Kabulay 11-21-2014

One of the things i've learned from my experience today with the Anticala-Kabulay Tree Farmers
Association, Inc. is that, assumed conflict on tenurial instrument does not hold true in the local
experience and interaction of local communities. While government instrumentalities sees
conflict arising from boundaries, more so with ambiguities, the local community overcomes
these boundaries through constant, day-to-day interaction and communication, anchored on
long enduring relationship and unequivocal trust. What appears to be a real conflict assumed by
the formal regimes of the governtment does not have any bearing at all to local institutions.
The institution has developed overtime a mechanism on how to extract contribution from its
members. For instance, during harvest, members are required to appropriate 5% of their net
sales to the institutions. According to what type of agricultural products to harvest, the
appropriation should be imposed on every harvest for timber products, every after three harvest
for abaca, and every after five harvest for fruit trees. Half of the appropriated contribution will
form part of the capital build-up (CBU) of the member, while the other half goes to the
operational expenses of the institution.
'Pahina' is a common mechanism for every members to contribute to collective action. The
Chairman calls a pahina, then members would come to their nursery and do some chores. For
those member who cannot personaly come, then can send proxy or give some foods for the
group to share after the day-long work. Proxy should be not be less than18 years of age.
Household who cannot send even proxy can contribute in monetary form which will be used
provide for the food
CBU, in monetary form, is also a mechanism for members to contribute to institution's endeavor.
Members regularly pool volutary contribution and invest it on enterprises that the group agreed.
Gains shall be deducted with the cost; the net amount shall then be proportionally divided to
members according to their CBU contriution.
However, there is little provision for monitoring and sanction. Monitoring is the primary
responsibility of sectoral leaders. Each sectoral leader is assigned a particular sitio or purok,
with an organization structurally part of the larger institution. Each sectoral leader conducts their
own meeting with members assigned to them. Monitoring takes the form of household visitation
and informal morning and afternoon chat.
Seldom will the community impose sanction on erring members. The predominant way of
resolving conflicts is through 'husay', or the means by which every conflicting parties, or erring
individual member, comes to terms consensually agreeable by all members. The have less
appreciation for imposing sanction to preserve harmony and makntain good relations amongst
members. As few members said, 'istoryahan lang na'.

When it comes to decision making, the Board of Directors decides first as a collegial body.
Whatever decisions that may arise from the deliberation, it shall then be passed on to the
general assembly. The assembly then decides to approve or deny decisions laid to them.
Normally, the whole assembly should opt to consensually decide on the matter before them. A
lot of convincing happens here. If however the group failed to arrive at a consensus, voting takes
place. During meetings and assembly, DENR's extension offier witness and sometimes
participate in the discussion.
There is less incentive to collectively act together because individual's gains are not directly
affected by the group. Although external conditionalities imposed by government agencies
forces compliance, it is done so with poor monitoring and sanction sanction.
It is the Chairman that holds most of information. For purposes of relaying information and
ATRICMPCO 11-26-2014
Meeting started at 10:45
The meeting is about membership to the PO. The Chairman started the PMES.
The Chair reported to have 21 members (14 female and 7 male) of the PO.
The chair is knowledgeable of what should be done, possessing some vision on how the coop
should run. He has been exposed to numerous programs and projects of the government as
well as non-government organizations. And has held various positions in various POs within the
watershed.
ATRICMPCO (formerly ATRISA) has been previously organized as a people's organization for
community forestry program of DENR. Most of their members are part of other POs as well,
especially from the IPO.
When conflict resolution available through the PO or tribal council fails, litigants can seek the
help of New People's Army.
The PO collects CBU and membership fee. There is resistance for would-be members to these
collections. Individuals become part of the organization all because of the project. They can take
part and gain benefits from the project but it is not compulsory to be part of the organization.
They little provision for monitoring and sanction. There has been no recorded incidence where a

sanction has been imposed to regular violator. Instead, they would talk to the violator and still
the violation persists, the erring member will be asked, or would volunteer to leave the PO.
Despite many years of operation, the
PO has yet to institutionalize their rules. Multiple times where defecting and violation to their
rules were reported and were not apprehended.
The PO also has yet to become financially self-sufficient. They are heavily dependent on the
assistance pf the government. They previously had a sari-sari store business but went down due
to mismanagement.
Forest tenure provides cooperative equilibria
Reading the case of Mt. Makiling Forest Forest, security of tenure provides future of cooperation
of forest occupants. This is because livelihood and destiny of these individuals would be highly
dependent on the forest. It would be to their interest to protect forest, as they would imperatively
do to their source of income, community of living, and legacy to their future children's children