Duties To Legal Profession

Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty.
Sergio Angeles
A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000
Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2
others in a civil case. Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable
decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP 50,000 from one of the
defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the judgement against the
latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the amount he had
received and never remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover such
fact on their own. Rivera and his co-plaintiffs filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act
amounted to serious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers
equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not
oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by
appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should
never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to
the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles
was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
On August 14, 2000, a Decision was rendered by this Court in the above-
entitled case, finding respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. guilty of gross
misconduct. The dispositive portion of the Court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found

guilty of gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further
directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the
latter's TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty
(60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure
on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's personal record in

the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
From the afore-quoted Decision respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. seeks
this reconsideration.
The finding of guilt for gross misconduct was based on the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines upon whom the case was referred for investigation. We again
quote the said findings for emphasis:
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward,

spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed
while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what
they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill motive
on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel them to
institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the
testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission's full
faith and credence.
Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His
defense (that he considered himself the owner of the subject property which
was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a
welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose

Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know
that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless
the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of
Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has
vigorously denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This
denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat,
Sr.) is not the owner of said property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance

of a real property, whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in
writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the
owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral "giving" of the
property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have
said that.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and
Exh. "A-2" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor
of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the
subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction
of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat,
Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he
said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose
Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or
ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wife's signature is
tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of
Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of
relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was
given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr.
has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too
difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the
respondent and Exh. "A-3" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose
Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which
respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise
of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied

having executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said
property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never
appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and
that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00 representing the
consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no
less when he admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that
the same was placed in the document only to make it appear that the
conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer,
respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he
should have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper
instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense.1
We remain convinced that respondent was remiss in his duty to abide by his
sworn oath as a member of the bar to "do no falsehood nor consent to its
commission"2 and further violated the mandate of his profession to "uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."3
In the instant case, after a review of the records, we note that this is the first
and only administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Villalon in his long
career as a member of the bar. At one time, he was even the President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Manila 1 Chapter, and as such he
introduced various programs to uphold the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the legal profession and to uplift the welfare of his brethren.
Furthermore, it appears that as of July 8, 1997, respondent Atty. Villalon
already returned to the complainant himself the owner's duplicate of the
subject TCT No. M-3023 and the complainant acknowledged receipt4 thereof,
thus there is a need to delete the directive to deliver the said TCT from the
Court's Decision. Hence, we agree to reduce the penalty imposed on
respondent Atty. Villalon.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and
MODIFIES the Decision dated August 14, 2000 in that respondent Atty.
Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS only with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely. The directive in the Decision to
deliver TCT No. M-3023 to complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. is DELETED, the
delivery thereof having been accomplished as of July 8, 1997.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent
as an attorney and as a member of the Integrated Bar, and furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473 (1992)DOCTRINES:The practice of law is not
a matter of right.No moral qualification for bar membership is more important
thantruthfulness or candor.FACTS:Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar
Examinations but was denied to takehis oath in view of the finding of the
Court that he was guilty ofunauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had
filed numerous petitionsfor him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.Acting
to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of theprovince
where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent'smoral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, theexecutive
judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any actscommitted by
the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission tothe Bar.
However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case beforehis court
for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, thenworking as
Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to havesecured a free
patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of landwhich, upon
investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptibleof acquisition
under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to thebank. The mortgage
was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold atpublic auction and
respondent has not redeemed the land since then.The case was however
been settled through amicable settlement. The saidamicable settlement
canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his
mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of thecertificate of title to
the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the massof public domain the land
covered by the aforesaid certificate of titlewith respondent refraining from
exercising acts of possession or ownershipover the said land. Respondent
also paid the bank a certain sum for theloan and interest.ISSUE: Whether the
respondent may be admitted to the practice of lawconsidering that he
already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding hisgood moral character,
and his pending civil case has been terminated.HELD:His petition must be
denied.Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter
ofright. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learnedin
the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.It should be
recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at theBureau of Lands.
Said employment facilitated his procurement of the freepatent title over the
property which he could not but have known was apublic land. This was
manipulative on his part and does not speak well ofhis moral character. It is a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in thepublic service, which cannot be
erased by the termination of the case andwhere no determination of guilt or
innocence was made because the suit hasbeen compromised. This is a sad
reflection of his sense of honor and fairdealings.Moreover, his failure to reveal
to the Court the pendency of the civil casefor Reversion filed against him
during the period that he was submittingseveral petitions and motions for
reconsiderations reveal his lack ofcandor and truthfulness.Although, the term
"good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, ithas been defined as
"including at least common dishonesty." It has alsobeen held that no moral
qualification for membership is more important thantruthfulness or candor.
In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in

some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations.
Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent. Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A.

Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers'
Association) as amici curiae.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written
by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star
Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page
of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline
in large letters - "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in
slightly smaller letters - "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One
School Favored," under the name - "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter
Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in full:
Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by

some of the law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter
this morning.
These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in

one subject, days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal
School.
Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed
questions on said subject fully one week before the tests.
The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the
tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen
students of this private university holding proudly around the city.
The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding
that the Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find
out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of
the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations.
The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations
came close on the heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official
organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines, on recent
government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of
nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools.
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have
been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the
Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of
Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and
investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of
the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be
stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of the Bar
Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August,
1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes
this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law,
and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was
promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations
yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the
Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and
finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and
examinees who have passed the examinations.
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on

which occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions directed to
him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news
item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a
spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the
information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to
reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence
and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The
investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the
confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar
Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said
examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public
service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants
so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the
necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take
action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and
anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the
revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the
Supreme Court as associate Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was
designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of
Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The
writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the
investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report
thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this
Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:
In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star
Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some
bar examination questions, which examinations were held in August 1948, Mr.
Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were
authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of
bar examiners to conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to receive the
testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of
said news item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948;
stenographic notes were taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice
Marcelino R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the committee of bar
examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of
this Court.
From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has
deliberately and consistently declined and refused to reveal the identity of
the persons supposed to have given him the data and information on which
his news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic
spirit, and for his cooperation, in order to enable this Court to conduct a
thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to

authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him
that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he
reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to
warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded
as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will
advise the Court of the result.
Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to
appear before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it
was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this
court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information and of
his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of
the people in general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in
particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it
also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who are
appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later
pass upon and correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it
also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in
the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was
further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in
investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions
and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that
without his help, specially the identities of the persons who furnished him the
information and who could give the court the necessary data and evidence,
the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no
basis from which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory.
Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be punished if he refused
to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over
and consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to do this
and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the
Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request, the
investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared,
accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this
opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court
Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal
demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath,
but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his
counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be
accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public
hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which,
Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking
the benefits of Republic Act No. 53 , the first section of which reads as
follows:
SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any

newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be
compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing
in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor
or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that
such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state.
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration,
involving as it does interesting and important points of law as well as
questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest
of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and
refers only to the security of the state, that is to say - that only when National
Security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to
reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess
that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which the conviction or
acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the Justice is not
unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic

Act No. 53, particularly the Senate were it originated, we examined the record
of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No.
6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill
prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a
publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under
no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his
information or news report. The committee, however, under the chairmanship
of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end
of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the public interest."
When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading,
Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an amendment by
eliminating the clause added by the committee - "unless the court finds that
such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause
would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was
discussed. Various Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already
referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving complete
immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed.
Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the

Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the
amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless
the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said
that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there
may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest
of the state required that the names of the informants be published or known.
He gave as one example a case of a newspaperman publishing information
referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued that if the
immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the
Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto
amendment was put to a vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto
proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the
end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and
substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase
public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment
was approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the
state" is confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public
safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed
by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the
state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the
records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that
the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with
the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended
by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public
interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used
in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the State" (interes del
Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and
discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest," Senator Sebastian
referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This
understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the
discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases
"public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness
or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first
Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the
phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was
involved, such as the theft of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was
obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the
state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose
to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we
can say that the phrase "interest of the state" can not be confined and
limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These
synonymous phrases, "security of the state" and "public safety," are not
uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar
with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the
Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of
communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and
Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President
may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion,
insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it.
The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the

Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, Crimes against National Security and the
law of Nations, Chapter I, Crimes against National Security. Then, more
recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in section 2, and the phrase
"public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No.
682 creating the People's Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as
contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had
meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases
where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it could
easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like
"public safety," "National Security," or "public security" of which it must have
been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that
was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase
"interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the exception
when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of
his information.
The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course
more general and broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad
and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything
though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance,
the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice
plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the estate" even under a
conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of
national importance in which the whole state and nations, not only a branch
or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the
public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of
Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such
matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine,
impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations,
integrity of the three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations
to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.
We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase
"interest of the state." Under constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13,
Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the
admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has
prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it
has equally prescribed the subject of the said Bar Examinations. Every year,
the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions,
then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later
make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination
candidates who are found to have obtained to passing grade are admitted to
the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of
the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practicing law or
occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a
prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds,
are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have
always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in
academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair
dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested
in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to
admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are
known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in
and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the
Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of public
knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in
this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as
compared to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The
predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges
of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact.
And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the
Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships
and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the
Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions.
Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar
Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and
national importance.
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find
their way out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the
examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees
succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later
admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should
not be, then the present members of the legal profession would have reason
to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before
the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally
lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person
contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it
would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case
has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate
preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of
those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in
advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal
career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by
intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly passed the Bar
Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this
anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from
the point of view of the public, they might be among those who had made
use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the
morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law
schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be
affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea that there is no
need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not
difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them
and be admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners
themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic
spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request
and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, ? one or two or more
of them ? that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption,
they have made possible the release if they have not themselves actually
released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The
employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar Examinations, specially
those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar
examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still,
the Supreme Court itself which has to overall supervision and control over the
examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence
of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of
this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and
shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and
will sufficiently cause the present case to fall and be included within the
meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not only
the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and
of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and
reputation of the members of the Committee of Bar Examiners, including the
employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connections with said
examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents
one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the
Philippine Government.
In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic

Act. No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general,
specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department,
to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and
render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in
the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct
of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the
Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have
previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity
of his informants, is essential and necessary to the investigation of the
charge contained in the publication already mentioned.
It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this
decision, that, informants, law graduates and bar examinees, were
denouncing the supposed anomaly ? consisting of the alleged leakage of the
Bar Examination questions ? to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If
those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective
denunciation, with expectation of results, the right place to air their grievance
was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an
investigation, they should have come forward and furnished or stood ready to
furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation,
instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that
Bar Examination questions in at least one subject had been obtained and
used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week before
the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers
during the investigation said that examination questions in several subjects
were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination
questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw
said alleged copies of examination questions; that they were actually and
carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on
the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and
willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have
been seen with the said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as
the university where they came from, was known; and even the law subjects
to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not
allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who
claim to have seen all these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in
August, 1948, approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each
candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were eight
subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar
examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and
multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a
total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in
the hand of eight different examiners. The examination books or papers bear
no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and
identification will not be known until the books or papers are all corrected and
graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath
that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed, ? evidence on the
identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions
prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects
or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court
does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and
desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books with
the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers of
any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or
conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this
Court may not and cannot base its findings and conclusions, especially in any
serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under
these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is
unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the
respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those
informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate
with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges
contained in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be
without basis, proof or foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that
he reveal the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by
mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an
investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations
clean and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the
Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing with
the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as
agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting
the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence
of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function
relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by
investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and
punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or
else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it
is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the
respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not
intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their
help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the
anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to
adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are
found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in
justice to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the
examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted
by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are
unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if,
as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is
found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think
that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too
long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and
make allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the
examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and
constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training
required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more
strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So,
in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of
questions long before examinations day, and study and prepare the answers
to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of
the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may
think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in
his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a
number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the
examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case
demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of
his information which formed the basis of his news items or story in the
September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his
decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court
required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly
stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the
persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and
still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power
to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he
can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand.
However, considering that case like the present are not common or frequent,
in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for
imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is
advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an
alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave, and,
considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the
members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his

immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month,
unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the
revelation demanded of him. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
Perfecto, J., concurring and dissenting:
The facts in this case, as narrated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Montemayor, justify conclusively the finding of the majority that respondent
is guilty of contempt for his stubborn refusal to obey an order of this Court.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53, invoked by respondent in his defense, does
not protect him. It would protect him only if we could agree with his theory
that the words "interest of the state" used in the law should be read to mean
security of the state or public safety. But there is nothing in the whole text of
Republic Act No. 53 and/or in the intention of those who drafted and enacted
it, as can be gleaned in the Senate journal, or in the grammatical, rhetorical,
or philosophical meaning of the words in question, that can justify the limiting
or narrowing of the scope of the ideas that they embrace within the small
circle of public security or safety of the state.
The word "interest" in the phrase "interest of the state" represents a world of
ideas and concepts within the ideas of security or safety occupy a place,
however privileged, insignificant in magnitude. There is no legal basis for us
to reduce the purpose of the law, as conveyed by its very words, to a
minimum that, if given effect, would virtually amend the law without the
benefit of congressional enactment. Such would be violative of the
Constitution.
In the tug of war between the theory of absolute privilege of the author of the
original bill and the Senate committee that would limit the privilege up to the
point where it runs in conflict with the wide area of public interest, the
opposing sides arrived at a meeting ground in which the line of limitation was
pushed up to the place where the privilege may be in conflict with the
interest of the state. No one is authorized to push that line of limitation still
farther to the fence surrounding the safety of the state. We have to stop at
the line of limitation set by Congress. To hurdle it is to transgress the law.
No matter how much we may agree with the side maintaining the absolute
privilege or reducing any limitation to an imaginable minimum, or how much
we may sympathize with its failure in the Senate or in Congress, we are
powerless to retrieve that side from its plight. We are not authorized to inject
in the statute a law of our own creation, or make of a legislative failure a
success, and thus defeat the legislative intent. There is no alternative for the
losing legislative side except to bide for time and wait for a more respective
mood of Congress.
Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially

if it consists in the disobedience of a judicial order. The orders of a court
demand obedience for their effectiveness. Administration of justice is
impossible with unenforceable judicial orders. The effectiveness of judicial
orders is the elan vital of the administration of justice. To disobey an order of
court is a terrible thing because it means sowing the seeds of anarchy and
chaos. The Supreme Court, if it can help it, will never allow such a thing to
obtain.
Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning

without an executive department or without a legislative department. As a
matter of fact, in this Republic, Congress functions only one third of the year.
During the remaining two thirds of the year the life of the nation does not
suffer any impairment. It can even be said that during those two thirds of the
year there is more normalcy than during the Congressional session when
legislative reforms and the enactment of new laws cannot but produce some
public uneasiness, sometimes, amounting to a real crisis in the way of life of
the people. No one can imagine the possibility of an orderly human society
without some effective system of administration of justice, functioning
without long interruptions.
While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial

authority to its full measure and this Supreme Court will never take lightly
any disobedience to or defiance of its orders, and it should mete out to all
affected parties the tremendous weight of its power and will punish, without
fear or favor, the guilty parties, regardless of who they may be, in the present
case we are constrained to disagree with the penalty imposed upon

respondent.
Respondent is punished under section 7 of Rule 64, the same section we have
already declared invalid in our opinion in the Harden case, 81 Phil. 741. The
provision of law applicable to respondent is contained in section 6 of Rule 64,
under which a person guilty of contempt may be fined in a sum not
exceeding P1,000 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.
Considering that there are mitigating circumstances that attenuate
respondent's responsibility, ? youthfulness, honest but wrong belief in the
existence of a privilege, absence of substantial harm, ? we should not impose
upon respondent a stiffer penalty than that which we imposed in the case of
Benito M. Sakdalan, L-2781, the very one which, as can be gleaned from the
Senate journal, prompted the enactment of Republic Act No. 53.
We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to

respondent the discretion to reduce the imprisonment imposed by the simple
process of making the revelation exacted from him. The penalty should be
measured by the responsibility, and that measure cannot be left at the
discretion of the guilty one. His future revelation will not diminish or in any
way affect his responsibility for the offense he has already perpetrated. His
past disobedience cannot be attenuated by a future action. The past cannot
be remade. What has been done cannot be undone. These are verities no one
can eloign.
We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
If, as insisted by the respondent, he wrote up and published in the newspaper

Star Reporter the story (Claim "Leak" in Last Bar Tests) quoted in full in the
decision of the majority, in good faith and in a spirit of public service, he
voluntarily should have revealed the identities of his informants, thereby
enabling this Court, conformably to the alleged demands of denouncing bar
examinees, to "institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the
source of the leakage, and annual the test papers of the students of the
particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations." If he
was in fact motivated by a spirit of public service, he should at least have
tried to secure their consent to the revelation. The point I want to underscore
is that newspaper reporters should be fearless as well in publishing stories as

in substantiating their truth. And if I am constrained to dissent from the ruling
of the majority, it is only because the respondent, in my opinion, cannot
legally be compelled to make the revelation, in view of Republic Act No. 53 ?
which this Court is bound to enforce ? providing that "the publisher, editor or
duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or
information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to
such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee
of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the
state." I have no hesitancy in believing that the phrase "interest of the state,"
as used in the Act, refers exclusively to matters affecting the security or
safety of the state.
In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the original bill sponsored

by Senator Sotto provided for absolute immunity. The committee on revision
of laws, however, inserted an amendment by adding the clause "unless the
court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest." Senator
Sotto's attempt to suppress this clause failed, after which, in view of the
remarks of the Chairman of the committee presently to be mentioned,
Senator Sotto proposed to change the words "public interest" into "interest of
the state," a proposal that was readily accepted. Hence, the use of the latter
phrase in Republic Act No. 53.
Our task now is to discover the meaning and scope of the phrase "interest of
the state," as intended by the lawmakers. In this task, it is important to recall
that the original intention of the author of the bill was to provide for absolute
immunity, and this purpose should not of course be unduly defeated by any
subsequent exception, especially when the limited sphere of the change is
apparent from the deliberations of the lawmakers. For instance, in explaining
the reason of the committee for opposing Senator Sotto's advocacy of
absolute immunity and of the suppression of the clause "unless the court
finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," added to the
original bill, Senator Cuenco gave the example of a newspaperman who
publishes an information regarding theft of plans of forts and fortifications, in
which case Senator Cuenco believed that "el interes publico y el interes
mismo del Estado requieran que se publique el nombre del informante."
Again, after proposing the change of "public interest" to "interest of the
state," Senator Sotto, when asked by Senator Garcia as to the essential
difference between the two phrases, explained that "La diferencia esta en
que puede haber un caso de espionaje, como el citado por el Senador
Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el Estado y no se puede discutir al
autor, y la frase `public interest' es muy elastica. En cambio, se se pone
`interest of the state,' claramente se entenderia que mediando el interes del
Estado, el periodista estara obligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion."

Last but not least, it should be noted that the Act in question was prompted
by the desire of its sponsor to prevent the repetition of the case of Benito
Sakdalan, a reporter who was imprisoned for refusing to reveal the source of
the information contained in a news item admittedly not affecting, like the
story published by the respondent, the security or safety of the State. It
logically follows that the phrase "interest of the state" was intended to be
limited to cases portrayed by the examples (theft of plans of forts and
fortifications and espionage), given during the deliberations which solely
affect the security or safety of the state.
It is immaterial whether the law did not employ phrases like "public safety,"
"national Security," or "public security," or whether "public interest" and
"interest of the state" were interchangeably used in the discussions, as long
as in using the phrase "interest of the state" in Act No. 53, the lawmakers
definitely knew and accordingly recorded, by specific examples, what they
intended to convey. Conjectures cannot prevail over the clear legislative
intent.
The exception provided in the Act in question should be strictly construed so

as not to frustrate the main purpose of the law. This would further make the
law more consonant with the spirit of the constitutional provisions that "the
privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the Court or when public safety and order require
otherwise"(Article III, section 1, paragraph 5), and that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of the press (Article III, section 1, paragraph 8).
It may not be amiss to add that the refusal of the respondent to disclose the
source of his information does not absolutely prevent this Court from
verifying, by any reasonable and feasible means, the truth of the alleged
anomaly; and it is certainly not required, by the mere publication of the story
in question, to admit the accuracy of said story if its investigation should fail
because of lack of evidence or of the refusal of those who know to come out
and testify.
In my opinion, the respondent has not committed any contempt of this Court.
PANGAN VS RAMOS
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty.

Dionisio Ramos was delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before
a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was checked (one which
Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the name Atty. Pedro
D.D. Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such
name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio
Ramos. D.D. stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mothers
surname. However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D.
Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the
names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is
not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney
solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of
justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and
frankness. In representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead
of Dionisio D. Ramos, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has
resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty.
Ramos and warned that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or
disbarment.
IN RE GUTIERREZ
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon
Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In
1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional
pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall not
commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment
case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that
he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It
merely remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez
must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to
the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by
treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the
time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude
involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.
NARIDO VS LINSANGAN
This case arose from a labor dispute where Atty. Rufino Risma represented
Flora Narido, an indigent client against her employer Vergel De Dios, the
client of Atty. Jaime Linsangan. During the proceedings in the trial court, Atty.
Risma vehemently opposed the submission of a certain affidavit executed by
De Dios because, in the belief of Risma, said affidavit is perjured. He
threatened Atty. Linsangan that if said affidavit is submitted in court, they
shall file a disbarment case against him. The affidavit was filed and so Risma
and Narido filed an administrative case against Linsangan.
Linsangan on the other hand filed a separate administrative case against

Risma where he accused Risma of instigating his client to file an
administrative case against him; that said administrative case is groundless;
that it was only filed to spite him and is just a mere scheme to threaten him
and to ensure that Risma and Narido has an edge over the labor case.
ISSUE: Whether or not both administrative cases should prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the Solicitor General
where it was recommended that both administrative cases are not well
merited.
In the administrative case against Linsangan, it was found out that there is no
sufficient evidence to prove that De Dios affidavit is perjured. Or if even so,
there is no showing that Linsangan was in bad faith for it was not proven that
he has the intention of misleading the court.
In the administrative case against Risma, it was not proven that he instigated
Narido. It was Rismas zeal in protecting his clients interest that made him to
convince Narido to file an administrative case against Linsangan. There was
no bad faith on the part of Risma. He even advanced the expenses because
Narido is indigent.
HOWEVER, it was found that Risma made an arrangement with Narido that he
shall collect 15% from whatever amount they shall collect from De Dios as a
result of the labor case. Risma was admonished for this; that under the
Workmens Compensation Act, hes only allowed to collect a maximum of
10%. Hes advised to keep abreast of said law.
LAPUT VS REMOTIGUE
In 1952, Atty. Laput was retained by Nieves Barrera as counsel in a testate
proceeding. He remained as counsel for three years. But in January 1955,
Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug filed his written appearance as new counsel for
Barrera. When Laput found out about Patalinghugs appearance, he
voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Barrera on February
5, 1955. On February 7, 1955, Atty. Remotigue also filed his appearance as
additional counsel for Barrera.
Laput is now charging the two lawyers of unethical and improper

appearances for Barrera; that they influenced her to replace Laput as her
counsel; that they caused her to disauthorize him as counsel for her; that the
purpose of said lawyers is to embarrass Laput to the officials and employees
of the corporations owned by the estate subject of the testate proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is encroachment of client in the case at bar.
HELD: No. It was found out that Barrera herself caused the filing of a pleading
to discharge Laput as her counsel. Barrera did this because she lost trust and
confidence in Laput. She lost trust in Laput because she found out that there
were some dividend checks that were supposed to be sent to her but Laput
took said checks as his own hence she felt cheated.
Thereafter, she went to the law office of Remotigue and Patalinghug where
she arranged a contract. The fact that Laput voluntarily asked the court to
discharge him as counsel for Barrera after Patalinghug filed his entry of
appearance showed Laputs acquiescence to Patalinghugs appearance as
counsel for Barrera. This should estop petitioner from now complaining that
the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug was unprofessional. On the part of
Remotigue, there can be no irregularity for he filed his entry of appearance
only after Laput was discharged as counsel for Barrera.
Camacho vs. Pangulayan
FACTS:
PANGULAYAN INDICTED FOR VIOLATION OF CANON 9: Lawyer should not
communicate upon subject of controversy with a party represented by
counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. Lawyer must avoid
everything that may tend to mislead party not represented by counsel and
should not advise him as to law.
HIRED LAWYER OF DEFENDANTS who had compromised agreements with
CAMACHOS CLIENTS.
Required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against
AMACC (principal defendant) and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it.
i.
Denied that they had negotiations,
discussion, formulation or execution.
ii.
No longer connected with Pagulayan and
Associates Law Offices.

iii.
Re-Admission Agreements nothing to do with
DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE involving 9 students of AMACC.
1. Civil case involved publishing of features or articles in Editorial Board of
DATALINE.
2. Found guilty by Student Disciplinary Tribunal of using indecent language
and unauthorized use of student publication funds.
3. Expulsion
a. Students appeal and was denied by the AMACC President which gave rise
to civil case.
b. During civil case, apology letters and Re-Admission Agreements were
separately executed by some expelled students.
ISSUE:
Does the Re-Admission Agreements have nothing to do with DISMISSAL OF

CIVIL CASE involving 9 students of AMACC?
HELD:
3 MONTHS SUSPENSION AND DISMISSAL OF CASE AGAINST OTHER
RESPONDENTS THAT DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE NEGOTIATION.
Individual letters and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized in which
PANGULAYAN was already counsel of AMACC.
Had full knowledge; did not discuss it with the students parents or their
counsel.
i.
Re-Admission Agreements affected the
dismissal of the civil case because signatories agreed to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings against AMACC.
W. W. ROBINSON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO VILLAFUERTE Y RAOLA, defendant-appellant.
R. Diokno for appellant.

Haussermann, Cohn and Fisher for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit in the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas against Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola, alleging as a first cause of
action: That the plaintiff was engaged, in the city of Manila and at the time
specified further on, in the importation and sale of flour and other products
from abroad, with an office in the city of Manila, a business which he still
continued, through the agency of Castle Brothers, Wolf & Sons, established
therein; that the defendant, a resident of Lucena, Tayabas, by an instrument
duly executed on October 19, 1906, by his attorney in fact and legal
representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and
authorized for the purpose, and ratified on the same date before the notary
public of Manila, D. R. Williams, acknowledged and confessed that he owed
the plaintiff the net sum of P3,852.50; that by the said instrument duly
executed the defendant bound and pledged himself to pay to the plaintiff the
said sum of P3,852.50 in four monthly installments from that date, at the rate
of P1,000 for each of the first three installments and P852.50 for the last one,
and likewise the interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, to be
adjusted and paid at the time of paying each of the installments fixed; that in
the said instrument the defendant moreover bound himself to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P500 for costs and expenses, in case the latter should
recur to judicial process for the collection of the aforementioned debt; and
that, as security for the payment of the said debt, of the interest thereon and
of the amount for costs and expenses, the defendant voluntarily executed, by
means of the said instrument and in favor of the plaintiff, a special mortgage
upon the properties of his absolute ownership and control, which are:
A., p. 72, back. A rural estate, No. 433, consisting of land planted in coconut
trees, in the barrio of Dumacaa of the municipality of Lucena, and containing
an area of 2 hectares, 57 ares, and 73 centares.
B., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 434, consisting of coconut land in the barrio of
Canlorang Mayao, Lucena, 2 hectare, 4 ares, and 78 centares in area.
C., p. 73. A rural estate, No 435, consisting of unirrigated land containing

1,200 coconut trees, in the same barrio of Lucena, and with and are of 7
hectares, 81 ares, and 4 centares.
D., p. 74. A rural estate, No 436, consisting of coconut land containing 700
coconut trees, in the barrio of Silangan Mayao, Lucena, and with and area of
1 hectare and 84 centares.
E., p. 74. back. A rural estate, No 438, consisting of land planted with 300
coconut trees, in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena, and measuring 52 ares and 66
centares in area.
F., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 439, consisting of coconut land containing 500
coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo, with an area of 98 ares and 66
centares.
G., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 440, consisting of coconut land containing
800 coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo, with an area of 36 ares and
5 centares.
H., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 441, consisting of coconut land containing
300 coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo, measuring 50 ares and 73
centares.
I., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 914, consisting of improved land, planted with
1,000 coconut trees situated in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena, of 7 hectares,
12 ares, and 60 centares in area.
J., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 915, consisting of improved land, planted with
100 coconut trees and situated in the barrio Cotta, Lucena, of 93 ares and 22
centares in area.
K., p. 79. A rural estate, No. 916, consisting of improved land, planted with
200 coconut trees and situated in the same barrio and pueblo, of 13 ares and
4 centares in area.
The respective bounderies of each one of the estates above enumerated

were set fourth in the said instrument of mortgage, which was duly inscribed
in the property registry of Tayabas. This deed does not appear to have been
canceled, and constitutes an encumbrance on the properties described in
favor of the plaintiff. It was stated in the instrument referred to, that the
liability of the property mortgaged was distributed in the following manner:
The estate described under letter A responded for P800 of the
debt and for the sum of P75 as costs .......................................................... P

875.00
Estate letter B, liability P200, costs

P40 ............................................................... 240.00
Estate letter C, liability P160, costs

P40 ............................................................... 200.00
Estate letter D, liability P130, costs

P40 ............................................................... 170.00
Estate letter E, liability P92.50, costs

P30 ............................................................. 122.50
Estate letter F, liability P150, costs

P40 ................................................................ 190.00
Estate letter G, liability P280, costs

P40 ............................................................... 320.00
Estate letter H, liability P250, costs

P40 ............................................................... 290.00
Estate letter I, liability P1,400, costs

P75 .............................................................. 1,475.00
Estate letter J, liability P260, costs

P40 ................................................................. 300.00
Estate letter K, liability P130, costs

P40 ............................................................... 170.00
Total ..........................................................................................................
4,352.50
It was stated further, as an express condition, that default of payment of any

of the installments specified in the fourth preceding paragraph would cause
the entire obligation to mature and would entitle the plaintiff (it says
"defendant") to require the payment of the same in its totality and forthwith
to institute foreclosure proceedings against any and all of the mortgage
properties.
The complaint further alleged, as a first cause of action, that, notwithstanding

the repeated demands made upon the defendant, the latter had not paid his
debt nor the interest thereon, excepting the sum of P550, paid on different
dates on account of the debt and interest due, wherefore the defendant owed
the plaintiff the sum of P3,302.50, the remainder of his debt and besides
P385.57 as interest due from December 6, 1906, to the date of the filling of
the complaint; that the plaintiff was then the legal owner of the mortgage,
and that he had not been paid the whole nor any part of the sum expressed
in the preceding paragraph.
As a second cause of action against the defendant, the complaint alleged,

among other things: That the defendant, by means of an instrument duly
executed on December 21, 1906, by his attorney in fact and legal
representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and
authorized an instrument ratified on the same date before the notary
Daniel R. Williams and in consideration of the credit which the plaintiff
agreed to allow the said defendant up to the sum of P3,560, executed a
special voluntary mortgage of the properties of his absolute ownership and
control which are described as follows:
No. 1, p. 72. Estate No. 432, first inscription, volume 28, general register;
coconut land containing 1,000 coconut trees, 26 hectares, 56 ares, and 87
centares in area, situated in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena. A part of this
land is planted with coconut and nipa palm trees and the rest is arable.
No. 2, p. 72, back. Estate No. 433, first inscription of the same volume;
centares in area, situated in the same barrio and pueblo.

centares in area, situated in the barrio of Canlorang Mayao, Lucena.
No. 6, p. 74. Estate No. 436, first inscription of the same volume; coconut
land containing 7,000 coconut trees, 1 hectare, 88 ares, and 54 centares in
area, situated in the barrio of Silangan Mayao, Lucena.
No. 7 p. 74, back. Estate No. 438, first inscription of the volume aforesaid;
coconut land, 52 ares and 66 centares in area, containing 300 coconut trees
and situated in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena.
No. 8, p. 75. Estate No. 439, first inscription of the same volume; coconut
land, 98 ares and 66 centares in area, containing 500 coconut trees and
situated in the same barrio and pueblo.
No. 9, p. 75, back. Estate No. 440, first inscription of the volume mentioned;
coconut land, 36 ares and 5 centares are, containing 500 coconut trees and
also located in the same barrio and pueblo.
No. 10, p. 75, back. Estate No. 441, first inscription of the said volume;
coconut land, 50 ares and 73 centares in are, containing 300 coconut trees
and located in the same barrio and pueblo.
No. 11, p. 73. Estate No. 914, consisting of improved land planted with 1,000
coconut trees, located in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena, with an area of 7
hectares, 12 ares, and 60 centares.
No. 12, p. 76. Estate No. 915, volume 106 general register; an improved piece
of land, 93 ares and 22 centares in area, containing 800 coconut trees and
situated in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena.
No. 13, p. 79. Estate No. 916, volume 106 general register; an improved piece
of land, 13 ares and 4 centares in area, containing 200 coconut trees and
situated in the same barrio and pueblo.
No. 14, p. 127. Estate No. 932, volume 106 general register; an improved
piece of coconut land, 2 hectares, 79 ares, and 49 centares in area,
containing 2,000 coconut trees and located in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena.
The respective boundaries of each of the estates above enumerate were set
forth in the said instrument of mortgage, which was duly inscribed in the
property registry of Tayabas, and does not appear to have been cancelled,
and constitutes an encumbrance on the properties described, in favor of the
plaintiff. It was stated, in the instrument referred to, that the liability of the
property mortgaged was distributed in the following manner:
The estate described under No. 1 responded for P800 of the debt and for the
sum of P90 as costs ...............................................
P890.00
Estate No. 2, liability P420, costs P40 ...........................................
460.00
460.00
160.00
130.50
130.00
160.00
150.00
150.00
Estate No. 10, liability P110, cost P40 ...........................................
150.00
105.00
150.00
120.00
Estate No. 14, liability P900, costs P90 .........................................
999.00
Total .....................................................................................
4,160.00
That the aforementioned mortgage was executed as security for the payment
to the plaintiff of the sum or sums which the defendant might owe him by
reason of the said credit, which was granted under the following terms and
conditions:
1. That the said credit should not exceed the sum of P3,560 and was granted
for the period of six months from the 20th of November, 1906, and defendant
was to make use of it in taking flour from the plaintiff's warehouse, at current
prices, by means of written duebills or orders signed by the defendant or by
his attorney in fact.
2. That the said written duebills or orders should be paid within thirty days
from their date, and it was stipulated that the amount or value of each one of
them should bear an annual interest of 8 per cent from the date of their
maturity, if not paid before.
3. That total amount of what the defendant might be owing, by reason of the
said credit, should be settled and entirely paid, together with the interest
thereon, by the 20th of May, 1907, on which date all the orders or duebills
issued by the defendant against the said credit should be considered as
matured, even though the extension above mentioned should not have
expired.
4. That it should be optional be optical on the part of the plaintiff to honor the
duebills or orders which the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte might issue
against the said credit, in the event that the latter should fail to pay the
amount of his previous duebills or orders at the time they should respectively
fall due, or should fail to comply with and observe any of the conditions and
stipulations contained in the said instrument of October 19, 1906, ratified
before notary Williams; that the defendant should be bound to pay to the
plaintiff P600, in case of litigation, and also to pay all the expenses that might
be occasioned by the execution of the said instrument of December 21, 1906,
those of its inscription in the registry, cancellation, and release, as well as the
expenses incurred by the plaintiff on account of the instrument of October 19,
1906, referred to in the first cause of action, together with those of its
inscription in the registry; provided, moreover, that the aforementioned
instrument of December 21, 1906, should be retroactive in its effect from the
20th of November of the same year, and that the flour which the said
defendant, through his attorney in fact, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, had
withdrawn from the plaintiff's warehouses since the 20th of November, 1906,
should be include in the credit opened; that the estates described under the
Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, bore a first mortgage in favor of
the plaintiff executed as security for the obligation, the fulfillment of which is
demanded in the first cause of action; that, by clause 14 of the said
instrument of December 21, 1906, it was stipulated that in case W. W.
Robinson, the plaintiff, should have to institute foreclosure proceedings
against the property above described, either by reason of the mortgage
hereby placed on the same, or of the obligation affecting the said property, in
his favor, by virtue of the said instrument of October 19 of the present year,
Robinson should be entitled to take charge of the management of all or any
of the said realities until they should be sold, and to collect their revenues,
rentals, fruits, and products for the purpose of applying the same to the
payment of the judgment; that, by clause 15 of the said instrument of
December 21, 1906, it was also stipulated that it was expressly covenanted
that, in case Robinson should have to proceed judicial against the property
therein mentioned in order to collect any amount to the payment of which

they were subject, all the orders or duebills issued on account of the credit
granted in the said instrument should be considered as matured and payable,
and Robinson should be entitled forthwith to demand the payment of any
balance found to be due him by Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola, with the
privilege of levying upon all or any of the realities comprised with the
mortgage mentioned in the said instrument; that the amount credited for the
expenses referred to in No. 7 of the fifth paragraph of this cause of action
reached P174.95; that the defendant, availing himself of the credit granted in
the aforementioned instrument of December 21, 1906, took and withdrew
from the plaintiff's warehouses, on different dates between the 20th of
November and the 19th of December, 1906, inclusive, various quantities of
flour, the total value of which amounted to P5,588.15; that the defendant had
not paid any part of this amount, except the sum of P375.00, and was owing
a balance of P5,213.15; that at the time of the complaint the said defendant
owed the plaintiff the sums of P174.95 and P5,213.15, in addition to P503.79
as interest due up to the date of the complaint; that the plaintiff was then the
legal owner of the mortgage above referred to, and that none of the sums
mentioned nor any part thereof had been paid to him: wherefore the plaintiff
asked that judgement be rendered in his favor against the defendant, for the
following amounts: (1) For the sum of P3,302.50, the principal demanded in
the first course of action, and interest thereon at 8 per cent per annum from
date until its payment; (2) for the sum of P385.57, as interest due on the
principal mentioned in the preceding paragraph and remaining unpaid, and,
in addition, the interest on this sum at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from
the date of the complaint until paid; (3) for the sum of P5,213.15, the amount
of the debt claimed in the second cause of action, together with the interest
thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from date until it's payment; (4)
for the sum of P503.79, the interest due on the principal mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from
date until payment; (5) for the sum of P174.95, claimed in paragraph 9 of the
second cause of action, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from
the date of the complaint until payment; and, (6) for the sum of 1,000 for
costs and attorney's fees.
The plaintiff further prayed that an order be issued directing the delivery to
the plaintiff of the properties described in the complaint, in order that he
might administer them during the course of this suit and until they should
ultimately be sold, and authorizing him to collect and receive the revenues,
rentals, fruits, and other products of the said estates and to retain them in his
possession in order to satisfy the judgment that would be rendered in this
case, and that in case the said judgment be not satisfied thereby, the sale of
the said properties be ordered and the proceeds thereof be applied to the
purpose.
The defendant, in his answer, made a general and specific denial of each and
all of the allegations of the plaintiff for each and all of the actions instituted
by him in each and all of the paragraphs of the complaint, and as a special
defense, and in his crosscomplaint, alleged: That the defendant did not
execute, consent to, nor authorize the execution of a power of attorney of any
kind whatsoever in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, empowering the
latter to mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, to the plaintiff or to any
person whatever, any of the properties mentioned in the complaint, nor to
accept from and open with the plaintiff any credit nor establish with him any
business in flour; nor execute any power of attorney nor grant any authority
whatever in favor of the said Concepcion so that the latter might represent
him and accept in his name credit, or moneys whatsoever from any person;
nor dispose of, mortgage, or encumber any of the properties described in the
complaint; that the defendant received no sum whatever from the plaintiff
nor was he in the latter's debt for the amount claimed in the complaint, nor
for any other sum of money; that he did not give his consent to all of to any
one of the mortgages alleged in the complaint, and that all the said
mortgages on the properties therein mentioned were founded on a supposed
power of attorney said to have been executed by the defendant in favor of
Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, which power of attorney was fictitious, false,
fraudulent, null and void, that it was not executed by the defendant, nor did
the latter intervene therein and that the said power of attorney had no true
reason for existence; wherefore the defendant asked that judgment be
rendered absolving him from the complaint with the costs against the
plaintiff, by annulling each and all of the mortgages alleged in the complaint
and the inscription of each of them in the office of the register of property of
Tayabas, and by ordering the cancellation of all the inscriptions of the said
mortgages and encumbrances of the aforementioned properties.
The plaintiff, in answering to the counter complaint, set up a general and

specific denial of each and all of the allegations of the defendant with respect
to each and all of the actions brought by him in each and all of the
paragraphs of the counter complaint, and prayed that judgment be
pronounced in his favor, and against the defendant, in conformity with the
petitions made in his complaint.
The case came up for hearing on November 30, 1908, and after the
presentation of oral evidence by both parties, the documentary evidence
being attached to the record, the court, on December 15 of the same year,
rendered judgment whereby it directed that the plaintiff should recover from
the defendant the sum specified in the first instrument of mortgage,
P3,302.50, as principal, the additional sum of P385.57 as interest up to April
30, 1908, besides the interest on the said principal, at the rate of 8 percent
per annum from the date just above mentioned until its complete payment,
also the P500 stipulated in the said instrument as payable by the defendant
as costs and expenses in case of litigation; and the sum mentioned in the
second instrument of mortgage, P5,213.15 as principal, besides P503.79, as
interest up to the 30th day of April, 1908, in addition to the interest on the
said principal at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, form the date just of
P174.95, as expenses for the execution of the instrument, for its inscription,
cancellation, and acquaintance, as provided for in clause 17 of the said
instrument, and the additional sum of P600, which it was stipulated in the
second instrument the defendant should pay for costs and expenses in case
of litigation. The judgment further ordered that the defendant should pay the
several amounts above mentioned, with the interest and costs, on or before
the first day of the sitting of the court in April, 1909, and that, in case such
order should not be compiled with, the mortgages should be foreclosed and a
final writ should be issued directing that all the properties before described
the sold, the proceeds of the sale to pay the principal, interest, and costs. The
defendant, when notified of this judgement, took exception thereto,
announced that he would file a bill of exceptions, and moved for a new trial
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the judgment
rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied and
exception was taken by the appellant, who filed the proper bill of exceptions,
which was certified to, approved, and forwarded to the clerk of this court. By
an order of March 1, 1909, it was provided that the execution of the aforesaid
judgment should not be suspended pending the appeal, unless the
defendant, for the reasons stated in the said order, should give a bond for
P10,000.
The purpose of the suit filed by the plaintiff, W. W. Robinson, is the collection
of various sums owed by the defendant, Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola, the
payment of which is secured by a mortgage on the real properties set out in
the two notarial documents evidencing the debt, exhibited under letter A and
B, and inscribed in the property registry of the Province of Tayabas.
The mortgage action brought by the creditor, based upon the two
aforementioned notarial documents is proper, inasmuch as it is sought to
collect certain sums specified in the said instruments on account of their not
having been paid within the periods therein stipulated, and consequently the
real properties offered as security for the solvency of the debts contracted by
the debtor are duly liable for the satisfaction of the same; and although the
credit of P3,852.50, the value of the flour furnished to Camilio C. Gomez, in
account with the defendant, and referred to in the instrument lettered A, was
to have been paid in four installments from October 19, 1906, at the rate of
P1,000 in each one of the three first months and P852.50 in the fourth and
last month, yet since the debtor, notwithstanding the demands made upon
him, did not comply with his obligation nor pay his debt in conformity with
the tenor of the said instrument, letter A, for he only paid the creditor the
sum of P550 delivered partially on different dates, the default of payment of
any of the installments agreed upon produces the effect that all of these
must be deemed to have matured and entitles the creditor to demand the
payment of his entire credit and to proceed against the mortgaged properties
for the purpose of collecting his credit, which amounts to P3,302.50, after the
deduction of the said P550 from the principal, with the interest due from the
6th of December, 1906, amounting to P385.57.
With respect to the credit mentioned in the instrument, Exhibit B, and

granted by the plaintiff to the defendant Villafuerte under agreement that the
latter should make use of the said credit by taking flour from the creditor's
warehouse by means of written duebills or orders signed by the debtor, or his
attorney in fact, under condition that the value or amount of the said duebills
should be paid within thirty days from their date and that these
acknowledgments of debts should bear interest of 8 per cent per annum from
the date of their maturity, it was also a condition that the aforesaid
instrument should be deemed to be retroactive in its effect, from November
20, 1906, that the quantities of flour which were taken from the plaintiff's
warehouse since the said November 20, 1906, should be considered as
included, and that the total amount of whatever the defendant might owe, by
reason of the credit mentioned together with the interest thereon, should be
settled and entirely paid on May 20, 1907, on which date all the orders or
duebills issued against the said credit should be deemed to have matured,
even though the thirty days' delay stipulated should not have expired.
In view of the fact that the defendant succeeded in withdrawing flour to the
value of P5,078.15, without his having paid the amount due therefor, except
P375, it can not be denied that there still remains a balance to be paid of
P4,703.15 (pp. 5 and 88 of the record).
In the account, Exhibit E, there appears a statement of the sacks of flour

which were taken on account of the said credit by means of the nine duebills,
Exhibit F, attached to the aforementioned account, in which it also appears
that the value of the said sacks of flour was P4,703.15, after the deduction of
P375.
The complaint which gave rise to the present suit is in accordance with the
provisions of section 255 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the mortgages
constituted in the two instruments aforementioned fulfill the conditions and

requirements prescribed in articles 1857, 1874, and 1875 of the Civil Code;
wherefore judgment should be rendered favorable to the mortgage creditor,
in accordance with section 256, and following, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The defendant debtor denied the existence of the obligations contained in the
said instruments; he asserted that the latter, and the powers of attorney
executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion were false, and likewise
denied that he owed the plaintiff any of the amounts claimed in the
complaint, or that he had authorized the said Concepcion to mortgage the
realties described in the said complaint, and in asking for his release, he
prayed that the aforementioned mortgages and the inscriptions of the same
in the property registry be declared null and void.
If it is true, as it appears to be, that the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte y

Raola executed, on July 11 and October 29, 1906, in this city, the powers of
attorney, Exhibits C and D, in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, before the
notaries Eugenio de Lara and Daniel R. Williams, respectively, it not having
been proved at trial that the said powers of attorney were false or null and
void, the mortgages upon the real properties, executed by the attorney in
fact, duly authorized for the purpose, in the instruments designated under
letter A and B, the first of them ratified in the notarial record, letter G, by the
debtor before the same notary, Williams, must be accepted as valid and in
force, inasmuch as the said mortgage deeds appear to have been ratified in
due form by contracting or interested parties before the said notary in Manila,
it not having been proven at trial that they contained any flaw or defect
which might operate to annul them.
The evidence adduced by the defendant in his attempt to prove that, on the
two dates before mentioned, when the said two powers of attorney appear to
have been executed, he was in Lucena, Tayabas, and not in this city of
Manila, has not resulted in defeating the validity, authenticity, and force of
the said powers of attorney, for the truth of their contents as well as their
ratification by the person executing them was certified to by notaries before
whom they were exhibited respectively in the presence of two witnesses; the
oral testimony presented by the defendant was insufficient to prove that the
notaries Lara and Williams untruthfully certified that Marcelino Villafuerte,
whom they attested under oath that they knew, personally appeared before
them and ratified in its totality the contents of the aforementioned document,
declaring that he had executed it freely and voluntarily and exhibited for the
purpose his cedula, No. 453963, issued in Lucena, Tayabas, on January 15,
1906.
In order to establish the conclusion, as the logical result of the evidence, that
the said two notaries, falsely, and entirely irrespective of the truth, issued the
certificates which appear under their respective signatures and seals at the
foot of the powers of attorney, letters C and D, it is not sufficient to prove, by
means of the testimony of witnesses, (mostly relatives) and by
unauthenticated documents, that on the dates of the execution of the powers
of attorney the persons executing them was not here in Manila, where the
instruments were certified to, but in Lucena, Tayabas; clear, strong, and
irrefutable proof must be adduced to prove that the said notaries could not
have averred that the said person was actually in their presence, that they
heard him ratify the contents of the respective documents, and could have
certified to the number of his cedula, the only one exhibited to both notaries,
without having ostensibly perverted the truth. The defendant himself, who
averred that he was in Lucena on July 11, 1906, the date of the first power of
attorney, said that he was not sure whether on October 29 of the same year,
the date of the second, he was in the said pueblo or in this city of Manila.
Public instruments authenticated by a notary or by a competent public

official, with the formalities required by law, are evidence, even against a
third person, of the fact which gives rise to their execution and of the date of
the latter. They shall also be evidence against the contracting parties and
their legal representatives with regard to the declarations the former may
have therein. (Arts. 1216 and 1218, Civil Code.)
The force of proof of depositions of witnesses shall be weighed by the courts

in accordance with the provisions of the law of civil procedure, taking care to
avoid that, by the simple coincidence of some depositions, unless their
truthfulness be evident, the affairs may be finally decided in which
instruments, private documents, or any basis of written evidence are usually
made use of. (Art. 1248, Civil Code.)
The defendant debtor having been requested by letter, in the beginning of

the year 1907, to pay his debt, were it true that he had not contracted the
obligations contained in the instruments lettered A and B, nor executed in
favor of Vicente Marcelo the powers of attorney lettered C and D, would have
at that time made the proper investigations and taken the necessary steps
for the annulment or invalidation of the said instruments. The defendant did
not even attempt to do anything of the kind, and we do not find any just
reason nor any legal ground whatever to warrant a discussion of the
conclusion arrived at by the evidence presented in this suit.
Were it true that on the dates of the 11th of July and the 29th of October,
1906, the defendant Villafuerte was in Lucena, Tayabas, and not in Manila, it
is not understood how two notaries who attested that they personally knew
him could have certified that, on the respective dates aforementioned, the
said defendant appeared in person before them, ratified the instrument of
power of attorney which he had executed, and, to identify his personality,
exhibited to the said notaries his certificate of registration, the only one and
the same one which he presented at each of his appearances on the said
dates. Without proof, nor rational, acceptable explanation, it is impossible to
believe that the personal certificate of registration, which identifies a citizen,
was for some four months in the possession of another person residing in a
distant place. It was not proved in a satisfactory manner at the trial how or
why the said cedula, or registration certificate, came to remain for so long a
time in the possession of the Chinaman Sy Chuy Chim or of Vicente Marcelo,
as averred by the defendant or his counsel, and under this supposition, so
strange, anomalous, and out of the ordinary rule that every citizen should
necessarily keep his certificate of identification in his possession, no
explanation whatever was given by the defendant's counsel as to the purpose
for which the defendant parted with his cedula and sent it to either the said
Chinaman or Marcelo. The Chinaman was not examined in this litigation and
the attorney in fact, Marcelo, denied that he had received the said cedula
sent by his constituent. So that for the reasons hereinbefore stated, it is
evident that the defendant Villafuerte personally exhibited the said cedula to
the two aforementioned notaries, on his ratification of the respective
instrument of power of attorney before each one of them, and it is not
permissible to conclude that the instruments of power of attorney executed
by the defendant, as well as the certifications subscribed by the notaries Lara
and Williams, are false, because of the absolute absence of proof as a
foundation for such a charge; for a notarial document, guaranteed by public
attestation in accordance with the law, must be sustained in full force and
affect so long as he who impugns it shall not have presented strong,
complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaw
or detect provided against by law.
Although the documents exhibited by the defendant's counsel could not, for
lack of proof of their authenticity, destroy or impair the value and force of the
notarial documents or instruments on which the plaintiff's claim is based, it is,
however, to be noted that Pedro Cantero, whose signature appears attached
to the papers found on pages 159, 162, and 170, of the record, was not
examined either, even for the purpose of identifying his signature, he being a
Spaniard and an attorney it is not possible to believe that he wrote the
aforementioned documents in the form and style in which they appear to
have been drawn up; wherefore, on account of these circumstances, it is
reasonable to presume that the documents of pages 159 and 170, and the
note of page 162, of the record, were not authentic.
It is also to be observed, in the document or letter found on page 136 of the

record, and which also was unauthenticated, that the aforementioned dates
of the 11th of July, 1906, appear therein with a correction, made in the proper
place, of the figures 11 and 6 of the first date, a repetition and details which
induce the presumption that the said letter was written on a different date.
By the foregoing it has been duly shown that the fourth, fifth, sixth, and
seventh errors attributed to the judgment are devoid of reason and legal
foundation. With respect to the third error alleged we hold that the admission
of the documents designated by the letters L and M was proper for the
purpose for which they were presented, because that of letter L is an original
and one of the triplicates drawn up for a single purpose, as stated therein,
and that of letter M is also an original ratified before a notary, in the
certificate of which, dated July 13, 1906, there certainly appears an
annotation of the dame number 453963 of the cedula of the defendant
Villafuerte which he exhibited to the notaries who authenticated the powers
of attorney Exhibits C and D.
With regard to the first two alleged errors, relative to Jose Moreno Lacalle
being permitted to address questions to some of the witnesses during the
hearing of the case, notwithstanding the presence of Attorney Agustin
Alvarez, who represented the plaintiff, it is unquestionable that the
intervention of the said law clerk and employee of Messrs. Haussermann,
Cohn & Williams, the plaintiff's attorneys in this suit, was improperly
admitted; it was not authorized by any law, for the reason that the said
Lacalle did not have the capacity and qualifications of a lawyer admitted
under oath to practice his profession before the courts of these Islands, and
therefore, on objection being made to his present at the hearing of the case,
the judge should have sustained such objection and should have excluded
Lacalle and not permitted him to address questions to the plaintiff's
witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that Attorney Agustin Alvares, designated
in substitution of the said Haussermann, Cohn & Williams as the plaintiff's
representative in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, was present.
Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the course of some of the

proceedings under the direction of Jose Moreno Lacalle are not subject to
annulment, as no positive detriment was caused to the defendant, although
such intervention is in no manner permitted by the law of procedure.
However, even though the questions addressed by Lacalle to the plaintiff's

witnesses and the presentation of documents of various kinds exhibited at
the trial be stricken out for the reason that they were made by a person who
was neither a party to the suit nor counsel for the plaintiff, yet we do not find
any reason, based upon any positive prohibition of the law, to authorize the
striking out to the answers given by the witnesses interrogated by Lacalle,
even though the said answers may have been evoked by questions
addressed by a person not authorized by law, and there is much less reason
for rejecting the cross-questions addressed to the same witnesses by the
defendant's attorney, and the answers thereto.
Although the presentation of the documents which support the claims of the
plaintiff party be deemed to be improper, on account of their having been
made by a person who had not the qualifications of a practicing attorney it is
nevertheless true that their presentation was authorized by the attorney
Alvarez and the documents exhibited continued to be united to the record
and were not stricken out therefrom on motion by the other side, but, on the
contrary, the attorney for the defendant or his counsel discussed the
authenticity and validity of the said documents, made allegations against the
same and concluded by asking that these documents, and also the inscription
of those designated under letters A and B, be declared null and void.
From the preceding statements it is concluded that the intervention of Jose

Moreno Lacalle in the present suit has in no manner prejudiced the rights and
interests of the defendant and that, if judgment was rendered against him
and in favor of the plaintiff, it was in consequence of the merits of the
evidence adduced by the plaintiff and of the inefficacy and worthlessness of
the testimony given by the defendant.
If the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte had presented substantial, strong and

convincing evidence of the falsity of the two powers of attorney executed in
favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, the plaintiff's documentary evidence
would have been totally invalidated and annulled, and this suit would have
had a different ending.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, to affirm the judgment
appealed from, as we hereby do, with the costs against the appellant, and in
consequence thereof we acquit the plaintiff from the cross complaint relative
to the declaration of nullity of the mortgages and inscriptions, as requested
by the defendant. The first day of the term of court immediately following the
date on which the fulfillment of this judgment is ordered shall be set for the
payment of the amounts due and the foreclosure of the said mortgages. So
ordered.
Tan Tek Beng vs. David

126 SCRA 389
Case: Administrative case filed in the Supreme Court
Tan Tek Beng (non-lawyer) has had an agreement with Timoteo David
(lawyer) as documented by a letter made by David with terms and condition
that reads:
1. all commission/attorneys fees from the clients supplied by Tan will be

divided 50-50 between them
2. David will not deal directly with their clients without Tans consent
3. Tan will be collecting and keeping the said fees/advances
4. Other clients who are related to Tan and are contacted through him will be
his clients
This agreement was agreed by the parties but their business relationship did
not last due to accusations and double-cross. Because of the alleged breach
of agreement Tan accused David to Pres. Asst. Zamora, Office of Civil
Relations and to Supreme Court, This case was sent to Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Issue:
WON a disciplinary action be taken against David?
Ruling:
David is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.
Grounds:
The agreement made is void because it is tantamount to malpractice of

soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
agents or brokers. Practice of law is a profession, not a business.
Commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of
professional ethics adopted by American Bar Association that prohibits
division of fees, intermediaries, and compensation, commission and rebates.
The discountenance of Davids conduct was not because of the complaint of

Tan Tek Beng (who does not know about legal ethics) but because David
should have known better that unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that
which violates the rule or ethical codes of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession.
DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS VS BAYOT

In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in
securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity;
that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free
for the poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious
Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he

admitted the same and asked for the courts mercy as he promised to never
repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The
advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. . It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again
emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But

because of Bayots plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did
not earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely
reprimanded him.
ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC, INC 223 SCRA 398 FACTS:

This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist
from issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law. The said advertisement of the
Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and
divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving
free books on Guam Divorce. Ulep claims that such advertisements are
unethical and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity
of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of
the fact of the publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not
engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal support services
through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be
allowed based on certain US cases decided.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law. Whether
or not the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
complained of.
HELD/RATIO
: Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined. Practice of
law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is
in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to
look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. The practice of
law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And
applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as
advertised, engaged in the practice of law.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of
the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent
and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of
his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession
advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. The only exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list
and use of an ordinary, simple professional card. The advertisements do not
fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication of advertisements of the
kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack. Hence, it should be enjoined.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,

SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ &CASTILLO" and IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA,ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES."
1979 / Melencio-Herrera / Obligations of partners with regard to third persons
> Partnership nameTwo firms ask that they be allowed to continue using the
names of their firms despite the fact that Attys. Sycip and Ozaeta died.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
1.
Under the law, a partnership is

not prohibited
from continuing its business under a firm name that includes the name of
adeceased partner.
NCC 1840
explicitly sanctions the practice.The use by the person or partnership
continuing the business of the partnership name, or
the name of adeceased partner as part thereof,

shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner
liablefor any debts contracted by such person or partnership.2.
In regulating
other professions
(accountancy and engineering), the legislature has authorized the
adoption of firmnames without any restriction as to the use
of the name of a deceased partner

. There is
no fundamental policythat is offended by the continued use
by a firm of professionals of a firm name, which includes the name of a
deceasedpartner, at least where such firm name has acquired the
characteristics of a "
trade name
."3.
The
Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed
by the continued use of the name of a deceased partnerbecause Canon 33 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association
declares that:The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
when permissible by local custom, is notunethical but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.4.
There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their

respective deceased partners were
well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days
. The
stationeries
now being used by them carrynew letterheads indicating the

years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm
.Petitioners will notify all leading national and international law directories of
the fact of their deceased partners' deaths.5.
No local custom prohibits

the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name. There is
noPhilippine custom or usage
that recognizes that the
name of a law firm identifies the
firms
individual members
.6.
The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been
consistently allowed byU.S. Courts
and is an
accepted practice
in the
legal profession of most countries
.
ISSUE & HOLDING
WON they may be allowed to continue using the current names of their firms.
NO.
Petitioners advised to drop the names SYCIP andOZAETA from their respective
firm names. Names may be included in the listing of individuals who have
been partners, indicatingthe years during which they served.
RATIOJURISPRUDENCE
The Deen case

[1953]
Court advised the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the
name of C. D.Johnston, who has long been dead
Register of Deeds of Manila v. China Banking Corporation

[1958]
In this case, the law firm of Perkins & PonceEnrile moved to intervene as
amicus curiae
. The Court in a Resolution stated that it "would like to be informed why
thename of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already
dead." The Court advised the firm to drop thename of E. A. Perkins from the
firm name, and ruled that no practice should be allowed which even in a
remote degreecould give rise to the possibility of deception. Deen case cited
in the ruling.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal
system.
The Supreme Court in the Deen andPerkins cases laid down a legal rule
against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can
prevail. This is not tospeak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a
partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner.
Custom which are contrary tolaw, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.
The use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will
run counter to NCC 1815.Art. 1815.
Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more ofthe partners. Those who, not being
members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name shall be
subject tothe liability of a partner.Names in a firm name of a partnership must
either be those of
living partners
and
in the case of non-partners, should be livingpersons who can be subjected to
liability.
NCC 1825 prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name
under painof assuming the liability of a partner.The heirs of a deceased
partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the
creditors of a firmparticularly where they are non-lawyers.
Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
prohibits an agreement for the paymentto the widow and heirs of a deceased
lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the
future business ofthe deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients
of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will notrepresent
service or responsibilit
y on the part of the recipient.
Neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactionsentered
into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits
accruing, there can be no corresponding liability.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantagesin the practice of the profession.
An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch.Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can
initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
NCC 1840 is within Chapter 3 of Title IX entitled "Dissolution and Winding
Up."
It primarily deals with the exemption fromliability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts
contracted by the person orpartnership, which continues the
business
using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part
thereof. Whatthe law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation
preparatory to formal reorganization.Secondly,
NCC 1840 treats more of a
commercial
partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a
professional
partnership
[with no saleable goodwill but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individualmembers]. A saleable goodwill can exist only in
a commercial partnership, not in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers.
ON ARGUMENT #2A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to
partnerships formed by other professionals or for business.
Thelaw on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy.A partnership for the practice of
law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. Itis not a partnership formed to carry on trade or business or of
holding property. The use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade namein law
practice is improper.
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business
1.
A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which

one may attain the highest eminence withoutmaking much money2.
A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability3.
A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary4.
A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methodsof advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clientsThe right

to practice law does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise ofa special privilege,
highly personal
and partaking of the nature of a public trust.
ON ARGUMENT #3
Canon 33
does not consider as unethical
the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when such a
practice is
permissible by local custom,
but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced.
In the Philippines, no local custom
permits or allows
the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name.Firm names, under
our custom,
identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law
firm.
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the
name of a deceased partner continues to beused cannot be ruled out. A
person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a
distinguished nameappearing in a firm title.
ON ARGUMENT #6U.S. Courts have allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name because it is sanctioned by custom. Not so inthis jurisdiction
where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice.
Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,legally binding and obligatory.
Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules ofevidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot
be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
establishedby competent evidence like any other fact.
Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean
that Courtscan rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical

custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom.The
former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such
statute. Not so with the latter.The practice of law is related to the
administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary
"money-making trade."
Petitioners' desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the
public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
Petitions DENIED.

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Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty.

A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,

DE LEON, JR., J.:

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's personal record in

Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward,

Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His

FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance

of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in

Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent. Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A.

Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by

These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in

Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed

questions on said subject fully one week before the tests.

The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on

thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to

SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any

In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic

Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the

The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the

In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic

members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his

Perfecto, J., concurring and dissenting:

Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially

Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning

While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial

case we are constrained to disagree with the penalty imposed upon

We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to

We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

If, as insisted by the respondent, he wrote up and published in the newspaper

is that newspaper reporters should be fearless as well in publishing stories as

In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the original bill sponsored

Estado, el periodista estara obligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion."

The exception provided in the Act in question should be strictly construed so

In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty.

ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.

Linsangan on the other hand filed a separate administrative case against

ISSUE: Whether or not both administrative cases should prosper.

Laput is now charging the two lawyers of unethical and improper

ISSUE: Whether or not there is encroachment of client in the case at bar.

only after Laput was discharged as counsel for Barrera.

Camacho vs. Pangulayan

No longer connected with Pagulayan and

Associates Law Offices.

Does the Re-Admission Agreements have nothing to do with DISMISSAL OF

R. Diokno for appellant.

C., p. 73. A rural estate, No 435, consisting of unirrigated land containing

The respective bounderies of each one of the estates above enumerated

The estate described under letter A responded for P800 of the

debt and for the sum of P75 as costs .......................................................... P

Estate letter B, liability P200, costs

Estate letter C, liability P160, costs

Estate letter D, liability P130, costs

Estate letter E, liability P92.50, costs

Estate letter F, liability P150, costs

Estate letter G, liability P280, costs

Estate letter H, liability P250, costs

Estate letter I, liability P1,400, costs