A Test of Two Postulates

Underlying Expectancy Theory^

FREDERICK A. STARKE
University of Manitoba
ORLANDO BEHLING
Ohio State University
The descriptive accuracy of two of the axioms underlying expectancy theoryindependence and transitivity
is examined. It was found that many individuals did not
make work effort decisions in a manner consistent with
these normative postulates. The implications for the
predictive accuracy of expectancy theory are discussed.
In recent years, a great deal of effort has been directed at gaining an
improved understanding of the processes through which individuals come
to expend varying levels of effort in on-the-job situations. A predictable outcome of this emphasis has been the proliferation of motivation theories,
some of which (7, 14) simply identify important variables while others
(1, 23) propose various interactions among the defined variables. Campbell,
Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick (3) label the former as content theories and
the latter as process theories.
Within the process group, expectancy theory recently has been dominant.
Vroom's (23) definitive statement of expectancy theory proposes that individual effort expenditures are a function of the desirabilities of certain
outcomes and the individual's estimate that these desired outcomes can be
attained. Specifically, there are three important variables in Vroom's proposal: instrumentality, valence (two types), and expectancy.
Instrumentality is the subjective belief by an individual that certain
outcomes lead to the attainment of other outcomes. It is thus an outcomeoutcome measure and ranges from 1 (belief that a second outcome is
attainable without the first outcome) through 0 (belief that there is no
relationship between the first outcome and a second outcome) to + 1
Frederick A. Starke (Ph.D.Ohio State University) is Associate Professor of Business
Administration, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
Orlando Behling (Ph.D.University of Wisconsin) is Professor of Management Sciences,
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
1 The research reported here was conducted by the first author as part of his doctoral
program at Ohio State University. The second author supervised the research,
703

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December

(belief that the outcome in question is necessary and sufficient for achievement of a second outcome).
Two types of valence exist in Vroom's formulation. The valence of
possible outcomes (such as status and recognition, which are usually
positively valent, and working long hours, which is usually negatively valent) is labelled Vki the valence of actual job performance is labelled Vj. The
valence of job performance is hypothesized to be the result of a multiplicative
interaction between (a) the individual's subjective perception that certain
job activities will facilitate achievement of desired outcomes and (b) those
outcomes viewed as desirable by the individual. Specifically, the interaction
is as follows:

VJ =J^
where Vj = the valence of performance level j
Ijk = the instrumentality of outcome j for the attainment
of outcome k
Vk = the valence of outcome k
n = the number of outcomes
Expectancy is defined as a momentary belief of an individual that an act
on his part will be followed by a given outcome. The value of the expectancy associated with any action-outcome pair may range from 0 (no
relationship perceived) to + 1 (complete certainty that the performance of
the act will result in the outcome). Vroom hypothesizes that expectancy
combines multiplicatively with the valence of job performance as follows:

where Fi = the force (motivation) to perform act i

Eij = the strength of the expectancy that outcome j will
follow from act i
Vj = the valence of outcome j
n = the number of outcomes
The individual cognitively analyzes the alternatives open to him and performs the act with the greatest positive or smallest negative force.
Other researchers have elaborated and extended the basic Vroom model.
Of these elaborations and extensions, five models are most widely known:
Porter and Lawler's (18) Expectancy Model; Graen's (6) Modified Instrumentality Theory; Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick's (3) Hybrid Expectancy Model; House's (8) Path-Goal Contingency Theory; and
Lawler's (11) Motivation Model.

1975

Volume 18, Number 4

705

Recently, a number of writers (2, 15, 16, 24) have questioned many of
the features and assumptions inherent in Vroom's basic expectancy model.
Criticisms of the theory range from concerns about the manner in which
the variables are conceptualized to questions about the descriptive accuracy
of the assumptions underlying expectancy theory. The research described
here pursues the line of questioning the descriptive accuracy of the normative postulates underlying expectancy theory.
Both Vroom's original expectancy statement and the elaborations and
refinements proposed by others place heavy emphasis on the expectancy
"core," i.e., the hypothesized 2(Ei]Vj) relationship which purportedly
predicts effort. This central core is actually a work motivation variant of
the subjective expected utihty (SEU) theory of decision making (20) and
assumes that individuals systematically analyze the value of performance and
the likelihood that it can be achieved before coming to a level-of-effort
decision. The mathematical similarity between SEU theory and expectancy
theory is evident when the formal statement of each is presented:
SEU Theory

Expectancy Theory

n
Optimum action =

i
(P.U)

where P. = the prob^bnity of

outcome i occurring
U. = the subjectively perceived utihty of
outcome i

Expectedlevelofeffort=

^^^""^ ^^ = the probability that act

' ^ ' " '^'""^^'" ""^'^^'"^ ^
^^ ^ * " ^^"^'^^ ^^ ""^^""^^ J

Vroom himself recognized the similarity of the basic expectancy core

and SEU theory by stating:" The concept of force as used here is similar to
Luce's (13) subjective expected utility" (23, p. 18). Further support for
the contention that the central core of expectancy theory is similar to the
basic SEU formulation is provided by Wahba and House (24) who trace
the roots of expectancy theory and its relation to SEU theory.
Subjective expected utihty theory has a well defined set of axioms underlying it, and Behding and Starke (2) argue that since the central core of
expectancy theoi7 is an SEU-type proposal, the axioms underlying SEU
theory are implicitly included in expectancy theory. For expectancy theory
to be viable (i.e., descriptively accurate), it is necessary (though not sufficient) that these assumptions describe the processes through which individuals arrive at a level of work effort decision. Until very recently, however, expectancy theorists have accepted these assumptions virtually without
question.
This study tests the descriptive accuracy of two of the normative postulates underlying expectancy theory. The two postulates tested are independence and transitivity.

706

Academy of Management Journal

December

Independence. There is no relationship between the valence of an outcome and the individual's estimate of the likelihood that it will follow
from working at a certain level of effort, i.e., rEjj.vj = .00.
Transitivity. Preference orderings of 2(EijVj) and of Vk's are transitive.
a. Given S(E,,Vj),>2(E,jV])2, and 2(E,jVj)2> 2(EuVj)3, then
where > is read as "having greater motivational force than."
b.

Given Vji>Vj2, and Vj2>Vj3, then Vji>Vj3,

where > is read as "preferred to."

This research used a design which overcomes a number of objections
raised regarding previous studies of expectancy theory. While the perfect
method remains elusive, the following criticisms of past studies are largely
met by this research:
1. Lack of Longitudinal Data. Only a few studies (10, 12, 21, 22) have
examined the same subjects over time. In addition, no studies (longitudinal
or otherwise) have explicitly tested the descriptive accuracy of the postulates underlying expectancy theory.
2. Deficiencies in Presenting Second Level Outcomes. A number of researchers (4, 15, 19) have criticized past studies of expectancy theory for
(a) faihng to present subjects with both positive and negative second level
outcomes (Vk's), and (b) not assuring that each subject is presented with
his most valent outcomes. In the research reported here, unique lists involving the four most desired and two least desired outcomes were generated for
each subject. This approach allowed greater variability in subject responses
and minimized the possibility that common questionnaires for all subjects
would mask relationships that would be apparent on an individual basis.
3. Confusing Importance with Desirability. A number of studies have
departed from Vroom's (23) definition of valence (desirability of outcomes
or satisfaction anticipated from their attainment) and instead have operationally defined it in terms of its importance to the subjects. As Dachler and
Mobley (4) note, this has neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis.
Therefore, in this study, subjects were asked to subjectively assess the
amount of satisfaction they would feel if the relevant outcome were attained.
4. Failure to Use Subjects from Multiple Organizations. Pritchard and
Sanders (19) argue that it is advantageous to draw subjects from different
organizations since this increases variability in subject responses and constitutes an excellent test of the predictive accuracy of the basic expectancy
model. In this study, although all subjects were studied in a single situation,
they were drawn from 40 service and manufacturing organizations, thus
varying the degree to which the successful completion of the task at hand
would be instrumental for obtaining company-controlled outcomes.

1975

Volume IS, Number 4

707

METHOD
The subjects were 54 lower and middle level managers taking a management development course at a Canadian university. Questionnaires designed to operationalize the basic expectancy variables were administered
seven times over a three month period as follows:
Instrumentality
Subjects were asked to indicate on seven point summated scales the
relationship they perceived between successful completion of the course
and the attainment of both positively and negatively valent outcomes, with
3 stated as "I will definitely (valent outcome inserted) even if I do not
successfully complete this course" and + 3 stated as "I will definitely (valent
outcome inserted) if I successfully complete this course."
Valence
Each subject was initially presented with a list of 17 outcomes that have
been used in other expectancy studies and asked to indicate his or her six
most valent (four positive and two negative) outcomes. Each individual's
choice pattern was recorded and a unique questionnaire was generated for
each of the 54 subjects for the seven subsequent data gathering points. As
noted above, it is important when measuring valence to ensure that desirabihty, not importance, is assessed. Accordingly, valence was operationalized on seven point summated scales, with 3 stated as "This outcome
would displease me greatly if it occurred," and +3 stated as "I would be
greatly pleased if this outcome occurred." Test-retest reliabilities were
computed across all valences (range.76 to .97; median.91); but since
each subject picked different outcomes, the meaning of the reliability coefficient is not clear. Computation of test-retest reliabilities could be done using common subsets of valence choices; this procedure would result in
coefficients higher than those indicated.
Expectancy
Each subject was asked to indicate his or her subjective perception that
four specific behaviors (e.g., regularly reading the text, regularly attending
class, etc.) would lead to successful completion of the course. The subjects
were asked to indicate their perceptions in a "chances in 10" format which
allowed conversion of subject responses to probability assessments even
though many of the subjects had no understanding of formal probability
theory. The internal reliability of these four questions was assessed by computing a Spearman-Brown split half reliability coefficient which equalled
.75.

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Academy of Management Journal

708

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1975

Volume 18, Number 4

709

Effort
A self-report (seven point scale ranging from 3 to -|-3) of effort
expended by each subject on a week by week basis was used. Subjects were
asked to indicate the amount of time they had spent during the preceding
week on class-related activities such as reading the text, taking class notes,
etc.
As the internal and test-retest reliabilities indicate, the difficulties often
encountered in using survey techniques to test expectancy theory as noted
by DeLeo and Pritchard (5) did not arise in this study. Correlation analysis
was used to assess the extent to which actual individual decision patterns
conformed to the transitivity and independence postulates.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The discussion of results is divided into two parts, one relating to the
transitivity postulate and the other to the independence postulate.
Transitivity Postulate
The data generated to test the transitivity postulate are presented in
Table 1. (Due to space limitations, data are presented only for selected
subjects whose responses are illustrative of the variations noted.) In order
to determine whether a consistent order of "effort preferences" existed for
the respondents, it was necessary to compare the "computed effort," generated by the formula EijS(IjkVk), and "actual effort," generated by summated individual self-report responses to questions concerning their effort.
The computed effort is shown in an ordered array from largest negative to
largest positive for each respondent; the week in which this measurement
occurred is also noted. The self-report measure of effort is then compared
with the computed effort (in terms of agreement of progression from largest negative to largest positive) to observe the extent of agreement between
the two measures.
It is clear from an inspection of Table 1 that none of the individuals
exhibit a logically consistent pattern, i.e., one in which the numbers in both
columns consistently move in the same direction. An analysis of one respondent will serve to illustrate the point. Subject number 32, for example,
exhibited the following pattern:
Week
6
7
4
5
3
2
1

Computed
Effort
-44.00
-34.50
-33.00
-21.00
-15.00
0.00
95.00

Self-Reported
Effort
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00

710

Academy of Management Journal

December

The basic expectancy model is premised on the belief that an individual

will exert continually more effort as computed effort increases. It is clear
from the above example, however, that this is not the case. There is, in fact,
no consistent relationship between reported effort and computed effort.
Inconsistency can be observed by viewing the computed and self-reported
effort expenditures in pairs. For example, with respect to computed effort in
weeks 6, 7, and 4 (E6, E7, and E4), the basic expectancy model predicts
that E7>E6. In addition, E4>E7 and logic argues that as a result E4
should be greater than E6. To determine whether this is actually the case,
the self-reported effort column must be analyzed to determine whether selfreported effort in week 4 exceeds that for week 6. In this triplet it does, of
course, and no inconsistency is evident. With 7 weeks of preferences, however, there are 21 triplets. There are V2m (m-1) triplets possible in any
paired comparison test; m = the number of "objects" presented to an individual (in this case, seven).
An examination of certain of these 21 triplets indicates inconsistencies.
For example, considering variables E3, E4, and E5, the preferences are as
follows:
E(computed)
E( self-reported)
3>5
3>5
3>4
3>4
5>4
4>5
The third comparison involving these three variables causes difficulties since
there is a disagreement between the effort that should have been expended
if expectancy theory is correct and the amount of effort that was actually
expended. Findings of this nature have negative implications for expectancy theory because they cast doubt on one of its key predictions
that actual effort expended will increase as the "computed effort" component increases. However, the determination of what constitutes a "practically significant" deviation from perfect consistency while still accepting
fundamental adherence to the transitivity postulate remains open to debate
in spite of the fact that a large amount of "consistency of choice" research
has been conducted by decision theorists during the past 20 years.
The determination of what is important in a practical sense also arises
when subjects are tested for consistency in their choices of valent outcomes.
Sheridan, Slocum, and Richards, for example, in using a paired comparison
test to assess the ability of 49 nurses to state transitive preferences for 18
valent outcomes found:
The valence scores represented a highly transitive ordering of preferences in
that eighty-four percent of the nurses had less than twelve incidents of an intransitive ordering of valence scores among all sets of 3 different outcomes (22,
p. 6).

It is probably pointless to argue about how many intransitivities are "too

many," but it remains open to question whether Sheridan et al.'s conclusion
that their subjects exhibited a "highly transitive ordering of preferences" is

1975

Volume 18, Number 4

711

defensible. In the present study, the consistency of valence preferences was

assessed in two ways. First, each respondent was given a paired comparison
questionnaire containing his six most valent (positive and negative) outcomes and asked to make a choice between each pair. A total of 13 intransitivities were noted in this sample (N=54). Second, a subsample of
29 respondents was given a paired comparison questionnaire containing
only positively valent outcomes. It was felt that significantly more intransitivities would result since respondents would have a more difficult time
distinguishing between outcomes because they were all favorable and therefore were not noticeably different. In the subsample, a total of 15 intransitivities were noted, approximately double the rate observed in the entire
sample. These findings suggest that individuals experience much greater
difficulty in dealing with similar outcomes than they do with dissimiliar
ones. The overall rate of intransitivities in this study, however, was considerably lower than that reported by Sheridan et al. This is probably
explained by the number of outcomes respondents were asked to consider
in each study18 in the Sheridan et al. study and 6 in the present research.
It seems likely that more intransitivities will occur as the number of choice
dimensions increases.
Independence Postulate
The data generated to test the descriptive accuracy of the independence
postulate are presented in Table 2. In order to determine the extent to which
the independence postulate is an accurate representation of individual behavior, the covariation between individual preferences for various outcomes
and the expectancy that these could be attained was analyzed. Table 2
indicates the relationship found between both types of valence (Vj's and
Vk's) and expectancy. Since the Vj component is a sum, only one figure is
generated for each person, while there are six Vk's because there are six
second level outcomes. The expectancy (Eij) component is the sum of the
four specific behaviors noted above divided by 4. (To be conceptually
precise, the only correlation which explicitly tests the independence postulate is that between Eij and Vj; however, the correlations between Eij and
the individual Vk's are also included.)
An inspection of the data contained in Table 2 indicates a fairly general
distribution of significant correlations between both types of valence and
expectancy. Although at an intuitive level this is detrimental to expectancy
theory, it is more important to come to some conclusions about individual
cases. When this is done, it becomes apparent that some individuals do not
violate the postulate at all; others show multiple violations. Of the 54 respondents, 27 exhibit at least one significant correlation between one Vk
and Eij; 15 respondents show a lack of independence for the summed Vk's
( V J ) . In addition to the significant correlations generated, a substantial
number of coefficients are quite large (although not statistically significant
because the A^ for each subject is only seven).

December

Academy of Management Journal

712

TABLE 2
Correlations Between Both Types of Valence and Expectancy
Respondent

Correlations Between Valence (Vt)

and Expectancy (En)
V,
V,

b^

V,

02
03
04
05
07
08
09

-.34
.00
.00

-.51

.42

.56
.05
.40
.15
-.73*

1 f\

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
52
53
54
55
56
57

.57
.00
,60
.38
.89**
.19
-.89**
.76*
.33
.5(,
.27
.58
.47
.96**
.88**
.85**
.34
-.35
.85**
.08
.25
-.75*
.35
.32

-.51
-.17
-.55

-.67*
-.44
-.52

.22
-.38
.57

,14
-.18

-.23
.64
.50

.84**
.10
.25

-.06
-.13
-.38
.12
.00

.25
-.13
.27
-.25

.93**

-.40
.03

.19
-,38
.99**

.29
.48

.30
.89**
.00
-.42
.99*
.04
.40
-.56
.14

,62
.88**
-.70*
.64*
-.02
.62
.00
-.54
.68*
-.37
-.40
.44
-.34
-.35
-.49

-.83**
.39
-.68*
-.26
-.34

.13
.79*
.24

.64*
-.22
.78**
.51
.84**
.67*
.41
.52
-.01
.37
-.50
.25

.73*
,55
-.18
.37
.44
,26
.26

,47
-.11
-.49
-.27
.14
,35
-.33
.58
-.65*
-,65*
.34

.25
.72*
.03
-.05

.40
.63

-.29
.17
.77*

-.43

.73*

-.48
.26

.21

,14

-.25
-.07
.71*
.28

.63
.06

**p < .01

.27

.11

.55

*p < .05

.34
-.05
,47
-.02

-.17
.87**

.41
.06
-,51
.36
.77*

.63
-.48
-.26
.64*
.04
-.21
,22
-.40

Correlations
Between Valence
(V,) and
Expectancy (En)
Ve

v>

-,52

.90**
.83**
-,68*

.23
.25
.27

.28
.54
-.19
-.27

-.70*
-.68*
-.16
-.64*
-.80**
.21
.41
.17
-.63
-.65**
-.30

-.50
.00
.03
-.40
.38

.55
.75*

.68*
-.07

.12
,22

.71*
.47
.11
-.42
-.55
-.89**
,71*
-.58
.10
.86**
.64
-.45
-.85**
,24
.61
.72*
-.08
.18
.24
-.30
.81**
-.44

-,67*
.02
-.28
-.28
.69*
.31
-.32
-.55
,17

.27
-.87**
-.57
-.20
-.58
-.29
.73*
-.29
-.50
.74*
-.26

1975

Volume 18, Number 4

713

One major difficulty exists when analyzing data relating to the independence postulate. Specifically, some subjectsNumbers 5, 10, 42, 43, and
44exhibited no variation over the seven time periods for one or both of the
variables of interest. The blank spaces in the matrices indicate this difficulty,
noting that a correlation coefficient in cases of this type is not conceptually
meaningful. When all cases of this type are removed from the analysis, 200
correlations remain. Of these, 43 are statistically significant. This, in combination with the many coefficients that exceed .40 (but are not statistically
significant), throws considerable doubt on the descriptive accuracy of the
independence postulate as it relates to expectancy theory.
CONCLUSION

The research strategy of testing the postulates underlying expectancy

theory rather than testing the theory itself is, at this writing, in an exploratory
stage. The evidence generated in this study indicates that numerous individuals do not exhibit behavior patterns that are consistent with two of the
normative postulates of expectancy theory.
With respect to the transitivity postulate, none of the subjects exhibited
effort preference patterns consistent with the basic expectancy model. It is
possible that the significance of this finding is overstated (since the criterion
of agreement was very strict), yet an examination of the data contained in
Table 1 leads to the conclusion that few systematic changes in effort occurred as proposed in expectancy theory. When the difficulty of the calculations assumed in expectancy theory is taken into consideration, these inconsistencies are not surprising. It seems highly unlikely that individuals will
routinely spend the time required to make decisions in a systematic fashion.
Rather, they likely will engage in a process which only roughly approximates
an SEU-type analysis, with time and cognitive constraints deterring maximizing behavior in most routine decisions.
In further research testing of the transitivity postulate, it will be important to examine the effect of different numbers of second level outcomes
and the impact this has on determining what an "acceptable" level of intransitivity is.
Many of the same general observations can be made about the independence postulate. At this point, the two major questions are: (a)
In a given sample, how many individuals can exhibit a lack of independence
between Vj and Eij before the independence postulate is clearly violated
and (b) How do individual differences mediate the rate of nonindependent
responses? Answers to these questions undoubtedly will be forthcoming as
research progresses in the area of testing postulates.
Although the apparent violation of these necessary postulates of expectancy theory does not eliminate the possibility that individuals may
arrive at levels of work effort through some combination of the variables
considered in expectancy theory, it does indicate that, if these results are
supported in future studies, the specific combination of them hypothesized

714

Academy of Management Journal

December

by Vroom (23) cannot be an accurate description of the processes involved

in level-of-work effort decisions.

REFERENCES
1. Adams, J. S. "Toward an Understanding of Inequity," Journal of Abnormal Social
Psychology, Vol. 67 (1963), 422-426.
2. Behling, Orlando, and F. Starke. "The Postulates of Expectancy Theory," Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 16 (1973), 373-388.
3. Campbell, J. P., M. D. Dunnette, E. E. Lawler, K, E. Weick. Managerial Behavior,
Performance and Effectiveness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).
4. Dachler, H, Peter, and William H. Mobley. "Construct Validation of an InstrumentalityExpectancy-Task-Goal Model of Work Motivation: Some Theoretical Boundary
Conditions," Journal of Applied Psychology Monograph, Vol. 58 (1973), 397-418,
5. DeLeo, Phillip J., and Robert Pritchard. "An Examination of Some Methodological
Problems in Testing Expectancy-Valence Models with Survey Techniques," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance. Vol. 12 (1974), 143-148,
6. Graen, G. "Instrumentality Theory of Work Motivation: Some Experimental Results
and Suggested Modifications,'" Journal of Applied Psychology Monograph, Vol. 53
(1969), 1-25.
7. Herzberg, F., B. Mausner, and B. Snyderman. The Motivation to Work (New York:
Wiley, 1959).
8. House, R. "A Path-Goal Contingency Theory of Leadership" (Unpublished paper, 1971).
9. House, Robert J., H. Jack Shapiro, and Mahmoud Wahba, "Expectancy Theory as a
Predictor of Work Behavior and Attitude: A Re-evaluation of Empirical Evidence,"
Decision Sciences, Vol. 5 (1974), 54-77,
10. Lawler, E. E. "A Correlational-Causal Analysis of the Relationship Between Expectancy
Attitudes and Job Performance," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol, 52 (1968), 462468.
11. Lawler, E, E. Pay and Organization Effectiveness: A Psychological View (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1971).
12. Lawler, E. E., and L, Suttle. "Expectancy Theory and Job Behavior," Oragnizational
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