Country Profile of Cambodia

Cambodia shares borders with Vietnam to the east, Laos to the north, Thailand to the west, and the ocean coast to the
Southwest.
NATIONAL FLAG
Cambodia ]: The flag was designed arround 1850 that has three horizontal bands of blue (top and bottom) and red
(central) with a depiction of Angkor Watt in the center. The flag was abandoned in a few years during the Khmer Rouge
and the occupation of Vietnamese in Cambodia. The flag was readopted in 1993 after the first general election with the
returned the monarchy.
COAT OF ARMS or ROYAL ARMS of CAMBODIA
COAT OF ARMS is symbol on the Royal Standard of the reigning monarch of Cambodia.. They were established since
the
independent
Kingdom
of
Cambodia
in
1953.
This Royal Standard was restored in 1993. Armiger - Norodom Sihamoni, King of Cambodia(wikepedia)
CONVENTIONAL NAME

Preah-reach-ana-chak Kampuchea is the official name used by the Royal Government of Cambodia.
It means, the Kingdom of Kampuchea.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Is the royal government of the fifth mandate really legitimate?
The signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991 launched Cambodia in a process of reconstruction after
two decades of conflict and civil war. The process, which was backed by a United Nations presence until the first
national elections in May 1993, facilitated the foundation of a constitutional monarchy with King Norodom Sihanouk as
head of State, and led to the establishment of a power-sharing government.

Type: Constitutional monarchy, Parliamentary representative democracy

Head of States: His Majesty Samdech Preah Baromneath Norodom Sihamoni(elected October 29, 2004)

Head of Government: Prime Minister Hun Sen (appointed on January 14 1985, elected in 1998, 2003,
and 2008) is in charge of overall execution of national policies and programs, and is accountable to the National
Assembly.

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Preah means Sacred

Reach derived from Sanskrit. It means King or Royal
Ana derived from Pali It means Authority or Power.
Chak derived from Sanskrit. It means Wheel
Srok Khmer (local short form) common and general used by Khmer People.Srok means Territory.
Pra-Tehs Khmer (local short form) - the formal name and general writing. Pra-Tehs means Country.
Pra-Tehs Kampuchea (local short form) Kampuchea was derived fromSanskrit word as Kambuja.
Camboja is called in Portuguese
Kampoja is called in Indonesian
Cambodia is called in English
Cambodge is called in French
Kambodsha is called in German
Camboya is called in Spanish
Cambogia is called in Italian

BRIEF OVERVIEW:
Main Language: Khmer
Main Religion: Buddhism (Theravada)
Population: 14.86 million (World Bank, 2012)
Poplulation in Phnom Penh: 1,501,725 (Wikipedia - 2012)
Ethnic group: Khmer, Vietnamese and Chinese minorities
Monetary unit: 1 riel = 100 sen
Climate: tropical humid climate: rainy (monsoon) season (May to November) and dry season (December
to April)
Capital: Phnom Penh
Major Cities: Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, Sihanouk Ville, Koh Kong
Area: 181,035 sq km (69,898 sq miles) : Water 2.5%
Border countries: Laos 541 km, Thailand 803 km, Vietnam 1,228 km
Coastline: 443 km
Independence: 9 November 1953
Constitution:Promulgated 21 September 1993
GDP: USD $14.06 billion (World Bank, 2012)
Life expectancy: 62.98 years (2011)
Major Exports: Garments, Fisheries Products, Rubber
Major Export Trading Countries: : United States (34%), Hong Kong (16%), Singapore (7%), Germany
(6%), United Kingdom (6%)
Major Imports: Gold (22%), Knit or crochet fabric, width <30 cm >5% elastomer (17%), Petroleum oils,
refined (5%), Floating or submersible drilling platforms (4%), Other woven fabrics of synthetic staple fibers (3%)
Major Import Trading Countries: Singapore (26%), China (22%), Hong Kong (14%), Thailand (12%),
Viet Nam (5%)
Internet domain: .kh
International dialling code: +855
Electricity: 220V AC 50 Hz
Driving: Right hand side; International Driving Permit required
Airport: Phnom Penh International (PNH), Siem Reap International Airport, & Sihanoukville International
Airport - Website
Direct Flight: from Bangkok (Thailand), Taipei (Taiwan), Hong Kong (China), Singapore (Singapore), Ho
Chi Minh City (Vietnam), Vientiane (Lao), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), Guangzhou (China), Soul (South Korea)

Born April 4, 1951 (family photo)

Wife: Bun Rany Hun Sen
Leading 10 deputy prime ministers, 17 senior ministers, 172 secretaries of state, and 28

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ministers.

Directory of the Government

Legislature: The Constituent Assembly, now called the National Assembly, promulgated Cambodias sixth
Constitution on 24 September 1993. The 1993 Constitution was amended in March 1999 to establish the Senate, a
new legislative body. The Constitution declares liberal democracy and a multiparty system as the foundations of
the political regime of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Under the Constitution, the Cambodian people are masters of
their own country, possess all powers, and exercise their powers through the National Assembly, Senate, Royal
Government, and Judiciary. It also stipulates that the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of government
shall be separate. Furthermore, all Khmer citizens possess the right to establish associations and political parties.

Senate(Upper House): Chaired by Samdech Chea Sim and consisting of 62 Senators

(referring to Figure 1)
o
National Assembly (Lower House): Chaired by Samdech Heng Samrinand consisting of
123 elected members (referring to Figure 2).
Judiciary Branch: Supreme Council of the Magistracy (provided for in the constitution and formed in
December 1997); Supreme Court (and lower courts) exercises judicial authority.
Local Government: The Constitution divides the territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia into provinces and
municipalities. Currently, there are 24 provinces and four municipalities (Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, Kep, and
Pailin). Each province is divided into districts (srok), and each district into communes (khum). In addition, there are
a group of villages (phum), although they are not considered formal administrative units. Each municipality is
divided into sections (khan), each section into quarters (sangkat). The Ministry of Interior is in charge of
administering provinces and municipalities.
o

Members of Cambodia Senate (2006-01-22 Senate Elections Results). (Figure 1)

King Norminees

Parliamentary
Nominees

CPP

Funcinpec

SRP

43

The 5th Mandate of National Assembly opened on September 23, 2013 byKing Norodom Sihamoni
Is the fifth mandate of National Assembly legitimate?
Political Parties

Votes

Percentage

Seats

Cambodian People's Party

3,235,969

48.83%

68

Cambodian National Rescue Party

2,946,176

44.46%

55

The 4th Mandate Election of Members of National Assembly 2008 (Figure 2)

Political Parties

Resources & Referrences:

http://www.cambodia.org/facts/
International Relations

CPP

SRP

HRP

Funcinpec

NRP

90

26

123

Cambodia joined the UN in 1955. After the prolonged civil war was ended in the early 1990s, the pace at which
Cambodia joined various international economic organizations picked up. Table I-4-1 shows some of the Cambodias
membership in international organizations to which Cambodia belongs. In addition, Cambodia is also a member of
FAO, IMF, Interpol, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, WHO, etc.
Table I-4-1 Membership of Major International Organizations
Organization

Member
Since

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

1950

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

1952

United Nations (UN)

1955

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

1956

International Civil Aviation Organization

1956

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

1961

Asian Development Bank (ADB)

1966

Universal Postal Union (UPU)

1969

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

1970

International Development Association (IDA)

1970

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

1992

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)

1995

International Finance Corporation (IFC)

1997

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

1999

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

1999

International Labour Organization (ILO)

1999*

World Customs Organization (WCO)

2001

World Trade Organization (WTO)

2004

Asian Productivity Organization (APO)

2004

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)

2005

Asia-Pacific Telecommunity

2007

International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)

2009
Note: * Cambodia ratified six fundamental conventions of the ILO in 1999.Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation
Economic Situation
1. Size of EconomyGDP amount has been steadily grown with 43,057 billion Riels in 2009 and 47,048 billion Riels in
2010 and is projected to be 52,141 billion Riel in 2011 (approximately USD 12.9 billion) and 57, 363 billion Riel in 2012
(approximately USD 14.2 billion).
Per capita GDP has also steadily increased since 1998 when the Riel greatly depreciated against the dollar. Per capita
GDP in 2010 reached USD 830, an increase of approximately 70% from 487 US dollars in 2005. It is projected to
reach USD 904 in 2011 and USD 984 in 2012 respectively, according to the MEFs forecast. (Figure II-1-2)
2. Industrial Structure
As the primary industry occupies 32% of the total economy, the agriculture is the main industry of Cambodia. Major
agricultural products are rice, rubber, maize, cassava, etc. The secondary industry and tertiary industry respectively
account for 22% and 38% of the total economy. The major industry of the manufacturing sector is apparel products,
which are directed to exports. Among the tertiary industry, the tourism-related industries are important to the
Cambodian economy.
3. Trade
The trade balance of Cambodia keeps a continuous deficit. Both exports and imports have been expanding as a result
of economic growth. In 2011, the export value was US$5.4 billion and the import value was US$7.0 billion.
The major destination countries of exports are USA, Hong Kong, China, EU, Canada, and Vietnam. The major
importing countries are Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.
The primary export product is apparel, which account for more than 80% of total exports. The major import products
are textiles, petroleum product, and vehicles. Cambodia significantly depends on imports for industrial input products
and daily commodities.
4. Currency
Although the official national currency is the Riel, US dollars are commonly used in business and commercial
transactions.
CCHR Briefing Note February 2013
Political and Electoral Reform in Cambodia
Executive Summary

This Briefing Note outlines the current state of politics in the Kingdom of Cambodia (Cambodia) ahead of the 2013
national elections, analyzes shortcomings in the electoral process, and offers recommendations for reforms which
would substantially benefit the state of democracy in Cambodia. The first section provides background on the structure
of the Cambodian political and electoral system and an overview of political parties, including an analysis of the extent
to which both the ruling Cambodian Peoples Party (the CPP) and the opposition have traditionally targeted voters
based on party personalities rather than on policies. The second section of this Briefing Note analyzes flaws in the
electoral process, including the advantage held by the CPP during campaigning and electoral periods, irregularities
during voter registration and at the ballot box, and the lack of independence of Cambodias electoral administrator, the
National Election Committee (the NEC). The third section discusses the marginalization of three groups of
Cambodian society from the formal political and electoral process: women; the youth; and the small-business sector. In
July 2013, parliamentary elections will be held in Cambodia, during which the electorate will vote for members of the
National Assembly (the NA). In order for these elections to be genuinely free and fair and to result in positive change,
however, a number of reforms must be undertaken. This Briefing Note recommends four key areas of reform:1.
Reforming the NEC to ensure the independence of its members and to reduce election irregularities.2. Increasing
womens representation in politics by implementing electoral gender quotas for candidate lists of a minimum of 30%.3.
Incorporating civic education into the national educational system to increase the youths participation and
representation in politics.4. Developing party platforms and campaigns that incorporate concrete policy initiatives for
developing and growing the nascent small-business sector.By considering these areas, both CPP and opposition
parties can campaign on iissues that benefit all Cambodians and achieve progress towards establishing a liberal
participatory democracy, with human rights properly protected and promoted in accordance with Cambodias domestic
and international legal obligations. This Briefing Note is written by the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR),
a nonaligned, independent, non-governmental organization that works to promote and protect democracy and respect
for human rights primarily civil and political rights throughout Cambodia.Background: Politics & Political Parties in
CambodiaThe Royal Government of Cambodia (the RGC) is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament
composed of the Senate1and of the NA2, which forms the legislative branch of government.The NA comprises 123
members elected for five-year terms by proportional representation, using provinces as constituencies of one to 18
members. The Senate consists of 61 members two nominated by the King, two elected by the NA and 57 elected
indirectly by commune councils and members of the NA. At the sub-national level, Commune/Sangkat Councils3serve
the local affairs for the interests of the communes and act as an agent of government, performing tasks designated or
delegated by the RGC. A cornerstone of the 2004 Rectangular Strategy for Growth, the RGCs policy of
decentralization and deconcentration has cemented the importance of Commune Councils to the development of
Cambodia. The NEC,
4the main electoral administrator in Cambodia, is responsible for planning, organizing and administering all elections
including direct elections of NA members and Commune/Sangkat Councils and indirect elections of Senate members
and Capital City, Provincial, Municipal, District and Khan Councils. Members of the NA and of Commune Councils are
elected by proportional representation, with each registered party submitting a list of candidates in order of preference,
meaning that independent candidates cannot run for election to these bodies. Seats are then allocated based on the
number of votes that each party receives. The NECs responsibilities include announcing election results, producing
and disseminating civic education materials, monitoring media, and registering voters and political parties. As a division
of the Ministry of Interior (the MOI), the NEC receives its budget from the Ministry of Economy and Finance.The NEC
is made up of nine members, which are nominated by the MOI and appointed by Royal Decree at the request of the
Council of Ministers upon approval by an absolute majority of members of the National Assembly. These members are
required to relinquish affiliation with any political party, in line with the Law on Elections of Members of the National
Assembly, which defines the NEC as an independent and neutral body and provides that in the carrying out of its
duties Members of the [NEC] and those of Electoral Commissions at all levels shall be neutral and impartial in the
implementation of their electoral duties.Despite being a parliamentary, multi-party democracy on paper, the RGC is
dominated by one political party the CPP and by Prime Minister Hun Sen. Nevertheless, opposition parties do exist
in Cambodia. In 2012, the Sam Rainsy Party (the SRP) and the Human Rights Party (the HRP) merged to form the
Cambodia National Rescue Party (the CNRP) in an attempt to consolidate opposition votes and to pose a more
formidable and concerted challenge to the CPP in the upcoming national elections. Similarly, Cambodias two royalist
parties, the Norodom Ranariddh Party (the NRP) and the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful
and Cooperative Cambodia Party (FUNCINPEC) merged to form the new Nationalist Party. A number of additional
political parties exist: the League for Democracy Party, the Khmer Anti-Poverty Party, the Khmer National Party, the
Republic Democratic Party and the Democratic Movement Party. These parties, however, typically win very few seats,
if any. Political campaigning in Cambodia often revolves around personalities, with political parties traditionally being
little more than projections of party leaders. As a result, during political campaigns, voters are encouraged to vote for
individual personalities rather than on substantive policy issues and party platforms. This is exacerbated by the stifling
of the political opposition over the past 20 years, which has resulted in those parties tending to promote radical causes
as a last resort to win votes.5Flaws in the Electoral ProcessIn the most recent national elections held in July 2008, the
CPP won 90 out of 123 seats in the NA,6its authority strengthened by a constitutional amendment passed in 2006
which lowered the majority required for the NA to grant a vote of confidence to the RGC from 2/3 of its members to an
absolute majority, lessening the need to form coalitions and make deals with smaller parties. During
Commune/Sangkat Council elections in June 2012, the CPP took 1,592 out of 1,633 seats,7 which together with its
control of the NA illustrates the monopoly that it holds on political power in the country at both the national and subnational level. The dominance of the CPP in all aspects of politics results in an electoral process that is not
independent and rarely transparent.Unequal OpportunitiesExtensive control over all aspects of Cambodian society by
the CPP results in little opportunities for opposition parties to make an impact upon the national political discourse and
to effectively campaign for elections. The RGC exercises widespread censorship of all forms of traditional media,
especially of TV stations which are all controlled by affiliates of the CPP. On 1 June 2012, the Ministry of Information
contacted several radio stations in Cambodia to inform them that they were prohibited from broadcasting programs
produced by Voice of Democracy, Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, Radio France International and Radio Australia
programs which provide balanced and impartial information on 2 and 3 June 2012. This ban coincided with the

commune elections, which were held on 3 June 2012.8 With an unclear legal basis for this ban, it seems clear that the
radio ban was directly linked to the CPPs attempt to stifle political discourse and to secure votes in the elections.
There are also significant gaps in the financial capacities of political parties to campaign. The Committee for Free and
Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) noted that the CPPs campaign spending for the2012 commune elections
vastly outweighed that of other political parties, with the CPP spending approximately US$9,000 per local campaign,
compared to US$1,500 by the SRP, US$300 by the HRP, US$200 by the NRP and less than US$200 by
FUNCINPEC.9This gap in resources between parties is exacerbated by the CPPs misuse of state resources to carry
out political activities in support of the CPP, such as the use of state property and officials for CPP campaigning
activities.10Lack of Independence of the National Election CommitteeDespite legal provisions, the nomination of NEC
members by institutions dominated by the CPP results in a problematic lack of independence. This fundamental flaw is
exacerbated by the lack of fixed terms for NEC members and of safeguards against the arbitrary removal of members,
which means that NEC members can easily be dismissed by the ruling party if they undertake actions deemed contrary
to the CPPs interests. Furthermore, the NECs dependence on the Ministry of Commerce for its budget deprives it of
the power to administer funds autonomously, and makes it more susceptible to executive control. The NECs lack of
independence most dramatically impacts upon the NECs complaint-hearing mandate regarding breaches of election
laws. According to statistics released by the NEC in 2010, of 22 electoral complaints received by the NEC in 2010, 13
were dismissed while nine were resolved at the commune level.11 These complaints related to: commune clerks
allegedly registering voters without sufficient proof of identification; voters names missing from the list; and commune
officials allegedly deleting voter names from the list. During elections and following elections, however, there is a
distinct lack of a comprehensive appeals process, with the current process riddled with loopholes. For example, in
making a polling- or counting-related complaint in relation to national elections, such complaints must be filed before
11:30 a.m. of the day after the election. Complaints concerning misbehavior on the part of officials must be filed within
three days of the event. The timeframe for submission of complaints is therefore insufficient for parties seeking to file
complaints the vast majority of whom are oppositionaligned to gather evidence. The result is that complaints are
routinely rejected.Irregularities during Registration and at the Ballot BoxThe lack of independence of the NEC and of
the electoral process in general is most clearly seen in the irregularities witnessed during the voting process, as
demonstrated by the types of complaints received by the NEC mentioned above. More than 3,000 irregularities were
noted by independent election monitors during the June 2012 commune elections, including during the cool-down
period preceding the elections, on election day, and during the counting days following the elections.12 In addition to
technical irregularities, it is well-known that civil servants, the military policy and the Royal Cambodian Army Forces are
all affiliated with the CPP; their presence at polling stations often acts as a deterrent from voting for opposition parties.
Irregularities are not limited to direct elections at the commune level: in January 2012, it was reported that two CPPaffiliated men had attempted to buy the vote of an SRP commune councilor, offering US$700 to vote for a CPP senate
candidate.13 These irregularities are likely to be repeated during the 2013 national elections if the electoral process is
not reformed. Already, monitors have noted worrying irregularities as regards the voter registration process, including
the taking of bribes by registration officers, the doubling of names on voter lists, a lack of respect for registration rules
by election officials, including the shortening of opening hours at registration offices, and the registration of voters in
absentia.14Marginalization from PoliticsIn addition to the lack of independence and transparency of the electoral
process and the control by the CPP of all organs of state, Cambodian politics is characterized by widespread
marginalization and alienation of segments of Cambodian society which have so much to offer to the country: women,
youth and small businesses.15 Political parties across the spectrum must strive to incorporate these various groups
into the political process by developing policies that address their particular concerns and needs.Under-Representation
of WomenDue to a mixture of cultural, socio-economic, political and institutional reasons, the numbers of women
election candidates and female representatives in leading positions are still very low at all levels of government. This
under-representation of female voices leads to the neglect of womens rights and a lack of concern for gender-specific
problems. The RGC has committed itself to promoting gender equality through Target 7 of Goal 3 of the Cambodian
Millennium Development Goals (CMDGs), which seeks to eliminate gender disparities in public institutions by
increasing the proportion of seats held by women in various governmental and administrative bodies.16 The targets
are to increase female representation in the NA and Senate to a minimum of 30% and in the Commune/Sangkat
Councils to a minimum of 25% by 2015. These commitments have been complemented by various other government
policy documents, such as Neary Rattanak I-III, and the National Strategic Development Plan I-II, both of which
provide an extensive outline of the goals, activities, monitoring indicators, conducting agencies and resources for the
promotion of gender equality. Despite these commitments, women remain under-represented in politics, with the level
of female representation in some bodies even decreasing in recent elections. In 2003, female representation on the
candidate lists for the NA elections amounted to 27%, yet dropped to 14.8% in the 2008 elections, with the current
overall level of female representation in that body to just 22%. In the Senate, womensrepresentation has remained at
only 14.75% for the past 13 years.18 Cambodias sub-national level also appears to be in need of an affirmative action
mechanism. In the recent 2012 Commune/Sangkat Council elections, women were elected to just 17.79% of council
positions, with only 501 women (representing just 0.45% of total candidates) being placed in the first spot on the
candidate lists.19In addition to failing to achieve the CMDG targets, the recent commune elections demonstrate the
disparity in female representation between political parties. Of the total number of seats won by the CPP, 21.5% went
to women, the highest percentage of representation among all political parties. Women candidates of the SRP won the
second highest percentage of seats allocated to their party with11% almost half that of the CPP. Other parties
recorded either very minimal female representation the NRP with 5.8%, FUNCINPEC with 3.3%, and the HRP with
1.5% or none at all, which demonstrates that womens under-representation within Commune Councils is particularly
problematic within smaller parties.Lack of Involvement of YouthCambodias population is the youngest in all of Southeast Asia: youth from 15 to 30 years of age represent 33% of the total population,20 and 15 to 24 year olds
approximately 32% of the labor force.21Young people are also active members of their communities: studies found
that 32.1% of males and 43.7% of females below the age of 25 gave at least part of their time to activities benefiting
their communities.22 There are approximately 50 to 60 youth-initiated organizations throughout Cambodia undertaking
civic education and social change activities.23However, due to cultural and structural issues, the youth have thus far
remained mostly excluded from the formal political and electoral process. In addition to a general lack of civic

education and national policy aimed at increasing youth participation, cultural issues including a hierarchal structure
of society that holds that elders should be in decision-making positions and that the youth do not have the knowledge
necessary to be in those positions and a lack of encouragement to participate in politics by families, have fostered an
environment that is not conducive to the youth taking an active part in politics. This lack of engagement has translated
into a lack of youth representation in government bodies: there are no parliamentarians and only 163 (1.43%)
commune councilors (as of the 2008 Commune Council elections) under 30In June 2011, the RGC adopted the
National Policy on Cambodia Youth Development (the NPCYD), which is a positive step towards increasing youth
participation and representation in politics. Inparticular, the NPCYD calls for the promotion of youth representatives at
national, sub-national, and regional committees or councils [and] youth integration in the decentralization and deconcentration process, and requests the establishment of Youth Development Councils at all levels of governance,
both national and sub-national, to co-ordinate the implementation of these goals and objectives. 25However, little
implementation has taken place thus far, and it is unlikely that the NPCYD will have an impact with regards to youth
involvement in the 2013 elections. Absence of Small-Business-Oriented PoliciesIn the 20 years since the signing of the
Paris Peace Accords, much progress has been witnessed in Cambodia, especially with regards to economic growth,
including an annual economic growth rate of around 10% between 2004 and 2008, only slowing to around 6-7% with
the onset of the global financial crisis, and a GDP of approximately US$12.86 billion.26 However, Cambodias rapid
economic development has largely benefitted an elite class close to the CPP, which has benefitted from the extensive
leasing and selling of Cambodias land and natural resources. At least 30% of Cambodians fall below the poverty line
while the trend of income inequality continues to grow apace.27 Despite small businesses representing 99% of all
enterprises and providing almost half of all employment in Cambodia,28 the RGC has failed to formulate adequate
policies to enable that segment of the economy to grow and to play a significant role in the economic development of
the country. Although the RGCs Second Socio-Economic Development Plan and the National PovertyReduction
Strategy both recognize the importance of small- and medium-sized businesses, an inadequate legal and regulatory
framework including a lack of necessary institutions, laws and regulations and limited access to financing continue
to hinder development of the sector. Yet the need to develop such a regulatory framework and to provide opportunities
for small businesses to grow is rarely featured in political discourse and in political parties policy platforms. Both the
CPP and the main opposition parties are focused on the sale and leasing of land through Economic Land Concessions
(ELCs) with the CPP heavily benefitting from them and the opposition campaigning strongly against them and
devote little time to developing policies that would assist and support small businesses and create a landscape
conducive to the engagement of those small businesses in the political and electoral process. Conclusion and
Recommendations CPP dominance over government institutions has seriously undermined the provisions in the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia and other relevant legislation that safeguard the democratic process and
human rights: a politically pliant judiciary is utilized to harass opposition figures; powerfulsenators are able to ride
roughshod over the land rights of communities; and security services serve the interests of the elite at the expense of
the urban and rural poor. The combination of an increasingly
repressive environment with a flawed electoral process is resulting in people losing interest in theelectoral process:
voter turnout during the June 2012 commune council elections was 60%, down from 87% 10 years ago.29The 2013
elections represent a real opportunity for change. All political parties in Cambodia and in particular the CPP30 and
the newly formed CNRP must make a concerted effort to move beyond partisanship and personality politics and to
present voters with real choices that are based on substantive policies that are inclusive of all segments of Cambodian
society. This includes ensuring that the electoral process is transparent and independent, that political campaigning is
equitable and based on policy rather than on rhetoric, and that all segments of society are included and considered.
Enacting these reforms and the specific recommendations outlined below would help diminish the image of
Cambodian politics as an old-boys club. Lack of Independence of the NEC: An independent, neutral and competent
election administrator that is capable of dealing effectively with complaints is fundamental to enabling voters to feel
confidence in the electoral process. As such, CCHR recommends the following with regards to the reform of the
NEC: Creating an open selection process, with greater political diversity and wider membership within the NEC and
local electoral administration; Ensuring security of tenure of members of the NEC and the absence of arbitrary
removal; Amending the rules of the NEC so that members cannot work for a political party immediately
after leaving the NEC; Creating an independent, legally-mandated budget to fund the NEC; and Revising the
deadlines and the procedure for the submission of complaints following an election, so as to allow those looking to file
complaints adequate time to gather evidence in support of their complaint. Under-Representation of Women: The
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) states in its general recommendation a
critical mass of 30 to 35% of womens representation is necessary to have an influence on the style and content of
political deliberation and public decision-making.31 As such, CCHR recommends the following: A binding gender
quota of a minimum of 30% should be applied to the candidate lists, reinforced with an additional mechanism that
stipulates a certain rank order, a so-called zipper-system which demands political parties alternate between male and
femalecandidates on lists. In the short-term, political parties should adopt voluntary gender quotas within their party
policies;32 and Women should be encouraged to participate in politics through the implementation of additional
programs, including by increasing implementation of the gender initiatives that the government has committed itself to.
These could include, amongst others, training and capacity-building opportunities for women, childcare provisions,
flexible hours and a reduction in late-night meetings. Lack of Involvement of Youth: With such a young population, it is
of primary importance to foster youth engagement in politics and to build up the next generation of leaders and
politicians, which means both increasing their capacity to become engaged in politics and incorporating their needs
and concerns into the political discussion. As such, CCHR recommends the following: Incorporate civic education in
the national educational system, including in the national curriculum, with the aim of encouraging the youth to vote and
to become more engaged inpolitics; Support youth associations and organizations and their activities through
financial, technical and educational support; and Consult with the youth in developing policy and programs and
incorporating their specific needs and concerns into those policies and programs. Absence of Small-Business-Oriented
Policies: A growing sector of the Cambodian economy, smallbusiness owners are major stakeholders in the
development process and must be actively encouraged to become involved in the political process. As such, CCHR
recommends the following: Develop party platforms and campaigns that incorporate concrete policy initiatives for

developing and growing the nascent small-business sector; Consult with small-business owners in the process of
developing policies and regulations; and Involve the small-business sector in the political and electoral process.
http://www.cchrcambodia.org/admin/media/analysis/analysis/english/2013_02_11_CCHR%20Briefing%20Note
%20Electoral%20and%20Political%20Reform_Eng_u.pdf Cambodian Center for Human Rights
The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) is a Cambodian electoral alliance between the two main democratic
opposition parties, the Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party founded in mid 2012 to run together in the 2013
Cambodian general election.
JOINT STATEMENT BY THE SAM RAINSY PARTY (SRP) AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PARTY (HRP)
In meetings between the SRP, led by its president Sam Rainsy, and the HRP, led by its president Kem Sokha, in
Manila on July 16 and 17, 2012, the two parties made the following decisions:

The SRP and the HRP will unite in accordance with the Khmer peoples will in order to save
Cambodia by bringing about political change to put an end to a dictatorship serving destructive foreign
interests.

The two parties will merge to form a new party that will unite all patriots and democrats so as to
establish a democratic regime that will properly defend our national interests.

The two parties will push for the holding of free, fair and genuine elections that will peacefully lead to
the desired democratic change. In this respect, the two parties absolutely insist on a change in the
composition of the National Election Committee and an overhaul of the current complicated election
procedures that make voting unnecessarily difficult.

The two parties absolutely insist on the free and full participation of the leader of the opposition in
the election process, so as to make any election legitimate and acceptable. In this respect, they demand
that the authorities stop using the judiciary to harass political opponents and human rights defenders.

The two parties will ensure close cooperation between recently elected leaders and members of
commune councils who are party members in order to improve the efficiency of local governments and
to promote democracy at the grassroots level.
While the new party is being formed, the SRP and the HRP have decided to set up the Cambodia Democratic
Movement for National Rescue, to unite all patriotic and democratic forces so as to begin immediately to fulfill our
national mission.
Manila, July 17, 2012
SAM
RAINSY
SRP President
KEM
SOKHA
HRP President
Cambodian National Rescue Party is officially registered and approved by the Ministry of Interior of the
Kingdom of Cambodia.
Government led by the National Party saved
Older age 65 years and up to 4 thousand USD 1 month
Workers receive the lowest wages of 60 thousand USD 1 month
And civil servants get paid minimum 1 million in 1 month
Farmers get insurance value of agricultural products (rice lowest 1000 R / kg)
Poor receive treatment free of charge
Young people get the same opportunities in education and employment
Discount oil, fertilizers, electric and Promotion rates
----------------------------------------About SRP
The Sam Rainsy Party (Kanakpak Sam Rangsee) is a personalist and more or less[vague] liberal party in Cambodia.
The party is a member of the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats. The name of the leader, Sam Rainsy is
pronounced in Khmer as Som Raeangsee.
The Sam Rainsy Party, founded in 1995 as the Khmer National Party and given its current name in 1998, was the third
largest party in Cambodia until the 2008 elections, and constitutes the official opposition to the ruling Cambodian
Peoples Party. After the decline of the junior coalition partner Funcinpec in the 2008 National Assembly elections, the
Sam Rainsy Party is now arguably the second largest party in Cambodia.
The Sam Rainsy Party won 15 of the 123 seats in the National Assembly in the 1998 elections, 24 seats in the 2003
elections, and 26 seats in the 2008 elections with 21% of the vote. The SRP won only 2 seats in the 2006 Senate
elections.
CAMBODIA
No Foreign Observers at the Coming Elections
No International Recognition for an Illegitimate Government
Resulting from Illegitimate Elections
Legislative elections in Cambodia are scheduled for July 28, 2013. Their organization by the National Election
Committee (NEC), controlled by the authoritarian Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP), which has been in power for 34
years, runs fundamentally counter to international standards.
Methods used by the NEC/CPP include the manipulation of electoral lists, which allows the CPP to give itself a 27%
start over the opposition before polling day. This 27% lead is made up of fictional voters, an automatic reservoir of
support for the ruling party (10%) (1), and of real voters who are known to be favorable to the opposition and whose
names are surreptitiously removed or deemed invalid by the NEC (17%) (2).
At the same time, the human rights situation continues to deteriorate with political opponents, critics and protesters
being arrested, convicted and sent to prison on trumped-up charges. As leader of the opposition I have found myself

the victim of the CPP judicial machine. I have been sentenced to a heavy prison sentence, forced into exile and
deprived of my civic and political rights. I am therefore excluded from the electoral contest, which will allow the
outgoing CPP prime minister to retain his post without being challenged.
In these conditions its clear that the coming elections will be everything but democratic, free and fair. However, the
Paris accords on Cambodia signed under the auspices of the United Nations in 1991 demand authentic elections to
guarantee a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism.
Faced with this totalitarian drift toward a one-party system, it is essential to support the United Nations, which has
recommended a series of reforms to make the coming elections acceptable by international standards. Two key ideas
are included in the recommendations: a reform of the composition and operations of the NEC to make it more impartial
and credible, and the safe return of the leader of the opposition who must be able to stand as a candidate for prime
minister and to take part fully in the electoral campaign as in any parliamentary democracy.
But as long as the Cambodian government continues to reject the UN recommendations, other international
organizations, friendly countries and non-complacent non-government organizations are asked not to send electoral
observers. In fact, based on the above figures, the result of the July 28 election has already been decided: another
landslide victory for the CPP, which will defeat the opposition by at least 27%. There is no point going to watch a game
that has been fixed in advance. Some ill-informed observers just risk validating the charade, which represents an
injustice to the Cambodian people, whose will is being distorted. In the communal elections of June 2012, the CPP
won a Soviet-style victory, while the two components of the parliamentary opposition now merged into the Cambodia
National Rescue Party still won 31% of the vote, despite the famous 27% handicap and other unfair practices by the
CPP.
International organizations and friendly countries are also asked to make known to the current government of
Cambodia that, after July 28, any government arising from fraudulent and illegitimate elections will, given the scale of
the fraud, be likewise considered as illegitimate.
Sam Rainsy,
President of the Cambodia National Rescue Party and leader of the opposition.
(1) Fictional, or phantom, voters significantly inflate the electoral register, which has 9.7 million names while the
population of voting age is only 8.9 million. See Sam Rainsy Calls Foul on National Voter Register in The Cambodia
Daily, January 23, 2013. There is clear evidence of impersonation.
(2) On the eve of communal elections on June 1, 2012, about 1.5 million legitimate voters, or 17% of the electorate,
were likely disenfranchised. See Ahead of Elections, Right to Vote in Doubt for 1.5 Million in The Cambodia Daily,
February 29, 2012, and Names Missing from Voter Rolls, Radio Free Asia, May 10, 2012.
Pressure groups
Cambodian
Freedom
Fighters
Cholana Kangtoap Serei Cheat Kampouchea
Description
The Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) emerged in November 1998 in the wake of political violence that saw many
influential Cambodian leaders flee and the Cambodian Peoples Party assume power. With an avowed aim of
overthrowing the Government, the US-based group is led by a Cambodian-American, a former member of the
opposition Sam Rainsy Party. The CFFs membership includes Cambodian-Americans based in Thailand and the
United States and former soldiers from the separatist Khmer Rouge, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and various
political factions.
Activities
The Cambodian Government arrested seven CFF members who were reportedly planning an unspecified terrorist
attack in southwestern Cambodia in late 2003, but there were no successful CFF attacks in 2003. Cambodian courts in
February and March 2002 prosecuted 38 CFF members suspected of staging an attack in Cambodia in 2000. The
courts convicted 19 members, including one US citizen, of terrorism and/ or membership in an armed group and
sentenced them to terms of five years to life imprisonment. The group claimed responsibility for an attack in late
November 2000 on several government installations that killed at least eight persons and wounded more than a dozen.
In April 1999, five CFF members were arrested for plotting to blow up a fuel depot outside Phnom Penh with antitank
weapons.
Strength
Exact strength is unknown, but totals probably never have exceeded 100 armed fighters.
Location/Area of Operation
Northeastern Cambodia near the Thai border.
External
AidUS-based
leadership
collects
funds
from
the
Cambodian-American
community.
http://fas.org/irp/world/para/cff.htm
Partnership for transparency fundTF is driven by the ambition to enhance individual human rights and civil rights
and promote the rule of law in poor countries. PTF is a funder and expert adviser to civil society organizations in
support of their anti-corruption projects. PTF is a learning organization building and sharing knowledge on
governmental transparency & accountability. http://ptfund.org/
StudentsMovement for Democracy (SMD) is a non-political and most active youth organization in Cambodia. It was
established in 1998 after the unfair and unjust election result released manipulated by the CPP. Students Movement
for Democracy (SMD) which is an independent and nonprofit youth/student organization, was established in 1998,
following days of massive demonstration stages by students, monks and concerned citizens in Phnom Penh against
flawed national eclection result.
SMD envisions a society where liberal ideals and principles, as well as democractic practices are established. We are
working to shape this society by mobilizing youth to stread out a democratic ideology throughout the nation. SMD is a
strong organization that will continue to grow as our networks are building in high schools, junior high schools, faculties
and universities, as well as out-of-schools youth nationwide.SMD leads by a group of Board of Directors which heads
by a chairman,and an executive committee which comprises of a president, a vice president, a general secretary and
program officers.SMD Vision:SMD needs the unity and solidarity amongst youth, students, Intellectuals, and monks in
order to enhance a real democracy in Cambodia.SMD Mission:Mobilize and encourage youth/students to promote

human rights respect, gender equity, healthcare and the quality of life and protect torritorial integrity, sovereignty, and
identity of Cambodia through the practices of democratic principles.
SMD Objectives:To make close relationship with all youth/students, intellectuals and monks from various educational
institutions so that they will understand how to solve the problems peacefully and learn to get over difficulties for one
another,create, unify and exchange matual help.
To ally with local and international organizations and associations who love democracy and social justice.
To educate Khmer young generation to precisely understand the real democracy and encourage them to protect and
keep it to last for long on this land.
To encourage Khmer new generation to highly value their own culture and tradition.
To cultivate Khmer new generation to pay attention to national interests. http://smdcam.wordpress.com/about/

Tuesday, 20 August 2013 22:46

In Cambodia, Political Instability Threatens Economic Prosperity
By Stratfor
Cambodia has been relatively peaceful since its National Election Committee ended its monthlong investigation into
disputed parliamentary elections Aug. 18, but the prospect of instability will loom so long as the ruling Cambodia
People's Party and the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party fail to reach an accord.
At the very least, the committee's ruling will prolong the fierce rhetoric and negotiations between the two parties. But if
tensions lead to higher levels of violence, the country's political stability could come into question -- as could the future
of its promising economy.
Cambodia is no stranger to political impasse. Virtually every election in Cambodia since the 1990s has been marred by
electoral fraud, power brokering or other forms of government interference, making political instability a recurring
problem. Yet the country has remained coherent, due in part to the authoritarian regime of Prime Minister Hun Sen. It
was his brand of governance that has enabled the country to develop economically over the past decade.
But the results of the July 28 elections revealed slow changes underway in the country's political environment. As in
previous elections, the opposition ran on a platform that contrasted sharply with that of the ruling party, but the
Cambodia National Rescue Party never demonstrated a strong aptitude for governance, partly because most of its
leaders have lived in exile and partly because its agenda was influenced by the regime. Yet the opposition performed
strongly in the elections, winning 55 of 123 seats in parliament, according to the ruling party. (The opposition claims it
won a higher number of seats.) This kind of performance could be a sign that the Cambodian public is growing
intolerant to endemic official corruption, cronyism and land seizures -- not to mention the ruling party's 30-year tenure.
Another factor that may have contributed to the success of the Cambodia National Rescue Party is that young voters
are further removed from the events of the Khmer Rouge era. The ruling party's legitimacy was based partly on its
stabilization of the country after the Khmer Rouge lost power, but that trait is lost somewhat on younger generations
that have no memory of the party's early years.
The mere fact that the Cambodia National Rescue Party can unilaterally challenge the regime appears to have brought
the country closer to two-party competition. Despite its preeminence, the Cambodia People's Party may no longer be
able to ignore the opposition completely and instead may be forced to acquiesce to some of its demands.
Unfortunately, sporadic violence has accompanied Cambodia's political deadlock. A bomb exploded in front of the
ruling party's regional headquarters in Kampong Speu province Aug. 14, Cambodia Daily reported. A week earlier,
authorities discovered two grenade launchers outside the home of an alleged pro-government reporter, and a bomb
exploded outside a Phnom Penh municipal court, though the device appeared to be unsophisticated. No one has
claimed responsibility for either attack, and no one has been arrested.
The timing of the incidents comes amid other tensions. Over the past weekend, a military exercise was held in Phnom
Penh after security forces, which Hun Sen controls, were deployed to the capital ahead of possible demonstrations.
Such moves have renewed fears of a civil strife, as well as rumors of food storages, security crackdowns and an
impending military coup, all of which are aggravating an already delicate security situation.
But while rumors are running rampant, the Cambodia People's Party and the Cambodia National Rescue Party have
been restrained, possibly because they do not want the security situation to deteriorate further. In theory, the regime
would not balk at cracking down on the opposition if protests escalated, but doing so would further undermine its
image. Likewise, the opposition is as close to power as it has ever been, and if it calls for violent protests it could
alienate some of its support base, which may begin to question its political agenda.
For its part, the international community has urged both sides to keep the situation under control. But because the
Cambodia People's Party and the Cambodia National Rescue Party still disagree on so many issues -- and because
the royal family, which once had the power to mediate such disputes, has lost relevance -- short-term protests and
security crackdowns are becoming more likely to occur.
The deteriorating security situation is already threatening Cambodia's economy, particularly the highly important
garment industry. The sector accounts for nearly 80 percent of the country's total exports and nearly 18 percent of all
economic activity, and it employs a large labor force. Most garment factories are concentrated near Phnom Penh and
the surrounding region. Tensions from the past week have left some factories operating below their normal levels of
production. In early August, around 10 percent to 30 percent of the workforce failed to return to Phnom Penh after

traveling to their rural homes to vote, according to unions and garment manufacturers. Now, citing fears of social
unrest, more have reportedly begun to leave the city for their homes, leading to workforce reductions as high as 80
percent for some factories.
Many factory owners have curtailed production, and others reportedly are not signing contracts for new orders.
Combined with the impact social unrest could have on tourism, which accounts for 12 percent of Cambodia's gross
domestic product, and other industrial activities, this could jeopardize the country's burgeoning economy in the short
term.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com) http://www.irgamag.com/component/k2/item/4262-in-cambodia-politicalinstability-threatens-economic-prosperity
Cambodia Poverty Assessment
This first poverty assessment for Cambodia is based on the 1997 update of Cambodia's baseline poverty profile of
1993-94. Since the early 1990s Cambodia has made progress in rebuilding its economy following more than two
decades of war. Trade and investment flows have risen to unprecedented levels, supporting average annual growth of
6 percent. In 1997 and 1998 reconstruction and recovery were set back by renewed political instability and by the East
Asian crisis. With the assumption of office of a new reform-minded government in late 1998, and the virtual end of the
Khmer Rouge movement in early 1999, there is renewed optimism that growth and recovery will resume.
Cambodia is nevertheless still a very poor country, with GDP per capita estimated at only $280 in 1998 and with other
non-income indicators of poverty comparing poorly with those in other countries in the region, The 1997 poverty
estimates confirm that poverty is pervasive in Cambodia--an estimated 36 percent of the population is poor--and rural
households, especially those for whom agriculture is the primary source of income, account for almost 90 percent of all
the poor.
The poor are more likely than the better-off to live in households that are larger, have a larger share of children, and
have a head of household who is less educated than the average. They also have much less access to public services
than the better off. For example, while 17 percent of people in the richest consumption quintile have access to piped
water, only 4 percent in the poorest quintile do. In rural areas the poorest quintile has net primary school enrollment of
50 percent, considerably below the 75 percent for the richest quintile. Less than 5 percent of children ages 12-14 in the
poorest quintile in rural areas are enrolled in lower secondary schools, but 25 percent in the richest quintile are. About
21 percent of people in the poorest quintile have to travel more than 5 kilometers to reach a health clinic; only 14
percent in the richest quintile have to travel that far. About 6 percent of the poorest two quintiles live more than 5
kilometers from the nearest road; only 1.4 percent in the richest quintile do. While almost 20 percent of the richest rural
quintile have access to publicly provided electric lighting, under 1 percent in the poorest quintile receives the same
service.
Differences in the design and coverage of the 1993-94 and the 1997 surveys mean that the two profiles are not directly
comparable. Nevertheless, the modest decline in poverty during 1993-97 (from 39 percent to 36 percent) suggested by
the profiles is corroborated by the estimated 3 percent increase in real per capita private consumption, as captured in
the national accounts, and by broad improvements in other non-income indicators of poverty such as enrollment rates
and maternal and infant mortality rates. The profiles also suggest that rural poverty declined less than urban poverty.
This is plausible given the strongly urban bias in growth during the period. Growth was unbalanced, centered in Phnom
Penh and other urban areas, driven by reconstruction efforts, and led by phenomenal increases in such activities as
construction and tourism. In contrast, growth of rural activities, based primarily on agriculture, showed considerable
variability and significantly lagged growth in the rest of the economy.
Despite its pervasiveness poverty in Cambodia is relatively shallow, suggesting great scope for poverty reduction
through rapid growth. In fact, income poverty rates could be cut by as much as 50 percent by 2005 if Cambodia is able
to resume and maintain average annual growth of 6 percent. But such gains in poverty reduction will depend strongly
on the pattern of growth. If growth continues to be urban-focused, poverty reduction gains can be expected to be much
less and rural poverty in particular will remain high--especially since the depth of poverty is greater in rural areas. In
contrast, poverty in Phnom Penh would be almost eradicated.
This report recommends three components to a broad poverty reduction strategy for Cambodia:

Expanding economic opportunities through rapid growth--particularly growth of the rural sector.

Helping the poor build human assets.

Providing an adequate safety net to address the needs of vulnerable groups in society.
The government's Five-Year Socio-economic Plan (1996-2000) gives priority to poverty reduction and recognizes
these three elements as critical to its antipoverty strategy. However, much greater attention to the growing HIV/AIDS
epidemic is needed given the significant potential it holds for increased poverty--both new poverty as well as a
deepening of existing poverty. Extensive public education on the epidemic and an prevention should figure prominently
in the government's health and overall poverty reduction strategy.
Creating Economic Opportunities through Rapid Growth
Creating new economic opportunities through rapid and sustained growth, particularly in rural areas, must be the core
of a successful poverty reduction strategy for Cambodia. Almost half of the poor in Cambodia would be lifted out of
poverty within the next eight years if the economy grew at 6 percent annually. But this growth must be more broad
based than in the recent past. This will require maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment and deepening
reform in order to tackle the remaining impediments to growth. Fiscal policy will continue to play an important role in
stabilization efforts, given the extensive dollarization of the Cambodian economy. The objective of policy should be to
avoid levels of fiscal deficit that could be destabilizing because they lead to rapid growth of the money supply, to high

levels of domestic borrowing that could crowd out the private sector, or to unsustainable levels of external debt.
Cambodia has in the recent past successfully used fiscal policy to maintain macroeconomic stability. However, the
quality of fiscal adjustment needs to be improved through greater reliance on revenue generation--especially by
addressing governance issues related to forestry revenues--and less on expenditure cum particularly in the social
sectors and in operations and maintenance. Success in the government's demobilization efforts will be important in
achieving sustainable fiscal adjustment while meeting social sector objectives.
Cambodia has made impressive progress in its transition to a market economy. Further reforms are needed, however,
to remove remaining distortions in the economy. This is especially important since most countries in the region have
reinvigorated their reform efforts in order to speed their recovery from the regional crisis and improve their long-term
competitiveness. Cambodia cannot afford to be left behind. The new government has already introduced fiscal
reforms. Other key areas for policy attention include further public enterprise reform: private sector development, and
banking sector reform. Public enterprise reforms should focus on commercializing enterprises remaining in the public
portfolio in line with the law regulating public enterprises. Rehabilitation plans should be formulated for the six rubber
plantations and a privatization plan outlined and implemented. Private sector development can be further fostered by
adopting a comprehensive commercial code and by strengthening the rule of law through better enforcement of
existing laws and modernization of the judiciary. Banking sector reforms should focus on strengthening the prudential
and regulatory framework, including adequate regulations on provisioning for loans, legislation that facilitates the taking
and enforcement of collateral, and enactment of a bankruptcy law. In addition, the supervisory capacity of the National
Bank of Cambodia should be strengthened, particularly its capacity to enforce capital adequacy standards and force
the exit of banks that cannot comply, especially the numerous weaker smaller banks.
But growth must also be more balanced than it has been in the recent past to ensure that economic opportunities are
widespread. In particular, special emphasis must be placed on stimulating growth and opportunities in the rural
economy, where the overwhelming majority of Cambodia's poor live. This will require both raising agricultural incomes
and promoting diversification into other rural activities. Key areas for policy attention include increasing crop
productivity through greater access to improved seed varieties; appropriate sail and pest management, and better
water control through small-scale irrigation facilities. Increasing livestock and fisheries production is also important, and
will require improved technical services for animal health, fisheries research, conservation, and management.
Investments are needed to upgrade and maintain secondary and tertiary roads, to strengthen rural infrastructure and
provide better access to input and output markets. Support for the development of formal rural finance institutions will
be important for expanding access to rural credit. And easing the land constraint will require addressing the issue of
military land holding and speeding up land titling efforts--particularly in rural areas--as part of the creation of a
transparent and secure land market.
Government efforts to promote growth must be combined with efforts to increase the assets of the poor, thus allowing
the poor to take full advantage of the economic opportunities created through growth. Increasing the physical assets-land, credit, rural infrastructure--of the poor is an integral part of promoting rapid growth of the rural sector and hence
of the economy as a whole. Building the human assets of the poor, including education and health, is equally important
for helping them access economic opportunities and for sustaining growth.
Expanding Access to Education for the Poor
Cambodia's achievements in education in the 1960s and early 1970s were systematically erased by the Khmer Rouge
in the second half of the 1970s, when schools, equipment, and books were destroyed, effectively abolishing education.
It is estimated that 75-80 percent of all teachers and secondary school students fled or were murdered in 1975-79
(Asian Development Bank 1996). Post-Khmer Rouge, Cambodia has made impressive progress in expanding
schooling. There was a concerted effort to rebuild the education infrastructure, but this had to be done under tight
budgetary constraints. The government made rehabilitation of primary education its main focus in the 1980s, but
despite these best of intentions, primary school enrollments plateaued at around 1.3 million between 1985 and 1991,
which actually meant declining enrollments given the rapidly expanding primary school-age population (Asian
Development Bank 1996). Since then, however, enrollments have expanded more rapidly than population, and gross
primary enrollments in 1997 increased to almost 95 percent, according to the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports.
This is impressive by any standard. But problems remain.
Why Enrollment Rates Are So Low among the Poor. Enrollment rates vary considerably between the poor and the
better-off in Cambodia. Only 55 percent of all children of primary school age in the poorest quintile of the population
attend school, compared with 79 percent for the top quintile. These disparities increase at higher levels of education,
with virtually no children from the poorest quintile enrolled beyond primary school. Both supply and demand factors are
important in explaining low enrollment among the poor and the significant disparities in enrollment across income
groups. Half of the rural population does not have a primary school in the village and more than 95 percent have no
secondary school. Children in the poorest quintile also have to walk longer distances to school--on average almost 7
kilometers to the nearest lower-secondary school outside the village, compared with about 4 kilometers for children in
the richest quintile. Limited and poor quality rural roads aggravates poor physical access to schools. Schooling is also
extremely expensive for the poor; the cost of one child in primary school takes up a quarter of all nonfood spending per
capita in the poorest quintile. Quality of schooling (as measured by such factors as availability of teachers and
proportion of trained teachers) is another contributing factor. The probability of enrollment is also strongly associated
with gender, with boys more likely than girls to be enrolled.
What Government Can Do to Raise Enrollment Rates among the Poor. Improving physical access to schools by
constructing more schools in poorer--particularly rural--areas and by improving rural infrastructure will be critical to
raising enrollments, but policy must also address issues of price and quality. In particular, the relative costs of

schooling will have to be lowered for the poor. Fewer than 10 percent of the poorest students are exempted from
school fees. Fee exemptions, coupled with a clearly established and transparent system of needs-based scholarships
for the poorest students will be necessary to raise the enrollment rate of this group. Another option is for the
government to provide (or to insure) loans to needy students to help them pay for education costs (as in Thailand and
the United States, for example). The advantage of a loan program is that it relies mainly on private resources in a
situation in which government funds are severely limited. The funds to finance both scholarships and loans can be
obtained by reducing high levels of public subsidies to post-secondary education, a practice that benefits mainly the
rich.
As well as reducing schooling costs, a pro-poor schooling policy should address school quality. The extraordinarily high
pupil-teacher ratios in rural areas (80 and above) will need to be brought down at least to the national average (around
60)--and probably lower. This will require a more rational policy of deploying teachers across provinces and villages.
One way to do this is to pay teachers a premium to work in underserved areas (a policy used with some success in
Indonesia and elsewhere). Funds to finance these quality improvements could also be obtained, at least in the short
run, from savings generated by reducing subsidies to post-secondary education.
Data on earnings suggest that women have higher returns to primary and lower-secondary schooling than do men,
especially at younger ages. Yet female enrollments, especially at the lower-secondary level, lag behind those of men.
This is not only inequitable but inefficient. Targeting at least some additional schooling subsidies to poor girls would
boost efficiency and equity. Some countries (Bangladesh and India, for instance) have found scholarship and stipend
programs targeted to girls an effective means of raising enrollments of girls.
Data also indicate that the private sector still has only a limited role in schooling in Cambodia. Fewer than 1 percent of
students are enrolled in private institutions, most of them in post-secondary schools (typically vocational training). The
support of the private sector will be needed to expand secondary school coverage in Cambodia. One strategy would
be for the government to target its limited educational spending to providing basic and secondary education to poor
students and to let the affluent turn to the emerging private sector for schooling needs. Alternatively, vouchers can be
used to provide access to private schools for the poor. Indeed, broader use of vouchers might increase efficiency in
education by fostering competition between public and private schools. Household survey data already show a strong
shift of upper-income groups to private schools. This should be encouraged, so that the government can better target
its expenditures to the poor. It would be useful, however, to identify constraints and problems, including any formal or
hidden restrictions imposed by the government, that may put a brake on the private sector expanding its role in the
provision of schooling in Cambodia.
Improving Access to Health Services for the Poor
Many health facilities around the country were completely destroyed. often deliberately during Cambodia's more than
30 years of war and conflict. Even today many parts of Cambodia still have no health facilities, and in other places
facilities are too dilapidated to be of any use. Yet despite these handicaps, the government has taken concrete steps to
reconstruct and revitalize the public health system. The Ministry of Health has also been instrumental in developing
and expanding programs to tackle infectious diseases, such as the National Tuberculosis Program and the National
Malarial Program, and in vastly expanding coverage of child immunization programs. In addition, since 1996 the
Ministry of Finance has been implementing a health services plan to expand access to health facilities. This improved
access to health services for the population could not have been achieved without the assistance of donors and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Why Health Service Use Is So Low among the Poor. High costs of health services, low house-hold incomes, limited
education, and inadequate access to health facilities and to health personnel are all important factors in explaining the
low use of health services by poor Cambodians. The cost of health care (measured by health spending per capita
relative to household spending per capita on nonfood items) is much greater for the poor than for the non-poor. One
outpatient visit to a commune clinic or district health center would use up half of all nonfood spending for someone in
the poorest quintile. Moreover, there is no formal and transparent mechanism for exempting the poor from user fees.
For them, health care is simply unaffordable. The poor also have less immediate physical access to health facilities
than the non-poor. Better-off Cambodians have much greater local (within-village) access than the poor to the four
most frequently used health providers: drug vendors, commune clinics, private clinics, and trained midwives. Moreover,
the poor have to travel much longer distances to all types of health facilities than the better-off when no health provider
is available in their home village.
But other factors, especially education, are also important in determining health services use. Immunization rates
among children up to 24 months old are significantly lower for the poor than for better-off Cambodians even though
more than 95 percent of the poor reported a child immunization campaign in their village in the previous 12 months.
Indeed, since child immunization has such wide coverage and is free in Cambodia, it is difficult to explain the large
disparities in immunization coverage based on differences in economic standing or affordability. Cambodians with more
schooling are more likely to treat their illnesses than those with no schooling. Moreover, women with primary and postprimary schooling are much more likely than those with no schooling to use preventive health services such as
immunization for their children.
While there is no hard data, anecdotal evidence suggests that health services to the poor are of much lower quality
than those available to the better-off. The low quality of health services, combined with high relative cost, must act as a
strong deterrent to the use of health services by the poor.
What Government Can Do to Improve the Health of the Poor. As with education, government efforts to increase use of
health services by the poor should include both demand and supply measures. Reducing out-of-pocket costs of health

services for the poor will be critical. Expanding and enforcing user fees, in parallel with a transparent mechanism for
exempting the poor from such fees and providing a free supply of drugs targeted exclusively to Cambodia's poorest will
be important in ensuring greater equity in access to health services while reducing affordability constraints for the poor.
These measures need to be implemented in parallel with greater cost recovery in secondary and tertiary health
facilities such as provincial and central hospitals.
Several of Cambodia's health facilities need rehabilitation, but in the long run additional primary health facilities are
needed to increase access. Unlike most other developing countries, Cambodia does not have a nationwide network of
primary health care facilities. The government's Health Coverage Plan aims to create a new network of 909 health
centers, 65 referral hospitals, and 8 national hospitals in 72 operational districts. The location of the new facilities will
have to be carefully selected, with an emphasis on providing facilities in remote and underserved regions, to meet the
objective of providing equitable access to basic health and referral services for the entire population. In the shorter to
medium term increased access in such areas could be provided through mobile health posts.
The low quality of health care in public facilities needs to be addressed. An important first step is to raise staffing
standards so that commune clinics and district health centers used by the poor have trained medical workers. Better
salaries and benefits for health workers could also provide increased incentives for higher quality service. In addition,
stocks of drugs and medical supplies in commune clinics and district health centers need to be increased. The quality
of health services could also be enhanced by allowing health facilities to retain a share of fees collected.
These efforts to raise health services utilization by the poor will entail a restructuring of public health expenditures to
benefit the poor. Public expenditures need to be targeted more toward proving adequate funding for primary health
facilities, a process that began in 1996 as spending was shifted from hospitals toward primary health care. This trend
should continue, shifting more resources to preventive health interventions (such as communicable disease control
programs) and curative services targeted to the poor. This shift also represents more efficient use of public resources,
given the substantial positive externalities of preventive health care and private underspending on such care.
Private sector provision should be encouraged to complement government efforts and to ensure adequate access to
health services as living standards improve with growth. Appropriate government regulation will be important in setting
quality standards that ensure public safety. This is especially important in the case of private drug vendors who are
mainly unregistered and used heavily by poorer groups for self treatment.
Providing an Adequate Program of Transfers and Safety Nets
Vulnerable groups in Cambodia can benefit from the protection offered by a well-functioning system of transfers and
safety nets. NGO and other aid agencies are active in this area, but there is very little in the way of a functioning
government system. A strategy for developing such a system should emphasize timely delivery of assistance and
effective and efficient targeting to ensure that resources reach only the intended beneficiaries. Given Cambodia's
largely rural population and low level of development, policies that are likely to work include well-designed rural public
employment schemes that can provide insurance against agricultural uncertainties. For those unable to work options to
consider include food-based interventions such as food distribution and feeding programs, special operations to
provide basic food items to the poor in remote and other high risk areas during times of insecurity, and feeding
programs and transfer schemes administered through the public health system. While the need for safety nets is great,
the effectiveness and successful targeting of such a system in addressing poverty will depend on further progress in
identifying indicators of poverty in Cambodia that have strong predictive ability.
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20204883~menuPK:43
5735~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367~isCURL:Y~isCURL:Y,00.html
Thailand's Response to the Cambodian Genocide
By Dr. Puangthong Rungswasdisab,
Research Fellow, Cambodian Genocide Program,
Yale University
Table of Contents
Introduction
I. The Khmer Rouge as a Threat
II. Alliance with the Khmer Rouge
III. Doing Business with the Khmer Rouge
Postscript
Introduction
Since the popular uprising of 14 October 1973, which overthrew the military regime of Thanom Kittikachorn and
Praphat Jarusathien, Thai society has undergone various changes. Civilian groups, such as the political parties,
student, intellectual, media, non-governmental organizations, peasant and labor movements, have been allowed to
participate in various aspects of Thai politics. Though democratic development was sporadically interrupted by
attempts to restore military rule through several coups, the spirit of the 14 October revolution has continued to develop.
The country has become more pluralistic with the growing influence of the business elite and of integration into the
world economy. Two decades after the October 14 revolution, further civilian challenges to military interference in
politics significantly contributed to the decline of the Thai militarys power. Thai society has become a more open
society than it was before 1973. It may be said that nowadays political ideas such as "decentralization of power,"
"bureaucratic reform," "political reform," "public participation," "transparency," etc., have become central to the
countrys political, social and economic development.

Amidst a stream of public calls for reform of the Thai political system, one aspect has hardly been challenged or
questioned by the growing political forces in Thailand. That was the countrys foreign policy towards its neighboring
countries, in particular the Indochinese states. In this area, decision-making has remained heavily dominated by
bureaucrats and military. In fact, it is the only aspect of Thai politics, where one can find a consensus among the
foreign policy-makers (the foreign ministry, the National Security Council and the army), some academics and the
media. We have hardly heard calls for a rethinking or change of the Thai foreign policy direction. Not to mention the
Thai government policy of supporting the Khmer Rouge, which has been strongly criticized internationally. In fact,
critics of the governments policy comprised only a small group of academics, and their criticism received little attention
from the Thai media. Some appear to have limited their comment to the role and implication of the military in the
foreign policy-making process. Their disapproval of the policy on the Cambodian conflict often focused merely on
different tactics in negotiations with Vietnam, or the degree to which Thailand should get involved in, and the
implications of, this protracted conflict.
Thus, as Suchit Bunbongkorn and Sukhumbhand Paribatra have pointed out, the power of the military in Thai politics
has been significantly challenged since 1973. But developments in foreign affairs in the 1980s, dominated by the
Cambodia-Vietnam issue, still served to strengthen the Thai bureaucratic polity in general and the power of the military
in particular. The Cambodian conflict allowed the Thai armed forces to monopolize all channels of information
concerning border problems and to increase the defense budget as well as to expand its manpower. The Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia, in early 1979, reinforced traditional suspicions and fears of Vietnamese imperialist ambition,
and catalyzed security concerns. It effectively enhanced the role of bureaucrats, both civilian and military, in the
decision-making process because they were considered "specialists". While foreign affairs has been an area in which
extra-bureaucratic actors tend to take less interest, criticisms or suggestions from them were usually dismissed as
motivated by ignorance or interference.
Chai-anan Samudavanija has noted that the prolonged Indochina conflict gave the Thai military a justification to exert
its role in internal politics by keeping the perceived threat of communism alive in Thai politics, despite its earlier claim
of victory over communism. Moreover, the issue of the Indochina conflict and its implications did not receive much
attention from political parties. No Thai party included a plank on the Cambodian conflict in its platform, or voiced
concern over the governments policy on the issue. The belief that "specialists" had handled the problem effectively
appeared to result in a lack of serious attention among the Thai political parties. They seemed to trust that agencies
involved in foreign policy would do their utmost to protect "Thai national interest". Such belief and trust was also shared
by the mainstream Thai academics.
Various publications were produced to support the Thai governments policy towards Vietnam and the Cambodian
coalition forces of Pol Pot-Sihanouk-Son Sann on the Thai-Cambodian border, with the Institute of Asian Studies at
Chulalongkorn University playing a leading role. The Institutes view was expressed in an interview with its director,
Khien Theeravit, which appears in its publication on The Kampuchean Problem in Thai Perspective: Positions and
Viewpoints Held by Foreign Ministry Officials and Thai Academics. His view was similar to the official view, and even
stronger than those of some of the officials. In the closed-door discussion between the foreign ministry officials and the
invited academics, which comprises the first section of the book, no academic challenged the wisdom of the Thai
government in supporting the Khmer Rouge forces.
Thai academic and media circles seem to have agreed with the militarys idea of national security and interest. They
did not question the secret nature of the information provided by the concerned government agencies. The Thai public
tends to accept that because foreign affairs is highly sensitive and concerned with the national interest the information
is to be kept highly confidential among specialists only.
The Thai elites perceptions of the impact of the Cambodian conflict on national security issues was also a reason why
the policy received strong public support. In a 1985 survey of the Thai elites perceptions, almost all respondents (over
98 percent) saw Vietnam as a threat to Thailands national security. Vietnam also ranked high in many forms of threat,
including direct military invasion, political subversion, undermining of the Association of Southeast Asian Nationss
regional solidarity, and support of military aggression by other countries. The majority of respondents (almost 60%)
also felt that the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia produced a grave impact on Thailands security, while 38% saw
the impact in a lesser light. Most agreed that the impacts came in various forms, including armed tension along the
Thai-Cambodian border, transformation of Kampuchea into a base for threatening Thailands sovereignty and territorial
integrity, aggravation of regional tension and intensification of superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia. In addition, 98% of
the respondents rejected the notion of acquiescence to the Vietnamese military occupation in Cambodia as an
acceptable outcome. Most of the Thai elite also considered Vietnams patron, the Soviet Union, a threat to Thailands
security. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia had exacerbated a historical agony between the Thai and the
Vietnamese. Both of them had tried to dominate Cambodia and Laos since the eighteenth century.
The attitude of the population of one country towards another is also an important basis for its foreign policy. The
standard text books on Thai history, at both school and university levels, usually begin with the migration of the Thai
race from the North to the Chaophraya River basin, where the Khom, or Khmer, had earlier settled. Then the Thais,
under capable leaders, were soon able to drive off the Khmer from the river basin. The rapid expansion of the Thai
kingdom finally brought down Cambodias Angkorean Empire, forcing the Cambodians to move their capitals
southward, from Angkor to Lovek, Udong, and Phnom Penh respectively.
A new interpretation by a Western scholar arguing that the southward movement of the Cambodian capitals tended to
be influenced by the changing economic environment- as the maritime trade in the region became increasingly
important to the post-Angkorean statecraft,- has not been welcomed by Thai scholars. Perhaps, such interpretations
do not go well with the notion of the greatest Thai kingdom, successfully bringing down the Angkorean empire.
Moreover, Thai popular history books by amateur historians describe Cambodia as a subordinate, untrustworthy
neighbor, often shifting its loyalty between the Thai and the Vietnamese courts. Cambodia sought to attack Siam
whenever the Thai kingdom was facing trouble. The classic case with which the Thais have been familiar was the
execution of Cambodian King Lovek, known as Phraya Lavek in Thai, by the Ayudhyan King Narasuen. The Thai
chronicles tell of King Lovek, who had raided and evacuated villagers in the Siamese eastern border while King
Narasuen was occupied by war with Burma. King Narasuen decided to take revenge on Cambodia. The Thai
chronicles depicted a dramatic execution of Phraya Lovek. The Thai king mercilessly beheaded the Cambodian king

and washed his feet with the latters blood. It was considered the act of contempt for the enemy. In fact, however,
evidence from Western missionaries reveals that the execution never happened. The Cambodian king was able to take
refuge in southern Laos. However, this Thai version of the King Lovek story still dominates the general understanding
of Thai-Cambodian relations among average Thais. The wars and chaos in Cambodia have always been described as
the fault of untrustworthy and factional Cambodia rulers, while the Thai invasions were interpreted as based on rights
to control their tributary state and/or to prevent Cambodia from Vietnamization.
Such historiography has enhanced a nationalistic feeling of a great nation with a great history in comparison to its
neighboring countries. On the other hand, it has depicted Cambodia, and of course Laos, as inferior nations. This
leads to the question of the situation of Indochinese studies in general, and Cambodian studies in particular in
Thailand. Perhaps, the perception of Indochinese countries, as poor, inferior countries with little business potential, has
dictated the direction of area studies in Thailand. In contrast to American, European and Japanese studies, which
dominated international studies in Thailand for three decades, Indochina is much less attractive to Thai academics as
a field of study. Thus, the situation of Indochinese studies in Thailand now is not much different from what Charnvit
Kasetsiri described in 1991, when he asserted that Thai academic institutions so far have not yet paid enough attention
to Southeast Asia as a study area. He wrote that "despite the fact that Thailand belongs to the area, there is no serious
attempt to pursue such study. The Thai government, elite and academic specialists, know very little of the economies,
politics, society and culture of its neighbors, without mentioning further away Southeast Asian countries." Charnvit
further noted that in Thailand only Silpakorn University offered an M.A. Program in the field of Southeast Asian History,
while the Institute of Asian Studies at Chulalongkorn and the East Asian Studies Institute at Thammasat University,
which have concentrated on China and Japan, are primarily research institutions.
Thus, nationalistic attitudes and ignorance became an obstacle for Thailand to develop a constructive policy towards
neighboring countries both during and after the Cold War. With national interest, politically and economically, as the
most important priority, Thailands foreign policy towards the Khmer Rouge simply bypassed Cambodias human cost
and tragedy.
For two decades already, Thailand has thrown clandestine support behind the Khmer Rouge group, ever since the
murderous regime was overthrown by the Vietnamese forces. It is thus timely to examine the relationship between
Thailand and the Khmer Rouge. This study will therefore examine Thailands policy towards the Khmer Rouge from
1975 to the early 1990s. It will focus on the response of Thai governments as well as the perspectives of various Thai
political groups on the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge.
I. The Khmer Rouge as a threat
The Khmer Rouge rule began as Thailand was going through a transitional period, from four decades of military
dictatorship to democratic rule, and from its role as an American client to a rapprochement with the communist states.
The transition was a result of the rapid changes in both the domestic and regional situations. The unstable civilian
governments after the 14 October 1973 revolution were forced to cope with the challenges in fear of expansive
communist power. The open political system permitted the internal political forces to participate in various policy
issues, including foreign affairs. The intense struggle between the left and the right subsequently led to a massacre of
students in the heart of the Thai capital, and the military coup on 6 October 1976. Between 1973 and 1976 there were
rapid shifts of Thailands foreign policy toward its neighbors from anti-communism to co-existence and then back to
anti-communism again. It was also the only period in which the countrys foreign policy towards its neighbors was
heavily criticized by non-bureaucratic elements. This chapter will discuss the factors which influenced the
establishment of relations between Thailands civilian government and Cambodia between 1973 and 1976, and the
subsequent suspension of the relationship after the Thai military staged the bloody coup of October 1976.
History
The Cambodian Civil War was a conflict that pitted the forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (known as
the Khmer Rouge) and their allies the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Viet Cong against the
government forces ofCambodia (after October 1970, the Khmer Republic), which were supported by the United States
(U.S.) and the Republic of Vietnam(South Vietnam).
The struggle was complicated by the influence and actions of the allies of the two warring sides. People's Army of
Vietnam (North Vietnamese Army) involvement was designed to protect its Base Areas and sanctuaries in eastern
Cambodia, without which the prosecution of its military effort in South Vietnam would have been more difficult.
The Cambodian coup of March 18, 1970 put a pro-American, anti-Vietnamese government in power and ended
Cambodia's neutrality in the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) was now threatened by a newlyunfriendly Cambodian government.
Between March and June 1970, the North Vietnamese moved many of its military installations further inside Cambodia
to protect them from U.S. incursions and bombing, capturing most of the northeastern third of the country in
engagements with the Cambodian army. The North Vietnamese turned over some of their conquests and provided
other assistance to the Khmer Rouge, thus empowering what was at the time a small guerilla movement. [4] The
Cambodian government hastened to expand its army to combat the North Vietnamese and the growing threat of the
Khmer Rouge.[5]
The U.S. was motivated by the desire to buy time for its withdrawal from Southeast Asia, to protect its ally in South
Vietnam, and to prevent the spread of communism to Cambodia. American and both South and North Vietnamese

forces directly participated (at one time or another) in the fighting. The U.S. assisted the central government with a
massive U.S. aerial bombing campaigns and direct material and financial aid.
After five years of savage fighting, the Republican government was defeated on 17 April 1975 when the victorious
Khmer Rouge proclaimed the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea.
The conflict was part of the Second Indochina War (19591975) which also consumed the neighboring Kingdom of
Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam individually referred to as the Laotian Civil War and the Vietnam
War respectively. The Cambodian civil war led to the Cambodian Genocide, one of the bloodiest in history.
International organization participation: ADB, ARF, ASEAN, CICA, CICA (observer), EAS, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD,
ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITU, MIGA, NAM,
OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNMISS, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO,
WIPO, WMO, WTO
Definition: This entry lists in alphabetical order by abbreviation those international organizations in which the subject
country is a member or participates in some other way.
Source: CIA World Factbook Asian Development bank
Last Updated 11-21-2012
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the first regionwide Asia-Pacific multilateral forum for official consultations on peace
and security issues. An outgrowth of the annual ministerial-level meeting of members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the states serving as ASEANs dialogue partners, the ARF provides a setting for
discussion anddiplomacy and the development of cooperative responses to regional problems. The inaugural ARF
meeting was held in July 1994 in Bangkok, Thailand, and was attended by 10ASEAN members
(Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines,Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and
ASEANs
10
dialogue
partners
(Australia, Canada,China,
the
European
Union, India, Japan, South
Korea, Russia, New Zealand, and the United States). Papua New Guinea and Mongolia joined the group in 1999,
and North Korea was admitted in 2000.
Unique among international organizations of its type, the ARF is characterized by minimal institutionalization, decision
making by consensus, and the use of both first track (official) and second track (nonofficial) diplomacy. Whereas
first-track diplomatic meetings consist of gatherings of leading officials to discuss security measures, second-track
meetings consist of scholars, government individuals not acting in their official capacity, private think tanks, and other
individuals and organizations. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, which discusses issues such as
preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures, is an example of second-track diplomacy. The central role of
second-track procedures distinguishes ARF from most other international organizations, which generally treat nonofficial diplomatic measures as residual and peripheral. ARF meetings are attended by foreign ministers and are held
in conjunction with the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, which occurs annually in July. The chair of the ARF is
rotated annually. The ARF Chairmans Statement, the organizations official declaration, is issued after each ARF
meeting. The organization is supported by the ARF Senior Officials Meeting (ARFSOM), which is held each May
The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) is an inter-governmental
forum for enhancing cooperation towards promoting peace, security and stability in Asia. It is a forum based on the
recognition that there is close link between peace, security and stability in Asia and in the rest of the world.
The idea of convening the CICA was first proposed by KazakhstanPresident Nursultan Nazarbayev on 5 October 1992,
at the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Helping in Cambodia
Program for Enhancement of Emergency Response
In partnership with the Asia Disaster Preparedness Center, the American Red Cross has been working since mid-2009
to address disaster vulnerability in South and Southeast Asia through a strategic regional risk reduction program, the
Program for Enhancement of Emergency Response (PEER). Through this regional disaster preparedness initiative, the
American Red Cross is assisting Red Cross and Red Crescent national partners and other organizations in nine
countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam) to help improve
disaster preparedness. This work includes building community-level first responder capacity (including the capacity of
the local Red Cross and Red Crescent societies) in disaster-prone communities by sharing essential disaster response
skills, such as how to safely conduct light search and rescue activities and effectively triage wounded survivors of
disasters or other local crises. At the same time, the project works to make community-based decision-making a key
part of emergency response systems, ensuring that first responders and authorities are directly linked to community
preparedness plans, enabling better-coordinated disaster responses. This program is partially funded by the U.S.
Agency for International Developments Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) with supplemental
funding from the American Red Cross. This project aims to train approximately 5,000 first responders who will be in a
position to support millions of vulnerable people living across the nine countries encompassed in this program.
http://www.redcross.org/what-we-do/international-services/where-we-help/asia/cambodia
New research shows military and organised crime plundering Cambodia's cultural heritage