School of Engineering And Technology

Structural Engineering
Forensic Engineering: Structural Evaluation and Retrofitting of Structures

CE 72.62
Instructor: Dr. Thanakorn Pheeraphan
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A Failure Case Study of

Harbour Cay Condominium

in Cocoa Beach, Florida
Presented By:
Chandani Chandra Neupane
ST 115587

Overview
Background
Objectives
Problem
Design and Construction
Investigation
Causes of Failure
Prevention of the Failure
Conclusion
Lessons Learned
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Background
The Harbour Cay Condominium, a 5 story flat-plate reinforcement
building, was under construction at Cocoa Beach, Florida.

LOCATION

 During construction on March 27, 1981, Harbour Cay Condominium

building, collapsed during the placement of concrete for the roof
slab, the entire structure collapsed vertically.
11 workers were killed and 23 were injured.

Objectives
To determine what causes the failure.
To suggest a way to prevent this type of failure.

Problem

Figure : Before the Collapse (Image courtesy of National Bureau of Standards)

Figure : After Collapse (Image courtesy of National Bureau of Standards)

Figure : After Collapse (Image courtesy of National Bureau of Standards)

Design and Construction

Five story flat plate structure of overall area 242ft x 58ft (74m x18m)
for residential use.
Stairwells at north ends and a structurally detached elevator tower at
the east end.
The slabs spanned up to 6.75 and 8.43 m in two directions.

Interior columns 10x18 in. (254 x 457 mm)

Exterior columns 10x12 in. (254 x 305 mm)
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 Compressive Strength Concrete = 27.6 MPa (4000 lb./in.2)

Reinforcing Steel - Deformed bars ASTM Grade 60.
Floor slab 8 in. (203 mm)
Story Height = 8- 8 (2.64 m)
At foundation level, columns were supported by pile caps containing
2 to 9 piles each.

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 Construction Rate 1 floor per week (with each floor cast in two halvestwo days apart)

Roof Slab was to be cast in one continuous placement and roughly

80% complete when the collapse occurred.
At the time of collapse, shores were in place on the fifth floor, and
reshores were in place on the second, third, and fourth floors.
Some of the reshores may have been removed by other trades, but it
is possible that not all were replaced. There were no reshores under
the second floor.
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At the time of Collapse:

Occurred at approximately 3:00 pm, on March 27, 1981.
Based on workers statements,
As the workers were finishing the concrete, they heard a load crack
that sounds like wood splitting.
It appears to have been triggered by a failure in fifth floor slab in the
center portion of the building and propagate straight down to
ground.

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Legend
Killed in collapse
o Surviving Workers

Figure : Location of Workers in Building at Time of the Collapse

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Investigation
( NBS)
Site Investigation
Slab had broken away from the column at the slab column
interfaces, so the failure node appeared to be a punching shear
failure type.
There was no evidence of overturning.
Measurement of outside dimension of column and slab section
indicated conformity with structural drawing.
Some columns in first story did not meet
the clear spacing requirement of ACI Code.

Figure: Field Measurement

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 Laboratory Investigations
Property

Description

Remarks

Quantities of ingredients

Insufficient documentation

Comp. Strength of slab Core

Satisfied with ACI Code for 27.6 MPa

o.k.

Comp. Strength of Column Core

Does not Satisfied with ACI Code

Not o.k.
for fifth floor and have high variability.

Reinforcing steel

Grade 60

o.k.

Cement Content

Lower (calculated value imprecise)

Tensile strength Characteristics-

Normal Weight Concrete

o.k.
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Fig: Compressive strength of drilled slab core

Fig: Compressive strength of drilled column core

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 Structural Analysis
At the time of collapse, gravity loads were only significant.
Finite Element Analysis for response measurement.

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Fig: Result of FEM analysis of fifth floor

Maximum shear force (B-2)

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Causes of Failure
Collapse of Harbour Cay Condominium (NBS findings)
Design errors + Construction errors
Design Errors
Slab thickness = 8 in.
Minimum slab thickness required by ACI code to resist punching
shear for the given loads, spans, and column sizes= 11 in.

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After the collapse, many of the columns remained standing with the
floor slabs stacked on top of each other on the ground. This showed
further strong evidence of a punching shear failure.

Standing
Columns

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A punching shear failure happens when the concrete floor slab cracks
and breaks away from its column connection.

Figure: Punching shear failure mechanism.

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The punching shear strength of a flat slab for a simplified case of an

interior column is:

Vc = 4((fc)^(1/2))(b0)(d)

fc = 28-day cylinder compressive strength of the concrete

d = effective depth of slab
b0 = the perimeter of the failure surface around the column measured
at distance d from the face of the column
For our case, max. punching shear force= 454 KN (102 kip)
Required D = 11 in. but provided d = 6.3 in. (D= 8 in.)

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The structural engineer was a retired NASA engineer who hired another
retired NASA engineer to perform the calculations.
Overall, design errors included:
There were no calculations for deflection or minimum thickness provisions.

There were no calculations for punching shear or beam shear.

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 There were no code checks for column reinforcement spacing.

Calculations used Grade 40 steel whereas the structural drawings

specified Grade 60 steel.
Congested column reinforcement prevented concrete from flowing
around the steel bars and thus caused a deficient bond between the
reinforcement and concrete.

Fig: Congested reinforcement in first floor

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Construction Errors
The top reinforcement steel was placed too low, which reduced the
effective slab depth and hence the punching shear capacity of the slab.
The top reinforcement bars were placed on chairs that were only 4 high,
which reduced the effective slab depth d from 6.3 in. to 5.3 in. Hence, the
top cover was increased to 1 5/8 whereas it was designed to be .

Figure: Field Measurement of Chair height

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 Bottom slab bars were not placed through many columns and that the
slabs broke away from the columns where the slabs and columns meet.
In addition, some vertical reinforcement was found to have been severely
bent during fabrication.

Fig: Severely Bend Column Reinforcement

Laboratory-cured test cylinders were used instead of field-cured test

cylinders to determine the actual strength of slabs prior to the stripping of
formwork.
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Also
Many workers stated that, The spider-web-type cracks were noticed
once the flying forms were removed.
Most cracks were located near mid spans and around columns, and
some were said to have extended 4 to 5 inches into the floor slabs.
Excessive deflections were reported once the forms were removed. A
1 (44 mm) deflection was noted and the structural engineer was
requested to recheck the design, which he did, reporting back that it
was O.K.

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 Workers also noted that some of the concrete from the on-site batch
plant had a non-uniform consistency and was difficult to finish .
One worker stated, Twenty-two years Ive been pouring concrete
and theyve never pulled the forms in two days like they did here.
They usually set there for a week or 10 days.
Shores and reshores initially supported the dead loads of the
structure and transferred the loads to the ground. Once the reshores
below the first floor level were removed, the concrete slabs were
forced to carry the weight of the structure through their punching
shear capacity at the columns.
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Figure: Lateral sequence of flying form removal

Figure: Assumed State of Construction at the time of Collapse

Prevention of the Failure

Punching shear failure could have been avoided by simple concrete
design checks for punching shear and minimum slab thickness.
The most economical way to increase the punching shear capacity of
the slabs would have been to increase the size of the columns. This
would also have created more space for casting concrete between the
vertical column reinforcement bars.
Increasing the thickness of the slab would have required much more
concrete than increasing the size of the columns. Hence, increasing
the column sizes would have provided a more economical solution.

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In addition,
Paying attention to warning signs of a potential collapse is critical. All
work on the building should have stopped after the excessive
deflections and spider-web-type cracks had formed. Instead, work on
the building continued without properly addressing these obvious signs
of possible failure.

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Conclusion
The Harbour Cay Condominium collapse due to both improper design
and construction procedures.
A punching shear failure on the fifth floor initiated a progressive
collapse of the entire structure.
Punching shear calculations were omitted by the structural engineer
when the structure was designed.

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 Reinforcement bars were placed too low in the concrete slabs, which
reduced the effective depth of the slabs and hence reduced the
overall strength of the slabs as well.
Warning signs of a potential failure were brought to the attention of
supervisors and the structural engineer but were basically ignored.
The Harbour Cay disaster could have easily been prevented had
simple design checks and careful construction techniques been
performed.

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Lessons Learned
Punching shear strength must be checked when designing flat slabs, for
punching shear is the most common mode of failure for concrete flat slabs.
Minimum depth of a flat slab much be checked to account for deflection
and strength requirements.

It is crucial to place reinforcing bars directly within the column periphery

to prevent progressive collapse. This can be done at no additional cost.
Proper design of formwork, shoring and reshoring plans and schedules,
and procedures for successful field construction control.

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Another important lesson is that

All work on a project must be stopped if warning signs of potential
failure are encountered. Workers should evacuate the building
immediately, and professional evaluation of the problems must be
performed before work can be resumed.

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We should also learn from Charges

Harold Meeler (primary structural engineer), surrendered his license
and said he would never practice again. Meeler said he would pay the
maximum fine of $3,000 to avoid a hearing on the collapse of the
structure (Engineer 1981).
The other structural engineer also surrendered his license and will
never practice in the state of Florida again.
The Florida Department of Professional Regulation charged five of the
parties involved in the project with negligence. Additionally, two
contractors were disciplined, and the architect was suspended from
practicing in Florida for ten years.

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We must remember that

Major failures in low-rise projects are still possible despite all of the
knowledge available to avoid them.

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References
1. Delatte, Norbert J. Beyond Failure: Forensic Case Studies for Civil
Engineers, ASCE Press, 2009, p. 149-155.
2. Feld, Jacob and Kenneth Carper, K. Construction Failure. 2nd Ed., John
Wiley &Sons, New York, N. Y., 1997, p. 271-274.
3. Kaminetzky, D. Design and Construction Failures: Lessons from Forensic
Investigations. McGraw-Hill, New York, N. Y., 1991, p. 72-78.
4. Lew, H. S. et al. Investigation of Construction Failure of Harbour Cay
Condominium in Cocoa Beach, Florida. Rep., U.S. Dept. of Comm., Nat.
Bureau of Standards, S/N 003-003-02405-8, Washington, D. C., 1982

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Thank You.

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