Parmenides' Refutation of Motion and an Implication

Author(s): P. J. Bicknell
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1967), pp. 1-5
Published by: BRILL
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Refutation
Parmenides'
of Motionand an Implication
P. J. BICK NELL

It

is commonly maintained that Melissus was the major forerunner

of atomism. This has been argued on a number of grounds, one of

these being that Leucippus reacted to a Melissean rather than a
Parmenidean refutation of locomotion. In the following short paper I
shall challenge this view and point out that not only is one other
argument for Melissus' influence on atomism insecure, but that Theophrastus, our most important witness, unequivocally states that
Leucippus opposed a pre-Melissean eleaticism.
Discussion is preceded by quotation of the two relevant texts.
B.
Parmenides DK.28.B.8.

26.

oair(p CxLvJy7ovLyckxwv

ae?cv
?V TitlpocaL

e(TaLV aVMpXOV

e7re tyeVet

TiX

30.

&rwaMGTov,

oCTaCC

4McX' eTrXxXO7)aV,

XcOct 6)?SOpoC
7tratLq

a-0'1

TE ,U'vov xOQ' LxuT6 T

XL
XTGUwov'r v TOUTC&
xparepn yap 'Avcayxn
tl?,vs
XoU'trW;.urcsaov tOML
7CELporro; eV 8aeaLoaLtv

o(vxEv

33.

8a

9 Ce,

[LLV Oap4 L

?c pyCeL,

P 0-qOv ?r6 0V Oe?C eZLvOL

OUx &X?7X

Ca'n yxp oux ent8eu?4

[ EOV 8 &v 7MvTO;

pn

8ezro

a. scanned 'CL8aelt. ent8s?' of some manuscripts is also possible.

b. p.' appears in all manuscripts at both Simplicius Phys. 30.10 and
40.6.
It has generally been expelled.
Melissus DK.30.B.7.7.
O'8a XeVe'V 'aTt OU8V-

-0

yap

xevC?V Ou8?V CrL

oUX &V ObV t - T6 yE

ou/ao a,
t)K
[I'J8eV.OV8?XLVELtzL U0ox pCa yap OUx
Et p&V y&p XeVeOViV, u'7reX)PCL &V 4g T0 XeVOV' XeVO5 8?
9XCL 6Xnf U'pY

cxv
v

atv.

EOVTO4 ox

a5eL.

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C.
In a fairly recent article G. S. Kirk and Michael C. Stokes jointly
maintained' that Parmenides rejected local motion on ontological
grounds alone. The main support for this view was derived from
fragment 8 lines 26-30. The co-authors took it that lines 29 and 30
guaranteed that CXLvTqovin line 26 covered locomotion as well as
'starting and stopping'. In their view, the invalidity of both species
of motion is deduced from Parmenides' previously argued2 interdiction
of coming-to-be and passing-away. Motion is a kind of change, and all
change involves these illegitimate concepts.
For Kirk (although not for Stokes)3 an important consequence of
this is that Parmenides did not employ the physical argument against
motion based upon the impossibility of void; this argument was added
by Melissus (fragment 7.7). In Kirk's view this affords further support
for the fairly common view4 that Melissus was the true precursor of the
atomic theory of Leucippus. Leucippus, he argues, reacted to an
argument against motion put forward not by Parmenides but by
Melissus.
I believe that the interpretation placed upon the Parmenidean lines,
and therefore the deduction about Melissus and atomism which is
based on it are false. Lines 26-33 do not, surely, contain an omnibus
ontological disproof of two varieties of motion, followed by an argument
concerned only with the limitedness of so owv,as Kirk would presumably
maintain, but two arguments each concerned with a different type of
motion. Lines 26-28 reject alteration, or passing from one quality to
another, which certainly does fall within genesis and phthora, while
lines 29-33 constitute an entirely separate disproof of locomotion. This
is confirmed by fragment 8 lines 36-41, which sum up the results of
I G. S. Kirk and Michael C. Stokes, 'Parmenides' Refutation of Motion', Phronesis
5 (1960) pp. 1-4.
2 DK.28.B.8. 5ff.
3 Kirk and Stokes, op. cit., p. 4 note 4.
4 For Melissean influence on atomism see most recently D. McKibbon, 'Melissus
and the Atomists', Mnemosyne 17 (1964) pp. 248-255. For an explicitly contrary
view, see H. Diller, 'Die Philosophiegeschichtliche Stellung des Diogenes von
Apollonia', Hermes 76 (1941) pp. 359-381. The importance of early Eleaticism
for atomism is implicit in K. von Fritz, Philosophie und Sprachlicher Ausdruck
bei Demokrit, Platon und Aristoteles, New York, Stechert, 1938. C. Mugler's
('L'isonomie des atomistes' R. Ph. 30 (1956) pp. 231-50) emphasis on the
atomistic invocation (Simplicius Phys. 28.10 and 25) of Parmenides' 'Principe
d'indifference' (DK.28.B.8.9-10; 22ff.; 44ff.) has similar implications.

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the way of Truth so far. According to line 41 it has been proved both
that change of bright colour is impossible (the most conspicuous
example of qualitative change) and that change of position cannot
occur. If lines 26-28 were an ontological disproof of locomotion as well
as alteration, so that lines 29-33 constituted an argument in its own
right for the peiras of what is, rather than a sub-proof, then the
summary must surely have included a referenceto the proof of peiras,
as to all the other proofs. The fact is that until line 33 Parmenides is
concerned purely with denying certain attributes to what-is, that is
with a negative part of the way of Truth. Peiras and its implications
are only dealt on their own account in the constructive, positive part
of the way of Truth (fragment8 lines 42-49) which is only commenced
when the negative part has been carefully summarised.
The argument of lines 29-33 can be paraphrasedas follows. What-is
could only change its position if there were vacancies into which it
could move. If, however, there were such vacancies then what-is
would be incomplete. But what-is could not be incomplete for if it
were then it would fall short of completeness by what is not (literally,
'what is not would be lacking from the whole'), and what is not is
inconceivable and unutterable.
Simplicius (Phys. 40.7-9) constructed the last line somewhat
6v, cynatv,eva
differently and paraphrasedas follows: ; yap To tq%
7nThv

?cv,

O1 GT)

SL
eXeLVOU 8at O XltVeOC
*

rO OV av6v8Md

'voV
O'CppX

xoc"t 'rXeLOV.
rG%8 XLVOU)LeVOV CVaeiq
xwveZrat.Ultimately both explanations

come to the same. What is most important is that Simplicius (40.3)5

recognised, as did Plato before him (Theait. 180e3-4) that fragment
8 lines 29-33 constituted a disproof of locomotion and that Parmenides' argument amounted to the same as that of Melissus. As
Simplicius puts it (40.9-15) xcd M?Laaoq
E &xtv1ov oC6 &bL8eCEe
xoaEr rv orr IVIn&?
eLv, rL XtVOLTO o'0 6V, SIVoL rL XeV69
tav ot)
TO5 6VTO
'to 'C

UO7tOXYWP 'aeL

T'0 0V

oUiE)w; ?v TXo piavrow

ayypMorL

X V0V ae npoxnkoet;

FIT' VOL. ?1yCL

8e

; he then proceeds to quote Melissus'

words.
Although, then, Parmenides, unlike Melissus, does not use the term
xevOv, his interdiction of locomotion is hardly less 'physical' than that

by Melissus. This realised, it no longer necessarily follows that we

must regard Leucippus' restitution of motion as defiance of Melissus.
5 His preoccupation at Phys. 30. 5ff. with the introduction by Parmenides of
the idea of peiras does not of course mean that at this point Simplicius failed
to realise that the peiras argument is only part of the disproof of locomotion.

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In fact, I believe that the view of Melissus as atomistic precursor par

excellence requires urgent reappraisal. Theophrastus, it must be recalled, most clearly and unequivocally connected Leucippus with Parmenides himself.
The crucial passage is the following:
Simplicius Phys. 28.4ff (a virtual transcript of Theophrastus, either
direct or through Alexander of Aphrodisias):
i M&X'cnoq
(& ot6po) y&p xys8? 6 'EXe4
tp.
Aei)XL7TCTOq
(cU-oi5) oLvOv'aGOC floppsvLta-8 xs YLoaGOpLocq, o'u -rv oci)-xv &Lcatae
ROppLeVfaZOL 1'=VOYO'VeL
xo
sopvr
7Cept T&V
O8OV) X
OXLT 'rv ~ovro
VcVlTolMV.
lpivL~
iv0-oO'V'r(OV 68v,&?
coqaoxez
exeLov
tO

7raV,

xoci 7CS?pSOCC
yoxp eV xOCL &xLVTnTOVXOCL&y6v-yTov
OV pLYae\ (eYCWV C
XOCL To Vn
@pOU"VT@V OUTo4

VOQV TCOLOUVrCOV
O"C7CS&OC
XOaL

OeL

Not only does Theophrastus

contact
between
Parmenides and an Eleate
emphasize
Leucippus, he states that Leucippus responded to an Eleatic who
held that ro- nFv was nwenpaa0tievov not aS pOV as Melissus proposed.7
The only ancient witness, in fact, to any sort of connection between
Leucippus and Melissus is Tzetzes8 who, even if he did not contradict
Theophrastus, could hardly be regarded as trustworthy.
If Melissean influence on atomism is to be maintained in the teeth
of Theophrastus' implications it must obviously be supported by far
more cogent arguments than that proposed by Kirk. The favourite
passage cited in support of it is Melissus fragment 8,9 which is supposed
to foreshadow an atomistic plurality of Eleatic ones. Even here the
deduction seems far from obvious. Melissus argues that if the components of the phenomenal world, air, fire, iron and gold, and so forth,
were real, they each of them must be of the same kind that he maintains
the one to be, that is immutable. However, we perceive that each of
these constituents is subject to alteration and disintegration, so that it
is apparent that we neither see nor know realities. It is not easy to see
how this conception of a domain composed of a contiguous multiplicity
of sensible but immutable constituents like, air, fire, gold etc. could
ZLVO
Q)evoc

to
personal6

? oca

aso6s...

6 When no personal contact is involved, Theophrastus employs a different

construction. Note Simplicius Phys. 27. 2-3 (again from Theophrastus);
tic 'Avocai'vouq cptXoao(pLcc4;
and see J. Burnet, Early
Avococy6pocq...xotvco,v-amc
Greek Philosophy 4, Macmillan 1930, p. 332, note 2.
7 DK.30.B.1. and B.2.
8 Tzetzes Chil. 2-980 (at DK. 6.7.A.5.).
9 See, for example, Kirk-Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge 1957,
pp. 304-6.

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have suggested the atomists' plurality of separated, sub-visible,

homogeneous corpuscles.
To return to motion and the void, it seems to me most likely that
Leucippus in replying to Parmenides made explicit To xevov implicit
in Parmenides' gaps of what is not in what is and that Melissus
attempted to refute Leucippus using atomism's own physical
terminology.10

Monash University

10

Finally, I wish to record my gratitude to Mr. D. J. Furley for a crucial

suggestion and for criticism of some of the material in an earlier draft.

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