A ‘dying’ party?
S WA PA N D A S G U P TA
EVER since the general election of
May 2009 returned the Congress-led
United Progressive Alliance to power,
this time with a comfortable majority,
the political buzz in India has centred
on a new phenomenon: the absence of
a viable Opposition.
On paper, the fears appear un-
founded. Despite its defeat, the BJP-
led National Democratic Alliance has
a meaningful presence in the Lok
Sabha; the combined Opposition is
also in a position to seriously embar-
rass the UPA in the Rajya Sabha; and,
for better or for worse, the BJP and its
allies still control state governments
in large states such as Madhya
Pradesh, Gujarat, Bihar, Karnataka
2 and Chhattisgarh, not to mention its
hold over smaller states such as
Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal.
SEMINAR 605 – January 2010
Yet, despite this formidable
presence that could become the
springboard for a future challenge to
the Congress, the BJP has conveyed
the impression of being mentally de-
feated. Following the second succes-
sive defeat in the national elections,
it has been engulfed in an existential
crisis which has manifested itself in
leadership squabbles, internal dissen-
sions over policies and an inability to
attract new adherents. Those who
stood solidly by the party during the
turbulent Ayodhya years when it faced
political isolation and the social op-
probrium of the chattering classes
have started having doubts over its fu-
ture. One of the intellectual stalwarts
of the party, a former cabinet minis-
ter in the Atal Bihari Vajpayee govern-
ment, was overheard in the Central
Hall of Parliament questioning the
wisdom of persisting with a ‘dying
party’.
There are always pitfalls in writ-
ing premature obituaries. Events have
an uncanny habit of resurrecting mori-
bund outfits and reviving political for-
tunes. In 1971, the Opposition to
Indira Gandhi was decimated in the
election but in 1977 the same group
was ruling at the Centre while the
Congress was witnessing splits and
internal convulsions. I personally re-
call the gloom in the Congress camp
in January 2004 when it seemed that
Vajpayee was almost certain of yet
another term in office. Those who then
spoke of Sonia Gandhi being the
BJP’s best friend now laud her re-
markable political acumen and abil-
ity to extricate the Congress from the
doldrums.
The see-saw of politics may yet
come to the rescue of the BJP in the
coming years. However, for the mo-
ment there is no doubt that the party
is in a right royal mess and politically
paralyzed.
T here are broadly three perceptions
in the BJP over what led to the second
consecutive election defeat. The first,
articulated by L.K. Advani and subse-
quently echoed by others, was that the
BJP was a victim of collateral damage.
The bravado of the Third Front, the
fear of Mayawati and the dread of
fractious coalitions and weak govern-
ments, it is said, propelled the elector-
ate into reposing faith in the Congress.
The theory is not entirely base-
less but it evades some important is-
sues. First, barring Uttar Pradesh, the
areas of Third Front intervention were
outside the BJP spheres of influence.
Second, with the exception of
Karnataka, Chhattisgarh, Himachal
Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand, where
the BJP performed spectacularly well,
there was a national swing away from
the NDA. This was so even in Gujarat,
Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, Punjab and
Maharashtra – states that were crucial
to the BJP’s calculations.
I t is also worth stressing that the BJP
attempt to make the general election
presidential in character by projecting
Advani as a ‘firm leader’ who would
provide a ‘decisive government’
didn’t click. To attribute Advani’s fail-
ure to provide the BJP an incremental
vote to his octogenarian status – a
problem brought into sharper focus by
his own campaign team’s ridiculous
bid to emulate some facets of the
Barak Obama campaign in the US –
doesn’t explain everything. But it is
worth noting that even within the BJP
there was a great deal of scepticism in
projecting Advani so over-enthusias-
tically. Grassroots BJP activists were
clearly of the view that the attributes
pinned on Advani were more suited to
Narendra Modi. The Gujarat chief
minister aroused much enthusiasm
wherever he went but was unable to
translate his own charisma into votes
for Advani.
It is striking that the explana-
tions for the defeat provided by
Advani and his personal campaign
team focused on tactical miscalcula-
tions. There was never any suggestion
that the problems of the BJP ran much
deeper.
The larger political problems
confronting the party didn’t find a
public expression – and not just after
President Rajnath Singh imposed a
gag order before the national execu-
tive meeting in June 2009. However,
they found expression in numerous
writings in the media by sympathiz-
ers and others who were clued into the
thinking within the BJP.
According to this ‘liberal’ cri-
tique, the BJP suffered from a grave
problem of perception: it was seen as
sectarian and backward-looking
killjoy by an age group that hadn’t
reached maturity when the Ayodhya
agitation was in full bloom. Advani’s
generational detachment from the
new India was a small illustration of
the problem, but far more marked was
the growing Hindu detachment from
sectarian politics.
T he liberals in the BJP stressed that
India had changed beyond recognition
in the past fifteen years. First, the era
witnessed sustained double-digit eco-
nomic growth, the end of shortages
and a consumer goods revolution un-
like any witnessed earlier. Most im-
portant, the changes were capsuled
into a very short time. Second, India
experienced globalization and sus-
tained exposure to global currents as
never before. In the past, Indians had
emigrated to break away from a self-
contained country and taste the world;
now the world arrived at the doorstep
of India – perhaps not uniformly but
quite decisively. The change in men-
tal attitudes brought about by this ex-
posure has still not been mapped in
detail but that it changed India isn’t in
any serious doubt.
Finally, the rapid economic
growth increased population mobility
and led to a surge in urbanization. Cu-
mulatively, it triggered the breakdown
of the joint family – the age-old trans-
mission centre of tradition and culture
– and produced a cultural ferment that
was initially marked by impatience
with tradition.
The BJP was an unwitting casu-
alty of the processes at work. Its hier-
archical structures, an ingrained
culture of deference and long-stand-
ing suspicion of westernization made
it an oddball in the eyes of a genera-
tion impatient to catch up with the
world. In the 1990s, the BJP appealed
to a Hindu youth that nurtured a sense 3
of emotional defeat, material depriva-
tion and an impatience for change. By
SEMINAR 605 – January 2010
 2009, another generation of youth that
had experienced the headiness of
prosperity and India’s emergence as
an economic powerhouse, felt unable
to relate to a party that had not changed
with the rest of the country. In the three
elections between 1996 and 1999, the
BJP emerged as the single largest
party, overtaking the Congress, be-
cause it replenished its core vote from
the youth and the middle classes. In
2009, the core vote shrunk dramati-
cally and left the BJP unable to attract
the incremental vote from regional
players.
T o a large extent, this shrinking ap-
peal owed to the BJP’s inability to
refashion the militant Hindutva of the
1990s. The emergence of global Is-
lamic radicalism, with some roots in
India, persuaded a section of the BJP
that the shrillness of the past would
continue to pay dividends in the
present. This miscalculation arose pri-
marily because the exasperation with
terrorism was seen in isolation. Jux-
taposed with the growing material
prosperity of the country, increased
opportunities and a growing popular
stake in the future, the resistance to
terrorism became far less populist.
There was a marked disinclination to
unsettle India’s forward march and
make a permanent enemy of India’s
Muslim community. The wave of re-
vulsion that greeted Varun Gandhi’s
Hindu machismo in Pilibhit cast the
BJP as an extremist force. Its nation-
alism became identified with the illib-
eralism of extremist players,
including those who beat up young
girls in the pubs of Mangalore. The
images that cast the BJP as the de-
fender of nationalism and Hindu inter-
ests in 1992 came to haunt it seventeen
years later.
4 It is possible that the BJP was
guilty of misreading the outcome of
the Gujarat assembly election in 2007.
SEMINAR 605 – January 2010
The perception that Modi’s second
consecutive victory (the fourth con-
secutive win for the BJP) owed to his
success in turning Sonia Gandhi’s
‘merchant of death’ taunt on its head
seems, in hindsight, to be somewhat
facile. No doubt Modi whipped up
passions in the last phase of the cam-
paign by his shrill assault on a sus-
pected terrorist, but this was merely
the icing on the cake. The substance
of the BJP campaign in Gujarat cen-
tred on Modi’s impressive develop-
ment record in the past five years.
Without a solid record of governance,
Modi’s invocation of an emotional is-
sue wouldn’t have paid dividends.
T he problem with the BJP campaign
in 2009 was that there was confusion
over where the party stood on matters
more substantive than Hindutva. In
2004, there was little ambiguity over
the BJP’s commitment to rapid eco-
nomic growth, the expansion of infra-
structure and the encouragement of
private enterprise. It is a different mat-
ter that the over-pitched slogan of ‘In-
dia Shining’ ended up consolidating
those who hadn’t fully tasted the ben-
efits of economic progress.
In 2009, the BJP failed to trans-
mit the right signals to its core con-
stituency. The five years it spent in
opposition was largely spent in denial,
obstruction and in pursuing a policy
of blind opposition to the UPA. The
party’s opposition to the Indo-US nu-
clear accord, for example, went
against the grain of its traditional con-
stituency. Indeed, it ended up project-
ing the BJP as Hindu leftists. The party
was unable to exploit the UPA’s indif-
ferent performance to its advantage
because it wasn’t clear in its mind
where it stood. In just five years, the
party dissipated its support among the
middle classes and this was reflected
in its defeat in a large number of ur-
ban seats, particularly Delhi and
Mumbai. The Congress under
Manmohan Singh ended up looking
like a better bet to many of those who
had voted BJP in the past.
It is interesting that this liberal
critique of where the BJP erred was
peremptorily brushed aside by the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh lead-
ership which saw itself as the most
important stakeholder in the party. In
the summer of 2005, disturbed and
angered by what it saw as Advani’s
heresy in Pakistan, the RSS took a de-
cision to increase its involvement in
the BJP. This was sought to be done
in a typically RSS style – through or-
ganizational control. The RSS be-
lieved that a dose of ideological
regimentation and discipline in the
ranks would see the BJP tide over its
post-defeat blues.
T he surprise appointment of Rajnath
Singh as Advani’s successor – over-
ruling the political consensus that had
developed around M. Venkiah Naidu
– was not dictated by a need to regain
Uttar Pradesh. Rajnath was a rubber
stamp to increase the RSS hold over
the organization. Following an
amendment to the party’s constitution
in 2006, the post of organising secre-
tary was created at both the party
headquarters and in the states. The or-
ganising secretary would occupy a
party post but he would be appointed
by the RSS and be answerable to it
alone.
In the past, the RSS had rou-
tinely sent its full-timers to the BJP to
assist the political leadership. In re-
cent times, these have included K.N.
Govindacharya and Narendra Modi
and among the past stalwarts were
Sundar Singh Bhandari and
Kushabhau Thakre. However, from
2006 onwards the pattern underwent
a shift. First, unlike the past where the
representation of RSS pracharaks in
the BJP had been nominal, the new
policy was to establish RSS control
over the party at all levels. The 2006
assembly election in Uttar Pradesh
was, for example, entirely managed
by pracharaks who fanned out to the
districts. There was the bizarre spec-
tacle of young pracharaks in their
twenties giving political instructions
and guidance to politicians with expe-
rience of winning three or four elec-
tions. Predictably, the outcome wasn’t
entirely happy. The BJP slipped to a
poor fourth position but this was ex-
plained away in terms of the limited
time available to the RSS to make its
wisdom felt. There was never any
question of the RSS reflecting on the
organization’s suitability for electoral
politics.
T he RSS has always nurtured a deep
disdain for politics. The founders of
the movement, and particularly M.S.
Golwalkar, viewed politics as natu-
rally divisive and a distraction from
the RSS’ central project of nation-
building. While the RSS leadership
thought it important to influence po-
litical thinking, it was always wary of
excessive involvement. The full-tim-
ers of the RSS were, in particular, al-
ways advised to maintain a healthy
detachment from partisan politics.
The BJP was always viewed as a
friendly party and the natural home of
all swayamsevaks who were inclined
to jump into public life but equally, it
was also understood that the BJP had
its own compulsions and could not be
regarded as an appendage of the RSS.
Maintaining this fine balance was
never easy and there were occasional
strains in the relationship. However,
as long as Vajpayee and Advani were
at the helm, the BJP could never really
complain that it was being suffocated
by the RSS. People such as Bhaurao
Deoras and Rajju Bhaiyya did exer-
cise tremendous influence on the BJP
but this was on account of their per-
sonalities and not an institutionalized
arrangement.
It is hard to put a finger on ex-
actly when this delicate arrangement
began to be disturbed. After the BJP’s
spectacular surge in 1991 and its suc-
cess in forming state governments,
some local RSS bigwigs developed an
undue interest in political power.
Pressures from lay swayamsevaks on
the local RSS translated into RSS
pressure on the BJP leadership. The
most glaring example of this was the
manner in which Jaswant Singh’s ap-
pointment as finance minister was
scotched in 1998 at the behest of a
RSS notable who, it was widely be-
lieved, was acting at the behest of cor-
porate interests. Throughout their
tenure in government, both Vajpayee
and Advani used to complain bitterly
at the attempted micro-management
by the RSS leadership. The RSS, it
was clear, was hell bent on enlarging
the lakshman rekha of the relation-
ship.
T he RSS was initially prone to
leveraging its volunteer army for se-
curing political returns. It was be-
lieved that the BJP was
disproportionately dependant on RSS
foot soldiers for electioneering. This
was certainly the case till the early-
1990s when the BJP’s presence
throughout the country was spectacu-
larly uneven. However, by the 1996
election it was clear that the political
momentum lay with the BJP rather
than the RSS. As more and more lo-
cal notables and activists from other
political parties flocked to the BJP,
making it the largest non-Congress
outfit, the party’s dependence on the
RSS declined. Apart from Madhya
Pradesh where the RSS network was
very extensive, the growth of the BJP
in the rest of the country owed prima-
rily to the entry of peoples and com-
munities from non-RSS backgrounds.
Vajpayee had always sought to make
the BJP a wholesome version of the
Janata Party that defeated the Con-
gress in 1977; by 1996, his mission
seemed near completion.
T here were certain features that dis-
tinguished the RSS from the BJP’s po-
litical style. First, the RSS believed
that an organization would expand
and be effective through organiza-
tional rigour and discipline. This was
based on its own experience in the
shakhas. The BJP attached a premium
on political articulation and the abil-
ity to draw in social groups. It believed
in a modicum of organization but was
never obsessive about it.
Second, the BJP, particularly
Vajpayee, believed that the growth of
the party could happen only when in-
dividuals and groups from different
political and cultural traditions also
rallied behind it. The BJP may have
flaunted its credentials as an ‘ideo-
logical’ party with a cadre base. The
reality, however, was very different.
It was at variance with the RSS which
believed in a composite ideology and
strict regimentation.
Finally, the community life of
the RSS was woefully incestuous. The
organization was markedly partial to-
wards those who had attended
shakhas in their youth and were will-
ing to parade in khaki shorts on appro-
priate occasions. There was an
unstated belief in the RSS that
swayamsevaks were morally superior
to those Hindus who had never been
exposed to the shakha environment.
Predictably, such an attitude posed
problems in the functioning of the
BJP. As the party expanded, the RSS
grew more and more reckless in its in-
sistence that only their chosen ones
could occupy positions of importance.
From being a remote moral ombuds- 5
man, the RSS soon transformed itself
into a faction in the BJP.
SEMINAR 605 – January 2010
 This transformation had pro-
found consequences. After the 2004
defeat, the RSS arrived at the conclu-
sion that the NDA failed because it
was insufficiently attentive to the core
concerns of Hindu nationalism. It was
believed that the correction could take
place if there was appropriate RSS in-
tervention at all levels. The ‘retire-
ment’ of Vajpayee and Advani was a
key component of the RSS strategy.
The appointment of Rajnath was sup-
posed to herald a slow organizational
takeover which would, in time, lead to
the BJP resuming its role as an ‘ideo-
logical’ party.
A lthough the RSS decided to give
Advani a final shy at power in 2009,
its heart was never in the election cam-
paign. Backed by his RSS point man,
Rajnath did his utmost to undermine
the projection of the BJP as a respon-
sible, centrist, party of governance.
Prior to the election, he encouraged
dissidence in Rajasthan, Gujarat and
Bihar. A particular attempt was made
to cut Narendra Modi to size by fer-
menting a Patel revolt in which the
VHP stalwart Praveen Togadia played
a major part. Prior to the 2007 assem-
bly election, the RSS even instructed
its full-timers to refrain from support-
ing Modi. In Uttar Pradesh, the selec-
tion of candidates was manipulated in
a manner so as to invite defeat. In
Rajasthan, a RSS-backed inner-party
revolt cost Vasundhara Raje her re-
election in 2008. And Rajnath’s own
secretariat was hyper-active in feed-
ing a hungry media both real and im-
aginary stories about the disarray in
the BJP.
The point to note is that the trou-
bles in the BJP weren’t the outcome
of Rajnath’s manipulative personality
alone. At every point he received the
6 backing of those senior RSS leaders
assigned to look after the BJP. The
RSS, it would seem in hindsight, was
SEMINAR 605 – January 2010
creating the conditions for a complete
takeover of the party – a process that
RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat made clear
to the whole country in October 2009.
Bhagwat did what no RSS functionary
had done so explicitly: he proclaimed
that the RSS was the boss and that BJP
could either take it or lump it.
F or the moment, a sullen BJP has cho-
sen the path of least resistance. Many
of those who flocked to the party af-
ter 1996 have departed for greener
pastures and many others are biding
their time before jumping ship. The
RSS has also succeeded in imposing
its man, Nitin Gadkari, as the next
president. The BJP tried to counter it
by proposing Narendra Modi – a
choice that the RSS found difficult to
oppose. However, a wise Modi de-
cided that this was not the time to jump
into the centre of controversy.
For the moment, many BJP stal-
warts, including those who are nomi-
nally swayamsevaks, are playing a
waiting game. They hope that the RSS
takeover will run its course, end in
complete failure and enable the poli-
ticians to begin the real task of politi-
cal reconstruction. A formal split in
the party is not being contemplated.
If events follow the script, the
next three years will witness the RSS
assuming the role of a political party
blessed with beliefs and certitudes
from another age. The dissenters be-
lieve that they will just have to endure
the dark days and live to fight another
day – there being no such thing as the
last word in politics. Their faith in the
future may well be justified. However,
it is also entirely possible that in a very
short span the RSS will reduce the BJP
into a mirror image of itself: a large
voluntary body with little influence in
society and irrelevant to the uniniti-
ated. That would be a cruel end to In-
dia’s most effective alternative to the
Congress.