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UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals,

SixthCircuit.
JohnW.CARSON,d/b/aJohnnyCarson,anindividual,andJohnnyCarsonApparel,
Inc.,acorporation,PlaintiffsAppellants,
v.
HERE'SJOHNNYPORTABLETOILETS,INC.,acorporation,DefendantAppellee.
No. 80-1720.
ArguedMay26,1982.
DecidedFeb.1,1983.
Entertainer,whousedphrase"Here'sJohnny"asmethodofintroduction,andapparel
companywithwhichentertainerwasassociatedbroughtactionagainstcorporation
engagedinrentingandselling"Here'sJohnny"portabletoilets,allegingtrademark
infringementandinfringementofrightofprivacyandrightofpublicity.The
UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMichigan,JulianAbele
Cook,Jr.,J.,498F.Supp.71,ordereddismissalofcomplaint,andentertainerand
apparelcompanyappealed.TheCourtofAppeals,BaileyBrown,SeniorCircuit
Judge,heldthat:(1)factsdidnotimplicatelikelihoodofconfusionwithin
purviewofLanhamTradeMarkActprovisiongoverningfalsedesignationoforiginand
falsedescription,but(2)entertainer'srightofpublicitywasinvadedby
intentionalappropriationofhisidentityforcommercialexploitation,
notwithstandingthatneitherhisnamenorlikenesswereused.
Judgmentvacatedandcaseremanded.
CorneliaG.Kennedy,CircuitJudge,dissentedandfiledopinion.
WestHeadnotes
[1] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 19
29Tk19MostCitedCases
(Formerly382k620,382k870(2),382k870.1TradeRegulation)
[1] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29
29Tk29MostCitedCases
(Formerly382k870(2),382k870.1TradeRegulation)
TestforequitablereliefunderLanhamTradeMarkActprovisiongoverningfalse
designationoforiginandfalsedescriptionandMichigancommonlawis"likelihood
ofconfusion"standard.LanhamTradeMarkAct,43(a),15U.S.C.A.1125(a).
[2] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 87
29Tk87MostCitedCases
(Formerly382k870(2),382k870.1TradeRegulation)
[2] Federal Courts 860
170Bk860MostCitedCases
(Formerly382k870(2),382k870.1TradeRegulation)
Undertwostepprocessusedindeterminingwhetherlikelihoodofconfusionexists
amongconsumersofgoodsinvolvedinactionunderLanhamTradeMarkActprovision
governingfalsedesignationoforiginandfalsedescription,eightfoundational
factorsarefactualandsubjecttoclearlyerroneousstandardofreview,while
weighingofsuchfindingsonultimateissueoflikelihoodofconfusionisquestion

oflaw.LanhamTradeMarkAct,43(a),15U.S.C.A.1125(a).
[3] Trademarks 1092
382Tk1092MostCitedCases
(Formerly382k870(2),382k870.1TradeRegulation)
InactionunderLanhamTradeMarkActprovisiongoverningfalsedesignationof
originandfalsedescription,federaldistrictcourtdidnotclearlyerrinfinding
thatphrase"Here'sJohnny,"whichwasusedbyentertainerasmethodofintroduction
andbyapparelcompanywithwhichentertainerwasassociated,wasnotsuchstrong
markthatitsuseforothergoodsshouldbeentirelyforeclosed,infindingthat
defendantcorporation,engagedinbusinessofrentingandselling"Here'sJohnny"
portabletoilets,hadnotintendedtodeceivepublic,infindinglittleevidenceof
actualconfusionorinfindingnoevidencethatcorporation'suseofsuchphrasehad
damagedentertainerorapparelcompany.LanhamTradeMarkAct,43(a),15
U.S.C.A.1125(a).
[4] Trademarks 1106
382Tk1106MostCitedCases
(Formerly382k870(2),382k870.1TradeRegulation)
GeneralconceptunderlyinglikelihoodofconfusionwithinpurviewofLanhamTrade
MarkActprovisiongoverningfalsedesignationoforiginandfalsedescriptionis
thatpublicbelievethatmark'sownersponsoredorotherwiseapproveduseof
trademark.LanhamTradeMarkAct,43(a),15U.S.C.A.1125(a).
[5] Torts 384
379k384MostCitedCases
(Formerly379k8.5(3))
"Rightofpublicity"protectscelebrity'specuniaryinterestincommercial
exploitationofhisidentity.
[6] Torts 332
379k332MostCitedCases
(Formerly379k8.5(5.1),379k8.5(5))
Factspresentedinactionbyentertainer,whousedparticularphraseasmethodof
introduction,andbyapparelcompanywithwhichentertainerwasassociated,arising
fromdefendantcorporation'srentingandsellingofportabletoiletsusingsuch
phrase,didnotamounttoinvasionofanyofinterestsprotectedbyrightof
privacy.
[7] Torts 384
379k384MostCitedCases
(Formerly379k8.5(3))
Theoryofrightofpublicityisthatcelebrity'sidentitycanbevaluablein
promotionofproducts,andcelebrityhasinterestthatmaybeprotectedfrom
unauthorizedcommercialexploitationofsuchidentity.
[8] Torts 387
379k387MostCitedCases
(Formerly379k8.5(3))
Ifcelebrity'sidentityiscommerciallyexploited,therehasbeeninvasionofhis
rightofpublicity,whetherornothis"nameorlikeness"isused.
[9] Torts 387
379k387MostCitedCases

(Formerly379k8.5(5.1),379k8.5(5))
Entertainer'srightofpublicitywasinvadedwheredefendantcorporation
appropriatedentertainer'sidentityinconnectionwithitscorporatenameandits
product,byitsuseofphrasewhichentertainerusedasmethodofintroduction,
notwithstandingthatneitherentertainer'snameorlikenesswasused.
Trademarks 1800
382Tk1800MostCitedCases
(Formerly382k736TradeRegulation)
Here'sJohnny.
*832RobertM.Newbury(argued),Pattishall,McAuliffe&Hofstetter,Chicago,
Ill.,JamesW.Goss,Miller,Canfield,Paddock&Stone,Birmingham,Mich.,for
plaintiffsappellants.
AllenM.Krass(argued),Krass&Young,Troy,Mich.,fordefendantappellee.
BeforeKENNEDY,CircuitJudge,BROWN[FN*]andSWYGERT[FN**]SeniorCircuit
Judges.
FN*CircuitJudgeBrownretiredfromregularactiveserviceunderthe
provisionsof28U.S.C.371(b)onJune16,1982,andbecameaSenior
CircuitJudge.
FN**TheHonorableLutherM.Swygert,SeniorCircuitJudgefortheSeventh
CircuitCourtofAppeals,Chicago,Illinois,sittingbydesignation.
BAILEYBROWN,SeniorCircuitJudge.
Thiscaseinvolvesclaimsofunfaircompetitionandinvasionoftherightof
privacyandtherightofpublicityarisingfromappellee'sadoptionofaphrase
generallyassociatedwithapopularentertainer.
Appellant,JohnW.Carson(Carson),isthehostandstarof"TheTonightShow,"a
wellknowntelevisionprogrambroadcastfivenightsaweekbytheNational
BroadcastingCompany.Carsonalsoappearsasanentertainerinnightclubsand
theatersaroundthecountry.Fromthetimehebeganhosting"TheTonightShow"in
1962,hehasbeenintroducedontheshoweachnightwiththephrase"Here'sJohnny."
ThismethodofintroductionwasfirstusedforCarsonin1957whenhehostedadaily
televisionprogramfortheAmericanBroadcastingCompany.Thephrase"Here's
Johnny"isgenerallyassociatedwithCarsonbyasubstantialsegmentofthe
television*833viewingpublic.In1967,Carsonfirstauthorizeduseofthis
phrasebyanoutsidebusinessventure,permittingittobeusedbyachainof
restaurantscalled"Here'sJohnnyRestaurants."
AppellantJohnnyCarsonApparel,Inc.(Apparel),formedin1970,manufacturesand
marketsmen'sclothingtoretailstores.Carson,thepresidentofAppareland
ownerof20%ofitsstock,haslicensedAppareltousehisnameandpicture,which
appearonvirtuallyallofApparel'sproductsandpromotionalmaterial.Apparel
hasalsoused,withCarson'sconsent,thephrase"Here'sJohnny"onlabelsfor
clothingandinadvertisingcampaigns.In1977,ApparelgrantedalicensetoMarcy
Laboratoriestouse"Here'sJohnny"asthenameofalineofmen'stoiletries.The
phrase"Here'sJohnny"hasneverbeenregisteredbyappellantsasatrademarkor
servicemark.

Appellee,Here'sJohnnyPortableToilets,Inc.,isaMichigancorporationengaged
inthebusinessofrentingandselling"Here'sJohnny"portabletoilets.
Appellee'sfounderwasawareatthetimeheformedthecorporationthat"Here's
Johnny"wastheintroductorysloganforCarsonon"TheTonightShow."Heindicated
thathecoupledthephrasewithasecondone,"TheWorld'sForemostCommodian,"to
make"agoodplayonaphrase."
Shortlyafterappelleewentintobusinessin1976,appellantsbroughtthisaction
allegingunfaircompetition,trademarkinfringementunderfederalandstatelaw,and
invasionofprivacyandpublicityrights.Theysoughtdamagesandaninjunction
prohibitingappellee'sfurtheruseofthephrase"Here'sJohnny"asacorporatename
orinconnectionwiththesaleorrentalofitsportabletoilets.
Afterabenchtrial,thedistrictcourtissuedamemorandumopinionandorder,
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,498F.Supp.71(E.D.Mich.1980),whichserved
asitsfindingsoffactandconclusionsoflaw.Thecourtorderedthedismissalof
theappellants'complaint.Ontheunfaircompetitionclaim,thecourtconcluded
thattheappellantshadfailedtosatisfythe"likelihoodofconfusion"test.On
therightofprivacyandrightofpublicitytheories,thecourtheldthatthese
rightsextendonlytoa"nameorlikeness,"and"Here'sJohnny"didnotqualify.
I.
[1]Appellants'firstclaimallegesunfaircompetitionfromappellee'sbusiness
activitiesinviolationof43(a)oftheLanhamAct,15U.S.C.1125(a)(1976),
andofMichigancommonlaw.Thedistrictcourtcorrectlynotedthatthetestfor
equitablereliefunderboth43(a)andMichigancommonlawisthe"likelihoodof
confusion"standard.Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670F.2d
642(6thCir.),cert. denied,459U.S.916,103S.Ct.231,74L.Ed.2d182(1982);
Wills v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.,369Mich.23,118N.W.2d954(1963).
[2]InFrisch's Restaurantsweapprovedthebalancingofseveralfactorsin
determiningwhetheralikelihoodofconfusionexistsamongconsumersofgoods
involvedina43(a)action.Inthatcaseweexaminedeightfactors:
1.strengthoftheplaintiff'smark;
2.relatednessofthegoods;
3.similarityofthemarks;
4.evidenceofactualconfusion;
5.marketingchannelsused;
6.likelydegreeofpurchasercare;
7.defendant'sintentinselectingthemark;
8.likelihoodofexpansionoftheproductlines.
670F.2dat648.Thedistrictcourtappliedasimilaranalysis.Underthetwo
stepprocessadoptedinFrisch's Restaurants,theseeightfoundationalfactorsare
factualandsubjecttoaclearlyerroneousstandardofreview,whiletheweighingof
thesefindingsontheultimateissueofthelikelihoodofconfusionisaquestionof
law.670F.2dat651.
[3]
[4]Thedistrictcourtfirstfoundthat"Here'sJohnny"wasnotsuchastrong
markthatitsuseforothergoodsshouldbe*834entirelyforeclosed.498F.Supp.
at74.Althoughtheappelleehadintendedtocapitalizeonthephrasepopularized
byCarson,thecourtconcludedthatappelleehadnotintendedtodeceivethepublic
intobelievingCarsonwasconnectedwiththeproduct.Id.at75.Thecourtnoted

thattherewaslittleevidenceofactualconfusionandnoevidencethatappellee's
useofthephrasehaddamagedappellants.Forthesereasons,thecourtdetermined
thatappellee'suseofthephrase"Here'sJohnny"didnotpresentalikelihoodof
confusion,mistake,ordeception.Id.at7577.
Ourreviewoftherecordindicatesthatnoneofthedistrictcourt'sfindingsis
clearlyerroneous.Moreover,onthebasisofthesefindings,weagreewiththe
districtcourtthattheappellantshavefailedtoestablishalikelihoodof
confusion.Thegeneralconceptunderlyingthelikelihoodofconfusionisthatthe
publicbelievethat"themark'sownersponsored or otherwise approvedtheuseofthe
trademark."Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.,658F.2d76,79(2dCir.1981)(emphasis
added)(quotingDallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604F.2d200,
205(2dCir.1979)).
Thefactsasfoundbythedistrictcourtdonotimplicatesuchlikelihoodof
confusion,andweaffirmthedistrictcourtonthisissue.
II.
Theappellantsalsoclaimthattheappellee'suseofthephrase"Here'sJohnny"
violatesthecommonlawrightofprivacyandrightofpublicity.[FN1]The
confusioninthisareaofthelawrequiresabriefanalysisoftherelationship
betweenthesetworights.
FN1.Michiganlaw,whichgovernstheseclaims,hasnotyetclearlyaddressed
therightofpublicity.Butthegeneralrecognitionoftheright,seeW.
Prosser,HANDBOOKOFTHELAWOFTORTS117,at805(4thed.1971),suggests
tousthattheMichigancourtswouldadopttheright.Michiganhasrecognized
arightofprivacy.Beaumont v. Brown,401Mich.80,257N.W.2d522(1977).
[5]Inaninfluentialarticle,DeanProsserdelineatedfourdistincttypesofthe
rightofprivacy:(1)intrusionuponone'sseclusionorsolitude,(2)public
disclosureofembarrassingprivatefacts,(3)publicitywhichplacesoneinafalse
light,and(4)appropriationofone'snameorlikenessforthedefendant's
advantage.Prosser,Privacy,48Calif.L.Rev.383,389(1960).Thisfourthtypehas
becomeknownasthe"rightofpublicity."Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,579F.2d
215,220(2dCir.1978),cert. denied,440U.S.908,99S.Ct.1215,59L.Ed.2d455
(1979);seeZacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,433U.S.562,572,97S.Ct.
2849,2855,53L.Ed.2d965(1977).HenceforthwewillrefertoProsser'slast,or
fourth,category,asthe"rightofpublicity."
DeanProsser'sanalysishasbeenasourceofsomeconfusioninthelaw.Hisfirst
threetypesoftherightofprivacygenerallyprotecttheright"tobeletalone,"
whiletherightofpublicityprotectsthecelebrity'specuniaryinterestinthe
commercialexploitationofhisidentity.Zacchini, supra,433U.S.at573,97S.Ct.
at2856.See generally The Right of Publicity-- Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities,42
BrooklynL.Rev.527(1976).Thus,therightofprivacyandtherightofpublicity
protectfundamentallydifferentinterestsandmustbeanalyzedseparately.
[6]WedonotbelievethatCarson'sclaimthathisrightofprivacyhasbeen
invadedissupportedbythelaworthefacts.Apparently,thegistofthisclaim
isthatCarsonisembarrassedbyandconsidersitodioustobeassociatedwiththe
appellee'sproduct.Clearly,theassociationdoesnotappealtoCarson'ssenseof
humor.Butthefactsherepresenteddonot,itappearstous,amounttoan

invasionofanyoftheinterestsprotectedbytherightofprivacy.Inanyevent,
ourdispositionoftheclaimofaninvasionoftherightofpublicitymakesit
unnecessaryforustoacceptorrejecttheclaimofaninvasionoftherightof
privacy.
*835[7]Therightofpublicityhasdevelopedtoprotectthecommercialinterest
ofcelebritiesintheiridentities.Thetheoryoftherightisthatacelebrity's
identitycanbevaluableinthepromotionofproducts,andthecelebrityhasan
interestthatmaybeprotectedfromtheunauthorizedcommercialexploitationofthat
identity.InMemphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.,616F.2d956(6th
Cir.),cert. denied,449U.S.953,101S.Ct.358,66L.Ed.2d217(1980),westated:
"Thefamoushaveanexclusivelegalrightduringlifetocontrolandprofitfromthe
commercialuseoftheirnameandpersonality."Id.at957.
[8]Thedistrictcourtdismissedappellants'claimbasedontherightofpublicity
becauseappelleedoesnotuseCarson'snameorlikeness.498F.Supp.at77.It
heldthatit"wouldnotbeprudenttoallowrecoveryforarightofpublicityclaim
whichdoesnotmorespecificallyidentifyJohnnyCarson."498F.Supp.at78.We
believethat,onthecontrary,thedistrictcourt'sconceptionoftherightof
publicityistoonarrow.Therightofpublicity,aswehavestated,isthata
celebrityhasaprotectedpecuniaryinterestinthecommercialexploitationofhis
identity.Ifthecelebrity'sidentityiscommerciallyexploited,therehasbeenan
invasionofhisrightwhetherornothis"nameorlikeness"isused.Carson's
identitymaybeexploitedevenifhisname,JohnW.Carson,orhispictureisnot
used.
InMotschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,498F.2d821(9thCir.1974),thecourt
heldthattheunauthorizeduseofapictureofadistinctiveracecarofawell
knownprofessionalracecardriver,whosenameorlikenesswerenotused,violated
hisrightofpublicity.Inthisconnection,thecourtsaid:
Weturnnowtothequestionof"identifiability."Clearly,ifthedistrictcourt
correctlydeterminedasamatteroflawthatplaintiffisnotidentifiableinthe
commercial,theninnosensehasplaintiff'sidentitybeenmisappropriatednorhis
interestviolated.
Havingviewedafilmofthecommercial,weagreewiththedistrictcourtthatthe
"likeness"ofplaintiffisitselfunrecognizable;however,thecourt'sfurther
conclusionoflawtotheeffectthatthedriverisnotidentifiableasplaintiff
iserroneousinthatitwhollyfailstoattributepropersignificancetothe
distinctivedecorationsappearingonthecar.Aspointedoutearlier,these
markingswerenotonlypeculiartotheplaintiff'scarsbuttheycausedsome
personstothinkthecarinquestionwasplaintiff'sandtoinferthattheperson
drivingthecarwastheplaintiff.
Id.at826827(footnoteomitted).
InAli v. Playgirl, Inc.,447F.Supp.723(S.D.N.Y.1978),MuhammadAli,former
heavyweightchampion,suedPlaygirlmagazineundertheNewYork"rightofprivacy"
statuteandalsoallegedaviolationofhiscommonlawrightofpublicity.The
magazinepublishedadrawingofanude,blackmalesittingonastoolinacornerof
aboxingringwithhandstapedandarmsoutstretchedontheropes.Thedistrict
courtconcludedthatAli'srightofpublicitywasinvadedbecausethedrawing
sufficientlyidentifiedhiminspiteofthefactthatthedrawingwascaptioned
"MysteryMan."ThedistrictcourtfoundthattheidentificationofAliwasmade
certainbecauseofanaccompanyingversethatidentifiedthefigureas"The

Greatest."Thedistrictcourttookjudicialnoticeofthefactthat"Alihas
regularlyclaimedthatappellationforhimself."Id.at727.
InHirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,90Wis.2d379,280N.W.2d129(1979),thecourt
heldthatusebydefendantofthename"Crazylegs"onashavinggelforwomen
violatedplaintiff'srightofpublicity.Plaintiff,ElroyHirsch,afamous
footballplayer,hadbeenknownbythisnickname.Thecourtsaid:
Thefactthatthename,"Crazylegs,"usedbyJohnson,wasanicknameratherthan
Hirsch'sactualnamedoesnotprecludeacauseofaction.Allthatisrequired
isthatthenameclearlyidentifythewrongedperson.Intheinstantcase,itis
notdisputedatthisjunctureofthe*836casethatthenicknameidentifiedthe
plaintiffHirsch.Itisarguedthattherewereotherswhowereknownbythesame
name.This,however,doesnotvitiatetheexistenceofacauseofaction.It
may,however,ifsufficientproofwereadduced,affectthequantumofdamages
shouldthejuryimposeliabilityoritmightprecludeliabilityaltogether.
Prosserpointsout"thatastageorotherfictitiousnamecanbesoidentified
withtheplaintiffthatheisentitledtoprotectionagainstitsuse."49
Cal.L.Rev.,supraat404.HewritesthatitwouldbeabsurdtosaythatSamuel
L.Clemenswouldhaveacauseofactionifthatnamehadbeenusedinadvertising,
buthewouldnothaveonefortheuseof"MarkTwain."Ifafictitiousnameis
usedinacontextwhichtendstoindicatethatthenameisthatoftheplaintiff,
thefactualcaseforidentityisstrengthened.Prosser,supraat403.
280N.W.2dat137.
[9]Inthiscase,EarlBraxton,presidentandownerofHere'sJohnnyPortable
Toilets,Inc.,admittedthatheknewthatthephrase"Here'sJohnny"hadbeenused
foryearstointroduceCarson.Moreover,intheopeningstatementinthedistrict
court,appellee'scounselstated:
Now,we'vestipulatedinthiscasethatthepublictendstoassociatethewords
"JohnnyCarson",thewords"Here'sJohnny"withplaintiff,JohnCarsonand,Mr.
Braxton,inhisdeposition,admittedthatheknewthatandprobablyabsentthat
identification,hewouldnothavechosenit.
App.68.Thatthe"Here'sJohnny"namewasselectedbyBraxtonbecauseofits
identificationwithCarsonwastheclearinferencefromBraxton'stestimony
irrespectiveofsuchadmissionintheopeningstatement.
Wethereforeconcludethat,applyingthecorrectlegalstandards,appellantsare
entitledtojudgment.Theproofshowedwithoutquestionthatappelleehad
appropriatedCarson'sidentityinconnectionwithitscorporatenameandits
product.[FN2]
FN2.See alsoProsser,HANDBOOKOFTHELAWOFTORTS,supra,at805("Itisthe
plaintiff'snameasasymbolofhisidentitythatisinvolvedhere,andnotas
amerename.").
AlthoughthisopinionholdsonlythatCarson'srightofpublicitywasinvaded
becauseappelleeintentionallyappropriatedhisidentityforcommercial
exploitation,thedissent,relyingonitsinterpretationoftheauthoritiesand
relyingonpolicyandconstitutionalarguments,wouldholdthattherewasno
invasionhere.Wedonotbelievethatthedissentcanwithstandfairanalysis.
Thedissentcontendsthattheauthoritiesholdthattherightofpublicityis
invadedonlyiftherehasbeenanappropriationofthecelebrity's"name,likeness,

achievements,identifyingcharacteristicsoractualperformances."Afterso
concedingthattherightisatleastthisbroad,thedissentthenattemptstoshow
thattheauthoritiesuponwhichthemajorityopinionreliesareexplainableas
involvinganappropriationofoneormoreoftheseattributes.Thedissent
explainsMotschenbacher, supra,wheretheadvertisementusedaphotograph,slightly
altered,oftheplaintiff'sracingcar,asan"identifyingcharacteristic"case.
Butthedissentfailstoexplainwhythephotographanymoreidentified
Motschenbacherthanthephrase"Here'sJohnny"identifiesappellantCarson.The
dissentexplainsHirsch, supra,bypointingoutthattheretheuseoftheappellation
"Crazylegs"bythedefendantwasina"context"thatsuggestedareferencetoHirsch
andthatthereforeHirschwasidentifiedbysuchuse.Here,thedissentstates,
thereisnoevidenceoftheuseof"Here'sJohnny"insuchasuggestive"context."
Puttingasidethefactthatappelleealsousedthephrase"TheWorld'sForemost
Commodian,"wefailtoseewhy"context"evidenceisnecessarywhereappellee's
presidentadmittedthatitadoptedthename"Here'sJohnny"becauseitidentified
appellantCarson.Wedonotunderstandappelleetoevencontendthatitdidnot
successfullyaccomplishitsintendedpurposeofappropriatinghisidentity.The
dissentexplainsAli, supra,bypointingoutthatinthatcasethemagazineuseda
drawingthat"stronglysuggests"ittobearepresentation*837ofthefamous
fighter,butitisalsotruethatthecourtputemphasisonthefactthatthe
subjectofthedrawingwasreferredtoas"TheGreatest,"which"furtherimplied"
thattheindividualwasAli.447F.Supp.at726727.
Itshouldbeobviousfromthemajorityopinionandthedissentthatacelebrity's
identitymaybeappropriatedinvariousways.Itisourviewthat,underthe
existingauthorities,acelebrity'slegalrightofpublicityisinvadedwheneverhis
identityisintentionallyappropriatedforcommercialpurposes.Wesimplydisagree
thattheauthoritieslimittherightofpublicityascontendedbythedissent.[FN3]
Itisnotfataltoappellant'sclaimthatappelleedidnotusehis"name."Indeed,
therewouldhavebeennoviolationofhisrightofpublicityevenifappelleehad
usedhisname,suchas"J.WilliamCarsonPortableToilet"orthe"JohnWilliam
CarsonPortableToilet"orthe"J.W.CarsonPortableToilet."Thereasonisthat,
thoughliterallyusingappellant's"name,"theappelleewouldnothaveappropriated
Carson'sidentityasacelebrity.HeretherewasanappropriationofCarson's
identitywithoutusinghis"name."
FN3.AlthoughMichiganlawisapplicableandtheauthorofthedissentisan
experiencedandableMichiganlawyerandjudge,wedonotunderstandthe
dissenttocontendthatthelawofthatstateinparticularproscribesthe
holdingofthemajorityopinion.
Withrespecttothedissent'sgeneralpolicyarguments,itseemstousthatthe
policiestheresetoutwouldmorelikelybevindicatedbythemajorityviewthanby
thedissent'sview.CertainlyappellantCarson'sachievementhasmadehima
celebritywhichmeansthathisidentityhasapecuniaryvaluewhichtherightof
publicityshouldvindicate.Vindicationoftherightwilltendtoencourage
achievementinCarson'schosenfield.Vindicationoftherightwillalsotendto
preventunjustenrichmentbypersonssuchasappelleewhoseekcommerciallyto
exploittheidentityofcelebritieswithouttheirconsent.[FN4]
FN4.Appelleedidnotbriefandmakethepolicyandconstitutionalarguments
relieduponinthedissent.Instead,theappelleeconfineditsargumentto
thestraightforwardpropositionthattherightofpublicityislimitedto

appropriationofthecelebrity's"nameorlikeness."
Thedissentalsosuggeststhatrecognitionoftherightofpublicityherewould
somehowrunafouloffederalmonopolypoliciesandfirstamendmentproscriptions.
If,asthedissentseemstoconcede,suchpoliciesandproscriptionsarenot
violatedbythevindicationoftherightofpublicitywherethecelebrity's"name,
likeness,achievements,identifyingcharacteristicsoractualperformances"have
beenappropriatedforcommercialpurposes,wecannotseewhythepoliciesand
proscriptionswouldbeviolatedwhere,ashere,thecelebrity'sidentityhas
admittedlybeenappropriatedforcommercialexploitationbytheuseofthephrase
"Here'sJohnnyPortableToilets."
Thejudgmentofthedistrictcourtisvacatedandthecaseremandedforfurther
proceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.
CORNELIAG.KENNEDY,CircuitJudge,dissenting.
Irespectfullydissentfromthatpartofthemajority'sopinionwhichholdsthat
appellee'suseofthephrase"Here'sJohnny"violatesappellantJohnnyCarson's
commonlawrightofpublicity.WhileIagreethatanindividual'sidentitymaybe
impermissiblyexploited,Idonotbelievethatthecommonlawrightofpublicitymay
beextendedbeyondanindividual'sname,likeness,achievements,identifying
characteristicsoractualperformances,toincludephrasesorotherthingswhichare
merelyassociatedwiththeindividual,asisthephrase"Here'sJohnny."The
majority'sextensionoftherightofpublicitytoincludephrasesorotherthings
whicharemerelyassociatedwiththeindividualpermitsapopularentertaineror
publicfigure,byassociatinghimselforherselfwithacommonphrase,toremove
thosewordsfromthepublicdomain.
Thephrase"Here'sJohnny"ismerelyassociatedwithJohnnyCarson,thehostand
starof"TheTonightShow"broadcastbytheNationalBroadcastingCompany.Since
1962,theopeningformatof"TheTonight*838Show,"afterthethememusicis
played,istointroduceJohnnyCarsonwiththephrase"Here'sJohnny."Thewords
arespokenbyanannouncer,generallyEdMcMahon,inadrawnoutanddistinctive
manner.Immediatelyafterthephrase"Here'sJohnny"isspoken,JohnnyCarson
appearstobegintheprogram.[FN1]Thismethodofintroductionwasfirstusedby
JohnnyCarsonin1957whenhehostedadailytelevisionshowfortheAmerican
BroadcastingCompany.Thiscaseisnottransformedintoa"name"[FN2]case
simplybecausethediminutiveformofJohnW.Carson'sgivennameandthefirstname
ofhisfullstagename,JohnnyCarson,appearsinit.Thefirstnameissocommon,
inlightofthemillionsofpersonsnamedJohn,JohnnyorJonathanthatnodoubt
inhabitthisworld,that,alone,itismeaninglessorambiguousatbestin
identifyingJohnnyCarson,thecelebrity.Inaddition,thephrasecontaining
JohnnyCarson'sfirststagenamewascertainlyselectedforitsvalueasadouble
entendre.[FN3]Appelleemanufacturesportabletoilets.Thevalueofthephrase
toappellee'sproductisintherisqumeaningof"john"asatoiletorbathroom.
[FN4]Forthisreason,too,thisisnota"name"case.
FN1.ItcannotbeclaimedthatJohnnyCarson'sappearanceson"TheTonight
Show"aretheonlytimesatwhichaperformerisintroducedwiththephrase
"Here's____________."Numerousotherperformersareintroducedwiththe
phrase"Here's____________,"usingtheirfirstname,lastnameorfullname.

FN2.Seenote5,infra.
FN3.RandomHouseCollegeDictionary397(Rev'ded.1980).
FN4.Id.721.
Appelleehasstipulatedthatthephrase"Here'sJohnny"isassociatedwithJohnny
Carsonandthatabsentthisassociation,hewouldnothavechosentouseitforhis
productandcorporation,Here'sJohnnyPortableToilets,Inc.Idonotconsiderit
relevantthatappelleeintentionallychosetoincorporateintothenameofhis
corporationandproductaphrasethatismerelyassociatedwithJohnnyCarson.
Whatisnotprotectedbylawisnottakenfrompublicuse.Researchrevealsnocase
inwhichtherightofpublicityhasbeenextendedtophrasesorotherthingswhich
aremerelyassociatedwithanindividualandarenotpartofhisname,likeness,
achievements,identifyingcharacteristicsoractualperformances.Boththe
policiesbehindtherightofpublicityandcountervailinginterestsand
considerationsindicatethatsuchanextensionshouldnotbemade.
I.PoliciesBehindRightofPublicity
Thethreeprimarypolicyconsiderationsbehindtherightofpublicityare
succinctlystatedinHoffman,Limitations on the Right of Publicity,28Bull. Copr. Soc'y,111,
11622(1980).First,"therightofpublicityvindicatestheeconomicinterestsof
celebrities,enablingthosewhoseachievementshaveimbuedtheiridentitieswith
pecuniaryvaluetoprofitfromtheirfame."Id.116;Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.,433U.S.562,573,57576,97S.Ct.2849,285758,53L.Ed.965
(1977).Second,therightofpublicityfosters"theproductionofintellectualand
creativeworksbyprovidingthefinancialincentiveforindividualstoexpendthe
timeandresourcesnecessarytoproducethem."Limitations on the Right of Publicity,
supra,118;Zacchini, supra,433U.S.at57576,97S.Ct.at285758.Third,"[t]he
rightofpublicityservesbothindividualandsocietalinterestsbypreventingwhat
ourlegaltraditionregardsaswrongfulconduct:unjustenrichmentanddeceptive
tradepractices."Limitations on the Right of Publicity, supra,118;Zacchini, supra,433
U.S.at580n.2,97S.Ct.at2860n.2(Powell,J.,dissenting)(unjustenrichment
argument);University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 15N.Y.2d
940,207N.E.2d508,511513,259N.Y.S.2d832,83738(1965)(dissent)(deceptive
tradepracticesargument).
Noneoftheabovementionedpolicyargumentssupportstheextensionoftherightof
publicitytophrasesorotherthingswhicharemerelyassociatedwithanindividual.
First,themajorityisawardingJohnnyCarsonawindfall,ratherthanvindicating
his*839economicinterests,byprotectingthephrase"Here'sJohnny"whichis
merelyassociatedwithhim.InZacchini,theSupremeCourtstatedthatamechanism
tovindicateanindividual'seconomicrightsisindicatedwheretheappropriated
thingis"theproductof...[theindividual's]owntalentsandenergy,theend
resultofmuchtime,effortandexpense."Zacchini, supra,433U.S.at575,97S.Ct.
at2857.Thereisnothingintherecordtosuggestthat"Here'sJohnny"hasany
nexustoJohnnyCarsonotherthanbeingtheintroductiontohispersonal
appearances.Thephraseisnotpartofanidentitythathecreated.Inits
content"Here'sJohnny"isaverysimpleandcommonintroduction.Thecontentof
thephraseneitheroriginatedwithJohnnyCarsonnorisitconfinedtotheworldof
entertainment.ThephraseisnotsaidbyJohnnyCarson,butsaidofhim.Its
associationwithhimisderived,inlargepart,bythecontextinwhichitissaid
generallybyEdMcMahoninadrawnoutanddistinctivevoice[FN5]afterthetheme

musicto"TheTonightShow"isplayed,andimmediatelypriortoJohnnyCarson'sown
entrance.Appellee'suseofthecontent"Here'sJohnny,"inlightofitsvalueas
adoubleentendre,writtenonitsproductandcorporatename,andthereforeoutside
ofthecontextinwhichitisassociatedwithJohnnyCarson,doeslittletorob
JohnnyCarsonofsomethingwhichisuniquetohimoraproductofhisownefforts.
FN5.EdMcMahonarguablyhasacompetingpublicityinterestinthissame
phrasebecauseitissaidbyhiminadistinctiveanddrawnoutmannerashis
introductiontoentertainerswhoappearon"TheTonightShow,"including
JohnnyCarson.
Thesecondpolicygoaloffosteringtheproductionofcreativeandintellectual
worksisnotmetbythemajority'srulebecauseinawardingpublicityrightsina
phraseneithercreatedbyhimnorperformedbyhim,economicrewardandprotection
isdivorcedfrompersonalincentivetoproduceonthepartoftheprotectedand
benefitedindividual.JohnnyCarsonissimplyreapingtherewardsofthetime,
effortandworkproductofothers.
Third,themajority'sextensionoftherightofpublicitytoincludethephrase
"Here'sJohnny"whichismerelyassociatedwithJohnnyCarsonisnotneededto
providealternativestoexistinglegalavenuesforredressingwrongfulconduct.
Theexistenceofacauseofactionundersection43(a)oftheLanhamAct,15
U.S.C.A.1125(a)(1976)andMichigancommonlawdoesmuchtoundercuttheneed
forpolicingagainstunfaircompetitionthroughanadditionallegalremedysuchas
therightofpublicity.Themajorityhasconcluded,andIconcur,thatthe
DistrictCourtwaswarrantedinfindingthattherewasnotareasonablelikelihood
thatmembersofthepublicwouldbeconfusedbyappellee'suseofthe"Here's
Johnny"trademarkonaproductasdissimilartothoselicensedbyJohnnyCarsonas
portabletoilets.Inthiscase,thiseliminatestheargumentofwrongdoing.
Moreover,themajority'sextensionoftherightofpublicitytophrasesandother
thingsmerelyassociatedwithanindividualisnotconditioneduponwrongdoingand
wouldapplywithequalforceinthecaseofanunknowinguser.Withrespectto
unjustenrichment,becauseacelebritysuchasJohnnyCarsonishimselfenrichedby
phrasesandotherthingsassociatedwithhiminwhichhehasmadenopersonal
investmentoftime,moneyoreffort,anotheruserofsuchaphraseorthingmaybe
enrichedsomewhatbysuchuse,butthisenrichmentisnotatJohnnyCarson's
expense.Thepoliciesbehindtherightofpublicityarenotfurtheredbythe
majority'sholdinginthiscase.
II.CountervailingInterestsandConsiderations
Therightofpublicity,whethertiedtoname,likeness,achievements,identifying
characteristicsoractualperformances,etc.conflictswiththeeconomicand
expressiveinterestsofothers.Society'sinterestsinfreeenterpriseandfree
expressionmustbebalancedagainsttheinterestsofanindividualseeking
protectionintherightofpublicitywheretherightisbeingexpandedbeyond
establishedlimits.Inaddition,therighttopublicitymaybesubjecttofederal
*840preemptionwhereitconflictswiththeprovisionsoftheCopyrightActof
1976.
A.FederalPolicy:Monopolies
Protectionundertherightofpublicitycreatesacommonlawmonopolythatremoves
items,wordsandactsfromthepublicdomain.Thatfederalpolicyfavorsfree
enterprisewasrecentlyreaffirmedbytheSupremeCourtinNational Society of

Professional Engineers v. United States,435U.S.679,98S.Ct.1355,55L.Ed.2d637


(1978),inwhichtheSupremeCourtindicatedthatoutsideofthe"ruleofreason,"
onlythoseanticompetitiverestraintsexpresslyauthorizedbyCongresswouldbe
permittedtostand.Id.at692n.18,98S.Ct.at1365n.18.Concernforthe
impactofadoptinganoverbroadapproachtotherightofpublicitywasalso
indicatedinthisCourt'sdecisioninMemphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc.,
Inc.,616F.2d956(6thCir.),cert. denied,449U.S.953,101S.Ct.358,66L.Ed.2d
217(1980).InMemphis Development,thisCourtheldthattherightofpublicitydoes
notsurviveacelebrity'sdeathunderTennesseelaw.Insoholding,thisCourt
recognizedthatcommercialandcompetitiveinterestsarepotentiallycompromisedby
anexpansiveapproachtotherightofpublicity.ThisCourtwasconcernedthatan
extensionoftherightofpublicitytotheexclusivecontrolofthecelebrity's
heirsmightcompromisetheefficiency,productivityandfairnessofoureconomic
systemwithoutenlargingthestockorqualityofthegoods,services,artistic
creativity,information,inventionorentertainmentavailableanddetractfromthe
equaldistributionofeconomicopportunityavailableinafreemarketsystem.Id.
95960.Memphis Developmentrecognizedthatthegrantofarightofpublicityis
tantamounttothegrantofamonopoly,inthatcase,forthelifeofthecelebrity.
Themajority'sgranttoJohnnyCarsonofapublicityrightinthephrase"Here's
Johnny"takesthisphraseawayfromthepublicdomain,givinghimacommonlaw
monopolyforit,withoutextractingfromJohnnyCarsonapersonalcontributionfor
thepublic'sbenefit.
Protectionundertherightofpublicityconfersamonopolyontheprotected
individualthatispotentiallybroader,offersfewerprotectionsandpotentially
competeswithfederalstatutorymonopolies.Asanessentialpartofthreefederal
monopolyrights,copyright,trademarkandpatents,noticetothepublicisrequired
intheformoffilingwiththeappropriategovernmentalofficeanduseofan
appropriatemark.Thisapprisesmembersofthepublicofthenatureandextentof
whatisbeingremovedfromthepublicdomainandsubjecttoclaimsofinfringement.
Therightofpublicityprovideslimitednoticetothepublicoftheextentofthe
monopolyrighttobeasserted,ifoneistobeassertedatall.Astherightof
privacyisexpandedbeyondprotectionsofname,likenessandactualperformances,
whichproviderelativelyobjectivenoticetothepublicoftheextentofan
individual'srights,tomoresubjectiveattributessuchasachievementsand
identifyingcharacteristics,thepublic'sabilitytobeonnoticeofacommonlaw
monopolyright,ifoneisevenassertedbyagivenfamousindividual,isseverely
diminished.Protectingphrasesandotherthingsmerelyassociatedwithan
individualprovidesvirtuallynonoticetothepublicatallofwhatisclaimedto
beprotected.Byensuringtheinvocationoftheadjudicativeprocesswheneverthe
commercialuseofaphraseorotherassociatedthingisconsideredtohavebeen
wrongfullyappropriated,thepublicislefttoactattheirperil.Theresultisa
chillingeffectoncommercialinnovationandopportunity.
Alsounlikethefederalstatutorymonopolies,thiscommonlawmonopolyrightoffers
noprotectionsagainstthemonopolyexistingforanindefinitetimeorevenin
perpetuity.See Memphis Development, supra(rightnotinheritableunderTennessee
law);Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,25Cal.3d813,603P.2d425,160Cal.Rptr.323
(1979)(rightnotinheritableunderCalifornialaw).Contra, King v. American Heritage
Products, Inc.,250Ga.135,296S.E.2d697(1982)(rightinheritableunderGeorgia
law);Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,579F.2d215(2dCir.1978),cert. denied,*841440
U.S.908,99S.Ct.1215,59L.Ed.2d455(1979)(rightinheritable);Groucho Marx
Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., Inc.,523F.Supp.485(S.D.N.Y.1981)(right

inheritableifcommerciallyexploitedduringlifetime).
B.FederalPolicy:FreeExpressionandUseofIntellectualProperty
Thefirstamendmentprotectsthefreedomofspeech,includingcommercialspeech.
U.S.Const.amend.I;Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,421U.S.773,95S.Ct.2004,44
L.Ed.2d572rehr'g denied,423U.S.886,96S.Ct.162,46L.Ed.2d118(1975).Strong
federalpolicypermitsthefreeuseofintellectualproperty,wordsandideasthat
areingeneralcirculationandnotprotectedbyavalidcopyright,patentor
trademark.Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,395U.S.653,668,89S.Ct.1902,1910,23L.Ed.2d610
(1969);Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,376U.S.225,84S.Ct.784,11L.Ed.2d661,
rehr'g denied,376U.S.973,84S.Ct.1131,12L.Ed.2d87(1964);Compco Corp. v. DayBright Lighting, Inc.,376U.S.234,84S.Ct.779,11L.Ed.2d669,rehr'g denied,377U.S.
913,84S.Ct.1162,12L.Ed.2d183(1964).Thefederalcopyrightstatuteonly
protectsoriginalworksthatfixtheauthor'sparticularexpressionofanideaor
conceptinatangibleform.Statestatutoryorcommonlawprotectionagainst
activitiesviolatingrightsthatarenotequivalenttothosegrantedundercopyright
laworprotectionofsubjectmatterwhichisnotcopyrightable,includingworksthat
arenotfixedinanytangibleformofexpression,arenotpreempted.17U.S.C.A.
301(b)(1977).See generally,Shipley,Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The right of
Publicity and Federal Preemption,66CornellL.Rev.673(1981).Apartfromthe
technicalargumentsregardingpreemption,iffederallawandpolicydoesnotprotect
phrasessuchas"Here'sJohnny,"whichiscertainlynotanoriginalcombinationof
words,statelawshouldnotprotectthemeitherunderarightofpublicityforwant
ofasufficientinterestjustifyingprotection.SeeU.S.Const.,art.I,8
(purposeofcopyrightandpatentlawsisto"promotetheProgressofScienceandthe
usefulActs");Zacchini, supra,433U.S.at575,57677,97S.Ct.at2857,2858
(purposeofrightofpublicityistopromoteproductionofworksthatbenefitthe
publicthatareproductofindividual'sowntalentsandenergy).Inaddition,
becausecopyrightdoesnotrestraintheuseofamereideaorconceptbutonly
protectsparticulartangibleexpressionsofanideaorconcept,ithasbeenheldnot
torunafouloffirstamendmentchallenges.United States v. Bodin,375F.Supp.1265,
1267(W.D.Okl.1974);Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates,345F.Supp.108,11516
(N.D.Cal.1972),citing,Nimmer,Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?,17U.C.L.A.L.Rev.1108(1970).See Zacchini, supra,433U.S.
at57778n.13,97S.Ct.at285859n.13(rightofpublicitycouldnotprevent
stationfromproducingownhumancannonballact).Theprotectedtangible
expressionsareassertedtonotrunafouloffirstamendmentchallengesbecausethe
noticerequirementsandlimiteddurationofcopyrightprotectionbalancesthe
interestofindividualsseekingprotectionunderthecopyrightclauseandthefirst
amendment.See, e.g., Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and Press?, supra,1193.Becausethephrase"Here'sJohnny"ismoreakintoanidea
orconceptofintroducinganindividualthananoriginalprotectablefixed
expressionofthatideaandbecausetherightofpublicityinthisinstanceisnot
complementedbysavingnoticeordurationrequirements,phrasessuchas"Here's
Johnny"shouldnotbeentitledtoprotectionundertherightofpublicityasa
matterofpolicyandconcernforthefirstamendment.
Apartfromthepossibilityofoutrightfederalpreemption,publicpolicyrequires
thatthepublic'sinterestinfreeenterpriseandfreeexpressiontakeprecedence
overanyinterestJohnnyCarsonmayhaveinaphraseassociatedwithhisperson.
III.CaseLaw
Thecommonlawrightofpublicityhasbeenheldtoprotectvariousaspectsofan

individual'sidentityfromcommercialexploitation:[FN6]*842name,[FN7]
likeness,[FN8]achievements,[FN9]identifyingcharacteristics,[FN10]actual
performances,[FN11]andfictitiouscharacterscreatedbyaperformer.[FN12]
Researchrevealsnocasewhichhasextendedtherighttopublicitytophrasesand
otherthingswhicharemerelyassociatedwithanindividual.
FN6.Theconceptthatanindividualshouldhavetherighttoprotectand
profitfromthecommercialuseofhisname,likeness,achievements,
identifyingcharacteristicsandactualperformancestookmanyformsasmodern
advertisingandmerchandisingtechniquesdevelopedandthename,etc.of
celebritiesassumedgreatervalue.Shipley,Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades
Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption,66CornellL.Rev.673,678
(1981).Therightofpublicityasadistinctrightisofrelativelyrecent
origin.ThisrightwasfirstrecognizedintheSecondCircuitcaseofHaelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,202F.2d866(2dCir.),cert. denied,
346U.S.816,74S.Ct.26,98L.Ed.343(1953).Onlyin1953didthisright
emergefromtherighttoprivacy,thetortofmisappropriation,theunfair
competitiondoctrineandothertheoriesincontractanddefamation,asa
distinctandseparatetheory.Thescopeanddefinitionofnewcommonlaw
rightsisoftenhazyinthedevelopmentprocess.Ettore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Corp.,229F.2d481,490(3dCir.)cert. denied,351U.S.926,76
S.Ct.783,100L.Ed.1456(1956).Althoughsomeofthecasescitedin
footnotes49,infra,discusstheseothertheories,itisevidentfroma
readingofthecasesthatvirtuallyallofthecourtswereconcernedwith
protectionofanindividual'srighttocontrolandprofitfromthecommercial
useofhisname,likeness,etc.andwereattemptingtocometogripswiththis
newinterest.Forthesereasons,severalcaseswhichdonotspecifically
refertotherightofpublicityarecitedforpropositionstowhichtheright
ofpublicitywouldnownodoubtbeapplied.
FN7.See e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co.,415F.2d1205(8thCir.1969)(realname);
Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co.,89F.2d891(2dCir.1937)(stagename);Hirsch
v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,90Wis.2d379,280N.W.2d129(1979)(nickname);
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,25Cal.3d860,603P.2d454,160
Cal.Rptr.352(1979)(stagerealname).
FN8.Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,447F.Supp.723(S.D.N.Y.1978)(likeness).See, e.g.,
Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,367F.Supp.876(S.D.N.Y.1973)(likeness);McQueen v.
Wilson,117Ga.App.488,161S.E.2d63(Ct.App.),rev'd on other grounds,224Ga.
420,162S.E.2d313(1968)(likeness);Brinkley v. Casablancas,80A.D.2d428,
438N.Y.S.2d1004(1stDept.1981);see Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,
25Cal.3d860,603P.2d454,160Cal.Rptr.352(1979)(likeness
impersonation);Memphis Development v. Factors Etc., Inc.,616F.2d956(6th
Cir.),cert. denied,449U.S.953,101S.Ct.358,66L.Ed.2d217(1980);King v.
American Heritage Products, Inc.,250Ga.135,296S.E.2d697(1982).
FN9.See, e.g., Palmer v. Schonhorn,96N.J.Super.72,232A.2d458
(Super.Ct.1967)(individual'sachievements);Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Productions,25Cal.3d860,603P.2d454,160Cal.Rptr.352(1979)(norightto
individual'slifestory);Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,58
Misc.2d1,294N.Y.S.2d122(Sup.Ct.1968),aff'd. mem.,32A.D.2d892,301
N.Y.S.2d948(App.Div.1969)(norighttoindividual'slifestory);Donahue v.
Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp.,2Utah2d256,272P.2d177(1954)(no

righttoindividual'slifestory).
FN10.Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,498F.2d821(9thCir.1974)
(identifyingcharacteristics/distinctiveracingcar);Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc.,58A.D.2d620,396N.Y.S.2d661(App.Div.1977)(identifying
characteristics/bandleader'sgesturessetting,nicknameMr.NewYear'sEve).
FN11.Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,433U.S.562,97S.Ct.2849,53
L.Ed.2d965(1977)(actualperformance);Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Corp.,229F.2d481(3dCir.),cert. denied,351U.S.926,76S.Ct.783,100
L.Ed.1456(1956)(actualperformance).
FN12.Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co.,523F.Supp.485
(S.D.N.Y.1981);Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,400F.Supp.836(S.D.N.Y.1975)
(Laurel&Hardycharacters).See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,25Cal.3d813,603
P.2d425,160Cal.Rptr.323(1979)(Dracula).
Thethreecasescitedbythemajorityinreachingtheirconclusionthattheright
ofprivacyshouldbeextendedtoencompassphrasesandotherthingsmerely
associatedwithanindividualandoneothercasemeritfurthercomment.Hirsch v.
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,90Wis.2d379,280N.W.2d129(1979),Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,447
F.Supp.723(S.D.N.Y.1978),andMotschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,498F.2d821
(9thCir.1974),arefactuallyandlegallydistinguishablefromthecaseonappeal.
Hirschsimplystandsfortheprincipleacceptedbythecommentators,ifnotbythe
courts,thattherightofpublicityextendsnotonlytoanindividual'snamebutto
anicknameorstagenameaswell.*843Hirsch, supra,280N.W.2dat137;Comment,
The Tort of Misappropriation of Name or Likeness Under Wisconsin's New Privacy Law,1978
Wis.L.Rev.1029,1046;Prosser,Privacy,48Cal.L.Rev.383,404(1960).Hirsch
requiredthatthenameclearlyidentifythewrongedperson.Hirsch, supra,280N.W.2d
at137.Hirschgoesontostatethatifafictitiousnameisused,contextmaybe
sufficienttolinkthefictitiousnamewiththecomplainingindividual,and
thereforegiverisetoprotectionunderarightofpublicity.IntheHirschcase,
contextsuppliedthemissinglinkwhichisnotpresenthere.Hirsch,a/k/a
"Crazylegs,"wasafamousfootballplayerandallaroundathlete.Heisdescribed
asthesuperstaroftheera.Id.280N.W.2dat131.Hemadeanumberof
commercialsandadvertisementsduringhiscareerandamoviewasproducedonhis
life.Hisuniquerunningstyle,whichwasdescribedbytheHirschcourtaslooking
somethinglikeawhirlingeggbeater,earnedhimhisnickname.Id.280N.W.2dat
131.ThedefendantinHirsch,S.C.Johnson&Son,marketedamoisturizingshaving
gelforwomenunderthenameof"Crazylegs."Thecontextlinkingthisproductto
HirschwasJohnson'sfirstpromotionofitsproductatarunningeventforwomen,
theuseofacheerinatelevisioncommercialsimilartothe"Crazylegs"cheer
initiatedatacollegewhereHirschbecameathleticdirector,andthefactthatthe
productwasforwomen'slegs.Id.280N.W.2dat138.Basedonthisevidenceof
"context,"theWisconsinappellatecourtfoundaquestionoffactforthejuryasto
whether"Crazylegs"identifiedHirsch.Inthiscase,notonlyisthemajoritynot
dealingwithanicknameorastagename,butthereisnotascintillaofevidenceto
supportthecontextrequirementofHirsch.[FN13]Appelleehasonlyusedthecontent
ofthe"Here'sJohnny"phraseonitsproductanditscorporatenameastransfigured
bythedoublemeaningof"John."
FN13.Infact,Iconcurwiththatportionofthemajority'sopinioninwhich
wefindnoreasonablelikelihoodofconfusionbetweenJohnnyCarson'slicensed

productsandappellee'sportabletoilets.
InAli,MuhammadAlisoughtprotectionundertherightofpublicityforthe
unauthorizeduseofhispictureinPlaygirlMagazine.Aliisa"likeness"case
reinforcedbythecontextinwhichthelikenessoccursandfurtherbolsteredbya
phrase,"theGreatest,"commonlystatedbyAliregardinghimself.Theessenceof
thecase,andtheunauthorizedactfromwhichAliclaimsprotection,isadrawingof
anudeblackmanseatedinthecornerofaboxingringwithbothhandstapedand
outstretchedrestingontheropesoneitherside.TheAlicourtfoundthatevena
cursoryinspectionofthepicturesuggeststhatthefacialcharacteristicsofthe
manarethoseofAli.Thecourtstated:"Thecheekbones,broadnoseandwideset
browneyes,togetherwiththedistinctivesmileandclosecroppedblackhairare
recognizableasthefeaturesof...[Ali]."Ali supra,726.Augmentingthis
likenessandreinforcingitsidentificationwithAliwasthecontextinwhichthe
likenessappearedaboxingring.Thecourtfoundthatidentificationofthe
individualdepictedasAliwasfurtherimpliedbytheaccompanyingphrase"the
Greatest."Id.727.Basedonthesefacts,thecourthadnodifficultyconcluding
thatthedrawingwasAli'sportraitorpicture.Seeid.726.Totheextentthe
majorityusesthephrase"theGreatest"tosupportispositionthattherightof
publicityencompassesphrasesorotherthingswhicharemerelyassociatedwithan
individual,theymisstatethelawofAli.Onceagain,Aliisclearlya"likeness"
case.Totheextentthelikenesswasnotaphotographiconefreefromall
ambiguity,identificationwithMuhammadAliwasreinforcedbycontextandaphrase
"theGreatest"statedbyAliabouthimself.Theresultinthatcaseisso
dependentontheidentifyingfeaturesinthedrawingandtheboxingcontextinwhich
themanisportrayedthatthephrase"theGreatest"maynotbeseveredfromthis
wholeandthelegalpropositionsdevelopedbytheAlicourtinresponsetothewhole
appliedtothephrasealone.Tobeanalogous,alikenessofJohnnyCarsonwouldbe
requiredinadditiontothewords"Here'sJohnny"suggesting*844thecontextof
"TheTonightShow"ortheAlicourtwouldhavetohaveenjoinedallothersfrom
usingthephrase"theGreatest."Inshort,Alidoesnotsupportthemajority's
holding.
Motschenbacher,thethirdcasecitedbythemajority,isan"identifying
characteristics"case.Motschenbacher,aprofessionaldriverofracingcarswhois
internationallyknown,soughtprotectionintherightofpublicityforthe
unauthorizeduseofaphotographofhisracingcar,slightlyaltered,inatelevised
cigarettecommercial.Althoughhewasinfactdrivingthecaratthetimeitwas
photographed,hisfacialfeaturesarenotvisibleinthecommercial.
Motschenbacher, supra,822.TheNinthCircuitfoundasamatterofCalifornialaw,
thattherightofpublicityextendedtoprotecttheunauthorizeduseofphotographs
ofMotschenbacher'sracingcarasoneofhisidentifyingcharacteristics.
Identifyingcharacteristics,suchasMotschenbacher'sracingcar,arenotsynonymous
withphrasesorotherthingswhicharemerelyassociatedwithanindividual.In
Motschenbacher,theNinthCircuitdeterminedthatthecardriverhad"consistently
'individualized'hiscarstosetthemapartfromthoseofotherdriversandtomake
themmorereadilyidentifiableashisown."Id.Since1966,eachcarhada
distinctivenarrowwhitepinstripeappearingonnoothercar.Thisdecorationhas
alwaysbeeninthesameplaceonthecarbodies,whichhaveuniformlybeenred.In
addition,hisracingnumber"11"hasalwaysbeenagainstanovalbackgroundin
contrasttothecircularwhitebackgroundusedbyotherdrivers.Id.Inthe
commercial,thephotoofMotschenbacher'scarwasalteredsothatthenumber"11"
waschangedto"71,"aspoilerwiththename"Winston"wasadded,andother

advertisementsremoved.Theremainderoftheindividualizeddecorationsremained
thesame.Id.Despitethesealterations,theNinthCircuitdeterminedthatcar
possessedidentifyingcharacteristicspeculiartoMotschenbacher.Id.827.This
caseisfactuallyandlegallydistinguishablefromthecaseonappeal.
Motschenbacher'sracingcarwasnotmerelyassociatedwithhimbutwasthevehicle,
literallyandfiguratively,bywhichheachievedhisfame.Theidentifying
characteristics,intheformofseveraldecorationspeculiartohiscar,werethe
productofhispersonaltime,energy,effortandexpenseandassuchare
inextricablyinterwovenwithhimashisindividualworkproduct,ratherthanbeing
merelyassociatedwithhim.Furthermore,thenumberandcombinationofthepeculiar
decorationsonhiscarsresultsinasetofidentifyingcharacteristics,which
althoughinanimate,areuniqueenoughtoresistduplicationotherthanby
intentionalcopying.Thisuniquenessprovidesnoticetothepublicofwhatis
claimedaspartofhispublicityright,asdoesanindividual'sname,likenessor
actualperformance,andnarrowlylimitsthescopeofhismonopoly.Incontrastto
Motschenbacher,JohnnyCarson'sfameasacomedianandtalkshowhostisseverable
fromthephrasewithwhichheisassociated,"Here'sJohnny."Thisphraseisnot
JohnnyCarson's"thumbprint";itisnothisworkproduct;itisnotoriginal;it
isacommon,simplecombinationofadirectobject,acontractedverbandacommon
firstname;divorcedfromcontext,itistwodimensionalandambiguous.Itcan
hardlybesaidtobeasymbolorsynthesis,i.e.,atangible"expression"ofthe
"idea,"ofJohnnyCarsonthecomedianandtalkshowhost,asMotschenbacher'sracing
carwasthetangibleexpressionoftheman.
Finally,Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,58A.D.2d620,396N.Y.S.2d661
(App.Div.1977),whichalthoughnotcitedbythemajorityisdiscussedbyanumberof
thecommentatorswiththecasescitedbythemajority,doesnotgosofarasto
extendtherightofpublicitytophrasesorthingswhicharemerelyassociatedwith
anindividual.InLombardo,anadvertisingagencyandforeignautomobile
manufacturerenteredintonegotiationswiththebandleader,GuyLombardo,forthe
purposeofproducingatelevisioncommercialdesignedtodepictLombardoandhis
orchestrainNewYear'sEvepartyhats,playing"AuldLangSyne"whilemodelsof
carsrotatedintheforeground.*845 Lombardo, supra,396N.Y.S.2dat665(Hopkins,
J.,concurring).Afternegotiationsbetweenthepartiesfellthrough,theagency
andmanufacturerproceededwiththecommercial.Anactorwasemployedtoleada
bandplaying"AuldLangSyne"inthesamemusicalbeatasdevelopedbyLombardo,
usingthesamegesturesasLombardoemployedinconductinghisband.Lombardothen
institutedsuitclaimingthattheagencyandmanufacturerhaduseda"likenessand
representation"ofhimselfwithouthisconsent,violatinghisstatutoryrightto
privacyunderNewYorklawandhiscommonlawrighttobefreefromthe
misappropriationofhiscultivatedpublicpersonaas"Mr.NewYear'sEve."Id.396
N.Y.S.2dat664.TheLombardocourtfoundnostatutoryviolationbutdidfinda
causeofactiontobestatedunderLombardo'scommonlawtheory.Lombardoappears
tobeinparta"likeness"casebasedonimpersonationreinforcedbycontext,andin
partan"identifyingcharacteristics"caselikeMotschenbacher.The"likeness"
aspectcomesfromtheactorportrayingabandleader,Lombardo'sprofessionand
vehicleforhisfame,whileusingthesamegesturesemployedbyLombardoanda
musicalbeatlinkedtohim.AsinAli,likenessisreinforcedbycontextthe
trappingsofNewYear'sEve,balloons,partyhatsandthebandplaying"AuldLang
Syne."LikeMotschenbacher,Lombardo'sgestureswhileconductingarepartofhis
"thumbprint"andhismusicalbeatandrenditionof"AuldLangSyne"onNewYear's
Eveareprobablyinseverablefromhisfame.Lombardo,however,isalesscompelling
caseforfindingarightofprivacythanMotschenbacherandhissimilaritiestothe

caseonappeal.UnliketheseveralindividualizeddecorationsonMotschenbacher's
car,onlytheconductinggesturesandmusicalbeatareuniquetoLombardo.The
veryelementsthatheurgedtiedhimtohispersonaas"Mr.NewYear'sEve"arenot
peculiartohimbutaresharedwithnumerousbandleadersonNewYear'sEve
balloons,partyhatsand"AuldLangSyne."Thecommonnessofthesecrucialalleged
"identifyingcharacteristics"undercutsthevalueoftheircombinationbyLombardo.
InMotschenbacher,thecombinationofseveralindividualizeddecorationspeculiarto
Motschenbacherresultedinrelativelyclearnoticetothepublicofwhattheextent
ofMotschenbacher'smonopolyrightwasandresultedinthismonopolyrightbeing
verynarrow;itprotectedonlytheunauthorizeduseofphotographsordepictionsof
aparticularsetofidenticalcars.Incontrast,inLombardo,thenetresultof
thecourt'sopinionwouldseemtobethatLombardohasamonopolyrightenforceable
againstanyonewhowishestoduplicateabandleaderplaying"AuldLangSyne"amid
thetrappingsofaNewYear'sEveparty.Limitations on the Right of Publicity, supra,123.
TheLombardocourtdidnotexploretheanticompetitiveorfreeexpression
ramificationsofitsdecision.Id.AswiththeholidayNewYear'sEve,thesong
"AuldLangSyne"andpartytrappingssuchasballoonsandpartyhatsinLombardo,
thephrase"Here'sJohnny"isverycommonandhardlypeculiartoaparticular
individual.Unlikethecombinationofcommonandunique(gesturesandmusical
beat)elementsinLombardo,thephrase"Here'sJohnny"asusedheredoesnotexist
incombinationwithotherelements,withtheexceptionofthepun,the"Great
Commodium,"anindirectreferencetoJohnnyCarson,tonarrowthemonopolyright
proposedorapprisethepublicofwhatisclaimed.Unlikethesituationin
MotschenbacherandLombardo,thephrasecontainsnothingpersonaltoCarsoninthe
senseofbeingcausedbyhimoraproductofhistime,effortandenergies.
Therefore,whilequestioningthemeritsofextendingtherightorprivacyasfaras
thecourtdidinLombardo,primarilyforthecourt'slackofpolicyanalysis
concerninganticompetitiveconsequencesandfirstamendmentproblems,Ibelievethat
Lombardoisdistinguishable.
Accordingly,neitherpolicynorcaselawsupportstheextensionoftherightof
publicitytoencompassphrasesandotherthingsmerelyassociatedwithanindividual
asinthiscase.IwouldaffirmthejudgmentoftheDistrictCourtonthisbasis
aswell.
698F.2d831,218U.S.P.Q.1,9MediaL.Rep.1153
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