Russians at The Gates of India Planning The Defence of India, 1885-1900

"Russians at the Gates of India"?
Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900

Author(s): R. A. Johnson
Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), pp. 697-743
Published by: Society for Military History
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3397324 .
Accessed: 24/10/2011 08:55
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Society for Military History is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal
of Military History.
http://www.jstor.org
"Russians at the Gates of India"?

Planning the Defence of India,
1885-1900
R. A. Johnson
Abstract
The annexation of CentralAsia by Russia in the second half of the
nineteenth century,which broughtthe Tsar's armies to the borders
of Afghanistan,compelled the Britishto consider how to defend their
prize imperialpossession, India.In the absence of a General Staff,
senior officers and the Intelligence Division in London drew up a
series of plans over a twentyyear period.A varietyof solutions were
proposed, including amphibious operations in the Black Sea, a
thrust through Persia and guerrilla attacks against Russian railroads. However,the most prominentidea, known as the "Scientific
Frontier,"was to defend India by holding a line along the Hindu
Kush mountains deep inside Afghanistan.The chief difficultywas
Afghanistanitself.The Britishwere unable to resolve its status: was
it an ally, or an enemy? This article seeks to highlightthe development of the Britishplans, and the problemsthey presented.
JN recent months, international attention has been focused on

Afghanistan and a joint Anglo-American military intervention. After a
short and decisive campaign, the question now is how to achieve stability in a highly militarized society after twenty years of conflict. The
defeat of the Taliban was achieved relatively swiftly, but the creation of
a lasting peace has been more difficult. As scholars of the British Empire
will know, this is a situation the West has faced before. The fundamentalism and tribal disunity of the Afghans made the region unstable in the
nineteenth century, although they were able to unite temporarily against
a common, preferably foreign, enemy. The masters of British India had
Rob Johnson received his Ph.D. from the Universityof Exeter and is a history
lecturer at Richard Huish College in Somerset, England. He is the author of
British Imperialism (Palgrave,2003) and is currently working on The Great
Game: The Imperial Secret Service and the Defence of India for I. B. Tauris.
The Journal of Military History 67 (July 2003): 697-744
Society for Military tlistory
697
R. A. JOHNSON
no wish to hang on to the troublesome state themselves, but a border

incident in 1885 forced the British to reconsider their relationship with
Afghanistan and the internal condition of the country. Whilst the socalled Great Game, the international rivalry of Britain and Russia, has
been covered admirably before (and in its most popular form by Peter
Hopkirk in his book, The Great Game), few have examined the military
plans for the defence of India.1
The Russian Empire annexed swathes of territory in central Asia
throughout the nineteenth century, bringing her borders, and her
armies, ever closer to British India and its attendant spheres of influence. In 1885, when the Russian advance ran up against the ill-defined
Afghan border, leading British officers looked for a solution to what was
now a perceived Russian threat to India, which was known as the "Central Asian Question." A vast number of official papers and intelligence
reports were produced, along with a variety of unofficial pamphlets and
letters. Civilian commentators, such as Charles Marvin, captured the
threatening nature of Russia's inexorable advance across Central Asia in
the phrase "Russians at the Gates of India." Today, such concerns seem
exaggerated. The chain of mountains that lies across India's northern
borders appears to offer a satisfactory perimeter against any invading
army. Indeed, many Liberal critics in nineteenth-century Britain felt
that the idea of a Russian invasion of India was an expensive and absurd
fantasy. However, the rim of mountains was not as inviolate as hoped.
There was concern that Russian agents would foment rebellion amongst
local tribesmen astride the frontier, and it was this, coinciding with the
threat of invasion, that alarmed the British most. For example, Russian
reconnaissance patrols penetrated the mountain barriers in 1889 and
1890, and this had the effect of encouraging the tribal states of Hunza
and Nagar to defy the British with armed resistance in 1891.
No war ever broke out between Russia and Britain on the North West
Frontier of India, or in Afghanistan, but they came close to conflict in
1885 when Russian troops clashed with the Afghans at Penjdeh. This
border incident appeared to offer evidence of Russian aggression against
a country Britain had pledged itself to protect and of Russian intent to
launch a decisive thrust towards India. If this war broke out, Afghanistan
would be the theatre of operations, but the question of Afghanistan's part
in India's defence became a battleground in other respects. There were
those who favoured a forward defence, whilst others looked to alternative and diversionary theatres. The plans became the badges of affiliation
to certain "rings" in the British and Indian Army officer corps and even
to political parties. The plans for the defence of India were drawn into
the debate on army reforms, particularly with respect to length of ser1. Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
698
THE JOURNAL OF
"Russia at the Gates of India"?
vice, deployment, and promotion. Whilst this context is important, it is

the most prominent of the plans themselves that form the focus of this
article.
The Defence of India: Historical Context

The British Empire was often faced with the problem of "unstable
frontiers," but, in South Asia, it had an added concern. The Russian
Empire's expansion into Central Asia raised fears that Tsarist intrigues
might exploit discontent on India's borders. Russian diplomatic overtures to the Afghans in 1837 added to unease about the security of India.
Attempts to win over Dost Muhammed, the Amir of Afghanistan, failed,
and an army of British and Indian troops fought its way to Kabul in 1839,
beginning an occupation that was supposed to last indefinitely. However,
a reduced garrison was compelled to retreat to India in 1842, following
an Afghan rebellion. Almost the entire force of seven hundred European
troops, thirty-eight hundred Sepoys and Sowars (Indian infantry and
cavalry), and twelve thousand civilians and camp followers was wiped
out in the retreat to the Jagdalak Pass. A British "Avenging Army"
returned and sacked Kabul, but the Governor-General of India, Lord
Ellenborough, was eager to evacuate Afghanistan. Dost Muhammed was
restored to the throne; he remained neutral during British operations
against the Sikhs (1845-46 and 1848-49) and against the Indian Mutineers (1857-58). Crucially, the Amir showed no inclination to ally with
the Russians, and, throughout the period following the First Afghan War,
the British had a strong desire to avoid any interference with
Afghanistan and a repeat of the humiliating retreat of 1842.
However, Russian expansion deeper into Central Asia from 1865
prompted concern that Russian influence over Afghanistan would
weaken India's defences.2 Should Tsarist forces eventually control the
passes into the Indus Valley, they could attack India with impunity.
Moreover, there was concern that the river Indus did not provide a
defendable frontier, for it was easily crossed and had proved no barrier
to British forces during the Sikh Wars. In 1873, the last independent
state of Central Asia, the Khanate of Khiva, fell to the Russians, and
hasty negotiations settled a borderline for Afghanistan and Tsarist
Turkestan. However, the arrival of a Russian envoy in Kabul in 1878,
coinciding with a dispute in southeast Europe between Britain and Russia, revived fears for India's security. The Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton,
2. A. P. Thornton, "The Reopening of the Central Asian Question, 1864-9," History 41 (1956): 122, but note that Garry Alder has argued that it was the Crimean
War (1854-56) that reopened this question. See G. J. Alder,British India's Northern
Frontier, 1865-1895 (London: Longmans, 1963), 165.
MILITARY HISTORY
699
R. A. JOHNSON
demanded a British diplomatic presence in Kabul to match the Russian

one, and when rebutted, he invaded Afghanistan.
The Second Afghan War (1878-80) was divided into two phases. In
the first, British forces defeated the Afghans and a British Resident was
installed in the capital. However, a second invasion was required when
the Resident and his bodyguard were wiped out by Afghan rebels in
1879. Mindful of the rebellion of 1842, the British did not incorporate
Afghanistan into the Raj. Instead, an apparently compliant ruler, Abdur
Rahman, was enthroned, and the British government promised to protect Afghanistan's territorial integrity as long as the Amir followed British
direction of his foreign policy. Abdur Rahman was, in fact, determined to
maintain his independence with or without British cooperation.
Although he resisted Russian aggression, he made use of British subsidies and arms to consolidate and strengthen his personal rule. When disputes arose over the Indo-Afghan borders, he was eager to acquire
territory regardless of British interests. He played no direct part in the
tribal unrest of 1897 (inside British India), but he did supply arms and
ammunition to those who resisted the British in the Khyber Pass.
Thus, Afghanistan remained the cornerstone of the defence of India,
but British influence there was marginal. To compensate, the British
exercised control over the main avenues of advance into Afghanistan
through the tribal belt of the North West Frontier. Yet these axes and
passes presented problems of their own. The terrain was mountainous,
arid, and populated by men eager to defend their independence and culture. They compelled the British to fight a series of punitive campaigns
from 1857 onwards. The British were concerned that, in the event of a
major war with Russia, the tribesmen would side with the Russians, or,
at the very least, tie down thousands of British and Indian troops who
would be needed elsewhere.
The Historiographical Debate

There was little agreement about the Russian threat. General
Mikhail Dimitrievich Skobelev's plans for an attack on India, drawn up in
1875, reflected an extreme wing of Russian militarism, and the Russian
press was also quite belligerent.3 Yet, even though some Russians had a
strong inclination to "advance against England," those in British diplomatic circles believed that this view was held by only a minority of Russian officers. The capability of the Russian army also provoked
disagreement. In January 1886, Captain Wolfe Murray of the Intelligence
3. See press abstract in Sir Edward Thornton to Earl Granville, enclosure, 22
April 1885, in FO 65/1241, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London; and Hans Rogger, "The Skobelev Phenomenon," Oxford Slavonic Papers 9 (1976): 52.
700
THE JOURNAL OF
"Russiaat the Gates of India"?
Division at the War Office estimated that twenty thousand Russian

troops might be able to cross the border into Afghanistan, using irregular cavalry "to carry rapine, plunder and slaughter into the invaded
country."4 However, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, Britain's "only general," believed that the main Russian effort would be directed towards
southeast Europe, whilst action in Central Asia would only be a feint.
Historians appear to be as divided as contemporaries on this issue.
Lawrence James, for example, concludes that the military effort to
secure India against Russia was "not worth the candle"; John Keay disparages the "waste" of lives and treasure; and David Omissi describes the
Russian plans against India as the "stuff of pipe dreams." Firuz
Kazemzedah, by contrast, demonstrates the extent of diplomatic and
military preplanning by Tsarist councils, and how they had gone to great
lengths to mislead the British in order to annex Central Asia. Peter Morris shows how far the British Foreign and India Offices had accepted the
apologies of the Russian foreign ministry and its spurious explanation
that the Russian government could not control its own military adventurers on the frontier.5 Yet D. R. Gillard doubts whether Russia was ever
a threat to India or even had the desire to secure hegemony in Asia.6
Aaron Friedberg highlights the concern that was raised in British military circles by the development of the Russian Central Asian railway network, and John Gooch shows how the importance of imperial defence,
centred on India, was altered only by the emergence of a new threat from
Germany.7 Peter Burroughs describes the debate about the defence of
India as "nagging, overblown fears," and how the Indian authorities
"were not averse to fuelling the Russophobia in order to enhance the
army's profile in Imperial strategy and counter the [rival] navalist influence."8 Adrian Preston picks up this theme to show how, at the highest
4. Captain J. Wolfe Murray,DAQMG,Report on the Military Situation in Transcaspia, 20 January 1886, WO 106 176, PRO.
5. Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (London:
Little, Brown and Co., 1997), 393; John Keay, The Gilgit Game (London: John Murray, 1979), 5; David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj (London: Macmillan, 1994), 205;
Firuz Kazemzedah, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914 (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1968); Peter Morris, "Russian Expansion into Central Asia," in
Peter Morris,ed., Africa, America and Central Asia (Exeter: Exeter University Press,
1984).
6. D. R. Gillard, The StruggleforAsia, 1828-1914: A Study in British and Russian Relations (London: Methuen, 1977).
7. Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative
Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), chap. 5; John
Gooch, The Plans for War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy,
c.1900-1916 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974).
8. Peter Burroughs, "Defence and Imperial Disunity" in Andrew Porter, ed., The
Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3:322 and 341.
MILITARY HISTORY
701
R. A. JOHNSON
levels of the army, the question of India's defence became a tool to

secure loyalties and promotion to key posts. He concluded that Wolseley
lost out in the "Indianisation" of imperial defence strategy.9
The truth lies somewhere within this debate. The existence of Russian plans for advances, by stages, against India, such as those drawn up
by General Alexei N. Kuropatkin in 1886, prove only that they, like their
British counterparts, prepared for contingencies. Whilst within the Russian officer corps there were opportunists who saw Central Asia as a place
to win the Tsar's approval, there were just as many officers who saw the
Balkans, or central Europe, as the main theatre of operations. However,
the reality, or fantasy, of the Russian threat produced a series of interesting plans on the British side; the most prominent of these are examined here.
The Theatre of Operations

An evaluation of the terrain may help to clarify some of the issues
involved. The Indus river had not been much of an obstacle to the historical invaders of India, but the mountains of the Hindu Kush had channelled their forces through certain passes. Alexander the Great, for
example, had crossed the Khawak Pass in Afghanistan in 327 B.C. before
sending his forces through the Khyber Pass into India. However, the
most important battles had taken place out on the plains of India:
Jalalpur on the Jhelum for Alexander, Panipat in 1398 for Timur, the
Emperor of Samarkand, and the same location for Babur, Amir of Kabul,
in 1526. For the British, there was an advantage in defending India in
this way. Any modern invader would have to maintain lengthy lines of
communication through passes troubled by snow or partisans. However,
the British were concerned that any setback would cause the Indian
troops to lose faith in British rule, and they would find themselves fighting another Mutiny whilst trying to stem an invasion at the same time.
As a result, much effort was directed towards finding a suitable alternative to fighting on Indian soil.
Afghanistan's northern border was a hilly piedmont rising up to the
Hindu Kush. The passes here were closed for long periods of the year. At
the eastern end was the complex of mountains and valleys called the
Pamirs, which was hardly explored at all. At the western end were the
9. AdrianPreston,"Wolseley,the KhartoumReliefExpeditionand the Defence
of India,1885-1900,"in AdrianPrestonand PeterDennis,Swords and Covenants
(London:CroomHelm,1976), 89-122. This chapteralso containsa list of the main
official and unofficialdocuments on the debate between those who favoureda
strongerhome defence and those who preferredto see the main effort directed
towardsIndia.
702 *
THE JOURNAL OF
low mountain range of the Paropamisus and the town of Herat. The Herat
valley was a fertile strip in a region of semiarid hills, watered by the HariRur River. To the south of the Hindu Kush lay successive ridgelines of
mountains and the two most prominent cities, Kandahar and Kabul. The
flanks of the Indian border offered further complications. To the south of
the mountainous North West Frontier was the great Baluch desert. An
invading army could avoid the Afghan mountains and swing towards this
open southern flank, supplying its troops from Herat in western
Afghanistan. However, British occupation in the 1870s and the scarcity
of water in the area ruled out this threat. In the north, the Karakoram
mountains provided a formidable curtain wall above Kashmir, but there
were several small passes and independent hill states that led from the
Pamirs. The British stepped up their exploration of these places between
1883 and 1885 but had mixed success in securing the alliance of Chitral
and Hunza-Nagar. By contrast, the Russian approaches to Afghanistan
from the north were vastly different.
Apart from the Pamirs, much of the Turanian Plain is desert. However, three rivers provided avenues of advance: the Oxus (Amu-Daria),
the Syr Daria, and, along the Persian border, the Attrak-Tejend. In addition, the oasis cities of the old Silk Route, Khiva, Samarkand, and
Tashkent, with the well-watered Ferghana valley, provided ideal military
bases. If the Russian army wanted to conduct operations against India,
the chief problem was the vast distances involved. It was quicker to bring
troops from the Caucasus across the Caspian Sea and thence the 680
miles to Herat, than to travel across the Kazakh Steppes. Railways were
constructed to speed up reinforcement times, but the Russian army
would have faced severe logistical problems in trying to supply invasion
forces beyond the Russian border.
The Problem of Afghanistan

Afghanistan was the key to the British defence of the North West
Frontier of India, and the strategic plans that were put forward cannot
be understood without reference to it. In the decades before 1880, the
prevailing idea was one of "defence in depth." Afghanistan was supposed
to afford a convenient buffer zone between British India and Russian
Central Asia. However, Afghanistan was an unreliable satellite. The
British doubted that the Afghans, rocked by rebellions and threatened by
invasion during border skirmishes at Penjdeh (1885) and Somatash
(1891), could ever hold off a full-scale Russian attack. Yet, as the Russians were to discover a century later, Afghanistan proved too volatile to
actually hold. The British had learnt this lesson themselves: the two
British occupations in 1838-42 and 1878-80 proved short-lived. To
MILITARY HISTORY
703
Russian Empire
Empire
- Teheran
Persia
a'
'
8. 800 KILOMETERS
''I
800 MILES
CENTRAL ASIA, 1880-1902
make matters worse, the tribal groups that lived astride the poorly
defined Indo-Afghan border were determined to resist British influence
and frequently clashed with the Indian Army. What concerned the
British commanders was that any large-scale attack by Russia against
India would probably mean the collapse of their Afghan allies, the
deployment of more troops than could be spared to suppress tribal disturbances on the border itself, or, alternatively, a serious risk of smaller
Russian patrols appearing through the passes of the mountains at precisely the moment of some infraction between the tribesmen and the
Raj. Large numbers of Cossacks would not be required in this particular
case and would be too difficult to supply anyway, but the very sight of
these potential allies for the tribesmen would, the British feared, affect
the "Oriental mind."
Afghanistan itself was an unstable country. It was perhaps more of a
"geographical expression" than a state before the reign of Abdur Rahman.10 In 1880, in the closing stages of the Second Afghan War, the
British Conservative government of the day had seriously considered
partition in order to control more easily its separate parts, and, perhaps,
to purchase the alliance of the Persians. Lord Cranbrook, the Secretary
of State for India, had dramatically told Lytton, "Afghanistan as a whole
can no longer exist."ll Persia signed the Herat Convention in November
1879, agreeing to protect Central Asia from Russian encroachment,
whilst the British planned to extend a railway from Kandahar to Herat,
and improve the telegraphic communications inside Persia. However, a
plan for an Anglo-Persian defensive alliance was rejected by the British
government on 27 December 1879, mainly because the Prime Minister,
Benjamin Disraeli, feared the consequences of the extension of Britain's
responsibilities. Abdur Rahman arrived in March 1880 to ascend the
Afghan throne. Although he accepted the provisions of the Treaty of
Gandamak in July 1880, namely British control of his foreign policy, he
wanted the return of Kandahar and the preservation of his territorial
integrity.l2 The new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, who was appointed that year,
was keen to avoid the responsibility of retaining Kandahar, and his view
10. Afghanistan was formally known as the Kingdomof Kabul,and it was united
in 1747. The history of the country before 1880 is really the history of Durrani monarchs and peoples. The rather loose control the Amirs exercised was demonstrated by
Amir Mohamed Akbar in the First Afghan War of 1838-42, even though that was a
"national"crisis. See also KumarGhose Dulip, England and Afghanistan, 1849-1887
(Calcutta: World Press, 1960); and M. Jamil Hanifi, Annotated Bibliography of
Afghanistan, 4th ed. (New Haven, Conn.: HRAFPress, 1982).
11. Cranbrook to Lord Lytton, 12 October 1879, cited in W. K. Fraser-Tytler,
Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 148-49.
12. Afzal Khan, Indian agent in Kabul,to Foreign Secretary, 27 November 1883,
FO 65/1202, PRO.
MILITARY HISTORY
705
R. A. JOHNSON
was in accordance with a new Liberal administration in London. Consequently, Afghanistan was handed to the Amir intact.13
Despite the control of Afghan foreign policy, the British did not have
a stable satellite state, for Abdur Rahman was never secure in his authority. Within days of his coronation on 22 July 1880, and before the British
had left his country, he faced the rebellion of Ayub Khan.l4 Leading a
rebel army from his governorship of Herat, Ayub Khan defeated a British
force at Maiwand on 26 July 1880 and seemed poised to take Kandahar.15
General Frederick Sleigh Roberts's famous forced march from Kabul, and
the subsequent battle of Kandahar on 1 September 1880, defeated Ayub
Khan, but only temporarily. The Amir himself went on to crush Ayub
Khan at Herat, and, with the transfer of Kandahar from the British, he
secured complete geographical control of Afghanistan.l6 It would be misleading to think that he controlled the Afghan people, however. Marginal
areas thought little of central authority at any time, whilst Ghilzais, Hazaras, and those in the northern districts resented Kabul's rule.
Nevertheless, according to D. Edwardes, Abdur Rahman's achievement at the end of his reign was substantial.17 He created and consolidated the position of the state in Afghanistan, subdued the hostile
chiefdoms, changed militias into a standing army, converted a small
group of scribes into a rudimentary bureaucracy, and, having prevented
further invasions of his country by both British and Russian forces, had
the unusual reputation of dying peacefully, rather than falling at the
hand of an assassin like previous Afghan rulers. However, the absolutism
and cruelty of the "Iron Amir" fuelled the hatred of his people. Kabulis
were so keen on revenge by the time of his death that they lined his proposed funeral route in order to attack his corpse.18 Abdur Rahman's
13. Governmentof Indiato Secretaryof Statefor India,no. 81, 31 March1880,
FO 65/1099, PRO;LordRiponto LordHartington,9 May 1880, Add MSS43565,
BritishLibrary(BL),London.
14. AyubKhanwas the brotherof the deposedformerAmirYakubKhan.
15. See L. Maxwell,My God!-Maiwand: Operations of the South Afghanistan
Field Force, 1878-80 (London: Leo Cooper, 1979).
16. Secretaryof Stateto Viceroy,31 July 1880, AddMSS43565, BL.
17. D. Edwardes, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier
(Berkeleyand LosAngeles:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1997), 83.

18. In the event,his funeralwas cancelled,and he was buriedhastilybesidehis
death bed. Edwardes,Heroes of the Age, 124. His cruelties have been well documented.See F.Martin,UndertheAbsoluteAmir(London:n.p., 1907), 157;Edwardes,
MoralFaultLines, 111;and SchuylerJones,Afghanistan(London:ClioPress,1992),
76. Sir PercySykeswas moresanguine,and believedthat "Hisjustice was grimand
cruel . . . but, in dealingwith his stubborn,treacheroussubjects,his methodswere
the only methodsthatwouldhave securedlawand order.It was typicalroughjustice
of the only kind that his peopleunderstood."Sykespraisedhis system of espionage
and likenedhis state-buildingachievementsto those of Williamthe Conqueror.Sir
PercySykes,A Historyof Afghanistan(London:Macmillan,1940), 2:198-200.
706 *
THE JOURNAL OF

excesses did not play a part in influencing British defence policy. The
British were only encouraged by his continued rule. The alternativescivil war, anarchy, or partition into small and weak hill states-could
only offer opportunities for Russian intervention, or so it was feared.
In 1886, the crushing of the rebellion of the Ghilzais, a people more
populous than the Durranis (the ruling clan), prompted Sir Mortimer
Durand, the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, to write:19
The Amir is a troublesome and unsatisfactory ally, and there is no
doubt he is thoroughly detested throughout the country. His cruelties are horrible, and one feels reluctant to support him in power,
especially as he shows the utmost jealousy of ourselves. If it were not
for the fact that his fall would throw everything into disorder and
give Russia an opening, I should not be sorry to see him driven out
of the country.20
A much more serious rebellion occurred in August and September

1888 in Badakshan.21 It, too, was crushed. Interestingly, Afghan rebels
made only a weak appeal to the Russians, who had eager troops close to
the border, even though the rebel leader, Ishaq Khan, fled to their protection in September 1888.22 Another rebellion broke out in spring 1891
19. Further details of this rebellion can be found at Government of India to India
Office, April 1885, L/P&S/7/44 and L/P&S/7/47, Oriental and India Office Collection
(OIOC), BL.
20. Cited in P. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand (London: Cassell and Co., 1926),
198.
21. The Badakshanrebels, led by Ishaq Khan, consisted of disaffected troops and
leading men of the border region, and, although appeals had also been directed at the
Ghilzai exiles, they refused to participate. Ishaq was in fact Abdur Rahman'scousin.
Following a month of illness, in which Abdur Rahman was nearly bled to death by his
physicians, rumours spread that he was dead. The rebels met the Amir's forces outside Tashkurgan.Duringthe battle it was alleged that some deserters from Abdur Rahman's army, galloping to join Ishaq Khan, startled the rebel leader and he fled the
field, whilst on the Amir's side it was maintained that Abdur Rahman's army was
defeated, and deserters spread the news that the Amir was deposed. There is no
record of Ishaq Khan'scowardice in the Peshawar diaries. The Amir stated that Ishaq
Khan had been sent twenty thousand rupees to spy on the Russians, but had bought
fifteen hundred rifles, and purchased the loyalty of his followers instead. The information was provided by Lieutenant Colonel Ata-Ulla Khan, who was acting as a
British agent in Kabul. The Amir seemed very confident of victory, especially when
news arrived that Bamian had remained loyal to him. General Ata-Ulla Khan (not to
be confused with the Colonel) was less hopeful. He remarked, as the Hazaras went
over to Ishaq Khan, "I do not believe that anyone will side with the Amir." Government of India to India Office, 7 September 1888, L/P&S/7/55,OIOC.
22. R. Tapper believes there was no appeal, but according to Mohammed Khan,
the secret newswriter in Kabul, the rebel leader had been in contact with the Russians. R. Tapper,ed., The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 248; see also Secret and Political letters received from
India, L/P&S/7/54, OIOC. The Russian troops in Bokhara were poised to attack, but
MILITARY HISTORY
707
R. A. JOHNSON
amongst the Hazara peoples. Resentment of Kabul's rule was again the
prime cause of the disturbance, but there was also a degree of opportunism, as Ishaq Khan's rebellion had been suppressed with some difficulty.23 The geographical,
ethnological,
and religious
positions
of the
Hazaras were their main weaknesses as well as the focus for their solidarity. Occupying the hills and mountains in the centre of Afghanistan,
they were attacked from all sides. Their ethnic origins, from the north,
made them the target of tribal rivalry and hatred. They were also Shias,
not Sunnis, and Abdur Rahman was able to mobilise support as defender
of the true Muslim faith. In fact, the rebellion served as a useful cement
in an unsettled period, even though Abdur Rahman was disappointed
that the Durranis, his own ethnic group, were not enthusiastic about
their involvement in the suppression. They felt they had too much to
lose.24 Durand described
the repression
that followed
as "extermina-
tion."25 Indeed, the rebellion was crushed, but the brutal reprisals went
on until September 1893. These rebellions show just how precarious the
Amir's rule was. The British were concerned that the Russians might
exploit these factions for their own ends, but they wisely kept their distance.26
Abdur Rahman was not above inventing a "foreign threat" to unite

his people against a common foe, and to distract them from the grievances that had caused rebellion. In May 1887, Durand recorded that the
Morier claimed that Giers, the Russian Foreign Minister, "intervened to prevent any
action." Sir Robert Morierto Earl Rosebery, 12 April 1893, FO 65 1463, PRO. In May,
Salor Turcomans in Russian service had ridden from Sarakhs along the northern frontier, appealing to Afghan Turcomans to abandon Afghanistan. Afghan regular troops
pursued those who defected, and a skirmish occurred on the Russian side of the border. There was continued tension until the late summer. Major Wolfe Murray,The
Russian Advance in Asia, vi, 1896, WO 33 50, PRO.
23. It was reported that the Hazaras were "delighted by news of Ishaq Khan's
rebellion." Government of India to India Office, 8 September 1888, L/P&S/7/55,
OIOC.
24. Tapper,Conflict of Tribe and State, 249-50.
25. Confidential letters, Sir Mortimer Durand Papers, D 727/11, OIOC; Sykes,
Durand, 199.
26. There was an interesting incidence of border violation during the revolt in
1892. A delegation of Hazaras begged Lieutenant Tarnovskii and his Turcoman Militia detachment to cross the border. He did so, driving out an Afghan post at Kila Nau,
but then withdrew on the orders of the Merv commander. He was threatened with a
court martial, but there was little other official reaction. The illegal border crossing,
and the official Russian condemnation, coincided with the outbreak of cholera riots
across Turkestan, suggesting that, whilst junior Russian officers still favoured the
seizure of opportunities against Afghanistan and Britain, the support of the higher
Russian authorities was essential. Tarnovskiiended up in the artillery arsenal at Askabad. Captain W. A. McBean, The Russian Advance in Asia, vii, 1895, WO 33 56,
PRO.
708
THE JOURNAL OF
Amir had issued afirman telling the Afghans to prepare for an invasion
by Kafirs (unbelievers). Durand wrote: "It is possible, though I think not
probable that he may have determined to raise a Jihad against us as a
means of taking the wind out of the sails of the Ghilzai rising. The Russians would, no doubt, if they have any influence with him, favour this
idea."27Durand felt that the only reason the calling of a Jihad might be
taken seriously was because Abdur Rahman was ill, but suggested that it
may have been that all his family were "more or less mad."
Moreover, Abdur Rahman was unpredictable even when it appeared
he would need British support. The rebellion of Ishaq Khan in 1888 had
represented the greatest threat to his reign, and Abdur Rahman had written to the Viceroy of India, Lord Dufferin, asking for military support,
whilst offering his approval for the British to occupy Jalalabad and Kandahar.28Dufferin and the Council of India were alarmed, since the fall of
Abdur Rahman would almost certainly be followed by a period of unrest
which the Russians would exploit. But the threat passed. The outcome
was a request by Abdur Rahman for the British to visit Kabul in October
1888.29 However, he changed his mind, no doubt fearful of the British
price for this support.30
Abdur Rahman was consistent in his desire to preserve the independence of his country, free of both British and Russian influence. At times
he appeared close to despair, descibing Afghanistan as a grain of corn
between two millstones.31 Durand even felt sorry for him, stating: "There
is something which went to one's heart about the man, standing there
between England and Russia, playing his lone hand." That he feared the
Russian advance across Central Asia is undoubted. He began a colonisation programme in the northwestern part of the country to prevent Russian annexation. This fear of Russia was shared by his people. Rumours
circulating in January 1885, which were typical of the time, suggested
the Russians would invade, close the mosques, defile the women, and
overthrow the religion.32 Consequently, many Afghans began to form
resistance groups, and considered whether to appeal directly to British
India for assistance, deciding against such a move only from fear of offi27. Confidential
letters,DurandPapers,D 727/8,OIOC;Sykes,Durand,199-200.
28. Governmentof Indiato IndiaOffice,lettersof Augustand September1888,
OIOC.
L/P&S/7/55,
29. The idea was put forwardby the Amiron 15 July 1888, Durand,demi-offiOIOC.
cial, 14 August1888, L/P&S/8/2/1030a,
30. AbdurRahmanexplainedthis as having"notime"for a MissionfromIndia,
LieutenantColonelAta-UllaKhanto Governmentof India,enclosurein Government
of Indiato IndiaOffice,7 September1888, L/P&S/7/55,OIOC;see also demi-official
correspondenceto IndiaOffice,L/P&S/8/2,OIOC.
31. Citedin P.E. Roberts,TheHistoryof BritishIndia (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1921), 475.
32. Governmentof Indiato IndiaOffice,January1885, L/P&S/7/43,
OIOC.
MILITARY HISTORY
709
R. A. JOHNSON
cial punishment.33 Abdur Rahman himself described the Russian tactics

as being "like an elephant, that examines a spot thoroughly before he
places his foot upon it and when once he puts his weight there is no
going back, and no taking another step in a hurry until he has put his full
weight on the first foot and has smashed everything that lies under it."34
Afghanistan was therefore an unreliable bastion in the defence of
India. Unstable, at times uncooperative, and too weak to defend itself
against Russia but too difficult to occupy, Afghanistan exasperated the
defence planners. Their responses tended to divide them into two categories: those who advocated direct intervention and others who promoted alternatives, such as defending India along the Indus River, or
making thrusts against Russia elsewhere.
The Defence Plans

What was the solution? General Frederick Sleigh Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief of India (1885-93), developed a scheme for the defence
of India known as the "Scientific Frontier." It was this comprehensive
plan, advocating intervention in Afghanistan, that was largely implemented between 1885 and 1900. It detailed defence not only by conventional means, but also through the function of military intelligence.
However, Roberts's chief rivals, General Sir Garnet Wolseley and Henry
Brackenbury, the Director of Military Intelligence in London, provided
the most prominent of the alternative strategies proposed. The plans
themselves became the springboards for their careers and attracted the
interest of politicians and journalists, which resulted in the publication
of many unofficial articles in the press. The defence of India also
involved a considerable diplomatic effort towards Russia, China, Persia,
and Afghanistan and consequently became an issue of importance in
Britain's imperial defence. The burden of protecting the trade and reinforcement routes to India raised the strategic value of the eastern
Mediterranean. In addition, China and Persia were regarded as powers in
decline, and, like the Ottoman Empire in the west, the British felt props
were required to keep them free of Russian intrigues. However, according to Andrew Porter, Britain's premiers between 1885 and 1899 were
compelled to reach some accommodation with Russia, since governments on both sides sought to avoid a war.35
33. J. R. Fitzgeraldto Governmentof India and ForeignOffice,no. 136, FO
65/1235, PRO.
34. V. Schofield, Every Rock, Every Hill (London: Century Hutchinson, 1987),
106; Sykes, Durand, 241.
35. Andrew Porter, The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3:14.
710
The first line of defence for India was diplomacy, which is described
in some excellent histories of this period; but the military plans seem
less well documented. The sheer volume of material that was generated
on this issue precludes an analysis of every plan put forward, but it is
possible to evaluate some of the most important ones in order to show
the process of planning, the problems faced, and the solutions produced.
Roberts and the Scientific Frontier
The Forward School of British officers, led by General Roberts, was
concerned that a defence of India on the actual Indian border (along the
river Indus) was weak in two respects. First, the Indus was an insufficient barrier for defence. Second, the Indian population might regard the
attackers as liberators and rise up in rebellion. The solution Roberts
advocated was a defence in depth where the fighting would be deep
inside Afghanistan, and where Russian invaders would have to contend
with the harassing raids of Afghan guerrillas.
The defence line Roberts proposed, known as the Scientific Frontier,
ran along the Hindu Kush mountains from the state of Kashmir to northern Afghanistan, before swinging south through the complex of mountains and hills in central Afghanistan, and culminated at Kandahar where
the left flank was protected by the great desert of Baluchistan. He felt not
only that the Indus simply did not present any form of defendable line,
as plenty of previous invaders had proved, but also that if the British
waited for Russian troops to pour out of the passes, then the initiative
would have been lost. This would cost the British the support of the
Afghans, who, under these circumstances, would join the Russians.
Worst of all, he believed the Pathan tribesmen of India's North West
Frontier would rise up, possibly encouraging the masses of the Indian
population to join them and then envelop the British army. Roberts was
convinced that Russian agents and sympathisers would prepare the
ground with campaigns of sedition, and he knew that the British army
could never hold down the Indian people in revolt and at the same time
stem a Russian invasion.
Roberts drew up his defence plan in 1877, the first paper of twenty
that he was to draft between that date and 1893. He also wrote many letters to politicians and the press to demonstrate to the government the
inevitability of an Anglo-Russian war in Central Asia and the vulnerability of India. Before, and during, the Second Afghan War (1878-80),
Roberts suggested that the British should take the initiative by marching
into Central Asia, there to defeat the Russians in one decisive battle.
In the event of war with Russia, Roberts anticipated that operations
would be conducted in the Baltic and Black Seas as they had been in the
Crimean War (1854-56). However, in 1877, Russian annexations of CenMILITARY
HISTORY
711
R. A. JOHNSON
tral Asian states had led Roberts to the conclusion that there was a more
immediate threat to India. If a war broke out, Roberts believed, Britain
would be compelled to assist the Ottoman Empire, which would require
an assessment of the security of the Suez Canal, Constantinople, and
Persia. Such operations would mean that no reinforcements would be
available from Britain to assist in the defence of India. In 1877, however,
Roberts did not envisage a defensive war. He examined the options for
the deployment of the Indian Army: one, the army could support operations in the Mediterranean; two, it could advance through Afghanistan;
or three (he considered with less enthusiasm), it could advance through
Persia, either via Syria and the Ottoman Empire or up the river Tigris
from the Persian Gulf.36Two other possibilities were considered: sending
agents into Armenia and Central Asia to raise the tribesmen against the
Russsians, and, most surprisingly, directly advancing deep into Russian
Turkestan.37
Roberts believed the Mediterranean theatre was the responsibility of
the home army, not the Indian Army. That left Persia and Afghanistan.
The factors militating against the Persian option were considerable, but,
primarily, he felt them to be the time and cost involved and the lack of
influence on the main theatre of war, that is, Afghanistan. The Russians
would use this to their advantage by attacking India via Afghanistan,
whilst the bulk of the Indian Army was still committed to Persia. Roberts
believed the Russians would incite the Persians to capture western
Afghanistan, which he deduced from evidence that the Russians already
exercised a great deal of influence at Teheran. This western region of
Afghanistan would be the springboard for an offensive eastwards. As a
solution, Roberts felt that, whilst dominating Afghanistan with the
Indian Army, the British could ensure the control of Southern Persia by
"a few men-of-war" of the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf.38He therefore
dismissed the Persian option.
Consequently Roberts's focus returned to the region northwest of
India. The Central Asian theatre presented a number of planning problems for the British, who had little information on the routes the Russians might take or the attitudes of the tribes that lived astride these
avenues of approach. It was already evident though, that for the Indian
Army to operate in Central Asia, the occupation of northern Afghanistan
36. Roberts to Sir Edwin Johnson, MilitaryMember, 11 March 1877, 162/5, Field
MarshalLord Roberts Papers, National Army Museum (NAM),London.
37. MajorGeneral F. S. Roberts, Memorandum to consider the measures which
should be adopted in India in the event of Englandjoining Turkeyin the War

against Russia, 4 June 1877, Para. 7 and 8, 95/1, Roberts Papers, NAM.
38. Ibid.
712
THE JOURNAL OF
would be required. Only with this area secured would there be enough
supplies to support thrusts up into Central Asia. Roberts concluded:
Fromsuch a position Englandmight view without anxiety the extension of Russianpower in CentralAsia. Her right would be protected
by the impassablerangeof mountainslying between Kashgarand the
Pamir;the Hindu Kush, covered by a force at Balkh, would be her
centre; and Herat, her left, which, while checking the further
advance of the Russians from the west, would enable her to regain
lost influence in Persia, give her absolute control over Afghanistan,
and bringher in alliance with the Turkomantribes.39
The focus of Roberts's plan was therefore Afghanistan. Occupation would
be carried through either as an ally, or as an enemy, but either way, it
was seen as necessary.40
Roberts admitted that the size of the forces needed to advance
through a hostile Afghanistan, hold its northern border, garrison the
towns, and guard one thousand miles of communications would have
been "considerable," but he did not commit himself to a figure for this
phase of the operation. Since detachments would no longer be mutually
supporting during the winter, Roberts really felt that only if the Afghans
were allies could the march into Central Asia be achieved.41 Herat in
western Afghanistan was the lynchpin of the plan, both for its strategic
and geographical position, and the way it would "check the advance of
Russia towards India from the southern shores of the Caspian [Sea], and
the lower valley of the Oxus [on the northern border of Afghanistan]." It
would also provide the springboard to raise not only Persians and Central Asian tribesmen, but also Circassians (peoples of the Caucasus
region) against Russian forces.42 The anticipated time to occupy Herat
was two to three months, and the force required to take, and hold, the
town, was to be ten thousand strong. A further ten thousand would be
39. Ibid.
40. Thisview was sharedby ColonelMarkSeverBell,VC,TheDefenceof India
and Its ImperialAspect, private circulationonly (London, 1890), L/P&S/20/G2,
OIOC.ColonelBell won the VC in the Ashanti(Asante)War(1873-74) beforeserving in both the IntelligenceDivisionat the WarOfficeand the IndianIntelligence
Branchat Simla(fromMarch1880 to 1890). He was awardedthe MacGregor
Gold
Medalfor reconnaissanceworkand was an advocateof the same ideasas Roberts.
41. By contrast,the captureof Heratwas considereda far easier undertaking,
since Robertsfelt that the KhojakPasswas the only obstacle,and this pass hadbeen
crossedsuccessfullyin the FirstAfghanWar.The distance,530 miles fromQuetta,
was not regardedas a difficulty.
42. Russianattemptsto close the Caucasusborderto preventBritishinfluence
from 1883 are dealt with in R. Tapper,"Nomadsand Commissarsin Mughan,"in R.
Tapper,The Conflictof Tribeand State, 410-35. See also W. E. D. Allen and Paul
Muratoff,Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the War on the Turco-Caucasian Bor-
der,1828-1921 (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1953).
MILITARY HISTORY
713
R. A. JOHNSON
needed to hold the lines of communication and occupy Kandahar in

southern Afghanistan, whilst a reserve would consist of ten thousand
more. These plans were incredibly ambitious, but they were based on
Roberts's experiences of the Second Afghan War. His remarkable threehundred-mile march from Kabul to Kandahar (July-August 1880) had
been as much a triumph of logistical planning as a feat of endurance.
Interestingly, Roberts was prepared to accept a loss of mutual support
between columns or an over-stretched transport system as a matter of
course, rather than as an exceptional circumstance.
In the summer of 1883, prompted by fresh Russian annexations in
Central Asia, Roberts drew up a new paper: Is an invasion of India by
Russia Possible?. This document took much the same line as Charles
MacGregor's The Defence of India.43 Roberts relished the task, since
"affairs seem to me to be progressing so rapidly on the North West Frontier of Afghanistan."44 Nevertheless, it took a year to research. Roberts
began by reconsidering the debate of 1880 at the end of the Second
Afghan War, which had focussed on the retention, or abandonment, of
Kandahar.45Sir Henry Norman, Member of the Council of India under
the Viceroy Lord Ripon, had argued that any danger to India was "so
remote, its possibility is hardly worth considering."46 In contrast,
Roberts cited the Liberal radical John Bright, usually a target of his displeasure, to emphasise the irony of Liberal views on Afghanistan's position: "Small Afghanistan has provided the distance [from India] as the
'silver streak' [the English Channel] is to England . . . [they] have
enabled her to do without those huge standing armies found necessary
by continental nations whose boundaries are coterminous."47 Bright had
intended to show how India was secure behind Afghanistan, but Roberts
43. General Roberts, Is an invasion of India by Russia Possible? 95/II, Roberts
TheDefenceof India:A
Papers,NAM;andMSSEurD.734/8,OIOC;C. M.MacGregor,
was the QuarterMasterGeneral
StrategicalStudy (Simla,1884), OIOC.MacGregor
(QMG)of the IntelligenceBranchat Simla. He had served in the Mutiny,and in
China,Bhutan,andAbyssinia.Hisconfidentialworkcauseda stormof protestin governmentcircles when it was leakedto the press in an attemptto influenceLiberal
governmentpolicy.The Russiansassumedit was Britishpolicy.See lettersdated 11
March1885, 59 in FO 539/26, PRO.
44. GeneralRobertsto ProfessorWilliamMarkby,OxfordUniversity,26 FebruRobertsPapers,NAM.
ary 1884, 97-1/LXXXIII,
45. See, for example, Memorandum on the consideration to withdraw from
Afghanistan,Major-General
Wilson,confidential,IndiaOfficeMilitaryDepartment,
10 July 1880, L/MIL/17/14/53,
OIOC.
20 September1880, cited in F.Roberts,Noteson the Central
46. Memorandum,
Asian Question, 14, L/MIL/17/14/80,OIOC.
47. John Bright, 16 April 1879, cited ibid., 15. John Bright was a radical
reformerwho had championedfree tradeand the repealof the CornLawsagainst
714 *
THE JOURNAL OF
used the expression in 1883 to demonstrate the new vulnerability of

India.
Afghanistan, Roberts believed, was weak and had to be kept free of
Russian influence, which meant convincing the Afghans of the merits of
siding with the British, and reassurances that:
We have no designs upon their country and that even should circumstances require a British occupation of Kandahar,the direction
of all internal affairswould be left in their hands;we must guarantee
them the integrityof their kingdom,we must be preparedto hold out
advantagesas great as they might accept from Russia;and they must
be made to see that their interests and ours are identical.48
Roberts did not condemn the Russian advance, but regarded it as a natural process, not unlike the British annexation of India. He saw it partly
as the result of punitive operations against the Central Asian tribes.
However, he believed strongly that Britain should conclude a commercial treaty with Afghanistan, and construct a railway to Kandahar, as a
first step to strengthening relations. It was hoped that, in this instance,
a railway would have "a civilising effect all over Afghanistan."49 Roberts
also advocated the despatch of intelligence agents to the frontier to give
warning of the Russian advance. In addition, he urged that the government should make it clear to Russia that a frontier violation would be an
act of war.
Nevertheless, despite these precautions, Roberts was convinced that
a conflict between Russia and Britain was inevitable. He was aware that
Russia's primary strength lay in her manpower reserves. Roberts therefore argued that India needed a bigger army, but one that was stiffened
by more British troops. He wrote:
It must moreoverbe rememberedthat, whereas the invasion of any
country is usually met with the determinedopposition of all classes
of the inhabitants, every man who can be depended on to fight for
his hearth and home, with the British in India the conditions would
be very different. At the best we could only expect the natives to
remain passive, while the first disaster for our arms would raise
throughoutHindustana storm, comparedwith which the troublesof
1857 would be insignificant.50
aristocraticinterests.He was a committedpacifistand anti-imperialist

who resigned
in 1882 becauseof Gladstone'sinvasionof Egypt.His eloquencemadehim a formidableopponentto the Russophobesandhe calledfornegotiationwith St. Petersburg,
not confrontation.
48. MajorGeneralRobertsto ProfessorWilliamMarkby,26 February1884, 97RobertsPapers,NAM.
1/LXXXIII,
49. Ibid.
50. Roberts,Noteson the CentralAsian Question,15.
MILITARY HISTORY
715
R. A. JOHNSON
The Indian Army was also regarded as inadequate because the sepoys
then serving were seen as inferior against European troops. This
prompted the search for more inherently "martial races" who could face
the Russians and their allies. In 1890, Major General Oliver Newmarch
warned: "Many Regiments are not fit to take the field against a European
enemy.... The near approach of a great European power compels us to
have an army composed of very different material from that which was
sufficient when we had no external enemy to deal with."51 Whilst this
issue has become a battleground for historians, its context is often overlooked. The criticism of Roberts stems largely from the comments he
made about the Madras soldiery and his racial stigmatism.52 The issue,
however, was that the troops would have to be reliable enough to take
offensive action as well as to maintain internal security in India. Roberts
faced opposition from contemporaries who felt that the Indian Army
should maintain a balance in its recruiting. However, progressively the
Indian Army drew its recruits from Dogras, Garwhalis, Gurkhas, Moplahs,
Baluchis, and Pathans. By 1893, these "martial races" made up half of the
army, although they had amounted to only 25 percent in 1881.53
In the report of 1884, Roberts regarded the Hindu Kush mountains of
Afghanistan as the most important theatre in a struggle between Russia
and Britain, the outcome of which would decide the future of India. But
whilst this was the most important line, extending in an arc from Kandahar to Kabul, he did not neglect the flanks of the Sind-Baluchistan desert
in the south, and the remote states of Gilgit and Hunza in the north. They
would be placed under observation. Still, the priority remained a rapid
advance into Afghanistan to secure the Hindu Kush passes. From these
passes, counterattacks into Central Asia would be possible. In order to get
forward as fast as possible, Roberts advocated the construction of lines of
communication, rather than fortifications on the Indian border, using
only Attock and Rawalpindi as reserve bases and depots.
51. Memorandum by Major General Oliver Newmarch, 30 April 1890,
L/MIL/17/2203,OIOC.
52. Frederick Sleigh Roberts,Forty One Yearsin India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief (London: Macmillan, 1898), 499 and 532; M. Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The "Manly Englishman" and the "Effeminate Bengali" in the Late
Nineteenth Century (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 1995), 8, 70-71. See
also David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (London:
Macmillan, 1994), 10-46, for a critical view of this issue. It is often forgotten how
Roberts tried to bring the Madras army up to the standard of the rest of the Indian
Army by active service on the frontier and through training. See Major General
Roberts to Lieutenant General Wilson, 9 August 1884, 97-2/CIV, Roberts Papers,
NAM;Major General Roberts to Lord Napier, 10 October 1884, 97-1/CXIX, NAM;
Major General Roberts to the Duke of Cambridge, 28 January 1884, 97-1/LXXIII,
NAM.
53. Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, 19.
716 *
THE JOURNAL OF
The defeat of four thousand Afghan troops in a Russian attack, called

the Penjdeh Incident of 1885, had a profound and far-reaching effect on
the defence of India. The attack appeared to be the beginning of a Russian bid to secure control of northern Afghanistan. A small British detachment, the Boundary Commission, which had been sent to delimit the
Russo-Afghan frontier, withdrew, but both Russia and Britain prepared
for war during the spring and summer of that year. Roberts adjusted his
own ideas because of the crisis. He seemed to have abandoned the
notion he had expressed in 1877 about going on the offensive inside Central Asia, and his plans became more defensive.54 Whilst retaining the
initiative by seizing passes inside Afghanistan and using Kandahar as a
forward depot, British and Indian troops would only take up advanced
positions along the Hindu Kush. He had written, in February 1884, "An
advance to Herat is now altogether out of the question." In a race, the
Russians would simply beat the Indian Army to it, and Roberts felt that
not enough troops were available. He had stated, it "would necessitate
the employment of a force infinitely larger than we could hope to
mobilise."55 Nevertheless, in May 1885, in light of the Penjdeh Incident,
he seemed to favour a vigorous counterattack. He wrote, "When I formed
this opinion I never expected that Russia would attempt so forward a
movement until she was more prepared than we believe her now to
be."56He thought that, within a few years, railways would give the Russians greater influence over northern Afghanistan, but Roberts was confident that even if Herat fell, "we ought to be able to turn them out of it,
and inflict such a punishment upon them as would prevent a recurrence
of the Afghan frontier question for many years to come."57
At the height of the Penjdeh Crisis in 1885, Roberts reinforced his
views in a new paper entitled What are Russia's Vulnerable Points and
How have Recent Events Affected our Frontier Policy in India?58 It was
54. R. A. Johnson, "The Penjdeh Incident, 1885," Archives 24, no. 100 (1999):
28-48.
55. MajorGeneral Roberts to Professor William Markby,26 February 1884, 971/LXXXIII,Roberts Papers, NAM.
56. Major General Roberts to Sir Henry Rawlinson, 3 May 1885, 97-1/CXXX,
Roberts Papers, NAM.
57. Captain F. Beaufort, Memorandum on Herat, 17 March 1885, WO 33/43,
PRO. Following the revelations of General Alexei N. Kuropatkin'splans for the invasion of Afghanistan, Beaufort went on a mission to gather intelligence but was
arrested by the Russians for spying en route to Batoum. See Brackenbury'sreport of
15 July and 4 August 1886, WO 106/11, PRO. For the Herat debate from an earlier
period, see G. Alder, "The Key to India? Britain and the Herat Problem, 1830-63,"
Middle Eastern Studies 10 (1974): 304-7. General Kuropatkin'splans were subject to
intense scrutiny when they were acquired in 1886. General Kuropatkin's Schemefor
a Russian Advance Upon India, June 1886, CID 7-D CAB 6/1, PRO.
58. General Roberts, 22 May 1885, IQ MadrasArmy, L/MIL/17/14/80,OIOC.
MILITARY HISTORY
717
R. A. JOHNSON
written at the request of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Donald Stewart,

who wanted to know where the Russians could be most easily attacked.59
Roberts felt that at the very least there should be a fixed line of defence
for Afghanistan's frontier. He still regarded the Hindu Kush as the only
defendable line that was practicable, and thus Roberts's conclusions
were unchanged from his previous work in 1884, with the exception of
the proposed advance on Herat. The decisive blow would be struck during one of the battles for the Hindu Kush passes, or in the Herat valley.
He also considered how to protect the vulnerable supply lines against
potentially hostile tribesmen, and came up with the idea that Afghan
Shias (from Hazara) would provide good line-of-communication troops
because of their hostility to the rest of the Sunni population. Clearly
Roberts expected Russian agents to precede an advance, and there
would be widespread subversion. The Russian "explorers" he deemed:
"the inevitable fore runners of every Russian advance . . . who will
endeavour by all means in their powers to gain influence amongst the
tribes, and if they can accomplish this, we are certain to have trouble in
the neighbourhood of Punjab and Peshawar."60The main recommendation was that, given the large numbers of Russian troops that would be
involved and the vulnerability of the lines of communication, the British
garrison of India required a massive increase, from sixty-five thousand to
eighty thousand men, and communications across the Indus were to be
greatly extended. In earlier papers he had advocated that two corps were
to be formed and held in readiness to cross the Afghan frontier the
moment the Russians made any southerly advance, and this idea was
unchanged.61
In July 1885 Roberts was selected to be the Commander-in-Chief of
India with the support of the Commander in Chief of the British Army,
the Duke of Cambridge; the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury; and the Secretary of State for India, Randolph Churchill.62 This gave Roberts the
opportunity to develop his plans for the defence of India throughout the
period from 1885 until his departure in 1893. Roberts had worked hard
to establish a strong link with the Prime Minister, who not only had
59. GeneralDonaldStewartbecameCommander-in-Chief
in Indiain 1881, having previouslyserved duringthe Mutiny,in Abyssinia,and as commanderof the
forces in Afghanistanduringthe war of 1878-80. He thoughthighlyof Roberts.He
wrote:"Hehas done a greatservicehere [Afghanistan],takingit at the estimateof
thosewho areleastfriendlyto him;andit willbe an infamousshameif any pettyfeeling of jealousyis allowedto standin his way."Stewartto his wife,cited in Sir George
Forrest,TheLifeof LordRoberts(London:Casselland Co., 1914), 114.
60. Roberts,Noteson the CentralAsian Question,Secret.
61. Robertsused this proposalfromDonaldStewart.In the days afterthe Penjdeh Incident,Robertshad been earmarkedto commandone of the corps.
62. Viceroyto GeneralRoberts,30 July 1885, 27/3, RobertsPapers,NAM.
718 *
THE JOURNAL OF
served as Secretary of State for India himself, but also had sympathy
with many of Roberts's ideas.63 This political lobbying can be traced back
to his speech at the Mansion House on 14 February 1881, when he had
advocated changes to the Cardwell army reforms.64He wanted to see the
restoration of long-service terms for soldiers in overseas forces to replace
the young, inexperienced drafts which were being sent out to keep battalions in India up to strength. The speech made Roberts a rival of General Sir Garnet Wolseley, not just because Wolseley backed the Cardwell
reforms, but because the two men were frequently in competition for the
same posts. Both men acquired "rings" of supporters amongst those who
had either served with them, or shared their ideas, both of which might
secure promotion opportunities. However, there does seem to be a strong
indication that Roberts genuinely felt that army reform in the 1870s had
had a negative impact on the quality of the soldiers who took part in the
Second Afghan War.
On appointment, Roberts still felt that it was only in Central Asia
that Russia could seriously strike against the British Empire, and once
more he assessed India's defences. He was set on the possession of Kandahar, since he still regarded Herat as strategically vital, but his notes of
1885 did not mention making a dash for the town, presumably because
Herat was at that moment being strengthened by British engineers. The
reliability of the Afghans was seriously questioned, and Roberts predicted there would be need for caution, as "the uncertain attitude of the
Afghans would prevent our undertaking the task of defending a line
extending from Herat to the most eastern part of the Oxus" on
Afghanistan's northern border.65Roberts also feared that the loss of sympathy in Kabul would lead to the extension of Russian influence not only
throughout Afghanistan, but also in the hill states to the north of India,
and even into India itself. Lord Salisbury believed that the defence of
Herat was out of the question, and agreed with Roberts that the priority
was the defence of the Hindu Kush mountains: "the scientific frontier
doctrine, which was so much derided some years ago, is master of the
field now."66
63. LordSalisburyto GeneralRoberts,6 July 1885, 80/4, RobertsPapers,NAM.
See also Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University
Press,1997), 95.
64. The Cardwellreformswere the most comprehensiveof the Victorianarmy.
andorganisational
Theyincludedadministrative
changes,but alsoin the deployment,
terms of service, and provisionof reinforcementsto the armyoverseas.See David
Chandler, ed., The Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University
Press,1994), 187-91.
Roberts
65. GeneralRobertsto LordSalisbury,8 June 1885, 97-1/CXXXVIII,
Papers,NAM.
66. LordSalisburyto GeneralRoberts,6 July 1885, 80/4, RobertsPapers,NAM.
MILITARY HISTORY
719
R. A. JOHNSON
The Capabilities of the Indian Army

The Indian Army was increased in size in 1885 to approximately
190,000 men. Three new cavalry regiments and nine new infantry
regiments were raised.67 By 1893, there had been an increase of 11,000
British troops (bringing the total to 72,500), and the formation of tribal
irregular forces, as well as an increase in Indian unit establishments.68
Continued fears about the quality and reliability of some Indian troops
in combat against Europeans led Roberts to advocate repeatedly the
despatch of reinforcements from Britain. He argued that any operations
in Asia Minor or in the Black Sea should be avoided, which differed from
General Wolseley's plan that the Near East would be the main focus of
operations, conducted by the army from home.69 Major General George
Tomkyns Chesney, the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council, hoped
that, since financial limits precluded an immediate strengthening of the
army in India, reinforcements would arrive from Britain if war broke out.
Roberts was less optimistic, having been informed by the Duke of Cambridge that there was no guarantee that even the reserves of battalions
already serving in India would arrive.70Lord Salisbury and Henry Brackenbury, the Director of Military Intelligence, eventually concurred with
Roberts that reinforcements should go to India. However, there was little enthusiasm in the Cabinet, nor was there any commitment in the
Stanhope Committee of 1888, which prioritised British defence as first,
aid to the civil power at home; second, the garrisoning of the colonies;
third, the defence of the United Kingdom; and fourth, the formation of
two corps to serve overseas. Thus, it remains uncertain whether Roberts
would ever have received the troops he expected in the event of war.71
The Indian Army provided the British Empire with a valuable source
of manpower throughout the nineteenth century. Certain infantry and
67. In some cases this gave the Indian Army the opportunity of reforming regiments that had only just been disbanded. The 16th and 17th Bengal Cavalry were
reformed, after having been disbanded in 1882. The 1st Poona and 1st and 2nd
Scinde Horse were reformed, as were the 4th, 5th and 6th Bombay Cavalry, and the
7th was newly raised.
68. Brian Robson, "Changes in the Indian Army," Journal of the Society for
Army Historical Research 70 (1992): 126. The proportion of Indian troops to British
was maintained at a ratio of two to one, and consequently, there were 133,663 Indian
soldiers in 1893.
69. General Roberts to Charles Marvin, 14 May 1887, 100-1/CXIX, Roberts
Papers, NAM.
70. Note on the urgent necessity of carrying out the sanctioned increase to the
British and native forces in India, 8 February 1887, 96-1/XXVI, Roberts Papers,
NAM.
71. Ian F. W. Beckett, "The Stanhope Memorandum of 1888: a Reinterpretation," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 57 (1984).
720
cavalry units were accorded a corps d'elite status, and all Indian units
were brigaded with British regiments. Artillery was handled by British
gunners, but highly mobile mountain batteries were crewed by Indian
troops with British officers.72 Irregular units which served exclusively on
the frontier, such as the Punjab Frontier Force, gave the Indian Army a
specialised mountain arm. In small arms, British troops were armed with
the Martini-Henry rifle whilst Indian troops retained the older Snider.
Magazine rifles and smokeless propellants, and the development of
machine guns, gave the Indian Army an advantage over the tribal war
parties of the frontier. However, as the Afghans were also armed with
Sniders (and some British Martini-Henrys), and the Russians were
equipped with the breech-loading Berdan, British units began to receive
the new Lee Metford from 1888, and the Indian troops were given the
Martini-Henrys.
The performance of the Indian Army in the Second Afghan War suggests that it would have had few difficulties in dealing with tribal resistance along its lines of communication as long as it could spare the
troops for the task of suppression.73 Against the Russian army, the
British soldiers had already proved their capacity to sustain heavy casualties and win during the Crimean War. Their battlefield discipline and
unit cohesion was strong. Strong loyalties prevailed in Indian regiments,
too. Sikhs established a reputation for courage and endurance in a number of campaigns on the frontier, whilst the Gurkhas excelled as light
infantry in hill warfare. According to Tim Moreman, after the Afghan War
the Indian Army clung to the European style of warfare, with its emphasis on loose-order skirmishing, rather than adapting itself wholly to
strictly mountain warfare with devolved chains of command. However,
the Afghan War had also forced British units to adopt close-order tactics
in order to resist charges by determined groups of swordsmen.74 The
most valuable outcome therefore was the practical experience the officers and men had picked up, and the lesson that flexibility was vital.
The Russian Army

Brian Bond once assessed the Russian army in the following terms:
72. This arrangement stemmed from the experience of the Indian Mutiny. T. A.
Heathcote, The Indian Army. The Garrison of British Imperial India, 1822-1922
(Newton Abbot and London: David and Charles, 1974), 41-42.
73. T. R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947 (London: Macmillan, 1998), 37.
74. Ibid., 39.
MILITARY HISTORY
721
R. A. JOHNSON
Its officer corps had little cohesion or sense of professionalism.Nor

was modern organisationand training helped by Russia'spoverty,
vast sparselypopulatedcountry with poor communicationsand lack
of a substantialarmamentsindustry ... [but] despite clumsy mobilisation, weak logisticalarrangements,a dividedcommand and obsolete tactics [in the war of 1877-78 againstTurkey,it] did not destroy
her awesome reputationas the "steamroller."75
It was the size of the Russian army that caused the British concern, but
precisely how many men could cross the border was unclear.76 In 1879,
the German General Staff estimated the size of the Russian army to be
600,000, but a decade later, British estimates were closer to 850,000.
Charles MacGregor, the Assistant Quarter-Master General (AQMG),
believed that the mobilised strength of the Russian army was 1,928,510
men. The bulk of the peacetime army was assigned to internal security
duties, and about half was deployed on the western frontier. In 1892,
George Curzon (later the Viceroy of India) estimated the number of
Russian troops in the Caucasus to be 101,500 and believed that this
force could be reinforced by 270,000 men on mobilisation, the bulk of
which would cross the Caspian and invade Afghanistan if war broke
out.77 In Turkestan and Trans-Caspia, the two regions of Russian Central
Asia, troop estimates ranged between 100,000 and 320,000, but once
again, the majority of these forces were designated for internal security.
The highest figure of troops available for an invasion of Afghanistan was
thought to be 95,000, but War Office calculations in 1889 reduced this
to about 30,000.78
Most of the Russian invasion troops would have been regulars in the
Russian army, augmented by mounted volunteers from Turkestan itself.
Conscription was not introduced in Central Asia, and most local forces
had been mounted before the Russian annexations. Unlike the Indian
Army there was no differentiation in the issue of small arms, but artillery
was crewed by Russian gunners. As far as fighting spirit was concerned,
the officer corps was all too eager to enliven its service on the fringe of
the Tsar's empire. Turcoman horsemen in Russian service were also
accustomed to frequent warfare and had enjoyed the riches of plunder
afforded by Khiva, northern Afghanistan, and Persia's remote Khorassan
75. Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970 (London: Fontana,
1984), 37. See also J. L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
76. J. Grierson, "State of the Russian Army and Preparationfor War,"12 August
1886, FO 65/1281, PRO.
77. George Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London: Longmans,
1892), 588.
78. Lieutenant General Brackenbury DMI and Major General Newmarch, Military Secretary India Office, Memorandum, Secret, 1889, CAB 37/25/43, 253, PRO.
722 *
THE JOURNAL OF
province.79 The axes of their advance were determined by logistics and

the channeling effects of deserts and rivers. The overwhelming problem
was how to supply forces of any size in the region.80 Colonel Frederick
Chenevix-Trench, the British Military Attache in St. Petersburg, reported
that even Russian officers doubted whether they could maintain troops
on active service in Afghanistan for any length of time.81 General
Kuropatkin's plan was to seize territory up to the rim of the Hindu Kush
and, if possible, dominate Herat. Then, once these gains had been consolidated, perhaps months later, the Russian army would cross the Hindu
Kush by means of major passes such as the Khawak and Shibar to
descend on Kabul, whilst a second thrust would be made from Herat
itself. The third phase, again, after several months had elapsed, would
bring the Russian army to India's borders, by which time the British
would be ready to sue for peace because of widespread insurrection in
the subcontinent.82
The Logistics of the Defence of India

The priority in 1885 had been the mobilisation of two army corps for
service against Russia after the Penjdeh Incident. This cut across the
existing presidency army system where Madras, Bombay, and Bengal
each supplied an equal proportion of the troops of the Indian Army.
Although the Eden Commission of 1879 had recommended the abolition
of these armies in favour of four army corps, the reforms were scotched
by the opposition of the Duke of Cambridge.83 Consequently, Roberts
established his own Defence Mobilisation Committee, and, in theory,
organised two army corps and a reserve division, although he made no
79. FrederickBurnaby,A Ride to Khiva (London:1876; reprintedOxford:
OxfordUniversityPress,1997), 96.
80. Colonel Belyavesky,who was attachedto the RussianHeadquartersstaff
between1879 and 1884, madeextendedreconnaisancesof CentralAsiabeforecomposingAffairsin Turkestan(1884). Thisdocumentexaminedthe problemsof supply
in an invasionof Afghanistanand concludedthat an armyof ten thousandwas the
most realisticallysized force.The documentwas translatedby CaptainWolfeMurray
of the IntelligenceDivision,15 June 1886, WO106 176, PRO.
81. ColonelChenevix-Trench,
Reporton the RussianArmy,16 October1886,
cited in WilliamBeaver,"TheDevelopmentof the IntelligenceDivisionandits rolein
aspectsof imperialpolicymaking,1854-1901"(Ph.D.diss., OxfordUniversity,1976),
179.
82. General Kuropatkin's Scheme for a Russian Advance Upon India, June
1886, CID7-D CAB6/1, PRO.

83. The EdenCommission(1879) did, nevertheless,insist that troopsfor each
presidencyarmybe drawnfromtheirown areas,and not fromotherregions.Heath-
cote, The Indian Army, 87; The Special Commission to enquire into the Organisation and Expenditure of the Army in India (Simla, 1879), L/MIL/17/5/1697,OIOC.
MILITARY HISTORY
723
R. A. JOHNSON
changes on the ground except in the selection of commanders.84 However, he did not act simply out of obedience to the wishes of the Duke of
Cambridge. Roberts's desire was to continue to garrison India, and thus
to maintain its internal security. The lack of actual reorganisation on the
ground was, in fact, quite typical. Throughout the late nineteenth century, the British army relied on its ability to improvise and prepare at
short notice, since the campaigns in which it was involved always varied
so greatly.85The emphasis would be on concentration and then transport
to the front.
Roberts carried out extensive changes to the communications infrastructure, with a view to moving forces rapidly up to the frontier, and
then into Afghanistan. This initiative mirrored the Russian railway
development of Central Asia. Railways were planned to run north-south
to cover all the passes of the North West Frontier.86The idea was also to
push a railway all the way to Kandahar, but Abdur Rahman refused to
allow such a development, which he feared might lead to further British
annexation.87 By the time Roberts left in 1893, this railway had been
extended to the Bolan Pass and New Chaman, but was still about seventy
miles short of Kandahar. In the north, another line reached Peshawar.88
In 1886, Roberts had expressed deep concern over the deficiencies of the
"Kandahar"line. A change in gauge, a steep gradient, and damage caused
by flooding cast doubts on the usefulness of the line during a period of
mobilisation.89 There were also concerns about the roads which were
opened up in the tribal districts, as they became the focus of tribal opposition, leading to operations such as the Zhob expedition of 1890.90
In 1885, a defence committee, chaired by Sir Donald Stewart, was
convened to discuss the tribes that lived across the lines of communication on the frontier between India and Afghanistan.91 The minutes are
interesting in that they reveal the differences in Roberts's and Stewart's
84. General Roberts to Viceroy, 12 October 1886, 78-1/15-17, Roberts Papers,
NAM.
85. EdwardM. Spiers, The Army and Society (London: Longmans, 1980), 207.
86. General Frederick Sleigh Roberts, Short Report on important questions
dealt with during the tenure of command of the Army in India by General Lord
Roberts (Simla, 1893), 49-54.
87. This was a price worth paying in fact, for Durand secured Abdur Rahman's
cooperation in the Pamirs in the 1890s in return for the abandonment of the Kandahar railway plan.
88. P. S. Berridge, Couplings to the Khyber (Newton Abbott, Devon: David and
Charles, 1969).
89. General Roberts to Viceroy, 16 April 1886, 97-1/7-8, Roberts Papers, NAM.
90. See for example, Memorandum on the desirability of making a military
road through the Kohat Pass, 17 August 1886, 96-1/XVIII,Roberts Papers, NAM.
91. Notes on the Proposals for the defence of the North West Frontier by the
Defence Committee, 1885, 22 June 1886, secret, L/MIL/17/14/80,OIOC.
724 *
THE JOURNAL OF
ideas on the policy to be adopted with regard to the tribal belt. Roberts
advocated that Chitral and Gilgit be brought under British control. If
Roberts intended annexation, then this recommendation would have
contradicted his earlier declarations against the extension of British formal rule. However, it seems he only envisaged a closer relationship with
the tribesmen, where the British assumed responsibility for law and
order and took control of all external policy, but generally avoided any
interference with local customs, and worked only through existing
elites.92 These closer relations were needed to thwart Russian intrigue.
Roberts explained:
Their emissaries, [once Afghanistanhas fallen] wouldbe busy everywhere, rousing the restless, discontented spirits which are to be
found in every province of India, and tamperingwith the loyalty of
our native soldiers . . . Our troops would be harrassedby incessant
raids from one end of the country to the other. ... by remainingon
the defensive, we might drive the Afghans,and the frontier tribes,
into the arms of Russia,while we should run a very serious risk, not
only of seeing our fellow subjects turn against us but of losing the
service of our native soldiers.93
The solution proposed was threefold: first, "to have such a hold over the
Afghans and the warlike tribes of the frontier as would ensure their
throwing their lot in with us"; second, "command of the approaches
from Afghanistan to India"; third, "the front contracted to such a length
to make it defended [sic] by a reasonably sized army."
Prestige was specified as a key factor, and Roberts felt closer relations
would be based on respect for British power: "We live by prestige, and we
cannot afford to let our Native troops or the people of India doubt the
maintenance of our supremacy."94He urged a policy that would "improve
relations with all the frontier tribes from Gilgit to Seistan," and acknowledged that in some areas, this would be an uphill struggle. The Afridis were
especially important, for not only were they the most likely, in Roberts's
view, to side with the Russians, but they lived astride the strategic Khyber
Pass. No less vital was the need to prevent any uprisings amongst the
Baluchis in the south, which might be exploited, letting the Russians out-
92. Robert Sandeman,the Governor-General's

Agent for Baluchistan,had
achieveda close rapportwith the peoplesof Baluchistanand Sindafter1877. Tohis
supporters,this representedthe real "ForwardPolicy"and stood in contrastto the
Liberalinterpretationof the concept,whichthey saw as shamelessexpansionism.
93. Notes on the Proposals for the defence of the North West Frontier by the
Defence Committee, 1885.
94. GeneralRobertsto CharlesMarvin,14 May 1887, 100-1/CXIX,Roberts

Papers,NAM.
MILITARY HISTORY
725
R. A. JOHNSON
flank them, and which, ultimately, "would make the defence of

Afghanistan untenable." Roberts warned that the existence of the vast
Baluchistan deserts was no bar to the Russians, who had marched considerable forces across similar wastes in Central Asia in 1873.95 He also took
the opportunity the Defence Committee had presented to reiterate his Scientific Frontier plan as a solution to the problem of the defence of India.
During 1886, Roberts was involved in the operations in Burma, but
he took time to draft a fresh report on the defence of the North West
Frontier, since he speculated that Russia might seize Afghan Turkestan
whilst the Indian Army was committed to fighting a guerrilla war in the
east.96 He was eager to point out that the annexation of Upper Burma did
not demand an increase in the army, which, after all, would have been
only a short term requirement. He concluded: "The sole reason for the
increase was the demands that it seemed likely would be made on our
army in the direction of the North West Frontier."97
Roberts continued to update his plans, providing a scheme for combined operations of the home and imperial armies for the former Secretary of State for War in 1887.98 He also refined the details of the Scientific
Frontier in May of that year.99In particular, Roberts sought a solution to
the manpower shortage in the employment of troops from the Native
states. He wrote: "In the spring of 1885,... I confess I was much struck
with the feeling which seemed to pervade all classes of a desire to come
forward in support of our rule. There appeared to be a general wish to
take a part in the defence of the Empire."100He envisaged British officers
training the existing troops of the Punjab, to bring them up to the same
level of efficiency as the rest of the Indian army. He also created the
Imperial Service Troops, levies raised from the hill states and led by
British officers, whose role would be to hold the passes until reinforcements arrived. To guard internal lines of communication, volunteer
corps were raised, which numbered twenty-four thousand by 1893.101
Such changes demonstrate both the lessons Roberts had learned from
95. Roberts referred to the expeditions led by General Verevkin and Colonel
Lomakin against Khiva. Ibid.
96. General Roberts to Owen Burne, Secretary of the Political Department of the
India Office, 21 August 1886, MSS Eur D.951/3, OIOC.
97. General Roberts,Note on the necessity of carrying out the proposed

increaseto theNativeArmyand offorminga sufficientreserve,12 September1886,
96-1/XIX, Roberts Papers, NAM.
98. General Roberts to W. H. Smith, secret, 1887, L/MIL/17/14/80,X, OIOC.
99. Notes on the militarypreparationsfor operationson or beyondthe North
WestFrontier, 23 May 1887, L/MIL/17/14/80,XI, OIOC.
100. Noteon the desirabilityof utilising theArmiesof NativeStates, 8 Septem-
ber 1888, 96-1/XXXVI,Roberts Papers, NAM.
101. GeneralRoberts,Principles of Army Administrationin India, 1 April
1893, L/MIL/7/7056,OIOC.
726
THE JOURNAL OF
the Penjdeh Incident and the greater priority he gave to the external
threat. In 1888, Roberts sent a copy of his latest report on the defence
of India to Lord Salisbury, who replied warmly and disagreed only with
Roberts's conclusions about the next Russian objective.102 Roberts
believed northern Afghanistan was likely to be annexed, but Salisbury felt
that northern Persia was more likely, simply because Russia had no boundary agreements there with which Britain could interfere.103 Either way,
Roberts still felt that closer relations with Afghanistan were essential.104
There was a more pessimistic outlook in Roberts's plans from 1891,
because of the development of the Russian railway network in Central
Asia.105He responded to the Viceroy Lord Lansdowne's request for a
defence plan, based on the existing forces available, as follows: "I consider, infact, it would be impossible to meet such an attack [by Russia]
with our present available force, and so it would be impossible for me to
show on paper how it could be done."'06 He felt there was not the "smallest chance of success," and dreaded the day when Russian and British
possessions might become adjacent, whereupon "I can see no end to our
troubles." He expressed the same concerns to Brackenbury, applauding
his efforts to increase the army's establishment.'07 Yet, despite the pessimism, Roberts continued to advocate the Forward Policy defence along
the Hindu Kush, and sincerely believed that any attempt to defend India
on the Indus was courting disaster. The first setback to British forces
would, he felt, only encourage resistance amongst the Indian people.
102. General Roberts, What part should India take in the event of a war
between England and Russia? 22 August 1888, 95/XXIII,Roberts Papers, NAM.
103. Lord Salisbury to General Roberts, 11 October 1888, 80/5, Roberts Papers,
NAM.
104. The advantages from a military point of view, of a good understanding
between the Government of India and the ruler and people of Afghanistan, 4 August
1890, 95/XXXIX,Roberts Papers, NAM.
105. The dangers to which a reverse would expose us in the event of a war
with Russia, and the best means of guarding against such occurances [sic], 27 January 1891, L/MIL/17/14/80,XLV,OIOC;The garrison to meet the requirements in the
event of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan, even though the advance may be only
intended to divert our attention, 8 June 1891, L/MIL/17/14/80, LIV, OIOC; later
updated by Garrison reinforcements if Russia invaded Afghanistan, and the desirability of taking early steps to render the army in this country betterfitted to meet
a civilised enemy, 13 June 1892, L/MIL/17/14/80,LXV,OIOC.
106. General Roberts to Viceroy, 13 June 1891, 99-1/CLXXXI,Roberts Papers,
NAM.
107. General Roberts to MajorGeneral Henry Brackenbury,MilitaryMember of
the Viceroy's Council. Brackenbury was a member of the Wolseley "ring," and
Roberts found him less sympathetic to his own ideas than the previous MilitaryMember, MajorGeneral George Chesney. Adrian Preston, "Wolseley,the Khartoum Relief
Expedition and the Defence of India, 1885-1900," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 6 (1977-78): 274.
MILITARY HISTORY
727
R. A. JOHNSON
Roberts's conclusions on the defence of India after the Penjdeh Crisis found expression in a series of reports and letters to newspapers and
politicians. As Commander-in-Chief of India from 1885, his views carried more weight than most other strategists of the day, but his ideas
were also supported by the Secretary of State for India, Randolph
Churchill, and Lord Salisbury. The long-term effects of Roberts's measures can be summarised as an increase in the communications network
on the frontier, a determination to improve relations with the frontier
tribes, and, ultimately, the extension of British authority over the northern states of Chitral, Gilgit, and Hunza and Nagar in 1891. British control was also extended over the other areas adjacent to the strategic
passes: the Khyber, the Bolan, the Khojak, and the Kurram valley.
Roberts believed that, in the final analysis, victory would be assured by
thorough preparations, good communications, and success in the race to
the mountains. He summed up as follows: "It is of vital importance to us
to get possession of the Hindu Kush passes leading to Kabul and Ghazni
before the Russians....
The first issue of the campaign will be decided
in favour of whoever isfirst able to reach the Hindu Kush."108
Wolseley and the Defence of India
General Sir Garnet Wolseley was a brilliant field soldier, but he was
perhaps less adept in strategic planning. Having fought with distinction
in Burma, the Crimea, and the Indian Mutiny, he was promoted to the
rank of lieutenant-colonel at the age of twenty-five. In 1870, he had
demonstrated his powers of organisation in the Red River campaign in
western Canada, led a lightning operation against the Ashanti (1873-74),
served in various posts in Africa, and crowned his career with victory in
Egypt in 1882. However, his fortunes changed with the failure to relieve
General Charles Gordon at Khartoum in 1884-85. Given his eagerness
to be "at the front," his approach to the defence of India was to support
those plans that might give him personal command or promotion. Originally, he was a proponent of the Forward Policy, but, according to
Adrian Preston, "he gave it up only when he realised that neither a Conservative nor a Liberal government would entrust the chief command in
India to anybody with such Caesarist inclinations."109
108. LordRobertsto LordKitchener,28 January1907, 30/57/28, LordHoratio
HerbertKitchenerPapers,PRO.
109. AdrianPreston,"FrustratedGreatGamesmanship:Sir GarnetWolseley's
plansfor waragainstRussia,1873-80,"InternationalHistoryReview 1 (1980):240.
A new biographyof Wolseleyhas now been published:HalikKochanski,Sir Garnet
Wolseley:VictorianHero (London:HambledonPress, 1999). This book is basedon
Ph.D.dissertationentitled"FieldMarshalViscountWolseley:A Reformer
Kochanski's
at the WarOffice,1871-1900"(Universityof London,1996).
728 *
THE
JOURNAL
OF
Wolseley therefore drew up an alternative set of plans, involving

amphibious operations in the Black Sea and the Balkans, rather than
land operations in Central Asia.110However, the army's most senior officers in London, including the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, were suspicious of his apparent careerism and his tendency to
court the press and make sensationalist speeches. His successes in the
Ashanti campaign of 1873-74 had only deepened the Duke of Cambridge's dislike for him. The Duke feared not only his ambition, but also
Wolseley's reforming zeal, and the "ring" of supporters he acquired and
selected for his subsequent campaigns.1l Nevertheless, Wolseley had, in
fact, been offered the posts of the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council and the Adjutant Generalship, two positions ideally suited to a
reformer of Wolseley's calibre, but he had turned them down.112 In fact,
only with the popular acclaim he received after his Ashanti expedition,
did he begin to consider high command and the great question of India's
defence.
During the Balkans unrest, or Eastern Question, of 1876-77, Wolseley's enthusiasm for planning Britain's military operations for a war in
the Balkans against Russia alarmed Disraeli's Conservative government.113 This made it more likely that his views on the defence of India,
which began to take shape in the same period, would be unacceptable to
the government. His first consideration of the Indian defence problem
appeared as an anonymous article in Blackwood's Magazine.ll4 He
argued that the Russians could not invade India until they had constructed strategic railways throughout the length of Central Asia. This
was a fair assessment and not unlike Roberts's own views of the time.
What was more likely, Wolseley had argued, was the spread of sedition
by Russian agents throughout Persia and northern India. The unrest that
would inevitably follow would demand larger numbers of British troops
than the government could afford or supply. Drawing British troops away
from the Balkans region would be just what the Russians would want in
order to secure their influence over southeastern Europe.
110. The traditionof amphibiousoperationsis coveredin moredetailin A. Preston, "BritishMilitaryPolicyand the Defenceof India,1874-80" (Ph.D.thesis, Universityof London,1966).
111. Amongstthe more prominentof the "ring"were Sir RedversBuller,who
accompaniedWolseleyin Canadaand the Ashanticampaign;Sir ArchibaldAlison,
who servedunderWolseleyin Egyptin 1882;SirJohnAdye,who wasWolseley'ssecond in commandin the same campaign;and Sir BindonBlood,who foughtin South
Africaand on the NorthWestFrontierof India.
112. GarnetWolseleyto LordNorthbrook,1 March1872, ThomasGeorge,First
Earlof NorthbrookPapers,MSSEurC. 144/20,OIOC.
243.
113. Preston,"Frustrated
GreatGamesmanship,"
114. "OurComingGuest,"Blackwood'sMagazine103 (1873): 712-21.
MILITARY HISTORY
729
R. A. JOHNSON
Wolseley had also claimed that Persia should become the centre of
strategic gravity in Asia. A Persian army, trained and officered by the
British, would be able to cut the Russians' lines of communication that ran
close to the northern border of Persia, while the Royal Navy acted in support in the Persian Gulf. A defensive alliance with the Persians was thus
an important first step, and essential to the strategic defence of India.
However, Wolseley's early ideas were flawed. If no advance against
India was likely by a conventional army, it would seem unnecessary to
cut Russian lines of communication. There was no mention of how Russian intrigue was to be fought either, even though this ranked as the most
important element of the Russian threat. Not surprisingly, then, Wolseley
later admitted, "It is the worst thing I have ever written, . .. between ourselves I did it for the sake of what I got for it [which was a few pounds]."11
However, when the Prime Minister, Disraeli, ordered Lord Lytton, the
Viceroy of India, to plan a war of insurrection in Russian Central Asia in
1876, Wolseley was seconded to the Viceroy's Military Committee.116 At
this point Sir George Colley, the Military Secretary to the Viceroy, suggested that Wolseley take command of a new border zone that would be
called the North West Frontier Province. Also considered was whether, in
fact, Wolseley should become a member of the India Office Council (an
advisory body to the Secretary of State for India), alongside Salisbury,
and perhaps even occupy a seat in the Cabinet.l7
An attachment to the India Council was what Wolseley received, and
he lost no time in drafting his report on The Military Aspect of the Eastern Question, even though the ideas were almost all shared with Colley's
Memorandum on the Central Asian Question.118 He advocated a strong
offensive launched from India, and the conclusion of a defensive alliance
with the Turks. Nevertheless, he retained the idea of an amphibious
landing of 40,000 British troops at Varna (Bulgaria). The Balkans were to
be the theatre of operations because only here would Britain enjoy the
close support of Austria, and, an advance here, he believed, would prob115. Preston,"Frustrated
GreatGamesmanship,"
245.
116. GathbornHardyto Wolseley,31 October1876, WolseleyMSS,cited in A.
GreatGamesmanship,"
246.
Preston,"Frustrated
117. Sir GeorgeColleyhad served in ChinabeforebecomingProfessorat the
StaffCollegebetween 1868 and 1873. He joined Wolseleyin the Ashanticampaign
(1873-74) beforetakingup the post of Military,then PrivateSecretaryto the Viceroy
from1876. He was a memberof the Wolseley"ring"of selectedofficers.He was proNatal
motedto MajorGeneralin 1880 and becamethe GeneralOfficerCommanding
in 1881, succeedingWolseley.Hewaskilledat MajubaHillon 28 Februaryof the same
year,duringthe FirstAnglo-BoerWar.
118. Sir GarnetWolseley,"TheMilitaryAspectof the EasternQuestion,"Memorandum,10 November1876, WolseleyOfficialPapers,Ministryof DefenceLibrary,
London; Kochanski, Sir Garnet Wolseley, 87.
730 *
THE JOURNAL OF
ably bring Romania in on the British side. Amphibious operations

avoided the poor roads south of the river Danube, and the Russians'
reliance on a single track railway line would be vulnerable to attack by
British-led partisans. Wolseley was confident that, augmented by the
150,000 Turkish troops, and supported by the Royal Navy, a Russian
force of 200,000 could be overwhelmed.
Wolseley also considered Russia's ability to limit operations to Armenia, which would enable the Russians to avoid the Royal Navy. A Russian attack across the Caucasus, he argued, might seize Armenia and
eventually result in the loss of Turkish-ruled Syria. A subsequent Russian thrust might be made towards Egypt. However, this was to be forestalled by the British drive from India, up through Afghanistan, and on
into Russian Central Asia. Wolseley believed that the British would be
able to recruit tribesmen along the way, and that their capture of
Tashkent and Samarkand would result in the collapse of Russian rule
throughout Central Asia. The similarity of the plan to Roberts's own in
this period is striking; both favoured the thrust into Central Asia through
Afghanistan. Disraeli's consideration of the paper was brief, and it was
rejected.119Wolseley's chances of being selected for an Indian command
also slipped away, and the best he could do was to write articles in Blackwood's which might keep him in the public eye.
As the risk of war grew stronger during 1878, Wolseley was selected
to act as Second in Command to Lord Napier, who would lead an
amphibious expeditionary force. Plans had not been finalised about
where this force would deploy, before Wolseley had turned his attention
to the ways in which a Russian coup de main at the Straits (near Constantinople) could be averted. His plan was to land British agents in
Turkey who would bribe the Turkish battery commanders on the Bosphorous, and, at the moment of Turkish surrender, the agents would seize
control of the guns. A relief force of marines, infantry, and artillery would
rush to join them from the sea.l20 Other ideas were considered, such as a
landing at Salonika, and a naval operation to run the gauntlet of the Dardenelles, even if the coastline was captured by the Russians. But, in the
event, the threat of Britain's entry into the conflict, and the difficulties
the Russians had faced during the campaign, were sufficient to deter
them from any further action. The Turks had proved formidable in
defence, despite courageous assaults by Russian soldiers. General Skobelev had demonstrated a rare flash of inspirational leadership at senior
119. Sir Ralph Thompson, Under Secretary of State for War, to Major General
Wolseley, 30 November 1876, Field MarshalViscount Wolseley Papers, Hove Central
Library,Kent.
120. G. J. Wolseley, "Secret Memorandum,"2 March 1878, Sir Henry Stafford
Northcote, First Earl of Iddesleigh Papers, Add MSS 50022, BL.
MILITARY HISTORY
731
R. A. JOHNSON
level in the siege of Plevna and had won a significant victory at the Shipka
Pass in 1878. However, one of the unexpected problems of the campaign
was in logistics, and the advance on Constantinople had taken months.
Russia's weakness featured in Wolseley's new assessment, written in
March 1878, of how best to take the offensive in the defence of India.121
Wolseley was confident that Russia would always be weak as long as
Britain maintained its naval supremacy, and therefore the capacity to
destroy Russia's merchant shipping. In addition, Russia's size, Wolseley
believed, prevented her ever being able to mount operations for any
length of time. Garrisoning her thousands of miles of borders and the
perpetual demands of internal security absorbed her armed forces. By
contrast, Wolseley confidently expected Britain to be able to raise more
men if the need ever arose. The existence of the Rifle Volunteer movement in Britain seemed evidence of that.122Wolseley also suggested that
where Britain had formerly relied on mercenaries from Hanover in the
Napoleonic Wars, she should now recruit Turkish, Indian, Egyptian,
Tunisian, Moroccan, Canadian, and Albanian soldiers.l23 If hostilities
broke out, the British army would sail to the Black Sea and deploy in
support of the Turks, with landings on the Bosphorus coast. The Russians, forced to operate at the end of a long line of communications, and
subjected to the harrassing attacks of Turkish and Romanian guerrillas,
would be easily checked. Meanwhile, strong raiding columns would be
assembled at Aldershot, before embarking for the Baltic. At Peshawar on
India's North West Frontier, another force would advance on towards
Russian Central Asia, just as Wolseley had considered in the report of
1876, but with the chance to command the army in the Balkans himself,
the Central Asian theatre was significantly reduced in importance.
Wolseley's opinions on the relative strengths that Britain and Russia
could muster were not accepted by the Intelligence Division, and his
ideas drew criticism from others. General Napier condemned Wolseley's
paper, which, he thought, "will diminish confidence in him."124Wolseley's plans were never implemented in any way, he played no part in the
intelligence gathering in the Balkans, and he did not accompany Salis121. G. J. Wolseley,"Preparingfor a war with Russia,"20 March1878, Field
MarshalViscountWolseleyPapers,WO107 W35,PRO.
122. Ian F. W. Beckett, Riflemen Form:A Study of the Rifle VolunteerMovement,
1859-1908 (London:OgilbyTrust,1982).
123. The projectedstrengthswere as follows;Turkey,100,000;India,80,000;
Canada,10,000;Egyptand Tunisia,20,000 each;Morocco,5,000;Albania,10,000.
124. Napierto his wife, 5 April 1878, NapierPapers,cited in Preston,"Frustrated Great Gamesmanship,"
264. LordNapierfought in the Sikh Warsand the
Mutiny,but his most significantcommandscame in the ChinaWarof 1860 and the
in Indiabetween
AbyssiniaCampaignof 1868. He becamethe Commander-in-Chief
1870 and 1876 and subsequentlythe Governorof Gibraltar.
732 *
THE JOURNAL OF
bury to the Congress of Berlin as he had hoped to do. His plans reflected
the characteristic of his tactical thinking, namely, a desire to carry out
rapid operations and effect a quick result. Wolseley was simply regarded
as a dynamic leader and an able field commander, but not a strategist.
Preston concluded: "He was thought to tailor his strategy to his eagerness for supreme command and to be looking for the crisis that might
give him the chance to win for Britain a decisive victory over Russia and
with it the Great Game in Asia."125
In 1881, following General Roberts's Mansion House speech criticising Cardwell's army reforms, Wolseley penned a reply in the Nineteenth
Century.126 The celebrated conflict between the two leading contenders
for the future command of the British army is well documented, and
their views on the defence of India were drawn into the debate.127Wolseley now described the plans to take the offensive in Central Asia as "the
dream of a madman whose head is filled with military theories drawn
from the time of Xerxes and Alexander the Great."128In 1882, Wolseley
set off on the Egyptian campaign in the same way he had conducted previous colonial campaigns, and in exactly the same way he believed any
campaign against Russia would begin: as an amphibious operation, followed by a swift thrust inland, and a decisive victory.l29 But the march
up the Nile to relieve General Gordon at Khartoum in 1884-85 did not
follow the pattern of the Red River campaign, and Wolseley failed to rescue Gordon in time. Wolseley blamed the Prime Minister, William Ewart
Gladstone, for unnecessary delays in sending a British force. This terminated an unholy alliance which had begun with Wolseley's appreciation
of Cardwell's Liberal reform proposals, but ended with his bitter condemnation of "Little Englander" policies, which would serve only to
wreck the empire.130
Wolseley also clashed with the conservative Lord Salisbury in 1888
over the publication of remarks he had made about politicians who
125. Ibid., 265.

126. G. J. Wolseley, "Long and Short Service," Nineteenth Century 9 (1881):
560.
127. Strachan, Politics of the British Army, 96.
128. Cited in C. H. Brownlow, "Memorandumon the Indian Mobilisation Committee as to the Strategical Situation in Central Asia," 1 February 1889, Appendix,
WO 33/49, PRO. See also "CentralAsian Affairs,"Wolseley Papers, WO 107/38, PRO.
129. Another report appeared, written by MajorJ. S. Rothwell in July 1884, and
approved by Wolseley on 10 April 1885, entitled "England'sMeans of Offence against
Russia." It was exactly the same as Wolseley's previous ideas, even including a proposal to capture the Caucasus and build a fleet of small boats to cross the Caspian,
CAB 37/13/36, PRO.
130. Peter Dennis and Adrian Preston, Soldiers as Statesmen (London: Croom
Helm, 1976), 31-33.
MILITARY HISTORY
733
R. A. JOHNSON
seemed concerned only with cutting the Army Estimates (votes of

some justificationexpenditure). Wolseley was unrepentent-with
when Salisbury protested. Wolseley's strength of feeling stemmed from
that fact that he regarded the establishment of three army corps,
available for service anywhere in the world, as essential for the defence
of the empire, and therefore, vital for the national interest.131 Wolseley
finally achieved his ambition and was appointed to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in 1895, but, despite his muchneeded army reforms, he played almost no part in the continuing debate
on the defence of India.132That said, the debates about enlistment terms,
conscription, and Army Estimates were inseparable from the question of
imperial defence which, to some extent, hinged on India.
Brackenbury, the Intelligence Division, and the Defence of India,

1889-95
Henry Brackenbury, the Director of Military Intelligence (1886-91),
was keen to improve both the standing and professionalism of the Intelligence Division in London.133 His advice was frequently sought on
strategic matters by Lord Salisbury because he was able to take an
empire-wide view of defence, and an apparently less partisan view than
either Wolseley, or Roberts and those other officers who were concerned
solely with India's defence. Brackenbury reviewed the different
approaches to India's defence in a Memorandum in 1889.134He sought to
answer two questions: what forces could India put into the field, and
under what circumstances would they be deployed.
Without an external threat, there was, Brackenbury wrote, no danof
internal rebellion: "We believe that the conditions now obtaining
ger
in India are so different from those which obtained at the time of the
Mutiny, that a serious military revolt, is no longer within the region of
probability."135Railways and the telegraph meant that concentration
against a small revolt would be far easier, "but," he went on, "the
131. Strachan, Politics of the British Army, 101.
132. Preston, "Wolseley, the Khartoum Relief Expedition and the Defence of
India," 272.
133. See H. Brackenbury,Some Memories of My Spare Time (Edinburgh:Blackwood, 1909), 352.
134. Memorandum by Lieutenant General Brackenbury, DMI, and Major General Newmarch, Military Secretary, India Office, secret, 19 August 1889,
CAB/37/25/43, PRO. See also "Russian Advances in Asia: Memorandum as to the
determination of a military frontier line for India" by MajorGeneral Brackenbury, 7
August 1887, enclosure of a letter dated 7 September 1887 from the War Office,
L/P&S/3/283C57, OIOC.
135. Secret Memorandum, 19 August 1889, CAB/37/25/43, PRO.
734 *
THE JOURNALOF
advance of the Russians on the frontiers or a serious defeat outside

India" would constitute a threat to order in India. As a result, Brackenbury accepted the need for the larger garrisons that Roberts had proposed in the Indian mobilisation scheme of 1887.
Brackenbury estimated the forces against which the Indian army
would have to deploy to be 34,000, with eighty guns. The size of this
force took into account the findings of the War Office Intelligence Memorandum of 1888, which identified the serious logistical difficulties the
Russians would face in mounting an expedition against India. The maximum number of troops available outside Europe was 180,000, but, even
with a plentiful supply of food, water, fuel, and forage, the Russian army
could not hope to put more than 70,000 into an attack on Afghanistan
and India. Brackenbury estimated that 34,000 was more likely, as that
number offered the most flexibility and was sustainable, given the supplies available. Brackenbury also accepted the views of Sir Charles
Brownlow, Assistant Military Secretary to the War Office, that there were
two routes that a Russian force might take.136The Kabul route would
involve crossing a pass at twelve thousand feet and then reducing Kabul's
defences. The route that followed the Herat-Kandahar axis involved
crossing 420 miles of desert, and the difficulty in transporting supplies
this distance would mean that the maximum size of an army that could
be sustained on this avenue would be between 30,000 and 50,000. Nevertheless, at the end of the route, this force would face British fortifications and a disciplined army, well supplied by its own rail network and
reinforced by troops from Britain.
Brackenbury later dropped the idea of being able to reinforce India,
no doubt influenced by Wolseley, who argued that to denude Britain of
30,000 men "would play Russia's game."137Brackenbury therefore concluded that the Russians were more likely to advance by stages, a view
confirmed by the translation of General Kuropatkin's plans, which had
been captured in 1886.138
The solutions Brackenbury proposed were less convincing than his
analysis. Blockades of the Dardanelles and Baltic seemed practical, but
were little more than a revival of the Liberal view that a campaign in
Central Asia was unneccesary if Britain conducted a naval war "all over
the world." His proposal of a naval attack on Vladivostok was no more
than a gesture, since it could have no bearing on a war either in Europe
or in Central Asia. Brackenbury also proposed the signing of defensive
alliances, particularly with Turkey. Turkish troops would provide essen136. C. H. Brownlow, "Memorandumon the Indian Mobilisation Committee as
to the StrategicalSituationin CentralAsia,"1 February1889, WO33/49, PRO.

137. Ibid.
138. "Kuropatkin's
Schemefor a RussianAdvanceon India,"CAB6/1 CID7D,
PRO.
MILITARY HISTORY
735
R. A. JOHNSON
tial manpower, open up the Black Sea, and hold the Russian railway
across the Caucasus. China was also to be allied, in order to provide
diversionary action in the Far East. However, there could be few guarantees that either of these would be successful. Neither the Ottomans nor
the Chinese concluded alliances with Britain as Brackenbury had hoped.
Indeed, British relations with both empires deteriorated rather than
improved during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century.
The degree to which Brackenbury's ideas mirrored those of his former commander Wolseley was revealed in his plans for the offensive
against Russia.139 The home army would be deployed in amphibious
operations, and India would have to defend itself. Referring to Roberts's
Memorandum of 1887, he condemned the Indian Army plan to attack a
Russian-held Herat as "dangerous" until communications had been severed between the Caspian Sea and Russian Central Asia. He agreed, however, that to stretch Russia's lines of communication by drawing the
Russians into Afghanistan was a viable option. He described General
MacGregor's plan of 1884, the brainchild of the Indian Intelligence
Branch on which Roberts had based his earliest ideas, as "unintelligible"
because of its proposal to seize Herat, even at the risk of precipitating
war, in order to deny the Russians supplies in the Herat valley. Brackenbury disagreed with it on the grounds that the Russians would bring all
their supplies with them. Instead he warned that it was the Indian Army
that would be faced with logistical difficulties. To supply thirty-two thousand Indian and British fighting troops would require the provisioning of
fifty-nine thousand men and 36,611 animals, across a desert which
included two waterless stretches of 50 miles. Each animal would be
required to carry thirty days' groceries, five days' rations, and two days'
grain . This vast camel train would be needed to supply one infantry division and a cavalry brigade. In addition, the troops would have to march
a further 275 miles from Herat to reach the Russian Transcaspian railway. It was easy to conclude that this operation was impractical. Yet he
still did not rule out the advance of Russian troops by stages, and examined the circumstances that might necessitate an advance into
Afghanistan.
Brackenbury dismissed the option of remaining passive if the Russians annexed Herat, for two reasons. The first was that he believed the
Afghans would sooner join the Russians than risk total defeat. The second was his concern that the Indian people would believe that British
power was weakening. A British advance into Afghanistan therefore
would be essential, and the Amir's approval would be sought "if possi139. Brackenbury's support of Wolseley's plans was not surprising. He owed
Wolseley a great deal for the promotion of his career. Ian Harvie, "AVery Dangerous
Man:Profile of Henry Brackenbury,"Soldiers of the Queen 96 (1999): 13-14.
736
THE JOURNAL OF
ble," which was also Roberts's view. As the Russian objectives would be
to take Herat and the northern Afghan provinces, and then follow up
with a period of consolidation before making a subsequent advance to
Kabul, the British solution would ultimately demand a decisive battle
that would halt the advance. Major J. Peacocke of the Indian Intelligence
Branch estimated in June 1885 that Herat could support a garrison of
sixty thousand, and Captain A. C. Yate felt that Afghan Turkestan could
supply more than that as long as the crops did not fail.140Therefore,
Brackenbury believed it was imperative that, in peacetime, the army
select its battlefields and key points that would require occupation in
time of war. The key points, Brackenbury argued, were Kabul and Kandahar, precisely as Roberts had advocated for many years. In the event
of a Russian advance, or, in a period of anarchy after the death of Abdur
Rahman, Kandahar would be occupied. The railway, only ninety-four
miles from the city in 1889, would be extended. He concluded: "We must
advance nearer to Kabul. If Russia advanced on Balkh and established
posts at Bamian, and a railway, we would not be close enough" to get
there first.141
Brackenbury felt the Hindu Kush would be no great obstacle, citing,

for example, the Shibar Pass (9,800 feet), which could be crossed all year
round. He expected the Afghans to delay the Russians in the passes while
British forces were mobilised. Indian troops were to be deployed to Jellalabad on the North West Frontier of India, closing the road to the northern tribal states, which would be on the Russians' left flank. The Russians'
centre would face the bulk of the Indian Army near Kabul, and their right
would be met by another British force which would have marched to Kandahar. These deployments, Brackenbury concluded, would take place
regardless of whether war was declared and would be initiated by the
Russian advance. Again, the deployments were, in fact, very similar to the
ones proposed by Roberts. With a division each at Kandahar, Ghazni, and
Jellalabad, the force would include 30,890 men and ninety-six guns, with
a reserve, ready to operate against Russian forces crossing the Hindu
Kush or attempting a flanking march from Herat.142
Nevertheless, Brackenbury anticipated some problems even with
this scheme, and his solutions were, perhaps suprisingly, criticised by
140. See "Thepowerof Russiato occupyHeratandthe Trans-Caspian
Railway,"
1891, WO106 178, PRO.
141. "Memorandum"
by LieutenantGeneral Brackenbury,19 August 1889,
CAB/37/25/43,PRO.
142. The reservewouldconsist of three Britishbattalions,twenty-fourIndian
battalions,two Britishcavalryregiments,ten Indiancavalryregiments,and fourteen
batteriesof artillery.These figureswere derivedfromAppendixII, GeneralRegulations for Mobilisation,Governmentof India, September1887. See CAB/37/25/43,
PRO.
MILITARY HISTORY
737
R. A. JOHNSON
Roberts. The occupation of Afghan Turkestan, the northernmost territories, would have to go unopposed, since to resist it would require Britain
to declare war and seek allies around the world, and that was a considerable demand for an area without strategic value. A Russian occupation
of northern Afghanistan and improvements in their communications
would also require a corresponding increase in the Indian Army establishment, thereby adding to the British financial burden. Brackenbury
argued that the army in India was sufficient at that time for its task, and
only if India was subject to an outright invasion attempt would drafts be
sent.143He was also keen to point out that any costs would have to met
from India's own resources. The two most important areas for development would be the construction of fortifications on the frontier and
improved communications to the border. Naturally, Roberts was critical
of Brackenbury's refusal to increase the establishment, but even more so
of the fortifications. He argued that to build forts at the Khyber and
Peshawar was too far forward and unnecessary for an advancing army.
Roberts, to reiterate, favoured depots at Attock and Rawalpindi to which
the army might withdraw if overwhelmed.144
Brackenbury criticised Roberts's pessimism. He wrote a note to
James Grierson in the Intelligence Branch at Simla, which strongly suggests his belief that the main focus for Russian operations was not in
Central Asia at all, but in southeastern Europe:
YourMemorandumstrengthenedmy hands greatly against those in
this country, and there are many, who live in a constant state of
apprehension of Russian aggression against India, an apprehension
they never disguise, which they communicate to a timorous press,
and thus play the very game of Russia, which is, as you and I have
always agreed, to paralyse the whole Army of India by threats of
aggression along its northern frontier.145
143. Brackenbury estimated the forces that could take the field to be 15,800
British troops, 18,000 Indian troops, and 25,550 "public and private [camp] followers." Brackenbury, "Memorandum,"Appendix I, 19 August 1889, CAB/37/25/43,
PRO.
144. The Victory Lines fortifications that were constructed by the time of
Roberts's departure, both as secure bases for frontier occupation and as depots,
Roberts calculated to have cost no more than 332,274, despite criticisms that such
schemes would cost too much. Nevertheless, after Roberts'sdeparture, the construction stopped. He was equally critical of the charge that too great an emphasis on fortifications would lead the Indian people to believe the British were incapable of
defending India. Roberts was confident that everyone knew that his reorganisation
was with reference to "service beyond the frontier." Roberts, Forty One Years in
India, 540.
145. Cited in D. S. Macdiarmid,The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir James Moncrieff Grierson (London: Constable and Co., 1923), 88.
738
In 1890, he was again critical of Roberts and his influence on the

Intelligence Department at Simla. He accused the Indian Intelligence
Branch of giving "an exaggerated estimate of the Russian situation in
Central Asia, and of Russian readiness for war."146Whilst he was genuinely sceptical of the Russian railway development that was such a
great source of anxiety for Roberts, he had another motive for his criticism. Brackenbury was eager to assert his authority over the Indian
Intelligence Branch and to bring it under the control of his own Intelligence Division at the War Office.
Sir George White, who succeeded Roberts in 1893 as Commanderin-Chief in India, expressed concern that Brackenbury was an intriguer.
He claimed that, whilst privately supportive of the work of others, Brackenbury tried to "turn everything to his own credit."147Brackenbury's
reforms in the Indian Intelligence Branch from 1891 were designed to
limit its activities to information gathering, rather than providing solutions to Russian invasion plans. First, the War Office Intelligence Division already concerned itself solely with the compilation of reports that
could be used by the army or the government offices.148 Second, the
Intelligence Division was divided into sections responsible for a geographical area. D section covered Russia, Persia, Central Asia, the Far
East, and India, as well as Burma and Afghanistan. Third, intelligence
gathering itself was also more clearly defined. Brackenbury opposed
clandestine operations, but encouraged foreign travel so that Intelligencers could familiarise themselves with their areas of responsibility.
Covert espionage was ruled out, but officers were expected to use their
initiative. Whilst these reforms appeared to temper the "alarmist" attitudes of the Indian Intelligence Branch, in reality they changed little.
Officers in the Great Game who had roamed Central Asia from the 1830s
had not regarded themselves as covert agents, engaged on clandestine
missions, but as "players" and gentlemen. Moreover, rather than develop
its own plans, the Indian Intelligence Branch had supported the formulation of defence plans by the Commanders-in-Chief. What Brackenbury
was really hoping to do was to replace Roberts's ideas, which had so
influenced the Intelligence Branch in Simla, with his own plans for the
defence of India, and therefore his own personal authority.
146. "Memorandumon the Relations between the Intelligence Departments of

the WarOffice, Admiralty and India," strictly confidential, 1890, WO 33 50, 4, PRO.
Brackenbury to Sir George White, 5 December 1892, Sir Henry Brackenbury Papers,
MD 1085/1 f439, Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, London.
147. Sir George White to John White, 7 April 1898, P3/132; cited in Harvie, "A
Very Dangerous Man," 16.
148. Fergusson, British Military Intelligence,
MILITARY HISTORY
78-100.
739
R. A. JOHNSON
Implementation and Effects, 1893-1900

The most important development in the plans for the defence of
India concerned the approach to the tribes who lived astride lines of
communication between Afghanistan and India. On the frontier, new
roads and railway lines were laid down, authority was extended over the
tribal states, the Indian Army was expanded, and depots were constructed. Measures for mobilisation were drawn up, and military exercises conducted. The weapons of the Indian regiments were upgraded,
and, controversially, "martial races" were selected to fill the ranks that
might have to face a European adversary. The occupation of Kandahar
and Jellalabad, Brackenbury noted, might adversely affect recruiting, but
he suggested that men be drawn from the frontier tribes "who will come
under our control." He reiterated this solution in the conclusion to his
plans, aiming "to bring the tribes beyond the frontier under our influence and to be prepared for the advance we have indicated." For those
tribesmen who lived in and around the passes, the construction of roads
and rail links seemed a direct assault on their way of life and they were
determined to resist the encroachments. The same determination was
shown by the Afghans.
In June 1891, Sir Mortimer Durand, the Secretary of the Foreign
Department of India, had written:
We are getting bad news all along the border,from the Black Mountain to the Waziri country. The Amir is threatening Kurram;the
Afridisare in a very shaky condition, with his emissariesgivingthem
ammunition .... This sounds almost incredible-I could not believe
it at first. But I am afraidthere is no doubt of it now.149
Abdur Rahman was reacting to British measures to secure the North
West Frontier. From 1885, Roberts had been pushing forward his
schemes for the defence of India. A road to the northern hill states was
proposed, which would link it to Peshawar and reduce Afghan interference.150 The Kandahar railway was extended, which Abdur Rahman
referred to as "running an awl into my navel."'15 The Zhob Valley had
also been annexed in 1890, with a campaign fought to secure its western
end, whilst operations against the Orakzai tribesmen of the frontier
lasted from January to February 1891, and were resumed in April after
attacks on a line of British forts on the Samana ridge in the vicinity of
the Khyber Pass. The defeat of these tribesmen, so close to the Afghan
frontier, no doubt convinced Abdur Rahman that this was the prelude to
another forward move, perhaps even the annexation of Afghan territory,
149. L/P&S/7/63,OIOC; Sykes, Durand, 201.
150. Alder,British India's Northern Frontier, 214.
151. The railway reached Quetta in 1887, the Khojak range was by-passed by
several tunnels (1889), and the New Chaman station was opened up in 1890.
740 *
THE JOURNAL OF
which he was determined to resist. In March 1892, he seized territory

along the border for himself. British efforts to secure their axes of
advance thus provoked a hostile reaction.
Durand believed that in the event of a war with Russia, the Amir
would probably side with the Russians, since, to the Afghans, they would
seem the stronger and the most likely to win, but until then he would
maintain his independent position and avoid a clash with the Tsar's
forces. Abdur Rahman, in fact, feared both British and Russian
encroachments. Russian patrols were advancing through the Pamir
mountains to the north of Afghanistan in early 1892, but through fear,
Abdur Rahman ignored the British advice, which urged restraint, and
threw forward his own detachments, courting "another Penjdeh."'52 At
Somatash on 24 July 1892, a Cossack unit clashed with an Afghan outpost and destroyed it, and then annexed the territory as far south as the
Oxus. It was not unexpected. In February of that year, Sir Robert Morier,
the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, had predicted that India would
have to choose between supporting Afghanistan and risking a "collision"
with Russia, or a "repetition of Penjdeh" (which had resulted in territorial concessions).l53 However, the military reverse pressed the Amir back
to his only ally, Britain.
A British mission was sent to Kabul to arrange for the withdrawal of
Afghans from the Pamirs without compromising the defence of India.
This would mean ensuring the control of certain passes for which the
Afghans would have the initial responsibility.154 Durand was given wide
powers to make territorial concessions on the North West Frontier of
India in order to secure the renewed "entente" of the Amir. To keep
Afghanistan on the British side was of greater importance than the loss
of small territories which could not be reinforced and were beyond the
Hindu Kush and the Scientific Frontier.
The British proposal was that the Afghans hold the Wakhan Valley, a
narrow strip of land, not more than ten miles wide in some places and
less than a day's march from one side to the other and which lay between
the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs. This would reduce the possibility of border incidents between British and Russian outposts, but, at first, the
Amir was in no mood to cooperate. He believed, having "lost a hand" in
a skirmish with Russian troops at Somatash, he was not going to "lose an
152. Alder,British India's Northern Frontier, 202.

153. Sir Robert Morier to Lord Salisbury, 2 February 1892, FO 65/1435, PRO.
154. Durand from the Foreign Department was accompanied by Colonel Elles,
Head of Intelligence in India, Captain McMahon,the Political Officer,and MajorFenn,
a doctor. They were escorted by the Afghan Commander-in-Chief,Gulam Hyder.
MILITARY HISTORY
741
R. A. JOHNSON
arm" at Wakhan. However, Durand was able to use the action at

Somatash for his own ends, pointing out to the Amir the advantage of following the British government's advice, which would be future support
against a Russian invasion.155In 1895, Anglo-Russian negotiations finally
settled the borderline of Afghanistan, but preparations for a conflict continued. Russian railway lines were extended from the Caspian across
Turkestan and terminated on the Afghan border. British and Asian
agents maintained an intelligence network, with mixed success, across
northern Persia and throughout Afghanistan. When General Horatio Herbert Kitchener took over as Commander-in-Chief in India in 1902,
Roberts urged him to maintain the Scientific Frontier doctrine. Kitchener, with typical thoroughness, reorganised the Indian Army to face a
European enemy by abolishing the old idea of forming two corps on
mobilisation. Instead, he created nine field divisions and supporting
units ready for operations anywhere, but particularly in Central Asia.
Conclusion
Afghanistan was the key to the defence of India. It was, at the same
time, an unreliable ally, a dangerous liability, and the vital ground in the
defence of India. Abdur Rahman's determination to follow an independent line called into question the 1880 agreement that had placed his
foreign policy under British control and made it difficult to be sure that
key passes on the Hindu Kush could be secured. Formulating plans for
the defence of India against an external threat was made imperative by
Russia's expansion across Central Asia in the 1870s, but it was given
added urgency when Russia's borders became adjacent to Afghanistan in
1885. The Penjdeh Incident of that year converted speculative military
plans into action. Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief of India, was influential and his ideas for a Scientific Frontier line were adopted between
1885 and 1893. Wolseley, despite becoming Commander-in-Chief of the
British Army in 1895, was unable to persuade either the government or
the army to regard the Indian frontier as secure enough to favour an
offensive through the Balkans or the Black Sea. The Director of Military
Intelligence, Brackenbury (and later Major General Edward Francis
Chapman), thoroughly examined the options for defence and the nature
of the Russian threat, especially its capabilities and deployment times.
155. Letterbook,copiesof lettersfromH.M.Durandto LordLansdowneduring
the Missionof 1893, DurandPapers,MSSEur D.727/5,OIOC.AbdurRahmanalso
receivedBritishsubsidies,ten lakhsof Rupeesin 1885, and six lakhsannuallyuntil
1893 when it was increasedto eighteenlakhsper annum.In return,the Amiragreed
to upholda nominalsuzeraintyoverthe WakhanValley,but he refusedto stationany
troopsthere.
742 *
THE JOURNALOF
All agreed that a Russian advance through Afghanistan by stages was the
most likely. Russia, they thought, would probably seize, then consolidate, parts of northern and western Afghanistan, before pushing on again
many months, perhaps even years, later. After all, this had been the pattern of Russian expansion across Central Asia from 1864. Afghanistan
and also Persia, to some extent, were crucial elements in the defence
plans, given their proximity to India, but occupation of both of these
were beyond the capacity of the British Empire. Instead, the British
reached a less than satisfactory political arrangement with Afghanistan
which did not really reflect the army's proposals for a rapid occupation
of the country in order to secure the vital Hindu Kush passes.
The Russian threat was determined less by Russia's offensive capability than by her unpredictability and the difficulty in finding a satisfactory solution to her "advance by stages" in Central Asia. One of the
chief remaining problems concerned obtaining accurate early warning of
any Russian advance. This led to an increase in survey and intelligence
activities after 1885, and the installation of consuls and agents across
Persia and Afghanistan. Intelligence was universally regarded as essential not only to provide early warning of Russian troop concentrations
and railway development, but also to give information on Russian military surveys and political intrigue. However, concerning the North West
Frontier of India itself, the planners required that the tribes who lived
adjacent to the strategic passes should come under British influence lest
they become the willing instruments of Russian espionage. The task of
winning over the tribes fell to political agents, whilst the Indian Army
ensured control of the border region. The situation on the frontier was
complicated by the unreliability of Abdur Rahman as an ally and the
resistance of the tribesmen, highlighted by widespread unrest in 1897.
The policy that emerged in the end was essentially the pragmatic oneholding the strategic passes and routes on the Indian frontier, keeping in
reserve a force that could fight beyond the Indian border if necessary,
and manning the defensive perimeter with either Indian Army troops or
those whose allegiance could be secured by other means.
MILITARY HISTORY
743

Russians at The Gates of India Planning The Defence of India, 1885-1900

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Russians at The Gates of India Planning The Defence of India, 1885-1900

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

"Russians at the Gates of India"?

Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900

"Russians at the Gates of India"?

JN recent months, international attention has been focused on

Society for Military tlistory

no wish to hang on to the troublesome state themselves, but a border

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

vice, deployment, and promotion. Whilst this context is important, it is

The Defence of India: Historical Context

demanded a British diplomatic presence in Kabul to match the Russian

The Historiographical Debate

"Russiaat the Gates of India"?

Division at the War Office estimated that twenty thousand Russian

levels of the army, the question of India's defence became a tool to

The Theatre of Operations

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

The Problem of Afghanistan

CENTRAL ASIA, 1880-1902

"Russiaat the Gates of India"?

16. Secretaryof Stateto Viceroy,31 July 1880, AddMSS43565, BL.

(Berkeleyand LosAngeles:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1997), 83.

"Russiaat the Gates of India"?

A much more serious rebellion occurred in August and September

Abdur Rahman was not above inventing a "foreign threat" to unite

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

cial punishment.33 Abdur Rahman himself described the Russian tactics

The Defence Plans

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

should be adopted in India in the event of Englandjoining Turkeyin the War

"Russiaat the Gates of India"?

needed to hold the lines of communication and occupy Kandahar in

43. General Roberts, Is an invasion of India by Russia Possible? 95/II, Roberts

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

used the expression in 1883 to demonstrate the new vulnerability of

aristocraticinterests.He was a committedpacifistand anti-imperialist

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

The defeat of four thousand Afghan troops in a Russian attack, called

written at the request of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Donald Stewart,

"Russiaat the Gates of India"?

The Capabilities of the Indian Army

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

The Russian Army

Its officer corps had little cohesion or sense of professionalism.Nor

"Russiaat the Gates of India"?

province.79 The axes of their advance were determined by logistics and

The Logistics of the Defence of India

1886, CID7-D CAB6/1, PRO.

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

92. Robert Sandeman,the Governor-General's

94. GeneralRobertsto CharlesMarvin,14 May 1887, 100-1/CXIX,Roberts

flank them, and which, ultimately, "would make the defence of

97. General Roberts,Note on the necessity of carrying out the proposed

99. Notes on the militarypreparationsfor operationson or beyondthe North

WestFrontier, 23 May 1887, L/MIL/17/14/80,XI, OIOC.

100. Noteon the desirabilityof utilising theArmiesof NativeStates, 8 Septem-

ber 1888, 96-1/XXXVI,Roberts Papers, NAM.

101. GeneralRoberts,Principles of Army Administrationin India, 1 April

"Russiaat the Gates of India"?

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

Wolseley therefore drew up an alternative set of plans, involving

"Russia at the Gates of India"?

ably bring Romania in on the British side. Amphibious operations

"Russiaat the Gates of India"?