Didipio

Police Power Eminent Domain

In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign
companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or
mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994,
Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The
FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N.
Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its
implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is
unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep.
Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set
their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which
they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private purpose
in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private
property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private
property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a
taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state
may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the
adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential
for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded
that to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government
to regulate by purchase.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain.
They are;
(1)
the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2)
the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3)
the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4)
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking
involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just
compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to
the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a
consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of
the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

Quezon city vs ericta

Police Power Not Validly Exercised
Quezon
City
enacted
an
ordinance
entitled
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE
AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR
BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law
basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent
City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is
no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.

Dela cruz vs paras

Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail
the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and
Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said
ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they
employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge
Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due
hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938
which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT
WITHIN
THEIR
RESPECTIVETERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the
prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare.
De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,
prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the
pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to
Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then
regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass
the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such
a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under
the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too
wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant
to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not
prohibit the business of cabarets.

Banco espanol vs palanca

1.
2.
3.
4.

Judicial Due Process Requisites

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land
as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is
worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make
his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios
property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died.
Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about
their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The
lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and
that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco
petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced
on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of
the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio
never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for
judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;
There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and decide the matter before it.
Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or
over the property subject of the proceedings.
The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

Marcos
Due Process
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious
transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the
Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J
Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No decision was reached by the
division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas innocence.
Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores
and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be
given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request,
Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with
J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special
order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to
the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores
manifestation grantedthat a majority has already decided on Imeldas favor. The
SB en banc ruled against Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no
strong showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was
deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores
manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan
are fatal to the validity of its decision convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had
already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of
unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner
had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices
in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different
view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original opinion
of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right
to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del
Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled
meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the
opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the
opinion
of Justice Amores
for
before
it
could
be
given,
PresidingJustice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

Delgado vs ca
Due Process
Delgado together with 3 others were charged for estafa causing
the frustration of one medical student. Delgado was assisted by one Atty.
Yco. The said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial and one
time he failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sick. No
medical certificate was furnished. The court was not impressed with such
actuation and had considered the same as Delgados waiver of her right to
trial. The lower court convicted her and the others. She appealed before
the CA and the CA sustained the lower courts rule. Delgado later found out
that Yco is not a member of the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Delgado. An accused person is entitled to
be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her
before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer,
there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be
inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.

consulta
Due Process
Consulta is charged for stealing a gold necklace worth 3.5k owned by a
certain Silvestre. He was convicted by the lower court. Consulta raised
before the CA the issue that he was not properly arraigned and that he was
represented by a non lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Consultas claim of being misrepresented cannot
be given due course. He was assisted by two lawyers during the
proceeding. In the earlier part, he was assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes
who seemed not to be a lawyer. Granting that she indeed is not a lawyer,
her withdrawal from the case in the earlier part of the case has cured the
defect as he was subsequently assisted by a lawyer coming from the PAO.

People vs opida
Mortera
FACTS: This is an appeal from the January 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in criminal
case which found accused Benancio Mortera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder for the killing of one Robelyn Rojas.
Prosecution witness Ramil Gregorio testified that one afternoon, he together with other
men were drinking tuba. They have just started drinking when Benancio Mortera, Jr.
arrived. He wanted to hit Alberto Rojas with a Nescafe glass. Alberto Rojas ran away.
Mortera said, "Sayang." He listened while the group of Ramil Gregorio were singing
accompanied by a guitar. Jomer Diaz, brother-in-law of Alberto Diaz, arrived. Mortera
said, "Here comes another Rojas." Gregorio and his companions told Jomer Diaz to run
away. Mortera hurled a stone at Diaz but the latter was not hit. Mortera left but he said
that he will return. After a few minutes, Mortera came back. When Jomer Diaz ran,
Robelyn Rojas, brother of Alberto Rojas went to Jomer. Mortera met Robelyn at a
distance of about seven meters from the place where the group were drinking. Mortera
and Robelyn discussed with each other and later shook hands. Robelyn turned his face
and Mortera suddenly stabbed Robelyn Rojas at the back. After stabbing Robelyn,
Mortera ran away. Robelyn Rojas tried to chase Mortera but he was not able to catch up
but he fell down mortally wounded. He was brought to the hospital by his brother but he
was pronounced DOA at the hospital. Jovel Veales who was drinking together with
Ramil Gregorio and others, corroborated Ramil Gregorio's testimony.
Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned, during the trial, he
admitted having stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed
self-defense. By his account he passed by a corner and saw a group of people
drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veales and Tonying. Upon seeing him,
Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto Rojas. When the accused was about
to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law of
Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three
men got angry. After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for
painting), causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine position, Tonying
attempted to hit him again. It was at that point that he was able to get hold of his knife
and thrust it forward and hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He then
immediately fled.
On January 23, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder.
In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court stated that it was not worthy of belief
as it was belied by the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The accused appealed to the CA raising the issues of denial of due process of law and
his right to an impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon,

was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his
"prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense.
In its decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the civil
liabilities. The CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the standard of "cold
neutrality" required of a magistrate and added that the questions he propounded were
"substantially clarificatory."
Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before the SC.
ISSUE: WON the accused were denied of his right to have an impartial trial.
HELD: As correctly pointed out by the CA, although the trial judge might have made
improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due
process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it
cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality. Not only did the accused
mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim otherwise during
trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his
intended defense. The invocation of Opida did not persuade the SC. In Opida, SC did
not fail to notice the "malicious," "sadistic" and "adversarial" manner of questioning by
the trial judge of the accused therein, including their defense witness. In Opida, the
accused never admitted the commission of the crime, and so the burden of proof
remained with the prosecution.
Therefore, SC affirmed the ruling of the lower courts.

Noryn tan

Remedial Law Summary Procedure Warrant of Arrest Notice to the Accused

Legal Ethics Judicial Ethics Abuse of Authority
In 2006, a criminal case was filed against Noryn Tan for estafa in the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio (Branch 4). Arraignment was set to fall on October 10, 2006. Tan was
not able to appear in court hence the presiding judge, Judge Clarita Tabin, issued a
warrant of arrest against Tan. Tan was arrested in Quezon City, her place of residence.
Tan posted bail. Later on, she filed an administrative case against Judge Tabin on the
ground of denial of due process. Tan alleged that she never received notice about the
said arraignment.
In her comment, Judge Tabin said that the notice was coursed through the Chief of
Police of Quezon City and that when two months lapsed after the issuance of said
notice and no return was made by the QC police office, Judge Tabin presumed that Tan
received the notice in the regular course of mail and that there was presumption of
regularity in favor of the police officers. Thus, she issued the arrest warrant against Tan
but such issuance was made in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the arrest warrant was proper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court clarified whenever a criminal case falls under the
Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order the arrest of the
accused, unless the accused fails to appear whenever required. In this case, the estafa
case falls under the Rules on Summary procedure. Judge Tabin is not justified in
issuing the warrant of arrest and her defense of good faith is not tenable.
The judge herself admitted that there was no proof that Tan received the notice for her
to appear in court. She merely relied on the presumption of regularity which should not
be used as an excuse in violating the right of the accused to due process. So basic and
fundamental is a persons right to liberty that it should not be taken lightly or brushed
aside with the presumption that the police through which the notice had been sent,
actually served the same on Tan whose address was not even specified.
Judge Tabin failed to uphold the rules. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes
it to her office to know and simply apply it. The Supreme Court held that a judge
commits grave abuse of authority when she hastily issues a warrant of arrest against
the accused in violation of the summary procedure rule that the accused should first be
notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits
and countervailing evidence. Judge Tabin was found guilty of abuse of authority and
was fined P10,000.00.

Lantion
Due Process
Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to
wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted
in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty
requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a
copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the
USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is
still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation
hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec
and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.
HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against
Jimenez refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones property or
property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us,
involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life
itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can
be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and
beyond recompense.

Dbp

Due Process Opportunity to be Heard

In 1968 and 1969, Continental Cement Corp. entered into a loan contract with DBP. In
1979, CCC entered into a MOA with DBP restructuring its loans. In November 1985,
DBP filed for a foreclosure against the assets of CCC. In December 1985, CCC
petitioned before RTC Bulacan to enjoin DBP and the Sheriff of Bulacan from
foreclosing its assets and praying further that its loan terms with DBP
berestructured and that the interest rate terms in the promissory note be declared null
and void. A TRO was issued in favor of CCC. In December 1986, PP 502 was issued
transferring nonperforming assets of the govt to Asset Privatization Trust. One of those
transferred was CCCs account. DBP filed a petition to dismiss the pending case as it
CCC could no longer deal with DBP but rather with APT. The trial court denied the
petition and has instead allowed APT to join the proceeding pursuant to PP 502 as
amended. To determine CCCs indebtedness to DBP/APT, the RTC designated JC Laya
(former BSP Gov and DepEd Sec) as chair of a fact finding commission. He was given
60 days to come up with a report and he was given a lot of extensions thereafter. After
several months, he was able to come up with the report. The parties then filed their
reactions to the report and during the trial they were given a chance to cross examine
each others witnesses. After cross examination, they were ordered to submit their
position papers as to their calculation of the amount of indebtedness.
CCCs computation is at P43.6M, the Commissioners computation is at P61.6M while
DBP/APTs calculation is at P2.6B. In June 1992, 3 of CCCs witnesses were scheduled
to be cross examined by APTs counsel as DBPs counsel had already done so. APTs
counsel was not able to do so raising the issue that he just took over the case and
needs time to prepare. The cross examination was reset to August 24-26, 1992 but
counsel for APT failed to appear due to Dengue. The other counsel, Jaime Cruz, for
DBP was likewise absent; hes also a witness. On Aug 25 , the RTC ordered that due to
the foregoing the case is deemed submitted for decision. APT filed for a motion for
reconsideration. It was denied and the RTC ruled that the indebtedness to be paid by
CCC is the calculation came up with by the Commissioner. APT appealed before the
CA averring that it was denied due process when it was not allowed to cross examine
the witnesses of CCC nor was it allowed to present further witnesses. CCC averred that
by the failure of APTs counsel to appear APT has waived such right. The CA sustained
the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not APT was denied of due process.
HELD: The SC sustained the CAs ruling. Long ingrained in jurisprudence is the
principle that there can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but did not do so. The withdrawal of APTs previous
counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek
postponement of the hearing. However, such reason necessitates a duty, nay an
obligation, on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled
th

hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsels failure to turn over the
records of the case to APT, shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover
the records of the case. Mere demands are not sufficient. Counsel should have taken
adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his client, rather than pass the blame on
the previous counsel.
The due process requirement is satisfied where the parties are given the opportunity to
submit position papers, as in this case. Both parties, CCC and DBP/APT, were given
opportunity to submit their respective position papers after the Commissioner rendered
his report. Contained in their position papers were their respective comments and
objections to the said report. Furthermore, the parties were also given the chance to
cross-examine the Commissioner and his representative. They were likewise granted
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, however, like in APTs
case, they were deemed to have waived their right, as previously discussed.
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to support any evidence he may have in support of his defense. What the law
prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a partycannot feign
denial of due process when he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.