Republic of the Philippines

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

Cebu City
FELIPE DATO LACSON,
Petitioner,
- versus -

RAB CASE NO. VI-08-10472-13

HON.
ROMULO
P.
SUMALINOG in his capacity as
Acting Executive Labor Arbiter,
and
DALO/
NELSON
TORIANO, ET. AL.,
Respondents.
x -------------------------------------- x
MEMORANDUM
In support of
VERIFIED PETITION
TO ANNUL ORDER DATED DECEMBER 15, 2014
WITH APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER/ PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Petitioner Felipe Datu Lacson, by counsel, most respectfully elevates
for review through this verified petition in accordance with Rule XII of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure the Order dated December 15, 2014 of Public
Respondent, the Honorable Labor Arbiter, and alleges that (1) there is prima
facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Honorable Labor
Arbiter in issuing the Order dated December 15, 2014; (2) Petitioner raises
purely questions of law for the resolution of the Honorable Commission and
(3) the Order dated December 15, 2014 will cause grave injustice upon
Petitioner if not annulled or rectified. The Order dated December 15, 2014
was issued by the Honorable Arbiter during pre-execution proceedings, and
there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The original copy of the Order dated December 15, 2014 rendered by
the Honorable Labor Arbiter is hereto attached as Annex A and is made an
integral part of this Petition.
I.

MATERIAL DATES

1.1 Petitioner received on January 5, 2015 a copy of the Order dated

December 15, 2014 of the Honorable Labor Arbiter subject of the present
Petition, giving Petitioner until January 15, 2015 within which to file a
verified petition in accordance with Rule XII of the NLRC Rules of
1

Procedure. Petitioner respectfully manifests that the instant Petition is

timely filed.
II.

GROUNDS

2.1 The Honorable Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion and ruled
in a manner clearly contrary to law when he awarded separation pay in favor
of private respondents through his Order dated December 15, 2014 despite
the final and executory judgment declaring private respondents were not
illegally dismissed.
2.2 The Honorable Labor Arboter committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when at the execution stage he
issued the Order dated December 15, 2014, which substantially modified the
final and executory Decision dated December 26, 2013, in blatant violation
of the rule on finality and immutability of judgments to the extreme
prejudice of herein Petitioner.
2.3 The Honorable Arbiter gravely abused his discretion when he ordered
the payment of separation pay to private respondents, despite the finding that
private respondents were not illegally dismissed in the Decision dated
December 26, 2013, which is final and binding against private respondents
who did not appeal the said Decision.
III.

DISCUSSION

3.1 THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER GRAVELY ABUSED

HIS DISCRETION AND RULED IN A MANNER CLEARLY
CONTRARY TO LAW WHEN HE AWARDED SEPARATION PAY IN
FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THROUGH HIS ORDER
DATED DECEMBER 15, 2014 DESPITE THE FINAL AND
EXECUTORY JUDGMENT DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
WERE NOT ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.
3.1.1 The Honorable Arbiter categorically declared in the Decision dated
December 26, 2013 that herein private respondents were not dismissed from
their employment at Hacienda Santol, to wit:
In the present case, the facts and the evidence did not establish
a prima facie case that complainants were dismissed from
employment. It was not even disputed that complainants continued
working in Hda. Santol on the portions owned and operated by Ma.
Jesusa D. Lacson and Rene D. Lacson. This clearly explained the
reason why they had not worked with respondent Felipe Datu Lacson
because they preferred to work with the other co-owners of Hda.
Santol.

3.1.2 Having found that herein private respondents were not dismissed by
Petitioner, but rather, preferred to work at other farms in Hda. Santol, the
Honorable Labor Arbiter dismissed herein private respondents claim for
illegal dismissal in his Decision dated December 26, 2013 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.
However, respondent FELIPE DATU LACSON is hereby
DIRECTED to give complainants NELSON TORIANO, GLECERIO
ARRABIS, SEGINDINO GLARAGA, JR., VICENTE IGNACIO,
DESIREE ARRABIS, GINA LEPORA, REMEDIOS MONDIDO,
VILMA MONDIDO, MARY JEAN TORIANO and CERILA
SARMIENTO their usual work assignments in Hda. Santol sans
backwages.
The original copy of the afore-quoted Decision dated December 26, 2013 is
hereto attached as Annex B and is made an integral part of this Petition.
3.1.3 The above-quoted Decision dated December 26, 2013 was not
appealed by the private respondents, and pursuant to Rule V, Section 21 of
the NLRC Rules of Procedure, has already become final and executory.
3.1.4 Private respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
and to Order the NLRC Sheriff to Physically Reinstate Complainants to their
Former Position with Computation of Complainants Accrued Salary.
3.1.5 The Honorable Labor Arbiter conducted a Pre-execution Conference
on March 24, 2014.
3.1.5 During the said Conference, herein Petitioner manifested his
willingness to faithfully comply with the dispositive portion of the aforequoted Decision dated December 26, 2013 to give private respondents their
usual work assignments at Hda. Santol. Petitioner and private respondents
proposed ways by which the usual work assignments can be determined
during the said conference.
3.1.6 On April 23, 2014, herein Petitioner submitted his Comment to the
motion for execution filed by herein private respondents. In addition to the
documentary evidence submitted by Petitioner in support of his position
paper, Petitioner attached payrolls in the farm operated by Cibie Lacson, son
of Rene D. Lacson, co-owner of one of the farms at Hda. Santol to show that
private respondents continue their work in Hda. Santol on the farms owned
by the other co-owners of Hda. Santol where they preferred to work,
including the period from the time Petitioner received a copy of the Decision
dated December 26, 2013 on January 10, 2014 up to the date of filing. A
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copy of the Comment dated April 23, 2014 is hereto attached as Annex C
and is made an integral part hereof.
3.1.7 Petitioner also submitted a Program of Work, which proposed a
way in which Petitioner can give the private respondents their usual work
assignments in faithful compliance with the final Decision dated December
26, 2013. A copy of the Program of Work is hereto attached as Annex D
and is made an integral part hereof.
3.1.8 However, instead of causing the execution of the Decision dated
December 26, 2013 strictly in accordance with its terms by ruling on the
manner on how Petitioner shall give private respondents their usual work
assignments, the Honorable Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion
when he modified the final and executory Decision dated December 26,
2013 and ordered herein Petitioner to pay private respondents separation
pay, despite the fact that said private respondents were not dismissed, legally
or illegally. The dispositive portion of the challenged Order dated December
15, 2014 of the Honorable Labor Arbiter states:
WHEREFORE, the complainants Motion for
Computation of Accrued Salaries is DENIED for lack of merit.

the

However, in light of the apparent strained relations of parties,

respondent FELIPE DATU LACSON is DIRECTED to pay
complainants, as follows:
Nelson Toriano
Glecerio Arrabis
Segundino Glaraga Jr.
Desiree Arabis
Remedios Mondido
Mary Jean Toriano
Vicente Ignacio
Gina Lepora
Vilma Mondido
Cerila Sarmiento

(28/178xP114,713.75)
(17/178xP114,713.75)
(18/178xP114,713.75)
(14/178xP114,713.75)
(15/178xP114,713.75)
(26/178xP114,713.75)
(7/178xP114,713.75)
(18/178xP114,713.75)
(17/178xP114,713.75)
(18/178xP114,713.75)

P18,044.86
10,955.81
11,600.27
9,022.43
9,666.88
16,755.94
4,511.21
11.600.27
10,955.81
11,600.27
P114,713.75

or the total sum of ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND

SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTEEN and 75/100 PESOS
(P114,713.75) as their separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement.
SO ORDERED.
3.1.9
Petitioner raises the following question of law for the resolution
of the Honorable Commission: Whether or not the Honorable Labor Arbiter
can order the payment of separation pay to laborers who were not illegally
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dismissed as adjudged in a final and executory judgment during the

proceedings for the execution of the said final judgment?
3.1.10
With all due respect to the Honorable Court, Petitioner
respectfully submits that the above quoted Order is null and void for having
been issued in direct violation of established principles of law and
jurisprudence andwill cause grave injustice upon Petitioner if not annulled or
rectified.
3.1.11
This question was squarely addressed by the Honorable
Supreme Court in the recent case of Leopard Security and Investigation
Agency vs. Quitoy (G.R. No. 186344, February 20, 2013), where it held that:
Is an award of separation pay proper despite lack of showing
of illegal dismissal? This is the main issue in this Rule 45 Petition for
Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 26 September 2008
rendered and the Resolution dated 21 January 2009 issued by the
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No.
03097.
xxx
Having correctly ruled out illegal dismissal of respondents, the
CA reversibly erred, however when it sustained the NLRCs award of
separation pay on the ground that the parties relationship had already
been strained. For one, liability for the payment of separation pay is
a legal consequence of illegal dismissal where reinstatement is no
longer viable or feasible. Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin reliefs of full
backwages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights. Aside
from the instances provided under Article 283 and 284 of the Labor
Code, separation pay is, however, granted where reinstatement is no
longer feasible because of strained relations between the employer
and the employee. In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine
is that separation pay is available in lieu of reinstatement when the
latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best interest of the
parties.
As a relief granted in lieu of reinstatement, however, it
consequently goes without saying that an award of separation pay
is inconsistent with a finding that there was no illegal dismissal.
Standing alone, the doctrine of strained relations will not justify an
award of separation pay, a relief granted in instances where the
common denominator is the fact that the employee was dismissed by
the employer. Even in cases of illegal dismissal, the doctrine of
strained relations is not applied indiscriminately as to bar
reinstatement, especially when the employee has not indicated an
aversion to returning to work or does not occupy a position of trust
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and confidence in or has no say in the operation of the employers

business. Although litigation may also engender a certain degree of
hostility, it has likewise been ruled that the understandable strain in
the parties relations would not necessarily rule out reinstatement
which would, otherwise, become the rule rather than the exception in
illegal dismissal cases. (Emphasis copied from the original and
supplied by the author.)
3.1.12
The Honorable Arbiter therefore clearly erred when he ordered
Petitioner to pay private respondents separation pay despite the final
judgment finding that there was no illegal dismissal, on the basis only of his
observation that there was strained relations between the parties.
3.1.13
Even assuming, without in any way admitting, that there was
strained relations between the parties, the afore-cited case of Leopard
Security emphasizes that the doctrine of strained relations does not
automatically justify the award of separation pay, especially in the case of
Petitioner and private respondents, who, during the pre-execution conference
held on March 24, 2014 were proposing ways by which private respondents
can be given their usual work assignments by Petitioner. The very fact that
Petitioner submitted a Program of Work to the Honorable Arbiter shows
his willingness to work with private respondents in accordance with the final
judgment that they be given their usual assignments, and belies the claim
that parties can no longer work together by reason of strained relations.
3.1.4
The only question that should have been resolved by the
Honorable Labor Arbiter during the proceedings for the execution of the
Decision dated December 26, 2013 was the determination of how private
respondents can be given their usual work assignments, taking into
consideration the proposals submitted by the parties for the implementation
of the final judgment of the Honorable Arbiter.
3.2 THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN AT THE EXECUTION STAGE HE ISSUED
THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 15, 2014, WHICH
SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 26, 2013, IN BLATANT
VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON FINALITY AND IMMUTABILITY
OF JUDGMENTS TO THE EXTREME PREJUDICE OF HEREIN
PETITIONER.
3.2.1 Public Respondent gravely abused his discretion when he issued the
Order dated December 15, 2014 substantially modifying the final and
executory Decision dated December 26, 2013, in blatant violation of the
fundamental rule on finality and immutability of judgments.

3.2.2 It is clear from the Decision dated December 26, 2013 that the claims
of private respondents have already been tried, adjudicated upon and
determined with finality. The afore-mentioned judgment already constitutes
the final determination of the rights of the private respondents vis--vis the
Petitioner.
3.2.3 The Decision dated December 26, 2013 dismissed the case for illegal
dismissal filed by herein private respondents. This Decision had already
become final and binding against the parties for having failed to appeal the
same. Private respondents had in fact already filed a motion for the
execution of the Decision dated December 26, 2013. The award of
separation pay directly conflicts with and modifies the Honorable Labor
Arboters own final judgment that there was no illegal dismissal.
3.2.4 It is settled jurisprudence that once a decision becomes final, even the
court which has rendered it can no longer alter or modify it, except to correct
clerical errors or mistakes. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation,
thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice, which is, to assist in
the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order,
by settling justiciable controversies with finality. (Heirs of Remigio Tan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71033 July 29, 1988)
3.2.5 The afore-mentioned judgment having long attained finality, all that
the Honorable Labor Arbiter had authority to do was to enforce the same
strictly in accordance with its terms. Petitioner and private respondents must
be required to comply only with what was decreed in the dispositive portion
of the final judgment being enforced.
3.2.6 As explained in the case of Kukan International Corp. vs. Hon.
Reyes, (G.R. No. 182729, September 29, 2010):
It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of
the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a
decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of
the parties. Once a decision or order becomes final and executory,
it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further alter or amend it. It thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable and any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose. An order of execution which varies the tenor of the
judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.
xxx

Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a

decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or
law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.
xxx
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of
quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed
by law. (Emphasis supplied.)

3.2.7 With all due respect to the Honorable Commission, the meaning of the
dispositive portion of the Decision dated December 26, 2013 was clear in
that it dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal and ordered Petitioner to
give herein private respondents their usual work assignments. The award of
separation pay made in the Order dated Decmber 15, 2014 resolving private
respondents motion for execution clearly modified the final Decision dated
December 26, 2013, and is null and void for violating the rule on
immutability of judgments.
3.2.8 As declared by the Supreme Court in the case of First United
Constructors Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171901,
December 19, 2006:
Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and
irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. This is better observed
if the court executing the judgment would refrain from creating
further controversy by effectively modifying and altering the
dispositive portion of the decision, thus further delaying the
satisfaction of the judgment. No matter how just the intention of the
trial court, it cannot legally reverse what has already been settled.
3.2.9 In the interest of justice, Petitioner respectfully entreats the Honorable
Commission to set aside the Order dated December 15, 2014 for having been
issued by Public Respondent without or in excess of its jurisdiction, and to
remand the case to the Public Respondent only for purposes of strictly
enforcing the dispositive portion of the final Decision dated December 26,
2013.

3.3 THE HONORABLE ARBITER GRAVELY ABUSED HIS

DISCRETION WHEN HE ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF
SEPARATION PAY TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, DESPITE THE
FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED IN THE DECISION DATED DECEMBER
26, 2013, WHICH IS FINAL AND BINDING AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WHO DID NOT APPEAL THE SAID DECISION.
3.3.1 It is a fundamental principle of law that a party who does not appeal
from a decision may not obtain any affirmative relief other than what he has
obtained from said decision.
3.3.2 This fundamental legal principle has been established in a long line of
jurisprudence.(Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Daniel, G.R. No. 156893,
June 21, 2005; Rural Bank of Sta. Maria, Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 110672, September 14, 1999; Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 101747, September 24, 1997; Pison-Arceo Agricultural and
Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 117890, September 18, 1997; Filflex Industrial & Manufacturing
Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115395, February 12, 1998; Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Company of Manila vs. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 114841-42,
August 23, 1995; Pepsi Cola Products vs. Patan, G.R. No. 152927, January
14, 2004; Foundation Specialists, Inc. vs. Betonval Ready Concrete, Inc.,
G.R. No. 170674, August 24, 2009; Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Lifetime Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 176434, 25 June 2008)
3.3.3 The Supreme Court categorically declared in the case of Loy vs.
SMCEU-PTGWO, (G.R. No. 164886, November 24, 2009), that:
The rule is clear that no modification of judgment could be
granted to a party who did not appeal.
3.3.4 In the afore-cited case of Leopard Security vs. Quitoy (supra.), it was
held that:
Parenthetically, said ruling is binding on respondents who did
not appeal either the decision rendered by the NLRC or the CA in line
with the entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction that a party
who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have
the judgment modified.
3.3.5 The Supreme Court rule in the case of Corinthian Gardens
Association vs. Tanjangco, (G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008) that:
It bears stressing that the Cuasos failed to appeal the ruling of
the CA. This failure to contest the CA decision before this Court was
fatal to their cause. It had the effect of an admission that they indeed
9

acted in bad faith, as they accepted the CA ruling. The decision of the
CA, therefore, became binding and final as to them. As a matter of
fact, the CA already issued a partial entry of judgment against the
Cuasos.
3.3.6 The grant of reliefs to Respondent as a party who did not appeal runs
counter to fundamental principles of fair play and due process, to the
extreme prejudice of the party who appealed. (Philippine Tobacco FlueCuring & Redrying Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 127395, December 10, 1998)
3.3.7 In executing the Decision dated December 26, 2013, Public
Respondent should have limited himself to determining the manner in which
Petitioner is to give the private respondents their usual work assignments,
giving due consideration to its own finding that the private respondents were
not dismissed, but by their own preference and volition, were in fact
working on two of the three farms found on the same Hacienda Santol
operated by Petitioners co-owners.
3.3.8 It is respectfully submitted that Public Respondent gravely abused his
discretion to the extreme prejudice of the Petitioner when he ordered the
payment of separation pay, thus awarding additional reliefs to private
respondents that were not granted in the Decision dated December 26, 2013,
which is binding upon private respondents for having failed to appeal.
IV. ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
4.1 The issuance by this Honorable Court of a temporary restraining order
is a matter of extreme urgency because to allow the immediate execution of
the Order dated December 15, 2014 would render nugatory any decision of
the Honorable Commission regarding the propriety of the award of
separation pay for private respondents who were not illegally dismissed.
Petitioner will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury as he will have no
means to recover any amount that we will be paid out to the private
respondents should the Honorable Commission rule that payment of
separation pay is not proper.
4.2 The Decision dated December 26, 2013 having already attained
finality, Petitioner has acquired the vested right of having the final and
executory judgment enforced strictly in accordance with its terms. There is
no standard by which the injury that Petitioner will suffer can be measured if
the execution proceedings before the Honorable Labor Arbiter are not
restrained, specifically, the order requiring Petitioner to pay separation pay
to private respondents. There is no amount that can adequately or fairly
recompense Petitioner from the damage or injury that will result to the
10

Petitioner should the execution proceedings before the Honorable Labor

Arbiter are allowed to continue.
4.3 The immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order in
accordance with Rule XII Section 10 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure is of
urgent necessity, in order to restrain the continuation of execution
proceedings in light of the clearly unlawful ruling of the Honorable Labor
Arbiter. The Petitioner stands to suffer great and irreparable injury if the
proceedings before the Honorable Labor Arbiter are allowed to proceed and
continue, before the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction can be resolved by the Honorable Commission.
4.4 Petitioner is entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for, as such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the unlawful acts
complained of, specifically, the payment of separation pay to private
respondents who were not illegally dismissed. The commission and
continuance of the acts complained of pending resolution by the Honorable
Commission of the matters submitted before it would work an injustice to
the Petitioner, in violation of his rights adjudicated in the final and executory
Decision dated December 26, 2013, and tending to render any order or
judgment that the Honorable Commission may render in the disposition of
the instant Petition ineffectual.
4.5 The right sought to be protected by the temporary restraining order
and writ of injunction applied for is existing and in esse as the Decision
dated December 26, 2013 has long attained finality by reason of the failure
to appeal by the parties, is legally binding and immutable.
4.6 The right of Petitioner to the enforecement of the final and executory
Decision dated December 26, 2013 is now being directly threatened by the
Order dated December 15, 2014. The urgent need for the protection and
preservation of the Petitioners rights warrants the immediate issuance of the
temporary restraining order and injunctive writ applied for in order to
maintain the status quo and to preserve the rights and interests of the
Petitioner until the Honorable Commission has resolved the instant Petition.
4.7 Petitioner is willing and able to file a bond in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as required in Rule XII Section 10 of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure, or such amount as may be fixed by the
Honorable Commission, executed to the parties enjoined, to the effect that
Petitioner will pay to such parties all damages which they may sustain by
reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order should the Honorable
Commission finally decide that Petitioner is not entitled thereto.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Petitioner most respectfully
prays that the Honorable Commission issue an order declaring the Public
Respondents Order dated December 15, 2014 as null and void for having
11

been issued in direct violation of principles of law and jurisprudence, in

grave abuse of his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner further prays for the immediate issuance of a temporary
restraining order directing Public Respondent to immediately cease and
desist from conducting further proceedings in connection with the execution
of RAB CASE NO. VI-08-10472-13, in particular, to cease and desist from
enforcing the assailed Order dated December 15, 2014, and upon expiration
of the temporary restraining order, that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to be effective pending resolution of the instant Petition.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.
MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
January 15, 2015, Bacolod City for Cebu City.

MICHELLE VARCA GONZAGA

Counsel for the Petitioner
Roll No. 49584
MCLE IV No. 0011199/2-5-2013
IBP No. 0984038/1-12-2015/Bacolod City
PTR No. 0004489/1-12-2015/Bacolod City
2/F St. Therese Bldg.
Cor. Rizal Locsin Sts., Bacolod City
Tel. No. 034 4340049
Copy furnished:
HON. EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER
NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI
Rosario St. Bacolod City
ATTY. ROMEO SUBALDO
Door No. 2
2/F Cineplex Building
Araneta St., Bacolod City
EXPLANATION
Due to the lack of messengerial staff and the urgency of the above
pleading, Petitioner was constrained to serve the same by registered mail.
MICHELLE VARCA GONZAGA
12