TURNER vs LORENZO SHIPPING

Respondent opposed the motion for partial summary judgment, stating that the determination of the

FACTS: The petitioners held 1,010,000 shares of stock of the respondent, a domestic corporation

unrestricted retained earnings should be made at the end of the fiscal year, and that the petitioners

engaged primarily in cargo shipping activities. In June 1999, the respondent decided to amend its

did not have a cause of action against the respondent.

articles of incorporation to remove the stockholders pre-emptive rights to newly issued shares of
stock. Feeling that the corporate move would be prejudicial to their interest as stockholders, the

RTC granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

petitioners voted against the amendment and demanded payment of their shares at the rate

Respondents Motion for Recon

of P2.276/share based on the book value of the shares, or a total of P2,298,760.00.

Petitioners Motion for Immediate Execution and Motion to Strike out MR

Petitioners and respondents havent come into terms as to the fair value of the shares. They sought

RTC granted petitioners Motion for Immediate Execution and denied petitioners MR.

for an appraisal committee pursuant to Sec. 82 of the Corporation Code to determine the fair value of
the share.

ISSUE: WON there was a cause of action when the Turners filed their complaint for the collection of
their shareholdings

On October 27, 2000, the appraisal committee reported its valuation of P2.54/share, for an aggregate
value of P2,565,400.00 for the petitioners. Petitioners demanded payment thereof plus 2% penalty

RULING: Turners appraisal right is subject to the legal condition that no payment shall be made to

from the time demand was made plus the reimbursement for the advanced appraisers prof. fee.

any dissenting stockholder unless the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings in its books to
cover such payment.

The respondent refused the petitioners demand, explaining that pursuant to the Corporation Code,
the dissenting stockholders exercising their appraisal rights could be paid only when the corporation
had unrestricted retained earnings to cover the fair value of the shares, but that it had no retained
earnings at the time of the petitioners demand, as borne out by its Financial Statements for Fiscal
Year 1999 showing a deficit of P72,973,114.00 as of December 31, 1999.

Upon respondents refusal to pay, petitioners sued them for collection and damages.

Later on, petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment when it learned respondents has
accumulated unrestricted retained earnings for the first quarter of 2002.

Before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause of action must be
in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to the
institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or
implied by law must be performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless the conduct
of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performance of
the condition.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.[27] The
essential elements of a cause of action are: (a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the
plaintiff; (b) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) an act or omission
by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the
defendant.[28] Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the
occurrence of the last element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery
of damages or other appropriate relief
It bears restating that a right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of action, while a
cause of action consists of the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. The right of
action does not arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to the action and may be taken
away by the running of the statute of limitations, through estoppel, or by other circumstances which
do not affect the cause of action. Performance or fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon which a
right of action depends must be sufficiently alleged, considering that the burden of proof to show that
a party has a right of action is upon the person initiating the suit.
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The Turners right of action arose only when petitioner had already retained earnings in the amount
of P11,975,490.00 on March 21, 2002; such right of action was inexistent on January 22, 2001 when
they filed the Complaint.

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF

DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY
FACTS: petitioners, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages
(subject complaint) against respondent "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso). They alleged that Magdaleno
Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C,
2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer
in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest
RTC dismissed the complaint finding that it failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso.
ISSUE: whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper
RULING: Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in
the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants
Petitioners allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in
the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title
and reconveyance, from granting the same.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership
and possession of property.1wphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding.

SWAGMAN HOTELS vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Sometime in 1996 and 1997, petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., through Atty.
Leonor L. Infante and Rodney David Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively, obtained
from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by three promissory notes dated 7 August
1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of
US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per annum payable every
three months.[1] In a letter dated 16 December 1998, Christian informed the petitioner corporation
that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment in the total amount of
US$150,000 plus unpaid interests in the total amount of US$13,500.
Private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59, a complaint
for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante.
The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-president, filed an Answer raising as
defenses lack of cause of action and novation of the principal obligations. According to them,
Christian had no cause of action because the three promissory notes were not yet due and
demandable. In December 1997, since the petitioner corporation was experiencing huge losses due
to the Asian financial crisis, Christian agreed (a) to waive the interest of 15% per annum, and (b)
accept payments of the principal loans in installment basis, the amount and period of which would
depend on the state of business of the petitioner corporation. Thus, the petitioner paid Christian
capital repayment in the amount of US$750 per month from January 1998 until the time the
complaint was filed in February 1999.
RTC and CA ruled that there was no novation.
ISSUE: May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of
a cause of action during the pendency of the case?
RULING: With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that when the complaint for a
sum of money and damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, no cause of action has
as yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in violation of the terms of the three
promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of action, the
private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court, and the trial court should have
therefore dismissed his complaint.
Despite its finding that the petitioner corporation did not violate the modified terms of the three
promissory notes and that the payment of the principal loans were not yet due when the complaint
was filed, the trial court did not dismiss the complaint, citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure (Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be reopened.24

According to the trial court, and sustained by the Court of Appeals, this Section allows a
complaint that does not state a cause of action to be cured by evidence presented without objection
during the trial. Thus, it ruled that even if the private respondent had no cause of action when he
filed the complaint for a sum of money and damages because none of the three promissory notes was
due yet, he could nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14
March 1997, which became due during the pendency of the case in view of the introduction of
evidence of their maturity during the trial.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence,
there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the
parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Such interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive
Page 2 of 19

manner without regard to technicalities, and that all other matters included in the case may be
determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits.[12]Section 5 thereof applies to
situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties
during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion
of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence
presented during the trial.
However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the
time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. For
example, if a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition precedent upon which the cause
of action depends, evidence showing that such condition had already been fulfilled when the
complaint was filed may be presented during the trial, and the complaint may accordingly be
amended thereafter.[13] Thus, in Roces v. Jalandoni,[14] this Court upheld the trial court in taking
cognizance of an otherwise defective complaint which was later cured by the testimony of the plaintiff
during the trial. In that case, there was in fact a cause of action and the only problem was the
insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. This ruling was reiterated in Pascua v. Court of
Appeals.
A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended
or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is
pending.[16] Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should
be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlying
reason for this rule is that a person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for
complaints which are immature.
Hence, contrary to the holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the defect of lack of
cause of action at the commencement of this suit cannot be cured by the accrual of a cause of action
during the pendency of this case arising from the alleged maturity of two of the promissory notes on
7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000.

of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong,
there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated
belonging to one person.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved
although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not
necessarily Identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery
by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in
essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or
omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs Lim

FACTS: Respondents obtained a loan from it and executed a continuing surety agreement dated
November 16, 1995 in favor of [petitioner] for all loans, credits, etc., that were extended or may be
extended in the future to respondents.
Petitioner granted a renewal of said loan upon respondents request, the most recent being on
January 21, 1998 as evidenced by Promissory Note Renewal BD-Variable No. 8298021001 in the
amount of P3,000,000.00. It was expressly stipulated therein that the venue for any legal action that
may arise out of said promissory note shall be Makati City, to the exclusion of all other courts x x x.
Respondents allegedly] failed to pay said obligation upon maturity. Petitioner foreclosed the real
estate mortgage executed by respondents valued at P1,081,600.00 leaving a deficiency balance
of P4,014,297.23 as of August 31, 1999.
Thus, Petitioners filed a complaint for the collection of the deficiency.

LUIS JOSEPH vs HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA

FACTS: Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73 for
conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12,
1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from
Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after
paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was
negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to
overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck
with Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then
driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the
process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the
road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. 1

Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue, invoking the
stipulation contained in the last paragraph of the promissory note with respect to the
restrictive/exclusive venue.
ISSUE: whether the action against the sureties is covered by the restriction on venue
stipulated in the PN
RULING: Petitioner correctly argues that there are two causes of action contained in its
Complaint. Only one suit may be commenced for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, only one case should remain and the others must
be dismissed.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo
truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro
Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.

As against Tri-Oro International Trading & Manufacturing Corporation, petitioners cause of

action is the alleged failure to pay the debt in violation of the PN; as against Elena Lim and Ramon
Calderon, in violation of the SA.

RULING: A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by
the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or omission
can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation

The cause of action, however, does not affect the venue of the action. Since the cases pertaining to
both causes of action are restricted to Makati City as the proper venue, petitioner cannot rely on
Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
Page 3 of 19

A restrictive stipulation on the venue of actions contained in a promissory note applies to the
surety agreement supporting it, because the nature of the two contracts and the factual
circumstances surrounding their execution are intertwined or interconnected. The surety agreement
is merely an accessory to the principal loan agreement embodied in the promissory note. Hence, the
enforcement of the former depends upon the latter.
Petition is DENIED.

CHUA and FILIDEN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY
FACTS:

Pending proceedings of the above cited case, another case was filed by petitioners which is a Verified
Compliant for Damages against respondent Metrobank, Atty Celestra and three other Metrobank
lawyers before RTC Br. 195 docketed as Civil Case No. CV-05-0402.
Petitioners sought in their Complaint the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages against the
respondents for making it appear that an auction sale of the subject properties took place, as a result
of which, the prospective buyers of the said properties lost their interest and petitioner Chua was
prevented from realizing a profit of P70,000,000.00 from the intended sale.
Petitioners filed with RTC-Branch 195 a Motion to Consolidate seeking the consolidation of Civil Case
No. CV-05-0402, the action for damages pending before said court, with Civil Case No. CV-01-0207,
the injunction case that was being heard before RTC-Branch 258. One of the grounds therein is that
Since the subject matter of both cases are the same properties and the parties of both cases are
almost the same, and both cases have the same central issue of whether there was an auction sale,
then necessarily, both cases should be consolidated
RTC Br. 195 granted the consolidation

petitioners obtained from respondent Metrobank a loan of P4,000,000.00, which was secured by a
real estate mortgage (REM) on parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No.
(108020)1148, No. 93919, and No. 125185, registered in petitioner Chuas name.
Petitioners debt amounted to a total of P103,450,391.
For failure to settle its obligations respondents move for the extra judicial foreclosure of the REM to
satisfy petitioners debt.
Petitioner Chua, in his personal capacity and acting on behalf of petitioner Filiden, filed a Complaint
for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction
and Damages,[12] against respondents Atty. Celestra, docketed as Civil Case No. CV-010207. Upon the motion of petitioners, RTC-Branch 257 issued a TRO enjoining respondents
Metrobank and Atty. Celestra from conducting the auction sale of the mortgaged properties on 31
May 2001.
After the expiration of the TRO and no injunction has been issued by RTC Br. 257, respondents reset
the auction sale on Nov. 8, 2001. On the said date, the court issued an order to reset the auction date
anew. However, respondent Atty. Celestra proceeded with the auction sale and accordingly issued a
Certificate of Sale to respondent Metrobank as the highest bidder.

Respondents filed before RTC Br. 258 two motions: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated 23 January 2006 of RTC-Branch 195, which granted the Motion to Consolidate of petitioners;
and (2) Manifestation and Motion raising the ground of forum shopping, among the affirmative
defenses of respondents.
RTC dismissed Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 on the ground of forum shopping
CA affirmed RTC. Petitioners MR denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not successively filing Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-050402 amounts to forum shopping.
RULING: YES, there was forum shopping.

FORUM SHOPPING, defined

Petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint in Civil Case No., CV-01-0207. Petitioners
alleged that the Certificate of Sale was a falsified document since there was no actual sale that took
place on 8 November 2001. And, even if an auction sale was conducted, the Certificate of Sale would
still be void because the auction sale was done in disobedience to a lawful order of RTC-Branch 257.

Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial remedies in

RTC denied petitioners motion for being moot and academic with the foreclosure sale. MR denied

pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.

different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either

CA the case for further proceedings.

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the
SC denied respondents appeal

same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved
yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the
Page 4 of 19

same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved

Chu v. Spouses Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185

(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a

dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that there is a

FACTS: Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed a deed of sale with assumption of

splitting of a cause of action.

mortgage[3] involving their five parcels of land situated in Saguin, San Fernando City, Pampanga, in
favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan (Cunanan) for the consideration ofP5,161,090.00.

EFFECTS for violation thereof

It was agreed that the Chus would retain the ownership of the lots as vendors and would only be
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements (Rule on Forum
Shopping)shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitutes willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.

transferred to the Cunanans only upon complete payment of the consideration and compliance with
the terms of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.

Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the five lots to her name without the knowledge of the Chus,
and to borrow money with the lots as security without paying the balance of the purchase price to the
Chus.

In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping, attached to their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before RTC-

Chus commenced Civil Case No. G-1936 to recover the unpaid balance from Spouses Cunanan. Later,

Branch 195, the existence of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258. Petitioners

it was amended and sought for the annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and of

committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although with

the TCTs issued pursuant to the deed, and to recover damages.

different prayers.
If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be
dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata. However, if the
forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be
dismissed with prejudice..[43] In this case, petitioners did not deliberately file Civil Case No. CV-05-

The Chus, the Cunanans, and Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise agreement,[9] whereby the
Cunanans transferred to the Chus their 50% share in all the parcels of land situated in Saguin, San
Fernando, Pampanga registered in the name of Cool Town Realty for and in consideration of the full
settlement of their case. The RTC approved the compromise agreement in a partial decision.

0402 for the purpose of seeking a favorable decision in another forum. Otherwise, they would not
have moved for the consolidation of both cases. Thus, only Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 is dismissed
and the hearing of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 before RTC-Branch 258 will be continued.

the petitioners herein brought another suit, Civil Case No. 12251, against the Carloses and Benelda
Estate seeking the cancellation of the TCTs of the two lots in the name of Benelda Estate, and the
issuance of new TCTs in their favor, plus damages.
Page 5 of 19

The Cunanans moved to dismiss the amended complaint based on two grounds, namely: (a)

litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. It is settled that the

bar by prior judgment, and (b) the claim or demand had been paid, waived, and abandoned. Benelda

absolute identity of parties was not a condition sine qua non for res judicata to apply, because a

Estate likewise moved to dismiss the amended complaint, citing as grounds: (a) forum shopping; (b)

shared identity of interest sufficed.[36]Mere substantial identity of parties, or even community of

bar by prior judgment, and (c) failure to state a cause of action. On their part, the Carloses raised

interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in

affirmative defenses in their answer, namely: (a) the failure to state a cause of action; (b) res

the first case, was sufficient.

judicata or bar by prior judgment; and (c) bar by statute of limitations.

In this case, The requirement of the identity of parties was fully met, because the Chus, on the one
RTC denied Motion to Dismiss; that the action was not barred by res judicata bec. there was no

hand, and the Cunanans, on the other hand, were the parties in both cases along with their respective

identity of parties and subj. matter between Civil Case No.12251 and Civil Case No. G-1936; and that

privies. The fact that the Carloses and Benelda Estate, defendants in Civil Case No. 12251, were not

the Cunanans did not establish that the petitioners had waived and abandoned their claim or that

parties in the compromise agreement was inconsequential, for they were also the privies of the

their claim had been paid by virtue of the compromise agreement, pointing out that the compromise

Cunanans as transferees and successors-in-interest.

agreement involved only the three parcels of land registered in the name of Cool Town Realty.
Cunanans MR was denied.

As to identity of the subject matter, both actions dealt with the properties involved in the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage. Identity of the causes of action was also met, because Case No. G-

CA nullified the RTCs decision; ruled that the compromise agreement had ended the legal

1936 and Civil Case No. 12251 were rooted in one and the same cause of action the failure of

controversy between the parties with respect to the cause of action arising from the deed of sale with

Cunanan to pay in full the purchase price of the five lots subject of the deed of sale with assumption

assumption of mortgage covering all the five parcels of land; that Civil Case No. G-1936 and Civil

of mortgage.

Case No.12251 involved the violation by the Cunanans of the same legal right under the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage; and that the filing of Civil Case No.12251 contravened the rule against

Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind

splitting of a cause of action, and rendered Civil Case No.12251 subject of a motion to dismiss based

the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.

on bar by res judicata.

Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into
ISSUE: was there an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action

several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them.[26] A single cause of action or

between Civil Case No.G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251?

entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more
different actions.

RULING: YES.
The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale
There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between

with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds

them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action

upon which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then
Page 6 of 19

to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation.[28] Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective
was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on the ground of bar by res judicata.

Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746

FACTS: Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale,
respondent herein. The jeepney was hit on the left rear side by a passenger bus owned by petitioner

Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,5 provides:

"Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to
relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged
to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided
in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any
question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in
the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest."
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs
or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on
jurisdiction and venue.
Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly
administration of justice.

Pantranco.

The total cost of damage was Php 21,415.00. Respondent Standanrd Insurance paid Php 8,000.00
and the remaining was shouldered by respondent Martina Gicale.

Respondents Standard Insurance and Martina demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter
refused to pay. Hence, a complaint for sum of money was instituted by respondents.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the rear side
of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent.
There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same
cause of action against petitioners.
Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:
"Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative
or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to
the following conditions:
xxx

In their answer, petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that it is
the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.
RTC fvored petitioners; ordering Pantranco to pay respondents

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction."
The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue in favor
of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is involved.

CA affirmed the RTC. Petitioners MR was denied

Hence, this petition
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT OF
THE ACTION CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS RESPECTIVE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
PETITIONERS DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION NOR ARE THERE
QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACTS COMMON TO BOTH PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS.
RULING: YES, the trial court has jurisdiction because petitioners cause of action arose out of the
same transaction.

totality rule - where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims
in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions

Umale v. Canoga Park, G.R. No. 167246

FACTS: The parties entered into a Contract of Lease[5] whereby the petitioner agreed to lease, for a
period of two (2) years starting from January 16, 2000, an eight hundred sixty (860)-square-meter
prime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the respondent.

Page 7 of 19

Before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Branch 68, Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No.
8084.[7] The respondent used as a ground for ejectment the petitioners violation of stipulations in the
lease contract regarding the use of the property.

Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action, such as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second
causes of action[23] (also known as the same evidence test),[24] or whether the defenses in one

MTC granted the ejectment case

case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.[25]Also fundamental is the test of
RTC Br. 155 affirmed MTC. but case was re-raffled to RTC Br. 267 upon petitioners MR
RTC Br. 267 The RTC-Branch 267 granted the petitioners motion, thereby reversing and setting
aside the MTC-Branch 68 decision. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 8084 was dismissed for being
prematurely filed.

determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing
of the first complaint.[26]

Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e.,
During the pendency of the petition for review in the CA, the respondent filed on May 3, 2002 another

whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first

case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the MTC-Branch 71,Pasig City. The case was

complaint and to which the answer is in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of

[14]

docketed as Civil Case No. 9210.

This time, the respondent used as a ground for ejectment the

expiration of the parties lease contract.

MTC Br. 71 adjudged in favor of respondents

the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioners violation of stipulations in the lease
contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At
the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease
contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years,

RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed Civil Case

from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease

No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia

remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that

CA CA nullified and set aside the assailed decision of the RTC-Branch 68, and ruled that there was
no litis pendentia because the two civil cases have different causes of action. The decision of the MTC-

the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the
respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case
was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.

Branch 71 was ordered reinstated. Petitioners MR was denied.

ISSUE: whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve the same cause of action.

RULING: Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action.

Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action.[21] If two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits

In response to the petitioners contention that the similarity of Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210
rests on the reiteration in the second case of the cause of action in the first case, we rule that the
restatement does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if the
respondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second
complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the lease
contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a second
complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within one year
after the accrual of the cause of action,[27] which, in the second case, was the expiration of the lease
contract.

in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.[22]

Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014

Page 8 of 19

FACTS: Petitioners, filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages, Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the
Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the
respondents and the City Government of Butuan. They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from
unlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the subject property. According to the
petitioners, they acquired the land from Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and
winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December 27, 1996.
RTC denied the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and ordered that the possession and
occupation of the land be returned to the respondents.
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA
While the petition for review on certiorari was pending before the CA, the petitioners filed an action
for specific performance8 against the City Government of Butuan. According to the petitioners, they
acquired possession and ownership over the auctioned property when they redeemed it from Tuazon.
The City Government of Butuan must therefore issue them a certificate of sale.
CA affirmed the RTCs decision in the first case (denied injunction); found the petitioners guilty of
forum shopping, dismissed the case, and referred the case to the Court and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation and institution of the appropriate administrative action. Rejected
petitioners MR.
Hence, this case. Petitioners argue that they did not commit forum shopping, as the reliefs prayed for
in the present case and in the specific performance case are not the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.
RULING: YES, the petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the specific performance
case despite the pendency of the present case before the CA.

property. On the other hand, the specific performance case prayed that the City Government of
Butuan be ordered to issue the petitioners the certificate of sale grounded on the petitioners
ownership of the land when they had bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or from
Tuazon. While it may appear that the main relief prayed for in the present injunction case is different
from what was prayed for in the specific performance case, the cause of action which serves as the
basis for the reliefs remains the same the petitioners alleged ownership of the property after its
purchase in a public auction.
Thus, the petitioners' subsequent filing of the specific performance action is forum shopping of the
third kind-splitting causes of action or filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but
with different prayers. As the Court has held in the past, "there is still forum shopping even if the
reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same
issues.

Bayang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-53564

FACTS: Bayang filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages against Biong in the Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Norte, Branch 1, docketed as Civil Case No. 1892. 1
While the case was pending, Biong succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiff of the land in question and
remained there until January 25, 1978. 2
The case was decided in favor of Biong, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, this decision
became final on February 2, 1978.
On February 6, 1978, Bayang filed a second case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2589, with the CFI of
Surigao del Norte, Branch II, seeking to recover from Biong the incomes earned from the same land
from 1970 up to the quarterly incomes from 1978 until the said land was delivered to the plaintiff.

Three ways forum shopping may be committed:

1) through litis pendentia filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet;

Biong filed a motion for summary judgment, reiterating the affirmative defense of res judicata raised
in his answer.
RTC granted respondents motion and rendered a summary judgment.

2) through res judicata filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved; and

CA sustained the RTC

3) splitting of causes of action filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with
different prayers the ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res judicata.

ISSUES: Whether or not the appealed decision of Civil Case No. 1892 constitutes res
judicata to bar Civil Case No. 2589?

"The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other."

RULING: There was res judicata.

The cause of action in the present case (and the main case) is the petitioners claim of ownership of
the land when they bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon. This
ownership is the petitioners basis in enjoining the respondents from dispossessing them of the

Requisites for res judicata to apply:

a) the former judgment must be final;
b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
Page 9 of 19

c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and d) there must be between the first case and the second
case identity of parties, identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action
The decision in Civil Case No. 1892 became final and executory on February 2, 1978. There is no
dispute that the trial court which rendered that decision had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and
the parties to the proceeding. The case was tried on the merits. The parties to Civil Case No. 1892
and the subsequent Civil Case No. 2589 are the same petitioner and private respondent now before
us.
The petitioner would draw a distinction between the land in dispute in Civil Case No. 1892 and the
income from that land being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589. But that is in our view splitting hairs to
split a cause of action. The subject-matter is essentially the same in both cases as the income is only
a consequence or accessory of the disputed property. We cannot agree that there are involved here
two causes of action calling for two separate cases. The claim for the income from the land was
incidental to, and should have been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for, ownership of the land.
Civil Case No. 2589 is barred by the previous judgment in Civil Case No. 1892. This being so, it
should follow that the trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in deciding the latter case by
summary judgment.

1. defendant was in bad faith on his continued possession of the hacienda despite
knowledge that the lease was declared rescinded by the lower court in the previous case;
thus, not entitled to the possession of the hacienda
2. defendants failed to comply with the obligations stipulated in the contract of lease that
is to use the care of a good father of the family in conserving the tools, agricultural implements,
draft animals, and other effects enumerated in an inventory made at the time the defendant entered
in possession under the lease
3. defendants illegally harvested the sugar canes in the property involved in the case
In his answer to the first and third causes of action, the defendants alleges that according to the
pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706, the two causes of action were included in that case and, therefore,
must be considered res adjudicata.
CFI sustained the defendants
ISSUE: whether or not the first and third issue was barred by res judicata?
RULING: There was no res judicata.

De Larena v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-29155

FACTS: Plaintiffs- owner/lessor of the hacienda
Defendants- lessee
The case at bar is a sequel to case G. R. No. 21706, Josefina Rubio de Larena vs. Hermenegildo
Villanueva, decided on March 26, 1924. 1 In that case we affirmed a decision of the Court of First
Instance ordering the rescission of a lease of the Tacgajan Sugar Plantation and the payment by the
defendant-lessee of the unpaid balance of the rent for the agricultural year 1920-1922 in the sum of
P5,949.28 with interest from August 26, 1922, an for P8,000 in rent for the agricultural year 19211923. The decision also provided that the possession of the leased land be delivered to the plaintiff.
Shortly after the record was returned to the court below, a writ of execution was issued, but before
levy was made the parties came to an agreement, under which the money judgment was to be
satisfied by the payment of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to the plaintiff of a dwelling house
situated in the municipality of Bais.
In the meantime, the defendant had harvested the sugarcane crop produced in the agricultural year
1922-1924, and after having satisfied the aforesaid money judgment, he also continued in possession
of the plantation long enough to appropriate to himself the following ratoon cane crop.
The present action was brought on April 13, 1925, alleging three causes of action against defendant,
to wit:

The Code of Civil Procedure says:

That only is deemed to have been so adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (Sec. 307, Code of Civil Proc.)
But the defendant maintains that the plaintiff having had an opportunity to ventilate the matter in the
former case, she cannot now enforce the same cause of action in the present case. Properly speaking,
this argument does not involve the doctrine of res judicata but rests on the well-known an, in
American law, firmly established principle that a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause
of action an make it the basis for several suits. But that is not this case. The rule is well established
that when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment is
an independent cause of action, though it has been held and is good law, that in an action upon such
a lease for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the time the action brought must be included
in the complaint and that failure to do so will constitute a bar to a subsequent action for the payment
of that rent.

Blossom & Company v. Manila Gas Corp., G.R. No. L-32958

FACTS: Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations (defendant) entered into a contract.
The contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of specified amounts of
water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced at Php65. It was agreed that the price would prevail only so
long as the raw materials (coal and crude oil) used by the defendants in the manufacture of gas
should cost the same price as that prevailing at the time of the contract. In the event of an increase
or decrease in the cost of raw materials, there would be a corresponding increase or decrease in the
price of tar.
Page 10 of 19

 The contract was later amended to extend the period for ten years. In consideration of the
modification, the plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant a certain piece of land lying adjacent
to its plant. The defendant sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn executed a
mortgage to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price.

FACTS: Respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner DANFOSS and Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80 for the latters failure to deliver two (2) unit 132 KW Danfoss
Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter.

Around 4 years from the execution of the contract, plaintiff filed an action against the defendant to
obtain specific performance and recovery of damages. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached
the contract by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar solely because of the increase in price of
tar products and its desire to secure better prices than what the plaintiff paid.

Petitioner DANFOSS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause

CFI Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted the recovery for damages but refused to
order the defendants to resume delivery but left it with its remedy for damages against the
defendants for any subsequent breach of contract.

action against Danfoss or plaintiffs right to demand delivery cannot arise earlier than November 19,

Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the ground that the defendant breached the
contract once more after refusal to perform its obligation under the same contract.
ISSUES: Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages

of action. It futher says that the allegations neither prove any right of the plaintiffs arising from the
transactions nor a violation of such right. It is submitted that this Honorable Court based on the
complaint, cannot render a valid judgment against the defendant Danfoss. The plaintiffs cause of
1997, which is the last day for the defendant Danfosss principal (Danfoss Denmark) to deliver the
two (2) units Frequency Converter.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners MR was likewise denied.
CA denied Danfoss petition for lack of merit. The CA likewise denied petitioners MR

RULING: Yes, the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages.
Doctrine:

ISSUES: whether or not the CA erred in affirming the denial by the court a quo of petitioners motion

Divisible contracts (as a general rule)

to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.

- A contract to do several things at several times is divisible. A judgement for a single breach
of a continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach.

RULING: The principle of anticipatory breach enunciated in Blossom & Company, Inc. v. Manila
Gas Corporation [9] does not apply here. In that case, Blossom & Company, Inc. entered into a

Entire contract (case at bar)

- When the contract is indivisible and the breach is total, there can only be one action in
which the plaintiff must recover all damages. The recovery of a judgement for damages by
reason of a breach is a bar to another action on the same contract and on account of the
continuous breach.
- The contract between the parties is an entire contract.
- In the case at bar, the defendant terminated the continuing contract by absolute refusal.
The claim for damages is an indivisible demand. Where a former final judgement was
rendered, it is a bar to any damages which plaintiff may thereafter sustain.

contract with Manila Gas Corporation for the sale and delivery of water gas and coal gas tar at
stipulated prices for a period of four years. On the second year of the contract, Manila Gas willfully
and deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water gas tar to Blossom and Company, Inc. because
it was asking for a higher price than what had been previously stipulated by them. The price of its tar
products had gone up. We held that:
even if the contract is divisible in its performance and the future periodic
deliveries are not yet due, if the obligor has already manifested his refusal to
comply with his future periodic obligations, the contract is entire and the breach
total, hence, there can only be one action for damages.[10]

Danfoss v. Continental Cement, G.R. No. 143788

Page 11 of 19

mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent
complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we
will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so
much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

Thus, the principle contemplates future periodic deliveries and a willful refusal to
comply therewith. Here, the obligation was single and indivisible to deliver two units of frequency
converter/inverter by November 19, 1997. The records do not show that petitioner refused to deliver
the goods on the date agreed upon. On the contrary, petitioner exerted efforts to make good its

Allandale Sportsline v. Good Development Corp, G.R. No. 164521

obligation by looking for other suppliers who could provide it the parts needed to make timely delivery

FACTS: Allandale Sportsline, Inc. (ASI) obtained a loan of P204,000.00 from The Good Development Corp. (GDC)
under a Promissory Note signed by Melbarose R. Sasot (Melbarose) andAllandale R. Sasot (Allandale), President
and Vice-President, respectively, of ASI, with Theresa L. Manipon (Manipon) as one of three co-makers.

of the frequency converter/inverter ordered by respondent.

To provide additional security, ASI and Melbarose executed in favor of GDC a Deed of Mortgage.

Bank of America v. American Realty, G.R. No. 133876

GDC demanded that Melbarose pay the unpaid account of P179,000.00 or surrender the mortgaged
chattels within five days from notice.

FACTS:

When no payment was made, GDC filed with the RTC a Complaint[10] for Replevin and/or Sum of Money with
Damages against ASI, Melbarose, Manipon, Florante Edrino and John Doe.

However, while the trial that ensued, GDC disclosed that after it obtained possession of the properties
subject of the writs of replevin, it caused the auction sale of some of them and realized proceeds amounting
to P78,750.00..
RTC decided in favor of GDC. Ordered plaintiff to pay respondents jointly and
severally the amount of P269,611.82 plus legal interest thereon effective to date until
the full amount is fully paid, and 25% of the total amount due as liquidated
damages.

ISSUES: Whether or not the filing of the four civil actions barred the petitioners their remedy to
foreclose the mortgage?

CA RTC affirmed. MR denied

RULING: Citing Bachrach Motor Co., Inc, vs. Icarangal:

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of
action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the
credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may
make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage.
But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for
that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the
mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former,
and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one
cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the
rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for
payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the

ISSUES:

RULING: As emphasized at the outset, the reliefs respondent prayed for in its Complaint and Amended Complaint
are in the alternative: delivery of the mortgaged properties preparatory to foreclosure or payment of the unpaid
loan.[44]

Page 12 of 19

Moreover, after respondent acquired possession of the mortgaged properties through the writs

Not only is there no more reference to the conduct of the auction sale of the mortgaged properties, there

of replevin, it caused the auction sale of assorted sports outfits, one unit Sansio Karaoke, one unit Sony T.V. Set and

is also no longer any acknowledgment that the proceeds earned from the auction sale should be deducted from the

one unit Toyota Corona, and earned proceeds amounting to P78,750.00.[45] While it appears that respondent failed

total unpaid loan.

to obtain the other personal properties covered by the Deed of Mortgage and the writs of replevin, there is no doubt
that it had effectively elected the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage security over the remedy of

This is a glaring error.

collection of the unpaid loan.

In Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal,[48] the Court held that the remedies available to any mortgage
The RTC was aware that respondent had elected one remedy. In its Decision, it cited the fact that some
of the mortgaged properties which were delivered to respondent by means of the Writs of Replevin had been sold
on auction, and acknowledged that the proceeds from said auction sale should be deducted from the loan account
of petitioners. The RTC noted:
The seized pieces of personal properties by virtue of the writ of replevin and alias writ
of replevin were sold in an auction sale where [respondent] realized P78,750.00 from the
sale.[46]
xxxx
[Respondent] realized P78,500.00[sic] from the auction sale of the seized personal
property by virtue of the writ of replevin. The amount realized from the auction sale is clearly
insufficient to cover the unpaid balance, interest, attorneys fees, costs of the suit and other
expenses incidental to litigation. This amount was deducted from the [petitioners] total
obligation in the amount of P269,111.82 [sic] resulting in the net total obligation
of P191,111.82 as of August 24, 1992.[47] (Emphasis supplied)

creditor are alternative, not cumulative or successive,[49] viz.:

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of
action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with
execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands,
the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the
same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single cause of
action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is
subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there
exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by
applying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a
complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure
of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the
subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints
simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage,
we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much
cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor. (Emphasis
supplied)

By causing the auction sale of the mortgaged properties, respondent effectively adopted and pursued the
Yet, it is curious that in the dispositive portion of its Decision, the RTC granted respondent the remedy of
collection of sum of money. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision is reproduced below for emphasis:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of the
[respondent]
Good
Development
Corporation
against
[petitioners] Melbarose Sasot, Allandale Sportsline Inc., and Ma. TheresaManipon ordering them
to pay the [respondent] jointly and severally the amount of P269,611.82 [sic] plus legal
interest thereon effective to date until the full amount is fully paid, and 25% of the
total amount due as liquidated damages.
SO ORDERED.

remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure,[50] using the writ of replevin as a tool to get hold of the mortgaged
properties.[51] As emphasized in Bachrach, one effect of respondents election of the remedy of extra-judicial
foreclosure is its waiver of the remedy of collection of the unpaid loan.

Therefore, there was no more legal basis for the RTC to grant respondent the relief of collecting from
petitioners the amount of Php269,611.82 [sic] plus legal interest thereon effective to date until the full amount is
fully paid, nor for the CA to affirm it.

Enriquez v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-16797

Page 13 of 19

FACTS: The record is to the effect that on 24 November 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses
Urbano Dizon and Aurea Soriano de Dizon sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date,
eleven (11) parcels of land situated in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, and covered by their corresponding
certificates of title, for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid P5,000.00 down,
P2,500.00 in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the Philippine National Bank, and agreed
to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within ninety (90) days. To secure the said balance, the vendee
Socorro A. Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven parcels in favor of the vendors. By
way of additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her children, Enrique, Antonio,
Milagros, and Lourdes, and as judicial guardian of her minor child Angelita Ramos, executed another
mortgage on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta Estate.
Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage, this
action for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-mortgagees in the court below, on 29
April 1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously had
filed action against her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on 24 February 1959 for the recovery
of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that at
the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable; that
plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single cause of action.

RTC commanded not to give due course to petitioners petition for prohibition and mandamus, but
to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1091.
Hence, the direct recourse to the SC.
ISSUES: whether or not there was a splitting of cause of action in filing the two cases
RULING: While from the strictly technical viewpoint there was a splitting of the cause of action in
pursuing the same remedy in two separate complaints notwithstanding the fact that the alleged
forcible entry constituted one and the same act, still a realistic and practical approach dictated the
action taken by the municipal court. It should be remembered that the first complaint was
commenced on 17 August 1964 and had not yet been tried when the second was filed about three
weeks later. The two cases could be tried together as one, or the second complaint could be treated
as an amendment of the first. Either way the entire controversy between the parties could be
judicially settled, disregarding unessential procedural niceties, especially in the light of the reasonable
explanation offered by the plaintiff below.

RTC denied motion to dismiss. Ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

Defendant Ramos appealed directly to the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not plaintiffs were guilty of splitting a single cause of action
RULING: An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of
Manila shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for
P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present action was for nonpayment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was,
therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage was constituted on
lands situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The
two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.

Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435

FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of the Spouses Baylon who sought for the partition of the Spouses
estate. It was alleged that after the death of the spouses, Rita took possession of the parcel of lands
included in the estate and appropriated for herself the income from the same. That from such income,
Rita allegedly purchased two parcels of land Lot No. 47096 and half of Lot No. 4706.
In their answer, respondents admitted that there and petitioners are co-owners of the subject
property but only with regards to the 22 out of 43 parcels of land. The rest are owned by Rita
exclusively including Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 by which according to them was acquired
by Rita using her own money.
During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation, conveyed Lot No. 4709 and half
of Lot No. 4706 to Florante.

Tarnate v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-26266

FACTS: Lucilo U. Garcia filed a complaint for forcible entry against herein petitioner Ramon A. Tarnate
in the Municipal Court of Batangas, Batangas, which complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1083.
On 10 September 1964 respondent Garcia filed another complaint for forcible entry against the same
defendant in the same court, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1091(reason for filing another
case: the fence built by petitioner not only intruded upon Lot 85, Batangas Cadastre which is the
subject matter of the first case, but also encroaches upon Lots 57, 59 and 60, Batangas
Cadastre, which are the subject matter of the case at bar.)
Tarnate moved to dismiss the second case (No. 1091) on the ground of pendency of another action
between the same parties for the same cause. Garcia opposed the motion.

Rita died intestate and without any issue. Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor
of Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading, praying that the said donation in favor of
the respondent be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged
that Rita was already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was supposedly executed
and, thus, could not have validly given her consent thereto.
RTC declared co-ownership over the 20 parcels of land as heirs of Spouses Baylon (excluding Lot
No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706) and directed the partition thereof; declaring a co-ownership on
the properties of Rita Baylon and directing its partition ; and declaring the donation inter vivos
rescinded without prejudice to the share of Florante Baylon to the estate of Rita Baylon (RTC found
the donation inter vivos in favor of Florante Baylon was executed to prejudice the plaintiffs right to
succeed to the estate of Rita Baylon in case of death)
Florante sought for reconsideration insofar as the rescission but the same was denied by the RTC

MTC denied motion to dismiss

Page 14 of 19

CA reversed and set aside the decision on the rescission of the Deed of Donation
The petitioners sought reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: whether the CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot
No. 4706 in favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a judicial determination that
the same actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon
RULING:
On Joinder of Causes of Action:
a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in
one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or
more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same
complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct
demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
Objective: to avoid a multiplicity of suits
Condition for a Joinder: the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special
rules.
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners
could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of
Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary
rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the
ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a
single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the
proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular
cause of action.

In this case, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of the
petitioners action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omission on
the part of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its
decision. The RTC validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed
by the petitioners.

Union Glass Corp. v. SEC, G.R. No. 64013

FACTS: Respondent Hofilea is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass. She obtained loans from
DBP. As security for said loan accommodations, Pioneer Glass mortgaged and/or assigned its assets,
real and personal, to the DBP.
When Pioneer Glass suffered serious liquidity problems such that it could no longer meet its financial
obligations with DBP, it entered into a dacion en pago agreement with the latter.
Part of the assets transferred to the DBP was the glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, which DBP leased and
subsequently sold to herein petitioner Union Glass and Container Corporation, hereinafter referred to
as Union Glass.
Hofilea filed a complaint before the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission against the
DBP, Union Glass and Pioneer Glass, docketed as SEC Case No. 2035. Of the five causes of action
pleaded therein, only the first cause of action concerned petitioner Union Glass.
Petitioners moved for dismissal of the case on the ground that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the suit.
SEC granted the motion to dismiss but later on reversed the same upon respondent Hofileas MR.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner can be joined as party-defendant to the SEC case?

1.
2.

misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal

3.

However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio
direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the
erroneously joined causes of action

RULING: petitioner Union Glass is involved only in the first cause of action of Hofileas complaint in
SEC Case No, 2035. While the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to proceedings before the
SEC, allows the joinder of causes of action in one complaint, such procedure however is subject to the
rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. 9 Since petitioner has no intra-corporate
relationship with the complainant, it cannot be joined as party-defendant in said case as to do so
would violate the rule or jurisdiction. Hofileas complaint against petitioner for cancellation of the sale
of the glass plant should therefore be brought separately before the regular court But such action, if
instituted, shall be suspended to await the final outcome of SEC Case No. 2035, for the issue of the
validity of the dacion en pago posed in the last mentioned case is a prejudicial question, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the action against petitioner Union
Glass. Thus, Hofileas complaint against the latter can only prosper if final judgment is rendered in
SEC Case No. 2035, annulling the dacion en pago executed in favor of the DBP.

the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the
causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action
has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication
rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.

Flores v. Hon. Mallare-Philipps, G.R. No. L-66620

Rules on the Misjoinder of Causes of Action:

4.

the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to
order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately.

Page 15 of 19

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for refusal to pay of respondents Binongcal in the amount of
11,643.00 and Calion in the amount of 10,212.00 representing the cost of truck tires the latter
purchased from the petitioner.

that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the
reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither
of which falls within its jurisdiction.

Respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount
of the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the
regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more
than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although
another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00,
his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.

Genesis Investment v. Heirs of Ebarasabal, G.R. No. 181622

Respondent Calion also moved for the dismissal of the case on the same ground.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality
rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
ISSUES: whether or not the totality rule applies as to justify the joinder of the parties?

FACTS: Respondents filed against herein petitioners a Complaint3 for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees. The Complaint was filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu. (HISTORY of the action: petitioner acquired the
land from the heirs of Gil Ebarsabal who sought the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject
property without the petitioners knowledge as co-owners thereof).
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss4 contending, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction to try
the case on the ground that, as the case involves title to or possession of real property or any interest
therein and since the assessed value of the subject property does not exceed P20,000.00 (the same
being only P11,990.00), the action falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).

RULING: Yes,
RTC granted petitioners Motion to Dismiss
The totality rule under Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules
is subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3
Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to
relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all
such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as
may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to
expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
Old rule/law "where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately
owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test"
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having
separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a
plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint.
However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more
defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a
common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
If the separate claims against the several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction
of the regional trial court.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,8 arguing that their complaint consists of
several causes of action, including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC which RTC granted; petitioners MR
was likewise denied.
CA dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari holding that the subject matter of respondents'
complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC,
considering that the main purpose in filing the action is to declare null and void the documents
assailed therein
ISSUES: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in concluding that the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 60 of Barili, Cebu has jurisdiction over the instant case when the ALLEGATIONS IN
THE COMPLAINT clearly shows that the main cause of action of the respondents is for the Recovery of
their Title, Interest, and Share over a Parcel of Land, which has an assessed value of P11,990.00 and
thus, within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
RULING: This is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of
partition of or recovery of shares or interest over the real property in question but includes an action
for declaration of nullity of contracts and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation
Contrary to petitioners contention, the principal relief sought by petitioners is the nullification of the
subject Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale entered into by and between some of their co-heirs and
respondents, insofar as their individual shares in the subject property are concerned. Thus, the
recovery of their undivided shares or interest over the disputed lot, which were included in the sale,
simply becomes a necessary consequence if the above deed is nullified. Hence, since the principal
action sought in respondents Complaint is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus, cognizable by the RTC.20 Well entrenched is the
rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
Page 16 of 19

allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.21
Moreover, it is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the causes of
action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may
be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein. Thus, as shown above, respondents complaint clearly falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petition denied.

RULING: The general rule on venue of personal actions, as in petitioners complaint for collection of
sum of money, is embodied in Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The afore-quoted provision is, however, qualified by Section 4 of the same rule which allows parties,
before the filing of the action, to validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue.11
The forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an action does not, however, preclude
parties from bringing a case to other venues.

Uniwide Holdings v. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456

FACTS: Uniwide Holdings, Inc. (UHI), whose principal office is located in Paraaque City, entered into
a Franchise Agreement1 (the agreement) granting respondent, Alexander M. Cruz (Cruz), a five-year
franchise to adopt and use the "Uniwide Family Store System" for the establishment and operation of
a "Uniwide Family Store" along Marcos Highway, Sta. Cruz, Cogeo, Marikina City.
Cruz had purchased goods from UHIs affiliated companies First Paragon Corporation (FPC) and
Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).
FPC and USWCI executed Deeds of Assignment4 in favor of UHI assigning all their rights and interests
over Cruzs accounts payable to them.
UHI filed a complaint5 for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0278 for its receivable from respondent based on the
Franchise Agreement for the the receivables from FPC and USWCI which the latter assigned to it.
Cruz filed a motion to dismiss7 on the ground of improper venue, he invoking Article 27.5 of the
agreement which reads:
27.5 Venue Stipulation The Franchisee consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of Quezon City, the Franchisee waiving any other venue

Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise out
of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in the one at bar,
may be brought before other venues provided that such other cause of action falls within the
jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.12
Based on the allegations in petitioners complaint, the second and third causes of action are based on
the deeds of assignment executed in its favor by FPC and USWCI. The deeds bear no exclusive venue
stipulation with respect to the causes of action thereunder. Hence, the general rule on venue applies
that the complaint may be filed in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.13
It bears emphasis that the causes of action on the assigned accounts are not based on a breach of
the agreement between UHI and Cruz. They are based on separate, distinct and independent
contracts-deeds of assignment in which UHI is the assignee of Cruzs obligations to the assignors FPC
and USWCI. Thus, any action arising from the deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to the
exclusive venue stipulation embodied in the agreement.
Exception to the gen. rule stated above: Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts
or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to breach of said contract.
Exception to the exception: But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily
encompassing, such that even those not related to the enforcement of the contract should
be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should be
strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement.

RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss.

Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the agreement is there a mention of FPC and USWCI, and neither
are the two parties thereto, hence, they cannot be bound to the stipulation on "exclusive venue."

Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285

ISSUES: WHETHER A CASE BASED ON SEVERAL CAUSES OF ACTION IS DISMISSIBLE ON THE

GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE WHERE ONLY ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION ARISES FROM A
CONTRACT WITH EXCLUSIVE VENUE STIPULATION

FACTS: On May 3, 1999, Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for
Declaratory Relief and later amended to Complex Action for Injunctive Relief (Consing, Jr.s
complaint) before the RTC-Pasig City against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, and Dela Cruz.
In his complaint, Consing, Jr. claimed that:
Page 17 of 19

1.

2.

3.
4.

the incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon him by Unicapital and PBI to return to
them the purchase price they had paid for the subject property,where he was an agent,
constituted harassment and oppression which severely affected his personal and professional
life.
He also averred that he was coerced to commit a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 2226 as
Unicapital and PBI, over threats of filing acase against him, kept on forcing him to issue a
post-dated check in the amount sought to be recovered, notwithstanding their knowledge
that he had no funds for the same.
He further alleged that Unicapital and URI required him to sign blank deeds of sale and
transfers without cancelling the old one sin violation of the laws on land registration and real
estate development.
Likewise, Consing, Jr. added that Unicapital and PBIs representatives were" speaking of him
in a manner that was inappropriate and libelous," and that some John Does "deliberately
engaged in a fraudulent scheme to compromise Consing, Jr.s honor, integrity and fortune x
x x consisting of falsifying or causing to be falsified, or attempting to present as falsified
certain transfers of Land Titles and Deeds for profit,"30 classifying the foregoing as ultra vires
acts which should warrant sanctions under the corporation law, Revised Securities Act and
related laws.

Accordingly, Consing, Jr. prayed that:

(a) he be declared as a mere agent of Dela Cruz, and as such, devoid of any obligation to Unicapital,
URI, and PBI for the transactions entered into concerning the subject property;
(b) Unicapital, URI, and PBI be enjoined from harassing or coercing him, and from speaking about
him in a derogatory fashion; and
(c) Unicapital, URI, and PBI pay him actual and consequential damages in the amount
of P2,000,000.00, moral damages of at least P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages of P1,000,000.00,
all per month, reckoned from May 1, 1999 and until the controversy is resolved, and attorney's fees
and costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action and failure to pay the
proper amount of docket fee.

The rule is that a partys failure to observe the following conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the
Rules results in a misjoinder of causes of action:
SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action . - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues
or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing, Jr. did not seek to hold Unicapital and PBI,
et al. liable for any specific violation of the Corporation Code or the Revised Securities Act. Rather, he
merely sought damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.s alleged acts of making him sign numerous
documents and their use of the same against him. In this respect, Consing, Jr. actually advances an
injunction and damages case82 which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig
City.83 Therefore, there was no violation of Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c)
thereof. Besides, even on the assumption that there was a misjoinder of causes of action, still, such
defect should not result in the dismissal of Consing, Jr.s complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules
explicitly states that a "misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action" and
that "a misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be
severed and proceeded with separately."

Iniego v. Hon. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876

36

The RTC-Pasig City issued a Resolution denying the above mentioned motions to dismiss, holding
that Consing, Jr.s complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages pursuant to
Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Unperturbed, petitioner et al, moved for reconsideration therefrom which was, however, denied for
lack of merit. Aggrieved, they elevated the denial of their motions to dismiss before the CA via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. CA rendered a Joint Decision holding that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the RTC-Pasig City.
ISSUES: whether or not was a violation of Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c)
thereof?
RULING: so as to obviate any confusion on the matter, the Court equally finds that the causes of
action in SCA No. 1759 were not as Unicapital, et al. claim misjoined even if Consing, Jr. averred
that Unicapital and PBI, et al. violated certain provisions of the Corporation Law and the Revised
Securities Act.80

FACTS: Respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy T.
Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as
owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground, among other
things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of action of the case.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss; MR is likewise denied
CA petition for certiorari was denied due course
Hence, this petition.

Page 18 of 19

Petitioner claims that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that
are capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the jurisdiction in such cases falls upon either the
municipal courts (the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts In Cities,
And Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), or the Regional Trial Courts, depending on the value of the
damages claimed.
Petitioner argues that in actions for damages based on quasi-delict, claims for damages arising from a
different cause of action (i.e., other than the fault or negligence of the defendant) should not be
included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. According to petitioner, the moral and
exemplary damages claimed by the respondents in the case at bar are not direct and proximate
consequences of the alleged negligent act. Petitioner points out that the complaint itself stated that
such moral and exemplary damages arose from the alleged refusal of defendants to honor the
demand for damages, and therefore there is no reasonable cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the claim for moral and exemplary damages.[14] If the claims for
moral and exemplary damages are not included in the computation for purposes of determining
jurisdiction, only the claim for actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00 will be considered, and
the MeTC will have jurisdiction.
ISSUES: whether or not damages based on quasi-delict be included to determine courts jurisdiction.
RULING: All claims for damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court
regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2,
Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he may have
against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section provides that where the claims in all such
joined causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be
the test of jurisdiction.

Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause of action
or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case
at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and
exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.

In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of pecuniary
estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the municipal courts,
depending on the amount of damages claimed. In this case, the amount of damages claimed is within
the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of
determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from
different causes of action.
petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED

Page 19 of 19