Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
VS
DEL
ROSARIO
94
Phil
778
FACTS:
Lara
et
al
were
former
taxi
drivers
of
the
defendant.
When
the
latter
sold
some
of
his
vehicles,
the
plaintiffs
who
were
no
longer
needed
were
dismissed.
Because
the
employer
did
not
give
them
their
one
months
salary
in
lieu
of
the
notice
required
in
Art
302
of
the
Code
of
Commerce,
this
action
was
instituted.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
New
Civil
Code
took
effect
on
August
30,
1949.
HELD:
In
this
case,
the
Supreme
Court
in
an
obiter
dictum
held
that
the
New
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines
took
effect
on
August
30,
1950.
This
date
is
exactly
one
year
after
the
Official
Gazette
publishing
the
Code
was
released
for
circulation,
the
said
release
having
been
made
on
August
30,
1949.
The
plaintiffs
then
are
not
entitled
to
any
compensation,
the
New
Civil
Code
having
repealed
the
Code
of
Commerce.
PEOPLE
VS
SIMON
234
SCRA
555,
569
(1994)
FACTS:
Accused-appellant
Martin
Simon
y
Sunga
was
charges
on
November
10,
1988
with
a
violation
of
Section
4,
Article
II
of
RA
No
6425
under
an
indictment
alleging
that
on
October
22,
1988,
at
Barangay
Sto
Cristo,
Guagua,
Pampanga,
he
sold
four
tea
bags
to
a
NARCOM
poseur-buyer
in
consideration
of
P40.00,
which
tea
bags
when
subjected
to
a
laboratory
examination,
were
found
positive
for
marijuana.
On
December
4,
1989,
the
trial
court
rendered
judgment
convicting
appellant,
and
sentencing
him
to
suffer
the
penalty
of
life
imprisonment.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
Intermediate
Sentence
Law
is
applicable
to
the
case.
HELD:
Yes.
Drug
offenses
are
not
included
in
nor
has
the
appellant
committed
any
act
which
would
put
him
within
the
exceptions
to
said
law
and
the
penalty
to
be
imposed
dies
not
involve
reclusion
perpetua
to
death.
The
Intermediate
Sentence
Law
is
a
legal
and
social
measure
of
compassion,
and
should
be
liberally
interpreted
in
favor
of
the
accused.
PEOPLE
VS
GODOY
250
SCRA
676,
732
(1995)
FACTS:
Accused-appellant
Danny
Godoy
was
charged
in
two
separate
filings
before
the
Regional
Trial
Court
for
Palawan
and
Puerto
Princesa
City,
Branch
47,
with
rape
and
kidnapping
with
serious
illegal
detention
of
17-year-old
Mia
Taha.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not,
if
found
guilty,
accused-appellant
Godot
will
be
subject
to
death
penalty
imposed
by
RA
No
7659.
HELD:
Yes,
since
RA
No
7659
which
reimposed
the
death
penalty
on
certain
heinous
crimes
took
effect
on
December
31,
1993,
fifteen
days
after
its
publication
in
the
December
16,
1996
issues
of
the
Manila
Bulletin,
Philippine
Star,
Malaya,
and
Philippine
Times
Journal,
and
not
on
January
1,
1994
as
is
sometimes
misinterpreted.
GSIS
VS
COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT
301
SCRA
731,
736
FACTS:
The
case
before
the
Court
is
a
special
civil
action
of
certiorari
seeking
to
review
the
decision
of
the
Commission
on
Audit
that
affirmed
the
ruling
of
Corporate
Auditor
Mariano
C.
Gaborne
disallowing
in
the
audit
the
payment
of
death
benefits
in
the
amount
of
P43,107.19,
to
the
heirs
of
the
late
Brig.
Gen.
Arturo
T.
Asuncion,
who
died
on
November
16,
1987,
in
a
helicopter
crash,
for
the
reason
that
a
reserve
officer
like
him
of
the
Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines
was
not
at
that
time
a
compulsory
member
of
the
GSIS.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
heirs
of
Brig.
Gen.
Asuncion
should
receive
payment
of
death
benefits.
HELD:
Yes,
since
EO
No.
79
is
effective
fifteen
days
following
its
publication
in
the
Official
Gazette,
or
on
January
7,
a987.
At
that
time,
the
late
Brig.
Gen.
Asuncion
was
a
reserve
officer
who
had
rendered
a
total
of
ten
years
of
continuous
active
duty
service
commission
in
the
AFP.
Hence,
he
was
compulsorily
covered
as
a
member
of
the
GSIS
on
the
date
he
died
on
November
15,
1987,
in
line
of
duty
in
a
helicopter
crash.
Consequently,
his
heirs
are
entitled
to
payment
of
death
benefits.
TANADA
VS
TUVERA
136
SCRA
27
(1995)
FACTS:
Invoking
the
right
of
the
people
to
be
informed
on
matters
of
public
concern
as
wells
as
the
principle
that
laws
to
be
valid
and
enforceable
must
be
published
in
the
Official
Gazette,
Lorenzo
Tanada,
et.
al
petitioned
a
writ
of
mandamus
to
compel
Juan
Tuvera,
Executive
Assistant
to
the
President
et
al
to
publish
a
number
of
presidential
decrees,
letter
of
instructions
and
general
order
to
the
Official
Gazette.
Petitioners
maintain
that
since
the
subject
of
the
petition
concerns
a
public
right
and
its
object
is
to
compel
public
duty,
they
need
not
show
any
specific
interest.
Respondents
further
contend
that
publication
in
the
Official
Gazette
is
not
a
sine
qua
non
requirement
for
the
effectivity
of
the
laws
where
the
laws
themselves
provide
for
their
own
effectivity
dates.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
publication
the
Official
Gazette
is
an
indispensable
requirement
for
the
effectivity
of
PDs,
LOIs,
General
Orders,
Eos,
ets,
where
laws
themselves
provide
for
their
own
effectivity
dates.
FACTS:
Po
Lay
was
accused
of
violating
Circular
No.
20
of
the
Central
Bank
compelling
those
who
had
foreign
currency
to
sell
the
same
to
the
Central
Bank.
Po
Lay
alleged
that
as
the
circular
had
not
yet
been
published
in
the
Official
Gazette
before
he
committed
the
act,
the
circular
should
have
no
effect
on
his
act
and
that,
therefore,
he
should
be
acquitted.
ISSUE:
Is
publication
in
the
Official
Gazette
a
requirement
for
the
effectivity
of
monetary
board
circulars?
HELD:
Yes,
so
long
as
the
circulars
issued
are
meant
not
merely
to
interpret
but
to
fill
in
the
details
of
the
Central
Bank
Act.
MARBELLA-BOBIS
VS
BOBIS
336
SCRA
747,
755
(2000)
FACTS:
Respondent
contracted
a
first
marriage
with
Maria
Javier.
Without
said
marriage
having
been
annulled,
nullified
or
terminated,
the
same
respondent
contracted
a
second
marriage
with
a
petitioner
Imelda
Marbella-Bobis
and
allegedly
a
third
marriage
with
a
certain
Julia
Sally
Hernandez.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
respondent
is
guilty
of
bigamy
despite
respondents
claim
of
ignorance
of
Art
40
of
the
Family
Code.
HELD:
Yes,
ignorance
of
the
existence
of
Art
40
of
the
Family
Code
cannot
even
be
successfully
invoked
as
an
excuse.
The
contracting
of
marriage
knowing
that
the
requirements
of
the
law
have
not
been
complies
with
or
that
the
marriage
is
in
disregard
of
a
legal
impediment
is
an
act
penalized
by
the
Revised
Penal
Code.
CONSUJI
VS
CA
GR
No
137873,
April
20,
2001
FACTS:
At
around
1:30
p.m.,
November
Jose
Juego,
a
construction
worker
of
D.M.
Consunji
Inc.,
fell
14
floors
from
the
Renaissance
Tower,
Pasig
City
to
his
death.
On
May
9,
1991,
Jose
Juegos
widow,
Maria,
filed
in
the
RTC
of
Pasig
a
complaint
for
damages
against
the
deceaseds
employer.
The
employer
raised
among
other
defenses,
the
widows
prior
availment
of
the
benefits
from
the
State
Insurance
Fund.
After
trial,
the
RTS
rendered
a
decision
in
favor
of
the
widow.
On
appeal
by
D.M.
Consuji,
the
Court
of
Appeals
affirmed
the
decision
of
the
RTC
in
toto.
ISSUE:
(1)Whether
or
not
the
petition
is
held
liable
under
the
grounds
of
negligence.
(2)Whether
or
not
the
injures
employee
or
his
heirs
in
case
of
death
have
a
right
of
selection
or
choice
of
action
between
availing
themselves
of
the
workers
right
under
Workmens
Compensation
Act
and
suing
in
the
regular
courts
under
the
Civil
Code
for
higher
damages
(actual,
moral,
and
exemplary)
from
the
employers
by
virtue
of
the
negligence
or
fault
of
the
employers
or
whether
they
may
avail
themselves
cumulatively
of
both
actions.
HELD:
(1)Yes.
The
doctrine
of
res
ipsa
loquitor
(the
thing
or
transaction
speaks
for
itself)
is
peculiar
to
the
law
of
negligence
which
recognizes
that
prima
facie
negligence
may
be
established
without
direct
proof
and
furnishes
a
substitute
for
specific
proof
of
negligence.
It
has
the
following
requisites:
(1.1)the
accident
was
of
a
kind
which
does
not
ordinarily
occur
unless
someone
is
negligent;
(1.2)
the
instrumentality
or
agency
which
caused
the
injury
was
under
the
exclusive
control
of
the
person
charged
with
negligence;
and
(1.3)
the
injury
suffered
must
not
have
been
due
to
any
voluntary
action
or
contribution
on
the
part
of
the
person
injured.
All
the
requisites
for
the
application
of
the
rule
of
res
ipsa
loquitor
are
present
in
the
case
at
bar.
Petitioner
does
not
cite
any
other
evidence
to
rebut
the
inference
or
presumption
of
negligence
arising
from
the
application
of
res
ipsa
loquitor,
or
to
establish
any
defense
relating
to
the
incident.
(2)
The
claims
for
damages
sustained
by
workers
in
the
course
of
their
employment
could
only
be
filed
under
the
Workmens
Compensation
Law,
to
the
exclusion
of
all
further
claims
under
other
laws.
In
the
course
of
availing
the
remedies
provided
un
the
Workmens
Compensation
Law,
the
claimants
are
deemed
to
have
waived
their
known
right
of
the
remedies
provided
by
other
laws.
The
Court
of
Appeals,
however,
held
that
the
case
at
bar
came
under
exception
because
private
respondent
was
unaware
of
petitioners
negligence
when
she
filed
her
claim
for
death
benefits
from
the
State
Insurance
Fund.
Had
the
claimant
been
aware,
she
would
have
opted
to
avail
of
a
better
remedy
than
that
of
which
she
already
had.
ORTIGAS
&
CO
VS
CA
GR
No
126202,
December
4,
2000
FACTS:
Ortigas
&
Co
sold
to
Emilia
Hermoso
a
parcel
of
land
located
in
Greenhills
Subdivision,
San
Juan
with
several
restrictions
in
the
contract
of
sale
that
said
lot
be
used
exclusively
for
residential
purposes,
among
others,
until
December
31,
2025.
Later,
a
zoning
ordinance
was
issued
by
MMC
(now
MMDA)
reclassifying
the
area
as
commercial.
Private
respondent
(Ismael
Mathay
III)
leased
the
subject
lot
from
Hermoso
and
built
a
single
storey
building
for
Greenhills
Autohaus,
Inc.,
a
car
sales
company.
Ortigas
&
Co.
filed
a
petition
which
sought
the
demolition
of
the
constructed
car
sales
company
against
Hermoso
as
it
violated
the
terms
and
conditions
of
the
Deed
of
Sale.
Trial
court
ruled
in
favor
of
Ortigas
&
Co.
Mathay
raised
the
issue
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
from
which
he
sought
favorable
ruling.
Hence,
instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
zoning
ordinances
may
impair
contracts
entered
into
prior
to
its
effectivity.
HELD:
Yes.
The
zoning
ordinance,
as
a
valid
exercise
of
police
power
may
be
given
effect
over
any
standing
contract.
Hence,
petition
is
denied.
A
law
enacted
in
the
exercise
of
police
power
to
regulate
or
govern
certain
activities
or
transactions
could
be
given
retroactive
effect
and
may
reasonably
impair
vested
rights
or
contracts.
Police
power
legislation
is
applicable
not
only
to
future
contracts,
but
equally
to
those
already
in
existence.
Non-impairment
of
contracts
or
vested
rights
clauses
will
have
to
yield
to
the
superior
and
legitimate
exercise
by
the
State
of
police
power
to
promote
health,
morals,
peace,
education,
good
order,
safety,
and
general
welfare
of
the
people.
Moreover,
statutes
in
exercise
of
valid
police
power
must
be
read
into
every
contract.
AGUJETAS
VS
CA
261
SCRA
17
(1996),
G.R.
No.
106560
FACTS:
Criminal
charges
were
filed
against
three
board
members
of
the
provincial
board
of
canvassers
for
the
Province
of
Davao
Oriental
for
violation
of
B.P.
Blg.
881
(Omnibus
Election
Code)
and
R.A.
No.
6646
(The
Electoral
Reform
Law
of
1987),
specifically
for
the
failure
to
proclaim
a
winning
elected
candidate.
After
preliminary
investigation,
criminal
charges
against
them
were
filed
for
violation
of
2nd
paragraph
of
Sec
231
in
relation
to
Sec
262
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code.
One
of
the
defenses
offered
by
the
accused
was
that
such
crime
no
longer
exists
because
R.A.
No.
6646
and
7166
amended
the
Omnibus
Election
Code
and
that
among
those
amended
was
Section
231,
which
was
modified
by
Sec
28
of
R.A.
No.
7166
by
removing
the
specific
manner
by
which
the
proclamation
of
winning
candidates
by
the
Board
of
Canvassers
should
be
made
and
thereby,
in
effect,
repealing
the
second
paragraph
of
Sec
231
of
the
Old
Omnibus
Election
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
R.A.
No.
7166
repeals
Section
231
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code,
saying
that
winners
should
be
proclaimed
by
the
Board
of
Canvassers.
HELD:
No,
since
R.A.
No.
7166
neither
expressly
nor
impliedly
repeals
Section
231
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code.
LAGUNA
LAKE
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
VS
CA
251
SCRA
421
(1995),
G.R.
NO.
120865-71
FACTS:
Section
4(k)
of
the
charter
of
the
Laguna
Lake
Development
Authority,
R.A.
No.
4850,
the
provisions
of
P.D.
No.
813
and
Sec.
2
of
E.O.
No.
927,
specifically
provide
that
the
Laguna
Lake
Development
Authority
shall
have
exclusive
jurisdiction
to
issue
permits
for
the
use
of
all
surface
water
for
any
projects
or
activities
in
or
affecting
the
said
region,
including
navigation,
construction,
and
operation
of
fishpens,
fish
enclosures,
fish
corrals
and
the
like.
On
the
other
hand,
R.A.
No.
7160,
the
Local
Government
Code
of
1991,
has
granted
to
the
municipalities
the
exclusive
authority
to
grant
fishery
privileges
in
municipal
waters.
ISSUE:
Did
R.A.
No.
7160
repeal
the
aforementioned
laws
creating
the
Laguna
Lake
Development
Authority?
HELD:
No,
since
it
has
to
be
conceded
that
the
charter
of
the
Laguna
Lake
Development
Authority
constitutes
a
special
law.
R.A.
No.
7160,
the
Local
Government
Code
of
1991,
is
a
general
law.
It
is
basic
in
statutory
construction
that
the
enactment
of
a
later
legislation
which
is
a
general
law
cannot
be
construed
to
have
repealed
a
special
law.
It
is
a
well-settled
rule
in
this
jurisdiction
that
a
special
statute,
provided
for
a
particular
case
or
class
of
cases,
is
not
repealed
by
a
subsequent
statute,
general
in
its
terms,
provisions
and
application,
unless
the
intent
to
repeal
or
alter
is
manifest,
although
the
terms
of
the
general
law
are
broad
enough
to
include
the
cases
embraced
in
the
special
law.
Where
there
is
a
conflict
between
a
general
law
and
a
special
statue,
the
special
statute
should
prevail
since
it
evidences
the
legislative
intent
more
clearly
that
the
general
statute.
The
special
law
is
to
be
taken
as
an
exception
to
the
general
laws
in
the
absence
of
special
circumstances
forcing
a
contrary
conclusion.
This
is
because
implied
repeals
are
not
favored
and
as
much
as
possible,
effect
must
be
given
to
all
enactments
of
the
legislature.
A
special
law
cannot
be
repealed,
amended
or
altered
by
a
subsequent
general
law
by
mere
implication.
DE
AGBAYANI
VS
PNB
38
SCRA
429
FACTS:
Agbayani
obtained
a
loan
P450
from
PNB
secured
by
a
Real
Estate
Mortgage,
which
was
to
mature
5
years
later.
15
years
later,
PNB
sought
to
foreclose
the
Real
Estate
Mortgage.
Agbayani
filed
a
complaint
claiming
that
it
was
barred
by
prescription.
She
also
claims
that
she
obtained
an
injunction
against
the
sheriff.
PNB
argued
that
the
claim
has
not
yet
prescribed
if
the
period
from
the
time
of
issuance
of
E.O.
32
to
the
time
when
RA
342
was
issued
should
be
deducted;
(E0
32
was
issued
in
1945
providing
for
debt
moratorium;
RA
342
was
issued
in
1948
-
extension
of
the
debt
moratorium).
The
RA
342
was
declared
void
and
since
it
was
an
extension
of
EO
32,
EO
32
was
likewise
nullified.
Here,
RA
342
(the
debt
moratorium
law)
continued
EO
32,
suspending
the
payment
of
debts
by
war
sufferers.
However
RA
342
could
not
pass
the
test
of
validity.
PNB
claims
that
this
period
should
be
deducted
from
the
prescriptive
period
since
during
this
time
the
bank
took
no
legal
steps
for
the
recovery
of
the
loan.
As
such,
the
action
has
not
yet
prescribed.
ISSUE:
Has
the
action
prescribed?
HELD:
No.
The
general
rule
is
that
an
unconstitutional
act
because
it
suffers
from
infirmity,
cannot
be
a
source
of
legal
rights
or
duties.
When
the
courts
declare
a
law
to
be
inconsistent
with
the
Constitution,
the
former
shall
be
void
and
the
latter
shall
govern.
However,
prior
to
the
declaration
of
nullity
of
such
challenged
legislative
act
must
have
been
in
force
and
had
to
be
complied
with.
This
is
so
as
until
after
the
judiciary,
in
an
appropriate
case
declares
its
invalidity,
it
is
entitled
to
obedience
and
respect.
Such
legislative
act
was
in
operation
and
presumed
to
be
valid
in
all
respects.
It
is
now
accepted
that
prior
to
its
being
nullified,
its
existence
as
a
fact
must
be
reckoned
with.
This
is
merely
to
reflect
the
awareness
that
precisely
because
the
judiciary
is
the
governmental
organ
which
has
the
final
say
on
whether
a
legislative
act
is
valid,
a
period
of
time
may
have
elapsed
before
it
can
exercise
the
power
of
judicial
review
that
may
lead
to
a
declaration
of
nullity.
It
would
e
to
deprive
the
law
of
its
quality
of
fairness
and
justice
then,
if
there
be
no
recognition
of
what
had
transpired
prior
to
such
adjudication.
The
past
cannot
always
be
erased
by
judicial
declaration.
(OPERATIVE
FACT
DOCTRINE).
The
existence
of
a
statute
prior
to
its
being
adjudged
void
is
an
operative
fact
to
which
legal
consequences
are
attached.
During
the
8-year
period
that
EO
32
and
RA
342
were
in
force,
prescription
did
not
run.
Thus,
the
prescriptive
period
was
tolled
in
the
meantime
prior
to
such
adjudication
of
invalidity.
FLORESCA
VS
PHILEX
MINING
CORP
G.R.
No.
30642,
April
30,
1985
FACTS:
Floresca
et
al
are
the
heirs
of
the
deceased
employees
of
Philex
Mining
Corp
who,
while
working
in
its
copper
mines
underground
operations
at
Tuba,
Benguet
oon
June
28,
1967,
died
as
a
result
of
the
cave-in
that
buried
them
in
the
tunnels
of
the
mine.
Specifically,
the
complaint
alleges
that
Philex,
in
violation
of
government
rules
and
regulations,
negligently
and
deliberately
failed
to
take
the
required
precautions
for
the
protection
of
the
lives
of
its
men
working
underground.
Floresca
et
al
moved
to
claim
their
benefits
pursuant
to
the
Workmens
Compensation
Act
before
the
Workmens
Compensation
Commission.
They
also
petitioned
before
the
regular
courts
and
sue
Philex
for
additional
damages.
Philex
invoke
that
they
can
no
longer
be
sued
because
petitioners
have
already
calimed
benefits
under
WCA.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Floresca
et
al
can
claim
benefits
and
at
the
same
time
sue.
HELD:
Under
the
law,
Floresca
et
al
could
only
do
either
one.
If
they
filed
for
benefits
under
the
WCA,
then
they
will
be
estopped
from
proceedings
with
a
civil
case
before
the
regular
courts,
vice
versa.
The
Supreme
Court
however
ruled
that
Floresca
et
al
are
excused
from
this
deficiency
due
to
ignorance
of
the
fact.
Had
they
been
aware
of
such,
then
they
may
not
have
availed
of
such
a
remedy.
However,
if
in
case
they
win
in
the
lower
court
whatever
award
may
be
granted,
the
amount
given
to
them
under
the
WCA
should
be
deducted.
The
Supreme
Court
emphasized
that
if
they
go
strictly
by
the
book
in
this
case,
then
the
purpose
of
the
law
may
be
defeated.
Idolatrous
reverence
for
the
letter
of
the
law
sacrifices
the
human
being.
The
spirit
of
the
law
insures
mans
survival
and
ennobles
him.
FILOTEO
VS
SANDIGANBAYAN
263
SCRA
222
(1196),
G.R.
No.
79543
FACTS:
Petitioner
Jose
D.
Filoteo,
Jr.
was
a
police
investigator
of
the
Western
Police
District
in
Metro
Manila,
an
old
hand
at
dealing
with
suspected
criminals.
A
recipient
of
various
awards
and
commendations
attesting
to
his
competence
and
performance
as
a
police
officer,
he
could
not
therefore
imagine
that
one
day
he
would
be
sitting
on
the
other
side
of
the
investigation
table
as
the
suspected
mastermind
of
the
armed
hijacking
of
a
postal
delivery
van.
Filoteo
admitted
involvement
in
the
crime
and
pointed
to
three
other
soldiers
as
his
confederates.
On
May
30,
1982,
petitioner
executed
a
sworn
statement
in
Tagalog
before
M/Sgt.
Arsenio
C.
Carlos
and
Sgt.
Romeo
P.
Espero.
Petitioner
however
sought
later
that
his
confession
be
inadmissible,
saying
that
the
law
should
favor
him
as
an
accused.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Article
III,
Section
12
of
the
1987
Constitution
shall
be
given
retroactive
effect
and
petitioners
extrajudicial
confession
be
held
inadmissible
evidence.
HELD:
No.
While
Article
22
of
RPC
provides
that
penal
laws
shall
have
retroactive
effect
insofar
as
they
favor
the
person
guilty
of
a
felony
who
is
not
a
habitual
criminal,
what
is
being
construed
here
is
a
constitutional
provision
specifically
contained
in
the
Bill
of
Rights
which
is
obviously
not
a
penal
statute.
PEOPLE
VS
AMIGO
252
SCRA
43,
53-54
(1996),
G.R.
116719
FACTS:
Accused-Appellant
Patricio
Amigo
was
charged
and
convicted
of
murder
by
the
regional
trial
court,
Davao
City
and
was
sentenced
to
the
penalty
of
reclusion
perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
that
the
penalty
or
reclusion
perpetua
is
too
cruel
and
harsh
and
pleads
for
sympathy.
HELD:
Courts
are
not
the
forum
to
plead
for
sympathy.
The
duty
of
the
courts
is
to
apply
the
law,
disregarding
their
feeling
of
sympathy
or
pity
for
the
accused.
Dura
lex
sed
lex.
The
remedy
is
elsewhere
clemency
from
the
executive
or
an
amendment
of
the
law
by
the
legislative,
but
surely,
at
this
point,
this
Court
cannot
but
apply
the
law.