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The present action arises out of the October 28, 2013, tragic shooting death of Clinton
Eugene Chavez Peterson, (Peterson), a competent adult of the full age of majority and
consent who died after being shot at point-blank range by City of Duncanville Police Officer(s)
John Doe I (Doe I), John Doe II (Doe II), and/or John Doe III (Doe III).
2.
Officer Doe I discharged his firearm in Petersons direction on multiple occasions, with
one (1) of the officers shots striking the right side of Petersons head directly behind the ear and
causing Petersons agonizing death in the minutes which followed.
3.
Officer(s) Doe II and/or Doe III likewise discharged firearm(s) into, at, near, and/or in the
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
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The Dallas County Medical Examiners Office performed an autopsy upon Petersons
This Honorable Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this civil action[] arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331.
6.
In particular, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, Defendants are liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 for violating both their own Constitutional rights as well as those of Peterson through the
use of plainly excessive, unreasonable, unnecessary, and ultimately deadly force.
7.
This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1343(a)(3-4).
8.
This Court has pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims against the City of
Duncanville, Texas, including those claims brought pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Sec. 101.001, et. seq., all pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367.
9.
Sovereign immunity has been waived for Plaintiffs state law claims against the City of
Duncanville, Texas pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Secs. 101.021, 101.025, and
101.0215.
10.
The events giving rise to this action occurred completely within the City of Duncanville,
County of Dallas, State of Texas, a geographical location which is wholly ensconced within the
jurisdictional boundaries of the United States District Court in and for the Northern District of
Texas. < http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/forms/scripts/showcitylink.cfm?city=Duncanville>
11.
Venue is proper in this Honorable Court through 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1-2) where, upon
information and belief, each and every named party Defendant herein works, resides, lives,
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
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and/or is domiciled within the County of Dallas, State of Texas, a region which is within this
Honorable Courts geographical boundaries.
III.
12.
PARTIES:
Until his untimely death at age twenty-eight (28), Clinton Eugene Chavez Peterson was
at all times relevant to this Complaint a legal citizen of the United States of America and a
competent adult of the full age of majority and consent, domiciled, living, and residing in the
City of Duncanville, Texas, County of Dallas, State of Texas.
13.
There is no legal representative for Petersons estate; Peterson died intestate, and no
Plaintiff Kendra Peterson is a minor child and the only descendant of decedent Peterson.
15.
Plaintiff Kendra Peterson appears herein by and through her mother, Kristine Peterson, a
competent adult of the full age of majority and consent, and both mother and daughter reside and
are domiciled within the County of Sevier, State of Utah.
16.
Kristine Peterson is decedent Petersons former spouse; however, Kristine Peterson and
the decedent were fully and finally divorced at the time of decedents death, and Kristine
Peterson appears herein solely in a representative capacity on behalf of the minor child Kendra
Peterson.
17.
representative for and on behalf of decedent Petersons sole heir and descendant, the minor child
Kendra Peterson, which representation is made and done pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Sec. 71.021.
18.
Kendra Peterson, by and through Kristine Peterson, is therefore entitled to bring the
instant survival action on behalf of decedent Peterson pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
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In support of the foregoing allegation regarding the assertion of any/all tenable survival
claims, Plaintiff Kendra Peterson, by and through Kristine Peterson, would show she is the sole,
exclusive, and only descendant heir at law unto Petersons estate, and, therefore, she is entitled to
prosecute the survival claims made herein: Heirs at law can maintain a survival suit during the
four-year period the law allows for instituting administration proceedings if they allege and
prove that there is no administration pending and none [is] necessary. Shepherd v. Ledford, 962
S.W.2d 28, 31-32 (Tex. 1998), as quoted in Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d
845, 850-851 (Tex. 2005).
20.
Plaintiffs aver the survival action asserted herein is brought by, for, through, and on behalf of the
Estate of Clinton Eugene Chavez Peterson, Deceased, an entity for which Plaintiff Kendra
Peterson, the decedents minor child who appears herein through her mother and guardian ad
litem Kristine Peterson, is and/or shall hereafter be the duly nominated and appointed personal
representative.
21.
Therefore, Plaintiff Kendra Peterson, by and through Kristine Peterson, brings the
survival action asserted herein in the capacity of personal representative of the Estate of Clinton
Eugene Chavez Peterson, Deceased, with the said entity being itself a named party plaintiff
herein.
22.
Plaintiff Melissa Peterson is the sister of Peterson, and she is a resident and domiciliary
Plaintiff Sherry Horne (Horne) is the mother of Peterson, and she is a resident and
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24.
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As decedent Petersons sole surviving parent, Plaintiff Horne is entitled to join with
Plaintiff Kendra Peterson, decedents child, in bringing this wrongful death action on behalf of
decedent Peterson pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 71.004(b).
25.
Defendant City of Duncanville is a municipal government in the State of Texas that may
be served by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the City of Duncanvilles
Interim City Secretary, Shirley Acy-King, 203 East Wheatland Road, Duncanville, Texas 75116.
See, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 17.024(a).
26.
The City of Duncanville operates and is responsible for the police department and is
therefore liable for the conduct of the Officers named as defendants; furthermore, the City of
Duncanville is liable for the said police departments constitutional violations as described
herein.
27.
Defendant Chief of Police Robert D. Brown, Jr. (Brown), is alleged upon information
and belief to be a citizen and resident of the State of Texas and an employee of Defendant City
of Duncanville, a municipal government within the State of Texas.
28.
Defendant Brown may be served with service of process at 203 East Wheatland Road,
Defendants Officer John Doe I (Doe I), Office John Doe II (Doe II), and Officer John
Doe III (Doe III) are all individuals who, upon information and belief, are citizens, residents,
and domiciliaries of the State of Texas and employees of Defendant City of Duncanville, a
municipal government in the State of Texas.
30.
At all times herein relevant, Doe I, Doe II, and Doe III acted as agents, servants, and/or
employees of the City of Duncanville and under color of the state law of Texas.
31.
Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this complaint in order to formally name and serve
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the officers temporarily identified as Doe I, Doe II, and Doe III.
32.
Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement and amend this complaint to name and serve
such other individuals and/or entities whose liability for the action(s) herein alleged is shown,
proven, and/or revealed by and through pretrial discovery.
IV.
33.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT:
Any/all required conditions precedent have been performed or have already occurred, and
Plaintiffs timely presented their claims to Defendants, and Defendants have therefore
received ample and sufficient actual and constructive notice of Plaintiffs claims as required by
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 101.101.
VI.
35.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
On or about Monday, October 28, 2013, at or near 08:00 AM CST, Peterson was
cornered, attacked, pursued, shot, and killed by Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III, all police officers
with the Duncanville Police Department who had been summoned to the 400 block of Kelly
Court in the City of Duncanville in response to a 911 call.
36.
Peterson was in the area on this date making a social call upon the home where his sister,
housemates, Debra, and by all accounts he traveled to the home on the morning of October 28,
2013, to speak with this acquaintance.
38.
Melissa Peterson advised her brother that Debra did not wish to speak with him, and,
after Melissa was unable to convince Peterson to depart, Debras daughter, Shyanna, came out to
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Peterson told the daughter he was departing, and he asked for a cigarette to take with him
when he left.
40.
Meanwhile, Debra, Petersons acquaintance, was indoors calling 911 to report Peterson
Shyanna asked Peterson to wait outside, and Shyanna went indoors to retrieve the
requested cigarette.
42.
While back indoors, Shyanna heard her mother (Debra) speaking with the 911 operator.
43.
Shyanna related to her mother than Peterson was soon to depart, and she also told her
mother to relate a warning unto the 911 operator that Peterson was not violent and was unlikely
to harm anyone, including himself.
44.
Debra related this message to the operator, specifically stressing that Peterson was not
violent, had made no threats, was unarmed, had committed no serious crime(s) / violation(s), and
was very unlikely to harm anyone.
45.
Shyanna, Debra, and Melissa Peterson all came back outside to find Peterson walking
away from the home as two (2) or more Duncanville police officersDoe I, Doe II, and/or Doe
IIIdrove toward him and parked along the street.
46.
These officers quickly disembarked from their vehicle(s) and pursued the departing
Peterson on foot.
47.
The officers managed to corral Peterson into a corner whereupon one of the officers
At the moment of the TASER deployment, Peterson was standing face-to-face with the
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49.
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At no point during the entire encounter did Peterson make any verbal or physical threats
At all points during the encounter, Peterson acted defensivelyattempting at all times to
withdraw from his encounter rather than engage with Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III.
51.
At no point during Petersons encounter with Defendants Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III
did Peterson evidence any predilection towards causing a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others. See, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct.
1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
52.
Instead, and much like the victim in Echols v. Gardiner, H-11-0882 (S.D.Tex.
12/3/2013), --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2013 WL 6243736, Peterson simply attempted to walk away.
53.
Even after Defendants Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III initiated a physical encounterby
cornering Peterson and deploying a TASERPeterson separated himself from his assailants and
tried to get away.
54.
Unfortunately, when the TASER deployment failed to stop Petersons attempted peaceful
departure, Defendant Doe I once again needlessly escalated the situation by firing two (2) rounds
at Peterson, a passive, non-violent, and wholly unarmed victim.
55.
Doe I fired these two (2) shots at close range, both shots were made in quick succession,
and it is believed that it was the second shot which fatally struck Peterson in the right side of the
head, just behind his right ear.
56.
Both of Officer Doe Is shots were fired while Peterson was attempting to disengage and
After being struck in the head by a bullet travelling slightly back to front, right to left,
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58.
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Officers Doe II and/or Doe III also each discharged a firearm into, at, near, and/or in the
Thereafter, Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III stood guard over Petersons body as he
lay dying, and they specifically prevented Petersons family and friends from touching or even
approaching Peterson.
60.
Shockingly, neither officer even checked to see if Peterson were still alive; instead,
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III simply stood guard over Petersons dying body until a
medical unit appeared some fifteen (15) minutes laterby which time Peterson had quite
literally bled to death on the ground in full view of his friends and family (including his sister
and bystander claimant, Plaintiff Melissa Peterson).
VII.
61.
CAUSES OF ACTION:
Plaintiffs adopt, restate, and incorporate those allegations contained in Paragraphs One
(1) through Sixty (60) in their entirety, as if fully copied and set forth in extenso herein.
A.
62.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III are liable unto Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983
because they used excessive force against Peterson in violation of Petersons rights under the
Fourth Amendment.
63.
The force utilized by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III caused Peterson to suffer
injury (i.e., death) resulting directly, solely, singularly, and only from a use of force that was
clearly excessive, and the excessiveness of the utilized force was clearly unreasonable. See,
Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 416 (5th Cir. 2007).
64.
The force utilized by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III was excessive, unreasonable,
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a.
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b.
c.
Peterson never threatened the safety of Officer Doe I, Officer Doe II, Officer Doe
III, nor any other person;
d.
e.
Peterson was at all times attempting to disengage and remove himself from the
seizure attempted by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III;
f.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III failed to obtain and/or heed available
information relating to Petersons relatively peaceful demeanor before pursuing
and attempting to forcibly detain Peterson;
g.
h.
Officer Doe I fired two (2) shots at or near Petersons head, although shots
deployed on a lower trajectory could have effected Petersons apprehension
(albeit still unlawfully) while being much less likely to cause Petersons
immediate, traumatic death;
i.
Officer Doe II and/or Officer Doe III each discharged a firearm into, at, near,
and/or in the direction or vicinity of Peterson;
j.
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young man who was non-violent, unarmed, and who failed to present any threat
(real or otherwise) to himself or those surrounding himwithout the use of
deadly force;
k.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III caused the use of deadly force against
Peterson while Peterson was actively seeking to disengage and flee; and,
l.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III utilized deadly force even though Peterson
remained in close proximity and well-within the immobilization range of a
deployed TASER device.
65.
It would have been obvious to a reasonable officer that the conduct of Officers Doe I,
Doe II, and/or Doe III was excessive, unreasonable, unnecessary, and unlawful in the
circumstances of this case.
66.
The force used by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III was objectively unreasonable
under the circumstances, and these officers actions violated Petersons clearly established
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable and/or excessive force.
67.
At all times herein relevant, Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III were acting under
The unreasonable, unnecessary, and wholly excessive use of force by Officers Doe I, Doe
II, and/or Doe III proximately caused Peterson to suffer personal injury and, ultimately, caused
his painful, traumatic, tragic, and utterly needless death.
69.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III are also liable unto Plaintiff Melissa Peterson for
Melissa Peterson is the decedents sister, and she was present both when Peterson was
fatally shot and while he lay unattended and dying on a nearby driveway.
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71.
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Accordingly, Melissa Peterson suffered acute shock as a result of the direct emotional
impact sustained from the contemporaneous, eyewitness observance of her brothers homicide.
72.
Melissa Peterson suffered and continues to suffer extreme emotional distress as a result
of the conduct of Defendants Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III, and Ms. Melissa Peterson is therefore
entitled to past (i.e., accrued) and future (i.e., prospective) mental anguish damages.
B.
73.
Petersons injuries and resulting death were also proximately caused by the grossly
implemented official customs, practices, and policies by which the City of Duncanville:
a.
Failed to properly train and supervise its police officers in the use of deadly force,
including training and supervision concerning when deadly force should be
withheld;
b.
Provided its police officers with excessively broad discretion in both the use of
force and the amount of force used without considering less drastic alternatives;
and,
c.
75.
The City of Duncanville knew or reasonably should have known that these customs,
practices, and policies would result in the violation of constitutional rights of individuals like
Peterson.
76.
Upon information and belief, the grossly negligent and deliberately indifferent nature of
the City of Duncanvilles customs, practices, and policies is established by numerous official
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and/or unofficial complaints of police misconduct as well as lawsuits / claims made against the
City of Duncanville relative to police incidents involving excessive use of force.
77.
As a direct result of the City of Duncanvilles customs, practices, and policies, Officers
Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III employed improper and excessive force by:
a.
b.
Using a TASER when the use of such instrumentality was grossly inappropriate in
the premises;
c.
Failing to properly utilize and deploy the said TASER device in a manner which
would have (however unlawfully) detained Peterson without the subsequent
escalation of force which followed;
d.
e.
Shooting a fleeing suspect (Peterson) in the head rather that at a point lower in the
body; and,
f.
78.
The City of Duncanville had actual or constructive knowledge that its customs, practices,
and policies were dangerous and certain to result in the violation of constitutional rights.
79.
Upon information and belief, the City of Duncanville knew or reasonably should have
known from multiple complaints and lawsuits that injuries and death were resulting and/or likely
to result from its officers misuse of force before Peterson was gunned down.
80.
The City of Duncanvilles failure to address and correct these customs, practices, and
policies demonstrates the City of Duncanvilles deliberate disregard for the constitutional rights
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
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and safety of individuals subject to the City of Duncanvilles law enforcement activities.
81.
The Citys customs, practices, and policies, therefore, amounted to conscious indifference
to the rights of citizens such as Peterson, especially considering the magnitude of harm that was
likely to result from the misuse of a TASER device and/or a high-powered firearm.
C.
82.
Chief of Police Robert D. Brown, Jr. is an official policymaker in and for the City of
Duncanville.
83.
Causing the deployment of dangerous and deadly weaponry against unarmed, non-violent
suspects forms an official municipal policy and custom of the City of Duncanville.
84.
This policy is attributable unto the City of Duncanvilles Police Department because the
said Departments policymaker, Chief Brown, has tolerated and acquiesced to such behavior.
85.
Such policy and custom do violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections
The City of Duncanvilles Chief of Police had policymaking authority both explicitly
through the Citys written ordinances and implicitly as a result of the delegation of authority and
the customs and practices of the City of Duncanville City Council.
87.
Chief Brown had authority to establish binding city policy respecting matters relating to
the police department and to adjust that policy for changing circumstances.
88.
The unreasonable and excessive use of force by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III
was made and done in accordance with the City of Duncanvilles policies, procedures, practices,
and customs.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
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90.
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In fact, the City of Duncanvilles practices and customs allowed for and even directed an
These deficient customs, policies, and practices are a direct and proximate cause of the
These deficient policies, procedures, practices, and custom proximately caused the
damages, and death, and the named Plaintiffs herein suffered a multiplicity of damages and
attendant losses arising out of, by, and through these said violations.
D.
94.
The City is also liable pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 101.021 because
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III acted within the course and scope of their respective
employment when they individually and/or collectively utilized tangible personal property in
effecting the negligent injury of Peterson.
95.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III, together with the City of Duncanville, owed the
b.
c.
Exercising reasonable care to protect others from dangers that are under the
Defendants control;
d.
e.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
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f.
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g.
96.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III breached these duties in their use of force in this
The negligent acts of Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III, together with those of the
Consequently, the City of Duncanville is liable under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Secs.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III acted with malice and gross neglect in their use of
The City of Duncanville acted with malice or gross neglect in the development,
maintenance, and/or implementation of its formal and informal customs, practices, and policies
that violated Petersons constitutional rights and resulted in Petersons injury and death.
101.
Consequently, both the City of Duncanville and Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III are
JURY DEMAND:
In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury
ATTORNEYS FEES:
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys fees, costs, litigation expenses, and expert
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XI.
104.
105.
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be summoned to appear and answer, and that on final trial, judgment be granted against
Defendants, jointly and severally, for the following damages:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Funeral expenses;
g.
h.
i.
j.
All other legal and equitable relief which may be necessary and proper to
effectuate the purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983; and,
k.
Such other and further relief to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled in these
premises.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
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Respectfully Submitted,
LAW OFFICE OF J. CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, SR., LLC
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
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