Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
by
Gary Robinson
..
The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those
of the Bank of England. The usual disclaimer applies. The author is
grateful to ran Bond of the Bank of England Economics Division and
Professor Stephen Schaefer of the London Business School for helpful
comments.
Bank of England 1993
ISBN
1 857300378
ISSN 0142-6753
Contents
Abstract
1
Introduction
1
3
11
14
Conclusions
21
Bibliography
23
Tables
28
Abstract
The stock market crash of October 1987 and the growing importance of
index arbitrage and portfolio insurance helped to focus the attention of
academics, practitioners and regulators on the possibly destabilising
role of equity index futures on the underlying cash market. Although
theoretical evidence on this question is somewhat am biguous,
empirical evidence, relating particularly to US markets, has been less
equivocal: typically, no significant effect of futures trading has been
found. This paper presents an analysis of daily stock price volatility on
the London Stock Exchange for the period 1980-93. The measure of
volatility produced is appropriate, given the distribution of returns and
the time-varying nature of stock price volatility, and changes in
monetary policy regime. The impact of futures on stock price volatility
is measured within an augmented ARCH framework and the principal
result is striking: rather than increasing volatility, index fu tures
contracts are found to have reduced volatility significantly by around
17%.
1.
Introduction
The stock market crashes in October 1987 and October 1989 helped to
focus academic attention, and that of the regulatory authorities, on the
possibly damaging role of the equity futures market and portfolio
insurers in creating 'excess' cash market volatility. Not surprisingly
perhaps, some of the most bitter complaints came from equity market
makers in the United States who, because of their obligation to quote
'continuous ' prices, suffered at the hands of portfolio insurers and
index arbitrageurs. (1) Both practitioners and academics have alerted
regulators to the possibility that futures markets and other derivative
security markets will attract both ill-informed traders and risk-loving
speculators, whose acti vities would tend to destabilise the cash
markets. This concern has resulted in restrictive action by some
regulatory authorities: in Japan, for example, trading hours have been
reduced, margins and commission charges increased, and daily price
limits reduced in an effort to control volatility.
or
(1)
See Miller
(1990) for a
market-makers.
(2)
In this study, by contrast, no asymmetry is found for the FTSE All-Share index .
2.
(a)
Theoretical Arguments
Ot' and their demand for stocks rises in response to expected excess
returns over the risk-free rate,
r.
expressed as:
(1)
alia, information from the index option market, whi ch wiJI help
investors distinguish between liquidity/portfolio insurance driven
trades and trades which signify news on fundamentals [see Grossman
(1988)].
(2)
where (j(L) is a polynomial lag fun ction. The demand which any
perceived disequilibrium generates depends upon the parameter ,
which in turn depends upon the wealth of feedback traders, wf' their
speed of response, vi' and the leverage available through the futures
market.
Equilibrium for this market obtains when the sum of excess demands of
both types of investor is zero, and is given by the recursion:
(3)
where tt+l
==
(.){j(L)19(.)
0;
where
[(1 - 1/1(.)1(1
30; 13",
<
I/IU)]. 02
(4)
o.
naive (in this context, positive feedback) traders, then this will increase
volatility; otherwise it will decrease.
(b)
Empirical Evidence
(3)
Apart from monetary policy regime. stock market volatility may. for example. vary
with the business cycle due to the effect of gearing.
ratio of the S& PSOO (moving average) volatility relative to the volatility
of a closely correlated index. Provided the two indices are subject to
similar influences o t her than the introduction of the S& PSOO futures
contract, the ratio of their volatilities will measure the effect of futures
contract trading on S&PSOO volatility.
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons for believing that this method
m a y a l s o f a i l to control f o r o ther i n f l u e nces, and may e v e n
systematically conceal the effect of futures trading on volatility if there
are strong arbitrage links between the two indices, thereby prejudicing
the results of empirical investigation against the discovery of any
significant futures trading effect. Edwards (1988a) argues that the
integration of modern capital markets (via the no-arbitrage conditions
which must hold between closely related securities) implies that a
change in the volatility of the S&PSOO index due to the introduction of
the S&PSOO futures contract, would cause an increase in the volatility of
other closely related securities (eg other liquid stocks) for which no
derivative securities are traded. The device of taking the ratio of
volatilities is therefore an imperfect control for non-futures influences
on volatility, and may even lead to statistical results which are
materially misleading.
This paper reports the ef fect of the FfSE-100 futures contract upon the
volatility of a closely index, the FTSE All-Share index. The FTSE-100
futures contract presents a problem for measuring its effect upon the
underlying index because the underlying index was created in
10
3.
11
Between March 1987 and March 1988, the D-Mark Sterling exchange
rate was a particularly important factor in determining domestic
m onetary policy.
'D e u t s c h e m a r k S h a d o w i n g'. B e t w e e n O c t o b e r 1 9 9 0 a n d
September 1992 sterling was a member currency in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism ( ERM ) of the European M onetary System. While this
regime obliged the authorities to defend sterling against internal and
external fundamental shocks, as well as speculation, the extent of any
consequent increase in interest rate (and therefore stock price) volatility
would be modified by the credibility of the authorities' commitment to
defend sterling'S ERM parity. There is strong evidence [ Pesaran and
Robinson (1993)] that sterling's membership of the ERM at its agreed
parity was highly credible, suggesting that speculation on sterling was
less than it was prior to joining the ERM. Interest rate volatility was
also lower in the ERM period.
12
(51):
(52):
(53):
(54):
(SS):
(56):
Our data are daily observations on the FTSE All-Share index, expressed
in daily return (Iog-differenced) form. Table 2 displays the first four
(unconditional) moments of the distributions of the stock price index
log-differences for each of the chosen sub-samples. Also given is the
(x2(2 normality test statistic, which summarises the skewness and
kurtosis of the distributions, and therefore any departure from
normality. Because other financial return distributions have been
found to become more approximately normal as the differencing
interval increases [see Boothe and Glassman (1987) and Hall, Brorsen
and Irwin (1989)], the 3rd and 4th moments (skewness and kurtosis)
and the normality test statistic for the 10 trading day log-difference are
included for comparison.
Several features of these results are worth noting.
F irst, all
13
4.
(a)
Alternative Specifications
consequence that the effect of the dummy variables for futures trading
and policy regime cumulates through time in a way determined by the
coefficient on lagged variance. This is undesirable if we believe that the
effect of a regime is fairly constant during its operation. For this
reason, only ARCH structures rather than G ARCH structures were
estimated, even though a G ARCH model would have been more
parsimonious. That is, conditional variance of the form:
(8)
was estimated. However, this is not unduly restrictive since a GARCH
0, otherwise.
D2:
D3:
D4:
D5:
D6:
The last dummy variable, D6, is included to account for any effect of
deregulation of the London stock market in late October 1986 (the
so-called 'B ig Bang '), which abol ished fixed commissions and the
demarkation between stock broking and jobbing. These changes may
have had the e f fect o f reducing pr ice volatility on account of the
increased l iquid ity wh ich these changes brought to the market;
alternatively, volat il ity may have been increased if deregulation
attracted predominantly speculative (ie feedback) traders.
In the case o f stock prices, volatility may be asymmetric: higher in bear
markets than in bull markets. This latter effect is probably due to the
effect of compan y g earing(4) and, when present, renders the
exponential GARCH <so-called E-GARCH) model more appropriate to
(4)
If finns have fixed costs (eg payments to corporate bond holders) which must be met
irrespective of company income, then a given item of news relating to future income
will have a proportionally larger effect upon expected dividends when income is low
relative to fixed costs than when income is high relative to fixed costs. [See Black
(1976).]
16
stock price returns than the simple GARCH model [see Nelson (1991)].
As an alternative to the ARCH specification, we therefore considered
the E-ARCH model which relaxes the symmetry restriction of ARCH
by specifying conditional volatility as:
h =exp a+
t
j-n
rEP,(e
i=1
.I.Jh
t-l
,J+ "(,(/e
t-l
,/I.Jh
t-l
t-l
.J
(l I.))+l:6z
]
]t
(9)
t to have different
Estimation
(i)
excess
er
(5)
included. However, this would almost certainly have been rejected owing to
the significance of
01'.
18
"2
0/
6.47(xlO
PRE
l-L "'(
i
-3
)%
.
1
19
"
"2
0
POST
0/
'
0/
5.38
(xlO
-3
1-1: 1 .
1
i
(6)
20
Concl usions
22
Bibliography
Aggarwal, R (1988), 'Stock Index Futures and Cash Market Volatility',
23
28.
Bollerslev, T (1987), ' A Conditional Heteroskedastic Time-Series Model
24
Stock Index and Interest Rate Futures ', Journal of Futures Markets,
Vo18, No 4, August, pages 421-39.
EngIe, R F (1982), 'Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity with
Cointegration in Variance'.
Engle, R F (1991), 'Statistical M odels for Financial Volatility ',
Grossman, S J (1988), ' Program Trading and Stock and Futures Price
26
27
I ndex'
PerIod
Santoni (1 987)
S&tPSOO
1975 - 1 986
.t
S&tPSOO
1 962 - 1 990
.t
DJ IA
1964-1989
Freris (1990)
HS
1 984-1 987
Ch an and Karolyi ( 1 99 1 )
NK (Simex)
1985 - 1 987
.t
AO
1981 - 1 987
.t
S&tPSOO
1975-1989
Brorsen ( 1 991)
S&tPSOO
1 962 - 1 986
.t
.t
1963-1988
.t
.t
Volatility
locr.a
Volatility
Volatility
No Change Deer.OM
.t
"
.t
.t
.t
S&tPSOO, DJIA
1981 - 1 987
H arris ( 1 989b)
S&tPSOO
1 975- 1 987
Laatsch ( 1 99 1 )
MMI
1 982-1986
.t
DJ I A
1 974- 1 989
.t
Various
Various
S&tPSOO
1976-1 988
.t
S&tPSOO, MMI
1 987- 1 988
.t
fTSE-1 00
1 988- 1 991
S&tPSOO
1 978- 1 989
NJ(
.t
"
Aggarwal ( 1 988)
.t
Various
.t
.t
28
variable
sub- period:
statistic
(5 1 )
pre-fulure
MTF5
Monetary:
(52 )
(53)
0. 1 8
mean
0.07
0.09
.04
0.01
0.01
0.86
0.73
1 .62
0.76
0.80
1 . 23
-0 . 1 2
-0.27
-2.72
.60
0.80
.43
normality
skewness
kurtosis
normality'
1 . 79
0.34
1 7. 1 9
1 .76
5.80
15.03
133.50
1 1 .65
3967.50
1 1 5.80
731 .70
1529.30
-0.66
-0 . 1 4
-2.81
.14
0.76
0.82
2.68
-0. 1 6
9.92
0. 1 7
0.71
1 . 15
386.20
3.24
1 440.00
2.94
56.70
27. 1 0
+ Normalised .
(56)
std dev
skewness
kurtosis +
A101 n pt
(55)
ShadClWing
Regime
t.1n Pt
(54)
29
Model:
Alog(Pt) 11 + b. Alog(Pt_ l )
e , 1 0t l - N(O)l, I 0,- 1)
d1 . D
p.llt + e ,
t-statistic
Estimate
+ 6'D
Significance level
4
5.59 (xlO - )
1 .83
0.07
0 . 1 15
10.95
0.00
.093
35 . 1 1
0.00
1 . 034
0 .24
0.81
d1
p
5
4.69 (x10 - )
01
1 1 .6
0.00
11
12
0. 138
3.79
0.00
0.065
1 .70
0.09
0.079
2.13
0.03
1?
0.054
1 .38
0.17
16
01
11
1'2
1,
19
62
63
64
65
66
Log likelihood
-5
- 1 .32 (X1O )
4
4.04 (x l O- )
om
-2.71
om
0.99
0.084
1 .88
0.06
.024
0.55
0.58
0.016
5
3.51 (xl O - )
8.30 (x l 0
5
1 . 22 (xlO- )
0.37
0.71
3.33
0.00
4.48 (xlO-5)
5
-5.30 (x 1 O- )
4.88
0.00
0.60
0.55
1 4285 . 1
0.94
0.34
1 .36
0.17
Sign - Bias T es t ( t )
1 . 29
t statistic
skewness
kurtosis
Variance
0.0075
- 0.43
- 0. 1 1
1 . 94
30
1 . 000683
(significance
0.61 )
(significance
0.0 1 )
(significance
0.00)
Model:
Alog(pt)
d
a
'Y 1
"12
"16
"1 ?
62
65
Log likelihood
b.tJog(Pt _ l )
4
5.92 (xlO- )
t statistic
skewness
kurtosis
d 1Dl
0.00
0.00
0.00
-39.36
14.25
5
4.48 (xl0 - )
0.00
0.00
1 0.75
0. 1 4
0.13
6.92
0.00
3.73
0.00
4.57
0.00
0.00
3.29
0.013
0.025
6
-7.63 (x1O- )
2.82 (xlO-5 )
2.51
3.78 (x 10-5 )
Slniflcance level
4.23
.095
+ t
10.19
0.1 1
0.01
0.00
9.81
t-statistic
Estimate
Parameter
a
= a +
1 . 40
( e tl v'hJ.
-0.00537
Variance
-0.31
-0. 1 1
1 . 99
31
0.9999
(significance
(significance
(significance
0.76)
0.0 1 )
0.00)
Parameter
Alog(P t) = a + b.Alog(Pt_ l) +
8. 10 (xl0- 4 )
0.1 58
b
"' 1
"'2
"'5
"'6
Log likelihood
4323.0
0.00
8.33
0.00
0.00 cc
0.01
0.03
2.73
0.01
0.81
0.25
0.06
1 .87
-8.97 (X1O-6 )
%
3.39
2.19
..,?
Significance level
2.49
01
t-statistic
4.79
4.30 (xl0-5)
9. 58 (xl0- 2)
2
7.83 (xl0- )
2
7.49 (xl0- )
01
et
0.06
1 .88
1 .14
mean
0.016
Variance
t statistic
- 0.49
(significance = 0.62)
skewness
kurtosis
(significance = 0.19)
-0. 1 0
0. 1 7
(Significance
32
0.28)
Andrew G Haldane
Mahmood Pradhan
Andrew G Haldane
Mahmood Pradhan
R J Colwell
E P Davis
David Miles
(October 1 992)
Tamim Bayoumi
D M Egginton
S G Hall
Spencer Dale
Andrew G Haldane
E P Davis
Paul Fisher
Suzanne Hudson
Mahmood Pradhan
11
Spencer Dale
Andrew J Derry
(May 1 993
Mahmood Pradhan
Tamim Bayoumi
Gabriel Steme
13
15
Tamim Bayoumi
F J Breedon
M A S Joyce
C L Melliss
17
Bahram Pesaran
(September 1 993)
Gary Robinson
Spencer Dale
Andrew G Haldane
(September 1 993)
19
Spencer Dale
Andrew G Haldane
Printed by