Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic

of the Philippines
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SPONSORED ADS
Civil Law Equity Change of Name Change of Sex Marriage
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. Hes a biological male who feels trapped
in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure
was successful he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the
change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth
certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes,
among others, so that he can marry his American fianc.
The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity;
that Silverios misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in
any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not
make any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fianc and the realization of
their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision
of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be
changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing
legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was
passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in

petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio
insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed
properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is based(gender reassignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name may
only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment
as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the
local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the
civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was
just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person
is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by
Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a maleto-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if Silverios petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has
to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
privilege.

CASE DIGEST: COMPAIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs.

ALHAMBRA CIGAR AND CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING CO.
FACTS:

It is admitted that plaintiffs trade name as evidenced by the certificate issued under the
Spanish regime, consists solely of the words La Flor de la Isabela. Plaintiff does not claim that
the word Isabela has been registered by it as a trade name or that it has a title from any
source conferring on it the exclusive right to use that word.

Defendant began the manufacture of cigarettes, offering them to the public in packages
on the front side of each of which appeared the words Alhambra Isabelas.

Action is brought to enjoin the defendant from using the word Isabelas.

The exclusive right to use this name, plaintiff claim arises from two causes: First, the
contraction of the phrase La Flor de la Isabela into the word Isabela by popular expression
and use; and second, the use for more than twenty years of the word Isabela.

Judgment was for plaintiff and defendant appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether defendants use of the word Alhambra Isabela is an infringement to the use of
trade name.

HELD:

The statute prohibits the registration of a trade name when the trade name represents
the geographical place of production or origin of the products or goods to which the trade name
refers, or when it is merely the name, quality or description of the merchandise with respect to
which the trade name is to be used. In such cases, therefore, no trade name can exist.

The two claims of the plaintiff are identical; for, there could have been no contraction
brought about by popular expression except after long lapse of time. The contraction of the
phrase in to the word would create no rights, there being no registration, unless it resulted from
long use.

The opinion of the plaintiff must fail. It shows that in not a single instance in the history of
the plaintiff corporation, so far as is disclosed by the record, has a package of its cigarettes
gone into the market, either at wholesale or retail with the word Isabela alone on the package
as a separate or distinct word or name.

Even admitting that the word Isabela may have been appropriable by plaintiff as a
trade name at the time it began to use it, the evidence showing that it had been exclusively
appropriated by the plaintiff would have to be very strong to establish the fact of appropriation
and the right to exclusive use. The law as it stands and has stood since the Royal Decree of
1888 prohibits the use of a geographical name as a trade name.

The judgment appealed from is reversed.

Sergs vs. Pci Leasing and Finance

Sergs Products, Inc. vs. Pci Leasing and Finance, Inc.

G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000.
Panganiban, J.:
Doctrine: After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be
considered as personal or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise.
Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting
party.
Facts: On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing for
short) filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of money, with an application for a writ of
replevin.
On March 6, 1998, respondent judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and
deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the
necessary expenses. On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to
petitioners factory, seized one machinery with [the] word that he [would] return for the other

machineries. Petitioners then filed a motion for special protective order, invoking the power of
the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a
directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. This motion was opposed by
PCI Leasing, on the ground that the properties [were] still personal and therefore still subject to
seizure and a writ of replevin.
In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as
defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties agreement to the contrary notwithstanding.
They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties.
They further stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal
because the contracts in which the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and
farcical.
On April 6, 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of
the remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from
taking the rest.
Issue: Whether the said machines are personal, not immovable, property which may be a proper
subject of a writ of replevin.
Held: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of
personal property only. Section 3 thereof reads:
SEC. 3. Order. Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall
issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to
be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his
custody.
On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real property as
follows:
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
x x xx x xx x x
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
x x xx x xx x x
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal
elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or
personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they
are essential and principal elements in the industry. In that sense, petitioners are correct in
arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the
Civil Code.

Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are
not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from
claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded
from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be
considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:
12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property
notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in
any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or
any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.
Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines
as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that our holding that the machines should be deemed personal
property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good
faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In any
event, there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.