MA. GINA L.

FRANCISCO,
JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS
M. JOAQUIN,
Complainants,

A.C. No. 6155

Present:
- versus -

ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P.

PORTUGAL,
Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairman,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 14, 2006

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint[1] on 15 August 2003 against

Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross
misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 15262123 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v.
People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on
Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the abovementioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice
of petitioners therein.

The facts are as follows:

On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando
M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the
accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals
and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the
Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial
ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan[2] found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide
and one count of attempted homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied
in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion
for Reconsideration.[3] Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this
Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (AdCautelam) on 3 May 2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent
telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries,
complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out
without any forwarding address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally
verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the
case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had
already issued a Resolution[4] dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and nonpayment of docket fees.
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of
arrest[5] had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts
remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration
from lapsing.

In his Comment,[6] respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes
that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide
and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on
hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But
only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion
for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made
informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the
Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the
efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and
that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses
that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with
this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,[7] seeking an additional
thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by
registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed
within the reglementary period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the herculean efforts he made in assisting the
accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered
the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his
handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate
financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to
explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for
the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the
contact person between respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as
their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to
sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he
could not locate the registry receipt issued for
the letter.

Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and
endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court.
Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to
find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent
suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.
On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
(Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three
complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference
held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further
participate in the IBP proceedings.[8]
The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005,
Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty
of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility [9] and recommended the imposition of
penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months. [10] On 12 November 2005, the
Board
of
Directors
of
the
IBP
resolved
to
adopt
and
approve Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically
to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented,
whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 15262123, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension
recommended by the IBP proper.
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent
has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of
the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As
held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:[11]

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and
duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good
faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x .
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from
any other profession in society. x x x[12]

At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of
time. Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File
Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he
should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading [13] and it
rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion
did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already
lost their right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore,
respondent cannot now say he filed thead cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is
the allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution dated7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute.
As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely
fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the
rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been
quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though
respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the
examination of the pleadings[14] he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the
same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents
office would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the
prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution
since they had constantly called respondents office to check the status of the case. Even when
he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have
been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the
case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had

he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between
them.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer
who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of
withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this
Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients
on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by
Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the
accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice
to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave
them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It
should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper
withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such
was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card,
which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3
Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that
complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the
latter had filed the ad cautelampetition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as
counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court
pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.[15]
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorneyclient relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to
conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to
abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final
adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause.[16]

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition
was primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed
inAromin v. Boncavil[17] that:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care,
and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[18]

Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without
adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim
when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip
in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with
account number 7186509273.[19] Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the
deposited amount.
The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between
the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper
consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v.
Atty. Magulta:[20]
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and
client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a
business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.[21]

Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:

A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may
be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x [22]

Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his
obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still
remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither
diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the
shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: the
accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage
of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario
C.Macato.[23] Rule 14.01[24] of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers
not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the
defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that salvaged the
victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an
event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6)
months, the most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain
why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal
brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the
Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension. [25] The Court
finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar
Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE,

MAXIMO B. USITA, JR. and
WILFREDO C. ANDRES,

G.R. Nos. 154297-300

Petitioners,

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN,

SPECIAL DIVISION,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
February 15, 2008

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari alleging that the Sandiganbayan, Special Division,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 11, 2002 retaining petitioners, Atty. Maximo B. Usita,
Jr. and Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), as counsels de oficio of
then accused President Joseph Estrada and his son, Jose Jinggoy Estrada.
The facts are as follows:
On March 15 and 18, 2002, Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of PAO
personally appeared before respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan [1] to request the

relief of the appearance of PAO as de oficio counsel for accused President Joseph Estrada and
Jose Estrada in their criminal cases before the Sandigabayan. However, the request was
denied.
On May 8, 2002, the Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and Ex-Parte Motion to be
Relieved as Court-Appointed Counsel with the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, praying
that she be relieved of her duties and responsibilities as counsel de oficio for the said accused on
the ground that she had a swelling workload consisting of administrative matters and that the
accused are not indigent persons; hence, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the
services of PAO.
On May 9, 2002, respondent Court found the reasons of the Chief Public Attorney to be
plausible and relieved the Chief Public Attorney as counsel de oficio of former President Joseph
Estrada and Mayor Jose Estrada.
On May 14, 2002, the remaining eight PAO lawyers filed an Ex-Parte Motion To Be
Relieved As Court-Appointed Counsels with respondent Court on the ground that the accused,
former President Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada, are not indigents; therefore, they are not
qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO.
On May 28, 2002, respondent Court issued a Resolution denying the motion, but
retaining two of the eight PAO lawyers, namely, the petitioners Atty. Usita, Jr. and Atty.
Andres. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
. . . There being no compelling and sufficient reasons to abandon the Courts
previous rulings, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. While it is true that a similar
motion filed by the PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta was granted per
Courts Resolution of May 9, 2002, the rationalization advanced by Atty. Rueda was
found meritorious by the Court in that there was unexpected upsurge in her
administrative workload as head of the office including the administration and
supervision of more or less 1,000 PAO lawyers and 700 staff nationwide and many
other functions which require her immediate attention and undivided time.
Nonetheless, considering that there are eight (8) de oficio counsels from the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO), the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
deems it proper to reduce their number and retain only two (2) of them, namely: Atty.
Wilfredo C. Andres and Atty. Maximo B. Usita to continue their duties and
responsibilities as counsels de oficio for accused Joseph and Jose Jinggoy Estrada. [2]

The retained lawyers of PAO joined the four Court-appointed counsels from the private
sector, namely, Prospero Crescini, Justice Manuel Pamaran, Irene Jurado and Noel Malaya.

On June 4, 2002, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution

dated May 28, 2002.
In a Resolution dated June 10, 2002, respondent denied the motion for reconsideration,
thus:
xxx

xxx

xxx

It appearing that the ground raised by the movants PAO lawyers are mere
rehashes/reiterations of their previous arguments which the Court finds to be not valid
justification for them to be relieved, either temporarily or permanently of their duties
and responsibilities as counsels de oficio in these cases, the instant motion in hereby
DENIED.[3]

Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by respondent in
rendering the Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 10, 2002.
On September 21, 2004, PAO filed a Manifestation and Compliance which informed the
Court that petitioners Atty. Usita and Atty. Andres were appointed as Assistant City Prosecutors
of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office sometime in August 2002, and that PAO is left as the
lone petitioner in this case.
The issue is whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the subject Resolutions retaining two PAO lawyers to
act as counsels de oficio for the accused who are not indigent persons.
PAO contends that it is undeniable that in retaining its two PAO lawyers as counsels de
oficio of former President Estrada and Jose Estrada, respondent Court relied upon the
provisions of Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio.The Court, considering the gravity
of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as
counsel de oficio such members of the bar in good standing, who, by reason of their
experience and ability, can competently defend the accused.

PAO, however, submits that the power of respondent to appoint and retain PAO lawyers
as counsels de oficio is limited by Sec. 20 of Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 20
dated December 31, 1972 and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1725 dated September 26, 1980,
thus:

LOI No. 20
Sec. 20. The Citizens Legal Assistance Office shall represent, free of charge,
indigent persons mentioned in Republic Act No. 6035, or the immediate members of
their family, in all civil, administrative, and criminal cases where after due
investigation the interest of justice will be served thereby, except agrarian reform
cases as defined by Republic Act 3844, as amended, which shall be handled by the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and such
cases as are now handled by the Department of Labor.
PD No. 1725
WHEREAS, the Citizens Legal Assistance Office as the law office of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines for indigent and low-income persons,
performs a vital role in the implementation of the legal aid program of the State, in
upholding the rule of law, in the protection and safeguarding of the institutional and
statutory rights of the citizenry, and in the efficient and speedy administration of
justice.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 renamed the Citizens Legal Assistance Office
as the Public Attorneys Office and retained its powers and functions. Section 14, Chapter 5,
Title III, Book V of the said Code provides:
Sec. 14. Public Attorneys Office (PAO). The Citizens Legal Assistance
Office (CLAO) is renamed Public Attorneys Office (PAO). It shall exercise the
powers and functions as are now provided by law for the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office or may hereafter be provided by law.

In the implementation of the foregoing provisions of law, PAO issued Memorandum

Circular No. 5, Series of 1997, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 2001,
and subsequently by Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2002, defining who are indigent
persons qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO, thus:

Section 3. Indigency Test. Taking into consideration recent surveys on the

amount needed by an average Filipino to 1) buy its food consumption basket and b)
pay for its household and personal expenses, the following shall be considered
indigent persons:
1. Those residing in Metro Manila whose family income does not
exceed P14,000.00 a month;

2. Those residing in other cities whose family income does not

exceed P13,000.00 a month;
3. Those residing in all other places whose family income does not
exceed P12,000.00 a month.
The term family income as herein employed shall be understood to refer to
the gross income of the litigant and that of his or her spouse, but shall not include the
income of the other members of the family.

PAO states that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities attached to the records of the cases
of the accused show that they were not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO,
since they could afford the services of private counsels of their own choice. It noted that the
wife of former President Estrada had an income exceedingP14,000.
PAO argues that the only exception when it can appear on behalf of a non-indigent client
is when there is no available lawyer to assist such client in a particular stage of the case, that is,
during arraignment or during the taking of the direct testimony of any prosecution witness
subject to cross-examination by the private counsel on record. The appearance of PAO is only
provisional in those instances.
PAO asserts that the sole reliance of respondent on Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is improper. Respondent should have not only considered the character
of PAO lawyers as members of the Bar, but especially their mandate to serve only indigent
persons. In so doing, the contradiction in the exercise of PAOs duties and responsibilities
could have been avoided.
PAO asserts that while its lawyers are also aware of their duties under Rule 14.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,[4] PAO lawyers are limited by their mandate as government
lawyers.
Hence, PAO submits that the subject Resolutions of respondent are not in accordance
with the mandate of PAO and affect the rendition of effective legal service to a large number of
its deserving clients.
In defense, respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, represented by the Office
of the Special Prosecutor, stated that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion since it did not
act in an arbitrary, capricious and whimsical manner in issuing the subject Resolutions.

It explained that it was facing a crisis when respondent issued the subject Resolutions. At
that time, the accused, former President Joseph Estrada, relieved the services of his counsels on
nationwide television. Subsequently, the counsels of record of co-accused Jose Estrada
withdrew, and both accused were adamant against hiring the services of new counsels because
they allegedly did not believe in and trust the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan had the duty
to decide the cases, but could not proceed with the trial since the accused were not assisted by
counsel.
Respondent stated that, bound by its duty to protect the constitutional right of the accused
to be heard by himself and counsel, it exercised its prerogative under Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,[5] and appointed Chief Public Attorney Persida V. RuedaAcosta of the PAO and eight other PAO lawyers, including petitioners, to act as counsels de
oficio for the said accused. As noted earlier, the Chief Public Attorney and six PAO lawyers
were later relieved from such duty, but respondent retained two PAO lawyers as counsels de
oficio for the accused.
Considering the attendant situation at the time of the issuance of the subject Resolutions,
respondent asserts that it did not act in an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical manner in
issuing the subject Resolutions. In appointing the PAO lawyers to act as counsels for the said
accused, respondent merely acted within the prerogative granted to it by the Rules of Court in
order to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel. Respondent also merely required petitioners to perform their duty as members of the
Bar and officers of the court to assist the court in the efficient administration of justice.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.[6]
The Court holds that respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the subject
Resolutions as the issuance is not characterized by caprice or arbitrariness. At the time of
PAOs appointment, the accused did not want to avail themselves of any counsel; hence,
respondent exercised a judgment call to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be
heard by themselves and counsel during the trial of the cases.
Subsequently, respondent reduced the number of PAO lawyers directed to represent the
accused, in view of the engagement of new counsels de parte, but retained two of the eight PAO
lawyers obviously to meet such possible exigency as the accused again relieving some or all of
their private counsels.

In any event, since these cases of the accused in the Sandiganbayan have been finally
resolved, this petition seeking that PAO, the only remaining petitioner, be relieved as counsel de
oficio therein has become moot.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

GORETTI ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOEL M. GRIJALDO, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a
unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once
this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual
lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of
the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence
in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession. In this administrative case for
disbarment, respondent Atty. Joel M. Grijaldo failed to perform his sworn duty to preserve
the dignity of the legal profession.
[1]

Complainant Goretti Ong is a widow residing in Talayan Village, Quezon City.

Sometime in the early part of 1996, she engaged the services of respondent, a practicing
lawyer in Bacolod City, as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 52843 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 5, against Lemuel Sembrano and
Arlene Villamil for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. During one of the hearings of
the case, the accused offered to amicably settle their civil obligation to complainant by
paying the amount of P180,000.00. Complainant accepted the offer on the condition that
payment shall be made in cash.
[2]

At the hearing held on July 17, 1996, respondent advised complainant to wait outside
the courtroom. When he came out, he handed to complainant cash in the amount of
P100,000.00 and Metrobank Check No. 0701263862 for P80,000.00, postdated August
16, 1996, drawn by Atty. Roger Reyes, counsel for the accused. Complainant objected to
the check payment and refused to settle the case, but he assured her that the check was
drawn by a reputable lawyer. Complainant was prevailed upon by respondent into signing
an affidavit of desistance, but she instructed him not to file it in court until the check is
cleared.
Upon presentment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to a stoppayment order from the drawer. Complainant immediately informed respondent of the
dishonor, and the latter told her that he will talk to Atty. Reyes about it. Later, when
complainant met with respondent in Manila, he relayed to her Atty. Reyes offer to replace
the check with cash. Several weeks passed without any payment of the proceeds of the
check, despite complainants repeated telephone calls to respondent. Sometime in
December 1996, she suggested that respondent move for a hearing of the case, but he
told her that courts are not inclined to set hearings near the Christmas season.

On December 17, 1996, complainant personally went to Bacolod City to inquire about
her case. She was surprised to learn that the same was dismissed as early as September
26, 1996. Apparently, respondent submitted her Affidavit of Desistance and, on the basis
thereof, the public prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the case which was granted by
the court. When complainant confronted respondent, he admitted to her that he had
already received the amount of P80,000.00 from Atty. Reyes but he used the same to pay
for his financial obligations.
[3]

[4]

Thus, on April 2, 1997, complainant filed an Administrative Complaint against

respondent for disbarment.
[5]

Complainant further alleged in her complaint that respondent represented her in

another case, entitled People of the Philippines versus Norma Mondia, also for violation
of B.P. 22, where she was the offended party. Respondent approached the accused,
Norma Mondia, and offered to delay the hearing of the case in consideration of the
amount of P10,000.00. However, Mondia did not have that amount of money. Attached to
the complaint is the affidavit of Norma Mondia attesting to this fact.
[6]

Furthermore, Henry Tiu, a former client of respondent, executed an affidavit, which is

attached to the complaint, alleging that he gave respondent the amount of P3,000.00 for
the purpose of posting his bail bond, but respondent did not post his bail which resulted in
Tius arrest.
[7]

Likewise, a certain Luz Dimailig, whose affidavit is also attached to the complaint,
averred that respondent represented her as counsel for plaintiff in a civil case before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 52; that the case was dismissed by the trial
court; that the appeal filed by respondent to the Court of Appeals was dismissed due to his
failure to file the appellants brief; and that the petition for review before the Supreme
Court was denied for lack of proof of service on the Court of Appeals, late filing and late
payment of docket fees. Moreover, Dimailig alleged that she gave respondent the amount
of P10,000.00 for settling the said civil case, but she later learned that he did not remit the
money to the defendants or their counsel.
[8]

On June 25, 1997, respondent was required to file his comment within ten days from
notice. Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time, alleging that he has not received
a copy of the complaint. On February 5, 1998, complainant furnished respondent a
copy of the complaint. However, despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, respondent still
failed to file his comment.
[9]

[10]

[11]

On October 19, 1998, respondent was required to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment. Respondent
[12]

filed a Compliance, stating that the copy of the complaint he received from complainant
was not legible. Complainant again furnished respondent with a clearer and more legible
copy of the complaint including its annexes; but respondent still did not file his comment.
Consequently, on June 14, 2000, another show cause order was issued against
respondent. Respondent replied by stating that the quality of the copy furnished him by
complainant was worse than the first one he received.
[13]

Dissatisfied with respondents explanation, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of

P1,000.00, which he complied with on November 27, 2000. However, he again failed to
file his comment and, instead, moved for additional time to file said comment.
[14]

On August 13, 2001, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The records of the IBP show that
respondent has not filed his comment to the complaint. On January 18, 2002, the
Investigating Commissioner, Manuel A. Tiuseco, submitted his report recommending the
disbarment of respondent. However, in its Resolution No. XV-2002-553 dated October 19,
2002, the IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty of disbarment and recommended
instead respondents indefinite suspension from the practice of law for grossly immoral
conduct and deceit.
[15]

[16]

[17]

After a careful review of the records of this case, we find the recommendation of
Commissioner Manuel A. Tiuseco well-taken.
It is clear that respondent gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by
his client, the complainant. Were it not for complainants vigilance in inquiring into the
status of her case, she would not have known that the same had already been dismissed
on September 26, 1996. Respondent deliberately withheld this fact from her,
notwithstanding that she talked to him sometime in December 1996.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04
state:
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Respondent breached his duty to his client when he failed to inform complainant of the
status of the criminal case. His negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and

diligence required of every lawyer. His infraction is rendered all the more deplorable by
the fact that complainant is a resident of Quezon City and the case was filed in Bacolod
City. It was precisely for this reason that complainant engaged the services of respondent,
a Bacolod-based lawyer, so that her interests in the case may be amply protected in her
absence. Respondents failure to look after his clients welfare in the case was a gross
betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust and confident which was reposed in
him. In a similar case, we held:
[18]

It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become
his client. He has the right to decline employment subject however, to the provision of Canon 14 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him.
Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the status of the case
and to respond within a reasonable time to his clients request for information. Respondents failure
to communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or
conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the
status of its case.
[19]

Worse, when respondent used the money which he received from Atty. Reyes to pay
for his own obligations, he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states that [a] lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession. Furthermore:
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those
of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful lees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Respondents misappropriation of the money entrusted to him and his refusal to
account for it to his client despite repeated demands were competent proof of his
unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him. His acts showed a lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. He
held the money in trust for his client as settlement of the case he was handling. Upon
receipt thereof, he was under obligation to immediately turn it over, in the absence of a

showing that he had a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should have been scrupulously careful
in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of
fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted.
[20]

A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice
and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report
promptly the money of his client that has come into his possession. He should not
commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his
clients consent. Respondent, by converting the money of his client to his own personal
use without her consent, was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. Not only
did he degrade himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he besmirched the fair name of an
honorable profession.
[21]

Aside from violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondents failure to

promptly turn over the money to his client and his conversion of the same for his personal
use rendered him liable for contempt under Rule 138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Unlawful retention of clients funds; contempt.--- When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the
court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not
be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, respondent violated his oath of office and duties as counsel when he
approached his clients opponent and offered to delay the case in exchange for money.
His offer to delay the case would have frustrated the interests of his client which he had
sworn to protect. As a lawyer, respondent should avoid any unethical or improper
practices that impede, obstruct or prevent the speedy, efficient and impartial adjudication
of cases.
[22]

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of

his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of
the community to the legal profession.
[23]

Respondents act of propositioning his clients .opponent and offering to delay the case
against her was intended to benefit the latter. Hence, such act amounted to doubledealing and conflict of interest, and was unethical practice of law. Attorneys, like Caesars
wife, must not only keep inviolate their clients confidence, but must also avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
[24]

Finally, respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the directives of this Court
to file his comment constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct
indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A resolution of this Court is not to be construed
as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.
Respondents obstinate refusal to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in
his character; it also underscores his disrespect of our lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof.
[25]

Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of
his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is
especially so, as in the instant case, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful
orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe
and maintain the respect due the courts.
[26]

All told, respondents transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave

misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not only to
complainant, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that
the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of
the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. He has proved himself unworthy of
membership in the legal profession and must, therefore, be disbarred.
[27]

WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and grossly unethical behavior,

respondent ATTY. JOEL GRIJALDO is DISBARRED from the practice law. His name is
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to PAY complainant
Goretti Ong the amount of P80,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision.
This Decision shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice;

the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; the Philippines Judges Association; and all
courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

GAMALIEL
ABAQUETA, complainant, vs.
FLORIDO, respondent.

ATTY.

BERNARDITO

A.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Bernardito A. Florido filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, praying that
appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent for representing conflicting interests.
[1]

Complainant is a Filipino by birth who had acquired American citizenship. He resides

at 15856 N. 15th Way, Phoenix, Arizona 85022, U.S.A. Respondent is a practicing lawyer
based in Cebu City.
On November 28, 1983, complainant engaged the professional services of respondent
through his attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, to represent him in Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R, entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Deceased
Bonifacia Abaqueta, Susana Uy Trazo, petitioner before the Regional Trial court of Cebu.
[2]

[3]

Accordingly, respondent entered his appearance in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R

as counsel for herein complainant. Subsequently, he filed complainants Objections and
Comments to Inventory and Accounting, registering complainants objection
[4]

. . . to the inclusion of the properties under Items 1 to 5 contained in the inventory of the
administratrix dated November 9, 1983. These properties are the sole and exclusive properties of
the oppositor per the latest tax declarations already marked as Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in
the Formal Offer of Exhibits by oppositor in writing dated August 17, 1983 xxx.
[5]

Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of money against
complainant, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and entitled, Milagros Yap
Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Abaqueta and Casiano Gerona. Respondent signed the
Complaint as counsel for plaintiff Milagros Yap Abaqueta, averring, inter alia, that:
[6]

Plaintiff and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal owners of those certain parcels of land,
more particularly as follows
The parcels of land referred to as conjugal property of complainant and Milagros
Yap-Abaqueta are the very same parcels of land in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R
which respondent, as lawyer of complainant, alleged as the sole and exclusive
properties of complainant. In short, respondent lawyer made allegations in Civil Case No.
CEB-11453 which were contrary to and in direct conflict with his averments as counsel for
complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R.

Complainant further averred that respondent admitted he was never authorized by the
former to appear as counsel for complainants ex-wife in Civil Case No. CEB-11453; that
respondent failed to indicate in the Complaint the true and correct address of herein
complainant, which respondent knew as far back as August 2, 1990, when he wrote a
letter to the complainant at the said address. Consequently, complainant failed to receive
summons and was declared in default in Civil Case No. CEB-11453. While the order of
default was eventually set aside, complainant incurred expenses to travel to the
Philippines, which were conservatively estimated at $10,000.00. He argues that
respondents conduct constitute professional misconduct and malpractice as well as
trifling with court processes.
[7]

In his defense, respondent claims in his Answer that he always acted in good faith in
his professional relationship with complainant in spite of the fact that they have not
personally met. He based the matters he wrote in the Complaint on information and
documents supplied by Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, complainants sister-in-law and attorney-infact, indicating that he was sole and exclusive owner of the properties. This was
sometime in November 1983. No affidavit of adjudication was ever furnished respondent
by complainant and this was apparently suppressed because it would show that the
properties formed part of the estate.
[8]

Eight years later, in November 1991, long after Special Proceedings No. 3971-R was
settled and the attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent was
terminated, Mrs. Milagros Abaqueta through Mrs. Baclig, engaged his services to file Civil
Case No. CEB-11453. Mrs. Baclig presented to him a deed of absolute sale dated July 7,
1975, showing that the properties subject hereof were not complainants exclusive
property but his conjugal property with his wife, the same having been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, in all good faith, respondent alleged in the complaint
that said properties were conjugal assets of the spouses.
[9]

Respondent further pointed out that his law firm handles on the average eighty new
court cases annually and personally interviews four or five clients, prospective clients
and/or witnesses daily except Saturdays and Sundays. It regularly closes to the public at
7:00 p.m., but work continues sometimes until 8:30 p.m. This has been going on for the
last twenty-five years out of respondents thirty-three years of private practice. The
absence of personal contact with complainant and the lapse of eight years resulted in the
oversight and/or lapse of respondents memory that complainant was a former
client. Furthermore, the caption of the Special Proceeding was not in the name of
complainant but was entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Bonifacia Payahay
Abaqueta.

Respondent expressed regret over the oversight and averred that immediately after
discovering that he formerly represented complainant in Special Proceeding No. 3971-R,
he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff, which was granted by the trial court.
He denied any malice in his acts and alleged that it is not in his character to do malice
or falsehood particularly in the exercise of his profession.
[10]

In his Comments/Observations on Respondents Answer, complainant averred that

respondents conduct was geared towards insuring a court victory for Milagros Yap in Civil
Case No. CEB-11453, wherein he deliberately stated that complainants address was
9203 Riverside Lodge Drive, Houston, Texas, 77083, U.S.A., when he knew fully well that
complainants true and correct address was c/o V.A. Hospital, 7 th Street & Italian School
Road, Phoenix, Arizona, 85013, U.S.A. By falsely stating and concealing his true and
correct address, respondent eventually succeeded in obtaining a default judgment in favor
of his client.
[11]

During the pendency of these proceedings before the IBP, it appeared that
respondents son got married to the daughter of IBP National President Arthur D.
Lim. Thus, Atty. Lim inhibited himself from participating in the resolution of the case.
Subsequently, a Resolution was issued requiring the IBP to elevate the entire records of
the case within thirty (30) days from notice.
[12]

[13]

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not respondent violated
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The investigating commissioner
found that respondent clearly violated the prohibition against representing conflicting
interests and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months.
We find the recommendation well-taken.
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty
to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In short, if
he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client.
[14]

[15]

There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer

will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any

matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
[16]

As pointed out by the investigating commissioner, respondent does not deny that he
represented complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R. He also does not deny that
he is the lawyer of Milagros Yap Abaqueta in Civil Case No. CEB-11453, filed against
complainant and involving the same properties which were litigated in Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R. Respondent also admitted that he did not secure the consent of
complainant before he agreed to act as Milagros Yap Abaquetas lawyer in Civil Case No.
CEB-11453.
The reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his clear
representation of conflicting interests in this case. First, the investigating commissioner
observed that the name Gamaliel Abaqueta is not a common name. Once heard, it will
surely ring a bell in ones mind if he came across the name again. In this case,
respondent actively prosecuted the cause of complainant in Special Proceedings No.
3971-R, such that it would be impossible for respondent not to have recalled his name.
Second, assuming arguendo that respondents memory was indeed faulty, still it is
incredible that he could not recall that complainant was his client, considering that Mrs.
Charito Baclig, who was complainants attorney-in-fact and the go-between of complainant
and respondent in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, was the same person who brought
Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him. Even a person of average intelligence would have made
the connection between Mrs. Baclig and complainant under such circumstances.
Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R are the same properties could not have escaped the attention of
respondent. With such an abundance of circumstances to aid respondents memory, it
simply strains credulity for him to have conveniently forgotten his past engagement as
complainants lawyer. What rather appears, given the prevailing facts of this case, is that
he chose to ignore them on the assumption that the long period of time spanning his past
and present engagement would effectively blur the memories of the parties to such a
discrepancy.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline such employment,
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he
agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence and champion the latters cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care and devotion.
[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client. The reason for the
prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. Indeed, as we stated in Sibulo v. Cabrera, The
relation of attorney and client is based on trust, so that double dealing, which could
sometimes lead to treachery, should be avoided.
[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

Credence cannot, however, be given to the charge that respondent fraudulently and
maliciously falsified the true and correct address of the complainant notwithstanding
respondents knowledge thereof. Lawyers normally do not have knowledge of the
personal circumstances of a party in a case and usually rely on the information supplied
by their clients. The fact that respondent sent a letter to complainant at the latters correct
address sixteen months before the filing of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 does not by itself
prove malice on the part of respondent. A new address was furnished by Milagros Yap
Abaqueta days before the complaint was filed. Respondent had no reason to doubt the
correctness of the address of the complainant given to him by Milagros Yap Abaqueta
considering that she was complainants wife.
[26]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Bernardito A. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
Three (3) months. He is further ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in
the performance of his duties towards his clients and the court. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.