraga Region, Region XIII, a petition for
disqualification against Penera for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning
and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign
period.
The Petition alleged that on 29 March 2007, a day before the start of the
authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007, Penera and her partymates went
around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and
requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections. Penera
alleged that the charge was not true although having admitted that a motorcade
did take place which was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby
cities and provinces, where the filing of COC was preceded by a motorcade,
which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. Penera in her defense
cited Barroso v. Ampig (385 Phil 2237; 328 SCRA 530) wherein the Court
ruled that a motorcade held by candidates during the filing of their COCs was
not a form of political campaigning. Pending the disqualification case, Penera
was proclaimed as winner and assumed office.
Comelec ruled that Penera engaged in premature campaigning in violation of
Section 80 and disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate.
The SC ruled no abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec and held that the
conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political
activity which fall squarely under of Section 79 of the OEC.
Penera moved for reconsideration arguing that she was not yet a candidate at
the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of RA

8436 (the law authorizing the Comelec to use an automated election system for
the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvasing/consolidating the results
of the national and local elections), as amended by RA 9369, is not officially a
candidate until the start of the campaign period.
In granting Peneras MR, the SC En Banc held that Penera did not engage in
premature campaigning and should thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty
candidate. The Court said(a) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision)
considered a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate
even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent
and letter of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended, which stated that a person
who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omission applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.
In applying the said law
(1)

The effective date when partisan political acts become


unlawful
as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the
start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts
are lawful.

(2)

Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense


only
for acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other
words, election offenses can be committed by a candidate only
upon the start of the campaign period. Before the start of the
campaign period, such election offenses cannot be committed.

Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for
examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the
Court but the Legislature.
(b) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15, of RA 8436, as
amended, does not provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate
before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the
start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political

acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but
becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as
envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of
expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

That Section 15 of RA 8436 does not expressly state that


campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed
decision asserted, is no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is
lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law
does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus,
there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436 that partisan
political activities before the start of the campaign period is lawful. It is
sufficient for Congress to state that any unlawful act or omission applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The
only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start
of the campaign period, are lawful.
(d) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot v.
Comelec (G.R. No. 164858, 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the
ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the
start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the
legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing COC under RA 8436
was set only to afford time to prepare the machine readable ballots, and they
intended to preserve the existing election period, such that one who files his
COC to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate
the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15, of RA 8436 that a
person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate
only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no
person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the
automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan
political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot
be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is
unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15
good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but
maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.

In Lanot vs. Comelec 507 SCRA 114, the Court ruled that there are two
aspects of a disqualification case:
1) Electoral aspect determines whether the offender should be disqualified
from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary
in character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring
candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of
probable cause in a PI. The electoral aspect may proceed independently
of the criminal aspect and vice-versa.
2) Criminal aspect determines whether there is probable cause to charge a
candidate for an election offense. If there is probable cause, the Comelec
through its Law Department, files the criminal information before the
proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown
hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A
criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender,
which may even include disqualification from holding a future public
office.

CANVASSING BODIES
Section 221, BP 881/RA 6646, Section 20 - Boards of Canvassers (Local
Boards). There shall be a board of canvassers for each province, city and
municipality as follows:
(a)

Provincial Board of Canvassers The provincial board of canvassers


shall be composed of the provincial election supervisor or a lawyer in
the regional office of the Commission, as chairman, the provincial
fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the provincial superintendent of schools
as member.

(b)

City Board of Canvassers The city board of canvassers shall be


composed of the city election registrar or a lawyer of the Commission,
as chairman, the city fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the city
superintendent of schools, as member. In cities with more than one
election registrar, the Commission shall designate the election
registrar as chairman.

(c)

Municipal Board of Canvassers. The municipal board of canvassers


shall be composed of the election registrar or a representative of the
Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice-chairman
and the most senior district school supervisor or in his absence a
principal of the school district or the elementary school, as member.

The proceedings of the board of canvassers shall be open and public.


BP881, Section 222. Relationship with Candidates and other members of
the Board. The chairman and the members of the boards of canvassers shall not
be related within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any of the
candidates whose votes will be canvassed by the said board, or to any member
of the same board.
BP881, Section 224. Feigned Illness. Any member of the board of canvassers
feigning illness in order to be substituted on election day until the proclamation
of the winning candidates shall be guilty of an election offense.
RA 8436, Section 23 National Board of Canvassers for Senators The
chairman and members of the Commission on Elections sitting en banc, shall
compose the national board of canvassers for senators. It shall canvass the
results for senators by consolidating the results contained in the data storage
devices submitted by the district, provincial and city boards of canvassers, of
those cities which comprise one or more legislative districts. Thereafter, the
national board shall proclaim the winning candidates.

Section 30, RA 7166 Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the
election of President and Vice-President: Determination of Authenticity and
Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass.
1) Congress for Pres. & VP (Sec. 4, Article VII)
2) Comelec Senators and Regional Officials
3) PBC Members of the HR and provincial officials (composed of the
PES, Provincial Prosecutor and provincial official of the DepEd
4) District BOC in each legislative district in MM members of the HR and
municipal officials
5) City and MBOC member of the HR, city and municipal officials
composed of the city or municipal EO, City Prosecutor and DepEd
Superintendent

RA 9189, Section 18(4) A Special Board of Canvassers composed of a lawyer


preferably of the Commission as chairman, a senior career office from any of
the government agencies maintaining a post abroad and, in the absence of
another government officer, a citizen of the Philippines qualified to vote under
this Act deputized by the Commission, as vice-chairman and member secretary,
respectively, shall be constituted to canvass election returns submitted to it by
the Special Boards of Elections Inspectors. Xxx xxx The Certificates of
Canvass and the accompanying Statements of Votes as transmitted via
facsimile, electronic mail and any other means of transmission equally safe,
secure and reliable shall be the primary basis for the national canvass.
CERTIFICATE OF VOTES, STATEMENT OF VOTES, ELECTION
RETURNS AND DISTRIBUTION
Certificate of Votes is an election document issued by the BEIs after the
counting and announcement of the results and before leaving the polling place
upon request of the accredited watcher. It shall contain the number of votes
obtain by each candidate written in words and figures, precinct #, name of the
city or municipality signed and thumb marked by each member of the board.
Typoco vs. Comelec 614 SCRA 391 In Garay v. Comelec 261 SCRA 222
(1996) the Court held that (a) certificate of votes does not constitute sufficient
evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only election returns
are, pursuant to Sections 231, 233-236 and 238 of BP881. Again in De
Guzman v. Comelec 426 SCRA 698 (2004) the Court stated that, in an election
contest where the correctness of the number of votes is involved, the best and
most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where the ballots can nor
be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best
evidence.
Doromal vs. Biron/Comelec 613 SCRA 160 (2010) the certificate of votes,
which contains the number of votes obtained by each candidate, is issued by the
BEI upon the request of the duly accredited watcher pursuant to Section 16 of
RA 6646. Relative to its evidentiary value, Section 17 of RA 6646 provides
that Sections 235 and 236 of BP 881 notwithstanding, the Certificate of Votes
shall be admissible in evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or
any anomaly committed in the preparation of the election returns concerned,
when duly authenticated by at least two members of the BEI who issued the
certificate. Failure to present the CV shall however not bar the presentation of

other evidence to impugn the authenticity of the ER. It cannot be a valid basis
of canvass.
Purpose of requiring authentication of at least 2 members of the BOC to
safeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time it is issued by the BEI to
the watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time that it
is presented to the board of canvassers to proved tampering.
FUNCTIONS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF VOTES
Prevent or deter the members of the BEI or other official from altering
the statement because they know of the existence of such certificate
To advise the candidate definitely of the number of his votes so that in
case the election statement submitted to the BOC does not tally with the
certificate in his hands, he may ask that the other authentic copies of the
same be used for the canvass
To serve as evidence of fraud in election protest cases and in subsequent
prosecution of the election offenses against those liable therefore.
Statement of Votes is a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the
candidates or reflected in the ER.
Certificate of Canvass is based on the SV and which serves as basis for
proclamation.
DISPOSITION OF ELECTION RETURNS
Election Returns and Distribution RA 8173 amending Section 27 of RA 7166,
provides that in the election for Pres., VP, Senators and members of the HR, the
ER shall be distributed as follows

1st CBO or MBOC

2nd congress, directed to the Pres. of the Senate

3rd Comelec

4th Dominant majority party as may be determined by the Comelec in


accordance with law

5th Dominant minority party as may be determined by Comelec in


accordance with law

6th Citizens Arms authorized by the Comelec to conduct an unofficial


count to be deposited inside the ballot box.

For Local officials (1) CBOB or MBOC (2) Comelec (3) PBOC (4) DMP (5)
DMP (6) Citizens Arms for unofficial count (7) inside ballot box.
Petition to Declare a postponement, failure or annulment of elections and
call for a special elections in accordance with Sections 5,6, & 7 of the OEC
as amended by Sec. 4 of RA 7166.
Sec. 5 of the OEC provides for the grounds for declaring a
postponement of elections that is when for any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism,
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records,
FM and other analoguous circumstances of such a nature that the holding
of a HOPE-FRECRE should become impossible in any political
subdivision.
Jurisdiction - the Commission en banc may motu propio or upon a verified
petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all
interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the
election to a date which is reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted to a failure to elect but not later than 30 days after
the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election
or failure to elect.
Sec. 6 on the other hand, prescribes the conditions for the exercise of the
power to declare a Failure of Elections. As reiterated in Dibaratun vs.
Comelec 611 SCRA 367, citing Banaga Jr. v. Comelec 336 SCRA 701
(2000) also in Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 517 - to declare a failure of
elections, either of these three (3) instances should be present conformably
with Section 6 of the OEC

the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes;
the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of voting on account of FM, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the ER or
in the custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect
on the same grounds.
Based on the foregoing provisions, two (2) conditions must concur to declare
a failure of elections
no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by
law or, even if there was voting the election nevertheless resulted in a
failure to elect and
the votes not cast would affect the results of the elections (Carlos. V.
Angeles)
In the same case of Coquilla v. Comelec, the SC stressed that what is
common in these three instances is the resulting failure to elect. In the first
instance, no election was held, while in the second, the election is suspended.
In the third instance, circumstances attending the preparation, transmission,
custody or canvas of the election returns cause a failure to elect. And, the term
failure to elect means nobody emerged as a winner.
Procedural Rules - On the basis of a verified petition by any interested party
and after due notice and hearing, the Comelec may call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than 30 days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect.
Sec. 4 of RA 7166 (An Act Providing for the Synchronized National and
Local Elections) provides that any declaration of postponement, failure of
election and calling for a special elections as provided in Section 5,6, & 7 shall
be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its

members. This power is exclusively vested in the Comelec as ruled in the case
of Sanchez v. Comelec 193 SCRA 849.
Loong v. Comelec 257 SCRA 1, a petition to declare failure of
elections/annulment of elections on the ground of massive fraud in some
municipalities was filed before proclamation.. Comelec dismissed the petition
for having been filed out of time since it was filed only after petitioners realized
that the annulment of election will wipe out their lead. HELD: It was ruled that
the Comelec Resolution dismissing the petition was arbitrary as no law
provided for a reglementary period within which to file a petition for annulment
of elections if there is no proclamation yet.
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512, Canicosa filed with the Comelec a
Petition to declare failure of elections and to declare null and void the canvass
and proclamation based on the following grounds (names of the RV did not
appear on the list, padlocks were not self locking among other) which was
dismissed by the Comelec en banc on the ground that the allegations therein did
not justify the declaration of failure of elections.
Canicosa insists that itswas error on the part of Comelec sitting en banc to
rule on his petition as it should have first been heard by a division. The SC held
that the matter relating to the declaration of failure of elections or the
allegations raised by Canicosa did not involve an exercise of QJ or adjudicatory
functions. It involves an administrative function which pertains to the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections.
Pasandalan vs. Comelec, et. al., G.R. No. 150312 July 18, 2002, the SC held
that a petition for declaration of failure of elections is an extraordinary
remedy and therefore the petition must specifically allege the essential
grounds that would justify the same. Otherwise, the Comelec can dismiss
the petition outright for lack of merit and no grave abuse of discretion can
be attributed to it. The Comelec is mandated to exercise this power with
utmost circumspect to prevent disenfranchising voters and frustrating the
electorates well.
In this case, Pasandalan filed a petition for declaration of failure of
election on the ground that while voting was going on Cafgus indiscriminately
fired their firearms causing the voters to panic and leave the polling places

without casting their votes and taking advantage of the situation, the supporters
of his opponent took the official ballots and filled them up with his name, the
BEIs failed to affix their initials at the back of several official ballots.
Pasandalan , on the basis of the affidavits of his own poll watchers, insists
that a technical examination of the official ballots in the contested precincts
be made which would show that only a few persons wrote the entries, citing
the case of Typoco v. Comelec 319 SCRA 498 and Basher v. Comelec 330
SCRA 736.
The SC held that the Comelec is not mandated to conduct a technical
examination before it dismisses a petition for nullification of election when the
petition is, on its face, without merit. In the case of Typoco, petitioner
buttressed his petition with independent evidence that compelled the Comelec to
conduct a technical examination of the questioned returns. Typoco filed a
Motion to Admit Evidence to prove that a substantial number of election returns
were manufactured and claimed that the returns were prepared by only one
person based on the report of a licensed examiner of questioned documents who
examined copies of the election returns.
Pasandalan failed to attach
independent and objective evidence other than the self-serving affidavits of his
own poll watchers.
In Basher, the fact that an election is actually held prevents as a rule, a
declaration of failure of elections, the Court, however, can annul an
election if it finds that the election is attended with patent and massive
irregularities and illegalities. In this case, after a series of failed elections in
Brgy. Maidan, Municipality of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur during the 1997 Brgy.
Elections, the election was reset to 30 August 1997. Due to the prevailing
tension in the locality, the voting started only at around 9 p.m. and lasted until
the early morning of the following day. Basher filed a petition for the
nullification of the election which was dismissed by the Comelec on the ground
that actual voting had taken place. The SC overturned the Comelec ruling
because the election was unauthorized and invalid. The electorate was not
given sufficient notice that the election would push through after 9pm of
the same day. Moreover, the voting did not comply with the procedure laid
down by the Comelec in its Resolution.
Banaga Jr. vs. Comelec 336 SCRA 701, the fact that a verified petition has
been filed does not mean that a hearing on the case should first be held before
Comelec can act on it. The petition must show on its face that the conditions
necessary to declare a failure of elections are present.

Ampatuan et. al. v. Comelec/Candao, et. al., G.R. No. 149803, January 31,
2002, private respondents filed a petition for declaration of failure of elections
in several municipalities in Maguindanao. During the pendency of the hearing
of said petition, the Comelec proclaimed petitioners as winners for the position
of governor, vice-governor and board members.
Thereafter, the Comelec issued an order directing the continuation of the
hearing on the failure of elections and issued an order outlining the procedure to
be followed in the technical examination. Petitioners, relying on the case of
Typoco, Jr. v. Comelec, contended that by virtue of their proclamation, the only
remedy left for private respondents is to file an election protest, in which case,
original jurisdiction lies with the regular courts and that Comelec no longer has
jurisdiction to conduct a technical examination as it would defeat the summary
nature of a petition for declaration of failure of elections citing several rulings
that an election protest is the proper remedy for a losing candidate after the
proclamation of the winning candidates.
ISSUE: whether the Comelec was divested of its jurisdiction to hear and
decide a petition for declaration of failure of elections after the winners
have already been proclaimed. HELD: It was ruled that the fact that the a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of its
authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation. In this case, it cannot
be assumed that the proclamation of petitioners was legal precisely because the
conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by respondents in
their petition for annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of
elections. The cases relied upon by petitioners that an election protest is the
proper remedy for a losing candidate after proclamation of the winning
candidate involved pre-proclamation controversies.
The SC made reference to its ruling in Loong v. Comelec that a preproclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of
election results, or failure of elections. In pre-proclamation cases, the
Comelec is restricted to an examination of the election returns on their face and
is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election
irregularities. The Comelec is duty-bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of
election results or for declaration of failure of elections conformably with the
OEC. Accordingly, the Comelec, in the case of actions for annulment of
election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical

examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters signatures


and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed
been free, honest and clean.
Borja, Jr. v. Comelec 260 SCRA 604, a petition for declaration of failure of
elections and to nullify the canvass and proclamation was filed by Borja
wherein he alleged that there was lack of notice of the date and time of canvass,
there was fraud in the conduct of the elections as several voters were
disenfranchised, presence of flying voters and unqualified members of the BEI.
The Comelec dismissed the petition ruling that the grounds relied upon by Borja
were ground proper only in an election contest. SC upheld the decision of the
Comelec.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
BP 881, Section 242 The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
pre=proclamation controversies. It may motu propio and after due notice and
hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate-elect or annual partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been
made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections.
Matalam v. Comelec 271 SCRA 733/BP 881 a pre-proclamation controversy
is defined, as a general rule, any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the BOC which may be raised by any candidate or any registered
political party or coalition of political before the board or directly with the
Comelec, on any matter raised under Sections 233 (when ER are delayed, lost
or destroyed), 234 (material defects in the ER), 235 (when ER appear to be
tampered with or falsified) and 236 (discrepancies in the ER) of the OEC in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation
of the ER and Certificate of Canvass.
Section 17, RA 6646, questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the
BOC may be initiated with the board or directly with the Comelec. However,
matters raised under Sec. 233 to 236 shall be brought in the first instance before
the BOC only.
EXCEPTIONS: Section 15 of RA 7166 provides that for purposes of the
elections for Pres. and VP, Senators and members of the HR, no Ppcases shall

be allowed on matters relating the P,T,R,C, and A of the ER or the certificate of


canvass, as the case may be. HOWEVER, this does not preclude the authority
of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of
an interested person to correct manifest error in the certificate of canvass or ER
before it.
Sano Jr. vs. Comelec 611 SCRA 475 It is settled that a pre-proclamation
controversy is summary in character; indeed, it is a policy of the law that preproclamation be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation.
The board of canvassers will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not
apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly
accomplished.
Authority of the Comelec in PPC the Commission exercises authority to
decide PPC in two instances
in appeals from the ruling of the BOC which is generally of two types
first type are n questions contesting its composition or proceedings and
appeal therefrom must be taken by the contestant adversely affected
within 3 days from such ruling .and the second type refers to ruling on
questions contesting ER. The party adversely affected must immediately
inform the board that he intends to appeal from the ruling and the board
shall enter said information in the minutes of the canvass and within 48
hours from the ruling, the adverse party must file with the board a written
and verified notice of appeal, and within an unextendible period of 5 days
thereafter, he has to take the appeal to the Comelec
in petitions directly filed with it.
BP 881 Section 243.Comelec Rules of Procedure Rule 27 (4) SCOPE/ISSUES that may be raised in a PRE-PROCLAMATION
CONTROVERSY
Illegal composition or proceedings of the BOC
The canvassed ER are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with, or falsified or contain discrepancies in the same returns or
in other authentic copies as mentioned in Sec. 233-236
The ER were prepared under duress, threats, coercion or intimidation or
they are obviously manufactures or not authentic in Ocampo v.

Comelec 235 SCRA 436, it was held that this fact must be evident from
the face of the said document. In the absence of a strong evidence
establishing spuriousness of the returns, the basic rule is that the ER shall
be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the
count of the votes which shall prevail for purposes of canvassing and
proclamation.
When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places are
canvassed, the result of which materially affect the standing of the
aggrieved candidate. (Sec. 243)
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
CONTROVERSY

IN

Pre-PROCLAMATION

Sec. 20 of RA 7166 (repealing Sec. 245 OEC) provides for the


mandatory two-step rule or requirement of verbal objection to the inclusion of
the ER and to be formalized in writing within 24 hours. Failure to observe such
rule is fatal to a candidates cause, leaving him with no other remedy except an
EP. This cannot be cured by instituting a petition directly filed with the
Comelec under Sec. 241
Sandoval v. Comelec 323 SCRA 407, it was stressed that Comelec exercises
exclusive jurisdiction and may motu propio or upon verified petition, and after
due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation
of the candidate elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has
been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with Sec. 242 of the
OEC.
Velayo v. Comelec 327 SCRA 713 a PPC is summary in nature,
administrative in character and which is filed before the BOC. It was ruled that
while it is true that RA 7166 provides for summary proceedings in PP cases and
does not require a trial type hearing, nevertheless, summary proceedings cannot
be stretched as to mean ex-parte proceedings.
In Velayo case, respondent objected to the inclusion of two (2)ERs which did
not contain a vote for respondent being statistically improbable which was
overruled by the BOC. It was ruled that it is possible for a candidate to get zero
votes in one or few precincts. The bare fact that a candidate receive zero votes
in 1 or 2 precincts can not support a finding that the ER are statistically
improbable. (Exception to the Lagumbay Doctrine)

Lagumbay v. Comelec 16 SCRA 175 (1966) The Lagumbay doctrine is


the prevailing case on statistical improbability which states that where there
exists uniformity of tallies in favor of candidates belonging to one party and the
systematic blanking out of the opposing candidates as when all the candidates of
one party received all the votes, each of whom exactly the same number, and
the opposing candidates got zero votes, the election returns are obviously
manufactures, contrary to al statistical improbabilities and utterly improbable
and clearly incredible.
Imelda Dimaporo vs. Comelec/Vicente Belmonte 544 SCRA 381 - (Sec. 15
of RA 7166) provides that for the purpose of the elections for president, VP,
senator & member of the HR, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of ER or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be, except as
provided for in Sec. 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the authority of
the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or ER
before it).
Rommel Munoz vs. Comelec, Carlos Balido Jr. 495 SCRA 407 - Results of
the Elections Defined the phrase results of the election is not statutorily
defined. However, as explained in Lucero v. Comelec it means the net result
of the election the rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the
margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter
precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where there was
failure of election, than such failure would certainly affect the results of the
elections.
EFFECT OF ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE OF CANDIDATE
ELECT/WHEN PPC IS NOT DEEMED TERMINATED A preproclamation controversy is no longer viable after the proclamation of the
winning candidates as the issues raised therein may be more closely examined
and better resolved in an EP. (RA 7166, Section 16 (2)).
However, this is only true where the proclamation is based on a complete
canvass and on the assumption that the proclamation is valid where a
proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the

proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the


power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation.
Section 16 of RA 7166 provides that all-pre-proclamation cases pending
before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term
of office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be
deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by
the aggrieved party. HOWEVER, proceedings may continue when on the basis
of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition
appears meritorious and accordingly issued an order for the proceedings to
continue or when appropriate order has been issued by the SC in a petition for
certiorari
ELECTION PROTEST
An EP is a special statutory proceedings designed to contest the right of a
person, declared elected to enter upon and hold office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and winning candidates as to who actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes and therefore, is entitled to hold office.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING - It is a formal judicial proceedings that goes
into the correctness of the counting and appreciation of ballots at the precinct
level were the parties are allowed to present and examine evidence in detail.
WHO CAN FILE can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for.
PERIOD TO FILE within 10 days from proclamation
GROUNDS fraud, vote-buying, terrorism, presence of flying voters,
misreading and misappreciation of the ballots, disenfranchisement of voters,
other election irregularities.
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez v. Eufrocino C. Codilla/ 668 SCRA 600 (2012)

Verification (Defective verification) The verification of a pleading is only a


formal, not jurisdictional requirement. The purpose of requiring the verification
is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and correct,
not merely speculative. This requirements is simply a condition affecting the
form of pleadings, and non compliance therewith does not necessarily render
the pleading fatally defective.
Nature of Election controversy An election controversy, by its nature,
touches upon the ascertainment of the peoples choice as gleaned from the
medium of the ballot. For this reason, an election protest should jibe resolved
with utmost dispatch, precedence and regard of due process. Obstacles and
technicalities that fetter the peoples will should not stand in the way of a
prompt determination of election contests. Thus, rules on the verification of
protests should be liberally construed.
Court upheld the jurisdiction of HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the member of the HRET.
Salvador D. Viologo, Sr., v. Comelec 658 SCRA 516 (2011)
Facts: Motion for reconsideration was denied by Comelec en banc for lack of
verification as required by Section 3, Rule 20 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System and Section 3, Rule 19
of CRP.
Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. In Quintos
v. Comelec (440 Phil. 1045; 392 SCRA 489 (2002)), this Court held that the
lack of verification of private respondents Manifestation and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration is merely a technicality that should not defeat the will of the
electorate. The Comelec may liberally construe or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of
all matter pending before the Comelec.
Nature of Election Protest: In Pacanan v. Comelec 597 SCRA 189 (2009),
the Court, in clarifying the mandated liberal construction of election laws held:
An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public
interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain that the candidate
proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What

is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of
proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest therefore involves
not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates
but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need
of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the
court has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command,
who is the real candidate elected by the people.
Moreover, the CRP are subject to a liberal construction. This liberality is for
the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the
objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec.
This principle was reiterated in the more recent consolidated cases of Tolentino
v. Comelec 617 SCRA 575 (2010) and De Castro vs. Comelec 617 SCRA 575,
where the Court held that in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by
its mandate to ptoetect the integrity of elections, the Comelec must not be
straijackedted by procedural rules in resolving election disputes.
Douglas R. Cagas v. Comelec/Bautista 663 SCRA 644 (2012)
The Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution issued by a Division of the Comelec. The governing
provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. This provision,
although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or
ruling of the Comelec, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
Comelec en banc and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the Comelec. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review
on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the Comelec.

Maria Laarni L. Cayetano v. Comelec/Dante Tinga 648 SCRA 561 (2011)


The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final
or interlocutory even a final resolution of a division of the Comelec the
Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the Comelec
en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a rule
which admits of exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory
order is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same.
(Court made reference to the case of Repol v. Comelec 428 SCRA 321 (2004)
which was affirmed in Soriano Jr. v. Comelec 520 SCRA 88 (2007) and
Blanco v. Comelec 554 SCRA 755. Ruling in Soriano. . . In the 2004 case of
Repol v. Comelec, the Court cited Ambil and held that this Court has no power
to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
division of the Comelec. However, the Court held that an exception to this rule
applies where the commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its
face. In Repol, what was assailed was a status quo ante Order without any time
limit, and more than 20 days had lapsed since its issuance without the Comelec
First Division issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court held that the
status quo ante Order of the Comelec First Division was actually a temporary
restraining order because it ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming the
position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to
assume the post in the meantime. Since the status quo ante Order, which was
qualified by the phrase until further orders from this Commission. Had a
lifespan of more than 20 days, this Order clearly violates the rule that a
temporary restraining Order has an effective period of only 20 days and
automatically expires upon the Comelecs denial of preliminary injunction.
Ceriaco Bulilis v. Victorino Nuez, Presiding Judge of MCTC, Ubay Bohol,
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 52, Talibon, Bohol 655 SCRA 241 (2011) Facts: Bulilis was proclaimed winner for the elections for punong barangay.
Opponent Victorino Nuez filed an EP (for judicial recount and annulment of
proclamation) with MCTC. The counsel of Bulilis filed his brief at 1:45pm on
the date of preliminary conference and when the case was heard at 2pm, Nuez
moved in open court to be allowed to present evidence ex parte since Bulilis
only filed his brief on the date of the preliminary conference which is contrary
to Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 08-4-15-SC which provides that the brief
should be filed at least one (1) day before the date of the preliminary
conference. Judge Garces granted the motion.
Bulilis filed MR which was denied by MCTC. Bulilis filed certiorari with RTC
which was dismissed on the ground that it is Comelec that has exclusive

jurisdiction in election cases involving municipal and barangay officials.


Hence, the petition for certiorari with the SC.
(Rule 28, Sections 1 and 2 of CRP/Section 12 Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58
and 65 of the Rules of Court/Section 8, Rule 14 of Comelec CRP ). Based on
these rules, the Court recognizes the Comelecs appellate jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari against all acts or omissions of courts in election cases.
Indeed, in the recent case of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo 643 SCRA 631 (2011),
the Court had the opportunity to rule that a petition for certiorari questioning an
interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest was within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Comelec.
Since it is the Comelec which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal
from the decision of the RTC in election contests involving elective municipal
officials (Sec. 8 Rule 14 CRP), then it is also the Comelec which has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Although Galang involved a petition for certiorari of an interlocutory order of
the RTC in a municipal election contest, the rationale for the above ruling
applied to an interlocutory order issued by a municipal trial court in a barangay
election case. Under Rule 14, Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, decisions of
municipal trial courts in election contests involving barangay officials are
appealed to the Comelec. Following the Galang doctrine, it is the Comelec
which has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari involving acts of the
municipal trial courts in such election contests.
Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr. v. Comelec and Dan Erasmo, Sr. 674 SCRA 530
(2012) - Demarcation line between the jurisdiction of the Comelec and the
House of Representatives: Facts: In May 2007 Jalosjos ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte and won. While serving as Tampilisan
Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay and occupied it in September 2008. Eight months after, he
applied with the ERB of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay for the transfer of his voters
registration record which application was opposed by Erasmo in a petition for
exclusion before the MCTC of Ipil-Tungawan. RTC ruled to exclude Jalosjos
on the ground that Jalosjos did not abandon his domicile im Tampilisan since he
continue even then to serve as its Mayor. Jalosjos appealed his case to the RTC
of Pagadian City which affirmed the MCTC decision on September 11, 2009.
Jalosjos elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was

granted and enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the
result that his name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Villages list
pending the resolution of the petition.
On November 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his CoC for the position of representative
of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Erasmo filed a Petition to deny due course to or cancel his CoC before the
Comelec, claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in his CoC
when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The Second
Division of the Comelec issued a joint reso dismissing the petition of Erasmo
for insufficiency in form and substance. While Erasmos MR was pending
before the Comelec En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place resulting in
Jalosjos winning the elections and was proclaimed on May 13, 2010.
In June 2, 2010, the CA rendered judgment in the voters exclusion case before
it holding that the lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos since he was
qualified under the Constitution and RA 8189. Erasmo filed a petition for
review of the CA decision before the SC. On the other hand, Comelec en banc
granted the MR of Erasmo and declared Jalosjos ineligible as he did not satisfy
the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor in
Tampilisan, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence form that
place to Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Constitution vests in the Comelec the power to decide all questions
affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
HR and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests
solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the HR.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the
Comelec ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a
congressional candidates following the election divests Comelec of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
proclaimed Representative in favor of HRET.

QUO WARRANTO
A petition for Quo Warranto refers to questions of disloyalty or ineligibility of
the winning candidate. It has the effect of disqualifying a candidate to hold
office to which he is elected. Its primordial objective is to prevent an elective
official from assuming office grounded on ineligibility. (Sec. 253 OEC)
NATURE OF PROCEEDING it is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible
person from office, but not to install the protestant in his place.
WHO CAN FILE any voter.
PERIOD TO FILE - within 10 days from proclamation
Republic v. dela Rosa 232 SCRA 785, a QW assailing the public officials title
and seeking to prevent him from holding office for alienage is not covered by
the 10-days period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the OEC.
Penera vs. Comelec 599 SCRA 609, is the well-established principle that the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In
this case, the rules on succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code shall apply which states that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office
of the Mayor, the Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the mayor. A permanent
vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily
resigned, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions
of his office.
(Virgnio Villamor vs. Comelec & Amytis de Dios-Batao 496 SCRA 334) As
a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning
candidate for the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or
a petition for QW. The filing of an EP or a petition for QW precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the

abandonment of one earlier filed, thus, depriving the Comelec of the authority
to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation. The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired
jurisdiction of an EP or a petition for QW, all questions relative thereto will
have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceedings. This
procedure is to prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
Basarte vs. Comelec 523 SCRA 76 The prevailing rule that as long as the
returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the BOC
cannot look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the
casting or the counting of the votes as it presupposes that the returns appear to
be authentic and duly accomplished on their face. This principle does not
apply in cases like the one at bar where there is a prima facie showing that the
return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the assailed return.
JURSIDCITON
WARRANTO

OVER

ELECTION

PROTESTS

AND

QUO

1) SUPREME COURT sitting en banc as Presidential Electoral Tribunal as


sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of
Pres. and VP. Protest to be filed 30 days from proclamation. Not subject to
judicial review (1987 Constitution). Joke on Supreme Court body.
2) SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL for members of senate as sole
judge over all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its
own members. Filed within 15 days from date of proclamation. Not subject to
judicial review except on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (1987 Constitution)
3) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL for
members of HR to be filed within 10 days from proclamation.
Composition - Each electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine members, three
of whom shall be justices of the SC to be designated by the CJ and the
remaining 6 members of the senate or HR, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of their proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system,. Senior
justice shall be chairman (Art. VI, Sec. 17, 1987 Constitution) .

4) COMELEC for regional, provincial and city officials filed in 10 days.


Subject to judicial review within 30 days from date of receipt of decision by
aggrieved party.
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) 1987 Constitution, Comelec shall Exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective, regional, provincial and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by courts of limited jurisdictions. Decisions, final order, or rulings of
the Commission, on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory and not appealable.
Mendoza v. Comelec 616 SCRA 443 There is a difference in the result of the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Comelec over election contests. The difference
lies in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case
brought before the Comelec. When a decision of a trial court is brought before
the Comelec for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the
appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the
banc where the majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without
the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed.
Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is
brought before the Comelec is an original protest involving the original
jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first
decided by the division, which process is continued in the banc if there is a
motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is
reach in the banc, the protest, which is an original, shall be dismissed.
There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.
Hence, if no decision is reached after the case is reheard, there are two different
remedies available to the Comelec, to wit (1) dismiss the action or proceeding,
if the case was originally commenced in the Comelec; or (2) consider as
affirmed the judgment or order appealed from, in appealed cases. This rule
adheres to the constitutional provision that the Comelec must decide by a
majority of all its members.

Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690 (1995) and in Carlos v. Angeles 346
SCRA 571 (2000), Comelec is vested with the power to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
consistent with Section 50 of BP 881 and Article 2(1) of the Constitution. It was
also declared that both the SC and Comelec has concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus over decision of trial courts of
general jurisdiction (RTC) in election cases involving elective municipal
officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. (Art. VIII 5(1) 1987 Constitution, Rule 65, Sec. 1)
Section 7, Article IX-A and Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The
Comelec in the exercise of its QJ functions to transact business may sit
en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate rules and
procedures in order to expedite the disposition of elections cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies and summon parties to a
controversy pending before it.

The authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamations


controversies is vested with a division and the Comelec sitting en banc does not
have the authority over it in the first instance. The Comelec en banc can
exercise jurisdiction only on Motions for Reconsideration of the resolution
or decision of the Comelec in division as a requirement for the filing of a
petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party with the SC within 30 days
from receipt of a copy thereof (Sec. 3 Art. IX-C).
Sec. 2 Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5)
days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends
the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling and
would in effect, suspend the running of the period to elevate the matter to the
SC (Sec.4).
5) REGIONAL TRIAL COURT exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the election, qualifications and returns for municipal officials. Protest
to be filed 10 days from date of proclamation. Subject to appeal with Comelec
within five (5) days from receipt of decision. Decisions of the Comeledc en
banc on contest on appeal involving municipal and barangay officials are final
and executory except on grounds of grave abuse of discretion within 30 days.

6) MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT exclusive jurisdiction over all contests


relating to the election, returns and qualifications for barangay officials. Protest
to be filed within 10 days from proclamation. Appeal to the Comelec within 5
days from receipt of the decision.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342/Pecson v. Comelec 575 SCRA 634
decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a
judicial evaluation of the ballots and a full blown adversarial proceedings.
Should at least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board
of canvassers. This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty
circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested
elective office, of the case.
Mananzala vs. Comelec and Julie Monton 523 SCRA 31. - Decisions, final
orders or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and not appealable;
All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
A decision of the RTC was raised on appeal which was heard by the 2 nd division
which reversed the decision of the RTC. In his MR petitioner argues that the
MR filed with the former 2nd division has thrown the whole case wide open
for review as in a trial de novo in a criminal case yet Comelec en banc
failed to conduct a thorough review of the contested ballots. Election cases
cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where, upon appeal from
a conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for review and the
appellate court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings.
Coquilla vs. Comelec, et. al. G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, the SC resolved
the issue on whether the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the
Comelec was suspended by the filing of a motion for reconsideration by
petitioner. Private respondent in this case contends that the petition should be
dismissed because it was filed late considering that the Comelec en banc denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration for being pro-forma and conformably
with Sec. 4 of Rule 19 of the CRP, the said motion did not suspend the running
of the 30-day period for the filing of the petition for certiorari under Sec. 7 Art.
IX-A of the Constitution.

The Comelec en banc ruled that the motion for reconsideration was pro-forma
on the ground that the motion was a mere rehash of petitioners averments
contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum, neither were new matters
raised that would sufficiently warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the
Second Division.
The SC ruled however that the mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration
of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a
motion pro-forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would not be a
reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.
In explaining the purpose/objective of a motion for reconsideration , the
SC referred to its decision in Guerra Enterprises Company Inc., v. CFI of Lanao
del Sur 32 SCRA 314 (1970), where it held that the ends sought to be achieved
in the filing of a motion for reconsideration is precisely to convince the court
that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence,
and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed
upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues,
the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party
would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial.
The SC further enumerated cases where a motion for reconsideration was
held to be pro forma:
it was a second motion for reconsideration;
it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings
and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence;
it failed to substantiate the alleged errors;
it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law
or the adverse party was not given due notice thereof.
Under Rule 13, (1) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a Motion for
Reconsideration of an En Banc Resolution is a prohibited pleading, except
in election offense cases (Sec. 261 of the OEC).

Angelia v. Comelec 332 SCRA 757, the SC addressed the issue on whether a
party can go to the SC via a Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court during the pendency of the MR filed with the Comelec en banc. Angelia
filed before the SC a Petition for Certiorari to set aside the resolution of the
Comelec en banc annulling his proclamation alleging that he was not given due
notice and hearing. Without waiting for the resolution on his motion,
Angelia filed the instant petition on the sole assignment of error that Comelec
violated his constitutional right to due process. Comelec raised that the petition
should be dismissed for being premature considering that the MR of petitioner
was still pending with the Comelec en banc and that he should have first
withdrawn the MR before raising the said resolution with the SC.
SC held that petitioner acted correctly in filing the petition because the
resolution of the Comelec en banc is not subject to reconsideration, and
therefore, any party who disagrees with it had only one recourse, that was to file
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
filing of the petition would in effect constitute as an abandonment of his MR
with the Comelec.
What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of
the Comelec that may be reviewable by the SC on Certiorari? The SC in
Garces v. Court of Appeals 259 SCRA 99 (1996) and Filipinas Engineering &
Machine Shop v. Ferrer 135 SCRA 25 (1985), the interpreted the term final
orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec reviewable by the SC on certiorari
as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the
Comelec and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial powers.
CERTIFICATE OF FORUM SHOPPING
The SC in Loyola v. CA 245 SCRA 477 (1995) and Lomarong v. Dubguban
269 SCRA 624 (1997), it was ruled that the SC Circular requiring that any
complaint, petition or other initiatory pleading must contain a non-forum
certification applies to election cases. The requirement is mandatory, not
jurisdictional, non-compliance therewith may warrant the dismissal of the
election case.
PAYMENT OF APPEAL/FILING FEES

Pacanan, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 597 SCRA 189


Aguilar v. Comelec 591 SCRA 491 - Petitioner Pacanan, Jr. and private
respondent Langi Sr., were candidates for mayor in the municipality of
Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was proclaimed
having garnered a total of 3,069 votes against private respondents 3,066 votes.
On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest with the
RTC which rendered a Decision on January 7, 2008 RTC declaring private
respondent as winner with a plurality of 6 votes. 3 days after or on January 10,
2008 petitioner filed a notice of appeal and paid 3K appeal fee before the RTC
and also appealed the RTC decision to the Comelec. Out of the 3K appeal fee
required under Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, petitioner
only paid 1K plus 200 to cover the legal research/bailiff fees. On March 17,
2008 Comelec 1st division issued on Order dismissing the appeal on the ground
that petitioner failed to pay the correct appeal fee within the 5-days
reglementary period which is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal under
Section 9(a), Rule 22 of the CRP. On March 28, 2008 petitioner filed a MR
with the Comelec En Banc which denied the resolution declaring that the appeal
was not perfected on time for non-payment of the complete amount of appeal
and for late payment as well, hence, did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.
Before the SC is a petition for Certiorari raising that 1) Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in holding that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time; 2) In failing to
consider, that assuming that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, the
alleged non-payment is not in anyway attributable to petitioner; 3) that
assuming the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, there are highly justifiable
and compelling reasons to resolve the subject case on the merit in the interest of
justice and public interest.
The SC noted that two (2) different tribunals earlier require the payment
of two different appeal fees for the perfection of the appeals of election cases.
Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the CRP ( Appeals form decisions of Courts in
election Protest Cases), mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed with
5-days after the promulgation of the decision. On the other hand, Section 3 & 4
Rule 40 of the CRP amended the amount of the appeal fees to 3.2K which
should be paid with the cash division of the Comelec.

On the other hand, Section 8 & 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15 SC


(Rules of procedure in Election Contests before the Court Involving
Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials effective May 15, 2007) also
provide the procedure of instituting an appeal and the required appeal fees to be
paid for the appeal to be given due course.
This requirement in the payment of appeal fees had caused much
confusion, which the Comelec addressed through the issuance of Comelec Res.
No. 8486 on July 15, 2008. The salient feature of the said resolution provide
that the appeal to the Comelec of the trial courts decision in election
contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the
filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the 1K appeal fee to the court
that rendered the decision within the 5-day reglementary period. The nonpayment or the insufficient payment of the addition appeal fee of 3.2K to the
Comelec Cash Division in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the CRP, as
amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in
outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.
Comelec 1st division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing the appeal taking notice that the notice of appeal and the 1K appeal
fee were, respectively filed and paid with the MTC on April 21, 2008 which
date the appeal was perfected. Comelec Res. 8486 clarifying the rule on the
payment of appeal fees was issued only on July 15, 2008, or almost 3-months
after the appeal was perfected. Yet on July 31, 2008 or barely two weeks after
the issuance of Comelec Res. 8486, the Comelec 1 st division dismissed the
appeal for non-payment of the 3.2K appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory
resolution on appeal fees, the appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by
Comelec Res. No. 8486. Fairness and prudence dictate the 1st division should
have first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee in accordance with
the clarificatory resolution. Instead it hastily dismissed the appeal on the
strength of the clarificatory resolution which had taken effect only a few days
earlier. (This unseemly haste is an invitation to outrage.) Court further
stressed the liberal construction policy.
Gomez-Castillo v. Comelec 621 SCRA 499 The period of appeal and the
perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for

they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the stability
of our judicial system. The short period of 5-days as the period to appeal
recognizes the essentiality of time in election protests, in order that the will of
the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible so that the winning candidate is
not deprived of the right to assume office, and so that any doubt that can cloud
the incumbent of the truly deserving winning candidate is quickly removed.
Loyola v. Comelec 337 SCRA 134 (1997), the Court stressed that there is no
longer any excuse for shortcoming in the payment of filing fees. The Court
held that in the case at bar any claim of good faith, excusable negligence or
mistake in any failure to pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases
which may be filed after the promulgation of this decision is no longer
acceptable (March 25, 1977). The Loyola doctrine was reiterated in the
subsequent cases of Miranda v. Castillo 274 SCRA 503, Soller v. Comelec 339
SCRA 684 hold that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees and errors in the payment of the filing fee
is no longer allowed.

EXECUTIONS PENDING APPEAL


Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Luis Bautista et. al. 678 SCRA 267
(2012)
Executions Pending Appeal - There is no reason to dispute the Comelecs
authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact that
the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under Section 2, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an
appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron 424
SCRA 26 (2004), the Court stressed the import of the provision vis--vis
election cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be
executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those
rendered by the Comelec whether in the exercise of its original or appellate
jurisdiction.

Saludaga vs. Comelec 617 SCRA 601 The discretion to allow execution
pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the assailed
decision, order or resolution, or the Comelec en banc, as the case may be not
to the presiding Commissioner. A writ of execution pending resolution of the
MR of a decision of the division is not granted as a matter of right such that its
issuance becomes a ministerial duty that may be dispensed even just by the
Presiding Commission.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342 The relevant rule provides that a motion for
execution pending appeal filed by the prevailing party shall contain a 3-day
notice to the adverse party and execution pending appeal shall not issue without
prior notice and hearing. The purpose of these requirements is to avoid
surprises that may sprung upon the adverse party who must be given time to
study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court.
Where a party had the opportunity to be heard, then the purpose has been served
and the requirement substantially complied with. In this case, even the Comelec
admitted that respondent was heard and afforded his day in court; hence, it
should not have annulled the RTC special order on said ground.
San Miguel vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 424 The law provides that the court
may issue execution pending appeal. Evident from the usage of the word
may, the language of the subject provision denotes that it is merely directory,
not mandatory, for the trial court to issue the special order before the expiration
of the period to appeal. The trial court may still thereafter resolve a motion for
execution pending appeal, provided: (i) the motion is filed within the 5-day
reglementary period; and (ii) the special order is issued prior to the transmittal
of the records of the Comelec.
Malaluan v. Comelec 254 SCRA 397, this was the first case where a judge,
acting without a precedent, granted the motion for execution of its decision in
an election protest case, pending appeal. It was ruled that Sec. 2 Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which allowed the RTC to order execution pending appeal upon
good reasons stated in a special order, may be made to apply by analogy or
suppletorily to election contest decided by it. The posting of the supersedeas
bond was considered good reasons by the judge.
Camlian v. Comelec 271 SCRA, executions pending appeal must be strictly
construed against the movant as it is an exception to the general rule on
execution of judgments.

Ramas v. Comelec 286 SCRA 189, what may constitute good reasons for
execution pending appeal
The public interest involved or the will of the electorate
The shortness of the remaining period of the term of the contested office
The length of time that the election contest has been pending.
The filing of a bond alone does not constitute good reasons. Nevertheless,
the trial court may require the filing of a bond as condition for the issuance of
the corresponding writ of execution to answer for the payment of damages
which the aggrieved party may suffer by reason of the execution pending
appeal.
Fernando U. Batul v. Lucilo Bayron, et. al. 424 SCRA 26, execution pending
appeal in the discretion of the courts applies suppletorily in election cases
including those involving city and provincial officials to obviate a hollow
victory for the duly elected candidate as determined either by the Court or by
Comelec. The Comelec resolution granting execution pending appeal (by virtue
of its original exclusive jurisdiction over all contest relating to the E, R and Q of
provincial and city officials) was raised before the SC arguing that Sec. 2 Rule
39 cannot be applied and the only ground that will validly sustain execution of a
decision by a Comelec division pending reconsideration is when the MR is not
pro forma.
Case of Ramas did not declare that such remedy is exclusive only to election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Sec. 1 of Rule 41
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure expressly provides that pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a
suppletory character.
Navarosa v. Comelec 411 SCRA, the RTC in an election protest case granted
execution pending appeal by Esto after finding that Esto won in the said
election. In the same order the judge allowed protestee Navaroza to stay the
execution of the decision pending appeal by filing a supersedeas bond in double
the amount posted by the protestant.. A Petition for Ceriorari was filed by Esto
with the Comelec where the Comelec 2nd division affirmed the trial courts order
granting execution pending appeal and nullified the stay of the execution. The

Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion as it is for Comelec in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition mandamus and injunction over all contest involving elective
municipal officials decided by the trial court of general jurisdiction elevate on
appeal, and NOT the trial court, that may order the stay or restrain the
immediate execution of the decision pending appeal granted by the trail court of
general jurisdiction in an election contest.
Except when the trial court reversed itself in a MR of its order granting
immediate execution, it cannot later on stay or restrain the execution thereof in
the guise of allowing the losing party to file a supersedeas bond. The issue
before the trial court where a motion for execution pending appeal is filed is to
determine whether or not there are good reasons to justify the immediate
execution pending appeal. The issue is not whether there are good reasons to
stay the immediate execution of the decision pending appeal.
LIM VS. COMELEC ET. AL. G.R. NO. 171952 March 08, 2007; Torres vs.
Abundo, Sr. 512 SCRA 556; - Before granting a motion for execution pending
appeal in election cases, the SC laid down the following requisites
(1) there must be motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party
(2) there must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal
(3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.
Good reasons (Fermo v. Comelec)
1) public interest involved or will of the electorate
2) shortness of the remaining term of the contested office
3) length of time that the election contest has been pending
Istarul vs. Comelec 491 SCRA 300 (2006) the length of time that the
election protest has been pending, thus, leaving petitioner only 21 months as the
remaining portion of the term to serve as mayor, does not constitute good
reasons to justify execution pending appeal. Referring to Fermo, the SC held
that shortness of term: alone and by itself cannot justify premature execution.
It must be manifest in the decision sought to be executed that the defeat of the
protestee and the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
CAN DAMAGES BE AWARDED IN ELECTION PROTEST CASES

Malaluan vs. Comelec, the Court ruled that damages cannot be granted in an
election protest case ratiocinating that the provision of law allowing damages
under specific circumstances, more particularly compensatory and actual
damages is provided under Article 2176 of the Civil Code which is appropriate
only in breaches of obligations in contracts and QC and on the occasion of
crimes and QD where the defendant may be held liable for damages the
proximate cause of which is the act or omission complained of.
Therefore, the monetary claim of a party in an election case must necessarily be
anchored in contract, QC, or a tortiuos act or omission of a crime in order to
effectively recover actual or compensatory damages. In the absence of any or
all of these, the claimant must be able to point out a specific provision of law
authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party.
The bonds or cash deposits required by the Comelec Rules of Procedure
are in the nature of filing fees not damages
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES IN AN ELECTION PROTEST CASE
Fernando Poe v. Arroyo March 29, 2005, the Court resolved the issue on
whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who die during
the pendency of the latters protest case.
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of
the PET Rules which provides only the registered candidate for Pres. or VP of
the Philippines who received the 2nd and 3rd highest number of votes may
contest the election of the P and VP, as the case may be, by filing a verified
petition with the Clerk of the PET within 30 days after the proclamation of the
winner.
The Court made reference in its ruling in Vda de Mesa v. Mencias where it
rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contest where the
protestant dies during the pendency of the protest on the grounds that the heirs
are not real parties in interest and that a public office is personal to the public
officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. The Court
pursuant to Rule 3, Section 15 of the rules of Court, however, allowed
substitution and intervention upon the death of the protestee but by a real party

in interest, one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment and entitled
to avail of the suit. In the Mencias and Lumogdnag v. Javier cases, the Court
permitted substitution by the VM since the VM is the real party in interest
considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the VM
succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected
cannot assume office.
The Court further held, that nobility of intentions is not the point in reference in
determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest case.

PROSECUTION OF ELECTION CASES


Article IX-C Section 2(6) of the Constitution vests in the Comelec the power
and function to investigate and where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses and malpractices. This prosecutorial power of the Comelec is reflected
in Section 265 of BP 881. It is well settled that the finding of probable cause in
the prosecution of election offenses rests in the Comelecs sound discretion.
(Garcia v. Comelec 611 SCRA 55 Jan. 2010)
Comelec v. Noynay, July 9, 1998, the Comelec resolved to file an Information
for violation of Section 261(i) of the OEC against certain public school officials
for having engaged in partisan political activities which was filed by its
Regional Director with Branch 23 of RTC of Allen Northern Samar presided by
Judge Tomas B. Noynay. The judge ordered the records of the cases to be
withdrawn and directed the Comelec to file the cases with the MTC on the
ground that pursuant to Section 32 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691, the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each
of the cases does not exceed 6 years imprisonment. The SC ruled that RA 7691
did not divest the RTC of jurisdiction over election offenses which are
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding 6 years. The opening sentence
of Section 32, provides that the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, MTC and MCTC does not cover those criminal cases which by
specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC and
of the SB, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefore.
Comelec vs. Espanol 417 SCRA 554, it was ruled that the Comelec, thru its
duly authorized legal officers, under Section 265 of the OEC, has the exclusive

power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable


under the OEC and to prosecute the same. The acts of these deputies within the
lawful scope of their delegated authority are the acts of the Comelec.
Pp. v. Inting July 25, 1990, Comelec is given exclusive authority to investigate
and conduct preliminary investigations relative to commission of election
offenses and prosecute the same. A preliminary investigation conducted by the
Provincial Election Supervisor involving an election offense does not have to be
coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor before the RTC may take cognizance
of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exist to issue a
warrant of arrest. If the Provincial Prosecutor performs any role at all as
regards the prosecution of an election case, it is by delegation or that he was
deputized by the Comelec.
Faelnar v. People 331 SCRA 429, (a) where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial
or City Prosecutor exercises the power to conduct preliminary investigation of
election offense cases and after the investigation submits its recommendation to
the Comelec, the issue of probable cause is already resolved. The proper
remedy to question the said resolution is to file an appeal with the
COMELEC and the ruling of the Comelec on the appeal would be
immediately final and executory.
(b) If the preliminary investigation of the complaint for an election offence is
conducted by the Comelec, the investigation officer prepares its
recommendation to the Law Department which department in turn makes its
recommendation to the Comelec en banc on whether there is probable cause to
prosecute. It is the Comelec en banc which determines the existence of
probable cause. The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a Motion
for Reconsideration of such resolution. This effectively allows for a review of
the original resolution, in the same manner that the Comelec on appeal, or motu
propio, may review the resolution of the State prosecutor, or Provincial or city
fiscal. (Take note that since this is an election offense a Motion for
Reconsideration of an En Banc resolution is allowed.)
Herman Tiu Laurel vs. RTC Judge of Manila Br. 10 and Comelec, the SC
upheld the power of Comelec to prosecute cases of violations of election laws
and further explained that there are two (2) ways through which a complaint
for election offenses may be initiated.

(1) it may be filed by the Comelec motu propio or


(2) it may be filed via written complaint by any citizen of the Philippines,
candidate, registered political party, coalition of political parties or
organizations under the party-list system or any accredited citizen arms of the
commission.
Motu propio complaints may be signed by the Chairman of the Comelec
and need not be verified. But those complaints filed by parties other than the
Comelec must be verified and supported by affidavits and other evidence.
The complaint shall be filed with the Comelec Law Department or with
the offices of the EO, PES or RED, or the State Prosecutors, provincial or city
prosecutors. Whether initiated motu propio or filed with the Comelec by any
party, the complaint shall be referred to the Comelec Law Department for
investigation. Upon the direction of the Chairman, the PI may be delegated to
any lawyer of the Department, any RED or PES, or any Comelec lawyer.
Comelec v. Silva Feb. 10, 1998, the SC settled the issue as to whether the Chief
State Prosecutor, who was designated by the Comelec to prosecute election
cases, has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of
dismissal of the RTC. It was held that the authority belongs to the Comelec and
not the prosecutor as the latter derive its authority from the Comelec and not
from their offices. Propriety dictates, that if the prosecutor believes, after the
conduct of the PI, that no probable cause warrants the prosecution of the
accused who have allegedly violated Sec. 27 of RA 6646 (tampering of
certificate of canvass), the matter would have been discussed with the Comelec
and if the latter disagrees, seek permission to withdraw from the case.
Dino vs. Olivares 607 SCRA 251 (2009). The SC held that being mere
deputies or agents of the Comelec (with continuing authority), provincial or city
prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and NOT contrary
to or in derogation of its resolutions, directives or orders in relation to election
cases that such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute. They
must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.
Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the Comelec, either
expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is
necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good,

or where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the
Comelec.
When the Comelec en banc directed the City Prosecutor of Paranaque to
transmit the entire records of the election offense case, it had the effect of
SUSPENDING THE AUTHORITY of the City Prosecutor. Hence, the filing of
the amended information and the amended information themselves, is declared
void and of no effect.
Kilosbayan vs. Comelec 280 SCRA 892, Kilosbayan filed a letter-complaint
with the Comelec against incumbent officials running for public elective office
for violation of Sec. 261 of the OEC alleging illegal disbursement of public
funds and submitting as evidence to support the complaint, published writings
in newspapers without any additional evidence to support the newspaper articles
on the argument that it was the Comelecs constitutional duty to prosecute
election offenses upon any information of alleged commission of election
offenses. The Comelec dismissed the complaint there being on probable cause
found. The SC rued that it is not the duty of the Comelec to search for
evidence to prove an election complaint filed before it. The task of Comelec
as investigator and prosecutor is not the physical searching and gathering
of proof in support of the alleged commission of an election offense. The
complainant still has the burden to prove his complaint.