PHILAMGEN vs.

SWEET LINES
FACTS:
A total 7,000 bags of low density polyethylene (600 bags of polyethylene 641 and 6,400
bags of polyethylene 647) were shipped from Baton Rouge, LA to Manila on board SS
Vishva Yash, a vessel belonging to the Shipping Corporation of India (SCI). From
Manila, the cargoes were shipped to Davao on board MV Sweet Love, a vessel owned by
Sweet Lines. The consignee was Far East Bank with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics,
Inc., Tagum, Davao City. The cargoes were insured by Far East Bank with the Philippine
American General Insurance Co (Philamgen) and were covered by bills of lading which
contained the following stipulation in paragraph 5:
Claims for shortage, damage, must be made at the time of delivery to consignee or agent, if container shows
exterior signs of damage or shortage. Claims for non-delivery, misdelivery, loss or damage must be filed
within 30 days from accrual. Suits arising from shortage, damage or loss, non-delivery or misdelivery shall
be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action. Failure to file claims or institute judicial
proceedings as herein provided constitutes waiver of claim or right of action. In no case shall carrier be liable
for any delay, non-delivery, misdelivery, loss of damage to cargo while cargo is not in actual custody of carrier.

On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the interisland carrier into the
custody of the consignee. A survey conducted on July 8, 1977 showed that of the
shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally contained in 175 pallets, only a total of 5,820
bags were delivered to the consignee in good order condition, leaving a balance of 1,080
bags. Some of the 1,080 bags were either MISSING OR DAMAGED beyond the point
of being useful for the intended purpose.
FEBTC and Tagum Plastics sued the international carrier, SCI, the inter-island carriers,
Sweet Lines, the arrastre company, Davao Arrastre and FE Zuellig (which I assume is the
shipper). Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between the
complainants and SCI and F.E. Zuellig, thus, only Sweet Lines and Davao Arrastre
remained as defendants.
The trial court ruled in favour of Philamgen and Tagum Plastics. The CA reversed on the
ground of prescription and denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES
(1) Was there a prescriptive period?
(2) If yes, was the prescriptive period valid and legal?
(3) If it was valid and legal, did Philamgen act within the prescriptive period?
RULING:
(1) Yes. There was a prescriptive period. When the complaint was filed, prescription as
an affirmative defense was seasonably raised by Sweet Lines in its answer. Though
the bills of lading were not presented in evidence, the SC said that: As petitioners are
suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained in the
bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which
under the Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the

genuineness and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically
denied under oath by the adverse party. The rules on actionable documents cover and
apply to both a cause of action or defense based on said documents. In their answer,
Sweet Lines included the prescriptive period under paragraph 5 of the bills of lading.
Philamgen did not deny the existence of the bill of lading under oath. Instead, in its reply
to the answer, Philamgen asserted that the bills of lading were contracts of adhesion and
that such provisions were contrary to law and public policy and thus, Sweet Lines
cannot avail of such prescriptive period as a valid defense. The SC said that Philamgens
failure to deny under oath the existence of the bills of lading was tantamount to an
admission of its existence, together with paragraph 5 containing the prescriptive period.
Thus, the existence of the prescriptive period was duly proved even if the bills of lading
were not presented in court.
(2) Yes. The prescriptive periods were valid and legal. Philamgen insists that the bills of
lading were contracts of adhesion and that the prescriptive periods stated therein were
void for being contrary to law and public policy. The SC, citing Ong Yu vs CA, said that
contracts of adhesion are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is
in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres he gives his consent. Philamgen, thus,
gave its consent to the contracts the bills of lading including consent to the
prescriptive periods therein. The SC also agreed with the CA that parties can stipulate a
shorter prescriptive period for the filing of suits. The SC quoted the CA, It must be
noted, at this juncture, that the aforestated time limitation (paragraph 5) in the
presentation of claim for loss or damage, is but a restatement of the rule prescribed
under Art. 366 of the Code of Commerce... The SC said that, ... the validity of a
contractual limitation of time for filing the suit itself against a carrier shorter than
the statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as such stipulation merely
affects the shipper's remedy and does not affect the liability of the carrier. In the
absence of any statutory limitation and subject only to the requirement on the
reasonableness of the stipulated limitation period, the parties to a contract of carriage
may fix by agreement a shorter time for the bringing of suit on a claim for the loss of or
damage to the shipment than that provided by the statute of limitations. Such limitation is
not contrary to public policy for it does not in any way defeat the complete vestiture of
the right to recover, but merely requires the assertion of that right by action at an earlier
period than would be necessary to defeat it through the operation of the ordinary statute
of limitations. The SC also said that, ..., the shortened period for filing suit is not
unreasonable and has in fact been generally recognized to be a valid business practice in
the shipping industry. This is in recognition of the inherent dangers of carriage by sea.
(3) No. Philamgen did not act within the prescriptive period. The shipment was
discharged into the custody of the consignee on May 15, 1977, and it was from this date
that petitioners' cause of action accrued, with thirty (30) days therefrom within which to
file a claim with the carrier for any loss or damage which may have been suffered by the
cargo and thereby perfect their right of action. Claim was filed only on April 28, 1978,
way beyond the period provided in the bills of lading and violative of the contractual
provision, the inevitable consequence of which is the loss of petitioners' remedy or
right to sue. The SC said, Even the filing of the complaint on May 12, 1978 is of no

remedial or practical consequence, since the time limits for the filing thereof, whether
viewed as a condition precedent or as a prescriptive period, would in this case be
productive of the same result, that is, that petitioners had no right of action to begin with
or, at any rate, their claim was time-barred.
ROLDAN vs. LIM PONZO
FACTS:
Plaintiff in this action seeks to recover damages in the sum of P3,780.12 for the alleged
failure of the defendant company to live up to its contract for the transportation of 2,244
packages of sugar from the plaintiff's hacienda to Iloilo. Defendants admits the execution
of the contract, the receipt from the plaintiff of 2,244 packages of sugar for
transportation, and the loss of a part of this sugar. Counsel for defendant insists, however,
that it should not be held responsible for its failure to carry out the contract, because, as it
alleges, the sugar was lost in a wreck in the river of Jalaud, without fault on the part of
the owner, the patron, or the crew of the vessel.
There would not appear to be much question as to the fact that the defendant company's
lorcha was wrecked in the river Jalaud, and that of the 2,244 packages of plaintiff's sugar
aboard the vessel, only 1,022 packages were saved in a more or less damaged condition.
At the trial in the court below, the plaintiff undertook to establish the facts upon which he
based his claim for damages and introduced evidence tending to disclose that
the lorcha had been wrecked and the sugar lost through the negligence and lack of skill of
the master of the lorcha in the management of his vessel. After the plaintiff had submitted
all his evidence and before the defendant company had called any of its witnesses, the
trial judge peremptorily dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was neither alleged
or proved that the plaintiff had complied with the provisions of section 366 of the
Commercial Code. That section is as follows:
Within the twenty-four hours following the receipt of the merchandise a claim may be brought against the carrier on
account of damage or average found therein on opening the packages, provided that the indication of the damage of
average giving rise to the claim cannot be case said claim would only admitted on the receipt of the packages.
After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or after the transportation charges have been paid, no claim whatsoever shall
be admitted against the carrier with regards to the condition in which the goods transported were delivered.

ISSUE:
Is notice to the carrier within 24 hours required?
RULING:
No for the 1,222 packages lost. Art 366 of the Commercial Code is limited to cases of
claims for damaged goods actually turned over by the carrier and received by the
consignee. It has no application in such cases wherein the goods entrusted to the carrier
are not delivered by the carrier to the consignee. In such cases there can be no question of
a claim for damages suffered by the goods while in transport, since the claim for damages
arises exclusively out of the failure to make delivery.
Article 367 of the Commercial Code is as follows:

If there should occur doubts and disputes between the consignee and the carrier
with regard to the condition of goods transported at the time of their delivery to
the former, the said goods shall be examined by the experts appointed by the
parties, and a third one, in case of disagreement, appointed by the judicial
authority, the result of the examination always being reduced to writing; and if the
persons interested should not agree to the report of the experts and could not reach
an agreement, said judicial authority shall have the merchandise deposited in a
safe warehouse, and the parties interested shall make use of their rights in the
proper manner.
It is very clear, then, that in so far as this action seeks to recover damages for defendant's
failure to deliver 1,222 packages or bayones of sugar, the failure to make claim for such
damages under the provisions of article 366 of the Commercial Code in no wise affects
the respective rights of the parties.
the necessity for making the claim in accordance with that article did not arise if, as it is
alleged, these 1,022 packages of sugar were recovered from the wreck by the plaintiff,
himself, in an effort, by his own activities, to save his property from total loss. The
measures to be taken under the terms of article 367 of the Code when the parties are
unable to arrive at an amicable settlement of claims for damages set up in accordance
with article 366, quite clearly indicate that the necessity for the presentation of claims
under this article arises only in those cases wherein the carrier makes delivery and the
consignee receives the goods in pursuance of the terms of the contract.
Until the defendant has had an opportunity to submit his evidence it is impossible to
determine under what conditions these 1,022 packages of sugar came into the possession
of the plaintiff, or to determine whether his claim for damages by the wetting of this
sugar, if well founded in every other respect, is or should be defeated by his failure to
make claim for such damages in the manner and form indicated in article 366 of the
Commercial Code.
ANG vs AMERICAN STEAMSHIP
FACTS:
Yau Yue Commercial Bank Ltd. of Hongkong, sell 140 packages of galvanized steel
durzinc sheets to one Herminio G. Teves, shipped by Tokyo Boeki Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan.
with American Steamship Agencies, Inc. as the agent in the Philippines, under a shipping
agreement. The bill of lading was indorsed to the order of and delivered to Yau Yue by
the shipper. Upon receipt thereof, Yau Yue drew a demand draft together with the bill of
lading against Herminio G. Teves, through the Hongkong &Shanghai Bank. Upon arrival,
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank notified Teves, the notify party under the bill of lading, of
the arrival of the goods and requested payment of the demand draft representing the
purchase price of the articles. Teves, however, did not pay the demand draft, prompting
the bank to make the corresponding protest. The bank likewise returned the bill of lading
and demand draft to Yau Yue which indorsed the said bill of lading to Domingo Ang.
Despite non-payment Teves was able to secure a Permit To Deliver Imported Articles
which he presented to the Bureau of Customs which in turn released to him the articles

covered by the bill of lading. Subsequently, Domingo Ang claimed for the articles from
American Steamship Agencies, Inc., by presenting the indorsed bill of lading, but he was
informed by the latter that it had delivered the articles to Teves. A complaint was filed by
Ang against American Steamship for having allegedly wrongfully delivered and/or
converted the goods covered by the bill of lading. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
upon the ground that plaintiffs cause of action has prescribed under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act.Lower court dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. Hence,
an appeal was filed to SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was "loss" of the goods subject matter of the complaint?
RULING:
Dismissal order is reversed and set aside. Case remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
Nowhere is "loss" defined in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Therefore, recourse must
be had to the Civil Code which provides in Article 18 thereof that, "In matters which are
governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied
by the provisions of this Code."
Article 1189 of the Civil Code defines the word "loss" in cases where conditions have
been imposed with the intention of suspending the efficacy of an obligation to give. The
contract of carriage under consideration entered into by and between American
Steamship Agencies, Inc. and the Yau Yue (which later on endorsed the bill of lading
covering the shipment to plaintiff herein Domingo Ang), is one involving an obligation to
give or to deliver the goods "to the order of shipper", that is, upon the presentation and
surrender of the bill of lading. This being so, said article can be applied to the present
controversy, more specifically paragraph 2 thereof which provides that, "... it is
understood that a thing is lost when it perishes, or goes out of commerce, or disappears in
such a way that its existence unknown or it cannot be recovered."
"Loss" contemplates merely a situation where no delivery at all was made by the shipper
of the goods because the same had perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared that
their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered. It does not include a situation
where there was indeed delivery but delivery to the wrong person, or a misdelivery, as
alleged in the complaint in this case.
From the allegations of the complaint, therefore, the goods cannot be deemed "lost".
They were delivered to Herminio G. Teves, so that there can only be either delivery, if
Teves really was entitled to receive them, or misdelivery, if he was not so entitled. It is
not for Us now to resolve whether or not delivery of the goods to Teves was proper, that
is, whether or not there was rightful delivery or misdelivery.
The point that matters here is that the situation is either delivery or misdelivery, but not
nondelivery. Thus, the goods were either rightly delivered or misdelivered, but they were
not lost. There being no loss or damage to the goods, the aforequoted provision of the

Carriage of Good by Sea Act stating that "In any event, the carrier and the ship shall be
discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one
year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered,"
does not apply. The reason is not difficult to see. Said one-year period of limitation is
designed to meet the exigencies of maritime hazards. In a case where the goods shipped
were neither last nor damaged in transit but were, on the contrary, delivered in port to
someone who claimed to be entitled thereto, the situation is different, and the special
need for the short period of limitation in cases of loss or damage caused by maritime
perils does not obtain.
UNITED STATES vs. SMITH BELL
FACTS:
An action by the plaintiff against the defendant, brought in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila, to recover the sum of $1,600, United States currency, for damages
occasioned to the Navy boat Barcelo on the 6th day of November, 1902, at about 11
oclock, p.m., on the said day, near the mouth of the Pasig River, by a collision with a
casco that was then and there being towed by the launch Alexandra. The launch
Alexandra is the property of the defendant.
Inferior court: the defendant had not complied with the rules of navigation in Manila Bay,
in that it failed to display lights in accordance with such regulations, and that, by reason
of such failure, the collision and consequent damages occurred. Findings are conclusive.
Defendant: claimed that the plaintiff could and recover in the action, for the reason that it
had not complied with the provisions of the Code of Commerce, relying particularly upon
article 835 of the same. Article 835 provides: "The action for the recovery of loss and
damages arising from collisions can not be admitted if a sworn statement or declaration is
not presented within twenty-four hours to competent authority of the point where the
collision took place, or that of the first port of arrival of the vessel."
Plaintiff: claimed that this provision of the Commercial Code did not apply to it.
ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not protest within twenty four hours is a mandatory requisite for bringing
and action for damages?
RULING:
The quoted provision of the Commercial Code applies to all persons engaged in traffic
upon the waters of the Philippine Archipelago; that the defendant has as much right to
insist upon compliance with this provision of the code where the damages were done to a
boat operated by the Government as if such boat had been operated by a private
individual or company. This provision of the Commercial Code, requiring protest to be

made and presented to the proper authority within twenty-four hours after the collision, or
after the arrival of the injured boat in port, is a prerequisite to the bringing of an action
for damages. By having failed to comply with this provisions of the Commercial Code it
can not maintain this action for damages.
An action for the recovery of loss and damages arising from the collision of boats
engaged in traffic upon the waters of the Philippine Archipelago, can not be admitted if a
sworn statement or declaration is not presented within twenty-four hours to competent
authority of the point where the collision took place or of the first port of arrival of the
vessel. (Art. 835, Commercial Code.) This statutory rules applies even though the injury
was done to a boat operated by the Government.
Inferior court is affirmed, and that the defendant recover of the plaintiff his costs in this
action, and at the expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance
herewith, and the cause remanded to the court below for execution of said judgment.
MITSUI VS. CA, 287 SCRA 366
FACTS:
Petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. is a foreign corporation represented in the Philippines
by its agent, Magsaysay Agencies. It entered into a contract of carriage through Meister
Transport, Inc., an international freight forwarder, with private respondent Lavine
Loungewear Manufacturing Corporation to transport goods of the latter from Manila to
Le Havre, France. Petitioner undertook to deliver the goods to France 28 days from initial
loading. On July 24, 1991, petitioner's vessel loaded private respondent's container van
for carriage at the said port of origin.
However, in Kaoshiung, Taiwan the goods were not transshipped immediately, with the
result that the shipment arrived in Le Havre only on November 14, 1991. The consignee
allegedly paid only half the value of the said goods on the ground that they did not arrive
in France until the "off season" in that country. The remaining half was allegedly charged
to the account of private respondent which in turn demanded payment from petitioner
through its agent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent's action is for "loss or damage" to goods shipped,
within the meaning of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)?
RULING:
No. The suit is not for "loss or damage" to goods contemplated in 3(6), the question of
prescription of action is governed not by the COGSA but by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code
which provides for a prescriptive period of ten years. As defined in the Civil Code and as
applied to Section 3(6), paragraph 4 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, "loss"
contemplates merely a situation where no delivery at all was made by the shipper of the

goods because the same had perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared in such a
way that their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered.
There would be some merit in appellant's insistence that the damages suffered by him as
a result of the delay in the shipment of his cargo are not covered by the prescriptive
provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act above referred to, if such damages were
due, not to the deterioration and decay of the goods while in transit, but to other causes
independent of the condition of the cargo upon arrival, like a drop in their market value.
EE ELSER vs CA
FACTS:

In the month of December, 1945 the goods specified in the Bill of Lading marked as
Annex A, were shipped on the 'S.S. Sea Hydra,' of Isthmian Steamship Company, from
New York to Manila, and were received by the consignee 'Udharam Bazar and Co.',
except one case of vanishing cream valued at P159.78. The goods were insured against
damage or loss by the 'Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.' `Udharam Bazar and Co.' Inc., who
denied having received the goods for custody, and the 'International Harvester Co. of the
Philippines,' as agent for the shipping company, who answer that the goods were landed
and delivered to the Customs authorities. Finally, 'Udaharam Bazar and Co.' claimed for
indemnity of the loss from the insurer, 'Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.', and was paid by
the latter's agent 'E. E. Elser Inc.' the amount involved, that is, P159.78..
Court of Appeals held that petitioners have already lost their right to press their claim
against respondent because of their failure to serve notice thereof upon the carrier within
30 days after receipt of the notice of loss or damage as required by clause 18 of the bill of
lading which was issued concerning the shipment of the merchandise which had allegedly
disappeared. In this respect, the court said that, "appellant unwittingly admitted that they
were late in claiming the indemnity for the loss of the case of the vanishing cream as their
written claim was made on April 25, 1946, or more than 30 days after they had been fully
aware of said loss," and because of this failure, the Court said the action of petitioners
should, and must, fall. Petitioners now contend that this finding is erroneous in the light
of the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, which apply to this case,
the same having been made an integral part of the covenants agreed upon in the bill of
lading.
ISSUE:
Whether or not period is suspended by extrajudicial demand?
RULING:
Decision appealed from is reversed. Respondents, other than the Court of Appeals, are
hereby sentenced to pay to the petitioners the sum of P159.78, with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint, plus the costs of action

The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936 may have application to the present case it
appearing that the parties have expressly agreed to make and incorporate the provisions
of said Act as integral part of their contract of carriage. This is an exception to the rule
regarding the applicability of said Act. This is expressly recognized by section 13 of said
Act which contains the following proviso:
Nothing in this Act shall be held to apply to contracts for carriage of gods by sea
between any port of the United States or its possessions, and any other port of the
United States or its possessions: Provided, however, That any bill of lading or
similar document of title which evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by
sea between such ports, containing an express statement that it shall be subject to
the provisions of this Act, shall be subjected hereto as fully as if subject hereto by
the express provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.).
This is also recognized by the very authority cited by counsel for respondents, who, on
this matter, has made the following comment:
The Philippine Act of 1936 like the U.S. Act of 1936, applies propio vigore only
to foreign commerce to all contracts for the carriage of goods by sea and from
Philippine ports in foreign trade.
Prior to Philippine Independence on July 4, 1946, trade between the Philippines
and other ports and places under the American Flag, was not, by an ordinary
definition, foreign commerce. Hence, the U. S. and Philippine Acts did not apply
to such trades, even though conducted under foreign bottoms and under foreign
flag, unless the carrier expressly exercised the option given by section 13 of the
U.S. Act to carry under the provisions of that Act. The fact that the U.S. coastwise
flag monopoly did not extend to the Philippine trade did not alter the fact that the
U.S. Trade with the Islands is domestic. (knaught, Ocean Bills of Lading, 1947
ed. p. 250 (Emphasis supplied.).
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, it would appear clear that action of petitioners
has not yet lapsed or prescribed, as erroneously held by the Court of Appeals, it appearing
that the present action was brought within one year after the delivery of the shipment in
question..
As regards the contention of respondents that petitioners have the burden of showing that
the loss complained of did not take place under after the goods left the possession or
custody of the carrier because they failed to give notice of their loss or damage as
required by law, which failures gives rise to the presumption that the goods were
delivered in the bill of lading, suffice it to state that, according to the Court of Appeals,
the required notice was given by the petitioners to the carrier or its agent on April 25,
1946. That notice is sufficient to overcome the above presumption within the meaning of
the law..
MARITIME CO. of the PHILIPPINES vs. CA

FACTS:
1. Rizal Surety 'was the insurer of 800 packages of PVC compound loaded on the
SS Doa Nati at Yokohama and consigned to the Acme Electrical Manufacturing
Company."
2. " The SS Doa Nati was owned by the National Development Company whereas he
Maritime Company of the Philippines was its Agent. This appears indubitably in the Bill
of Lading. Exhibit D."
3. The goods were never delivered to the consignee (Acme Electrical, etc., supra) so that
x x (Rizal) as Insurer, paid x x (said) consignee the sum of P38,758.50."
4. The cause of the non-delivery of the goods, from the evidence presented by both
Defendants is that in Nagoya Bay, while the SS Doa Nati was being piloted by a
Japanese pilot, the SS Doa Nati was rammed by M/V Yasushima Maru, causing damage
to the hull of the SS Doa Nati and the resultant flooding of the holds damaged beyond
repair the goods of the consignee in question."
5. There is no doubt that under our Code of Commerce, it would be the vessel at fault in
this collision, that would be responsible for the damage to the cargo. And the evidence of
both Defendants, which has not been rebutted, is that the M/V Yasushima Maru was at
fault in the collision, so that the cause of action of plaintiff should be directed to the
owners of the negligent vessel. However, as Plaintiff has brought this action in good
faith, attorney's fees are not recoverable."
Rizal Surety elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. 3 That Court found merit in its
appeal. It thus rendered judgment, 4setting aside that of the Trial Court and 'ordering
defendants-appellees (NDC and Maritime Co.) jointly and severally to pay jointly and
severally to plaintiff-appellant (Rizal Surety) the sum of P38,758.50 with legal rate of
interest from the filing of the complaint ." 5
This judgment of the Appellate Tribunal was in turn appealed by Maritime Company. To
that Court Maritime Co. attributes the following errors, in a bid to have its judgment
reversed by this Court, viz:
1) holding that it was a ship agent under the Code of Commerce instead of merely an
agent under the Civil Code;
2) not holding that under the Bill of Lading sued upon, Rizal Surety had no cause of
action against either impleaded defendant;
3) not holding that the collision between the SS Doa Nati and the M/V Yasushima Maru
which caused the loss of the insured goods was due solely to the fault or negligence of
the complement of theYasushima Maru, as well as the character of the goods themselves
and the defect in their packing, and

4) not holding that Rizal Surety's cause of action was barred by prescription as well as
Stipulation No. 19 of the Bill of Lading.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription starts from delivery or collision?
RULING:
Under the established facts, and in accordance with Article 1734 above mentioned,
petitioner Maritime Co. and NDC, as "common carriers," are liable to Acme for "the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods," and may be relieved of responsibility if the
loss, etc., "is due to any of the following causes only: 15
1. Flood, storm, earthquakes, lightning or other natural disaster or
calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
5. Order or act of competent public authority.'
Since none of the specified absolutory causes is present, the carrier's liability is palpable.
The petitioner's other claim that the loss of the goods was due entirely to the fault of the
Japanese vessel,Yasushima Maru, which rammed into the Doa Nati cannot be sustained.
The Appellate Tribunal found, as a fact, after a review and study of the evidence, that
the Doa Nati "did not exercise even due diligence to avoid the collision.' In line with the
familiar axiom that factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and may
not be reviewed, the petitioners attempt to shift the blame to the Japanese vessel is futile.
Having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence to avoid any loss of life and property, as
commanded by law, not having in fact exercised "even due diligence to avoid the
collision,' it must be held responsible for the loss of the goods in question. Besides, as
remarked by the Court of Appeals, "the principal cause of action is not derived from a
maritime collision, but rather, from a contract of carriage, as evidenced by the bill of
lading."