Escolar Documentos
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Cultura Documentos
People vs Tabarnero
Facts:
Gary went to the house of the deceased Ernesto Canatoy (Ernesto), where the
former used to reside as the live-in partner of Mary Jane Acibar (Mary Jane),
Ernestos stepdaughter. Gary and Ernesto had a confrontation during which the
latter was stabbed nine times, causing his death. Gary and his father, Alberto,
were charged with the crime of Murder. Gary surrendered to a barangay tanod.
Alberto was later on arrested. During pre-trial conference, Gary admitted having
killed Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-defense (hence, reverse
trial).
Issue:
1.) Should the justifying circumstance of self-defense be considered on the part
of Gary? 2.) Is Gary entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender?
Held:
NO. Garys contention that the
unlawful aggression on the part of Alberto was when the latter struck him of a
lead pipe, his pleas outside their house could not be considered as sufficient
provocation, and that his defense was reasonable, are unmeritorious. His
testimony is insufficient and self-serving. The alleged initial attack on him when
he was about to leave seemed to be all-convenient considering that no one
witnessed the start of the fight. The nine stab wounds inflicted on Ernesto
indicate an intent to kill and not merely to defend himself. He further argues that
even if he is not qualified to the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he is still
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article
13(1). The court however, ruled that Gary failed to prove the presence of
unlawful aggression which is an indispensable element of self-defense whether
complete or incomplete. Hence, he is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance.
2.) NO. In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be
credited to the accused, the following should be present:
(a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. A
surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous,
i.e.,
there must be an intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and
Held:
Treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the absence of
any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery
to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.
Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the
witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he
failed to see the victim at that time.
People vs Vilbar
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated February 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00270 which modified the Judgment[2] promulgated on
August 6, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, of Ormoc City, in
Criminal Case No. 5876-0. The RTC originally found accused-appellant Vicente
Vilbar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for treacherously
stabbing with a knife the deceased Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert), but the Court of
Appeals subsequently held accused-appellant liable only for the lesser crime of
homicide.
The Information charging accused-appellant with the crime of murder
reads:
That on or about the 5th day of May 2000, at around 7:00
oclock in the evening, at the public market, this city, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
VICENTE VILBAR alias Dikit, with treachery, evident premeditation
and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab, hit and wound the victim herein GUILBERT
PATRICIO, without giving the latter sufficient time to defend
himself, thereby inflicting upon said Guilbert Patricio mortal wound
which caused his death. Post Mortem Examination Report is
hereto attached.
In violation of Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. 7659, Ormoc City, June 13, 2000.[3]
During the pre-trial conference, the parties already admitted that Guilbert
was stabbed at the Public Market of Ormoc City on May 5, 2000 at around seven
oclock in the evening, and that immediately before the incident, accusedappellant was at the same place having a drinking spree with a certain Arcadio
Danieles, Jr. and two other companions. However, accused-appellant denied
that it was he who stabbed Guilbert Patricio.[5] Trial then ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Maria Liza Patricio (Maria
Liza),[6] the widow of the deceased, and Pedro Luzon (Pedro),[7] an eyewitness at
the scene. The defense offered the testimonies of accused-appellant[8] himself
and Cerilo Pelos (Cerilo),[9] another eyewitness. On rebuttal, the prosecution
recalled Pedro to the witness stand.[10]
On August 6, 2001, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accusedappellant guilty of murder and decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the Court
finds the accused Vicente Vilbar alias Dikit GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged, and hereby
sentences him to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, [and ordered]
to pay the offended party the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity, the
sum of P3,000.00 as medical expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
If the accused is a detainee, his period of detention shall be
credited to him in full if he abides by the term for convicted
prisoners, otherwise, for only 4/5 thereof.[12]
The foregoing RTC Judgment was directly elevated to us for our review,
but in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[13] we issued a
Resolution[14] dated December 1, 2004 referring the case to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action.
Accused-appellant, represented by the Public Attorneys Office, [15] and
plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General,[16] filed their Briefs
on August 15, 2006 and April 30, 2007, respectively. The Court of Appeals made
the following determination of the issues submitted for its resolution:
On intermediate review, accused (now accused-appellant)
seeks the reversal of his conviction for the crime of murder or in the
alternative, the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime of
homicide. He argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to
the inconsistent, irreconcilable, and incredible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) the exact number of persons
drinking with accused-appellant in the adjacent store; (2) what
Maria Liza was doing at the exact time of stabbing; and (3) the
accused-appellants
reaction
after
he
stabbed
the
victim. Moreover, accused-appellant argues that if he was indeed
the culprit, why did he approach Guilberts family in the hospital
immediately after the stabbing incident? Granting without admitting
that a crime of murder was committed, accused-appellant insists
that he could only be held guilty of homicide for it was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt that treachery and evident premeditation
Q:
A:
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xxxx
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A:
Mrs. Patricio, can you recall where were you in the evening
at about 7:00 oclock of May 5, 2000?
I was at the store.
Q:
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Where?
In the market.
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Vilbar, how far was the place wherein they were drinking to
where he urinated from where the group was drinking?
Just near.
Q:
COURT INTERPRETER
The witness estimated a distance at about 2 meters.
xxxx
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What happened after your husband was hit below the left
nipple?
Vicente Vilbar ran away and my husband told me to call for
some help and he said, Im stab.
xxxx
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COURT INTERPRETER
The witness demonstrated below his left nipple and the
witness was pointing to the position below his left nipple.
xxxx
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The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Maria Liza and Pedro,[25] these being
relatively trivial and insignificant, neither pertaining to the act constitutive of the
crime committed nor to the identity of the assailant. Also, these minor
contradictions were expected from said witnesses as they differ in their
impressions of the incident and vantage point in relation to the victim and the
accused-appellant.
In contrast, accused-appellant admitted being present at the scene and
time of the commission of the crime but asserted that one Dodong Danieles was
the perpetrator thereof. Yet, the RTC was unconvinced by the version of events
as testified to by accused-appellant himself and Cerilo, because:
Q:
Now, you said a while ago that there were four (4)
companions of the accused. Now, tell us, were all of the four
(4) people that you are referring to that exclude the
accused?
There were four (4) of them including the accused, sir.
A:
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A:
Q:
Now, you said that there was somebody from the group who
relieved himself, is that right?
Yes, sir, urinated.
And what happened when he urinated?
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And what did he do after the man in black stabbed the slim
[g]uy?
He ran away passing by the Apollo and (while the witness
was demonstrating by pressing his hand to his chest) that he
was hit.
A:
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A:
Now, this person whom you said who stabbed the victim,
did you meet him before?
Not yet, sir.
xxxx
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to the slim guy as the person who urinated. Moreover, Cerilos identification of
the purported assailant of Guilbert as a certain Dodong is highly unreliable,
given that Cerilo admitted that he learned of said assailants name from an
unidentified spectator of the stabbing incident.
The fact that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Guilbert to death on
the night of May 5, 2000 was already established beyond reasonable doubt. The
next question is what crime for which accused-appellant should be held liable:
murder as held by the RTC or homicide as adjudged by the Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty only of
homicide in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In a number of cases, surveyed in People v. Rivera,[28] we ruled that
treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and
unexpected:
[W]e agree with accused-appellant that the qualifying circumstance
of treachery was not established. Surveying the leading decisions
on this question, in People v. Romeo Magaro we recently stated:
In People v. Magallanes, this Court held:
There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Thus,
for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution must
establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a)
that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. . . .
. . . where the meeting between the accused
and the victim was casual and the attack was
done impulsively, there is no treachery even if the
attack was sudden and unexpected. As has been
Similar to Rivera and the cases cited therein, the prosecution in the instant
case merely showed that accused-appellant attacked Guilbert suddenly and
unexpectedly, but failed to prove that accused-appellant consciously adopted
such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
While it appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden,
the surrounding circumstances attending the stabbing incident, that
is, the open area, the presence of the victims families and the
attending eyewitnesses, works against treachery. If accusedappellant wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him,
he could have chosen another time and place to stab the
victim. Yet, accused-appellant nonchalantly stabbed the victim in a
public market at 7:00 oclock in the evening. The place was welllighted and teeming with people. He was indifferent to the
presence of the victims family or of the other people who could
easily identify him and point him out as the assailant. He showed
no concern that the people in the immediate vicinity might retaliate
in behalf of the victim. In fact, the attack appeared to have been
impulsively done, a spur of the moment act in the heat of anger or
extreme annoyance. There are no indications that accusedappellant deliberately planned to stab the victim at said time and
place. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that accused-appellant,
who at that time was languishing in his alcoholic state, acted
brashly
and
impetuously
in
suddenly
stabbing
the
victim. Treachery just cannot be appreciated.[30]
should be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, the imposition of imprisonment from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is in order.
As to the award of damages to Guilberts heirs, we affirm the amounts
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Medical
and burial expenses were indisputably incurred by Guilberts heirs but the exact
amounts thereof were not duly proven. So in lieu of actual damages, we award
Guilberts heirs P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Article 2224 of the Civil
Code provides that [t]emperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[32]
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
appeal
of
accused-appellant
is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 14, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00270 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Vicente Vilbar is found GUILTY of the
crime of HOMICIDE, for which he is SENTENCED to imprisonment of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay the heirs of Guilbert
Patricio the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Dearo, Paulino Luague, Wilfredo
Toledo; G.R. No. 190862, October 9, 2013
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts:
On February 26, 1996 at the house of Jose at Bayawan Negros Oriental accused
Ricardo Dearo, Paulino Luague, and Wilfredo Toledo killed Emeterio, Proferia
and Analiza while they were sleeping.
About 10 meters away from the house, Jose and Rolly heard the sound of a
gunshot coming from inside the house, after which they saw Luague come out
saying, Ti, tapos ka man! (There, now you are finished!). Jose and Rolly heard
womens cries for help immediately followed by a series of rapid gunfire coming
from the back of the house. Dearo and Toledo emerged from the back of the
house carrying long firearms, walk with Luague towards the road. After the
perpetrators lef, Jose and Rolly found the victims with gunshot wounds inside the
house, with Emeterio and Porferia already dead, and Analiza still moaning in
pain.
In three Informations, the accused were charged with murder, all committed by
conspiracy and attended by treachery and evident premeditation.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count. On appeal to the CA, Luague and appellants Dearo and Toledo decried
the alleged violation of due process due to supposed partiality and vindictiveness
of Judge Rosendo B. Bandal, Jr. (Judge Bandal). They also pointed out the lack
of evidence, which do not satisfy the standard of proof of beyond reasonable
doubt. On 7 July 2009, the CA rendered a Decision affirming RTCs ruling.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the guilt of accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt
even if the evidences were circumstantial
2. Whether or not the crime was attended with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery
Ruling:
ISSUE I
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, applies when no witness has seen the
actual commission of the crime. It states:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
ISSUE 2
We also find that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
properlyappreciated by the RTC and the CA. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party
might make. We have ruled that treachery is present when an assailant takes
advantage of a situation in which the victim is asleep, unaware of the evil design,
or has just awakened.
Thus, it has been established that appellants killed Emeterio, Porferia and
Analiza. Appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the crime is
properly denominated as murder. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
punishes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. Since the penalty of death has
been prohibited under RA 9346, accused is hereby sentenced the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Wherefore, the decision of Cebu City Court of Appeals in CA-G.R No. 00035 is
affirmed with modification. Accused Dearo and Toledo is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole for each of the three counts of murder and
ordered to pay heirs of Emeterio, Proferia and Analiza amount of P75, 000. 00 as
civil indemnity, P75, 000.00 moral damages, P30, 000.00 as exemplary damages
and P25, 000.00 as temperate damages plus legal interest at the rate of 6%
from finality of this decision.
INSTIGATION/ENTRAPMENT
People vs Naelga
For Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
Decision[1] dated 30 November 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
00304 entitled People of the Philippines v. Elly Naelga, affirming the
Decision[2] rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan,
Branch 53, in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, finding Elly Naelga guilty of the illegal
sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu.
By virtue of a Criminal Complaint, accused-appellant Elly Naelga y
Bongay (accused-appellant) was indicted before the RTC of Rosales,
Pangasinan, Branch 53, for violation of Sections 5[3] and 11(3),[4] Article II of
guilty.
PO2 Noe Sembran testified that upon receiving information from a civilian
asset that the accused Elly Naelga was peddling illegal drugs at the public
market of Rosales, Pangasinan, Police Chief Inspector Policarpio Cayabyab, Jr.
hatched a plan to conduct a buy-bust operation to apprehend the accused. PO2
Sembran was tasked to act as poseur-buyer, with PO1 Danilo Asis, Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 1 Jesus Caspillo, and PO1 Rosauro Valdez as backup
operatives. The money used for the buy-bust operation was provided by the
Rosales Treasurers Office and affixed thereto were his signature and that of the
municipal treasurer of Rosales.
In his testimony, PO2 Sembran narrated that on 15 July 2003, he was
informed by an asset that accused-appellant Elly Naelga was selling illegal drugs
at the Rosales Public Market in Pangasinan. Thereafter, at about three oclock in
the afternoon of the same day, PO2 Sembran went inside the public market and
approached accused-appellant. PO2 Sembran was familiar with accusedappellant, because the polices confidential agent had been monitoring accusedappellants activities for several weeks. PO2 Sembran talked to accusedappellant, who asked the former if he was a security guard, to which he replied in
the affirmative. While engaged in this conversation, PO2 Sembran asked the
accused-appellant what he could use to keep him awake while on duty as a
security guard. Accused-appellant suggested that he drink Red Bull. PO2
Sembran replied that he already did, but this did not work, and that he was
caught sleeping on his post. Accused-appellant then declared that he knew
something more effective, as he passed his index finger under his nose as if
sniffing something. When asked what he meant, accused-appellant told PO2
Sembran that he was referring to bato or shabu. PO2 Sembran said he was
willing to try this and to buy Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) worth
of shabu. Accused-appellant told PO2 Sembran to give him the money and
committed to return with the shabu. PO2 Sembran gave appellant four One
Hundred Pesos (P400.00) in marked bills. Upon receiving the money, accusedappellant left. PO2 Sembran went back to the police station to plan the arrest of
accused-appellant.
Police Chief Inspector Policarpio C. Cayabyab, Jr. instructed PO2
Sembran to act as a poseur-buyer and the other members of the team as
backup. PO2 Sembran and his fellow police officers returned to the public
market almost an hour later. They waited for accused-appellant until he finally
arrived, alighting from a tricycle. PO2 Sembran followed him in an alley. There
were people sleeping on bamboo tables in the alley, and PO2 Sembran
expressed apprehension at being noticed. Accused-appellant reassured him that
they would not be disturbed and immediately asked for the balance of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00). PO2 Sembran gave accused-appellant the marked
money. Thereupon, accused-appellant took out a sachet containing white
granules and handed it to PO2 Sembran, who then revealed that he was a
policeman. Accused-appellant tried to run, but PO2 Sembran held on to the
formers belt. They struggled and fell to the pavement. PO1 Valdez came to help
PO2 Sembran arrest accused-appellant. PO2 Sembran was able to recover the
One-Hundred-Peso (P100.00) bill from accused-appellant, who had used the
Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) he earlier received to buy shabu. Accusedappellant was taken into custody, and PO2 Sembran executed an affidavit of
arrest. The plastic sachet containing 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance
purchased from accused-appellant for P500.00 was marked EN and taken to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office in Camp
Florendo, San Fernando, La Union, for laboratory examination.[7] The four
marked One-Hundred-Peso bills earlier given to accused-appellant were no
longer with him, but the last P100.00 marked bill later paid to him was recovered.
PO1 Rosauro Valdez corroborated PO2 Sembrans testimony, narrating
how he acted as backup in connection with the buy-bust operation that led to the
arrest of accused-appellant.
The parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of the Chemist, Police
Inspector Emelda Besarra Roderos, who conducted the laboratory examination
of the subject drug, considering that the defense admitted the existence,
authenticity and due execution of Chemistry Report Number D-260-2003-U dated
16 July 2003, showing that the laboratory examination of the drug confiscated
from accused-appellant yielded a positive result for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. [8]
For the defense, accused-appellant took the witness stand.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General is for sustaining
accused-appellants conviction, arguing that the alleged inconsistencies are
minor and inconsequential and, in fact, do not negate the occurrence of the buybust operation and accused-appellants involvement.
The instant controversy involves no less than the liberty of accusedappellant. The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a
basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules that place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. This being an appeal of a criminal
case, opening the entire case up for review, we have carefully reviewed and
evaluated the records and the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
and find no reason to deviate from their rulings.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that prosecutions involving illegal
drugs largely depend on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and
impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of
the trial court.[14] This Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of witnesses except when there appears on record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted.[15] This rule is consistent with the reality that
the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.[16] Thus, factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on its findings are
accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case.
A successful prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous/prohibited drugs
must establish the following elements:
(1)
(2)
Here, the law enforcers received a report from their confidential informant
that accused-appellant was engaged in illegal drug trade in the public market of
Rosales. Poseur-buyer PO2 Sembran then pretended to be engaged in the drug
trade himself and, with the help of his fellow buy-bust operatives, arrested
accused-appellant in the act of delivering the shabu to him. In an entrapment,
ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense,
and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and
conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has
been accepted as a valid and effective mode of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust operation, the idea of committing a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit
the offense.[19] In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was formed by the
police officers precisely to test the veracity of the tip and in order to apprehend
the perpetrator.
While accused-appellant claims that it was PO2 Sembran who
approached and asked him to buy shabu for him, the same cannot be considered
as an act of instigation, but an act of feigned solicitation. Instigation is resorted
to for purposes of entrapment, based on the tip received from the police
informant that accused-appellant was peddling illegal drugs in the public market
of Rosales. In fact, it was accused-appellant who suggested to PO2 Sembran
to use shabu; and, despite accused-appellants statement that he did not know
anybody selling shabu, he still took the money from PO2 Sembran and directly
went to Urdaneta, where he claimed to have bought the illegal drug. Then he
returned to the Rosales public market and gave the drug to PO2 Sembran.
The records of the case disclose that PO2 Noe Sembran, the designated
poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, positively identified accused-appellant as
the seller of the confiscated shabu. His testimony was corroborated by PO1
Rosauro Valdez. The object of the corpus delicti was duly established by the
prosecution. The sachet confiscated from accused-appellant was positively
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The above provision further states that non-compliance with the stipulated
procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers. The evident purpose of the procedure provided for is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Its
absence, by itself, is not fatal to the prosecutions case and will not discharge
accused-appellant from his crime. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In the instant case, the integrity of the drugs seized remained intact,
and the crystalline substance contained therein was later on determined to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 9165, the requirements
contained in Section 21(1) were already present, per Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite such regulation and the non-
compliance therewith by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied the
presumption of regularity, holding:
The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the
Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally
irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that
the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is
considered consummated once the sale or transaction is
established x x x and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by
the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of
the Dangerous Drugs Board. [21]
Chemist P/Insp. Emelda Besarra Roderos,[24] the same person who conducted
laboratory tests on the substance. The transparent plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance was later on determined to be positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
PO2
Sembran
positively
identified
the
plastic
sachet
containing shabu, which he had bought from accused-appellant in the buy-bust
operation. Thus, the identity of the shabutaken from accused-appellant had been
duly preserved and established by the prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the
evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill
will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. The accused-appellant
in this case bears the burden of making some showing that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers
properly discharged their duties. There is no doubt that the sachet marked EN,
which was submitted for laboratory examination and found to be positive
for shabu, was the same one sold by accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer PO2
Sembran during the buy-bust operation.
Finally, accused-appellants claim that he is a victim of a frame-up is
viewed by this Court with disfavor, because being a victim can easily be feigned
and fabricated. There being no proof of ill motive on the part of the police
operatives to falsely accuse him of such a grave offense, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with
respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over the claim of the accusedappellant.[25] While the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty by law enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption
of innocence, for the claim of frame-up to prosper, the defense must be able to
present clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption of
regularity, which the defense was not able to proffer.
Accused-appellant was charged with the unauthorized sale and delivery of
a dangerous drug in violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved.
Thus, the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 00304 convicting accused-appellant ELLY NAELGA of
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ART 16-20
People vs Dulay PDF
People vs Gamboa PDF
Ong vs People
JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted
accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree
No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said
accused, with intent of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from unknown person involving
thirteen (13) truck tires worth P65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y
LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been
derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued,
and the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.
The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has
established the guilt of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-Fencing
Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years
and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the
records, the RTC's finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a
Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires,
described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount
of P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires.
Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565
dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the
tires specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked
the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in 720
San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat,
Paraaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker
of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires
sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal
that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of
which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal,
reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous
business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24,
1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in
Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if
appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to
which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the
description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from
his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon.
Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock,
which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the
store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the
Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was
composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by
Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza was
appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with
the Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The
team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza
proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves across the
street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone
truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display,
which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more
in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his
warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires
were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and
found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their
serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buybust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen
from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team
went inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the
confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the
barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the
evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station
for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate
thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza.
knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there
is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for
another.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite
quantum of evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this
case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar),
whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the
warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen testified that the crime of
robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove
ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November
1994 and an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that
robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the
Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.14The report led to the conduct of a buybust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the
robbery, he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in
his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an
accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38)
missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial
numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong's possession.15 Ong
likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total
amount of ?45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No.
980.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object
or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to
another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twentyfour (24) years,18ought to have known the ordinary course of business in
purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered
to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the
tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires
happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have given
him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his
first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just
peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated
that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Azajar had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total amount
of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair and
regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is
not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the
transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the
parties, we do not find sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the
trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the
minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Mel Dimat
, Petitioner
vs.People of the Philippines
, Respondent
Abad, J.:Facts:
Sonia Delgado, wife of herein respondent, brought a Nissan Safari from Mel
Dimat. Spouses Delgadowhere driving along E. Rodriguez Ave. when they were
apprehended by the Traffic Management Group(TMG), afterwards they found out
that the vehicle was a stolen property. Samson and Mantequilla, theregistered
owner of the vehicle, filed charges against Mel Dimat for violation of the AntiFencing Law.On his defense he claims that he did not know Mantequilla, and that
he bought it in good faith for value.The RTC found him to guilty and which the CA
affirms with modification.
Issue:
Whether or not Dimat knowingly sold for gain the Nissan Safari which was earlier
stolen.
Ruling:
The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the
accused, who took nopart in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that
robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and
(4) he intends by thedeal he makes to gain for himself or for another.Dimat
testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the
Nissan Safarito him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him
the old certificate of registration andofficial receipt of the vehicle and even
promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official
receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists
that Tolentinos
failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could notproduce any certificate of registration or official receipt.Based on
the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properlydocumented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of
registration and official receipt.But this certainly could not be true because, the
vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had nodocuments to show. That
Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce newdocuments
undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit
source. Still,Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no
effort to check the papers covering her
purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she
did not stand accusedin the case.WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 inCA-G.R. CR 29794.