VICTOR BOROVSKY VS.

THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND THE

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (G.R. No. L-4352 September 28, 1951)
FACTS: Victor A. Borovsky, petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in
Shanghai, China, of Russian parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936 and had
resided herein ever since, if the period of his detention be included.
On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines
the petitioner was arrested for investigation as to his past activities. A warrant for
deportation was issued by the Deportation Board on the grounds that he has been
found to be an undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard.
Petitioner was deported to China but he was not provided with an entry visa
because he was not a a national of China. He was therefore brought back to Manila
and was confined to the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. On December 8, 1947,
was granted provisional release by the President through Secretary of Justice for a
period of six months. Before the expiration of that period, the Immigration
department rearrested him and brought him to Cebu for the purpose of placing him
on board a Russian vessel carrying out the deportation order issued against him.
However, said deportation failed to materialize as the captain of the ship refused to
take him on board without permission from the Russian government. As such,
petitioner was again detained. The Immigration Officials however alleged that while
in detention, they have been taking steps regarding the disposition of those
foreigners subject to deportation while awaiting availability of transportation or
arrangements to the place where they may be sent.
Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus to which the court denied as mainly
on the ground that such detention was merely temporary. Over two years had
elapsed since the decision was promulgated, but still the Government had not found
ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country. Hence this second
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: WON petitioner be continuously detained without a fix period pending
deportation
HELD: NO.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein
(Soewapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are
"stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. Foreign nationals, not enemy, against
whom no criminal charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may
not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty,
without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the
land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy
aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the country in
violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the Government is
unable to deport him, is beside the point and we need not decide. There is no
allegation that the petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not lawful; on the
contrary, the inference from the pleadings and the Deportation Board's findings is
that he came to and lived in this country under legal permit.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a
resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its
plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other

fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. lt was there
resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art.
1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or
other status (Art. 2) ; that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9) etc.

Beltran vs. Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929]

First Division, Romualdez (J): 6 concur
Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered Francisco Beltran
to appear before the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in
his own handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such was for the fiscal to
compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he who wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified. Beltran filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.
Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
Held: The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper
judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the
investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The
privilege is found in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall he be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not limited to
declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this privilege is not limited
precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. Writing is
something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers. Writing is not a
purely mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means that Beltran is to furnish a
means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the provincial fiscal
clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the present case is similar to that of
producing documents of chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of
documents or chattels, which is not so serious as present, the same eminent
Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864): "2264, Production
or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows that the production of
documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in
response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of
process treating him as a witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the tribunal to
furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused
under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded." Thus, for the
purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen
of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the
production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write
and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and

which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if permission to
obtain a specimen of Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens
without resorting to the means complained of, that is not reason for trampling upon
a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental
and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege
exists for the protection of innocent persons. Hence, the Court ordered the judge
and the fiscal and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever
from compelling Beltran to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison.
German vs Barangan
One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray
and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago
Barangan from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the
Malacaang. And considering that Germans group is expressively known as the
August Twenty OneMovement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists,
Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are
there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacaang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St.
Lukes is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion.
HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or restrained of their
freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they
had attempted to translate the same into action. There has been a clear
manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow German et al to practice their
religious belief but not in the manner that German et al impressed. Such manner
impresses clear and present danger to the executive of the state hence the need
to curtail it even at the expense of curtailing ones freedom to worship.
Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been
unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious
freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority
among human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this
Court will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of
stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith
that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of
mankind. Without that faith, mans very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of
significance.
J. Teehankee The right to freely exercise ones religion is guaranteed in Section 8
of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression
and speech and peaceable assembly along with the other intellectual freedoms,

are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on the other departments -rests
the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense
with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign
prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the
weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do
precedence and primacy.
J. Makasiar With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and
respondents, there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to
the security of persons within the premises of Malacaang and the adjacent areas,
as the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any
public disturbance or violence.