Vivarium

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2000

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VIVARIUM

editors

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committee
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published

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AND INTELLECTUALLIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
vivarium
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and theintellectual
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CONTENTS
Russell E. Friedman
& Lauge O. Nielsen
William Duba
Lauge O. Nielsen
Alessandro D.
Conti
Chris Schabel
Charles Bolyard
Russell L. Friedman
Antonie Vos
Antonie Vos
Henri Veldhuis
Eef Dekker
Nico den Bok
St. Kirschner

Reviews

Books Received

OF VOLUME

XXXVIII

(2000)

Introduction

The ImmaculateConceptionin the Works

of Peter Auriol
The Debate between Peter Auriol and
Thomas Wyltonon Theology and Virtue
Divine Ideas and Exemplar Causality in
Auriol
Place, Space, and the Physicsof Grace in
Auriol's Sentences
Commentary
Auriol's Propositional
Knowing naturaliter.
Foundations
Peter Auriol on IntellectualCognitionof

5
35
99
117
162

177
Singulars
Scotus on Freedom and the Foundation
of Ethics.An UtrechtContribution
195
The Scotian Notion of Natural Law
197
Ordained and AbsolutePower in Scotus'
I 44
Ordinatio
222
The Theoryof Divine PermissionAccordI 47
231
ing to Scotus' Ordinatio
Freedomin Regard to Opposite Acts and
Objects in Scotus' LecturaI 39, 45-54 243
Oresme on Intension and Remission of
Qualitiesin His Commentaryon Aristotle's
255
Physics
JacquelineLeclercq-Marx,La sirnedans
la pense et dans l'art de l'Antiquitet du
Moyen Age. Du mythepaen au symbole
chrtien[rev.byHarryTummers)
275
WilliamJ. Courtenay,ParisianScholarsin
the Early FourteenthCentury.A Social
Portrait{rev.byStenEbbesen
277
)
281

18:22:15 PM

PeterAuriol:Introduction

RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN& LAUGE O. NIELSEN

For much of the last 600 years,the French Franciscantheologian,Peter

Auriol,has languishedin the shadow of his more well known confrre,
WilliamOckham, being viewed primarilyas one of Ockham's numerous
A rvaluationof Auriol was begun, however,in the first
"forerunners".
halfof the 20th century,when the originality,
the intrinsicmerit,and the
historicalsignificance
of severalaspectsof Auriol'sthoughtwere firstmade
clear. This "rediscovery"
of Auriolhas continuedto the presentday, and
indeed interestin Auriol's thoughtis on the increase,with several new
studiesappearingeveryyear,and witha criticaleditionof Auriol'sworks
The six articlescontainedin the presentvolume investigate
underway.1
variousaspects of the thoughtof Peter Auriol,and each confirmsin its
own way Auriol's importanceas a perceptivecriticof earlier scholastic
and theology,
and as an authorof innovativeand oftenprovocaphilosophy
tiveideas.
Auriol was born around 1280 in the region around Cahors. Except
forthe factthathe joined the Franciscanorder,we know basicallynothing about his life before 1312, when he was lector at the Franciscan
studiumin Bologna. It was here that he authored his Tractatus
de prinhis
of
work.
the
end
Auriol
was in
1314,
cipiis, only non-theological
By
at
the
Franciscan
and
it
seems
that
his
treaToulouse, teaching
studium,
tiseson the ImmaculateConceptionstemfromthistime.In one or both
of these cities,Auriol must have also lecturedon the Sentences
of Peter
a
because
draft
of
his
voluminous
Lombard,
Scriptumsuperprimum
- more than 1100 folio
Sententiarum
pages in its early modern printing
(Rome 1596) was almost certainlyfinishedby late 1316, when Auriol
1 See on thecritical
K.H. Tachau,ThePreparation
Edition
edition,
ofa Critical
ofPierre
Auriol's
Sentences
Lectures
TheCritical
Edition
Aureoli'
s Scholastic
Works
, andL.O. Nielsen,
,
ofPeter
bothin:Alvaro
Gacciotti
andBarbara
Faesde Mottoni
di Quaracchi
100anni
(eds.),Editori
. Bilancio
e prospettive
referred
A select
to there.
Auriol
(Rome1997),andtheliterature
dopo
is availableon "The AuriolHomepage"
(= http://www.igl.ku.dk/~russ/
bibliography
auriol.html).
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2000

Vivarium
, 38,1

18:22:30 PM

INTRODUCTION

arrivedin Paris in order to qualifyfor his doctorate.Auriol read the

at Paris 1316-18,and by late 1318 he was the Franciscanregent
Sentences
masterin theologythere.Auriol served as regentmasterin Paris until
1320 or 1321, lecturingon the Bible, and holdingQuodlibetal disputations. In 1321, he was elevated by his mentor,Pope John XXII, to the
but Aurioldied soon after,in
positionof Archbishopof Aix-en-Provence,
1322.
early
The extantworksof Auriol are predominantly
theologicalin nature,
and include several Biblical commentariesand a treatiseon apostolic
of his works,however,froma theological,
poverty.The most significant
and
historical
philosophical,
point of view are his commentarieson the
Sentences
. Besides the Scriptum
of lecturesthat Auriol
, we have reportationes
held on all fourbooks of the Sent.,some of which have obviouslybeen
reworkedby Auriol himself.A versionof his commentaryon books IIIV was publishedin Rome in 1605 (along withAuriol'ssingleQuodlibet),
but the relationbetween these publishedtextsand otherversionsfound
as well as the relationbetweenthe publishedScriptum
onlyin manuscripts,
and the extantreportationes
on book I of the Sentences
, is complex,and historicalstudyhas been slow to get underway.2
As should be clear fromthe above, one of the major tasksin Auriol
studiesis to establishthe relativeorderingof his works:only in thisway
will we be able to trace the developmentof his ideas and therebydetermine his matureviews. In the firstpaper below, William Duba attempts
to show the relativeorderingof Auriol'sworkshavingto do withMary's
ImmaculateConception.It is fairlywell-knownthatAuriol was an early
supporterof the Immaculate Conception,and he actuallyaddressedthe
issue in writtenworksat least threetimes:twicein commentarieson book
III of the Sentences
and once in separate treatisesdevoted to the issue.
an
analysisof the textsand Auriol's argumentationin them,
Through
Duba reconstructsa probable relativeorder, in the process laying out
some fundamental
featuresof Auriol'sideas on theImmaculateConception.
One way of determining
the probable orderof and dates forworksof
Auriolis throughidentifying
whom Auriolconfronted
the contemporaries
in his various works. One of Auriol's most notable opponentswas the
Englishsecular theologian,Thomas Wylton.In Wylton'scase we are so
2 Forthemostrecent
oftheissues,
Peter
Auriol's
Words:
seeL.O. Nielsen,
study
Waywith
TheGenesis
Auriol's
Commentaries
onPeter
Lombard's
First
andFourth
Books
,
ofPeter
oftheSentences
in: G.R. Evans(ed.),Mediaeval
Commentaries
ontheSentences
Lombard
, Leiden(forthofPeter
andtheliterature
referred
to there.
coming)

18:22:30 PM

INTRODUCTION

fortunateas to have writingsof his that are directedagainstAuriol. In

his contributionto this volume, Lauge O. Nielsen chartsAurioPs and
Wylton's exchangeon the natureof what is practicaland speculativeas
well as of virtue,and he arrivesat the conclusionthat this particular
in Paris.
debate took place when Auriol was a bachelor of the Sentences
As his debate with Wyltonmakes clear, Auriol was somethingof a
innovativeand oftenprovocative
controversial
figurein his time,offering
views.AurioPscapacityto provokeappears to remainundiminishedwith
theyears,as AlessandroConti showsin his article.Conti looks at AurioPs
theoryof divineideas againstthe backdropof Thomas Aquinas' and John
Duns Scotus' viewson thisissue. Conti concludesthatAurioPstheoryon
"the sharpconflictbetweenthe Greeklogicothe matterclearlyillustrates
metaphysicalapparatus (in the form of medieval Aristotelianismand
Neoplatonism)and (some of) the chiefcontentsof the Christianfaith".
So clear is this conflictin Auriol,in fact,that Conti accuses Auriol of
hereticallyholdingthat creationwas necessary.
In his contribution,
Chris Schabel examinesAurioPsideas in matters
studied
by historiansof science: the latitudeof formsand
traditionally
the relatedissuesof place, space, and local motion.Here, as in so many
areas of his thought,Auriolwas innovative,perhaps most particularly
in
his ideas on place, and Schabel suggeststhatAurioPsdeparturefromthe
Aristotelian
theoryon thisissue can perhapsbe looked at as a small step
on the way to the Newtonianworldview.Moreover,in appendicesto his
article,Schabel offersan editionof hithertounavailabletexts,and on the
basis of this materialhe is able to show the developmentof AurioPs
thoughton these topics.
The volume rounds out with two examinationsof aspects of AurioPs
epistemologyand noetics.In his article,Charles Bolyard deals with the
foundation
ofAurioPstheoryof knowledge:perse notaepropositions.
Several
scholasticsbeforeAuriol,notablyAquinas and Scotus, basicallyconsideredperse notaepropositionsto be analyticpropositionsin whichthe predicate is includedin the subject.Bolyardshows that,in contrastto these
earlierthinkers,
Auriolstressedthe psychologicaldimensionofperse notae
i.e. that theywere propositionsthat one understoodswifdy
propositions,
and withoutthe necessityof a teacher. Moreover,Bolyard argues that
the IslamicthinkerAlhazenwas a particularly
stronginfluenceon AurioPs
theoryof perse notaepropositions.
In his article,RussellL. Friedmandiscussesthe way Auriol tacklesthe
problemofintellectual
cognitionof singulars.A corollaryto AurioPsnoted
- one of the reasonsforhis
conceptualism
being regardedas a forerunner

18:22:30 PM

INTRODUCTION

of Ockham- is that only individualshave real extra-mentalexistence.

Further,in contrastto severalotherFranciscanthinkers(e.g.John Duns
Scotus),Auriol denies that everyindividualhas a distinguishing
intelligible property.How, then,can the human intellecthave cognitionof really
existingsingulars?Auriol adopts a positionthat remindssomewhatof a
verywell developedversionof Thomas Aquinas' theoryon the same issue,
with the human intellecthavingmediate knowledgeof singularsthrough
the phantasm.
The guest editorsof the presentvolume would like to take this op, and especiallyC.H.
portunityto thank the editorialboard of Vivarium
the
for
invitation
to
the
We hope thatthese
volume.
Kneepkens,
compile
studieswill contributeto the ongoingprocessof elucidatingPeterAuriol's
significancefor medievalphilosophyand theology.

18:22:30 PM

in theWorksof PeterAuriol
The Immaculate
Conception
WILLIAMDUBA*

One of the major theologicalissues traditionally

discussedin commenis the Immaculate Conception. Peter
tarieson book III of the Sentences
Auriol,O.F.M., figuresamong the firstscholasticdefendersof this doccommentariestestify
to his
trine,and the variousversionsof his Sentences
consistent
defenseof the conceptionof Mary withoutthe stainof Original
he produced two separate
Sin. In additionto his Sentences
commentaries,
workson the ImmaculateConception:the treatiseDe concepitone
containingAuriol's systematicexpositionof the doctrine,and the ReperDei, reflecting
editum
contra
adversarium
innocentiae
matris
cussorium
his polemic
Since
a
critic
of
the
former
text.
these
have
to
treatises
traditionresponse
ally been dated to winter 1314-1315, scholarsinterestedin the textual
traditionof book III have used them in theirattemptsto date Auriol's
commentaries.Conversely,those occupied with Auriol's positionon the
ImmaculateConception have had to considerthe relationshipbetween
the textsto determineAuriol's matureopinion. Nevertheless,these two
conclusionsconcerningthe relativedatingof
groupsreach contradictory
the principaltextsin question.
In thisarticle,I shall brieflyreviewtheseconclusions,and evaluate the
criteriaused to reach them.This evaluationwill suggesta freshapproach
to the problem,namely,one thatseeksto establishthe orderof the texts
by means of a detailed considerationof textualand doctrinalparallels.
The conclusionthat I will reach will be that the treatmentcontainedin
thelongercommentary,
foundin a singlemanuscriptand the 1605 Rome
edition,antedatesthe separatetreatises,and the one in the shortercommentary,publishedby Buytaertin 1955, was composed afterwards.
The textualsituationfor Auriol's commentaryon book III of Peter
is quite complex,and establishingin detail the relaLombard's Sentences
tions among the various redactions,and between these redactionsand
* Theauthor
L. Nielsen,
wouldliketothank
R. Friedman,
K. Boughan,
F. Del Punta,
oftheFranciscan
C. Schabel,
K. Tachau,G. Trifogli,
andthelibrary
ofMnster
convent
fortheir
inpreparing
thisarticle.
assistance
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium,
38,1

18:22:37 PM

WILLIAM
DUBA

theirmanuscriptand printedwitnessesis a dauntingtask. The lack of

any firmdates of compositionforany of the textsaggravatesthisproblem.1
In what follows,I shall largelylimitmyselfto consideringthe two main
of 72 questionsexemplified
redactions,thatis, the reportatio
by manuscripts
L, P and T and the 22 distinctionsdiscussedin manuscriptS and the
1605 Rome edition,X. ManuscriptN, reportinga textslightlydifferent
fromLPT, does not receiveseparateattentionhere,as it does not reflect
any material differences,and, in fact, seems to be an abbreviation.2
ManuscriptC reportsa text similarto SX, but presentssome unique
problemsthat will be treatedin a later study.For the sake of brevity,I
will use LPT to referto the collectionof 72 questions,and SX for the
22 distinctions.3
1 In
AurioPs
commentaries
I follow
thesiglausedby
on bookIII oftheSent.,
discussing
E. Buytaert
in hisAur
eoli'
s unpublished
III, d. 3, q. 1-2, in:Franciscan
15
Studies,
reportatio
Die Kommentare
desP. Aureoli
Sentenzenbuch
zumdritten
, in:
(1955),159-74and V. Heynck,
Franziskanische
51 (1969),1-77,thatis:Florence,
Bibi.Laurenziana,
Plut.32dex.
Studien,
12 (= L); Florence,
BNG,B. VI. 121(= N); Paris,BN,Lat. 17,484(= P); Sarnano,
BC,
E 92 (= S); Toulouse,
ediBM,243(= T).; totheseI addX forthe1605Romeprinted
tionandC forSalamanca,
BU, 2295.
2 Cf.Buytaert
1955(op.rit.,
above,n. 1),162-3.
3 Indeed,it is easier
to discuss
witnesses
to
andtheredactions
attributed
manuscript
them:
LPT
and3
Collatio
quaestiones
ordinatae

N
-

72 quaestiones qq. 1-42

last
(missing
but
sextern),
shorter

S
-

X
-

C
-

dd. 1-4,6-22

dd. 1-4,
9(part)-22
copiedas
d. 23

dd. 1-22,but
shorter

qq. 47-72as
dd.27-40

qq. 42-72(one
not
sextern,
N)

d. 5, 3question
appendix
qq. 47-72

Additional
notes:
Gd. sem.,46/85contains
witness
to LPT; I havenot
another
(1) Presumably,
Pelplin,
auRpertoire
this.cf.Z. Wiodek,
Commentaires
surlesSentences.
beenabletoconfirm
Supplment
deF. Stegmller
lesmssdela Bibliothque
duGrand
dePelplin,
Seminaire
, in:Mediaevalia
d'aprs
8 (1961),33-8.
Polonorum,
Philosophica
ofCardinal
Torri
dueinparttotheefforts
Costanzo
(2) X is the1605Romeedition,
auRpertoire
deM. F. Stegmller
ofSarnano.
V. Doucet,Commentaires
surlesSentences.
,
Supplment
Florence
thatS is without
doubtthebasisofX. Anexamina1954,67,n. 661,declares
tionofthetexts
confirms
ofthelatter
thepart
this;a comparison
partofthemanuscript,
shared
withLNPT,showsthatS is veryunreliable,
withmanyvariant
Forthe
readings.
mostpart,X sharesS's variants;
thesamevariant
as S, itusuwhenX doesnotreport
ofa marginally
successful
at correction.
Moreover,
manyof
allyshowsevidence
attempt

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

LPT and SX are linked,althoughnot necAs Sentences

commentaries,
lectureson the Sentences.
As we shall
to
Auriol's
various
essarilydirectly,
in
and
content
to
their
notbeing
the
differences
structure
see,
point
on the
the
same
text.
Auriol
lectured
redactionsof essentially
different
at least twice,possiblythree times: at Toulouse ca. 1313-1315
Sentences
and at Paris 1316-1318, and possiblyat Bologna ca. 1312. Thus, these
commentarieswere almost certainlycomposed in the second decade of
the fourteenth
century.
Among the expositorsof Peter Auriol's doctrineof the Immaculate
Conception,Leo Rosato is the most recentto have proposed a textual
order. In his monographhe notes that,among other things,LPT and
most notablythe distheDe conceptione
share a good deal of terminology,
tinctionbetweenthe contractionof Original Sin de iureand defacto
; SX,
withthe treatises.
on the otherhand, does not show such close affinities
Largelyon thisbasis, Rosato concludesthatLPT is dependenton the De
, and SX precedes it.4
conceptione
The last scholarto considerin detail the textualproblemof book III,
Valens Heynck,reaches a different
conclusion.Heynck rightlycritiques
Rosato'sassumptionthatterminological
similarity
impliesany orderamong
the texts.5Yet he furtherargues that theyimplyproximityin time. In
an articlededicatedto Auriol's commentaryon book III of the Sentences
,
forthe other
he triesto relateLPT and SX to Auriol'sknownReportationes
books. Since many of Auriol's commentarieson the other books of the
have been associated with his lectures at Paris or Toulouse,
Sentences
Heynckseeks to findstructuraland stylistic
parallels that implya comforthe other
mon origin.For Heynck,thereare two seriesof Reportationes
books: a versionrevisedby the author for books I, II and IV; and a
" ofAuriol'slecturesbeforerevision.6
"strictreportatio
Accordingto Heynck,
from
in thelatX's variants
S canbe explained
or illegible
abbreviations
byambiguous
tertext.Fora similar
conclusion
on thederivation
oftheprinted
forpartofthe
edition
at Sarnano,
inprimum
from
a manuscript
seeSchabelinthisvolume,
G.
Scriptum
appendix
4 L. Rosato,
deImmaculata
B.V.M.Conceptione
secundum
Petrm
Aureoli
Doctrina
, Roma1959,
5-16.Otherrecent
treatments
ofAuriol
andtheImmaculate
are:S. Manelli,
Conception
deldebitum
Pietro
0. Min.(f 1322),e la questione
Aureoli
, Napoli1961;
peccatiinMaria
15
A. Di Lella,TheImmaculate
intheWritings
Aureoli
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
ofPeter
Conception
andF. De Guimaraens,
O.F.M.Gap.,La doctrine
destheohgiens
surl'imma(1955),146-58;
cule
de1250 1350, in:Etudes
n.s.111:10
n.s.111:9
Franciscaines,
(1952),181-203;
conception
(1953),23-51,167-87.
5 V. Heynck,
deImmaculata
B.V.M.Conceptione
ReviewofL. Rosato,Doctrina
secundum
41 (1959),431-3,at p. 433.
Petrm
Aureoli
Studien,
, in:Franziskanische
6 Fordiscussions
on thevarious
versions
ofAuriol's
commentaries
on theother
books,
onbookI, seeS. Brown,
Petrus
Aureoli'
De unitate
entis
Parisiensis
principally
conceptas
(Reportatio

18:22:37 PM

WILLIAM
DUBA

internaland externalevidencepointsto the derivationof both reportationes

fromAurioPslecturesat Paris in the period 1316-18. Based on a stylistic analysis,Heynck declares that LPT is somewhatsimilarto the strict
and SX slightly
less so to the revisedversion.7Heynckthentakes
reportatio,
the ImmaculateConceptionquestionand juxtaposesSX and LPT to show
that these textsdo not derive fromthe same lecture.Heynck concludes
on the basis of terminologicalsimilarityin the Immaculate Conception
discussionsthat LPT is contemporaryto the De concepitone,
and hence is
a reportatio
of AurioPs lecturesat Toulouse. Since SX has some stylistic
to the revisedreportationes
affinities
, he associatesthemwithAurioPsParis
lectures.As furtherproof of the sufficiency
of such criteriafor determiningdating of manuscripts,Heynck cites DettlofFsclaim that,when
givinga lectureon a topic previouslytreated,Auriol does not slavishly
copy his precedingdiscussion,but rathertreatsthe issue anew, albeitwith
the same arguments.So SX need show no tracesof the precedingdebate.
Accordingto Heynck, it is an incompleterevisionof AurioPs Parisian
lectures,neverintendedforcirculation.For thisreason,whenAurioPsParisian reportatio
was circulated,AurioPs"editors"had to scrambleto fillthe
hole leftby this incompletetext,which explains why manuscriptsLPT
are compositesof AurioPs Parisian collatioon book III, three quaestiones
on the firstdistinction,
ordinatae
and 72 questions.8
account
does
not
stand
Heynck's
up to scrutiny.First,all of AurioPs
Sentences
lecturesoccurredwithina few years of each other;shared terbut is not sufficiently
minologymay argue for temporalproximity,
precise to be of use here. Second, althoughtheremay be similarities
between
inI Sententiarum,
dist.2, p. 1, qq. 1-3etp. 2Sqq. 1-2),in: Traditio,
50 (1995),199-248;
Peter
Aureol
andFuture
inPrimm
onDivine
Sententiarum,
Schabel,
Foreknowledge
Contingents:
Scriptum
distinctions
38-39
de l'Institut
du Moyengegrecetlatin,
65 (1995),63-212,
, in:Cahiers
atpp.78-82;L.O. Nielsen,
Peter
Auriol's
with
Words
Evans(ed.),Commentaries
, in:Gillian
Way
onPeter
Lombard's
Sentences
, Leiden(forthcoming).
7
forthesimilarities
., above,n. 1),"36-59.His chiefarguments
Heynck1969(op.cit
between
SX andthe"revised
on page59) are:(A)theformula
(found
reportationes
arguo
thepositing
ofthequestion
often
beginwitha
quodfollows
throughout.
(B)Thequestions
reference
to theLombard's
SX doesnotalways
havethedirect
text,
quotation
although
in theother
found
books.(G) theindividual
in length.
considerably
questions
vary
8 Heynck1969(op.cit.,
es durchaus
der
above,n. 1), 67-8,"Andererseits
entspricht
undSelbstndigkeit
als er an derPariser
da er vierJahrespter,
Aureolis,
Eigenart
seineSentenzenvorlesungen
Buchhielt,die Frageganzneu
Universitt
berdas dritte
Wir
undganzendieselbe
Ansicht
vertritt.
hat,wenner auchhierimgroen
angepackt
machen
da unserFranziskaner
in all denFllen,
wo er
ja auchsonstdieBeobachtung,
wiederum
dieselben
sichnichteinfach
sondern
zumminwiederholt,
Fragenbehandelt,
eineneueDarstellung
desten
cf.W. Dettloff,
DieEntwicklung
derAkzeptationsund
bietet.";
Verdienstlehre
vonDunsScotus
bisLuther
mitbesonderer
derFranziskanertheologen
,
Bercksichtigung
Mnster
1963.

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

the commentarieson book III and the different

redactionsof the other
are
the
texts
as
identical.Such an
books,
not, Heynckadmits,stylistically
are
the
conclusion
that
not
the same redacanalysisonly permits
they
tion.9Finally,the claim that AurioPslater argumentsdo not reflectthe
formulation
of previoustreatments
begs the question.
LPT
and
SX
lack
So,
anythingbut superficialsimilaritiesto any of
AurioPsothercommentarieson the otherbooks of the Sentences.
Nor do
we knowof any unequivocalinternalcitationsthatwould clarifythe relations between the texts.Nevertheless,an examinationof the textscan
suggesta likelyorder,providedone assumes as a criterionfor posterity
a more sophisticated
of the issue. In otherwords,ifAuriol,
understanding
in part as a result of the vigorous debate witnessedby his treatises,
achieved a greaterawarenessof his own position,and his workspostethena chronoriorto the debate reflectthismoreprofoundconsideration,
can
order
for
the
texts
be
logical
proposed.
For Auriol,such a more sophisticatedunderstanding
will manifestitself
in (A) a strongerstatementof his position,representedby the elaboration of a general theoryor a syntheticpoint of view instead of ad hoc
of
reasoning,(B) a structurethat reflectsrevisionsand reconsiderations
the material,(C) a more thoroughawarenessof the implicationsof his
position,and of competingones.
Such an assumptionof greaterspecificity
over timebecomes even more
if
we
that
can
show
AurioPs
later
treatments
make use of prepersuasive
vious formulations
of his position.Some of AurioPscommentarieson the
otherbooks of the Sentences
containexplicitindicationsof date thatplace
themafterthe treatiseson the ImmaculateConception.If passages containedin thesecommentariescan be shown to be substantially
the same
as thosedevelopedin the treatises,thenit becomes difficult
to claim that
Auriol,in the years immediatelyfollowinghis debate at Toulouse, did
not consulthis precedingformulations.
In addition,once it is shown that
when
later
had
Auriol,
treatises, presenthis previousarguments,
composing
if
textsfor
mentally, not physically,we can then considerthe different
evidenceof AurioPsreworking
of previousarguments.Specifically,
we can
9 Indeed,
a roughsampleofthefrequency
oftheappearance
oftheword"dico"in
Auriol's
various
textsreveals
thefollowing
Printed
edition
ofbooksII and IV
pattern:
440and475words,
(= "corrected
reportatio
"): oneappearance
approximately
every
respecVat.Lat.6768("uncorrected
315words;
the"uncorrected
tively;
"): every
reportatio
reportatio"contained
inBerlin,
cod.theol.
lat.536andPadua,Anton.
292:oneevery
260words;
1 (= SX, dd. 1-5,9-22):oneapproximately
X, bookIII, dd. 1-22,23 article
every140
words.
X, bookIII, dd.27-40(= LPT,qq. 47-72),oneoccurrence.

18:22:37 PM

10

WILLIAM
DUBA

examine parallel textsto see where contextualdiscrepanciescan indicate

a possible order.
Before analyzingthe textsby means of these two criteria,namely,a
considerationof paralleltextsforevidenceof relationsof dependenceand
of the arguments,it is usefulto
an evaluationof the relativespecificity
on
establishthe contextof this analysisby sketchingthe statusquaestionis
theImmaculateConception,thecircumstances
AurioPs
treatises,
surrounding
in LPT and SX.
and the formof these treatisesand of the treatments
1. Context
The basic termsof the ImmaculateConceptiondebate were understood
by AurioPs contemporaries21sfollows.Humans born via carnal union
contractOriginal Sin at conception,and are infectedwith it untilbaptism or some other divine act of removal. In the case of Mary, it was
agreed that, at the momentof her birthshe did not have the stain of
OriginalSin. The problemunderdiscussionwas: Did she everhave Original
Sin? Could she have been conceived withoutcontractingOriginal Sin?
In the Xlllth century,some theologiansansweredthisquestionin the
affirmative.The firstscholastic treatmentsdefinitelyassociated with
Immaculistpositionare those of the FranciscansWilliam of Ware and
withAuriol opposed
John Duns Scotus. Most theologianscontemporary
the ImmaculateConception.10
As has been noted, the chief sources that we have for ascertaining
AurioPspositionon the ImmaculateConceptionare his separatetreatises,
theDe concepitone
and the Repercussorium.
The circumstances
of the treatises'
and
determine
their
content
compositionhelp
specific
purpose,and confromAurioPsdiscussionsof the issue
sequentlymany of theirdifferences
in his Sentences
commentaries.Moreover,a balanced examinationof the
evidence will help clarifythe eventssurroundingthe compositionof the
treatises,and confirmtheirdating,which has untilnow been assumed.
Roughly a dozen medieval manuscriptscontain copies of the De conhalf of those also possess the Repercussorium
.H Several printedverceptions^
10Gulielmi
Guarrae
DunsScoti
Aureoli
deImmaculata
, Ioannis
, Petri
Quaestiones
disputatae
Conceptione
Beatae
Franciscana
Scholastica
mediiaevi,3
MariaeVirginis,
ed. [Lemmen],
in:Bibliotheca
deconceptione
), 94-153(.Repercussorium
); C. Balie,Ioannes
1904),23-94(Tractatus
(Quaracchi
DunsScotus.
Doctor
Immaculatae
1952-53(op.cit
, Roma 1954.De Guimaraens
Conceptionis
themostcomplete
ofscholastic
on thematter.
above,n. 4) provides
inventory
opinion
11Manuscripts
withcopiesof theDe conceptione
and theRepercussorium
: Dsseldorf,
Stiftsbibl.
Staatsarchiv
IV.97;Erfurt,
372;Rome,BN
Amplon.
Q, 131;Klosterneuburg,
withonlytheDe conceptione:
Sessor.1405(100);Sankt-Florian,
Stifstbibl.
138.Manuscripts

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

11

sionsof the textswere made, among which the mostimportant,textually

and historically,
are theversionthatthe XVIIth-century
ImmaculistPedro
de Alva y Astorga,O.F.M., preparedand the 1904 editionof the Quaracchi
editors.12
At the end of AurioPstexts,Alva y Astorgasuppliesa textthat
e:
describesthe circumstancessurroundingthe De conception
intheconvent
Minor
ForwhensaidBrother
Peter
waslector
oftheFriars
ofToulouse,
in thehouseoftheFriarsPreacher
on thefeastof
it happened
thathe preached
andinthesermon
theConception
oftheBlessed
thathemadetotheclergy,
Virgin,
arediscussed
headduced
certain
which
above,thatitwaspioustobelieve
arguments,
thatGodpreserved
theBlessed
from
Sin;forGodcould
Virgin
contracting
Original
himto do this,and,perhaps,
it wasdone,inasmuch
do this,anditsuited
as said
as wasexplained
feast
above.Butwhena cerwasabletobe legitimately
celebrated,
to theclergy
on thefollowing
tainFriarPreacher
heardthis,he preached
Sunday,
thattheBlessed
contracted
Sin- he resolved
Virgin
showing
byarguments
Original
from
hisposition
withhisownarguments,
hisownarguments,
which
are
confirming
alsodiscussed
andasserting
thatsaidBrother
Peterhimabove,nevertheless
adding
selfhadaffirmed
thatitwereso,butnevertheless
hadentirely
itunder
buried
doubt
saidBrother
in
andpiouscredulity;
wherefore
Petersolemnly
thisquestion
disputed
oftheseculars,
andwithall religious,
theschools
andtheremaindoctors,
masters,
in thepresence
oftheentire
studium
in theman, he determined
ingclerics
present,
nerindicated
in theaforesaid
above.Andthishappened
in the
cityofToulouse,
oftheLord1314,on thevigilofSaintThomastheAposde
yearoftheIncarnation
andwithGualhard,
[December
21],Louis,KingoftheFranks,
newly
reigning,
bishop
ofToulouse
theApostolic
See beingat thetimevacant.13
present;
Stiftsbibl.
BC 193;Douai,BM 518;Munich,
CLM 3590;Vatican
340;Assisi,
Admont,
BM 400 (876),is a highly
mutilated
Arras,
City,Vat.Lat. 10275.In addition,
copyof
whatappears
oftheDeconcepitone
tobea slight
Maturinus
dementis,
bya certain
reworking
O. Carm.F. Pelster,
desQuodlibet
undanderer
desPetrus
Aureoli
O.F.M.
,
(Zurberlieferung
Schrifien
at p. 392,indicates
in:Franciscan
Studies
Bibl.epls.Theca
14,(1954),392-411,
Bruges,
116n. 1 as a Spanish
translation.
P. Glorieux,
desMatres
enthologie
deParisau
Rpertoire
XIIIesicle
Munich691 and 1502,as wellas
, Paris1933,244-8,alsolistsas manuscripts
Krakow
itis notclearwhatheis referring
1600,but,inthecaseofMunich,
to,and,for
I havenotbeenableto confirm
this.Additionally,
he signals
a manuscript
in
Krakow,
without
further
andChartres
428,whichhassincebeendestroyed.
specification,
Naples
12P. deAlvay
Monumenta
Mariae
Antiqua
proImmaculata
Conceptione
Astorga,
Seraphica
Virginis
exvariis
inunum
Auctoribus
etcollecta
, Lovanii1665;Fr.Gulielmi
Seraphicae
Religionis
comportata
Guarrae
. . . Qg.Disput,
deImmac.
B.M.V.
1904(op.cit
, ed. [Lemmen]
., above,n. 10).
Concept.
Unless
thistextwillrefer
totheedition
toLemmen.
attributed
Thisedition
isbased
noted,
onthemanuscripts
from
Assisi
andtheBiblioteca
inRome.
Nazionale
Erfurt,
Dsseldorf,
13Alvay Astorga
1665(<op.cit
., above,n. 12),79,placesthispassageat theendofthe
section
to"Petrus
de Verberia",
attributed
Aureoli
buttiesitdirecdy
to theDe conceptione
,
which
atthebeginning,
"Adfinem
Tractatus
Petri
extaAureoli,
appears
explaining,
primi
banthaecverbapraetermissa
I havenotfoundthispassagein the
ab Impressoribus."
thatI haveexamined.
therubric
totheSpanish
transNevertheless,
manuscripts
surviving
lationreported
derives
1954(op.cit.,
from
sucha
above,n. 11),392,clearly
byPelster
a terminus
establishes
antequem
of 1475foritsLatinoriginal.
and,moreover,
description,
Alvay Astorga
1665(iop.cit
indicates
twomanuFurthermore,
., above,n. 12),1, himself
AurioPs
one ofwhichpresumably
servedas thebaseforhis
treatise,
scripts
containing
thatthetextis "repertus
Tolosaein Francia
in Bibliotheca
et
edition,
Fuxensi,
specifying
Parisiis
The manuscript
at theCollgede Foixcouldhave
apudD. D. Cancellarium."

18:22:37 PM

12

WILLIAM
DUBA

So, accordingto thispassage, the originaltreatisearose froma debate

betweenAuriol and at least one Dominican opponent;more specifically,
it representsa systematicexpositionof the doctrinad
pointstouchedupon
Auriol's determinain AurioPssermonon the ImmaculateConception.14
tiondid not settletheissue,as his subsequentRepercussorium
clearlyaddresses
a criticof the De conceptione.
Such a chronologyfitsthe circumstantial
evidenceextremelywell. We
know fromindependentsources thatAuriol was Lectorat the Franciscan
Studium
of Toulouse ca. 1313-1315.As Auriol'swritingsshow,the Immaissue in the early XlVth century;
culate Conceptionwas a controversial
Dominican theologiansin general vehementlyrejected it.15Moreover,
the purporteddate for the sermon,December 8, 1314, the feastof the
ImmaculateConception,fellon a Sunday and hence coincidedwiththe
second Sunday in Advent; in the XlVth century,Sunday sermonsat
the University
of Toulouse were givenin the Dominican Convent.16
Thus,
about Auriol'ssermonoccurtherewould have been nothingextraordinary
totheendowment
madebyCardinal
Pierre
de Foix;many
oftheCollge'
s books
belonged
wereoriginally
whenhe tookpossession
ofthepapalpalaceof
bytheCardinal
acquired
oftheschismatic
VIII in 1429[P. Foumier,
Les
after
theabdication
Clement
Peiscola
descollges
del'Universit
de Toulouse
de l'Ecolede Chartes,
, in: Bibliothque
bibliothques
- saformation
La Librairie
desPapes
, sa composition
, ses
443-76;M. Faucon,
51(1890),
d'Avignon
is
Paris1886,v. 2, 109].Thus,it probable
thatentry
516 in
(1316-1420),
catalogues
thecatalogue
ofPeiscola
de conceptione
viz.,"Itemtractatus
(ca. 1411-1415),
Virginis
thatAlvayAstorga
a fratre
PetroAureoli",
is infactthemanuscript
is referMarieeditus
Avigrion
et
de Pommerol
etJ. Monfrin,
La Bibliothque
Pontificale
ringto [H.M.Julien
etsa dispersion
Peiscola
leGrand
Schisme
d'Occident
, Rome1991,43-54].Unfortunately,
pendant
sawthecodex,thelibrary
ofFoixhadbeenindecayforthree
at thetimeAlvay Astorga
a 1668inspection
revealed
thatthreequarters
ofthemanuscript
ofa century;
quarters
weremissing.
a largeportion
ofthoseremainbooksin thecatalogue
thereafter,
Shortly
de
intotheBibliothque
Le cabinet
desmanuscrits
Royale[L. Delisle,
ingwereincorporated
v. 1, 494-509].
The copyof
la Bibliothque
, w. 2-4],Paris1868-1881,
impriale
[nationale
the
NorhaveI identified
treatise
hasnotbeenfound.
Auriol's
Immaculate
Conception
in thecollection
ofFrance.
locates
oftheChancellor
thatAstorga
copy
14Sucha sermon
that
Aswithmany
ofthesermons
hasnotbeenfound.
J.B.Schneyer,
Sermones
derlateinischen
desMittelalters
, 9 vols.,Mnster
fiirdieeitvon1150-1350
Repertorium
vol.4: Autoren:
toAuriol,
theoneon theImmaculate
L-P,attributes
1969-80,
Conception,
to onethathe attributes
on betestlucis
aeternae
, is identical
viz.,p. 594,no. 152,Candor
is
in anycase,on doctrinal
sucha sermon
to Francis
terauthority
Meyronnes;
grounds,
as itplacesOriginal
Sinintherational
withAuriol's
inasmuch
soul,
position,
incompatible
itinthesensitive
cf.Franciscus
instead
maintains,
of,as Auriol
consistendy
locating
appetite;
Sermones
de Mayronis,
, Venetiis
1493,f. 142vab.
15Seethecatalogue
1953(op.cit
ofopponents
., above,n.4),
compiled
byDe Guimaraens
172-86.
16
danslesuniversits
de Fanjeaux,
Laprdication
mridionales
32(1997),
, in:Cahiers
J.Verger,
at p. 279.
275-93,

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

13

ringin a conventthat harboredlittlesympathyforits doctrinalcontent,

or the opinionsof its author.
In any case, one of the manuscriptwitnessesto both the De conceptione
and the Repercussorium
, Roma, BN Sessor., 1405 (100), is dated to 1315,
providingfurther
supportforsuch chronology.Moreover,numerousmanthe
De
of
containrubricsdatingthe textto 1314; othuscripts
conceptione
ers further
that
the
is of the same date.17Therefore,
Repercussorium
specify
the De conceptione
was composed at Toulouse in December, 1314, and the
Repercussorium
shortlythereafter,
probablybeforeApril, 1315.
The formof these treatisesreflectsthreemajor concerns.First,Auriol
seeksto establishthetheoretical
framework
forthe ImmaculateConception
what
Sin
how
it
is transmitted,
and how it is
is,
by explaining
Original
possiblethatGod preventedMary fromcontractingit. Second, he works
to supplyan exegeticalmodel that rendersthe Immaculate Conception
compatiblewith authority.Auriol claims that the numerousarguments
fromScriptureand authorityagainst the positionuse the termsof the
debate equivocally.In favorof the Immaculate Conception,aside from
authoritative
passages,Auriol also reasonsfromgeneral rules and analodoctrines
to exemptMary fromsin. Third,Aurioljustifiesthe validgous
of
a
ity holding theologicalpositionthatlacks any explicitscripturalbasis
and findsat best fewdefendersamong the Church Fathers.He does this
by elaboratingan understandingof Christiandoctrinethat restrictsthe
and excludes the Immaculate
typeof beliefsthatare held withcertainty,
from
that
Thus
he
determines
that certaintheologiConception
group.
cal views,the ImmaculateConceptionincluded,are opinable.
These goals determinethe shape of AurioFsDe conceptione.
This shape
can perhapsbe best explainedby breakingit down accordingto chapter:
1. objectionsto the ImmaculateConception
2. theoreticalframework:
Definitionof terms:conception,Original Sin,
17
372(lateXIV c.),f.36vb:
tractatus
de conStiftsbibl.,
E.g.,Klosterneuburg,
"Explicit
Marievirginis
editusa fratre
PetroAureoli
ordinis
fratrum
minorum,
ceptione
magistro
sacretheologie
inTholosa,
AnnoDominiMCCCXIIII."One ofthemanuscripts
usedin
theQuaracchi
Bibl.Amploniana,
toW.
edition,
Erfurt,
namely
Q. 131,dates,according
Beschreibendes
derAmplonianischen
zu Erfurt
Schurr,
Verzeichni
, Berlin
Handschriften-Sammlung
theearlyXIVthcentury,
is ofSouthern
French
andcon1887,393,from
provenance,
tainsthefollowing
rubrics:
"Innomine
Dominietunigeniti
Marie
(a) fortheDe conceptione:
tractatus
de conceptione
eiusdem
inviolate
Marieeditus
a fratre
PetroAureoli,
ordiincipit
nisfratrum
annoDomini
M CGCXIIII."(b)fortheRepercussorium:
minorum,
apudTholasam
editum
contraadversarium
innocentiae
matris
"Incipit
repercussorium
compositum
per
fratrum
Petrm
Aur.de ordine
annoet locosupradictis."
minorum,

18:22:37 PM

14

WILLIAM
DUBA

and contraction,
theirvarioussenses,and the indicationof whichsense
is primary
3. theoretical
framework:
divinepower,and thepossibility
of theImmaculate
Conception
4. exegeticalmodel: argumentsfromauthority
in favorof the Immaculate
Conception
5. A. opinability:the conceptionof the Virginis a matteron which theological opinion is licit
B. exegeticalmodel: the typesof responsesto be given to the authorities cited to the contrary
6. responsesto specificobjectionsraised in chapter1, on the basis of 5B.
Attachedto the end of chapter 6 is a briefquestion on whetherthe
feastof the Conception of the Virginshould be celebrated.
The Repercussorium
is composedin responseto a critic,and largelyaddresses
the theoreticalunderpinnings
of AurioPsposition.It is dividedinto eight
conclusiones.
The firstsix deal withdifferent
aspectsof AurioPsdoctrineof
the
seventh
defends
Original Sin;
corporeal formation('animal conception') as a significateof conception; and the eighth contains AurioPs
defenseof virtuallyeveryotherpositionhe holds in the firsttreatise.
Aurioldiscussesthe Immaculate
commentaries,
Turningto the Sentences
in
book
d.
the
locus
classicus
for the debate concernIII,
3,
Conception
of theImmaculateConception
ing theconceptionofMary.These treatments
to
a
set
different
of
obviouslyrespond
very
requirements.Being part of
a much largerwork,the author does not need to elaborate his position
on relateddoctrines,such as OriginalSin and Divine Power.At the same
is at least in part dictated
time,the structureof AurioPs argumentation
whereasAuriolconcentrates
commentaries;
by the conventionsof Sentences
on his own thesisin the treatises,in the commentarieshe also evaluates
othertheoriesconcerningthe conceptionof the Virgin.
The treatments
of the ImmaculateConceptionfoundin the two Sentences
also varyconsiderablyamong themselves.
commentaries
The textreported
is
SX
several
times
than
in
that
found
thus
LPT;
by
longer
any arguments
fromomissionin LPT will have to be viewedwithparticularskepticism,
as such omissionscould verywell be due to thisstylistic
distinction.
thefollowing
Thus, in the SX versionof book III, d. 3, Auriolarticulates
structure
forthe relevantarticlesin the firstquestion,concerningthe issue
of Mary's sanctification
when she was conceived(conceptio
passiva):
1. presentation
and resolutionof authorities
the Immaculate
proand contra
Conception

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

15

2. one impossibleway in which Mary was initiallysanctified,that associated withHenry of Ghent,namelyin the same instantin whichshe
was conceivedin Original Sin
3. threepossibleways in which Mary was initiallysanctified
A. she was in Original Sin for the firstinstant,and sanctifiedin the
time contiguouswith that instant
B. she was conceivedimmaculately
C. she was conceived in Original Sin, and was sanctifiedsome time
thereafter
4. determination
of which of the threepositionsshould be held, namely
Immaculate
the
B.,
Conception,and how, namelyas opinion,not with
certitude
5. whetherthe feastof the Conception of Mary should be celebrated.
LPT's treatmentof the ImmaculateConception questionis similarto
SX, inasmuchas the two treatpossible and impossibleways of understandingthe conceptionof Mary. Yet, in LPT the ImmaculateConception
is treated in a separate question that unites the arguments for the
position'spossibility,its authoritativesupport,and the declarationthat
it is actuallythe case; the remainingpossible and impossibleways that
interestAuriolare discussedin the followingquestion,producingthe followingstructure:
Question 1: whetherthe Blessed Virginwas conceivedin Original Sin
I. authorities
pro and contra
II. response:
A. rule: since we read very littleabout Mary in Scripture,to her
should be attributedwhateveris worthyof her loftystate
B. God was capable of preservingMary
C. Mary was, in fact,preservedfromthe stain of Original Sin
D. the feastof the Conception of Mary can be celebrated
III. resolutionof the authoritycontra
.
Question II: whether,if Mary were conceivedin Original Sin, she could
be sanctifiedin the same instant
I. argumentspro and contra.
II. response:
A. as formulated,
thispositionis impossible,(cf. Article2 of SX)
B. it is possiblethatMary was conceivedin OriginalSin and sanctified
in time contiguouswith that instant(cf. 3a of SX above).
III. Resolutionof the argumentcontra
.

18:22:37 PM

16

WILLIAM
DUBA

in mind,let us now considerthe relationsamong

Withthesedistinctions
the texts.
2. TextualParallels
The fact that Auriol elaborateshis doctrineof Original Sin in the treatises on the Immaculate Conception,but, owing to the comprehensive
natureof Sentences
commentaries,
onlyneeds to referto it in his Immaculate
Conceptiondiscussionsin LPT and SX allows us to see clearlywhat role
of his positions.The polemic
the separatetreatisesplay in the formulation
of substannature of the debate surfacesin his repeated reformulations
his
concernthe
structure
of
discussion
tiallythe same position.Further,
commentariesfirmlyassociated
ing Original Sin in one of his Sentences
with Auriol's Parisian lecturesof 1317-18 reflectsAuriol's last formulation of his position. Finally,when the De conceptione
integratesAuriol's
the
Sin
into
discussion
doctrineof Original
concerningthe Immaculate
Conception,the textbetrayssignsof havingbeen reworked;a comparison witha parallel passage in SX shows thatthe discussionin thatcommentaryhas been adapted imperfecdyto the new context.
In the treatises,Auriol formulateshis doctrineof Original Sin three
and once in the Repercussorium.
times: twice in the De conceptione
First,
Auriol lists the significatesof Original Sin. The term "Original Sin"
Auriol claims, can be used to referto any one of its three elements:
causal, material,and formal.(1) With respectto its cause, Original Sin
refersto the sinfulact of seminalconceptionthatbeginsthe process.How
carnal union serves as a cause of Original Sin Auriol explains in the
course of elaboratingthe materialaspect of Original Sin.
In the materialsense, Original Sin is (2A) in itselfsomethingpositive,
but is (2B) privativewithrespectto OriginalRighteousness.That is, just
as OriginadRighteousnessis forAuriol the naturalobedience of the sensitiveappetiteto the human will,so Original Sin materiallyis the rebellion of the sensitiveappetite against the will. Auriol repeatedlyinsists
that in this sense Original Sin is not merelythe privationof Original
Righteousness,but is a positiveattribute,eitherone createdand inflicted
by God as punishment,or one that sproutedup afterthe removal of
Original Righteousness.18
18Fr.Gulielmi
cit
1904(op.
B.M.V.
. . . Qg.Disput,
deImmac.
Guarrae
.,
, ed. [Lemmen]
Concept.
, 104.
, 39,46; Repercussorium
above,n. 10):De conceptione

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THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

17

(3) The formalaspect of OriginalSin is the offenseto God constituted

by originalrebellion,that is, (2) the materialaspect. Thus, Original Sin
is the "imputability,
offense,and guilt"thatarisesin those possessing(2).
In the De conceptione
Auriol then raises and resolvesa series of objectionsto his position.To meet these objections,Auriol provideshis second formulation
of Original Sin, explainingthe quiddityof OriginalSin
in
to
relation
(I)
OriginalSin itself thiscorrespondsto the positivematerial sense (2A) discussedabove; (II) in relationto its opposite,corresponding to the privativematerialsense (2B); (III) in relationto its subjectof
inherence,namelythe sensitiveappetite,in which the materialelement
is present;and (IV) in relationto God, thatis, its formalaspect (3). This
second formulation
allows Auriol to considerand to refutethe opinions
of his adversaries.Indeed, in this manner,he is able to attackin turn
the positionsthat OriginadSin is (Ol) merelythe privationof Original
Righteousness,
(02) a habit inheringin the rationalsoul, and (03) primarilyassociatedwithhuman nature.19
In the firstsix conclusiones
of the Repercussorium
, Auriol respondsto his
the
on
matter
of
Sin.
each
in turn,Auriol
conclusio
opponents
Original
Taking
reiterates:(CI) That the sensitiveappetiteby natureis indifferent
to the
habitual
rebellion
is
and
hence
will;
positive.(C2) That
somethingadded,
thissomethingadded to the sensitiveappetite,the privationof Original
Justice,or habitual rebellion,is not the formalelement,(C3) which is
ratherthe offenseto God and the hate in God. Moreover,(C4) the cause
of Original Sin is libidinousconception.Finally,he clarifiesthat (C5)
OriginalJusticeinhered in the sensitiveappetite,and (C6) that when
Adam transgressed,
he was actingon behalfof all human nature.20
in
the
of
Thus,
treatises,Auriol providesthreeseparate formulations
Sin.
The
first
contains
his
of
the
three
senses;
Original
positiveexposition
the second distinguishes
his theoryfromthe opinionsof others;and the
thirdis a polemic reelaborationof his position.This testifies
to the hotly
contestednatureof Auriol's doctrineof Original Sin. Indeed, the Repercussorium
, Auriol'sresponseto his adversaries,consistsmainlyof the expositionof his doctrineof Original Sin!
When Auriol considersthe same problemin the printedcommentary
forbook II, associatedwithhis Paris lecturesof 1317-18,he draws upon
19Deconceptione
Guarrae
. . . Qg.Disput,
deImmac.
B.M.V.,ed. [Lem, in:Fr.Gulwlmi
Concept.
menl1904(op.cit.,
above,n. 10),at 39-47.
20Repercussorium
Guarrae
. . . Qg.Disput,
deImmac.
B.M.V.
, in:Fr.Gulielmi
, ed.[LemConcept.
above,n. 10),at 96-137.
men]1904[op.cit.,

18:22:37 PM

18

WILLIAM
DUBA

: (C1)-(C3) formthe structuraland

the formulationof the Repercussorium
materialbasis forAuriol's discussionof the topic in d. 30, article2; and
to the firstarticleof dd. 32-33.21Thus Aurioldoes
(C4) showssimilarities
his arguments.Rather,thissimilarity
showsthat
not inevitablyrestructure
when he reconsidersan issue, he does so with ready consultationof his
Therefore,we should expect to findsubstantialsimprevioustreatments.
ilaritiesbetween parts of Auriol's Immaculate Conception treatisesand
his discussionof the Immaculate Conception in d. 3, book III of his
Sentences
commentary.
surfacefroma conStrongparallelsbetweenSX and the De concepitone
siderationof how Auriol integrateshis discussionof OriginalSin into his
discussionof the possibilityof the ImmaculateConception.Auriolbegins
by arguingfor the possibilityof the
chapter three of the De concepitone
Immaculate Conception. In fact, he tacitlymixes two distinctlines of
Auriolbeginsby claimingthat,at the firstinstantof Mary's
argumentation.
God
could have preventedMary fromcontractingOriginal
conception,
Sin and conferredGrace on her. Auriol deploysa seriesof reasonswhy
this is so; chiefamong these are the claims that divine agency is superiorto naturalagency,a legislatorcan privilegean individualfroma law,
and, since the soul is capable of receivingGrace at the firstinstantof its
Withoutindicating
existence,God can conferGrace at the firstinstant.22
the divergence,Auriol then proceeds to demonstratethat, at the first
instantof Mary's existence,God could have removed{tollere)
OriginalSin.
The difference
is of some importance:the seriesof argumentsabove mainhad Original Sin; the
tains that,by divineaction,Mary could have never
second, on the other hand, impliesthat Mary could have had Original
has an easy
This apparent difficulty
Sin at thefirstinstant
of herexistence.
in a loose sense that
solution:Auriol is probably using the verb tollere
does not implythat its object ever existed.
A parallel passage in SX makes explicitthe two lines of reasoning.In
Auriol treatsthe same issue when arguingthat
thisSentences
commentary,
at the firstinstantof Mary's existence,God was able to infuseGrace and
removeguilt.To supportthisposition,and to show how it fitswithinthe
framework
of his theoryof divinepower,he argues separatelyforthe infusionof Grace and the exclusionof guilt. He startswith three of the
argumentsforthe possibilityof the infusionof Grace at the firstinstant
21X: 284a-285b
'X', seeabove,n. 3).
(forthesiglum
22De conceptione
B.M.K, ed.
Guarrae
. . . Qg.Disput,
deImmac.
, in: Fr.Gulielmi
Concept.
1904(op.dt.,
above,n. 10),at 49-52.
[Lemmen]

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

19

that are also foundin the De conceptione.

Then he turnsto the exclusion
of guiltand presentsa versionof the firstargumentpresentin the treatise. Thus, SX makes explicitthe two lines of argumentation
implicitin
: Auriol is arguingfor the possibilityof an immaculate
the De conceptione
conceptionfirstfromthe perspectiveof conferralof grace, and second
fromtheperspectiveof the exclusionof guilt.Such a relationship
between
SX and the De conceptione
does
not
suffice
to
an
, however,
suggest order
betweenthe texts.
A closercomparisonof the argumentforthe exclusionof OriginalSin
sharedby the two textsdoes suggesta directionof dependence.In particular,if we examine the argumentfor the exclusionof guilt common
to both texts,we discoversubstantiallythe same argumentationbeing
contexts.The argumentas it appears in SX reads:
employedin different
I ask,"what
doyoumeanby'Original
Sin'?"Either
ofOriginal
(A)itis theprivation
withan aversion
toit,which
aversion
is concupiscence,
and
Righteousness
(obliquitas)
thisconcupiscence
is a relation
ofreason,
sinceinrelation
tothatpower,
which
was
theopposite
ofOriginal
Butformally
Sin
Sin,itis disobedient.
materially
Original
is imputability,
sinceit is nota sinunlessit is imputed;
and thisimputability
is
removed
in baptism,
butthatwhichis material,
remains.
namely
concupiscence,
Therefore
I saythatitispossible
thatthesouloftheBlessed
waswithout
sin
Virgin
at thefirst
instant.
If(B)youshouldsaythatthematerial
there
element
thestainofsin,I
signifies
it.
saythatGodcouldsuspend
Godcouldremove
thatsickly
sincepureflesh
in andofitself
is
Equally,
quality,
notinfected,
as Christ
hadflesh
andyethisflesh
wasnotinfected
byanysickly
qualwouldnotfollow,
sincethere
is no agentthat
ity,andthustheaction[ofinfecting]
wouldstain.
Butif(C) youpositthatOriginal
Sinis thelackofOriginal
with
Righteousness
therequirement
ofhaving
it(cum
debito
anddis), I saythatGodcouldalsoremove
misstherequirement.
withimputation,
inthiscaseGodcouldat
Similarly
(A)thataversion
concerning
thefirst
ofexistence
notimpute,
instant
andthatquality,
whichis thelawofthe
he couldsuspend,
members
andhe couldmakeit suchthat
(lexmembrorum),
bodily
itwerenotpresent,
andthusitcouldbe thatat theinstant
ofherconception,
she
didnothaveOriginal
Sin.23
23S: f.24vb;X: 382b:
Autenimest
"Quaeroquidimaginaris
perpeccatum
originale?
cumobliquitate
estconcupiscentia,
et haecconcupisprivatio
quae obliquitas
originali,
centia
estrespectus
ad illampotentiam
estinobediens,
rationis,
quiainordine
quaepotentiaeratopposita
sedformaliter
estimputabilitas,
materialiter,
peccatooriginali
quianon
estpeccatum
nisiimputetur;
ethaecimputabilitas
aufertur
in baptismo,
sedremanet
illud
scilicet
Ideodicoquodpossibile
estquodanimabeatae
quodestmateriale,
concupiscentia.
fuitsinepeccato
inprimoinstanti.
Virginis
Si dicasquoddicitibimateriale
X materia
ser:['materia
originale
S] maculam
peccati
eamsuspendere.
S, seddel.5C],dicoquodDeuspotuit
Item,Deuspotuit
[X peccatoris
illamqualitatem
morbidam
cumpuracarode se nonsitinfecta,
amovere,
quiaChristus

18:22:37 PM

20

WILLIAM
DUBA

In thispassage, Auriol argues dialectically,demonstrating

that regardless
of which understandingof Original Sin his opponent may have, it is
withinGod's power to preventMary fromcontracting.
Thus, he presents
what
we
know
De
to
from
the
conceptionebe his own opinposition(A),
ion, namely that Original Sin is materiallyconcupiscenceand formally
and statesthat it is possiblethatMary was conceivedwithimputability,
out thisimputability.
Then, he considersposition(B), whichholdsOriginal
Sin to be a "sicklyquality"(qualitasmorbida
) thatinheresin the flesh;since
the fleshof Christdid not possess such a quality,it is not a necessary
property;thus God could remove it. Auriol then reportsposition (C),
whichmaintainsthatOriginalSin is theprivationof OriginalRighteousness
) of havingit, and respondsthat God
coupled withthe obligation(<debitum
could removethe obligation.At thispoint,Auriolreturnsto position(A),
and refinesit, concludingthat God could not only preventthe formal
element,namelyhis imputationof the person to guilt,but also, drawing
on his argumentsgiven position(B), the materialelementon whichit is
based, namelythe inherenceof a qualityin the human body.
This returnto his firstargumentintroducesa slightamount of confusion, since Auriol recyclesan argumentused dialecticallyto explain his
own position.Nevertheless,the dialecticalstructureis clear, and Auriol's
use of it here is easily explainable: in the Immaculate Conception discussion in SX, Auriol is not arguingfor his interpretation
of Original
thus
of
his
demonstration
the
of
the
exclusion
of Original
Sin;
possibility
Sin seeks to show such a possibilityregardlessof what understanding
of
Original Sin is had.
The De conceptione
of AurioPs
, however,containsan extensivetreatment
doctrineof Original Sin. Moreover,this analysisappears in the section
immediatelyprecedingthe passage parallel to the one under consideration. Therefore,it is not surprisingthat, althoughAuriol presentsthe
same structureas in SX, here the threepositionsare presentedas three
, Auriol'sfirstarguaspectsof the same position.Thus, in theDe conceptione
ment for God's exclusionof Original Sin reads,

carnem
et tarnen
nonfuitinfecta
et sicnon
habuit,
peraliquammorbidam
qualitatem,
actio,ex quo agensnonestqui maculet.
sequeretur
cumdebito
Si autem
estcarentia
iustitiae
dico
ponisquodoriginale
peccatum
originalis
cumimpuetiam
tollere
debitum
Similiter
de illaobliquitate
etdimittere.
quodDeuspotuit
in primoinstanti
nonimputare,
et illaqualitas,
adhucDeuspotuit
tatione,
quaeestlex
etitapotuit
esseistemodus
etfacere
membrorum,
quod
potuit
suspendi,
quodnoninesset;
in instanti
suaeconceptionis
nonhabuit
peccatum
originale."

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

21

ofOriginal
Sinthere
is only(B) concupisto theformula
Further,
(ratio)
pertaining
ofOriginal
which
cenceseededin theflesh
or(C) privation
to
Righteousness
ought
or (A)theoffense
to Godfounded
on both.ButGodcouldremove
all
be present
ofhercreation:
theBlessed
at theinstant
from
thesefrom
her
Virgin
concupiscence
fromtheprivation
ofrighteousness
and thatrequirement
and
flesh,
[ofpresence]
he wasableto remove
Therefore
from
boththeoffense.
completely
original
guilt.24
As we have seen, theDe conceptione
prefacesthisdiscussionwitha determinationof the natureof OriginalSin, and thispassage seems to assume
itsconclusions,withone significant
difference:
whereasAuriolconsistently
maintainsthe materialelementof Original Sin to be, under its positive
aspect,rebellionor concupiscenceand, underits negativeaspect,the privation of Original Righteousness,in this passage he insertsthe words
debitae
inesse
, "whichoughtto be present",intothe descriptionof the negathathe suggestsGod can remove.
tiveaspect. Moreover,it is thisdebitum
Yet, Auriol's understandingof the materialelementof Original Sin as
elaboratedin the previouschapterand made explicitin his Repercussorium
allows it to be merelythe contraryof Original Righteousness,and not
to contain an obligationto possess it. Indeed, Auriol attacksthe comhabendi
as partof Original
petingopinionthatpositspreciselysuch a debitum
Sin.25One could, of course,suggestthat,here as well, Auriol is arguing
dialectically,
assumingthe positionof his opponents,but then one would
be at a loss to explain how, in the same sentence,Auriol makes the
offenseto God- what he understandsas the formalelementin Original
Sin- inherein both the privationof Original Sin and concupiscenceas
in its materialelement,an inherencethat reflectsAuriol's own view of
what Original Sin is. In short,Auriol seems to conflatehis opinion on
OriginalSin with those of his adversaries.26
24De conceptione
. . . Qg.Disput,
Guarrae
deImmac.
B.M.V.,ed.
, in: Fr.Gulielmi
Concept.
1904(op.cit
de ratione
., above,n. 10),at 52,"Amplius,
[Lemmen]
originalis
peccatinon
estnisivelconcupiscentia
in carneseminata
velprivatio
debitae
iustitiae
inesse
originalis
veloffensa
Deisuper
sedhaecomniaDeuspotuit
a beataVirgine
tollere
fundata;
utrumque
ininstanti
suaecreationis,
eta carneconcupiscentiam,
eta privatione
iustitiae
obligationem
etab utroque
offensam:
tollere
totaliter
ipsam,
ergo
potuit
culpam
originalem."
25Repercussorium,
in: Fr.Gulielmi
Guarrae...
deImmac.
B.M.V.
, ed.
Qg.Disput,
Concept.
1904(op.cit.,
above,n. 10),at 106-7.Rosato1959(op.cit.,
above,n. 4), 21,
[Lemmen]
describes
theopinion
thatholdsOriginal
Sintobe theprivation
ofOriginal
Sinwiththe
"debitum
earn"as the"communior"
habendi
associated
withHervaeus
Natalis.
position
26A further
is thatAuriol's
definition
ofcontrahere
theentire
series
, andindeed,
problem
ofdefinitions
inthepreceding
thereader
fora position
ontheImmaculate
prepare
chapter,
thatsaysthatMarydidnotdefacto
haveOriginal
Sin,butdeiure
did,since
Conception
allhumans
haveconcupiscence.
Yethere,andinwhatfollows,
Auriol
isunequivocal:
Mary
contracted
neither
theformal
northematerial
Sin.But,ifcontraction
aspectofOriginal
deiure
is founded
on possessing
ofconcupiscence,
thequality
howcanwe say,as Auriol
in thisway?
does,thatshecontracted

18:22:37 PM

22

WILLIAM
DUBA

The SX versionhelps to clarifythe reasons for the conflationin the

If we posit that,when composingthe De conceptione
De conceptione.
, Auriol
had the argumentas presentedin SX in mind or at hand, the resulting
text becomes explainable as a partiallysuccessfulattemptat reworking
the passage to accommodate the precedingdiscussionof Original Sin.
Thus, just as the Repercussorium
appears to have served as a source for
so SX, or the lecturefromwhich
AurioPsParisianSentences
commentaries,
it derives,seems to have been the source forthe De conceptione.
LPT, on the otherhand, does not contain any discussionof the doctrineof Original Sin. Since LPT is a much shorterversion,this omission does not tell us anythingabout the order of LPT with respectto
SX and the separate treatises.
3. ParallelReasoning
For medievaltheologians,one of the centralproblemsof the doctrineof
the ImmaculateConception was how to reconcilethispositionwith the
scripturalsilence on the matterand the apparent oppositionof many
authorities.By examininghow Aurioladdressesthisissue acrossthe three
works,we can perceive an order among the texts,providedwe assume
a more
froma generaltheoryrepresents
thatsophisticatedargumentation
mature,and hence temporallyposterior,considerationthan ad hocreaprovidea more completeressoning.Indeed LPT and the De conceptione
tries
olutionof contraryauthoritiesthan SX. Moreover,the De conceptione
to apply to authoritative
argumentsa position,foundin SX in a different
context,on the relativevalue of the authorities.Yet, giventhe fullapparatus of interpretativeschemes Auriol employs, this position appears
superfluous.In addition,it has some awkwardconsequences,and Auriol
In any case, this
himselfseems to retreatfromit in the Repercussorium.
if
we
as
LPT.
assume
from
is
Thus,
signs of posterity
position missing
the more completeresolutionof contraryauthoritiesand the awareness
of the problemswith his position,then we can conclude fromthis evidence the order SX-treatises-LPT.
Let us examine this in detail. SX's resolutionof authoritiesincludes
elementsthat are repeatedin the De conceptione.
Moreover,it containsin
of theImmaculate
theopinability
a different
contexta discussionconcerning
, will be applied to the problemof
Conception that,in the De conceptione
Auriol'streatmentof the ImmaculateConceptionin SX begins
authority.
with a discussionof how to evaluate argumentsfromauthority;the ini-

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

23

tial argumentsagainstand for the ImmaculateConception are citations

texts.AurioPsresponseis illuminating:
of authoritative
In thisquestion,
and
I respond:
oneshouldadheremoreto authoritative
passages
Butauthoritative
to thetestimony
oftheSaintsthanto demonstrative
arguments.
to
So nowit remains
from
theSaintshavebeencitedforbothpositions.
passages
Anditseemsthatthelatter
onesare,namely
onesaretobepreferred.
beseenwhich
in Original
thosethatprovethatshewasnotconceived
Sin,sincethesearguments
is related
to thelawthatappliesgento theformer
onesas a privilege
arerelated
thatdo notmakemention
authoritative
sincetheformer
aregeneral
passages
erally,
do.
butthelatter
underconsideration,
oftheperson
fortheformer
suchas thearguments
theauthoritative
Moreover
position,
passages
ingeneral
conareonlyveryweighty
whenspeaking
andAugustine,
from
Scripture
at
noris anyofthemdirected
thelawthatappliesgenerally,
specifically
cerning
is madeofMary,
mention
as isclearinthe
special
arguments
Mary.Butintheother
andAnselm.
derofrom
authoritative
Therefore,
justas a privilege
Augustine
passages
so thelatter
authoritative
from
the
thelawthatapplies
generally,
passages
gatesfrom
hisposition,
after
former.
Bernard
is saidto haveretracted
death;whence
Further,
hisdeathwitha stainonhisbreast,
monk
after
itissaidthatheappeared
toa certain
oftheGlorious
becauseofthosethings
thathe saidabouttheconception
Virgin.
ofhisauthoritative
Anselm
alsosaysthecontrary
position.27
passagefortheformer
Thus, Auriolbeginsby statingthatthe authoritative
passages fromthe
Saints supporteitherside of the argument.Nevertheless,in this issue,
thanto demonstrative
Auriolgivesmoreweightto suchtestimony
arguments,
27S: f.23va;
inistaquaestione,
X: 379b-380a:
auc"Respondeo:
magisestadhaerendum
toritatibus
Sanctorum
demonstrativis.
Suntautemallegatae
ettestimonio
quamrationibus
estquae sintpraeponendae.
auctoritates
Sanctorum
proqualibet
parte;sed videndum
inpeccato
Vide[n]turquodistaeultimae,
ipsamnonfuisse
conceptam
origiquaeprobant
ad iuscommune,
ad aliasprimas,
sicutprivilegium
nali,quiase habent
quiaillaesunt
illaeautemsic.
mentionem
de proposita,
auctoritates
generales,
quaenonfaciunt
ingenenisiloquentes
nonsuntauctoritates
solemnes,
Praeterea,
proiliapartemultum
necaliquis
rali[S generale
Canonis,
X] de communi
Augustini;
lege,utsuntauctoritates
inspeciali.
Sedinaliisfitspecialis
mentio
de Maria,utpatet
istorum
descendit
ad Mariam
inauctoritatibus
Sicutergoprivilegium
sicultiAnselmi.
iuricommuni,
derogat
Augustini,
maeauctoritates
Bernardus
illamopinionem
saltem
moretiamdicitur
retractasse,
primis.
cummaculain pectore,
tuus:undedicitur
cuidammonacho
quodapparuit
postmortem
illaquaedixerat
Anselmus
de conceptione
etiamdicitcontraVirginis
gloriosae.
propter
riumauctoritate
prima."
hissolution
Auriolrepeats
at theend of theentiredistinction
(S: 26rb;X: 385b),
"Auctoritates
incontrarium
suntvaldegenerales;
etspeciales
nonhabent
utde
efficaciam,
Undedixitalibiquodsi asiiliodeconsecratione
; illeenimfuitrudisin theologia.
apparatu
nusbiberet
velbaptismalem,
biberet
sacramentum.
Ubi autemsunt
aquambenedictam
dictaeorum
et Bernardo,
etc."
invenio
contraria
alibi,utpatetde Anselmo
efficaces,
Thispassage
is preceded
the
andfollowed
bya "haecde totaquaestione".
Presumably
theformer;
latter
is an emblema
from
itshouldread"haecde totadistinc"quaestione"
In anycase,thispassageappears
tione".
oftheGratian's
onlytherejection
superfluous;
from
citedearlier
in thequestion.
theresponse
glossis notrepeated

18:22:37 PM

24

WILLIAM
DUBA

he seeks to resolvethe conflictusingtwo techniques.First,

and therefore
he claims that many authoritiesagainst the ImmaculateConceptionare
in factgeneralpositionsregardingthe contractionof Original Sin; since
theydo not make specificreferenceto Mary, theycan be understoodas
reportingthe rule to which Mary is an exception.Second, Auriol does
state that
not produce a genericresolutionof authoritiesthatspecifically
as
in
he
admits
their
sin.
was
conceived
existence, his disRather,
Mary
cussionof Anselmand Bernardshows,but he can onlyprovidea casual
responseby citinglociwhere the particularauthorscontradictthemselves,
or are reputedto have renouncedtheiranti-Immaculist
position.As we
shall see, this ad hocapproach contrastssharplywith the general exegesis Auriol providesin his other treatises.
Elsewhere in SX, Auriol makes mention of the opinabilityof the
Immaculate Conception,a positionhe will repeat in the separate treatises. Afterthe discussionfromauthoritycited above, Auriol elaborates
threepositionson the conceptionof Mary thathe considerspossible,and
then concludes which of the threeshould be held, namelythat she did
not contractOriginal Sin. To defendthisposition,Auriol delineatesthe
typesof religiousbeliefs:"Now, some thingsare known,and some are
believed,as theArticlesof Faith,and some are piouslybelieved;
necessarily
and thus I piouslyhold and believe thatthe Blessed Virgindid not contractOriginal Sin."28
In the De concepone
, the discussionon opinabilityis linked with the
exegesisof opposingauthorities.In addition,a discussionon the multiple
moresophisticated.
ofkeytermsrendersthisexegesisconsiderably
significates
In the De conceptione,
Auriol addressescontraryauthoritiesin threespatiallydistinctphases. In the firstchapter,he introducesthe authoritative
argumentsagainstthe position,includingthosefoundin SX. In the fifth
chapter,he providesthe argumentsfor the position,and elaborateshis
general resolutionof authoritativeargumentsagainst the Immaculate
Conception.Then, in the sixthand last chapter,Auriolapplies thesegeneral exegeticalrules to the contraryarguments.
Thus, Auriol elaborates his generic resolutionof contraryauthorities
28S: f. 25ra,
Dico
de factoquidtenendum.
"Circatertium
X: 382b-383a:
articulum,
fuerit
modum
noncredoessede facto,
legescommunes
quiaetsisecundum
quodtertium
hocpotuit
noninesse
nonpropter
necessarium
verum,
quodomnes
opinquodcontraxerit,
teneo
sitde facto,
modorum
Ideononsicabsolute
ionestressuntpossibiles.
quisillorum
Modoaliquasuntscita,et quaedam
tarnen
peccatum.
originale
pie quodnoncontraxit
et sicpie teneoet credoquod
utarticuli
necessario
eredita,
Fidei,quaedampieeredita;
ad hoc."
et adducorationes
beataVirgononcontraxit
originale,

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

25

in thefifth
context.In the course
chapter,but he does so in an interesting
of arguingthatthe ImmaculateConceptionis a theologicalissue on which
opinion may be had, he considersthe objection that conciliarapproval
makes them a valid basis on which to argue that
of the dictasanctorum
the ImmaculateConception is erroneousand contraryto the faith.To
thisAuriol respondsthat:
are not declarationsof orthodoxfaith.
(A) the dictasanctorum
foreitherside of theImmaculateConception.
(B) thereare dictasanctorum
saints
sustainMary'sconceptionin OriginalSin,
where
the
(C)
apparently
in
either
, about all humans, but
general, de iure
(1)
they speak
, was excepted,or
Mary, defacto
(2), iftheyspeak about Mary in particular,theyrefernot to human
conception,but to seminadconception,that is, to the maritalact,
which,on AurioPsview, can be called OriginellSin insofaras it
is its cause.29
The reference(C) to the equivocityof termsas a means to resolve
authoritative
out of place. Withthe firsttwo claims,
opinionsseemsslightly
Auriol sustainsthat the authorityof the saints does not, neither(A) in
general nor (B) in this particularcase, exclude any position from the
realm of doctrineson which opinion is possible.30Argument(C), on the
otherhand,ignoresopinabilityand insteadelaborateshow to resolvecontraryauthorities.
The degreeof affinity
betweenthispassage and SX is evident.Whereas
maintainthatthe ImmaculateConception
both SX and the De concepitone
is a doctrineon whichopinionmay be had, here (A) pointsout the necessaryantecedentthat the declarationsof the Saints are not ipsofacto
Church doctrine.This fusionof positionsmeans that here, AurioPsdeclaration(B)- thatthereare authorities
bothforand againstthe Immaculate
- is not
(as it is in SX) the declarationof a problem to be
Conception
of theinconclusiveness
of such authorsolved,but ratherthedemonstration
ities.Nevertheless,(C) purportsto provide an exegeticalmodel capable
of resolving
all authoritative
either,in a manner
argumentsto the contrary,
29Deconceptione
. . . Qg.Disput,
Guarrae
deImmac.
ed.[Lemmen]
, Fr.Gulielmi
B.M.V.,
Concept.
1904(<
., above,n. 10),at 74-8.
op.cit
rora discussion
o theweight
withparbyscholastic
giventoauctontates
theologians,
ticular
reference
to Scotus,
see R.L. Friedman,
Inprincipio
eratVerbum:
TheIncorporation
of
intoTrinitarian
1250-1325
Ph.D.Dissertation,
Philosophical
Psychology
Theology,
Unpublished
ofIowa(1997),201-28.
University

18:22:37 PM

26

WILLIAM
DUBA

analogous to the distinctionbetweengeneral rules and exceptionsmade

in SX (C)(1), or by referenceto different
of conception(C)(2).
significates
the
in
fact
the
of
SX
unconIndeed,
that,
place (C)(2),
providesrelatively
vincingad hocargumentssuggeststhat SX is prior to the De conceptione.
his opinion(A) musthave elicitedresponsefromhis oppoFurthermore,
of
nent, for in the Repercussorium
, our doctor defendsthis interpretation
the dictasanctorum.
He argues explicidythat the Church confirmedthe
dictasanctorum
as being neitherhereticalnor illicit.He arrivesat thisconclusion via a process of elimination.First,he statesthat the dictasanctorumare not true and necessaryfor faith;only the Scripturesare such.
Nor are they simplytrue, otherwisethe Fathers' opinions that vision
occurs by extramissionand that the angels are corporealwould be true.
Auriol
Thus, theyare approvedas non-heretical.
Continuinghis discussion,
seems somewhatembarrassedby the consequencethatthe Churchwould
have approvedfalsehoodin some way. In what follows,he concedes that
the dictasanctorum
are "forsitanminus vera" instead of false. It would
seem, therefore,that Auriol has reduced the authorityof the saints to
that of possessinga sort of conciliarnihilobstat
, but, under pressure,is
with
the
uneasy
consequences.31Moreover,given his capacityto explain
all opposingauthorities
via (C)(1) and (C)(2), Auriol's use of such a patendy
controversial
positionis largelyunnecessary.
Althoughthe notion of opinabilityis implicitlypresentin LPT, it is
never explicitlyelaborated. When LPT resolvescontraryauthorities,it
does so by means of (C)(1) and (C)(2). Moreover,it unitesthemwith a
whereAurioloudines his
passage parallel to the part of the De conceptione
theoreticalbasis forthese arguments.As noted above, Aurioldevotesthe
second chapterof the De conceptione
to the definitionof the terms'conception', 'Original Sin', and 'to contract'.Excludingthe long digression
on Original Sin treatedabove, Auriol's chiefintentionin thischapteris
to elaborate the different
of these termsso that he may
significations
resolveargumentsto the contraryby pointingto an equivocation.
disThus, in describingconception,Auriolpositsa commontripartite
tinctionbetweenseminal,animal,and human conception.These different
typesof conceptioncorrespondto the beginningof the process; to the
productionof the corporealform;and to the infusionof the rationalsoul,
that is, the quickening.This latterconceptionmakes the fetusa human,
and hence is conceptionin the truestsense, but occurs at least 40 days
31Fr.Gulielmi
. . . Qg.Disput,
deImmac.
B.M.V.
1904(op.
Guarrae
, ed. [Lemmen]
cit.,
Concept.
above,n. 10),De conceptione
, 74-5;Repercussorium
, 141-2;148-9.

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

27

afterseminal conception.The most common use of the word 'conception',on the otherhand, is forseminalconception.32
Additionally,Auriol elaborates his position on the uses of "Original
Sin" to referto the cause, the materialelement,and the formalelement,
as noted above. Auriol then definesthe senses of the term"to contract"
). Auriol discernstwo relevantmeanings,which he then applies
(icontrahere
to the model of Original Sin outlinedby the previousdefinition.These
. In sense (A) everydescendentof
meaningsare (A) de iureand (B) defacto
Adam contractsOriginalSin, since each one is born withconcupiscence,
which God decreed to be imputedto guilt.In sense (B) only those who
actuallyincur Gos offensecontractOriginal Sin. So it is possible that
someone contractde iure
, but not defacto.
As shouldbe clear,(C)(1) resolvescontraryauthoritiesby claimingthey
use the term"to contract"in a secondarymanner,that is, for contraction de iure
, while (C)(2) makes referenceto a secondary
, and not defacto
use of "conception",thatis, in referenceto the conceivingact insteadof
human conception.
In LPT, Auriol discussesthe same multiplemeaningsof key termsas
in the De concepitone
, but he firstdiscussesthemin the contextof respondto
to
ing objections his position.Moreover,he onlymentionsthosemeaningsessentialto his claim thatapparendycontraryopinionsare usingthe
can be summarizedwitha table:
These differences
keytermsequivocally.33
De conceptione
, chapter2
I. Conception
A. Seminal
B. Animal
C. Human
II. Original Sin
A. Cause
B. Material element
C. Formal element
III. To contract
A. de iure
B. defacto

LPT
I. Conception
A. Seminal
B. Human
II. Original Sin
A. Cause
B. Material element
III. To contract
A. de iure
B. defacto

32De conceptione
deImmac.
. . . Qg.Disput,
Guarrae
B.M.V, ed.
, in: Fr. Gulielmi
Concept.
1904(op.tabove,n. 10),at 35-6.
[Lemmen]
33Buytaert
1955(op.t.,
above,n. 1),167-8.

18:22:37 PM

28

WILLIAM
DUBA

Auriol mentions neither animal conception nor the formal element

of Original Sin. Indeed, his treatmentof the termsis explicitlygeared
to formingthe basis for his responseto these authoritative
passages. In
summary,LPT resolvesauthoritiesby means of (C)(1) and (2). It does
not discuss opinability,and thus omits any discussionof how the dicta
sanctorum
shouldbe believed;nor does it bringup the contradictory
nature
of the authoritative
Immaculate
on
the
Conception.
passages
Thus, SX discussesthe opinabilityof the ImmaculateConception,and
deploys an exegesisof contraryauthoritative
passages that at timessettlesforan ad hocresolution.
detailsthemultiplesignificates
The De conceptione
of terms,which formsthe basis for a more sophisticatedresolutionof
authoritativepassages. Moreover, the text integratesthe discussionof
authoritywith his positionon the realm of theologicalopinion,but in a
manner,such that in practicallythe same breath,
less-than-satisfactory
forboth sides of the argument
Aurioladmitsthatthereare dictasanctorum
and denies that the dictasanctorum
againsthis positionactuallyoppose it.
Since, as opposed to SX, Auriolclaims thatthereis no authoritative
pasthat
that
the
soul
was
infused
without
the
stain
of
denies
of
Mary
sage
the
claim
that
the
dicta
sanctorum
do
not
exclude
opinabilOriginal Sin,
ity has value merelyas a dialecticalrefutationof an opposing opinion;
thateven
moreover,it is clear fromAuriorsdefensein the Repercussorium
he found some of the consequencesproblematic.Finally,LPT resolves
in a manneridenticontraryauthoritiesbased on a seriesof definitions
cal to the De conceptione
and omitsthe discussionof opinability.In sumbut findsthemless
mary,SX admitsthe existenceof contraryauthorities,
The
treatises
separate
provide explicitargumentsto justifythe
weighty.
of
authorities
thatdenythe ImmaculateConception,
out-of-hand
rejection
but then claims that any apparendycontradictory
authoritative
passages
do not actuallyexclude the Immaculate Conception. Finally,LPT simauthoritiesare in fact contraply denies that apparentlycontradictory
Such
an
of
evolution
dictory.
argumentationimplies the textualorder
SX-treatises-LPT.
4. Structural
development
impliestemporalposUsing the same assumptionthatgreaterspecificity
terity,the order SX-treatises-LPTcan be concluded fromthe structure
of the varioustexts.In particular,two structuralapproachescan be seen
in the threetexts.First,all threetextsreflect(A) the approach thatseeks
to demonstratethe Immaculate Conception as the most pious of possi-

18:22:37 PM

CONCEPTION
THE IMMACULATE

29

ble opinionson Mary's Conception. This approach, which involvesthe

evaluationof competingpositionsat an equal level with the one that
commentaries.But the degree
Aurioladopts,is typicalof Auriol'sSentences
to which these textsreflect(A) is inverselyproportionateto the degree
withwhichtheyfollow(B) a structure
theImmaculate
gearedto demonstrate
from
its
and
its
that
is, the structure
suitability,
Conception
possibility
to
that
Immaculist
arguments
argues according to the formula
specific
etfecit?*SX entirelylacks (B); the De concepone
claims to foldecuit,
potuit,
low (B), but structuresits argumentin a manner typical of (A); LPT
adheres closelyto (B), consigningthe elementsrepresentative
of (A) to
the second question.Such a progressionstrongly
that
the
De consuggests
is an intermediatestage betweenSX and LPT.
ceptione
SX presentsthe conceptionof Mary firstas a problem of conflicting
beforediscussingthreepossibleways and one impossibleway
authorities,
for the virginto have been conceived. Finally,Auriol determineswhat
should be held, and that it should be held as a pious opinion.
, thistreatisecontainsan explicitdeclaraTurningto the De concepone
tion of the structureof its centralchapters.The relationof this declaration to its immediatesurroundings
and to the structureof the text as a
whole requiressome consideration.In chapterthree,afterhaving establishedto his satisfaction
the logical and physicalpossibility
thatGod made
the conceptionof the Virgin in some way immaculate,Auriol declares
this possibilitysufficient
to conclude that God could preserveMary de
.35
ordinata
To
Auriol, this is the same as God's absolute power,
potentia
since God, as the source of all order cannot act inordinately.For this
34See,Rosato1959(<
oftheAnselmian
., above,n. 4), 52,n. 12 fora discussion
op.cit
ofthisformula.
derivation
35Auriol's
hereparallels
treatment
thatofSX, where,
after
thepossibility
of
discussing
theImmaculate
Auriol
thepossibility
treats
tothelawsordained
Conception
according
by
Godandcontained
in Scripture.
In SX, Auriol
limits
himself
to arguing
that,sinceGod
other
herfrom
theoffense
ofOriginal
laws,hecouldhavedispensed
dispensed
Maryfrom
Sinas well.Here,on theother
a general
elaborates
rather
thana
hand,Auriol
principle
solution.
Thatis,he responds
to theobjection
thathe hasonlyshown
thepossispecific
depotentia
thatthere
is nodifference
between
thispossibility
and
absoluta,
bility
byclaiming
depotentia
ordinata.
S: ff.24vb-25ra,
X: 382b:"Dicesquodestpossibile
de potespossibility
tateabsoluta,
nonautemsecundum
et rationes,
leges,statutas
quae nobisex scriptura
utDeusinstituit
semelmori;etsicDeusinstituit
seminaliter
innotescunt,
quodquicumque
de Adamdescenderet,
essetinfectus
taliculpa.
Dico ad haecquodDeusetiamin quibusdam
communibus
Nam
legibus
dispensavi.
estlexcommunis,
incinerado
et patetquodDeusdispensavi
quodnonessetincinerata,
utpiecreditur,
etasseritur
etiamde beatoIoanne.Item,lexcommunis
est:intristitia
paries
autemin laetitia
etsinedoloreDeumparturivit."
; econtra
filios

18:22:37 PM

30

WILLIAM
DUBA

reason,orderis a necessaryconcomitantof divineaction.Hence, the only

limitationto divineactionis logicalimpossibility.36
"God's ordainedpower
is
the
of
the
subject
absolutelyconsidered",
argumentsof the firsthalfof
this chapter (three).Further,Auriol announces here that the following
of theImmaculateConception,
section,chapterfour,willtreatthesuitability
that chapterfivewill considerGod's defactopreservationof
and, further,
Mary fromOriginalSin. Arguingalong theselines,Auriolimplicitly
adopts
as his basic structure
what have been since the timeof Anselmthe three
canonical stages in medieval argumentsforthe ImmaculateConception:
, i.e.,
, i.e., God's power to preserveMary fromOriginal Sin, decuit
potuit
God's
the suitabilityof such a course of action, etfecit
, i.e.,
actualizing
thispossibility.
AlthoughAuriol claims that the treatise,at least in the centralchapAuriol
ters,followsthese three stages,37the actual structureis different:
the logical possibilityof the ImmaculateConception(chapdemonstrates
ter three),argues for its probability(chapterfour)and determinesthat,
in mattersof faithnot yet determinedby the Church,no degree of certaintybeyondpious opinion can be had (chapterfive).Indeed, the structure of the centralchaptersof the De concepitone
differsfromthat of SX
onlyin thathere the competingopinionson the conceptionof Mary are
not considered.
In LPT, Auriol is much more faithfulin adheringto the structure
, etfecit.Instead of evaluatingthe ImmaculateConceptionas
potuit,decuit
one of severalpossibleways in which Mary could have been conceived,
as in SX, in LPT Aurioltreatsthe ImmaculateConceptionand the other
possibilitiesin two separate questions.
In thefirstquestionin LPT, Auriol,discussing
whetherMary contracted
and positionsas
Original Sin, presentsthe same arguments,distinctions,
in the De conceptione.
Thus, afterposing the question,Auriolpresentstwo
36De conceptione
. . . Qg.Disput,
deImmac.
B.M.V.,ed.
Guarrae
, in: Fr. Gulielmi
Concept.
absoluta
1904(op.cit.}
n. 10),at53: . . Deusdepotenta
above,
Virginem,
[Lemmen]
potuit
utdeclarane originale
veroabsoluta
contraheret,
ipsaestordinata,
praeservare,
potentia
cumin eo nihilsit
tumest,relinquitur,
ordinata,
quodpotuitde potentia
praesertim,
ofthetechnical
Fora discussion
ofAuriol's
irrationabile
autinordinatum."
understanding
and ordained
see C. Schabel,TheQuarrel
distinction
between
God'sabsolute
powers,
over
andFuture
Conwith
Aureol
Peter
AureoVs
Late-Medieval
Debate
Divine
Roleinthe
Foreknowledge
ofIowa1994,77-83,and
1315-1475
Ph.D.Dissertation,
, Unpublished
University
tingents,
Power
W. Gourtenay,
A History
Distinction
andOrdained
andVolition:
,
ofAbsolute
ofthe
Capacity
1990.
Bergamo
37Thestatement
Guarrae
. . . Qc.Disput,
is alsomadeintheDe conceptione
, in:Fr.Gulielmi
deImmac.
B.M.V.
1904(op.at.,above,n. 10),at 91-2.
, ed. [Lemmen]
Concept.

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

31

arguments;fromthe firsthe derivesthe premise"whateverwas possible

and suitedto the Virgin,should be attributedto her"; with the second
he shows that the Immaculate Conception was possible. It remainsfor
him to show thatit was suitableforMary to be conceivedimmaculately.
In thisway, Auriol quicklyjuxtaposes an argumentforthe possibilityof
the ImmaculateConception also found in chapter three of the De con, withone of thesuitability
ceptions
argumentsfromchapterfour.The result
is a sequence of argumentsthatestablishesthe premiseforhis successive
reasoning:thatindeed, Mary did not contractOriginal Sin. In what follows,all of the argumentsemployedcan be foundin chapterfourof the
De conceptione.
Thus, the firstquestion of LPT employsthe same material as the De conceptione
to the structure
, but is much more faithful
potuit,
decuit
The second question,on the otherhand, presentsthe other
, etfecit.
opinionson the ImmaculateConception.Thus, LPT possessesthe same
materialas SX, and presentsthe ImmaculateConceptionas just one possible positionamong several,althoughthe one to be preferred,but in
LPT this approach is secondaryto the argumentthat the Immaculate
Conceptionis what actuallyoccurred.
Thus, the structureof SX, the De conceptione
, and LPT demonstratea
shift.
AurioPs
not substantially
does
significant
Although
position
change,
- that
his expositionmoves fromone typicalof his Sentences
commentaries
is, of presentinga seriesof competingpositionson the topic and determiningthecorrectone to a stylespecificto discussionsof the Immaculate
.
Conception,across the hybridexpositionof the De conceptione
5. Conclusion
: The relationship
between
LPT, SX and thetreatises
From an analysisof the Immaculate Conception question,the connectionsbetweenthe textshave become clear. Auriol,when addressingan
issue thathe has consideredpreviously,consultshis precedingtreatments.
for
Thus, forthe doctrineof Original Sin, one of the Parisianreportationes
Book II reflectsthe last of threeformulations
thatAurioluses in the separate treatises.Similarly,in the De conceptione
, Auriol uses and reworks
discussionsfoundin SX. In addition,SX resolvescontraryauthoritiesby
a combinationof reasoned argumentationand evaluationof the weight
of authority.The De conceptione
develops a semanticsolution that purportsto explain everyauthorityto the contrary;Auriol also includeshis
38Buytaert
1955(iop.citabove,n. 1),165-7.

18:22:37 PM

32

DUBA
WILLIAM

but now it is both unnecessary

considerationof the weightof authority,
and problematic. Finally, LPT makes exclusive use of the semantic
the structureof SX, the De conceptione
solution.Furthermore,
, and LPT
from
of
the
Immaculate
the
witnessa steady progression
presentation
Conception as the most pious of possible opinions to one that reflects,
etfecit.
structure
potuit,decuit,
implicitlyand explicitly,the argumentative
The simplestexplanationof the phenomenawould be that SX antedraws upon SX for its discussion,
dates the treatises;the De conceptione
mostnotablyin the thirdchapter.LPT, then,postdatesthe treatises,and
reflectsAuriol's integrationof his conclusionsfromthose worksinto his
Sentences
commentary.Accordingly,he adapted the structureof SX to fit
a more sophisticatedsolutionto the problem.
Such an explanation would also fit with a referencemade in the
five,Auriol defendshis
, and signaledby Rosato. In conclusio
Repercussorium
view that Original Righteousnessis a habit in the sensitiveappetiteby
claiming that the possession of Original Righteousnessalone was not
sufficient
for Adam to be accepted by God. Rather, Adam possessed
Grace in his will. To the objection that Original Righteousnessis formally the opposite of being hated by God, Auriol respondsthat he is
discussingthe termin its materialsense,as the oppositeof habitualrebellion. In this sense, OriginalJustice,in concertwith the other virtuous
habits,partiallyfoundsbeing accepted by God, "especially",Aurioladds,
"since Grace is not a habit distinctfromthe virtues,but somethingresulting fromthe entiretyof virtues,as beauty is corporeal grace and the
colorationof the membersin the requiredproportion,as was said elsewhere."39Rosato sees this as a referenceto the printedcommentaryon
book II of the Sentences,d. 26, art. 1, or possiblyto the printededition
of book IV.40 Yet both these worksdefinitely
postdatethe Repercussorium.
of Mary in d. 3
In Auriol's treatmentof the effectsof the sanctification
of SX, however,a parallel passage appears:
thatGraceplacedherin accepted
Butthereis a difficulty,
whether
beingconseandmeans,
oras a principle
He gaveGrace",
quently,
e.g.,"sinceshewasaccepted,
a certain
form
suchthatthereexists
as "sinceHe gaveGrace,shewasaccepted",
andI callthatform
thatgivesaccepted
givesbeingwhite;
being,
justas whiteness
39Repercussorium
B.M.V.
deImmac.
. . . Qg.Disput,
Guarrae
, ed.
, in: Fr.Gulielmi
Concept.
unacumaliisabitibus
iliumhabitm
1904(op.t
., above,n. 10),at 128:"super
[Lemmen]
non
cumgratia
esseacceptum
Deo et gratum,
fundabatur
virtuosis
praesertim
partialiter
utpulchriex integritate
a virtutibus,
sedaliquidresultans
sitdistinctus
habitus
virtutum,
sicutaliasdicetcoloratione
ex debitaproportione
tudoetgratia
membrorum,
corporalis
tumfuit."
40Rosato1959(<
., above,n. 4), 9.
op.cit

18:22:37 PM

THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION

33

. . . ThusGodonlyso lovessomeone
in
whoparticipates
theconnection
ofvirtues.
to Him.Andthushe is dform
sucha wayin thosevirtues,
bywhichhe conforms
inthosevirtues;
itis impossible
therefore
thatsomeone
be lovedby
byparticipation
ofvirtues,
forwhite
toexist
withGodwithout
thisconnection
justas itis impossible
...
sincehe is formally
outwhiteness,
gracedandaccepted
byGodbythevirtues
andthisrequires
all thevirtues,
so thathe be wellgraced,
justas a manis called
in whichthereis neither
ifhe haswell-disposed
nor
bodyparts,
ugliness
"graced"
is called"Grace",
ifthatisposited,
allthevirtues
defect.
because,
Therefore,
charity
Gracehasthisformal
tomakesomeone
areposited.
Therefore,
effect,
namely
graced
therewasGrace,as shewasgracedand
Virgin
byGod,andthusin theblessed
thatGodlovedbefore
andafterwards
lovedbyGod.Nordo I imagine
gaveGrace;
thatbywhich
Godfirst
lovesman,is Grace,whichis onlyconsequent
in
therefore
as I said.41
thesenseofcommunicating,
Here, he describesGrace as the entiretyof the virtues,and employsthe
analogyofphysicalappearance.Could thisbe the passage to whichAuriol
is referring?
An additionaladvantageof assumingthe versionof book III recorded
in LPT to be the laterone is thatthiswould explainwhy,in the famous
tabulaquaestionis
appended to T, the compilerincludedthe questionsfrom
this collectionas representative
of book III, where for the otherbooks,
he citesversionsthat have 1316 as theirterminus
; if LPT conpostquern
tainsAurioPslatestknowntreatmentof book III, it mostlikesdates from
his Parisianperiod,and, SX, on the otherhand, does not need an explanationforits absence fromthe list in T.42
41S: f.25"**^,
X: 384a"Sedestdubium,
an iliagratia
earninesseaccepto
conposuit
utquiafuitaccepta,
deditgratiam;
velprincipaliter
etmediative,
utquiaddit
sequenter,
fuit
itaquodsitaliquaforma,
sicutalbedoalbum;
gratiam
accepta,
quaedetesseacceptum,
et istamvococonnexionem
sicaliquem
virtutum.
... Ita Deusnondiligit
nisiiliumqui
sicvirtutes,
etitadiligit
Ei. Et sic
sicparticipante
<m>, <quo> sicconformatur
participt
illedeiformis
illarum
virtutum
estaliquem
Dei; ideoimpossibile
perparticipationem
diligi
a Deo sineillaconnexione
sicutimpossibile
essealbumsinealbedine,
virtutum,
quiaper
sitformaliter
virtutes
et acceptus
Deo-non
dicatunumsubstratum
nec
gratus
quodgratia
suaqualitate
virtute-et
hocrequirit
omnesvirtutes,
ut sitbenegratus,
sicutdicitur
'gratus'homohabensomniamembra
in quibusnonsitturpitudo
benedisposita,
necdefectus.Igitur
Charitas
vocatur
omnesponuntur;
'gratia',
quia illaposita,
igitur
gratiahabet
formalem
effectum
facere
fuitgratia,
hune,scilicet
Deo, et itain beataVirgine
gratum
Necimaginor
id
quodfuitgrataet dilecta.
quodpriusdiligat,
posteadetgratum;
igitur
Deushominem
estgratia,
nisicommunicans,
quoprimo
diligit,
quaenonestconsequens
utdixi."A passage
in d. 13 ofthesametext,
occurs
butlacksthecomparquitesimilar
isontophysical
usedhere.
appearance
T: ff.124r-127v.
cf.Brown1995(op.at.,
ofT is
above,n. 6), 204-6.The testimony
becausethetexts
theversions
ofbookIII andbookIV,
there,
particularly
strong
namely
anda tabula
forallfourbooks,
areindicated
as beingcopiedinMarch,1323.
quaestionum
To beprecise,
therubric
thatestablishes
thisdateisthehighly
effaced
forthetabula
explicit
Onecannevertheless
makeoutthefollowing
lines:"Explicit
quaestionis.
rep
m(agist)ri
ordinis
li/bros
editum
a
petriaure/oli
fr(atru)m
minor(um)
superquatuor
sententiar(um)
Bernardo
de Pi/reto
eiusdem
ordinis
..
p(er)man(um)
scriptum

18:22:37 PM

34

WILLIAM
DUBA

version of Auriol's comThus, it seems likelythat the fragmentary

in
the 1605 editionanteIII
of
the
Sentences
recorded
on
book
mentary
and therefore
has December
datesAurioPsImmaculateConceptiontreatise,
antequem.It would thenrelateto Auriol'slectures
21, 1314 as its terminus
at Toulouse or Bologna. The series of 72 questionson
on the Sentences
book III exemplifiedby manuscriptsLPT, on the otherhand, seemsposteriorto SX and, probablyalso to the ImmaculateConceptiontreatises.
It is less certainwhethertheyrelate to Auriol's lecturesat Toulouse or
Paris. Obviously,such conclusionscan onlybe tentative,
and pointto the
editionboth of Auriol'scommentarieson book III, and
need fora critical
of Auriol'sDe conceptione
and Repercussorium.
Pisa
ScuolaNormaleSuperiore
di Pisa

18:22:37 PM

PeterAurioland ThomasWylton
The Debatebetween
on Theology
and Virtue
LAUGE O. NIELSEN*

In 1926 Konstanty
Michalskidrewattention
to a debatebetweenThomas
Wyltonand PeterAuriolwhichhe had discoveredin the manuscriptno.
63 in the libraryof Balliol College, Oxford.In view of the factthatoral
discussionwas one of the primaryvehiclesof teachingin medieval universitiesand an invaluable part of university
life,and that remarkably
few recordsof such debates have been preserved,Michalskiwas understandablyenthusiasticabout his find.1Though two of the more prominentstudentsof Aurioland his contemporaries
recognisedthe importance
of the recordspreservedin the Balliol manuscriptand signalledthem,2
hardlyany subsequentscholarshave paid attentionto the manuscriptor
its contents.3
This situationis, however,much to be regretted,
since it is,
as Michalski realised,an extraordinary
valuable source of information
withrespectto the intellectualcurrentsin the timeof Aurioland Wylton.
* In preparing
I haveincurred
thisarticle
several
I amparticularly
debtsofgratitude.
to AllanTadielloandtheothermembers
ofthestaff
in BalliolCollegeLibrary
grateful
fortheir
andforproviding
suchagreeable
toDr.Cecilia
conditions;
great
patience
working
AllSoul'sCollege,
forallowing
meto usehertranscription
ofWylton's
Oxford,
Trifogli,
L. Friedman
toDr.Russell
forhiscareful
ofthemanuscript;
quodlibetal
questions;
reading
andto Prof.FritzS. Pedersen,
ofOdense,forhisjudicious
comments
on the
University
in theappendices.
editions
included
Travelgrants
fromtheTheological
the
Faculty,
ofCopenhagen,
enabled
metowork
with
theoriginal
inBalliol
University
manuscript
College.
1 Michalski
didnotanalyse
thepertinent
texts
butventured
theguess
1926,2. Michalski
thatthedebatehadtakenplacein Oxford
at somepointwhenbothcombatants
were
oftheology
there.
SinceAuriolis known
notto havebeenactivein Oxford,
professors
Michalski's
neednotdetainus.
hypothesis
Withregard
toAuriol's
nameI follow
Valois1906,479sqq.,andadopttheverfamily
nacular
"Auriol".
His Latinnamewillappearas "Aureolus"
sincethisis wellspelling
in themedieval
documented
cf.Teetaert
sources;
1935,col. 1811.
Itwasmentioned
whoalsoprovided
a valu1935,col.1840;andPelster,
byTeetaert
abledescription
oftheBalliolmanuscript;
seePelster
1954,398sqq.
3 Thisis trueof,e.g.,A. Maier,eventhough
muchofherresearch
the
concerning
ofAuriol's
transmission
commentaries
onPeter
Lombard's
Sentences
wasbasedonan analysisoftherelationship
between
andAuriol;
seeMaier1964,280sqq.W. Senkois
Wylton
a noticeable
inasmuch
as he usedthemanuscript
forhisedition
of one of
exception
note6.
seebelow,
Wylton's
questions;
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium
, 38,1

18:22:46 PM

36

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

That Michalski'snote and the publisheddescriptionsof Balliol College

634 failed to promptscholars to furtherexplore the textspreservedin
this manuscriptis, presumably,primarilydue to the readilyobservable
difficulties
associatedwithworkingwiththe manuscript.Many of its more
textsare writtenin a verysmall hand and in a verypale or
interesting
faded ink. The parchmentis not of a particularlygood quality,and in
severalplaces the ink has bled throughfromthe reverse.In short,work
on these textsis only feasibleif one is preparedto studythe manuscript
'in loco'.
In the following,
I shall presentan analysisof the sourcesto the debate
between Auriol and Wyltonas transmitted
in Balliol 63. First,a brief
descriptionof the relevanttextswill be provided.Secondly,I shall concentrateon the relationships
thatcan be shownto existbetweenWylton's
and Auriol's contributions;
this analysiswill aim at establishingthe date
and the historicalsettingof the debate. Thirdly,the doctrinalopposition
between the two theologianswill be sketched.Finally,the immediately
pertinenttextswill be made available.
1. Textsby Wylton
andAuriolin Balliol 63
Several textsby Thomas Wyltonand PeterAuriolhave been preserved
in Balliol 63. From Wylton'shand thereis, in the firstplace, the question that is directedagainstAuriol,and to which Michalskidrew attention (fols. 19va-20rb).5
Secondly,thereis an incompletecopy of Wylton's
question "An intellectivamesse formamcorporishumani possit ratione
necessariaprobari et convincievidenter"(fols.52ra-53rb).6
The textsby Auriol are far more numerous.In the firstplace, the
manuscriptcontains a selectionof questionsfromAuriol's commentary
on the second book of Peter Lombard's Sentences
(fols. lr-18v).7
Secondly,
the manuscripttransmitsthe followingquestionsby Auriol,
1. Determinado fratrisAureoli, utrumvirtusin quantum virtussit ens
cf. Auriol, Quodlibet
, q. 11).
per accidens (fol. 19ra"va;
4 See Mynors
thismanu1963,43 sqq.,as wellas Pelster
1954,398sqq.Henceforth
willbe referred
tobywayoftheabbreviation
"Balliol63".
script
5 Cf.Mynors
1963,44.
6 Gf.Mynors
wasedited
1964.Cf.Michalski
1963,45.Thisquestion
bySenkoinWylton
1926,9 sqq.;as wellas Senko1963.
7 Thisis theversion
thanthe
issomewhat
shorter
discussed
1926,2,which
byMichalski
ofthecommentary.
version
an abbreviation
oran early
version
andmaybe either
printed

18:22:46 PM

ON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTON

37

a formaagendi tamquam res alia (fol. 20vavb;cf.

2. Utrumactio diffrt
Auriol,Quodlibet
, q. 2).
vus distinguai!
tur ab invicemper
3. Utrumhabituspracticuset speculati
esse principiumactivumet non esse principiumactivumin ipso sciente (fol.21rava;cf. Auriol, Quodlibet
, q. 15).
4. Utrumsola distinctio
rationisfactaper intellectum
sufficiat
ad tollendum
in divinis(fol.21vavb;cf.Auriol,Quodlibet
omnemcontradictionem
, q. 5).
5. Utrum ad visionembeatificamrequiratursimilitudocreata (fol. 21vb;
cf. Auriol,Quodlibet
, q. 8).
6. UtrumvidensDeum videat omnia, quae in ipso repraesentantur
(fol.
, q. 10).
86rava;cf. Auriol, Quodlibet
7. Utrum ad visionembeatificamsit necessariumaliquod lumen supercf.Auriol,Quodlibet
naturaleultralumenintellectus
,
agentis(fols.86va-87rb;
q. 9).
In the thirdplace, the manuscriptbringsvarious fragmentsand summarieswhichhave close linksto Auriol.8Moreover,Auriol's name crops
up in many places in the manuscript,both in the textsthemselvesand
in marginalnotes.9
Those of Auriol'squestionsthatare recordedin Balliol 63 and do not
concernthesecondbook in the Sentences
, have close parallelsin his Quodlibet
whichwas made generallyavailable in 1320.10It is immediatelyobvious
that the questionsin theirBalliol 63 versionsare shorterthan the ver11 This
sionsof the questionsthatwere incorporatedintoAuriol's Quodlibet.
does not imply, however, that they are abbreviationsof the printed
Their "style"is farless polishedthan the carefullyelaborated
questions.12
8 Thesearethe"Conclusiones
Aureoli
de tempore"
andan excerpt
from
(fol.27vb),
Distinction
33 ofAuriol's
Primm
Sententiarum
cf.Auriol1596,
54va-56vb;
super
Scriptum
(fols.
cols.732sqq.)In themargin
on fol.24raitis notedin a laterhandthata determination
follows
thequestions
tothefirst
bookoftheSentences
which
is contained
byAuriol
relating
on fols.24ra-26rb;
thisis,however,
notthecase,andlaterthenotewaspartly
erased.
9 Forthe
commentaries
on thefirst
andthesecondbooksoftheSentences
anonymous
inwhich
Auriol
is attacked
on several
andwhich
on fols.60r-66r
is contained
and
scores,
seeNielsen1999,notes7-8.
57r-59r,
respectively,
10See Teetaert
to thetestimony
ofthemanuscript
1935,col.1839,andthereferences
tradition
there.
provided
The numbers
oftheparallel
in theQuodlibet
havebeenaddedm thelist
questions
above.
12Anabbreviation
is found
ofAuriol's
inVat.lat.946,fols.88rsqq.Thecopy
Quodlibet
oftheworkin Munich,
cod.lat.26.309,fols.207rsqq.,is a rather
odd
Staatsbibliothek,
caseinasmuch
as itstarts
outas a fullcopy,butapparently
thescribetiredandstarted
to abbreviate
8 on fol.216ra.
thetextfrom
question

18:22:46 PM

38

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

, just as the argumentsare much more clearly

questionsin the Quodlibet
in the quodlibetalversion.On the otherhand, the strongsimstructured
ilaritiesbetween the versionsof the questionsin Balliol 63 and in the
cannotbe overlooked.The pointsof view sustainedare the same
Quodlibet
in both groups of questions,and even the lines of argumentare, in the
main, identical.Consequently,thereare strongindicationsthatthe quesin Balliol 63 are eitherreportsof oral lecturesor
tions as transmitted
determinations
or, simply,draftversionsof what Auriollaterput into his
.13
Quodlibet
In Balliol 63 the two authors'questionsare linkedin many ways. In
the firstplace, they are tied togetherin the purelyexternalsense that
theyseem to have been writtenat the same timeand by the same hand.14
in the manuscript,
of which
Secondly,thereare numerouscross-references
some have the formof highlyelaborateand finelyexecutedspecial signs.
Several of these cross-referential
signs are blanks in the sense that they
are not matched in the manuscriptin its presentstate.15However, this
is not true of all of them,and takingone's guidance fromthe peculiar
as well as explicit referencesin the textsit
signs of cross-referencing
becomes possible to identifythreeof the questionsas havingparticularly
close links.One of these questionsis Wylton'squestionagainstAuriolin
which cross-referential
signsreferthe reader to Auriol's questionon the
natureof speculativeand practicalhabits.This turnsout to containAuriol's
repliesto Wylton'sarguments,and here the reader is assistedin making
the rightconnectionsnot only by way of the special signs but also by
explicitreferencesin the text.16In Wylton'squestion againstAuriol an
13Cf.Pelster
itis notpossible
topursue
thislineof
context
1954,403.In thepresent
sinceitwouldrequire
critical
editions
ofthepertinent
of
including
investigation
questions
is ruledoutbya simple
Auriol's
consideration
a comofspace.However,
Quodlibet
, which
between
thetwinversions
ofthesequestions
withrespect
to
holdsgreatpromise
parison
I
manner
Auriol's
ofpreparing
forpublication.
In thenearfuture
questions
elucidating
to thisissue.ForAuriol's
versions
ofhiscommentaries
various
hopetobe ableto return
on theSentences
, seeNielsen
(forthcoming).
14See Mynors
1963,46.
15Anexample
inAuriol's
"Utrum
actiodiffrt
a forma
ofthisisfound
question
agendi
in thetext
resalia",whereon fol.20vb
oneofthesespecialsignsis embedded
tamquam
butis notmatched
Otherexamples
bya similar
partofthemanuscript.
signinanyother
in Auriol's
Thissuggests
ofblankcross-referential
fifth
thatthe
signsarefound
question.
in itspresent
statecontains
a selection
available.
ofthetexts
only
originally
manuscript
16SeeWylton,
habitus
. . sec.5.1,which
refers
toAuriol's
"Utrum
"Utrum
theologicus
. . sec.10.2,
habitus
. . .", sec.2.5.1;andWylton,
"Utrum
habitus
practicus
theologicus
whichrefers
to Auriol's
"Utrum
habitus
references
sec.2.1.3;thesection
practicus...",
in theedition
ofthetexts
thisarticle.
arefound
thatfollows

18:22:46 PM

ANDVIRTUE
AURI
OL ANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

39

explicitreferencedirectsthe reader back to the immediatelypreceding

question,i.e., Auriol's question on the nature of virtue,which Wylton's
questionis claimed to be an answer to.17
on theNatureof Theolog)/
2. Wylton's
Question
Wylton'sauthorshipof the questionon the natureof the habitof theology in Balliol 63 is relativelysecure. The attributionin the manuscript
and thereseems to be no good reason to doubt its veris unmistakable,
acity. Admittedly,when Auriol replies to the argumentsthat are put
forwardin this question,he does not spell out Wylton'sname in the
versionof his replyfoundin Balliol 63;18in the later quodlibetalversion
of the question,however,Wyltonis explicitlyidentifiedas the author of
thesearguments.19
The structure
and objectivesof Wylton'squestionon the habit of theclear.
The question opens with a succinctsummaryof
ology are quite
Auriol's teachingon the nature of the habits of theologyand logic as
well as his refutationof the view that theologyis a deductivescience.
The followingfoursectionsbringWylton'srebuttalof Auriol'sviews and
arguments,and in the course of thisWyltonadvances his own view on
the natureof logic. In the sixthsection,which is termedthe "solutionof
the question",Wyltondefendsthe view that theologyis an "affective"
science.The followingtwo sectionsbringargumentsagainstthisview as
well as Wylton'srepliesto these arguments.In the finalsectionWylton
presentshis second and alternativeanswer to the question posed and
adopts the positionthattheologyis a speculativescience. Since the quesin Balliol 63 is incomplete,it is impossibleto know
tion as transmitted
whetherat a laterstage in his questionWyltonattemptedto reconciliate
his two solutions.20

17Wylton,
. . sec.3.2.2.
habitus
"Utrum
theologicus
18Auriol,
"Utrum
habitus
. . sec.2.1.3and2.5.1.
practicus
19HereThomasWylton
see Auriol,
appearsunderthenameof ThomasAnglicus;
Quodlibet
, q. 15 (Auriol
1605,col. 138a),whichis unanimously
bythemanusupported
tradition.
script
20Thereis a question
ofspeculative
on thenature
andpractical
sciences
in
byWylton
inTortosa;
themanuscript
no.88 intheCathedral
seeEtzkorn
andAndrews
1994,
library
61. I havenothadan opportunity
to examine
thismanuscript.

18:22:46 PM

40

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

Account
3. Wylton's
ofAuriol'sViewof Theolog))
Wylton'saccount of Auriol's views is remarkablyfull.Moreover,it is
accurate in the sense that it is, in the main, substantiatedby
strikingly
Auriol's own works. Accordingly,this part of Wylton'squestion might
seem to indicatethatthe authorwas familiarwithat leastsome of Auriol's
writings.Since Auriol treatedof the key issues raised by the nature of
theologyin severalpassagesof his works,thereare severalpossiblesources
for Wylton'sexposition.In the firstplace, Auriol devoted the prologue
on the firstbook of the Sentences
of his earlyand voluminouscommentary
,
Primum
the so-calledScriptum
Sententiarum
, to thistopic.21Secondly,in
super
the conclusionto thiscommentaryAuriolreturnedto the questionof the
natureof theology,and while outliningthe salientfeaturesof his stance
he dealt a vehementblow not only to the Dominicans' view of the matA thirdtreatment
terbut also to what he called the "opinio communis".22
of the nature of the habit of theologyAuriol provided in the prologue
to his shorterand stillunpublishedcommentaryon the firstbook of the
.23
Sententiarum
Sentences
, which was writtenafterthe Scriptum
superPrimum
with
in
habitus
Auriol
the
issue
at
hand
the
"Utrum
dealt
question
Finally,
question15 of his Quodpracticus. . in Balliol 63 and the corresponding
Auriol'sreply
libet.
Since thislatterexpositioncontains,as alreadymentioned,
to Wylton'sargumentsin the questionfoundin Balliol 63, it cannot,however,have servedas a sourceforWylton'ssummaryof Auriol'sposition.24
A comparisonbetweenWylton'saccountof Auriol'sviewsand the pertinentpassages in Auriol'sliteraryremainsyieldsa farfromsimpleresult.
Not surprisingly,
several parts of Wylton'sexpositioncould echo either
Auriol's
of
prologuesto the two commentarieson the firstbook of the
21The dateofthisworkis relatively
a copyofthework
securesinceAuriol
donated
in Mayof 1317;seeMaier1964,65,
to PopeJohnXXII,andthiscopywascompleted
note60; andBuytaert
1952,XII sqq.
22Thisconclusion
on theverylast
to thecommentary
is appended
as a third
article
Primum
Sententiarum
distinction
oftheLombard's
text;Auriol,
, d. 48, a. 3
Scriptum
super
1596,cols.1120sqq.)
(Auriol
23In themanuscripts
thiswork
is termed
a "reportatio",
andthisis anaccurate
descriphalf
inParisheldinthefirst
is basedonAuriol's
lectures
tioninsofar
as thiscommentary
notbe takento imply
thatthis
Thisshould,
oftheacademic
however,
year1316-1317.
that
ofunedited
or "raw"reports;
therearequiteclearindications
consists
commentary
thework;
effort
intoediting
cf.Maier1964,285sqq.;andNielsen
Auriol
putconsiderable
in
In thefollowing
thisworkwillbe referred
to as theCommentarius
Breuior
(forthcoming).
Sententiarum.
Primum
24ForAuriol's
seeBrown1998andNielsen
1999as well
as a science,
viewoftheology
citedthere.
as theliterature

18:22:46 PM

ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

41

Sentences
, and the reason for this is quite simplythat in these passages
In one instance,however,
AurioPstwo commentariesagree veryclosely.25
it seemsthatWylton'sexpositionreflectsa line of reasoningthatis found
In
Sententiarum.26
superPrimum
solelyin the prologue to AurioPs Scriptum
another case it appears that the only possible writtencounterpartto
and phrasingof AurioPs thoughtis a passage in
Wylton'sidentification
Sententiarum
the conclusionto AurioPsScriptum
, i.e., the third
superPrimum
27
articlein Distinction48. Finally,severalpartsof Wylton'sexpositionof
AurioPsstand could only reflectwhat Auriol presentedin his later and
,28In one
on the firstbook of the Lombard's Sentences
shortercommentary
25Thisholdsgoodforsec. 3.1 in Wylton's
"Utrum
habitus
. . ." which
theologicus
either
Primum
Sententiarum
sec.3, a. 2,
reflect
Auriol's
, Prooemium,
super
Scriptum
might
inPrimum
Brevior
Sententiarum
21 (Auriol
1952,241),or hisCommentarius
, Prologus,
pars3,
"Utrum
habitus
. sec.4.2,
theologicus.
q. 3, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,fol.llrb).Wylton's
Primum
derive
from
either
Auriol's
Sententiarum
sec. 1,a.
, Prooemium,
Scriptum
super
might
hisCommentarius
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum
1952,153),orfrom
1, 73 (Auriol
, Prologus,
Sec. 4.3 in Wylton's
pars2, q. 1, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,fol.7vb).
question
agreeswith
Primum
bothAuriol's
Sententiarum
sec.1,a. 2, 80 (Auriol
, Prooemium,
1952,
super
Scriptum
andhisCommentarius
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum
, Prologus,
155-6),
pars2, q. 2, a. 3 (Vat.
sec.4.4 in Wylton's
"Utrum
habitus
. . ." could
Borgh.123,fol.9va).Finally,
theologicus
Primum
1 (Auriol
buildon either
Auriol's
Sententiarum
, d. 48,a. 3, conclusio
Scriptum
super
inPrimum
Brevior
Sententiarum.
1596,col.1123a),orhisCommentarius
, Prologus,
pars3, q. 4,
a. 1 (Vat.Boreh.123,fol.llvb).
26Thisisdefinitely
hasa closeparallel
intheScriptum
trueofsec.1.2,which
Primum
super
est
sec.3, a. 3, 82a (Auriol
Sententiarum,
Prooemium,
1952,243):"Illenamquehabitus
a sciente
etper
excellentioribus
purepracticus,
quiestde obiecto
attingibili
operationibus
Hoc etenim
nobiliores
tumquiataleobiectum
actus,quamsitactusilliushabitus.
patet,
ad scientem
nonutspeculabile
sedutoperabile,
hocestoperationibus
tantum,
comparatur
tumquia medicina
et omnesscientiae
ex hocpracticae
sunt,quia
attingibile;
practicae
earumestab homine
et nobiliori
modoattingibile
obiectum
operabile
quampersolum
melius
estenimhomini
habere
sanitatem
etessesanum
etesse
scire;
quamsciresanitatem
etmelius
esthabere
virtutes
secundum
quamscirequidestvirtus,
aegrotum;
Philosophum,
habetproobiecto
2. Ethicorum.
Sed,habitus
Deum,quodesta nobisattintheologicus
excellentioribus
creditiva
intelactus,
operationibus,
quamsitintelligere
gibile
pernobiliores
lectione
ex purisnaturalibus
habitain hac via; nobilius
enimattingitur
Deus,si sibi
etineumassurgatur
adhaereatur
etsi eius
perfidem
perspem,etdiligatur
percaritatem,
oboediatur
consiliis
etpraeceptis,
credibilia
quamsi hocmodonubilose
exponuntur.
Ergo
istehabitus
eritpracticus
pure".
27Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
sec.4.1,patendy
to Auriol's
theologicus...",
corresponds
Primum
Sententiarum
, d. 48, a. 3 (Auriol1596,col. 1121
Scriptum
super
b): "Et confirmatur,
sua principia,
contranegantes
ut patet1. Physicorum
et 1.
quianullusartifex
disputt
etpraecedentium
Posteriorum.
Constat
conatus
sanctorum
autem,
quodtotus
theologorum
fuitad disputandum
contra
et ad convincendum
artculos
haereticos.
Undeet
negantes
fidessaluberrima
defenditur
dicit,ibidem,
Augustinus
quodperhancscientiam
gignitur,
etroboratur."
Forthisparticular
from
seebelow,note29.
quotation
Augustine,
28Thussec.1.1inWylton's
Commentarius
toAuriol's
question
corresponds
quiteclosely
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum
, Prologus,
pars3, q. 4, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,fol.llvb):"Sed
estpractica
egodico,quod(seil.,
theologia)
accipiendo
practicam
simpliciter
proactiva,

18:22:46 PM

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

instancetheagreement
betweenWylton'sexposition
and AurioPsCcmmientaus
Brevior
in Primm
is quite telling,and thisconcernsAurioPsuse
Sententiarum
of a textofAugustine's.One ofAurioPsfavourite
passagesfromAugustine's
De Trinitate
is the one in which Augustinestatesthat the science of the
divineis truewisdom by which salvatoryfaithis strengthened,
and that
fewbelieversare proficient
in thissciencethoughtheyare strongin faith.29
Auriol derivedtwo points of principalsignificancefromthispassage. In
the firstplace, he used the passage to prove thatthe properaim of theological science is to defend the Creed or the articlesof faith.Wylton
was in no doubt about AurioPs point of view or his basing it on this
authoritativetext,as transpiresfromhis expositionof AurioPs stance.30
The second lesson Auriol learned fromthispassage was that,according
to Augustine,thereis a fundamentaldifference
betweenthe habit of faith
and the habit of theology,and that theologyis not a kind of superior
faith.Again, Wyltonwas accurate in his descriptionof AurioPspoint of
view and its foundationin Augustine'ssaying.31
Moreover,Wyltoncould
not have learned of this second point that Auriol derived from this
Sententiarum.
Augustininpassage by readingAurioPsScriptum
superPrimum
In thisearlierworkof AurioPsthe verysame passage was used to prove
that the habit of theologybestowsa deeper understandingof the mysteriesof faith.32

nonprooperationali.
Et ad hocadducotalemrationem,
actus,quinonsolumconsidrt
veritates
circasubiectum
sedagiteas,illeestactivus.
Sedtheologicus
esthuiusmodi,
suum,
nonenimsolumconsidrt
defensiones
etdeclarationes
circaactum
sustentationem,
fidei,
sedagiteas ad modum,
nonsolumconsidrt
circaorationem
persuasivam
quo rhetor
sed agitearn.Sic etiamdialecticus.
conditiones
et proprietates,
Propter
quodponuntur
disactivi.
istehabitus
eritpracticus
siveactivus.
Undesicutdialecticus
esthabitus
Igitur
sictheoet defensivus
et declarativus
scientiarum
ad opinionem,
putativus
principiorum
et defensivus
habitus
fideipropter
adhaerere
logicusestdeclarativus
per
principiorum
Thesameis trueofsec. 1.4in Wylton's
which
fidem".
is closely
matched
bythe
report
Commentarius
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum,
pars3, q. 4, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,fol.12ra).
29Augustine,
De Trinitate
424 (CCSL,vol.50).
, lib.XIV,I, 3, ed. Mountain,
30Wvlton,
"Utrum
habitus
. . sec.4.1:cf.above,note27.
theoloeicus
31Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
sec. 1.5,whichis matched
byAuriol's
theologicus...",
Commentarius
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum
, Prologus,
pars2, q. 1, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,
. . . Sed
foi.8ra),:"Dicunt
enimquidam,
viatoris
estquaedamfides
extensa
quodtheologia
contra
hocestAugustinus
XIV de Trinitate,
ubidicit,
capitulo
primo,
quodfidepollent
fideles
Hac scientia
nonpollent
fideles.
plurimi.
Ergoetc."
32See
Primum
Auriol's
Sententiarum
sec.1,a. 3, 127(Aunol
, Prooemium,
super
Scriptum
theemphasis
ofhisexposi1952,169).It wouldseemthaton thispointAuriol
changed
tionon thenature
oftheology
between
thetwocommentaries,
andthattheimmediate
forthisshift
washisvehement
occasion
to so-called
"deductive"
opposition
theology.

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AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE

43

What conclusioncan be drawn fromthis analysisof Wylton'sdebt to

Auriol'swrittenworks?In orderto have been able to constructhis expositionof Auriol'sviewsas presentedin thefirstpartof his question"Utrum
habitus theologicus..." Wyltonwould have had to have access to the
prologues in both of Auriol's commentarieson the firstbook of the
In additionto these texts,he should be assumed to have had
Sentences.
an opportunity
to examine the concludingpart of Auriol's Scriptum
super
Primm
Sententiarum.
This conclusion,however,cannot but call into question the assumption thatWyltondepended on Auriol'swrittenworksfor his description
of his opponent'sviews.In the firstplace, it is by no means evidentthat
Wyltonwould have been able to draw on all of Auriol'swrittenexpositions of the nature of theology,since it is not very likelythat Auriol's
shortercommentaryon the firstbook of the Sentences
was ever finished
or made generallyavailable.33Secondly,it is hard to see why Wylton
would have made the task of presentingAuriole'sviews such a complex
one. Utilisingso many sources would not have been strictlynecessary;
he couldjust as well have reliedon a singleof Auriol'swritings.In other
words,the highlyintricatemannerin which Wylton'sexpositionreflects
Auriol's writtenwords seems to make it necessaryto look for another
and more straightforward
way in whichWyltoncould have obtained his
of
Auriol's
knowledge
position.34
thereis no absolutelycompellingreasonforstipulating
that
Fortunately,
his remarkably
Wyltonconstructed
preciseaccounton the basis of Auriol's
- that Auriol
writtenworks.It can also be argued- and quite plausibly
33See Maier1964,285sqq.;andNielsen
(forthcoming).
34SomeofWylton's
Auriol
indicate
thathehadnofirst-hand
knowlagainst
arguments
Primum
Sententiarum.
Thussec.8.3inWylton's
"Utrum
habiedgeofAuriol's
Scriptum
super
inAuriol's
tustheologicus
..." hadalready
been"answered"
Primum
Sententiarum
,
Scriptum
super
sec.1,a. 2, 80 (Auriol
Prooemium,
1952,155sqq.)
In Wylton's
"Utrum
habitus
. . sec.2.4.2,itis claimed
thatAuriol
illustheologicus
trated
hisunderstanding
oftherelationship
between
thelogician
andthespeculative
sciwhichinvolved
encesbymeansofa simile
a shoemaker
andhispartitioning
ofa hide.
thissimile
doesnotappearin Auriol's
itis nota giventhatthislessthan
texts,
Though
simile
wasofWylton's
In hiscommentary
onthefourth
bookoftheSentences
lofty
making.
Auriol
thecausality
ofthesacraments
thatinvolves
an
explained
bymeansofa likeness
arsonist
andhisrelationship
to fire;cf.Nielsen1997,288.ThusAuriol
doesnotappear
to havebeentooparticular
in hischoiceofexplanatory
On theotherhand,
examples.
oftheshoemaker
version
simile
doesnotrepresent
Auriol's
standwithaccuracy
Wylton's
sinceit conflates
'activa'and 'factiva',
whichare clearly
distinct
to Auriol's
according
Whatis indisputably
certain
is thatWylton
didnotlearnofthissimile
understanding.
extant
through
anyofAuriol's
writings.

18:22:46 PM

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

himselfsupplied the backbone of Wylton'sreport.However, addressing

thisaspect of the debate betweenWyltonand Auriolwill be significantly
easier after an investigationof the date and historicalsettingof the
discussion.
4. AurioVsQuestion
on Practicaland Speculative
Habits
That AurioPs "Utrum habitus practicus. . ." is a reply to Wylton's
argumentsput forwardin his "Utrumhabitustheologicus..." is beyond
doubt,35
just as it is clear that the cross-references
providedin Balliol 63
are accurate as faras these two textsare concerned.Equally, thereis no
reason to doubt AurioPs authorshipof the question,and the testimony
of Balliol 63 is supportedby the unanimousmanuscripttraditionof the
parallel questionin AurioPs Quodlibet.
FromAurioPsquestionit transpires
thatWyltonwas not alone in opposof the differences
betweenspeculativeand pracing AurioPsunderstanding
ticalsciences.Other opponentsvoiced equallystrongoppositionto AurioPs
stance,and one of theseis singledout as a 'doctor' or regentmaster.In
the main, the question consistsof AurioPsrepliesto the argumentsthat
had been advanced, and he does not seem to have elaborated on his
originalcontributionin a more than incidentalmanner.
What is only intimatedin Wylton'squestion,transpiresclearlyfrom
AurioPsreply,and thisis the factthatthisparticulardebate moved from
focusingon the natureof practicalsciencesor habits,in contradistinction
to what is speculative,to dealingwiththe natureof relationsor relational
entities.What promptedthis transitionwas the objection that AurioPs
distinctionbetween the practical and the speculativewould make these
in the firstspecies of quality.36
into essentialdifferences
characteristics
This would, however,contradictthe positionofJohn Duns Scotus, who
had demonstratedthat what belongs to the categoryof relationcannot
Whetherthis
be constitutive
of what belongsto the categoryof quality.37
objection originatedwith Wyltonis not indicatedin eitherWylton'sor
AurioPsquestion.It is clear, however,thatWyltoncontinuedthisline of
reasoningwhen arguingagainstAurioPsview of the relationshipbetween
what is absolute and what is relativein an entitythat,by its nature,is
linkedto somethingelse.38
35Thisis trueeventhough
toallofWylton's
Auriol
doesnot,inthisconnection,
reply
butconcentrates
on thoseofmoreprincipal
significance.
arguments
36Wylton,
. . sec.3.1.
"Utrum
habitus
theologicus
37Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
. sec.3.2.1.
theologicus.
38Wylton,
habitus
. .", sec.10.1-10.2.3.
"Utrum
theologicus.

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ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTON
ON THEOLOGY

45

Obviously,Auriol was forcedto explain himself,and for this reason,

of the nature
he spentconsiderableeffort
on expoundinghis understanding
and
of
virtues
of the relationalaspect
rebuttingWylton'sobjections.39
s Question
on theNatureof Virtue
5. Auriol3
In Balliol63 it is impliedthatWylton'sobjectionsagainstAurioPsunderstandingof relativeentitieswere promptedby AurioPsexpositionin the
question "Utrum virtus. . .,,4Since it is not very likelythat Wylton's
questionwould have included a referenceto "a precedingquestion",it
seemsmostlikelythatthisreferencewas originallylocated in the margin,
and thatit laterfounditsway intothe textthroughtheprocessof copying.
But is thereany strongreason to accept the suggestionthat Wylton's
objectionshad been inspiredby AurioPs"Utrumvirtus. . ."? In view of
the fact that Wylton'sobjectionsare fullycomprehensiblesolely on the
basis of the discussionas reportedby Wyltonit would seem reasonable
to answerin the negative.Apparently,the originalargumentmaintained
that,accordingto Duns Scotus, thereis only an accidental relationship
betweenqualitiesand externalrespects,and to thisAuriolhad responded
by attemptingto demonstratethat membersof the firstspecies of qualfrommembersof the thirdand fourthspecies of quality
ityare different
virtue
of
by
being copulated to somethingelse.41Counteringthis reply,
viz., that
Wyltonobjected that this would implyeitheran impossibility,
it would
and
or
virtue
between
therewere no intrinsicdifference
vice,
on AurioPspart.Moreover,and thiswas Wylton's
resultin a contradiction
more subtle point, on the basis of AurioPs theory,virtuewould be an
accidentalentityinasmuchas it would have constituent
partsthatbelong
to different
genera.42
Now the factis thatAuriol does not explicitlyaddressthisfinalaspect
but
of Wylton'sargumentin his question"Utrumhabituspracticus. .
- in his
thisis preciselywhat he does- and withgreatthoroughness
question "Utrum virtus. . ." Here Auriol recapitulatesWylton's objections
in a verycircumspectand detailed manner,43and at this point he had
This entailsthat
learnedof additionalargumentsagainsthis viewpoint.44
39Auriol,
. sec.3.1-3.2.4.
"Utrum
habitus
practicus.
40Wylton,
. . sec.10.
habitus
"Utrum
theologicus
41Wylton,
. . . , sec.10.1.
habitus
"Utrum
theologicus
42Wylton,
. . sec.10.2.1.
habitus
"Utrum
theologicus
43Auriol,
"Utrum
habitus
theomatchWylton's
"Utrum
virtus...",sec. 1.2.1-1.2.3,
.", sec.10.2.1-10.2.3.
logicus..
44Auriol,
virtus
. . .", sec. 1.2.4-1.2.10.
"Utrum

18:22:46 PM

46

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

the referenceinsertedinto Wylton's determinationindicatingthat this

questionof Wylton'swas a responseto AurioPs"Utrumvirtus. . should
not be accepted.The relationship
betweenthe two textsis the strictopposite: AurioPs "Utrumvirtus..." is to a large extenta replyto Wylton's
"Utrumhabitustheologicus. .
That thisexchangeof argumentsturnedout to be merelythe startof
a longerdebate transpiresfromthe second articlein AurioPs"Utrumvirtus. . .", which atteststo the continuationof the debate and listssubsequent argumentsby Wylton,to which Auriol also replied.45
6. TheDate oftheDebatebetween
andAuriol
Wylton
Previousscholarship
assumedthatthe debatebetweenWyltonand Auriol
took place at a time when both were professorsor regentmasters.This
was the view of Michalski,and in thishe was secondedby Pelster.46
Since
Auriol became a master in the second half of 1318 and left Paris in
47
1320, this means that the debate should have occurredbetween 1318
and 1320.
to find.In Wylton'squestionAuriol
Supportforthisview is not difficult
is describedas a 'doctor',48
which is a tide that,strictly
speaking,was in,49Moreover, the great diligence
applicable to bachelors of the Sentences
shown by Wyltonin his reporton AurioPsviews indicatesthat Wylton
consideredhis opponent to be if not his equal, then at least somebody
of a certainstanding,and, in general,thiswould not be trueof baccalarii
sententiarii.
to be
Nonetheless,these considerationsare clearlytoo circumstantial
sufficient
fordecidingon the date and the settingof the debate. In order
to obtain a firmerfoundationforsettlingthese mattersit is necessaryto
take into account some of Wylton'sother questionsand to attemptto
identifypossible links between the documentsof this debate and other
parts of AurioPsliteraryremains.
45Auriol,
"Utrum
virtus
. . .", sec.2.1.1sqq.
46Pelster
on thevarious
datesin 1318as wellas thefol1954,402,whospeculated
forsucha debate.Cf.Mynors
lowing
yearwhichwouldhavebeensuitable
1963,44.
Teetaert
thisquestion.
1935,col. 1840,didnotaddress
47See Teetaert
1935,col. 1815.
48Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
. . sec.4.
theologicus
lhat baccalarii
sententiarii
themselves
as regent
masters
and,in thecaseof
comported
often
thesamematerial
is well-known;
see Bazan 1985,
mendicants,
enjoyed
privileges
104sqq.

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ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

47

The manuscript416 in the municipal libraryin Bordeaux contains

is
anotherdetermination
of Wylton's againstAuriol.50This determination
dividedinto two parts. In the firstWyltonaddressesAurioPsversionof
betweenprimaryand secondarynecessity,
whereasthe secthe distinction
ond concernsthe nature of relation.Wyltondoes nothingto hide that
is intendedas a replyto two different
debates.Obviously,
his determination
in
the
the
first
debate
inasmuch
as here he conwas
on
offensive
Wylton
frontedsome of AurioPsnotoriouspositions.In the second debate he had
been on the defensiveand had had to stand up forhis view on the real
characterof a relationof which only the foundationhas real existence.
This point of view had been challengedby severalscholars,and Wylton
was especiallyconcernedwithreplyingto the objectionsbroughtforthby
Auriol,who seems to have been the drivingforcein the opposition.51
The immediatecontextof the firstpart of Wylton'sBordeaux determinationis not difficult
to identify.The pivotal issue in the debate is a
distinction
betweenprimaryand secondarylogical necessityby means of
whichAuriolattemptedto prove,among otherthings,that the Christian
conceptionof creationfromnothingdoes not implya contradictionin
nor its applicationto, e.g., creterms,even thoughneitherthe distinction
ation fromnothingis evidentto natural reason.52Since Wyltonquotes
some of the argumentsby which Auriol had attemptedto underpinhis
viewpointit is possible to compare Wylton'scontributionto this debate
In the first
withAurioPsexpositionin his commentarieson the Sentences.
in
first
it
is
that
the
the
first
of
place,
apparent
argument
part Wylton's
is closelyrelated to AurioPs discussionof the concept of
determination
in the openingquestionof AurioPs
creation,whichis underinvestigation
on
of
the
.53In the second place,
the
fourth
book
Sentences
commentary
from
AurioPs
Wylton'squotations
originalargumentconcerntheEucharist,54
whichis one of AurioPskey examplesin the discussionof the verysame
50Wylton,
willbe referred
ed. Del Punta-Luna
thisdetermination
to
1987;henceforth
as Wylton's
determination".
"Bordeaux
51"Arguit
contra
isteidemdoctor
scilicet
aliqua,quaedixiin quadamaliaquaestione,
in actu";Wylton,
realisin actupotest
essesinetermino
ed. Del Punta-Luna
quodrelatio
ofthistext,
seeHenninger
1990.
1987,213.Foran interpretation
52Fora brief
ofthis,seeNielsen1996.
survey
53The
caseaddressed
in the
is oneinwhich
an impossibility
bythisargument
specific
in thefirst
second
modeincludes
an impossibility
ed. Del Punta-Luna
mode;seeWylton,
in theopening
to whatAuriol
ofhiscom1987,211.Thisrelates
propounded
question
onthefourth
bookoftheSentences'.
Commentantes
inQuartum
; seeAuriol,
Sententiarum,
mentary
a. 2 (Auriol
1605,col.6b).
Quaestio
prooemialis,
54Wylton,
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,212.

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

.55Moreover,
on thefourthbook of theSentences
questionin the commentary
in Distinction13 of his commentaryon the fourthbook of the Sentences
Auriolrepliedto the- oftenquite fierce
objectionsthathad been brought
againsthis expositionin the openingquestion.In thisconnectionAuriol
addressed the objectionsput forthby Wylton,and he even quoted one
of Wylton'smore teasingcounter-arguments.56
The firstpart of Wylton'sBordeaux determinationis, admittedly,a
rathermixed bag insofaras it includesan expositionof Wylton'sproper
of propositionsthatare "per se"57as well as a long digresunderstanding
sion on the natureof similarity,58
whichrefersto a debate thatis reflected
in more than one place in Auriol'sshortercommentaryon the firstbook
.59The lattertopicis resumedin the secondpartof Wylton's
of the Sentences
Bordeaux determination,
of the
which treatsof the properunderstanding
nature of relations.In this connectionthe kindsof relationssingledout
fordebateare the relationships
thatexistbetweenGod as Creatorand creation, between formand matteras principlesof metaphysics,and, lastly,
betweengoals and theirmeans in finalcausality.60
In Wylton'sBordeaux determination
it is clearlyimpliedthatAuriol's
of
on
the
of
the
nature of relationsantedated
topic
challenging Wylton
it is made
the occasion on whichWyltonobjectedto Auriol.Furthermore,
clear by Wylton'sexpositionthat thisdebate disclosedfunincontestably
damentaldifferences
of opinion betweenthe two authorsconcerningthe
and
natureof relations.Auriol'sobjectionswere of principalsignificance,
the subsequentdebate involvedthe major typesof relations,whereasthe
relationshipof divine knowledgeto creationand that of practicadhabits
to theirproduce were mentionedonly in passing.61
A simplecomparisonbetween,on the one hand, the discussionof the
in Wylton'sBordeaux determination
nature of relationsas transmitted
55Auriol,
a. 2 (Auriol
Commentarius
inQuartum
Sententiarum
1605,
, Quaestio
prooemialis,
col.6a).
56Auriol,
Sententiarum
Commentarius
in Quartum
, d. 13,q. 1, a. 3 (Auriol
1605,col. 123
ofWylton,
see Auriol,
in Quartum
Sententiarum
Commentarius
, d.
quoting
sqq.)ForAuriol's
13,q. 1,a. 3 (Auriol
1605,col. 124b);cf.Nielsen
(forthcoming).
57Wylton,
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,212-3.
58Wylton,
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,211-2.
59Thisdebateanditscourse
is echoedinDistinctions
3, 30 and31 oftheCommentarius
the
Bremm
inPrimum
Sententiarum.
thattheargument
Thereis thepossibility
concerning
in Auriol's
form
ofwhiteness
andtherelationship
ofsimilitude
"Utrum
virtus
..." initiatedthisdebate.
60Wylton,
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,213 sqq.
61Wylton,
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,218;cf.Henninger
1990,480 sqq.

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ON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
AURI
OL ANDWYLTON

49

and, on the other,the debate on the relationalaspect of practicalhabits

in Wylton'sand AurioPsquestionsin Balliol 63 disclosesthe relativeordering of the debates.62If Wyltonand Auriol had alreadygone throughthe
protracteddiscussionon the nature of relationsthat is documentedin
thenit would have made no sense for
Wylton'sBordeaux determination,
them to conduct the debate that is attestedto in Balliol 63. Wylton's
rathertentative
of the relationalaspect
objectionsto Auriol'sunderstanding
of practicalhabits and the subsequentexchangesof argumentsreported
in Auriol's"Utrumvirtus. . ." would have been quite superfluous.
At the
time of challengingAuriol's conceptionof the nature of practicalhabits
of the main points
Wyltonwould have had a much clearerunderstanding
of Auriol'sstance,and he would have been in a positionto launch a fullscale attack.In otherwords,the evidenceavailable suggeststhatWylton's
and Auriol'squestionsin Balliol 63 reflectdebates thattook place before
the discussionsthat resultedin Wylton'sBordeaux determination.
Now the factis that thereis everyreason to thinkthatAuriol'sopenon the fourthbook of the Sentences
reflects
ing questionin the commentary
in early 1317.63This impliesthatWylton'sBordeaux deterhisprndpium
minationshould be placed sometimein the firsthalf of that year. That
Auriol'sresponseto some ofWylton'sobjectionsis to be foundin Distinction
13 of his commentary
on the fourthbook of the Sentences
further
supports
this dating of Wylton'sBordeaux determination.In the very same distinction
Auriolansweredobjectionsthathad been raisedby the Dominican
professorof theology,Hervaeus Natalis, who leftParis in June of 1318,
whichis to say beforeAuriol advanced to the professorship.64
If Wylton'sBordeauxdetermination
what tookplace in the first
reflects
halfof 1317 thenthe obvious conclusionis thatthe questionsby Wylton
62Obviously,
thefactthatWylton's
Bordeaux
is in a morerough
determination
state
thanhisquestion
inBalliol
63 doesnotimply
thattheformer
antedates
thelatter.
Wylton's
twocontributions
concern
different
discussions
or stagesin a
topicsandreflect
separate
debate.
continuing
63SeeNielsen
1999.In ParisAuriol
lectured
onthebooksofLombard's
Sentences
inthe
following
order.
I, IV, II, III; seeTeetaert
1935.col. 1832:andHevnck1969.45 saa.
64See Guimaeres
becameregent
master
between
sometime
1938,65 sqq.Auriol
July
andOctober1318;see Buytaert
bestows
thetideofdoctor
on
1952,XV. ThatWylton
Auriol
inhisBordeaux
determination
ed.Del Punta-Luna
1987,213)as well
(cf.Wylton,
as in his"Utrum
habitus
..." (cf.above,note48) is nota strong
theologicus
argument
an early
ofWylton's
In theBordeaux
allWylton's
determination
against
dating
questions.
arecalleddoctors
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,216.),whichseems
opponents
(cf.Wylton,
toindicate
thatWylton
wasnotparticularly
in hisuseofthistitle.On theother
careful
is alsothedistinct
thatthetitleofdoctor
is a laterscribal
hand,there
possibility
"updathavebeena marginal
ing"ofwhatmayoriginally
gloss.

18:22:46 PM

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

and Auriol in Balliol 63 transmitwhat took place in the latterhalf of

this early dating65of the Balliol 63 textsfindsaddi1316. Furthermore,
tional supportin Auriol's shortercommentaryon the firstbook of the
In the thirdquestion of the thirdpart of the Prologue to this
Sentences.
work Auriol discussed whetherhabits are essentiallydivided by being
speculativeor practical.Bringingthe second articleto its conclusionAuriol
made a point of notingthat it mightbe objected againsthis theorythat
of the relationalaspect of habitsis mistaken.In replyhis understanding
to
Auriol
this
gave a highlycondensed summaryof his conception
ing
of what is absolute and relativein virtues,and he took care to note that
the principalexpositionof the nature of virtuewould be postponedto
the thirdbook.66It is quite obvious that therewas no strictreason for
Auriol's introducingthis objection,just as his remarkthat the natureof
virtuewould be dealt within the commentaryon the thirdbook is rather
odd insofaras thisis, in fact,what everybodywould expect.On the other
hand, seen against the background of the debate that is reflectedin
Wylton'sand Auriole'squestionsin Balliol 63 Auriol'smotivesforadding
such a pointerbecome much easier to understand.Auriol'sexpositionof
the speculativeand the practicedas essentialdifferencesof habits had
sparkedoffheated discussionon the nature of virtue,and for this reason the subject presenteditselfto Auriol in this connection;moreover,
some of the futurereadersof his commentarycould be expectedto know
of this developmentand should be alerted to the fact that the sequel
should be soughtin the thirdbook.67
andAuriol
7. The Setting
of theDebatebetween
Wylton
Since severalpassages in Wylton'sdescriptionof Auriol'spositionin his
"Utrumhabitustheologicus..." are remarkablyclose to Auriol'sexposi65Thatis,relative
of1316;cf.Teetaert
in Parisin thelatesummer
toAuriol's
arrival
1935,col. 1813.
66Auriol,
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum
Commentarius
, Prologus,
pars3, q. 3, a. 2 (Vat.
sed in
nonsolumin absoluto,
consistit
Borgh.123,fol.llva):"... Ratioenimvirtutis
dishabitus
naturae
dicitur
ab
obiecto.
Unde
conveniens
caracterizatione
'virtus',
quadam
inmuliere,
vitium
inviro.Ideo6. Ethicorum
ettaciturnitas
virtus
conveniens
dicitur
Vitium',
sitsolumrespectus
autemvirtus
virtus
estdispositio
ad optimum.
Utrum
dicitur,
perfecti
libro".
de simitate
veldenominatio,
sicutdicitur
nasi,de hocin tertio
67Auriol's
on thethird
bookoftheSentences
wasnever
finished.
Thereare
commentary
in Heynck's
short
on thistopicintheversion
tworelatively
which,
terminology,
questions
is calledthe"Circatertium";
see Heynck1969,13 sqq. I hopeto be ableto publish
ina nottoodisoffaith
ofthesequestions
as wellas thoseon thenature
critical
editions
tantfuture.

18:22:46 PM

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AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

51

tion in his shortercommentaryon the firstbook in the Sentences

, and as
either
or
seems
to
be
to
Wylton'squestion
prior
roughlycontemporary
with this work of AurioPs,it is quite unlikelythat Wyltoncould have
used AurioPsworkas his source.For thisreasonit is necessaryto attempt
to identifyanother manner in which Wyltoncould have obtained his
detailedpresentationof AurioPsview on the natureof theology.
Though most of Wylton'sliterarylegacy has been chartedin only its
bare outlines,recentyears have improvedour knowledgeof thisimportant early fourteenth-century
thinkerin a number of ways. Among the
questionswhichhave been establishedas belongingto Wylton,and which
,68the fifth
appear to have been collectedin his somewhatelusiveQuodlibet
is
than
incidental
to
an
of
more
relevance
question
understandingof
Wylton'squestion against Auriol in Balliol 63. This question asks "An
omnes rationes,quae dicunturde Deo secundumsubstantiam,sint eaedem interse et omnibusmodis ex parte rei".69Clearly,the topic debated
in this question has no direct bearing on the issues dealt with in the
debate betweenAuriol and Wylton;what is pertinentin this connection
is the structure
of the question.Afterthe principalarguments,the question reportsratherfullythe solutionpresentedby the respondentor, as
it is explained in the manuscript,the baccalarius.
Afterthis follow the
that
the
other baccalari
z, and to
counter-arguments were advanced by
which the respondentreplied. Since Wyltonentertainedthe same opinion as the respondenthe refrainedfromincludingthe student'sreplies;
insteadhe proceeded to explain the matterat hand. At the end of the
in order
questionhe returnedto the previouslylistedcounter-arguments
to refutethem.70
What is of principalsignificancein the presentconnectionis the fact
that this question by Wylton reveals that he was not at all averse to
into his determinations
the contributions
made by younger
incorporating
scholars,or to depictingwhat had takenplace in the hall of disputation.
Seen againstthisbackdrop,a possibleexplanationforWylton'sremarkof AurioPsreasoningcomes to light.
ably fulland precise identification
Thus thereis at least the possibility
thatWylton'squestionagainstAuriol
had an historicalsettingcomparableto that of Wylton'sfifthquodlibetal
68Cf.Dumont
1998.
69Wylton,
, q. 5 (Vat.Borgh.
Quodlibet
36,fols.59ra-65vb).
70Wylton,
baccalarii
ad ista
, q. 5 (Vat.Borgh.
Quodlibet
36,fol.60ra):"Responsionem
brevitatem
nonrepeto.
tarnen
baccalariorum,
argumenta
propter
Argumenta
quaefiebant
contra
colorem
contra
infine,
eum,saltem
illa,quaehabent
viam,quamtenebo,
repetam
etsolvam
..
ordine,
quo factafuerant

18:22:46 PM

52

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

question. On these premises,the explanationfor Wylton'scomposinga

refutation
of Auriolwould be rathersimple:Auriol had acted as respondent in a disputationover which Wyltonhad presided as professoror
regentmaster,and forwhichhe had been obligedto compose the determination. In contradistinction
to what was the case in Wylton's fifth
quodlibetal question, Wylton did not on this occasion agree with the
respondent,and for this reason the presentationand refutationof the
respondent'spositionwere placed at the beginningof the determination,
afterwhich Wyltongave his own solutionto the question.
The implicationof thisis thatWylton'spresentationof Auriol'sviewpoints would not have required him to procure,study,and summarise
numeroustextsby Auriol. It would seem far more likelythat the material had already been collectedby Auriol with a view to presentinghis
case in the hall of disputation.Moreover, this settingwould certainly
explain the strikingparallelsbetweenWylton'saccount of Auriol'sviews
and Auriol'sshortercommentaryon the firstbook of the Sentences.
There
would,obviously,be nothingstrangeabout Auriol'sputtinghis notesfrom
commentary.
disputationsto use when composinghis Sentences
The reasons forAuriol's being singledout as a respondentin a magto grasp
isterialdisputationon the natureof theologyare not thatdifficult
either.FromAuriol'sprologueto his Comrmtarius
Bremm
inPrimm
Sententiarum
it transpiresthatthe natureof theologywas the subjectsettledon forthe
debate of the fall of 1316.71Equally, it is evidentthatAuriol's
prinripium
contributionon this occasion involved him in tempestuousdebates on
more than one topic,and thathis expositionof the divineTrinity,which
was broached in his contributionon this occasion, was opposed quite
fiercelyby both Wyltonand the Dominican professorHervaeus Natalis.72
In short,alreadyat the startof his Parisiancareer Auriol had become a
centreof controversy.
in Balliol 63
8. TheNatureofAuriol'sQuestions
In oppositionto thisdatingof the debate betweenWyltonand Auriol
attestedto in Balliol 63 it mightbe argued thatit disregardsthe factthat
71Auriol,
inPrimm
Sententiarum
Commentarius
Brevior
, Prologus
(Vat.Borgh.123,fol.lva):
et an sitspeculaan sitnecessaria,
a sociisde theologia,
an sitscientia,
"Quaesito
igitur
autem
in ea, frustratoriae
et quomodosituna,et quidsitsubiectum
tivavelpractica,
noncompaterecertitudinem
scientificam
divinorum
essent
istae,si materia
inquisitiones
in nostro
turin se et ex natura
haecinquisitio
sui,idcirco
principio
praeponatur".
72Cf.Nielsen1999.

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AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

53

to the debate in
Auriol includedexpanded versionsof his contributions
a
mere
baccalarius
sententiarius
his
as
Auriol
would not
;
precisely Quodlibet
have been entitledto determinequestions,since this was the exclusive
prerogativeof regentmasters.On the otherhand, in view of the nature
of Wylton'sand AurioPsconfrontation
the latter's"Utrumhabituspracticus . . and "Utrum virtus. .
cannot be construedas anythingbut
determinations.73
They are builton and explicitlyreferto disputationsin
whichthe principalopponentwas easilyidentifiable.
Consequently,there
would seem to be strongevidence in favourof maintainingthat these
questionsderivefromAuriol'speriod of magisterialregency.
There is no denyingthat AurioPs "Utrum habituspracticus. . ." and
"Utrumvirtus..." bear some of the distinguishing
marksof a determination of a disputation.74
Equally, it is evidentthat as a bachelor of the
Sentences
Auriol would not have been allowed to publish these determinations.But thisis by no means tantamountto sayingthatWylton'sand
AurioPsquestionsbelong to a time afterthe latter'sinceptionor promotionto the professorship.
The factis thatseveralof the questionsthat
went into AurioPs Quodlibet
directlyreflectdisputationsthat had taken
AurioPs
This is true of,
place during
period as lectureron the Sentences.
to his
e.g., the secondquestion,on action,whichis AurioPsdetermination
protracteddebate withHervaeus Natalis on the natureof action and passion, and whichis attestedto in AurioPscommentarieson both the first
and the fourthbook of the Sentences
as well as by Hervaeus Natalis' fourth
.75
This
is
of
the
true
Quodlibet
third,fourth,and fifthof AurioPs
equally
quodlibetal questions which reflecthis discussionwith, among others,
Hervaeus Natalis and Wyltonon the nature of the divine Trinityand
the notions of unityand plurality.76
Moreover, the eighth,ninth,and
tenthquestionsin AurioPs Quodlibet
containAurioPsfinalword on some
of the most difficult
problemsraised by his epistemologyand concern
thosepoint on which he had been attackedalready duringhis lecturing
73The twoversions
areso clearly
related
thattheycannotbutderive
from
thesame
occasion.
thiswasa contributing
factor
behind
thedating
inpreviPresumably
suggested
ousscholarship;
cf.above,note46.
74Thisis alsotrueofthe
version
ofthequestions
whicharefoundin the
expanded
Quodlibet.
As Hervaeus
leftParisbefore
Auriol
oftheology
as projoinedtheParisian
faculty
fessor
wouldhavebeenno possibility
forthemto opposeeach
(cf.above,note64),there
otheras ordinary
oftheology.
Forthedebatebetween
Hervaeus
Natalisand
professors
seeNielsen
Auriol,
(forthcoming).
76Thisdebatestarted
soonafter
AurioPs
first
debateand appearsto have
pnpium
himfora considerable
Foran outline
time.
ofthevery
redactional
issues
engaged
complex
raisedbythispartofAuriol's
seeNielsen
literary
legacy,
(forthcoming).

18:22:46 PM

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

on the firstbook of the Sentences.11

In otherwords,thereis everyreason
to thinkthatAuriol includedin his Quodlibet
what had originatedduring
his time as bachelor of the Sentences.
Though the evidence available does not indicate for which audience
Auriolcomposedhis pseudo-determinations
foundin Balliol63, it is temptthat
to
were
for
intended
Auriol'sstudents.Since Auriol
ing speculate
they
met withstrongoppositionin the Parisianfacultyof theology,his acting
as respondentin disputationsmusthave been a ratherless than uplifting
experience;time and again Auriol would have sufferedthe humiliation
of havinghis views and argumentsrejectedby the presidingmasters.In
view of the fact that several of his studentsare likelyto have been present on these occasions,it would be quite understandableif Auriolcomand presented
posed antidotesto some of the magisterialdeterminations
them to his students.In this way he could safeguardhis own authority
and ascertain that the studentswere not misled by the, according to
Auriol,flawedreasoningof the regentmasters.A suggestionalong these
lines would also make it easier to understandwhy so many of the questionsin Auriol's Quodlibet
reflectdebates thatcould onlyhave takenplace
18
his
time as baccalarius
sententiarius
during
9. The Topicsof theDebatebetween
andAuriol
Wylton
In the debatebetweenWyltonand Auriolone featureis particularly
promould in which
nounced,and thisis the predominandy"argumentative"
the partiescast theircontributions.
When presentingAuriol'sviewpoints
listed
the
Wyltonsimply
argumentsby which his adversaryhad triedto
his
main
theses.
However,explaininghow the different
prove
pointsmaintained by Auriol relate to one anotherwas not somethingthat claimed
of Auriol'sstand the same approach
Wylton'sattention.In his refutation
is apparent:to each of Auriol's argumentsa counter-argument
or refutationis supplied.Even in Wylton'sdefenceof his view that theologyis
an affective
science the main emphasisis on the argumentsthatmay be
On the
adduced againstthisview as well as Wylton'scounter-arguments.
other hand, Wyltoncompletelyneglectsthe task of explainingthe precise importof this characterisation.79
When expoundinghis second solu77Fortheother
in Balliol63,seeabove,note9.
Auriol
contained
questions
against
78Thisis indisputably
trueofthequestions
thatinvolved
Hervaeus
cf.above,
Natalis;
note75.
79Thisis all themoreto be wondered
claimsthathisunderstanding
at,sinceWylton

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ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

55

tion to the problem of the nature of theologyWylton seems to have

adopted a less rigid styleof exposition.Since only the opening part of
no telling
Wylton'sexpositionhas been preservedthereis, unfortunately,
whetherthiswas a generalfeatureof thispart of his question.80
to the debatebear the same imprintas Wylton's
AurioPstextspertaining
and
contribution, expositionin the propersense of the word is foundpriAuriol's
marilyin connectionwith replyingto particulararguments.81
extremelybriefexplanationof his fourpremisesat the beginningof the
question"Utrumvirtus. . ."82is the sole part of thisquestionwhich does
A comparisonbetween
not consistof moreor less well-formed
syllogisms.83
these two questions and the parallel quodlibetal questions reveals that
mostof the "extra" paragraphsthatwere incorporatedinto the Quodlibet
are of distinctly
explanatorynature.For thisreason, an exhaustivetreatmentof the verycomplex topicsthat were up for debate in these three
questionswill have to await the criticaleditionsof the pertinentquesand theircommentarieson
tionsin Auriol'sas well as Wylton'sQuodlibets,
the Sentences.
a. TheDisagreement
on theNatureof Theology
On the basis of the Balliol 63 questionsit is fairlyeasy to identify
sevWith regard
eral of the salientpointsthatseparatedAuriol and Wylton.84
to the questionof the nature of theology,it is evidentthat,in the first
place, Wyltonand Auriol did not share the same appreciationof the
relativevalue of what is speculative,and what is practical.To Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
. . .",
oftheology
as an affective
science
is a novelty;
Wylton,
theologicus
tothethirteenth-century
undersec.14.1. Presumably,
thisimplies
thathedidnotsubscribe
cf.Tihon1966,222sqq.
ofthisclassification;
standing
80Dealing
willrequire
intoaccount
with
oftheology
Wylton's
conception
taking
properly
several
other
ofhis,suchas thequestion
mentioned
texts
above,note20.
81See,e.g.,Auriol,
"Utrum
habitus
. . sec.3.2.2.1-3.2.2.3.
practicus
82Auriol,
"Utrum
virtus...",sec.1.1.2-1.1.4.
83In
itissmallwonder
indiscussing
thepossibility
ofthenature
ofthisdebate
that,
light
ofintellectual
thatsprang
mindwas thatofforming
theexample
to Auriol's
memory,
Prior
in Quartum
see Auriol,
Commentarius
Sententiarum
, d. 45, q. 3, a. 1, "Alia
arguments;
estactusintellectus,
sealiquid
dicit,
intellexisse,
experitur
opinio
quiaquilibet
quodrecordari
ut 'feciheritaleargumentum'
velaliquidtale.Hoc autemnonpotestessenisivirtutis
se intellexisse"
nonsentit
BU,2295,fol.97^);
intellectivae,
(Salamanca,
quiaparssensitiva
bookoftheSentences
forthisearly
version
ofAuriol's
onthefourth
, seeNielsen
commentary
(forthcoming).
It is clearly
all aspects
it
notpossible
to address
ofthisdebatehere.Consequently,
is necessary
suchas thenature
oflogic
topostpone
treatment
ofevenprominent
subjects
andtheproper
oftheological
virtues.
understanding

18:22:46 PM

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

speculationis the highestgoal to which man can aspire, whereas the

practicalis of lowervalue insofaras it involvesalso the corporealside of
human nature.85
Auriol,on the otherhand, is of the oppositepersuasion
and sees the practicalas thatwhichis "more" thanpure speculationinsofar as it involvesthe whole human substanceas an active subject.86
This diversityof opinion is also reflectedin their fundamentaldisagreementon the proper definitionof what is practical.Wyltonmaina habit as practical.In
tained that thereare two criteriafor classifying
thatit bringsabout
orderfora habit to be practicalit is required,firstly,
of a facultydifferent
itsproperobject;and, secondly,thatit is a perfection
In oppositionto this,Auriol maintainedthatneither
fromthe intellect.87
criterionis adequate. The firstis inaccuratefor the simple reason that
no habit is productiveof any object in the strictsense of the word, and
thatpracticalhabitsonlyassistin the productionof something.88
Wylton's
second criterionis even less apposite;whethera given habit perfectsthe
intellector anotherfacultyof the human substanceis, in the last resort,
of only incidentalsignificance.89
Accordingto Auriol,what is decisivefor
of
a particularhabit is whetherthe habit
the
nature
establishing proper
is endowed with an inner activity,which is to say that it directsother
facultiesor habitsbelongingto the completehuman being.90Accordingly,
Auriolclaimed thatthe practicalis by naturedirectedtowardsome piece
character.91
ofwork,irrespective
ofwhetherthisis ofcorporealor incorporeal
A thirdpoint of contentionbetweenWyltonand Auriolwas the value
of deductivereasoningin theology.Wyltonseems to be of the opinion
that theologyis a deductivescience in the sense thatthe articlesof faith
functionas premisesfromwhich conclusionsregardingthe divine may
whether
be deduced. Moreover, to him it makes a world of difference
or are derivedby a process
such conclusionsare based solelyon authority
betweenfaithand
of reasoning;this is, accordingto him, the difference
on
the
stanceignores
other
science.92
To
hand,
Auriol,
Wylton's
theological
85Wylton,
. . sec.5.3.
habitus
"Utrum
theologicus
86Auriol,
. . .", sec.1.2and3.2.9.2.
"Utrum
habitus
practicus
87Wylton,
. .", sec.6.3 and7.4.1.
habitus
"Utrum
theologicus.
88Aunol,
virtus
. . . , sec.3.2.6.
Utrum
89Auriol,
. . .", sec.3.2.11.2.
"Utrum
habitus
practicus
90Auriol,
and3.2.12.
habitus
. .", sec.3.1;3.2.11.1-2;
"Utrum
practicus.
91Auriol,
is exemplified
"Utrum
virtus
. . sec. 3.2.6-8;herethepractical
bysuch
ofcreatures,
divine
medical
as theartofwriting,
diverse
activities
treatment,
production
andtheological
reasoning.
92Wylton,
thatthetothink
"Utrum
habitus
. . .",sec.8.3.Wylton
appears
theologicus
offaith
arenoteviinthestrict
senseofthewordsincethearticles
ologyis nota science
"Utrum
faith
as an actofthewill;cf.Wylton,
dent,andbecausetheology
presupposes

18:22:46 PM

ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

57

the fundamentallaw of thoughtthat the conclusionof a syllogismcannot be more certainthan its weaker premise.This means that a syllogism of which one of the premisesis groundedon faithalone, does not
yield a conclusionwhich is of higherevidentialvalue.93To Auriol the
veryidea of viewingtheologyalong the lines of deductivescience is a
to elicitfurther
knowlInstead of attempting
completemisunderstanding.
articles
of
is
from
the
of
the
divine
faith,theology primarilyconedge
cerned with defendingthe articlesof faith.For this reason theologyis,
accordingto Auriol, a practicalscience inasmuch as it teaches how to
defendthe Creed.94
How thispoint of view agrees with Auriol's claim that theologygoverns the theologicalvirtuesof faith,hope, and charity,is not explained
in Wylton
's question against Auriol,just as Auriol did not address this
in
question his "Utrum habitus practicus. . ." Moreover, the reader of
's questionis givenno clue as to whyAuriol maintainedthattheWylton
the firmness
of belief,or how thisagrees
does
nothingto strengthen
ology
with his view that theologydirectsthe theologicalvirtues.The consisand, in
tencyof theseclaimsis, however,establishedin Auriol'swritings,
Pmum
Sententiarum
is
thisrespect,Auriol'sconclusionto the Scriptum
super
particularly
explicit.95
To Auriolit is apparentthat the articlesof faithare far fromevident
to naturalreason, and that theyare in conflictwith the dictatesof natural reason. Consequently,the faithfuls'
adheringto the Creed is based
not on intellectualpersuasionbut on an act of the will. Furthermore,
since the intellecthas a verytenuousgrasp of the articlesof faithand is
with the counter-rational
characterof religiousbeliefit
oftenconfronted
is incumbenton the will to constandykeep the intellectin tightreins.
Sometimesthe will is simplynot strongenough to performthistask sucand this resultsin man's becomingtroubledby doubt. In this
cessfully,
connectiontheologyfindsits proper place. One of the prime objectives
of theology96
is to demonstratethat the impossibilitiesimplied by the
. . sec.5.6-9.In thisrespect
ofAuriol's
habitus
Wylton's
critique
conception
theologicus
oftheology
thatofWilliam
cf.Nielsen1999,note42.
resembles
Ockham;
93Auriol's
in Wylton,
is presented
"Utrum
habitus
. . .",
lineofreasoning
theologicus
in Auriol's
seeabove,note25.
sec.4.3;fortheparallel
ownworks,
passages
94Thisis aptlystatedin Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
sec.4.1 and 4.4.
theologicus...",
to thehabitoflogicis thatofexemplar
The 'activity'
whichAuriolascribes
causality,
shouldalsobe trueoftheology.
which,
by
implication,
95Gf.Auriol,
Primum
Sententiarum
, d. 48,a. 3 (Auriol
1596,cols.1120bsqq.).
Scriptum
super
96Ofcourse,
suchas interin Auriol's
alsoserves
otherfunctions
conception
theology
newarticles
offaith.
and,morerarely,
deducing
preting
Scripture

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

articlesof faithare not of primarylogical order,i.e., contradictory,

but
of
order.
this
consists
in
constructonly secondarylogical
Demonstrating
ing an intellectualframeworkwithinwhich the articlesof faithmay be
viewed as possiblestatesof affairs.In this mannertheologicalreasoning
comes to the assistanceof the troubledintellectof believersinasmuchas
it removessome of the causes of doubt. However, accordingto Auriol,
thisis not tantamountto sayingthattheologystrengthens
the firmness
of
faith.Fundamentally,
adheringto the Creed depends on man's will,and
theologycontributesto this act of will only in an indirectmannerinasmuch as it makes the task of the will somewhatlighter.97
b. TheDisagreement
between
andAuriolon theNatureof Virtue
Wylton
In the ensuingdebate on the natureof virtueWylton'spositioncan be
identifiedsolelyon the basis of his ratherprobingobjectionsto AurioPs
conceptionof virtuewhichare foundin his question"Utrumhabitustheologicus..." His subsequent and much more explicitargumentshave
been recordedin AurioPs"Utrumvirtus. . ."98
it is highlyriskyto attemptto constructsomebody'sposAdmittedly,
itive view on the basis of purelynegativeargumentsdirectedagainst a
conflicting
position.Nonetheless,in the presentcontextit is presumably
safe to assume thatWylton'sobjectionsreflectsome kind of realistconceptionof relativeentitiessuch as virtues.The common denominatorin
Wylton'sargumentsagainst Auriol seems to be that, on AurioPsview,
not nearly enough weightis attached to what is relativein virtue.In
other words, Wylton opposed AurioPs view of virtue because, on his
accountof a compremises,AurioPsbasic view was a patentlyinsufficient
such
as
virtue.
This
stance
was
the
plex entity
drivingforce behind
that
virtue
is
from
vice by something
Wylton'sobjection
distinguished
that is veryreal, and that the firstand the thirdspecies in the category
of quality are distinguishedby essentialdifferences.99
This line of reais
in
also
as
soning
apparent Wylton'sarguments preservedin AurioPs
"Utrum virtus..." Here Wyltonis reportedto have adduced the currentdistinctionbetweenrelativesthatare real ("relativasecundumesse")
and those that are only denominative("relativasecundumdici") with a
97Fora fuller
ofthis,seeNielsen1999.
account
98SeeWylton,
"Utrum
habitus
. . sec.10;andAuriol,
"Utrum
..
virtus
theologicus
sec.2.1.
99Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
sec. 10.2.1-2.
theologicus...",

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AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

59

view to establishingthat virtuebelongs to the firstclass.100This line of

reasoningappears to have been viable for Wyltonfor the sole reason
that,accordingto his appraisal,a relativeentitythat is real, consistsnot
only of its foundationbut also of an accidentthat is somehow added to
the foundationand directedtowardsome otherthingwhich is the term
of the relation.101
Wylton'sargumentsdid not carrymuch weightwith Auriol,and the
of relsimplereasonforthiswas thatAuriol'sfundamentalunderstanding
ative entitieswas completelydifferent
from that of his opponent. To
Auriol,so-calledrelativeentitiessuch as virtuesare, as far as ontologyis
fromordinaryabsoluteentities.102
Time and again
concerned,no different
Auriolunderlinedthat,in reality,a relativeentitysuch as virtueis nothing but an absolute quality.The distinctionbetween absolute and relativeentitiesarisesonlyaccordingto the way the absolutequalityis looked
at. This is to say that a quality such as whitenessshould be classified
as an absolutequalityif it is consideredin itselfand as a forminhering
in a subject.On the otherhand, if such a qualityis seen withrespectto
a norm it may be classifiedas eithera virtueor a vice. In the terms
of one of Auriol's favouriteexamples,one may say that whitenessin a
tooth is a virtue,whereas it is a vice and a sign of blindnessif it is
foundin an eye. However,as faras ontologyis concerned,thereis no intrinsicor real difference
betweenthe whitenessin the tooth and that of
the eye.
AnsweringWylton'sobjectionsAuriol has no problemwithcountering
betweenthe firstand the thirdspecies
Wylton'sappeal to the distinction
in the categoryof quality.What is classifiedin these two species are,
accordingto Auriol,different
concepts and not different
things,as Wylton
would seem to believe. Seen as relatedto a norm,an absolutequalityis
representedby a complex concept,viz., the absolute qualityas coupled
with somethingexternal,and this concept properlybelongs to the first
100
"Utrum
virtus
. . sec.2.1.8.
Auriol,
101
Thisfundamental
viewtranspires
from
Bordeaux
determination
wherehis
Wylton's
is muchmorefully
see thelucidexposition
theory
1990,471
developed;
byHenninger
of"accidentia
and"accidentia
media"inWylton,
sqq.Cf.alsotheexposition
respectiva"
ed. Etzkorn-Andrews
1994,74 sqq.and78 sqq.
An exception
to thisAuriol
in actionandpassion,
finds
to him,
which,
according
aretruly
relative
entities
thatexistbetween
theagentandthepatient.
Theyarenotentitiesin thefullsenseoftheword,though;
their
status
is thatofbeingan "id
ontological
to an "idquod".Cf.,e.g.,Auriol,
Quodlibet
, q. 2 (Auriol
quo"in contradistinction
1605,
cols.8b sqq.).

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

species of quality.Seen in itself,the absolutequalityfostersa simpleconcept, which is properlyplaced in the thirdspecies of quality.103
between"relativasecundum
Wylton's appeal to the currentdistinction
esse" and "relativasecundumdici" also failsto impressAuriol. To him
betweenvarithis distinctiondoes not signal any ontologicaldifference
ous kinds of relativeentities.That some relativesare characterisedas
thattheyare relativein the ontobeing "secundumesse" does not signify
is merely
logicalsensethatWyltonintends.The importof thisclassification
that some relativeconceptsalwaysimplytheircorrelatives.Equally, that
some relativesare only "secundumdici" merelysignifiesthat theymay
In his questionsin
be conceived in isolation fromtheir correlatives.104
of the distincBalliol 63 Auriol does not elaborate on his understanding
tionbetweenrelativesthatare "secundumesse" and thosethatare "secundum dici". However, in his two commentarieson the firstbook of the
he explainsthisdistinction
Sentences
accordingto thevariouswaysin which
the human mindsformsconceptsinvolvingmore thanone singleobject.105
Auriol's steadfastpersuasion that there are no relativeaccidents or
featuresof his thought,and it
qualitiesis one of the most characteristic
voiced in his Balliol 63 questionson the natureof
is certainlyforcefully
theologyand virtue. On the other hand, Auriol's ulteriormotivesfor
adoptingthisstance do not surfacein thesepartsof his literaryremains.
Withoutpretendingto supplymore than a fewpointersforfutureexplorationof thispart of Auriol'sthought,one may say, though,thatAuriol's
originalview of complex entitiessuch as relativeswas motivatedby two
major concerns.In the firstplace, it is obvious thatAuriol'sreductionof
ontological pluralityto conceptual pluralityformspart of his general
assaulton the realistontologiesof,e.g., Thomas Aquinas and John Duns
Scotus.In the second place, Auriol'sinsistenceon the non-complexnature
of virtueas an entitywas motivatedby purelytheologicalconsiderations.
justificationand salvationare inextricaAccordingto his understanding,
whichare bestowedon the electdirectly
the
virtues
tied
to
theological
bly
or wholly
through
by God, and whichcannotbe acquired eitherpartially
on the part of man. As activeprincipleswhichestablisha comany effort
103See Auriol,
"Utrum
. . sec.3.2.2.1-4;
habitus
"Utrum
3.2.3;andAuriol,
practicus
1997.
See alsoFriedman
virtus...",sec. 1.3.2.2-3.
104
sec.2.1.9,
habitus
"Utrum
Auriol,
virtus...",sec.2.3.7.In "Utrum
theologicus",
thatare
relatives
between
a linguistic
rulefordistinguishing
toestablish
attempted
Wylton
as completely
dici".ThisAuriol
"secundum
esse"andthosethatare"secundum
rejected
virtus
. . .", sec.2.3.9.
"Utrum
seeAuriol,
inapposite;
105In theseworks
ct.Henninger
thistopicis treated
ofm greatdepth;
1989,150sqq.

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ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

61

munityof love betweenGod and man, the theologicalvirtues and primarilythehabitof love shouldbe seen as absolutequalitieswhichdefine
in virtueswould
the human person. Allowingof ontologicalmultiplicity
of
virtues
their
the
invariablydeprive
uniquityand integrity
theological
and, consequently,
jeopardise theirrole in the order of salvation.106
it
is
true
to say that the confrontation
betweenWyltonand
Though
Auriolas documentedin the Balliol 63 questionsdid not probe the ultiit is, nonetheless,
mategroundsfortheirdisagreements
of more thanpasswhichAuriol'soppoing interest.Besidesrevealingthe obviousdifficulties
nentsexperiencedwhen confronting
his quite novel approach to current
it providesan insightinto the
philosophicaland theologicalproblems,107
mannerand styleof debates in the university
of Paris in the earlyyears
of the fourteenth
century.In additionto this,one may hope that it will
prove to be of serviceto the ongoingattemptsto establishthe chronological order of parts of Auriol's literaryremainsas well as to identify
some of Wylton'swidelyscatteredquestions.108
Copenhagen
of Copenhagen
University
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Unprinted
Sources
PeterAuriol

Commentarius
inPrimum
Brevior
Sententiarum.
Biblioteca
Vaticana,
Apostolica
Borgh.123,fols.1r-198v
PeterAuriol Commentarius
Prior
inQuartum
Sententiarum.
Biblioteca
Salamanca,
Universitaria,
M 2295,fols.50r-104v
PeterAuriol Utrum
virtus
in quantum
virtus
sitensperaccidens.
BalliolCollege,
cod.63,fol.19ra"va;
editedbelow
Oxford,
PeterAuriol Utrum
habitus
et speculativus
ab invicem
practicus
distinguantur
per
esseprincipium
etnonesseprincipium
activum
inipsosciente.
activum
BalliolCollege,
cod.63,fol.21ra
Oxford,
va;editedbelow
Thomas
Biblioteca
101v
Vaticana,
36,fols.47rWyltonQuodlibet.
Apostolica
Borgh.

106
ForAuriol's
ofthetheological
intheorder
virtues
ofsalvation,
seeVignaux
appraisal
1934,43 sqq.
107Evensomebody
likeJohnBaconthorpe,
whowasquitefamiliar
with
Auriol's
thought,
failed
to understand
forinsisting
Auriol's
motives
on theontological
ofvirtue;
see
unity
Commentarius
inTertium
Sententiarum
JohnBaconthorpe,
, d. 33,q. 1,a. 5, 2 (Baconthorpe
1618,vol.2, 188).
108
Forthehighly
transmission
ofWylton's
seeDumont1998.
complicated
writings,

18:22:46 PM

62
ThomasWylton

LAUGEO. NIELSEN
velspeculaUtrum
habitus
sitpracticus
theologicus
cod. 63, fols.19vative. BalliolCollege,Oxford,
edited
below
20rb;

B. Primary
Sources
Hervaeus
Natalis1513
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PeterAunol1596
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PeterAuriol1952
1964
ThomasWylton
ThomasWylton
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ThomasWylton
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etTractatus
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Libros
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Quaestio
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, ed.W. Senko,
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Determinati
Petrm
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deiManoscritti
Omnia.
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Del
1/3*Francia
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e Concetta
Luna.Firenze.
Punta
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Medii
Accademica
Nazionale.
Corpus
Philosophorum
Aevi.Testie Studi,VI)
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essesimul
Utrum
accidentia
usdem
speciei
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, in:Etzkorn

C. Secondary
Literature
Bazan,B.C. 1985

de
danslafacult
Lesquestions
disputes,
principalement
dumoyen
in:Typologie
dessources
,
geoccidental
thologie,
fase.44-45.Turnhout
1985,15-149
andGregory
Peter
F. 1998
Walter
Aureoli,
, in:
Brown,
ofRimini
Burky,
Stephen
Marenbon
1998,368-85(Chapter
15)
Introduction
M. 1952
, in:PeterAuriol1952
Buytaert,
Eligius
e studi
1998
NewQuestions
, in:Documenti
Dumont,
Wylton
byThomas
Stephen
341-81
9 (1998),
filosofica
sullatradizione
medievale,
'
and
88:A 'Thomas
Cathedral
1994 Tortosa
Etzkorn,
Manuscript
Wylton
G.J.andR. Andrews
in
Accidents
ontheCompatibility
theQuestion
ofMultiple
PolotheSameSubject
, in:Mediaevalia
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32 (1994),57-99
norum,
Some
Modist
Roots
andModifying
R. 1997
of
Friedman,
Reality:
Conceiving
Formation
Peter
AurioVs
, in: Marmo
ofConcept
Theory
1997,305-21
Herv
A. de 1938
Nol(f 1323).tude
, in:Archivm
Guimaraes,
biographique
8 (1938),5-81
Fratrum
Praedicatorum,
1989
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1250-1325.
Relations.
Medieval
Theories
M.G. 1989
Henninger,
e
Thomas
M.G. 1990
, in:Documenti
Theory
ofRelations
Wylton's
Henninger,

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ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

63

studisullatradizione
filosofica
vol. 1,2
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(1990),456-90
DieKommentare
desPetrus
Valens1969
Aureoli
zumdritten
Sentenzenbuch
,
Heynck,
in:Franziskanische
51 (1969),1-77
Studien,
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Diskussionen
ber
dasaktuell
Unendliche
inderersten
Maier,Anneliese
Hlfte
des14.Jahrhunderts
SerieIII, 24
, in: DivusThomas,
& pp.317-37[reprinted
in:Maier1964,
(1947),147-66
41-851
1958
des14.Jahrhunderts
Sentenzenkommentaren
Maier,Anneliese
, in:
Zu einigen
Archivm
Franciscanum
51 (1958),369Historicum,
409 [reprinted
in:Maier1964,264-3051
1964
Mittelalter.
Gesammelte
zurGeistesgeMaier,Anneliese
Ausgehendes
Aufstze
des14.Jahrhunderts,
schichte
Rome1964(Bd.1.Storia
e
letteratura,
97)
ed. 1998
Vol.III. Medieval
Marenbon,
,
John,
Routledge
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History
Philosophy
London1998
ed. 1997
Verba.
Semiotics
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Theological
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Le criticisme
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Catalogue
Manuscripts
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Dictates
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Peter
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TheSacraments
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TheIntelligibility
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AurioVs
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Studia
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TheGenesis
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WaywithWords.
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Commentaries
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First
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onPeter
Commentaries
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F. 1954
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Pelster,
%urberlieferung
Schriften
Petrus
Aureoli
O.F.M.
14(1954),
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
392-411
3deThomas
W. 1963
La quaestio
'DeAnima
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Wilton
Senko,
disputata
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tom.XII,2, Paris1935,cols.1810-81

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

Foietthobgie
deFontaines,
Paris1966(Museum
selon
Lessianum,
Godefroid
section
tholorique,
61)
dela France
Pierre
littraire
mineur
, tom.33,479Auriol,
, in:Histoire
Valois,N. 1906
frre
528
etprdestination
P. 1934 Justification
auXIVesicle
, Paris1934
Vignaux,
imMittelalter.
undihre
Miscellanea
IhreUrsprung
P.,ed. 1963 DieMetaphysik
Bedeutung.
Wilpert,
Bd. 2., Berlin1963
Mediaevalia,
Tihon,P. 1966

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AURIOLANDWYLTON
ON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
APPENDIX

65

Determinatio fratris Petri Aureoli

UTRUMVIRTUSIN QUANTUM
VIRTUSSIT ENS PER AGGIDENS
<0.1. 1> Quod sic, quod includitres duorumpraedicamentorum,
est ens
per accidens.Patetper Philosophum.Huiusmodiest virtusut virtus,quia
5
includitqualitatemet respectum.Igituretc.
<0.1. 2> Itemad idem,quod non facitad actum,acciditvirtuti.
Hoc patet,
quia habitusest solum propteractum. Sed respectusnon facitad actum.
Igituracciditvirtuti.
nullumens per accidensestper se in praedicamento.
<0.2. 1> In oppositum,
Sed virtusin quantum huiusmodiest per se in prima specie qualitatis. 10
<0.2.2> Item, virtusest per se definibile.Igituretc.
<0.3> In ista quaestionesic est incedendum,primoponendusest punctus
Secundo removendasunt quaedam
quaestioniscum suis dificultatibus.
obiecta per aliquos socios.
15

<Articulusprimus>

<1.1> Ad evidentiamprimitria suppono.

< 1. 1. 1> Primmest,quod virtusper essentiamest qualitas absoluta.Hoc
Dicit
expressedicitAugustinus,et allegateum Magisterin 2 Sententiarum.
est
virtus
bona
mentis.
Idem
dicit
in
enim,quod
suis,
qualitas
Categoriis
capitulode qualitate.Hoc etiam vult Aristoteles,
qui in fine 1' Ethicorum20
dividitvirtutemin moralem et intellectualem,quae oratio nullo modo
, qui dicit,
competitrespectui.Hoc et vult Commentator,5 Metaphysicae
quod studiositaset pravitascollocantursub qualitate.
<1.1.2> Secundum supponitur,quod per necessitatemad coexistentiam
et cointellectumvirtutisrequiriturrespectusvel habitudo congruentiae. 25
Hoc patet3 Ethicorum
de circumstatiis
istisut 'oportet'et 'quando oportet'
etc.
1 BalliolCollege,
God.63 (B'),fol.19ra
21 in]om.B' 24 coexistentiam]
cumexistentiam
B'
4 Aristoteles,
lib.6 cap.2 (1026b12sqq.)20 Petrus
Sententiae
in
Metaphysics
Lombardus,
IV libris
distinctae
, lib.2, dist.27, cap. 1, p. 480 (Grottaferrata,
1971). 19 Augustinus,
Ethica
, cap. "De qualitate"
Categorie
, lib. 1, cap. 13
(PL 32, col. 1433). 20 Aristoteles,
In Aristot.
lib.5, t. 14 (ed. Iuntina,
(1103a4 sqq.) 22 Averros,
VIII, f.
Metapkysicam,
Ethica
, lib.3, cap.2 (lilla 2 sqq.)
127ra).26 Aristoteles,

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

<1.1.3> Tertio supponitur,quod impossibileest, quod 'virtus'dicat aliex absolutoet respectu,quia sic perireitotaprimaspecies
quid constitutum
5

10

15

20

25

30

35

qualitatis.
<1.1 .4> Ex his tribussuppositiseliciturquartum,videlicetquod virtusin
recto nihil includitnisi qualitatempraedicationedicente "hoc est hoc",
et in obliquo solum includitrespectumcongruentiaenon praedicatione
dicente"hoc est hoc", sed "hoc est ad hoc" vel "hoc est huiusmodi"vel
"huic" vel quomodolibetaliter.
multae et non modicae.
<1.2> Sed istissic positisoccurruntdifficultates
<1.2.1> Primo videtur,quod ex istis sequitur,quod virtussit ens per
sive
accidens, quia quicquid includitres diversorumpraedicamentorum,
in rectosive in obliquo, est ens per accidens.Si in recto,non est dubium.
Si in obliquo, etiam sequituridem, quia magis deficitab unitate,quod
includeretaliquid in obliquo, quam quod includeretillud in recto,et per
consequensmagisvideturad ens per accidensaccedere.Quocumque modo
igiturponaturvirtusincludereduo, sequitur,quod sit ens per accidens.
<1.2.2.1> Item, essentia virtutisaut consistitin absoluto praecise, aut
ultra absolutumhabet respectumpartem sui. Primumnon potest dari,
cum albedo secundum
quia si sic, prima species et tertianon differrent,
totumillud, quod est in ea absolutum,sit in tertiaspecie qualitatis.
<1.2.2.2> Item sequitur,quod virtuset vitiumnon differrent;
quod idem
absolutum,quod in uno est vitium,in alio sitvirtus,sicutalbedo in dente
et in oculo.
<1.2.2.3> Si secundumdetur,habereturpropositum,quod virtussit ens
per accidens.
<1.2.3> Item, illud,quod clauditin se duo, quorum unum acciditalteri,
est ens per accidens. Sed huiusmodiest virtus,quia tu dicis,quod virtus
est qualitas, ut fundat.Sed istud accidit absoluto,quia potest adesse et
abesse etc. Igituretc.
<1.2.4.1> Item, respectusiste congruentiaeaut est propriapassio aut est
formalis.Non est propriapassio,quia sic essetin secundomodo,
differentia
et posset Deus illum separare manentevirtute.Si sit differentia
formalis,
habeturpropositum.
<1.2.4.2> Et confirmatur,
quia subiectumpotest intelliginon intellecta
propriapassione, quod negas de virtuteet respectuisto.
B' 19
includeret
11 quia]iter.
B' 13 quod]om.B' 14 quam]om.B' 16 includere]
add.etdel.B' 22 albedo]
sisecundum
detur
B' 20 illud]id B' 20 qualitatis]
albedo]ar00
B'
g
secundum
ardo
secundo]
. . 10.2.1-3
"Utrum
habitus
9 Gf.ThomaeWylton,
theologicus

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<1.2.5> Item,quod acquiriturin aliquo factasolum mutationein altero,

est relatioin recto. Huiusmodi est virtus.Igituretc.
<1.2.6> Item,istudabsolutumactu fundansaut est aliquid ultraabsolutum aut nihil.Si nihil,non iuvat te. Si aliquid, igiturnon unum per se.
5
Igiturper accidens.
<1.2.7> Item, relativumsecundumesse est ens per accidens. Sed aliqua
virtusest relativumsecundumesse. Igituretc. Maior patet. Minor probaturde iustitia,quia illud,quod est,est ad alterum,quae est differentia
relativisecundumesse.
album non est in genere,quia eius est duo 10
<1.2.8> Item, 3 Topicorum
Sed
certum
est, quod album non significaiplura in recto,
significare.
in
sed unum recto,id est qualitatem,et alterumin obliquo, scilicetsubiectum.Igiturnon obstante,quod virtusnon significet
plura in recto,tamen
in
unum
alterum
in
te
recto
et
per significet
obliquo. Igituradhuc erit
ens per accidens.
15
Io
Elenchorum
<1.2.9> Item,
probatPhilosophus,quod 'duplum'et 'duplum
dimidii'non significent
idem. Aut igiturvirtusimporttrespectumper
modum,quo 'duplum' dicit duplum dimidii,aut per modum, quo tota
ista oratio'duplumdimidii'dicitduplumdimidii.Sed quodcumque detur,
habeturpropositum,quod virtussit ens per accidens, quia tam duplum 20
quam duplum dimidiiest ens per accidens.
<1.2.10> Item,non minusintimeconvenitalbedinifundaresimilitudinem
quam virtuticongruentiam.Sed ad albedinem,ut actu fundat,non est
impositumaliquod nomen speciale. Igiturnec illi absoluto in virtute,ut
actu fundatcongruentiam,
conveniethoc nomen 'virtus'specialiter,immo 25
videtur ficticium,
quod dicis.
<1.3> Modo ad ista per ordinemrespondeo.
<1.3.1.1> Praemittotamen unum secundum doctrinamPhilosophi,ut
,
magis videantursolutionesargumentorum.Philosophus,7 Metaphysicae
de accidente,quod quoddam est aliquod simplex,et quoddam 30
distinguit
est aliquod copulatumcum subiecto,quorum differentia
in hoc consistit, quod accidens simplex potest intelligiet definirisine suo subiecto
determinato
separatim,accidensvero copulatumnon. Et hoc expressedicit
1 mutatione]
solumadd.B' 4 igitur]
nonestadd.etdel.B' unumadd.B' perse add.et
del.B' 8 quia]quae B' 10 album]arB' 10 quia]propter
B' 10 duo]nihilB' 11
B' 14 alterum]
et add.etdel.B' 22 albedini]
ar"'
album]ar"1B' 11 plura]Platonem
B' 23 quam]quodB' 24 Igitur]
nonadd.B'
10Aristoteles,
Elenchi
, lib.4, cap. 1 (120b20 sqq.) 16Aristoteles,
, lib.1,cap. 13
Topica
, lib.7, cap.5 (1030b15sqq.)
(173a35 sqq.) 29 Aristoteles,
Metaphysica

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

ibidemCommentator.Accidentiumvero copulatorumquaedam suntcopulata determinatissubiectissicut simitas;quaedam sunt copulata determinateshabitudinibussicutvirtus.Unde sicutsimitasnon obstante,quod
non sic sit simplex,sed copulata, est ens per se et per se in genere,sic
virtuseritens non per accidens,sed per se non obstantetali copulatione.
et ideo illa
<1.3.1.2> Sed dices, primamcopulationemponit Aristoteles,
rationabilisest; sed secunda est de tuo, ut videtur.
<1.3.1.3> Item,prima est rationabilis,quia aliquod essentialiter
dependet
a subiecto,et ideo non definirinec intelligipotestsine eo. Sed non estsic
de ista habitudine,quia ipsa magisdependetab absolutoquam econverso.
<1.3.1.4> Respondeo, immo expressevult hoc Aristoteles,quia secundum primamdefinitionem
relativorumnecesse est ponere aliqua relativa
ut manus et caput. Unde dicit
secundumdici, sicutpartessubstantiarum
sunt
relativa
secundum dici, quod relativa
Simplicius exponens, quae
secundumdici sunt,secundumquod subiectumabundanthabitudine.
<1.3.1.5> Et cum dicitur,quod habitudo "magis dependet etc.", dico,
quod non est inconveniensidem esse priuset posteriusalio in alio et alio
genere.Pro quo sciendumest,quod naturaingeniavitipsas qualitatesnon
Et ideo simulstat,quod
propterse, sed propternaturam,quam perficiunt.
in genere esse materialissubiectumsit prius habitudine,sed in genere
finishabitudocongruentiaeest priorquam subiectum,in quantumhabitudo ilia tenetse a parte naturae et quasi ligat unum cum alio.
<1.3.1.6> Et si dubites,quare aliae species qualitatisnon sunt sic copulatae, dico, quod causa est, quia natura non omnes sic ingeniavit,non
enim ingeniavitnatura albedinemad hoc, ut faceretme similemtibi.
<1.3.2> Per hoc ad rationes.
<1.3.2.1.1> Ad primum,quando dicitur"quandocumque aliquid includit
plura etc.", dicendum,quod includerealiquando est per modum tertii
constitutiex hoc et hoc, | aliquando includereplura,quia includitunum
copulatum alteri. Primus modus arguit ens per accidens sicut patet de
albo; secundusmodus non, sicut patet de simitate.
29 B', fol.19rb
B' 29 aliquando]
abndat
B' 9 potest]
om.B' 15 abundant]
4 sit]iter.
aliquidB' 31
B'
incerta
albo]delectio
14Simplicius,
InAristot.
1 Averroes,
VIII,f.166va-vb).
, lib.7,t.4 (ed.Iuntina,
Metapkysicam
inAristotelem
latinm
commentariorum
InAristot.
, vol.V, p. 241,
Praedicamentia,
graecorum
Corpus
11.78 sqq.(Louvain,
1971).
16 ad 1.3.1.3 27 ad 1.2.1

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<1.3.2.1.2> Et cum dicitur"magiscadit ab imitate",dico, quod hoc arguit

propositummeum,quia cum aggregatumper accidens requiritunitatem
ex hoc et hoc eo ipso, quod virtusdeficitab ista unitateconconstituti
stitutionis,
sequitur,quod non sit ens per accidens, cum non sit aliquid
ex hoc et ilio, sed solum importtunum ut copulatumalteri. 5
constitutum
<1.3.2.2> Ad secundum,cum dicitur"aut essentia virtutisconsistitin
absoluto,aut ultraabsolutumhabet habitudinempartemsui", dico, quod
arguitab insufficiente,
quia dimittittertiummembrum,quod magis est
ad propositum,scilicetistud "aut habet aliquid, cui copulatur",et istud
concedo. Unde ut est virtuset in prima specie, habet ultra se ipsam, ut 10
est in tertiaspecie, habitudinemcongruentiae,cui copulatur.Nec differt
albedo ut in prima specie et in tertianisi per copulali et non-copulari,
et istud sufficit
ad distinguendum
species qualitatis,cum per ista essentialitervarieturmodus qualificandi,qui est propriusactus qualitatis.
<1.3.2.3> Et per hoc patet ad illud de vitioet virtute,nam eadem quali- 15
tas absolutacopulata congruentiaeest virtussicutalbedo in dente,copulata vero incongruentiae
est vitiumsicut albedo in oculo.
<1.3.2.3> Ad tertiumde adesse et abesse dicendum, quod quandoita quod resultet
cumque aliquid includitduo per modum constitutionis,
tertiumconstitutum
ex istis,quorum unum alteriaccidit,illud tale infal- 20
libiliterest ens per accidens. Sed non est sic in proposito.
<1.3.2.4> Ad quartumde propriapassione dicendum,quod loquendo de
qualitateabsoluta in virtuteet vocando illud absolutumvirtutem,sic est
respectusille propriapassio eius et potestseparali ab ilio in esse et intelligi. Sed si loquamur de isto absoluto,ut actu fundat,sic non est passio 25
eius nec est formaleconstitutivum
eius, et tamen non potestseparali nec
in esse nec in intelligi.Video, quod unum relativorumnon potestintelet tamenneutrumest alteriuspassio nec
ligi nec esse sine suo correlativo,
differentia
formalis,immo unum est alteriextrinsecum.
<1.3.2.5> Ad quintum,quando dicitur"illud,quod acquirituretc.",dicen- 30
dum, quod non oportet,quod sit respectusin recto,sed sufficit,
quod sit
fundans
et
dicat
in
et
sic
interimenda
aliquid
respectum
ipsum obliquo,
est maior propositio.
<1.3.2.6> Ad sextumde iustitiadicendum concedendo maiorem,quod
relativumsecundumesse sit ens per accidens. Et cum dicitur"iustitiaest 35
B' 12 albedo]a10B' 18 quandocumque]
11 tertia]
secunda
B' 32
quantumcumque
i add.B'
ipsum]
1 ad 1.2.1 6 ad 1.2.2.1 15ad 1.2.2.2 18 ad 1.2.3 22 ad 1.2.4.1 30 ad 1.2.5 34 ad
1.2.7

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

Et ad probationem,cum dicitur"iustitia
huiusmodi",per interemptionem.
est
ad
alterum",
dico, quod iustitiaest virtusnon solum
illud, quod est,
sed ad alterumordinans.Ad differentiam
hominemin se ipso perficiens,
hominemin se
quae solumperficiunt
igituraliarumquarundamvirtutum,
ipso, dicitur,quod iustitia"illud,quod est,est ad alterum",istudnon est
secundumesse. Unde aequivocaturde esse ad
esse ad aliquid relativorum
alterum.
<1.3.2.7> Ad septimum,cum dicitur,quod album non includitduo in
rectoet tamenest ens per accidens,igitursic virtus,dicendum,quod aliud
reformat
quod
pactum,quia album includitduo per modumconstitutionis,
non facitvirtusnec etiamsimitas.Sed certesimileest quantumad hoc de
albo et simo, utrumqueenim est ens per accidens proptercausam tacex hoc et hoc,
tam, quod utrumquesignificat
per modum tertiiconstituti
licet non importetutrumquein recto.
<1.3.2.8> Ad octavum de ilio duplo et dimidio dicendum,quod virtus
importtrespectumnec per modum dupli nec per modum dupli dimidii,
sed magis per modum duplicitatis.
dicendumest,
<1.3.2.9> Ad nonum de albedine fundantesimilitudinem
modus
variatur
intrinsece
et
qualificandi,
quod quia per copulali non-copulari
unde ad quaestionemfactamper "quale" convenienterrespondeturper
per "album"
"pulchrum"et per "album", si albedo copulaturcongruitati;
ut actu funnon.
Ideo
sive
sive
albedini,
etiam,
copulaturcongruentiae
sui ipsius
dat congruentiam,imponiturnomen speciale ad differentiam
vel
non-fundare
actu non
non-copulatae.Sed quia fundaresimilitudinem
variatmodumqualis intrinsece unde ad quaestionemfactamper "quale"
- ideo albedini,ut
non proprie respondeturper "simile" vel "dissimile"
non necessariumest nomen speciale, cum fundare
fundatsimilitudinem,
non ponant ipsam in alia et alia specie.
et non fundaresimilitudinem
<1.3.2. 10> Ad decimum,quod ponitursexto loco, cum dicitur"absoluex dictis.
tum ut actu fundansetc.", patet sufficienter

B' 10album]
ar"1
B' 5 est1]
om.B' 8 album]
om.B' 6 aliquid]
3 hominem]
hominum
ar"1
B' 21 albedo]arB' 21
ar"cB' 21 album1]
B' 12albo]arB' 18albedine]
ar"1
B' 27 cum]con.s.l.exquiaB'
ar
B' 26 albedini]
ar
B' 22 albedini]
ar"1
album2]
8 ad 1.2.8 15 ad 1.2.9 18 ad 1.2.10 29 ad 1.2.6

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<Articulussecundus>
<2.0> Istae sunt radones magistiThomae Wyltona.Secundus articulus
quaestionisest removereobiectionesreplicatascontra praedicta.
<2.1.1> Primo arguitursic, voceturabsolutumin virtuteA', absolutum
actu fundansvocetur'B', et respectuscongruentiaevoceturC' Quaero 5
tunc,utrumB addat aliquid ultraA vel nihil.Si nihildicat plus quam A,
igitursicutA non est virtus,sic nec B. Si dicat plus, sequitur,quod virtus
eritaliquidintrinsece
constitutum
ex A et ilio alio, quod est negatumprius.
<2.1.2> Item ad idem sic, B fundatC aut per rationemaliam ab A aut
non. Si non per rationemaliam ab A, igitursicutB fundatet est virtus, 10
sic A secundum se et absolute. Si per rationemaliam ab A, igiturB
includitduo, scilicetA et illud aliud, et sic virtusest intrinsececonstitutum
ex duobus absolutisvel saltemex absolutoet respectu,quod est negatum.
<2.1.3> Item ad idem, B connotatC, et non connotatA, igiturA et B
non idem.
15
<2.1.4> Item, communissententiaphilosophorumest, quod absolutum
absolutum,
possitintelligisine respectu,igiturvirtus,cum sit essentialiter
quod tamen negatur.
<2.1.5> Item,Aristoteles
vult,quod tota causa, quare aliquid non potest
ex ilio. Cum igiturvirtus 20
intelligisine alio, est, quod illud constituitur
non constituitur
ex respectu,sequitur,quod possitintelligisine ilio.
subiectumpassioni, id est posteri<2.1.6> Item, oportetpraeintelligere
ori. Sed in minoreoportetaccipere medium,quod est quidditassubiecti.
Si igitursubiectumactu fundetvel includat passionem,sequitur,quod
statmin minorepropositionehabebiturpassio concludenda de subiecto 25
in conclusione.Et sic non praeintelligitur
subiectumsuae passioni tempore, cuius oppositumdicit Philosophus.
tiam interrelativasecundum
<2.1.7> Item, Philosophusassignatdifieren
esse et secundumdici, quia relativasecundumesse non possuntintelligi
sine suis correlativis,
relativasecundum dici possunt. Cum igiturvirtus 30
non possitintelligisine respectu,videturetiam,quod sit relativumsecundum esse.

add.im.B' 6 quam]quodB' 12 constitutum]

2 Istae... Wyltona]
ad add.etdel.B'
lectio
incerta
B' 29 non]add.s.l.B'
22-23posteriori]
19Aristoteles,
, lib.7, cap.4 (1029b25 sqq.) 28 Aristoteles,
, lib.
Metaphysica
Metaphysica
5, cap. 15(1020b26 sqq.)

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

<2.1.8> Item, Commentator,5 Metaphysicae

, dicit,quod scientianon est
unum genus grammaticae,quia est ad aliquid. Nec valeretistuddictum
si scientiasolumponereturad aliquid secundumdici et in
Commentatoris,
obliquo. Igituretc.
5 <2.1.9> Item, Augustinusin suis Categoriis
reprehenditAristotelempro
Cum igiet
scibile
dici
ad convertentiam.
non
scientiam
eo, quod
posuit
ad
esse
dicantur
relativa
secundum
tursola
convertentiam,
sequitursecundum intentionemAugustini,quod virtussit relativumsecundumesse.
<2.1.10> Item, Philosophus,7 Physicorum
, volens probare,quod ad ilia,
10 quae suntin prima specie qualitatis,non est motus,arguitsic, ad aliquid
non est motus sive ad relationem;sed scientiaest ad aliquid; igituretc.
Commentatordicit,quod ratioista estin primafigura.Et sic oportet,quod
accipitur"ad aliquid" in recto. |
<2.1.1 1> Item quaero, quando Philosophusaccipit in maiore "ad relais tionemnon est motus",aut vult ibi intelligerede relationepura aut de
absolutosub relatione.Si primomodo, sequitur,quod virtussit relatioin
recto,vel arguitex divisisterminis.Si secundomodo, sic essetmaiorfalsa,
quia omnis motusterminaturad absolutumsub respectu.
20 <Rationes Aureoli>
<2.2> Ad istas obiectionesdicendumest per ordinem.
<2.2. 1> Et adduco primo duas rationespro me, scilicetquod virtusnon
sit ens per accidens, sic, nulla qualitas copulata determinataehabitudini
est ens per accidens,quia multumrefertaliquid esse compositumex hoc
25 et hoc et aliquid esse copulatumhuic, quia in primo dico duo, quia hoc
et hoc, sed in secundo dico unum cum alio. Sed virtusest huiusmodi.
Igituretc.
<2.2. 2> Item ad idem sic, 5 et 7 Metaphysicae
, ens per accidens non est
diversorum
ex
nisi aggregatumet constitutum rebus
generum.Sed virtus

13 B', fol.19va
om.B' 25 ethoc]om.
viisB' 18motus]
3 grammaticae]
quodadd.etdel.B' 17divisis]
B' 26 unum]con.exunamB'
InAristot.
1 Averroes,
VIII,f. 129vb)5 Augustinus,
, lib.5, t. 20 (ed.Iuntina,
Metaphysicam
, b.7, cap.3 (246b
Physica
, cap."Adaliquid"(PL 32,col. 1431) 9 Aristoteles,
Categoriae
In Aristot.
2 sqq.) 12 Averroes,
IV, f. 320rb) 14
, lib. 7, t. 17 (ed. Iuntina,
Physicam
, lib.5, cap.6
Metaphysica
, lib.7, cap. 3 (246b2 sqq.) 28 Aristoteles,
Aristoteles,
Physica,
, lib.7, cap.3 (1028b34 sqq.)
Metaphysica
(1015b16 sqq.) 28 Aristoteles,

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non est huiusmodi,quia si sic, idem esset actu fundarerespectumet esse

ex fundamentoet respectu.Igituretc.
compositumvel constitutum
<Ad obiectionesThomae Wylton>
<2.3> Modo ad rationes.
<2.3. 1> Ad primum,cum quaeritur,utrumB dicat plus quam A, dicendum,quod non dicitB plus quam A praedicationedicente"hoc est hoc",
sed bene est plus in rationeterminan
tis,et hoc est esse cum pluribus.
B fundatC per radonemaliam
Ad
cum
"aut
<2.3.2>
secundum,
quaeritur
ab A etc.",dicendum,quod B non fundatnisiper A, non absolute,sed ut
actuaturper C. Et sic non sequitur,nisi quod A actuatumper C sit actu
fundanset virtus,quod concedo.
<2.3.3> Ad tertiumdicendum,quod A et B non sunt omnibus modis
idem; patet quo modo et quo modo non.
<2.3.4. 1> Ad quartum,quando dicitur,quod "absolutumpotestintelligi
si accipitursub sua absolutione
etc.",dicendum,quod absolutumin virtute,
et
sic
sine
praecise,
potest intelligi
respectu, sed adhuc non habetur
completaratio virtutis.
<2.3.4.2> Et sicut dicis, quod "est communissententiaphilosophorum,
quod absolutumpotestintelligisine respectu",ita dicam ego, quod est
communissententiaomnium,quod absolutumpotestfundarerespectum.
<2.3.5> Ad quintum,cum dicitur"tota causa etc.", dico, quod extenditurnomenconstitutionis
ad omne illud,quod necessariocoexigiturad esse
alicuiusvel ad eius intelligi.
<2.3.6> Ad sextumde propriapassioneet medio demonstrandi
dicendum,
quod sicutpatet ex praedictis,si accipiturabsolutumut actu fundanset
includensrespectum,sic non est respectuspassio eius, quia ut sic nullo
modo sunt separabilia in esse vel intelligi,et sic petitur,quod deberet
probari.
<2.3.7> Ad septimum,cum dicitur"differentia
est interrelativaetc.", dicendum,quod quia relativasecundumesse designatoproprio significant
ideo nullomodo possuntintelligisine suis correlativis.
Sed relarelationem,
tivasecundumdici modo oppositodesignatoproprioimportantabsolutum,
1 esse]factum
add.etdel.B' 5 B] om.B' 7 pluribus]
in B' 30 propluriB' 29 inter]
B' 32 secunrelativum
prio]pariB' 31 ideo]nullap add.etdel.B' 31-32relativa]
dumdici]add.i.m.B' 32 proprio]
pariB'
5 ad2.1.1 8 ad2.1.2 12a/2.1.3 14
29 ad2.1.7

2.1.4 18ai/2.1.4 21 a/2.1.5 24 ad2.1.6

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

rationecuius non rpugnteis intelligisine respectu.Et ideo dicitur,quod

relativasecundumdici possuntintelligisine respectusumendorespectum
in recto.
directeet praecise quo ad illud, quod significant
<2.3.8> Ad octavumde grammaticadicendum,quod ratioprobatopposiscientiamesse
tum,quia eo ipso, quo Commentatornon negatsimpliciter
genus grammaticae,sequitur,quod scientianon sit pura relatio.Sed in
hoc, quod dicit ipsam deficerea vera rationegeneris,patet,quia 'scientia' aliquid connotatsaltemin obliquo, quod non connotai 'grammatica',
ratione cuius non habet rationemveri generis,cum verum genus nihil
includat,quod non includiteius species.
<2.3.9> Ad nonum de Augustinodicendum,quod non sequitur,relativa
dicunturad convertentiam,
igitursunt relativasecundumesse, quia constat, quod caput non est relativumsecundum esse, et tarnen'caput' et
'capitatum'dicunturad convertentiam.
<2.3.10.1> Ad decimum de 7 Physicorum
primo dico, quod non valet
medium
in
oportetsumiin recto",quia
"argumentum primafigura,igitur
ex obliquis,
sic sequitur,quod in primafiguranon possetesse argumentum
verum.
est
non
quod
<2.3.10.2> Vel sic, dato quod assumptumesset verum, tunc dicerem
concedendo,quod virtusest respectusin recto concretive,quia est relativum,sed non abstractive,quia non est relatioin recto.
cum dicitur"accipitPhilosophusin ma<2.3. 11> Et ad confirmationem,
iore etc.",dico, quod loquiturtam de relationepura quam de absolutosub
respectu,quia de utroqueest maiorvera, quia nec ad relationempraecise
acceptam est motus nec ad absolutumsub respectuut sub respectuper
se. Unde maior Philosophiest vera communitertam de respectuquam
de absolutosub respectu.Et cum dicitur,quod "omnis motusterminatur
ad absolutumsub respectu",verumest,sed non ut sub respectu.Si enim
acquisitoaliquo absolutoper motumper unum alium motumtuncimprimeretursibi respectus,ut acquisita albedine per motumtunc per unum
add.et
add.i.m.B' scientiae
ad add.etdel.B' 3 quo]om.B' 6 grammaticae]
3 directe]
B' 15valet]enim
del.B' 10non]om.B' 13 est]om.B' 15 Physicorum]
Metaphysicae
de ab add.etdel.B' 26 quam]quodB' 29 enim]meadd.etdel.
add.B' 23 loquitur]
B'
B' 30-31imprimeretur]
absolutum
B' 30 absoluto]
impraevenietur
InAristot.
5 Averroes,
VIII,f.129vb). 11 Augustinus,
, lib.5, t.20(ed.Iuntina,
Metaphyskaxn
b.7,cap.3 (246a
Physica,
, cap."Adaliquid"
(PL 32,col.1431). 15Aristoteles,
Categoriae
30 sqq.)
4 ad 2.1.8 11 ad 2.1.9 15 ad 2.1.10 22 ad 2.1.Ii

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75

motum novum imprimeretur

sibi similitudo,verum esset motus ille ad
respectumvel saltem ad absolutumut sub respectu.Sed modo non est
ita, immo sine omni mutationefactain ipsa albedine potestsibi advenire
respectustalis.
<2.3. 12> Et sic patet,quod rationeset obiectionesistae non concludunt. 5

1 imprimeretur]
B' 1 verum]
scribendum
verus 3 albedine]
ar"eB'
impraevenietur
fortasse

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
APPENDIX

II

<Determinatio Thomae Wylton contra Petrum Aureolum>

Wyltona
SIT PRAGTIGUS
UTRUMHABITUSTHEOLOGICUS
VEL SPEGULATIVUS
<1. Opinio Aureoli>
5

10

15

20

25

<a. Quod habitustheologicusest practicus>

<1> Dicit hie una opinio et est Aureolis,quod est propriepracticus.
< 1. 1> Quod sie probat,omnishabitus,qui non solumconsidrtveritates
circa subiectum,sed eas facit,est habitus practicus.Sed theologia est
huiusmodi.Igitur etc. Maior patet per exemplumde rhetorica.Minor
etiam patet, quia theologianon solum considrtveritatesde Deo, sed
etiam multas defensionesinvenitet multas vias, quibus possit veritates
theologicascontrahaereticos defendere.
<1.2> Item secundo sic, illa scientia,quae est de obiecto attingibiliper
nobilioremactum,quam sintactus speculandi,est practica.Ista statuitur
de medicina,quae ideo diciturpractica,quia non solum attingitad cognitionemsanitatis,sed ad esse sanum. Et similiterde scientiamorali,quae
sed etiamad operali secundum
non solumattingitad cognitionemvirtutis,
est theologia.Patet,quia
Sed
huiusmodi
et
ideo
dicitur
virtutem,
practica.
actum
est de obiecto attingibili
credendi,sperandiet amadi, qui actus
per
nobilioressunt quam nuda speculatiosciti.Igituretc.
<1.3> Item tertiosic, ille habitus,qui ultraspecularihabet directionem
aliorumhabituum,est practicus.Sed theologiaest huiusmodi,quia dirigit
habitusfidei,spei et caritatis.Igituretc.
< 1.4> Nec valet,si dicatur,quod istiactuspertinentad contemplationem,
igiturnon ad praxim, quia activa et contemplativanon distinguuntur
per speculativumet practicum,sed per laboriosumet non-laboriosum.
Unde jejunare et orare et alia opera quaecumque exercentursine labore
corporisexteriore,quantumeumquesintpraxes,tarnenad contemplativam
pertineant,non ad activam.
1 BalliolCollege,
Cod. 63 (B'),fol.19va
B' 14statuitur]
stadefendare
sicB' 12defendere]
add.i.m.B' 6 Aureolis]
2 Wyltona]
add.etdel.B' 20 quam]quodB' 25 distinguuntur]
tiniB' 16 de] verit
distinguitur
B'
B' 27 labore]con.exlaboris

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ab habitutheologiae,
<1.5> Quod autemhabitusfideisithabitusdistinctus
fide
|
pollentplurimumetc.
patet per Augustinumdicentem,quod
<1.6> Unde imaginaturiste doctoret dicit,quod 'practicum'et 'speculativum'non suntdifferentiae
accidentales,ita quod practicumdistinguitur
a speculativoper habere duplicemet non habere ilium,sicutponitScotus. 5
Sed dicit,quod scientiadiciturpracticaper propriamactivitatemintrinsecam, qua nata est dirigereactus aliorumhabituum.
<b. Quod logica est practica>
<2> Ex quo sequi statuit,quod logica est vere practica. Et hoc probat
10
multipliciter.
nisi
Primo
ex
<2.1>
sic,
directione,quam habet respectualiorum
logica
habituumultraspeculationempropriisubiecti,dicereturpractica,sequitur,
quod essetbis speculativa,semel a speculationepropriisubiecti,et semel
a directionerespectualiorumhabituum.Sed hoc est inconveniens,sicut
inconveniensesset dicere,quod homo esset bis risibilisvel bis rationalis. 15
<2.2> Item secundo sic, ille habitus,qui habet actum, qui consimili
ter
a speculari,est practicus.Ista patet,quia habitusdistinguitur
distinguitur
per actus. Sed logica est huiusmodi,quia si suum dirigereesset speculari, sequeretur,cum dirigatcirca conclusionesgeomtricas,quod eas
20
cognosceret,quod non est verisimile.Igituretc.
<2.3> Item tertiosic, illa scientiaest practica,quae intenditopus. Huiusmodi est logica, quae 6 Topicorum
docet, quid eligendum,et quid
fugiendum.
<2.4. 1> Item quarto sic, illa scientiaest practica,quae habet subiectum
de metaphysica,mathema- 25
operabile a nobis. Patet ex 6 Metaphysicae
tica et naturali.Ibi enim arguitPhilosophussic, illa, de quibus suntistae
scientiae,habent in eis principiamotus sive factionis.Igituristae scientiae nec suntfactivaenec activae. Sed logica non est huiusmodi,sive sit
de syllogismosive de secundisintentionibus.
Igituretc.
<2.4.2> Imaginaturenim, quod sicut sutor,si praesentatursibi corium 30
magnum,per arteminciditcoriumet inducitformamsubtalaris,sic habens
2 B', fol.19vb
4 differentiae]
B' 5 duplicem]
definitones
om.B' 9 statuit]
statim
B' 12practica]
practicusB' 28 non]om.B' 30 praesentatur]
B' 31 subtalaris]
subtellaris
B'
pertenetur
2 Augustinus,
De frinitale,
DunsScotus,
Ordinatio
XIV,1,3(CGSL50,p. 424). 5 Johannes
,
vol. 1, p. 115). 22 Aristoteles,
Prologus,
, lib.6,
pars5, qq. 1-2 (ed.Vaticana,
Topica
, lib.6, cap. 1 (1025b3 sqq.)
cap. 1 (139b6 sqq.) 25 Aristoteles,
Metaphysica

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

logicam, si detur oratio longa, formatipsam in syllogismumet inducit

Et ideo sic habitusiste debet dici practicusactivus
formamsyllogisticam.
sicut ars sutorisfactiva.
<2.5> Item quinto sic, logica est assecutivarhetoricae.Sed rhetoricaest
practica. Igituretc.
essentiales>
<c. Quod practicumet speculativumsunt differentiae

sintdifferentiae
essen<3.1> Itemprobat,quod practicumet speculativum
tiales, sic, quando duae differentiae
primae dividuntaliquem habitm,
duabus
differentiis
subdividitur
habitus
aliis,si differentiae
postmodum
qui
10 secundae subdivisionssintessentiales,et primaeeruntmultomagis essentiales. Sed nunc est ita, quod habitus sive scientiaprimo dividiturper
per metaphyspeculativumet practicum;scientiaspeculativasubdividitur
sicam,naturalemetc. Sed constat,quod ista subdivisioest per differentias
essentiales.Igituret divisioprima,quae est per speculativumet practicum.
15 <3.2. 1> Postea respondetad rationemScoti, qui probat ex intentione,
essentiales.ArguitScotus sic, speculativum
quod istae non suntdifferentiae
habere
et practicumdistinguuntur
duplicemrespectumet non habere.
per
Sed scientia quaecumque est de prima specie qualitatis.Et per conseessentialiseius non poteritesse respectus.
quens differentia
20 <3.2.2> Solvitdicens,quod respectusnon clauditurin rationehabitusin
recto,sed solum connotaturextrinsecein obliquo. Vide de istisin quaestione praecedentiper totum.
<d. Quod articulifideinon sunt principiain theologia>
<4> Item dicitdoctoriste,quod articulifideinon sunt principiain the25 ologia.
<4.1> Quod etiam probat, nullus artifexsive scientiaprobat sua principia. Sed theologiamultuminsudatcirca hoc testeAugustino,qui dicit,
quo fidesgignitur,nutrituretc.
quod huic scientiaeattribuitur,
<4.2> Item, omnes articulisunt conclusionesunius articuli,igiturnon
30 sunt principia. Antecedenspatet, quia omnia concludunturet habent

rhetosaribendum
2 debet] add.s.l.B' 4 logica. . . rhetoricae]
logicaeestassecutiva
forlasse
sintB' 15 qui]quodB'
rica 7 et]praadd.etdel.B' 10 sint]scilicet
vol.1,p. 115).
DunsScotus,
16Johannes
Ordination
Prologus,
pars5,qq. 1-2(ed.Vaticana,
"Utrum
De trini..." 27 Augustinus,
inquantum
virtus
Aureoli
virtus
21-22i.e.,inquaestione
tate
, XIV,1,3 (CGSL50,p. 424).

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79

firmitatem
ex ista "Credo ecclesiamcatholicam".Igituretc.
<4.3> Item,conclusiofideinon est conclusiotheologiae,cum sinthabitus
distincti.
Sed si articulifideiessentprincipiain theologia,sequeretur,quod
eadem esset conclusiofideiet theologiae.Verbi gratia,si dicatur,omne
habensin se duas naturasintellectuales
habetin se duas volun- 5
suppositum
Filii
sed
sive
Christus
est
huiusmodi;igiturChristushabet
tates; suppositum
duas voluntates.Certum est, quod haec conclusio sequiturcertitudinem
praemissaedebilioris,et ilia est minor,quae tantumest eredita.Igiturhaec
conclusio"in Christosunt duae voluntates"tantummodoest credita.Si
igiturcum hoc dicatur,quod conclusionesdeductae ex articulisfideisint 10
conclusionestheologicae,sequitur,quod eadem eritconclusiofideiet theologiae, quae sunt distinctihabitus.Dicit igiturdoctor,quod conclusiones
omnes deductae ex articulisfideisolum sunt conclusionesfidei.
<4.4> Quis igiturest habitustheologiae?Dicit, quod habitus,quo scimus
exponereunum locum Scripturaeper alium; quo scimusinvenirevias et 15
rationesad defendendum
fidemecclesiae;et quo scimusdeclarareartculos
fidei.Iste talis habitusproprieloquendo est theologicus.Et addit, quod
habitusiste nihilfacitad firmitatem
adhaesionis,sed solum ad maiorem
sunt
fidei.
cognitionemeorum,quae
20
<4.5> Haec est opinio sua fideliteraccepta.
<11. Contra opinionemAureoli de speculativoet practico>
<5> Contra ista per ordinem.
<5.1> Contra per Wyltona.Et quia dicit se velie loqui de practico et
speculativo,sicutlocutisuntphilosophi,ideo primoprobo, quod ista non
stantsimul,quod theologiasit propriepractica, et quod loquitur,sicut 25
philosophisuntlocuti.Et probo primoex parteobiectisic,Philosophus,1Io
et in 6 etiam,Veritasmetaphysicae
, facitistamconsequentiam,
Metaphyskae
est de rebusaeterniset immobilibus,
igiturest speculativa.Si consequentia
Philosophivaleat, ita arguii de theologiasicut de metaphysica,quia quis
habitusita est de immobilibuset aeternissicut theologia?Igituretc.
30

6 sive]sintB' 7 certitudinem]
conclusionem
B' 14 habitus2]
quae add.etdel.B' 15
. . . Wyltona]
add.i.m.B' 26] signum
add.i.m.B'
locum]add.i.m.B' 23 Contra
speciale
26 IIo] 10B' 27 istam]
isteB' 27 Veritas]
in virtute
B'
26 Aristoteles,
, lib.11,cap.7 (1064a30 sqq.) 27 Aristoteles,
Metaphysica
, lib.
Metaphysica
6, cap. 1 (1026a30).

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10

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25

30

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

<5.2> Item probo,quod diligereDeum non sitactuspracticus,quia si sic,

tuncessetactus voluntatiset per consequensactus electivus,quod Philoso, ubi dicit, quod felicesesse volumus,
phus expresse negat, 3 Ethicorum
sed eligerenon congruit.
<5.3. 1> Item probo, quod nec crederenec speraresintpracticisicutnec
,
diligeresecundum viam Philosophi,nam Philosophusin 10 Ethicorum
determinavit
de
omnibus
tam
intellectualibus
virtutibus,
postquam
quam
moralibus,comparai speculariad operari,et probat,quod specularisive
contemplariDeum sit nobilioret perfectioromni alio actu.
<5.3.2> Et certumest, quod Philosophusibi non excluditactum voluntatis nec etiam actum credendiet sperandi,quia omnes tales, per quas
probat intentum,ita curruntde actu diligendisicutde actu cognoscendi.
Istud patet discurrendoper omnes. Prima est continuado;secunda, quia
indihabet mirabileset puras delectationes;tertia,quia nullisexterioribus
in
est
hominis
sistit
et
vacatione;
quinta, quia speculari
get; quarta, quia
in quantum divinus,sed practicumest totiushominis.Modo certumest,
quod ita curruntistae causae de actibus appetitusvoluntatiset intellectus, cum idem respondeatutique pro obiecto.
virtutis
sistatin actu
<5.4> Item,postea in eodem quaerit,utrumperfectio
electivoelicitovel in opere exteriori,scilicetactu imperato,et respondet,
utrumque
quod in utroque.IgiturvultPhilosophus,quod ad perfectionem
meritoconcurrat,scilicetactus voluntatiselicituset actus exteriorimperatus. Ex quo sequitur,quod diligereDeum secundumviam eius non possit
haberi actus imperatus,nisi sit actus voluntatis,| et per consequensnec
practicus.Igituretc.
<5.5> Item nunc probo, quod principiasua non concordantcum Philosopho. Ponit enim, quod theologiahabeat rationemsapientiaeproprie
sumptae,proutaccipiteam Philosophus,et tamendicit,quod est practica.
<5.6> Primo probo, quod ista non stantsimul. Philosophusenim in 6
numerai sapientiaminterhabitusmere speculativos.Igituretc.
Ethicorum
<5.7> Item, sapientia proprie dieta includitscientiamproprie dictam.
24 B', fol.20ra
cumB' 24 nisi]
B' 5 nec1]om.B' 23 secundum]
B' 3 3] lacuna
virtutis
2 voluntatis]
B'
virtutis
nonB' 24 voluntatis]
Ethica
Ethica
2-3Aristoteles,
, lib. 10,cap.7
, lib.3, cap.2 (11lib 28-29). 6 Aristoteles,
Ethica
Ethica
,
, lib.10,cap.9 (1179a1 sqq.) 29 Aristoteles,
(1178a1 sqq.) 19Aristoteles,
lib.6, cap.7 (1141b2 sqq.)

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81

Sed scientiapropriedicta includitevidentiam.Theologia autem de lege

communinon includitevidentiam.Igituretc.
<5.8> Item,conclusioscientiaepropriedictae,quae includitur
in sapientia
propriedicta, non stat cum fide.Sed theologiastat cum fide. Igituretc.
<5.9> Item, omnis scientiapropriedicta facitintellectumassentirecon- 5
clusioniante omnemactum voluntatis.Sed nulla conclusiotheologiaeest
huiusmodi,quia crederenon potestquis nisi volens. Igituretc.
<111. Ad rationesAureoli>
<6> Ad rationes.Primoad illas,quae probant,quod theologiasitpractica.
<6.1> Ad primam,maior est falsa,quae dicit,quod "ilia scientiaetc.",
quia aliud est scientiamfacere subiectumet aliud facere veritatescirca
subiectum.Primumbene arguithabitmesse practicum,dum tarnennihil
aliud obsistat.Sed secundumnon, quia sic sequitur,quod metaphysica
esset practica,cum multas veritates,multas defensionesinveniatcontra
adversarios,ut patet in 4o Metaphysicae.
<6.2> Ad secundum,cum dicitur"de subiecto attingibili",dicendum,
quod ratio illa, secundum quam obiectum est attingibileultra speculationemobiecti,sive respicitobiectumut operabile a nobis aut ut nonoperabile.Si primomodo, tuncest maiorvera,et minorfalsain proposito.
Si secundo modo, tunc est maior falsa,et tunc est argumentumcontra
eos, quia quaecumque sit ratioilla, secundumquam est attingibileobiectum,dum tarnennon respiciatobiectumut operabile a nobis, non facit
habitmexire limitesspeculativinec cadere in praxim.
<6.3> Ad tertiumdicendum,quod non quaecumque directioponit habitmpracticum,nec quaecumque operatiofacithabitmcadere in praxim,
sed solumilla,quae estproductivasubiecti.Unde operali,quod Philosophus
ponit finemhabituspractici,non est quidcumque operali, sed est opercontraspeculari,et quod est productivumsubiecti,
ali, quod distinguitur
et cum hoc est perfectioalteriuspotentiaeab intellectu.

10

15

20

25

1 dicta]cm.exdietm
B' 7 credere]
quodadd.etdel.B' 23 cadere]a add.etdel B'
26 operari]
B'
quodadd.etdel.B' 29 intellectu]
intelligi
10cf.1.2 15Aristoteles,
, lib.4,cap.4 (1006a1 sqq.) 26Aristoteles,
Metaphysica
,
Metaphysica
lib.9, cap.8 (1050a10sqq.)
10ad 1.1 16 ad 1.2 24 ad 1.3

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

<7> Ad radones,quae probant,quod logica etc.

<7.1> Ad primam,cum dicitur"igituresset bis speculativa",dicendum,
quod ponitur,quod logica docens et utens sint unus habitusnumero,et
tunc modo sequituraut ponitur,quod sintdiversihabitus.Et adhuc non
sequitur"sit bis speculativa",sed sequitur,quod logica docens et logica
utens sint duo habitus speculativi,sicut duo hominessunt duo risibiles,
non bis risibilis.
<7.2> Ad secundum,cum dicitur"igiturlogica cognosceretconclusiones
geomtricas",dicendum,quod hoc est necessariumponere saltem sicut
obiectumsecundarium,non sicut obiectumprimarium.Nec Philosophus
et sophistacirca idem
hoc negaret,maximecum ponit,quod metaphysicus
non
est
4
Tamen
in
ut
dicitur
inconveniens,
versantur,
quod
Metaphysicae.
concluditurpro inconvenienti.
<7.3> Ad tertiumde 6 Topicorum
dicendum,quod logicus in quantum
considrtin universali,non
huiusmodisolumrationeseligibiliset fugibilis
autemper applicationemad opus nec in particulari.Et ideo non sequitur,
quod sit practica.
<7.4. 1> Ad quartumde operabilidicendumest, quod duae conditiones
ad hoc, quod scientiasit practica.Prima est,quod sit factiva
requiruntur
sui subiecti.Secunda est, quod sit perfectioalteriuspotentiaeab intellects Prima tenetin proposito,sed secunda deficitomnino.
<7.4.2> Ad quod diciturper exemplum de incisione corii, dicendum,
quam compositioet divisioquam etiam
quod tam simpliciumintelligentia
discursusa praemissisad conclusionessunt actus potentiaeintellectivae.
sive
Et ideo cum mediantibusistisactibusformaturdiscursussyllogisticus
ideo logica, ad quam spectatista
qui est perfectiointellectus,
syllogismus,
Nunc
autem
erit
mere
constat,quod incisiocoriiet infacere,
speculativa.
ductioformaesubtalarisin ipso,istaenon suntactuspotentiaeintellectivae,
et ideo non valet, quod assumitur.

add.i.m.B' 11ponitquod]add.s.l.B'
. etdel.B' 10-11Nec. . . negaret]
6 sint]sintadd
om.B' 22 Ad]EtB' 27
ex10B' 14 Topicorum]
124]c<m.
TopicisB' 15considrt]
B'
B' 28 subtalaris]
subtellaris
inscisio
incisio]
lib.4, cap.4 (1006a1 sqq.) 14Aristoteles,
12Aristoteles,
, lib.6, cap.
Topica
Metapkysica,
1 (139b6 sqq.)
2 ad 2. 8 ad 2.2 14

2.3 18 ad 2.4.1 22 ad 2A.2

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<7.5> Ad quintumdicendum,quod pro tantoest logica assecutivarhetoricae, quia utraque proceditex communibus,cum quo stat,quod logica
sit speculativa.
<7.6> Et sic patet,quod rationesnon concludunt.
<8> Nunc ad rationes,quibus probat,quod articulifideietc.
<8. 1> Ad primam,cum dicitur"nullascientiaprobatprincipiasua", dicendeclarat
dum,quod hoc verumesta priori.Tarnenquod scientiaa posteriori
communiter.
immo
hoc
facit
Aristoteles
est
non
inconveniens,
principia,
<8.2> Ad secundumde ecclesia catholica dicendum,quod secus est de
ilio articuloet de aliis, quia ille quodam modo est medium nobis concludensomnes alios.
<8.3> Et cum dicitur"alii sunt solum crediti",dicendum,quod aliquid
concludiex articuloduplicitercontingit.Aliquando immediate,sicutscilicet si dicatur"ecclesia tenet,quod Christusest Deus et homo, igiturest
verum". Tunc dicendum est, quod habitus talis conclusionissolum est
habitusfideiet non est habitustheologicus,quia immediatedependetex
testimonioChristiet ecclesiae. Aliquando ex articuloconcludituraliquid
non immediate,sed per medium,sicutsi sic dicatur"in Christosuntduae
naturae intellectuals;sed omne suppositum,in quo sunt duae naturae
intellectuals,habet duas voluntates;igiturChristushabet duas voluntates". Ista conclusio est theologicaet scientifica,quia discursusyllogistico conclusa et non immediatedependetex testimonio,sed mediate.
<8.4> Ad tertiumpatet responsioex immediatepraecedentibus,ubi dictum est, qualiteralia conclusioest conclusiofidei,et qualitertheologica.
Unde concedo,quod uterquehabitusest theologicus,tam ille, quo scimus
unum locum Scripturaeexponereper alium et defendereartculosfidei,
quam etiam ille, qui deduciturex articulisipsis, dum tarnenfiat per
mediumet discursumsyllogisticum.

10

15

20

25

<IV. Opinio propriaThomae Wyltonde logica>

<9.1> Sed quantum ad logicam dico, quod logica est pure speculativa. 30
Sciendum tamen est, quod secundum nullam divisionemAristotelisde
practicoet speculativoest practicavel speculativa.Et ideo oportetdicere,
. . . rhetoricae]
scribendum
rhetorica
5 probat]
1-2logica
fartasse
logicaeassecutiva
probant
B' 6 primam]
B' 7 declarat]
B' 10 est]add.s.l.B' 12 cumdicideclarare
primm
B' 13Aliquando]
B' 12aliquid]con.i.m.exarticulum
AutB'
tur]tamen
1 ad2.5 6

4.1 9 ad4.2 12 ad 4.3 23

4.4

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84

10

15

20

25

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

quod Aristotelessolum est locutusde scientiisprincipalibus.Solum enim

inveniturAristotelesdivisissespeculativumin metaphysicam,
physicamet
in
et
et
civilem.
Verumtamathematicam; practicam monasticam,
politicam
men latiusest locutusSimplicius,qui . . . dicit,quod hi quidem theologici,
id est speculativi;hi practici,et hi organici.Et de organicisdicit,quod hi
quidem vel iuvantnos ad cognoscendum"bonumet malumin actionibus"
quantum ad rhetoricam,vel ad discernendumverumet falsumquantum
ad logicam. Ex quo patet, quod magis secundumintentionemSimplicii
saltem dici debet speculativaquam practica.
inter
<9.2> Igitur est sciendum,quod potest colligi triplexdifferentia
falsum
et
Prima
verum
et
discernere
est, quod
practicum organicum.
omnino est extraneumpractico. Sed organica logica est immediatum
instrumentum
discernendiverum a falso. Secunda differentia
est, quod
ad actus aliarumpotentiaruma potentiaintellectiva,
practicumextenditur
logica autem non. Unde aliud est extenderepotentiamad potentiam,et
aliud extenderehabitmad habitmet actum ad actum. Unde licetlogica extendatactumad actumsive habitmad habitm,in quantumdirigit
actus aliorum habituum,tamen non extenditpotentiamad potentiam.
Sed tertiadifferentia
est, quod ultimusactus habituspracticiest perfectio
alterispotentiaequam intellectus.Sed non sic de actibus speculativiet
specialiterlogicae,quia ipsum dirigere,quo dirigitalias scientias,quod est
ultimum,in quod potestlogica, est perfectiointellectus.
<9.3> Ex his potestsic argui,ille habitus,cuius ultimusactus estperfectio
intellectivaepotentiae | et est immediatuminstrumentum
discernendi
verumet falsum nisi consideransde fugibiliet prosecutibili est speculativa. Sed logica est huiusmodi.Igituretc.
<V. Contra Aureolumde respectu>

<10> Contra copulationemillam,quae poniturin quaestionepraecedenti.

< 10. 1> Sed contrahoc, quod dicitdoctoriste in solutioneargumentide
- et ulterius
30 respectu,quod scientiaest absolutumut copulatumrespectui
dicit, quod inter absolutum copulans et respectumcopulatum nihil est
24 B', fol.20rb
B' 21 quod]quiB' 28 Contra
add
. i.m.B' 30est] eritB'
4 . . .] lacuna
. . . praecedenti]
4 Simplicius,
inAristotelem
InAristot.
talinum
commentariorum
, voi.
Praedicamenta,
graecorum
Corpus
"Utrum
inquanAureoli
virtus
V, p. 6, 11.12 sqq.(Louvain,
1971). 28 i.e.,in quaestione
tum
..."
virtus

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AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

85

mediumnec rei nec rationis;et quando quaeriturab eo, per quid differunt
ilia, quae suntin primaspecie,ab his,quae suntin tertiavel quarta,dicit,
extrinseceilio respectucongruentiae,sed intrinsece
quod distinguuntur
copulationeipsa
5
<10.2> arguo contraista similiter.
< 10.2. 1> Primo sic, tu ponis absolutumcopulans, respectumcopulatum
et copulationem.Ista copulationon est absolutum,quia absolutummanet
etiam per te isto respectunon manente; et etiam per copulationemest
virtus,non per absolutum;nec ista copulatioest respectuscopulatus,quia
virtusintrinsece,
non autem per respectum, 10
per copulationemdistinguitur
sed solumextrinsece.
Aut igiturista copulatioest aliquid aut nihil.Si nihil,
contraper te,per illamdistinguitur
virtusa vitio.Si est aliquid,aut rei vel
rationis.Sed utrumquecontrate, et edam essetens per accidens,cum esset
constitutum
ex rebus diversorumgenerum.
sub genere distinguuntur 15
<10.2.2> Item secundo sic, species diffrentes
in
de
eis
differentiis,
quid primomodo dicendiper se.
quae praedicantur
Sed haec copulationon potestponi huiusmodi.Igituretc.
<10.2.3> Item tertiosic, accipio simum,quaero, utrumaliquid sitin simo,
quod praedicaturde ilio in primomodo dicendiper se praetercavitatem
vel non. Si non, igiturnon plus intrinseceincluditsimitasquam cavitas, 20
et per consequensnon constituiturintinseceper copulationemtalem,sicut
nec cavitas.Si aliquid includatsimitas,quod non includitcavitas,quid est
illud? Sive sit rei sive sit rationis,est contra te.
<VI. Solutio prima Thomae Wyltonde natura theologiae>
<11> Solutio quaestionis.Dico igitur,quod secundumviam Philosophi 25
nec propriepotestponi, quod theologiasit practicanec speculativa.Quid
igiturponam? Quod sit affectiva.
< 11. 1> Dico, quod non potest ilia via de affectivaimprobariper aliNon enim credo
quid, quod possitconvinciesse de intentioneAristotelis.
in
Aristotelem
posuisse volntatenostraaliquem actumdirigibilem
respectu 30
Dei, ex quo actu homo dicereturvirtuosus,si diligereicum 'oportet'et
3 distinguuntur]
B' 3 congruentiae]
teradd.etdel.B' 5] signum
add.
distinguitur
speciale
i.m.B' 13utrumque]
B' 13contra
utrum
B' 25
te]con.execceB' 18insimo]m5*1
Solutio
add.i.m.B' 31 cum]et B'
quaestionis]
5 signum
hicadd.i.m.etiaminvenitur
inAureoli
"Ultrum
habitus
speciale
quaestione
practicusetspeculatiuus
. . 2.1.3.

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LAUGEO. NIELSEN

cum aliis circumstantiis,

et vitiosus,si non sic diligerei.Nec per consequens
viam
secundum
oportet
Philosophiponere in intellectuhabitmdirectivum actusvoluntatisin diligendoDeum sic vel sic, qui habitussitpracticus
vel speculativus.
5 <1 1.2> Et ideo non est mirum,ut dicuntisti,quod nos ponimushabitm
allium,quam Philosophusposuerit,ex quo ponimustalemactumvoluntatis
respectuDei, quem ipse non cognovit.Pro quo est sciendum
dirigibilem
prout expresseex dictisPhilosophiet Commentatorissui potestpatere
Philosophusposuit Deum esse causam rerumde necessitatenaturae et
10 sic produxisseres in esse, quod non potueritnon produxissenec aliter.
Et ideo consequenterposuit,quod homo non haberet ad Deum actum
amicitiae,sed concupiscentiae,cum amicitiaeobiectumsit obiectumvirtutis,cuiusmodinon ponebat Deum, quia non libere produxitres, quod
derogat actui virtutis.Expresse videturfuisseistiusmentis,cum in suis
15 magnis moralibusdicat sic, amicitiamautem dicimus,ubi est redaman;
amicitiatamen ad Deum non recipitredamationem,non enim ad Deum
magis habemus amicitiamquam ad brutum.
<VII. Obiectionescontra solutionemde affectiva>
<12> Contraviam de aTectiva.Sed in oppositumhuiusnituntur
aliqui sie
20 ostendere,quod scilicetAristotelesposuerittalem actum etc.
< 12. 1> Et arguuntex dicis Philosophi. 10 Ethicorum
dicit Aristoteles,
quod secundumintellectumoperans et hunc curanset habens hic amantissimusDeo, ex quo videtur,quod Dei ad hominemsit amicitiaetc.
<12.2> Item,. . . dicit,quod qui non timetDeum, non est fortis.Sed sicut
25 Deus est timenduspropterpotentiam,sic est diligenduspropterbonitatem.
<12.3> Item, Aristotelesposuit cultum divinum Io Caeli et Mundi
, ubi
Deum
honorandum
secundum
numerum
ternarium.
ponit
<12.4> Item, per rationemhoc patet, quia Deus est summe appetibile
et diligibilesecundumviam Philosophi.Sed errat,qui non summediligit
30 illud, quod summe est diligendum.Igituretc.
virtuti
B' 14videadd.i.m.B' 12cum]actusadd.etdel.B' 14virtutis]
8 potest
patere]
add.i.m.
cm.exfuisse
B' 16 tamen]
dumB' 19 Contra
. . . affectiva]
turfuisse]
videtur
B' 25 est2]oportet
B' 24. . .] lacuna
B' 27 Deum]hominem
add.et
B' 19in]tamen
del.B' 30 quod]quemB'
15Aristoteles,
lib.8, cap.7 (1158a18 sqq.) 21 Aristoteles,
lib.10,cap.9
Ethica,
Ethica,
Ethica
Aristoteles,
, lib.3,cap. 10(1115b11sqq.),etEccli.
(1179a22 sqq.) 24 cf.fortasse
De CaeloetMundo
34,16. 26 Aristoteles,
, lib.1,cap. 1 (268a6).

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<12.5> Item, dicunt doctores,quod praecepta primae tabulae sunt de

iure naturali.Dicere, quod Philosophusnon videritillud,quod est de iure
naturali,non est consonumrationi.Igituretc.
<12.6> Item,tenetura multis,quod homo de iure naturaliteneturdiligere
5
Deum. Igiturnon videnturhabere veritatem,quae prius dicta sunt.
<VIII. Ad obiectionescontrasolutionemde affectiva>
<13> Sed rationesistae non concludunt.
< 13. 1> Ad primumde amantissimodicendum,quod Philosophusloquitur
ut vulguset secundummodum famosumloquendi, ut potest dici, quod
Aristoteles
vocat amantissimumesse ilium,qui perfectiusDeum intelligit 10
et ei magis assimilatur.
<13.2> Similiterad secundumper idem.
<13.3> Ad tertiumde culto divinodicendum,quod Aristotelesibi solum
recitative,non assertiveloquituribi, solum recitandodicta aliorum.
<13.4> Ad quartum,"Deus est summe appetibiliset diligibilis"verum 15
est amore concupiscentiae,in quantum summe appetimussibi assimilali
nostram,non autem amore amicitiae.Et ideo non
propterperfectionem
concludit.
<13.5> Ad quintumde praeceptisdicendum,quod supposito,quod Deus
produxitalia a se libere,prout fidestenet,verum est, quod praeceptum 20
de diligendoDeum eritde iure naturali,aliternon.
<13.6> Et per hoc patet ad sextum.
<13.7> Et sic patet, quod via ista non potest ex hoc improbari,quia
Philosophusnullumtalem habitmposuerit.
<IX. Solutio secunda Thomae Wyltonde natura theologiae>

25

< 14.1> Sed tarnenmalo loqui ut pluresquam novitatesaliquas invenire

sine magna et evidentinecessitate,et ideo teneo,quod theologiasitspeculativa et non practicanec affectiva.
<14.2> Quod sit speculativa,patet ex differentia,
quae est interhabitm
Pono enim,quod habitushabet,quod sitspecu- 30
practicumet speculativum.
lativuspraecise a subiecto,quia videlicetsubiectumest talis conditionis,
quod sciresive specularisitultimum,in quod possitpotentiarespectutalis

4 iurenaturali]
B' 26 aliquas]aliasB'
supernaturali
8 ad 12.1 12ad 12.2 13 ad 12.3 15 ad 12.4 19 ad 12.5 22 ad 12.6

18:22:46 PM

88

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

subiecti.Et quia huiusmodiest Deus, cum nullo modo sit operabile a

nobis,videtur,quod habitusquicumque est de Deo, quod sit speculativus.
<14.3> Practicusautem diciturhabitus quicumque tam factivusquam
activusa fineprincipaliter.
5 < 14.3.1> De factivopatet,quia quandocumquealiquod dependet ab alio,
et illud a tertio,primmplus dependebita tertioquam a secundo. Haec
maior patet de positione et faciente.Sed habitus factivusdependet ab
obiecto,et tam obiectumquam habitusdependenta fine.Igiturhabitus
magisdependebita finequam ab obiecto.Minor patetin exemplode freSi quaeritur,quare estunus habitusalius ab altero,
io nifactivaet domifactiva.
alia
est natura freniet alia domus. Sed si quaeritur,
respondetur,quod
materia
alia
ab illa, oportetire ad fines,quia alius est finis
est
haec
quare
huius et illius.
<14.3.2> Similiterdico de habitibuspracticisactivis,quod licetaccipiant
tamen habent distinguia
15 distinguiab obiectiset a potentiisprincipaliter,
sunt
secundum
virtutem,
finibus,quae
propterquas ingeniavit
operationes
eos natura.
<14.4> Sed si quaeritur,quis finissit ille, secundumquem homo dicitur
perfectevirtuosus,dico, quod non est simpliciterunus, quia nec sufficit
20 directioprudentiaenec electionec operatioper se, quia nec unum sufficit
per se nec duo, sed oportetomnia simulconcurreread hoc, quod homo
dicaturperfectevirtuosusnec huic . . .
<Nota scholariumI>
Utrum habitustheologicussit practicusvel speulativus
25 Ista puncta continethaec opinio Aureolis:primo,quod theologiasit pure
practica,et hoc probattribusrationibus;secundoquod practicumet speculativumsintdifferentiae
essentialeshabitus,probatunica ratione;sed tersit
tio, quod logica
practica,et probat quinqu rationibus;item quarto,
articuli
fidei
non
suntprincipiain theologia,probattribusrationibus;
quod
30 item,quod theologiasit sapientiapropriedieta.

B' 22... ] finis

tex7 patet]paretB' 10 quare]add.i.m.B' 16 ingeniavit]
ingennavit
tusinB'
in margine
inferiori
inveniuntur
23 Sequentia
B', fol.19va-vb.

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AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

89

<Nota scholariumII>
Hie respondeiWyltonaprimoad rationes,quae probanttheologiamesse
practicam;secundo ad rationes,quae probant logicam esse practicam;
tertioad rationes,quae probant,quod articulifidei non sunt principia
theologiae;et quartosolvitquaestionemde logicatenens,quod sitspeculativa;
et quinto improbatopinionemde copulationerespectuscongruentiae.

1 Sequentia
inveniuntur
in margine
inferiori
B', fol.20ra.

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90

LAUGEO. NIELSEN
APPENDIX
<Petri>
Quaestio

III

Aureoli

de distinctione habitus speculativi et practici>

<0.0> Quaestio est,utrumhabituspracticuset speculativusdistinguantur

ab invicemper esse principiumactivumet non esse principiumactivumin
5 ipso sciente.
ab habitu,
<0.1. 1> Quod non, quia per illud,quod per accidensrespicitur
non distinguitur
habitusunus ab alio. Sed huiusmodiest ordo ad scientem.
Licet enim scientiaper se refertur
ad scibile,per accidens tarnenrefertur
ad scientem.
10 <0.1. 2> Item, si sic, sequitur,quod omnis habitusesset practicus,quia
omnis scientiaest principiumelicitivumsui actus,sicutomnis alia forma.
Consequens falsum.Igituretc.
<0.2> In oppositumvideturesse Philosophus,ubicumque ponit distinctionemistorum.
15 <0.3> In ista quaestioneistoordineest incedendum,primopono punctum
circa ipsam.
quaestionis;secundo movebo difficultates
<Articulusprimus>
<1.1> Punctusquaestionisest iste, supponendoquod practicumet spea fineet ab obiecto,inquiretur,
utrum
culativumextrinsecedistinguantur
intrinsece.
20 propria activitatedistinguantur
<1.2> Ubi dico statm,quod practicumet speculativumfinaliterdistinguuntura fine,sicut entitatemhabent ad finem,sed radicaliteret per
ab obiecto.Formalitervero et intrinsecedistinguuntur
modum originantis
propriaactivitate,ita quod ille habitusdicendusest 'practicus',qui habet
25 intrinsecamactivitatemrespectupraxis,qua abundat ultraspeculationem.
Ille habitusdicatur'speculativus',qui caret tali activitate.
<1.3> Istam conclusionemprobo, oratio,quae non solum indicai, quod
quid est rei,sed edam dicitcausam propterquid, est vera definitioeius et
intrinsecamdefiniti.Ista patet ex 7 Metaphysicae
continetdifferentiam
per
1 BalliolCollege,
cod.63 (B'),fol.2Ira
B' 16
incendendo
1 Aureoli]
addi.m.B' 3 ] Aureoli
add.i.rn.B' 15 incedendum]
B' 16 ipsam]
addendum
Et tertio
solvam
om.B' 16 movebo]
movendo
fortasse
secundo]
B'
eas 23 distinguuntur]
distinguitur
InAristot.
29 Averroes,
, lib.7, t. 43 (ed.Iuntina,
VIII,f. 195va).
Metaphysicam

18:22:46 PM

AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE

91

in 7 Metaphyskae
Sed Aristoteles
Commentatorem.
ponitunam orationem,
indicai
habitus
istam
scilicet,quod ilia sunt
quae
propterquid
practici,
in
nobis
ut
sunt
intellectus
et ars; activa,
factiva,quorum principium
est
in
electio
et
In
nobis
ista
autemoratione
quorumprincipium
phronesis.
5
contine
tur esse principiumactivumetc. Igituretc.
<1.4. 1> Sed dices, quod dicit quidam doctor,quod istae non sunt definitionesverae, sed sunt quaedam propositiones,quae non convertuntur.
Unde licet habeatur a Philosopho,quod omnis habituspracticusest de
ente,cuiusprincipiumest in nobis,non tarnenhabemus ab eo conversam
huius,scilicetquod omnisscientia,quae est de ente,cuius principiumest 10
in nobis, sit practica,nec licet istam conversaminferreex illa conver- nisiconvertendo
universalem
tendo,quam dat Philosophus
propositionem
affirmativam
simpliciter.
< 1.4.2.1> Sed contra,Commentator,commentoIo, expresseexponitPhiet dicit,intenditautem dare causam prop- 15
losophumad istumintellectum,
terquid quorundamentium,suntenimhabitusactiviet quorundamfactivi
et quorundam neutro modo. Propterhoc supple, quod entia quaedam
habentprincipiumin nobis, quaedam non.
<1.4.2.2> Item, 2 Ethicorum
poniturconversa eius expresse.Et confirloco
matur,quia
'praxis' semperutiturCommentator'operatione',quia 20
est
'praxis' graece
'operatio' latine.
etiam per opinionemsubtilemde duplici habitu<1.4.2.3> Confirmatur
dineprioritatis
et conformitatis,
quae quidemduplexhabitudoest causalitas
ad
cuius
fitaliquid posteriusessentialiter.
imitationem
exemplaris,
<Articulussecundus>

25

<2> Nunc pono difficultates

quasdam,quae possuntmovericircapraedicta.
<2.1.1> Primo videtur,quod per talem activitatemnon distinguuntur
intrinseceisti habitus,sic, nullus respectusest differentia
intrinsecaconstitutivaalicuius absoluti.Sed ista activitasest respectus.Igitur.
<2.1.2> Si dicas, quod extrinsecedistinguuntur
per respectusillos, sed 30
intrinseceper copulali vel non-copulariad respectustales,
1 7]6 B' 4 phronesis]
B' 6 doctor]
Instantia
add.i.m.B' 11-12converprohaeresis
B' 14 Io] 2 B' 23 est]quamB' 26 quasdam]
tendo]convertente
quaedamB' 27
B' 30 Si] Sed B' 30 distinguuntur]
B'
distinguuntur]
distinguitur
distinguitur
1Aristoteles,
InAristot.
, lib.7,cap.7 (1032b12sqq.) 14Averros,
,
Metaphysica
Metaphysicam
lib.6, t. 1 (ed.Iuntina,
InAristot.
Ethicam
VIII,f. 144vb) 19 Cf.forte
Averros,
, lib.2,
DunsScotus,Ordinatio
III, f. 20ra) 20Johannes
cap.2 (ed.Iuntina,
, Prologus,
pars5,
vol.1,p. 115).
qq. 1-2(ed.Vaticana,

18:22:46 PM

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10

15

20

25

30

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

<2.1.3> contra hoc arguitura quodam doctore similiter,et vide illas

tresrationesin praecedentifolioin principiosecundae columnae ad tale
signumXXX.
<2.2> Item secundo sequitur,quod idem habituseritpracticuset speculativusvel saltempossitesse, et non solum idem specie, sed idem numero.
<2.2. 1> Probatio,certumest,quod moralisphilosophiain menteangeliet
in mentemea sunteiusdemspeciei,cum sintde eodem obiectoet respectu
eiusdemfinis.Sed in angelo non est istehabitusactivus,in me est activus.
Sic si per esse activumetc.,propterquod possitidem habitusnumeroesse
practicuset speculativus.
<2.2. 2> Pono, quod Deus acciperethabitm,qui est in mente mea, et
poneretipsum in angelo. Idem sequitur.
mihi scientiamproducendirosam,illa
<2.2.3> Item, si Deus infunderet
scientiaex ea parte,qua essetfactivarosae,essetpractica.Sed ex ea parte,
qua essetde ente habenteprincipiumsuae factionisin se ipso, cuiusmodi
est rosa et quaecumque res naturalis,esset speculativa.
<2.3> Item tertiosequitur,quod medicina non esset practica,cum non
habeat activitatem
respectusanitatis,sed solumrespectuviae ad sanitatem.
Sed hoc videturridiculum.Igituretc.
<2.4> Item quarto sequitur,quod scientiaDei de creaturisessetpractica,
quia nulla scientiaactiviorilla. Consequens falsum,quia practicascientia
determinaiagentemad sic vel sic agendum.Deo autem rpugntomnis
talis determinado.
<2.5> Item quinto sequitur,quod theologianon essetpractica,quia non
est activa respectuDei. Sed hoc est contrate.
<2.5. 1> Et probatur,quod non sitpractica,et quaere has rationesin quaestione de practicoet speculativoin praecedentibusad tale signumXXX.
<2.6> Item sextosequitur,quod istemodusloquendidiscrepata communi
et hoc est ridiculumet absurdum.
usu Aristotelis,
<2.7> Item septimosequitur,quod logica esset practica,quia habet activitatemrespectusui obiecti. Consequens est falsum,cum omnis actus
3 XXX]signum
B' 27 XXX]signum
intextu
B' 28 sequitur]
intextu
om.B'
speciale
speciale
"Utrum
1 i.e.,ThomaeWylton,
habitus
. . ." 26-27ThomaeWylton,
"Utrum
habitheologicus
tustheologicus
..."
3 idemsignum
contra
istasimiliter,
add.i.m.B', fol.20rb,iuxta"Arguo
primo
speciale
"
. . .", 10.2 27 idemsignum
add.
habitus
sic...", i.e.,ThomaeWylton,Utrum
theologicus
habii.m.B', fol.19vb,iuxta"Contra
istaperordinem
"Utrum
. . i.e.,ThomaeWylton,
. . .", sec.5.1
tustheologicus

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93

nec logica habet dirigerenisi solum circa actus

intellectussit intelligere,
intellectus.
etc.
Igitur
<2.8> Item octavo sequitur,quod omnisscientiaessetpractica.Immo de
scientiismathematicis,de quibus minus apparet, nonne geometriaest
essetpracticus,quia
directiva,ut patuitin Aegypto?Item,liberPhysicorum
dirigitin metaphysica.
<2.9> Ex his omnibusvideturopinio ista irrationalis.

<Articulustertius>
<3> Nunc tertiorespondendumest ad rationeset difficultates.
<3.1> Ad cuius evidentiampraemittounam distinctionem
de principio
activo,quod 'principiumactivum5tripliciter
potestaccipi: uno modo elicitiveet formaliter,
et sic non constituit
practicum,quia hoc est commune
omnibusformistam vitalibusquam non-vitalibus.
Secundo accipitur'prinet coelicitive,et sic non adhuc constituit
cipiumactivum'instrumentaliter
praxim,quia est communenotitiaeet formisaliis.Isto modo dicimus,quod
propositionessunt principiaactiva respectuconclusionis,et omnis scientia, quae aliae scientiaepraebet aliquas propositiones,est activa respectu
eius. Tertiomodo potestaccipi 'principiumactivum'per modumprincipii
exemplariset per modumregulaeet formaepraeconceptaein mente,quae
quidem formanon est elicitiva,sed potentia ad eius imitationemelicit
aliquidsicutad exemplaret respectumut ad principiumactivum,quia sine
ilio nulla actio fieripotest.Et ista est activitas,quae constituit
praxim,quia
est proprianotitiae,unde notitiaest.
motas.
<3.2> Hac distinctione
praemissadicendumest ad difficultates
in<3.2. 1> Ad primumdicendumsicutprius,quod habitusdistinguitur
trinseceper copulationemad respectum,qui est duplex,quia aut congruit
solum veritati,et tunc solum constituitur
per copulationemad talem reaut
scientia
spectum
speculativa; congruitoperationi,quae est duplex,aut
est manensin agenteet vocatur'dictio',et sic constituit
practicamactivam;
aut transitin materiamextraet vocatur'factiva',et sic constituit
practicam
factivam.
<3.2. 1. 1> Ad primumcontrahoc, cum dicitur"ista copulatioest aliquid
vel nihil etc.", dicendum est, | quod est aliquid, sed non est aliquod
33 B', fol.21rb
17aliae]alterius
B' 17propositiones]
estadd.etdel.B'
"Utrum
. . 10.2.1
25 ad 2.1.1 32 ThomaeWylton,
habitus
theologicus

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10

15

20

25

30

94

10

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20

25

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

illorumquinqu, quae accipiunturin argumento,sed est sextum.Quia

cui copulatur;nec respectus
non estqualitasabsolutapraecise;nec respectus,
medius realis;nec respectusmedius rationis;nec aggregatumex absoluto
et respectuper modum constitutiex hoc et hoc; sed est sextum,quia est
hoc huic, scilicetest absolutumnon praecise,sed ut copulaturrespectui.
<3.2.2> Ad secundum,cum dicitur"differentia
specificapraedicaturin
hic
duo.
assumo
quid etc.",
<3.2.2. 1> Primmest, quod idem realiter,ut induitalium et alium conceptum,est in diversisspeciebus.Hoc vultAugustinusexpressein Categoriis
, capitulo 12, ubi
suis, capitulo de qualitate; Damascenus in Elementarlo
alia
rem
sub
et
alia
intentione
est
etc.; Commentator,
dicit,quod possibile
7 Metaphysicorum
, commento2; Simplicius,eadem qualitas ut affectioest
in tertiaspecie, ut habitusest in prima. Et est ratio huius,quia conceptus praedicabileset conceptusspecierumsunt conceptusincompossibiles.
Cum igitureiusdem rei sunt conceptus disparati,quorum unus accidit
alteri,necesse est, quod pertineatad diversasspecies.
<3.2.2.2> Secundo pono arboremin qualitatesic, qualitas praedicabilis,
alia copulata, alia simplexnon-copulata.Qualitas non-copulata,alia de
mobiliset sic passibilisqualitas;
facilimobiliset sic passio; alia de difficili
et sic de ceteris.Vado ad aliud fsatusf.Qualitas copulata, alia copulatane congruentiaeet sic virtus;alia incongruentiaeet sic vitium.Item,
qualitas copulata congruentiae,alia copulaturcongruentiaecorporiset sic
virtuscorporalis;alia animae et sic virtusanimae. Item, qualitas copulata congruentiaeanimae, alia copulaturin rationeprincipiiactiviet sic
habituspracticus;alia copulaturin rationeprincipiipassivi et sic habitus
speculativus.Item, qualitas copulata respectuiin rationeprincipiiactivi,
alia copulaturtali respectuiin actione immanente,quae propriedicitur

1 accipiuntur]
B' 10Damascenus]
DamB' 10 12]13B' 12Metaphysicorum
]
accipitur
alia
B' 13 in2]om.B' 21-23Item... animae]add.i.m.B' 22 corporis]
Physicorum
animaeadd.etdel.B' 24 animae]add.s.l.B' 24 activi]con.exactivaeB' 26 activi]
add.etdel.B' 27 quae]estadd.etdel.B'
actione
transeunte
9 Augustinus,
Damascenus,
, cap."De qualitate"
(PL 32,col.1435) 10Johannes
Categoriae
InAristot.
,
Elementarium,
Metaphyska
(PG 94,col.574). 11Averroes,
cap."De differentia"
InAristot.
lib.7, t. 2 (ed.Iuntina,
Praedicamenta;
VIII, f. 153rb-va).12 Simplicius,
Corpus
latinm
commentariorum
inAristotelem
vol.V, p. 349,11.17 sqq.(Louvain,
1971).
graecorum,
6 ThomaeWylton,
"Utrum
habitus
. . .", 10.2.2
theologicus

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ANDVIRTUE
AURI
OL ANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY

95

'actio', et sic practicumactivum;alia copulaturtali respectuiin operatione

transeunteet sic practicumfactivum,et ibi est et actus.
<3.2.2.3> Et sunt omnes isti conceptus quidditativiper se pertinentes
ad genus qualitatis,quod probo per regulamPhilosophi,quam dat in 7
differentias
ad investigandum
Metaphysicae
propriasrerum.Documentum 5
non faciat
suum est, quod si illud, quod additur tamquam differentia,
in
non
bene
se
differentiam
cui
ilio,
apponitur,
assignaturdifferentia,
per
ut si dicatur "animal, quoddam pedale, quoddam non-pedale; animal
pedale,aliud alatum,aliud non-alatum".Si sic dicatur,non recteassignatur
differentia,
quia esse alatum vel non esse alatum non facitdifferentiam10
in pedali. Sed si dicatur "pedale, aliud bipes, aliud tripes",tunc bene
assignatur.Sic est in proposito.Igituretc. Nam prima definitioqualis est,
quod est illud, secundum quod quales dicimur;dicimur autem quales
aut secundumbene vel maile,et sic habemus primamspeciem; aut per
sive per faciliteret difficulter,
et sie habemus 15
potentiamet impotentiam,
secundam speciem; aut per esse quale absolute,et sie habemus tertiam
speciem;aut per secundumfiguramet formam,et sic habemus quartam
speciem.
<3.2.2.4> Ex his ad formamrationis,cum dicitur"differentia
specifica
praedicaturin quid, sed sic non praedicaturesse copulatumde absoluto 20
in virtute,quia acciditei", dicendum,quod qualitati,ut statsub conceptu
absolutipraecise,accidit,quod fundetetc.; eidem tarnen,ut induitconnon accidit,sed est sibi intrinsecumconstitutivum
eius.
ceptumvirtutis,
Et ut sic concedo, quod praedicaturin quid.
<3.2. 3> Ad tertiumde simitateet cavitatedico, quod in simitatenon est 25
alia res a cavitate,sed est bene alius conceptusquidditativus
distinctus.
Sic
ex parteista in virtuteintrinsecenon est res alia a qualitateabsoluta,sed
est alius conceptus,hoc est,est eadem res sub alio quidditativoconceptu,
Et hoc sufficit,
ut patetex
per quem formaliter
reponiturin specie virtutis.
30
praedictis.
<3.2.4> Et nota,quod interistasqualitates,quas ingeniavitnatura,quaedam sunt,quae non suntnisi in subiectis,quibus sempercongruunt,sicut
5 Metaphysicae]
add.i.m.B' 8 pedale]esseadd.etdel.B' 11 aliud1]
om.B' 6 additur]
B'
pibadd.etdel.B' 13quales1]
qualisB' 25 est]om.B' 27 parte]con.expartes
4 Aristoteles,
, lib.7, cap. 12 (1038a10 sqq.)
Metaphysica
"Utrum
19Thomae
"Utrum
. . 10.2.2 25 Thomae
habitus
habiWylton,
theobgicus
Wylton,
tustheologicus
. . 10.2.3

18:22:46 PM

96

10

15

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25

30

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

scientiain anima, cui sempercongruit;quaedam non suntnisi in subiectis, quibus numquam congruunt,sicut error;quaedam sunt in subiectis,
quibus aliquando congruunt,aliquando non congruunt,sicut albedo in
utin
corpore,quae in alia parte congruit,ut in dente,in alia incongruit,
oculo; quaedam sunt in subiectis,quibus nec congruuntisto modo nec
sicut calor in ligno.
incongruunt,
de angelo dicendum,quod non est
<3.2.5. 1> Ad secundam difficultatem
eadem scientiaspecie in angelo et in nobis propterdiversitatem
potentiarum,scilicetpotentiaeintellectivaein nobis et in angelo.
<3.2.5.2> Sed ad illud de rosa dicendum,quod illud impossibilesolum
sequiturex mutationenaturae et obiecti.
<3.2.5.3> Vel possetdici ad difficultatem,
quod idem absolutummanetin
ideo in
me et in angelo. Quia tamenin me copulaturrespectuiactivitatis,
me induitrationempractici,sed non sic in angelo. Et tune non sequitur,
sed sequitur,quod eadem
quod idem habituseritpracticuset speculativus,
uni
induit
rationem
qualitascopulata
practici,et proutcopulatur
respectui
alterirespectui,induitrationemspeculativi.
<3.2.6> Ad tertiumde medicina dicendum,quod ad hoc, quod habitus
quod attingatformamultimam
aliquisveredicaturpracticus,non requiritur,
modum
sic
non
essetin toto mundo una ars,
per
principalisagentis,quia
formaintenta
quae vere posset dici practica,quia in nulla arte attingitur
isto modo ab arte, sed a natura, quae mota ab arte et adiuta inducit
formam.Sicut patet in arte scribendi,quod a natura pennae habentis
duritiamet etiam naturali fluxibilitateencausti, prout moveturmanu
scribentis,induciturformalitteraeet scripturae.Similiterdicendum est
de medicina,quod non obstante,quod non attingatad sanitatemcausandam per modumagentisprincipalis,
vere tamenest practicanon solum
sed
ad
respectudispositionis sanitatem, respectuetiam sanitatis,ad quam
inducendamsuo modo concurritcum natura.
<3.2.7> Ad quartumde scientiaDei dicendum,quod esse practicumest
dupliciter;uno modo ut prudentia,quae determinaiagentemet modum
agendi,scilicetquod agat, quando oportet,et ut oportet,et sic de ceteris.
Isto modo non est scientiaDei practica,quia rpugntDeo omnis talis
determinado.Alio modo est aliquid practicumut ars,quae non determinai
B' 24 movetur]
incausti
3 albedo]ar00B' 19 quod]in add.etdel B' 24 encausti]
B'
moventur
7 ad 2.2.1-2 10

2.2.3 12 orf
2.2.1-2 18 ad 2.3 30 ad 2.4

18:22:46 PM

ON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTON

97

modo praedictoagentem,sed magiseffectum

productumper artem,et sic
est scientiaDei practica,et non est malum.
<3.2.8> Ad quintumde theologiateneo, quod theologiasit practica.Et
probo hoc ratione,illa scientia,quae considrtveritatemnon propter
ipsammet,sed propteropus, est practica. Huiusmodi est theologiaviae, 5
cuius finisest caritas,non Veritas,ut patet ex tota ScripturaSacra.
<3.2.9> Ad rationesin contrarium.
<3.2.9. 1> Ad primumde enteimmobilidicendum,quod accipituribi 'imalia operationequam speculativa,
mobile'pro 'inoperabili'et 'inattingibili'
10
nec accipituribi 'immobile',prout includitmotumpropriesumptum.
<3.2.9.2> Ad aliud de illis conditionibusomnibusdicendum,quod licet
istae conditionesrequiranturad hoc, quod aliqua scientiasit speculativa,
ad concludendumaliquam scientiamesse speculatitamennon sufficiunt
nisi
vam,
plus addatur,scilicetquod solum speculeturpropterspeculariet
non propteraliquam utilitatemad opus. Et quia ista conditiodeficitin 15
Et etiam videtur,quod arguitur
theologia,ideo arguiturex insufficienti.
convertendouniversalemaffirmativam
simpliciter.
<3.2.9.3> Ad illud de electione dicendum, quod licet electio non sit
respectufinis,est tamen respectudilectionisfinis.
de modo loquendi philosophorumita 20
<3.2. 10> Ad sextmdifficultatem
dico ego tibi,non enim inveniturab aliquo philosopho,quod dilectiosit
speculativa,nec quod scientiamere | speculativafaceretsuum obiectum.
<3.2.1 1> Ad illud de logica dicendum,quod logica est practica, quia
intrinsecamexemplaremper modum regulaeet formae
habet activitatem
25
praeconceptae.
<3.2.1 1.1> Sed dicis, verum est respectuactus eiusdem potentiae,non
respectualteriuspotentiae.
<3.2.1 1.2> Dico, quod hoc accidit omnino,quia per habere activitatem
habitusin generepractici.Sed quod suum agere
constituitur
intrinsecam

22 B', fol.2lva
B' 11 dicendum]
add.s.l.B'
con.exconcludit
add.i.m.B' 10 includit]
3 sitpractica]
"Utrum
. . 5.1 11Thomae
"Utrum
habitus
3 ad2.5 8 Thomae
Wylton,
theofogicus
Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
.
.
18
Thomae
habitus
.
.
5.3.2
theofogicus5.4;responWylton,
theologicus
. . 5.2 et5.5habitus
in "Utrum
ThomaeWylton
siones
Aureoli
ad obiectiones
theofogicus
in B' 20 ad 2.6 23 ad 2.7
9, noninveniuntur

18:22:46 PM

98

LAUGEO. NIELSEN

vel dirigeresit respectu talis vel talis potentiae,hoc accidit. Hoc vult
Avicenna in Logicasua expresse,ubi dicit,quod logica non est scientia
Et postea subdit,quod dominuslogicae
speculativa,sed est instrumentum.
indigetfrequentiusu sui operis.
<3.2. 12> Ad octavumde geometriadicendum,quod altimetriabene est
practica,quia est de linea concretaad terram.Sed geometria,quae est de
linea similiter,est speculativa.
<3.3> Ad argumentaprincipaliapatet ex dictis.

5 quod]alinetri
add.etdel.B' 5 altimetria]
altmetra
B'
2 Avicenna,
(1508,f.2ra-va)3 Avicenna,
Logica
Logica
(1508,f.2vb)
5 ad 2.8

18:22:46 PM

DivineIdeas and ExemplarCausalityin Auriol

ALESSANDROD. CONTI*

In his OutofMy LaterTearsEinsteinobservesthat what is incomprehensiblein the universeis just the factthatit is comprehensible.
Yet, the
of
as
well
as many
comprehensibility the world,which troubledEinstein
other 20th centuryscientistsand epistemologists,
was not a problem at
all formedievalthinkers.The standardtheoryof divineideas, developed
sis quaestionibus
83 providedan excellent
by St Augustinein his De diver
answer(or scheme for an answer)to thisquestion. Our world is intelligible and orderedbecause God has createdit accordingto (some of) the
formed
patterns(or universaltypes,conceivedof as distinctfromindividual tokens)eternallypresentin his mind- that is, the divine ideas. As
God thinksof them,He knows everything
other than Himself,and, as
in the world.
He looks to them,He rationallycreateseverything
But in a genuinephilosophicalcontext,everysolutionposes its problems. This is also the case with the theoryof divine ideas. In fact,it
raisesat least two main problems:it apparentlycompromises(i) the thesis of divinesimplicity,
since a pluralityof thingsseems to be somehow
presentin God, and (ii) thatof divineomniscience(and providence),since
God seemsto knowcreaturesmediatelyonly,by means of somethingelse.
medievalphilosophers
and theologianshad to discussextensively
Therefore,

* Thisarticle
isa revised
version
ofa paperI readattheXthInternational
of
Congress
Medieval
in Erfurt
inAugust
1997.I wishto express
to Russell
Philosophy
mygratitude
L. Friedman,
whokindly
reviewed
theEnglish
ofthearticle,
itstexton many
clarifying
points.
1 Cf.St.
De diversis
83,q. 46,PL 40,cols.29-31:"Suntnamque
quaestionibus
Augustine,
ideaeprincipales
formae
velrationes
rerum
stabiles
quaedam,
atqueincommutabiles,
quae
nonsunt(acperhocaeternae
ac semper
eodemmodosesehabentes),
ipsaeformatae
quae
indivina
etcumipsaenequeoriantur
secundum
continentur;
intelligentia
nequeintereant,
eas tamenformari
dicitur
omnequodoririet interire
et omnequodoritur
et
potest,
Foran assessment
interit."
inAntiquity
ofthisAugustinin
doctrine
andMiddleAges,see
L.M.deRijk,Quaestio
de Ideis.Some
onanImportant
Notes
, in:J.Mansfeld
ofPlatonism
Chapter
andL.M.de Rijk(eds.),
Studies
inGreek
andItsContinuation
, Assen1975,
Kephalaion.
Philosophy
204-13.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium
, 38,1

18:22:54 PM

100

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

thesetwo subjectsin theirworks,in orderto finda suitablesolution,one

that could reconcilethe conflicting
demands put on the theory.
in
this
is
to
sketch
PeterAurioPsdoctrineof divine
My purpose
paper
on
his
of
the
two
above-mentionedquestions,
ideas, focussing
analysis
and what he proposes as a solutionto them.AurioPspositionis particularly interestingsince it shows betterthan any other of his time the
betweenthe Greeklogico-metaphysical
sharpconflict
apparatus(in theform
of medieval Aristotelianism
and Neoplatonism)and (some of) the chief
- a conflictwhich was the real
contentsof the Christianfaith
engine in
the developmentof late-medievalphilosophy.2Auriol expounds his conceptionof divineideas and exemplarcausalityin d. 35 of his longercomoftenclarifying
(his Scriptum)?
mentaryon the firstbook of the Sentences
his view by contrastingit with those of St Thomas Aquinas4and John
Duns Scotus.5Thereforein the firstsectionof this articleI shall briefly
sum up the theoriesof the two earlierMendicantmasters.In the second
section,AurioPschiefargumentsagainstthemwill be analysed.The third
sectionwill be devotedto an expositionof AurioPsown position.Finally,
in the last section,some provisionalconclusionswill be drawn.
' Doctrines
' and Duns Scotus
1. The PolemicalTargets
: Aquinas
1. 1

ThomasAquinas

St Thomas' mostcompleteand clear presentationof the theoryof divine

exemplarismcan be foundin qq. 14 and 15 of the firstpart of his Summa
when he distheologianthe text to which Auriol refersmost frequently
cusses Aquinas' position.
Accordingto the Dominican master,the divine ideas are reallythe
same as the divine essence, but distinctin reason fromit, since God is
fromHimselfcan be presentin
absolutelysimpleand no realitydifferent
2 On thistopicseeAlessandro
e teologia
nelsecolo
cristiana
D. Conti,Paradigma
aristotlico
XIV.Fedee ragione
delmedioevo
ad Oxford
e Parigi
sulfinire
22 (1996),137-223.
, in:Medioevo,
6 Petri
Sentenharum
Parsprima,
Aureoli
Commentanorum
inpnmum
librum
, ed. C. Sarnanus,
Romae1596.
4 Auriol
on thesubject
12 times:
or implicitly)
to St Thomas'opinion
refers
(explicitly
749a,758a-b,763a,764a,779b,789a-b,795a,805a,814b,817b,824b,and825a.
pp.
5Auriol
6 times:
refers
orimplicitly)
toScotus'opinion
(explicitly
pp.750a,763a,764a,
784a-b,794a,and814b.
6 Gf.alsoThomasAquinas,
contra
Gentiles
InI Sent
., d. 19,q. 5; d. 36,qq. 1-2;Summa
deveritate
I, ch.54; III, ch.24; Quaestiones
q. 3, aa. 2-3.

18:22:54 PM

DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
CAUSALITY

101

Him. So divineideas are produced by the mentalrelationsby means of

which God views his essence as capable of being imitatedby a possible
- and in effect,
created by God has a certainsimicreature
everything
larityto the divineessence.7Thereforethe name 'idea' refersto the divine
essence,but it does not connote the divine essence as it is in itself,but
as it is the real model of everycreature.8The fullnessof God's perfection is echoed by everypossible creaturein its own way, as any imitationof the divineessenceis alwayspartialand inadequate. Thus the ideas
are the standardsagainst which the particularnatures of created indiand the formalreasons which
viduals are measured [rerum
perfectiones)
of
From
the
internal
structures
thispoint of view,one can
explain
things.
say thatthe divineideas are thingsthemselvesas theysubsistfrometernityin the mind of God.9
When any given possible creatureis broughtinto existenceby the
divinevolition,then the divineidea which is its correspondingparadigm
also servesas a principleof divine creation,therebybecomingan exemplarin thestrictsenseof the term.As a consequence,accordingto Aquinas,
thereis a difference
betweena divineidea as a ratioby means of which
God frometernitythinksof any given possible and as an exemplar
by
means of which God produces at a certainpoint in time an individual
or a given set of individuals.Qua principleof knowledge{ratio)the idea
is connectedwith mere possibles;qua principleof action (exemplar
) it is
connectedonlywiththe thingswhichare (or were or will be) part of the
actual world.10
This distinction
preventsAquinas' systemfromlapsinginto
7 Cf.Thomas
STh.I, q. 15,a. 1: "Adtertium,
dicendum
Aquinas,
quodDeussecundumessentiam
suamestsimilitudo
omnium
undeideainDeo nihilestaliudquam
rerum;
. . . [a.2] Adquartum
Deiessentia.
dicendum
ideas,nonsunt
quodrespectus
multiplicantes
in rebuscreatis,
sedin Deo. Nontarnen
suntrealesrespectus,
sicutilliquibusdistinguuntur
sed
intellecti
a Deo."
Personae,
8 Gf.Thomas respectus
In I Sent.,
d. 36,q. 2: "Hoc nomen'idea'nominat
essentiam
Aquinas,
divinam
secundum
imitata
a creatura.
. . . Ideanonnominat
essentiam
quodestexemplar
sedessentiam
imitabilem."
tantum,
9 Gf.ThomasAquinas,
STh.I, q. 14,a. 6: "Quicquid
estin quacumque
perfections
totum
etcontinetur
inDeo secundum
modum
excellentem.
Nonsolum
creatura,
praeexistit
autem
id inquocreaturae
scilicet
sed
communicant,
esse,ad perfectionem
ipsum
pertinet;
etiamea perquaecreaturae
ad invicem
sicutvivere,
etintelligere,
ethuiusdistinguuntur,
modi... Et omnis
resinpropria
forma,
perquamquaelibet
specieconstituitur,
perfectio
nonsolumquantum
ad id quodcomquaedamest.Et sicomniain Deo praeexistunt,
muneestomnibus,
sedetiamquantum
ad ea secundum
Et sic,
quae resdistinguuntur.
cumDeusin se omnesperfectiones
Dei essentia
ad omnesrerum
contineat,
comparatur
nonsicutcommune
ad propria,
ut unitasad numros,
velcentrum
ad lineas;
essentias,
sedsicutperfectus
actusad imperfectos."
10Cf.ThomasAquinas,
STh.I, q. 15,a. 3: "Idea,secundum
quodestprincipium

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102

D. CONTI
ALESSANDRO

some formof necessitarism:the two spheresof existentand possibledo

not coincide,since the existentis a sub-setof the possible.God does not
to a certainidea
give existenceto everypossibleindividualcorresponding
nor to everyidea presentin his mind.In thisgap betweenthe two spheres
lies the mystery
of divinevolitionand freedom,since nothingcan prompt
God to exerthis omnipotencein orderto give existenceto any one idea
or another.
Divine ideas are universais.More precisely,theyare ideas of speciesof all the species that God has produced and could have produced,as
we have seen.11Their pluralityis not repugnantto divine absolutesimplicity,because the ideas are not to be regardedas formsby whichGod
understands(intelligibiles
species)somethingelse,12but as objects of understanding,and a pluralityof thingsunderstooddoes not cause any comThe reallyexistentdivine
positionin the mindwhichunderstandsthem.13
factionis
dicipotest;
etad practicam
autem
Secundum
rerum,
exemplar
cognitionem
pertinet.
ratio
dicitur
etiamad scientiam
est,proprie
; etpotest
quodprincipium
cognoscitivum
speculativam
hocse habetad omnia
Secundum
est,secundum
pertinere.
ergoquodexemplar
secundum
veroquodprincipium
Secundum
quaea Deo fiunt
aliquodtempus.
cognoscitivum
a Deo,etiamsi nullotempore
et
est,se habetad omniaquaecognoscuntur
fiant;
ad omniaquae a Deo cognoscuntur
secundum
et secundum
rationem,
propriam
quod
ab ipsopermodum
cognoscuntur
speculationis."
11Cf.Thomas
STh.I, q. 15,a. 3: "Dicendum
Aquinas,
quodeorum
quaenequesunt
Deusnonhabetpracticam
nisivirtute
tantum.
nequeerunt
cognitionem,
nequefuerunt,
Underespectu
eorumnonestideain Deo, secundum
sed
quodideasignificai
exemplar,
solumsecundum
rationem.
. . . Ad quartum
dicendum
quodgeneranon
quodsignificai
habere
ideamaliamab ideaspeciei."
In thecommentary
bookofthe
on thefirst
possunt
deveritate
Sentences
(d. 36,q. 2, a. 3) andin hisQuaestiones
(q. 3, a. 3) St.Thomasseems
to admittheexistence
in God ofideasofsingulars
etiamquodperdivinam
("Ponimus
nossingularium
definiuntur
omniasingularia;
etideooportet
ideas"),
ponere
providentiam
butin thelaterSumma
offact,
he doesnotmention
them.
As a matter
theyare
theologiae
oftheunion
within
histheological
aretheoutcomes
redundant
Sinceindividuals
system.
ofthespecific
withprime
so thatmatter
andform
arethe
forms
matter,
(formae
specierum)
ofthesingulars,
ofthecomponents
solemetaphysical
thecomplete
components
knowledge
at
ofthecomposites.
See alsobelow,
is sufficient
forassuring
alsoa complete
knowledge
nn.15-19.
12Within
Thomas'system
it is thedivineessence
itself
whichplaystheroleofspecies
Godunderstands
andtheobjectofGod's
is boththatbywhich
So,hisessence
intelligibilis.
at once.
knowledge
13Cf.ThomasAquinas,
divinae
STh.I, q. 15,a. 2: "Hocautemquomodo
simplicitati
nonrepugnet,
ideamoperati
essein mente
facileestvidere,
si quisconsideret
operands
faciens
sicutquodintelligitur,
nonautem
sicutspecies
intelquaeestforma
qua intelligitur,
lectum
in actu.Formaenimdomusin mente
estaliquidab eo intellectum,
aedificatoris
ad cuiussimilitudinem
domumin materia
format.
Nonestautemcontra
simplicitatem
diviniintellectus,
sedcontra
eiusessetsi perplures
quodmultaintelligat,
simplicitatem
eiusintellectus
formaretur.
Undeplures
ideaesuntin mente
divinautintellectae
species
ab ipso."

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CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR

103

essenceis one simplething;thereis no impliedreal internalcomplexity,

but only a rationalcomposition.Divine ideas are the divine essence as
it is knownby God Himselfas imitable.14
On the otherhand, if the ideas were the sole objects of divine intelwhen God thinksof Himself,then He could not
lection(quodintelligitur)
could not exercisehis proviknowindividualsadequately,and consequently
dence and justice. As far as the problem of divine knowledgeof individuals is concerned,Aquinas thoughtthat God conceives of not only
creatednatures(whichdirecdycorrespondto the divine ideas), but also
created individualsperfecdy.He argued that, since (i) God is the first
cause, whose propereffectis being (esse),and (ii) it is throughhis knowlthat God produces everything,15
thereforeHe necessarily
edge (scientia)
conceivesof all that He creates:
CumDeussitcausarerum
in tantum
se extendit
scientia
Dei,
persuamscientiam,
inquantum
se extendit
eiuscausalitas.
activaDei se extendat
non
Unde,cumvirtus
solumad formas,
a quibusaccipitur
ratiouniversalis,
sedetiamusquead materiam,
necesse
estquodscientia
Dei usquead singularia
se extendat,
quae permateriam
individuantur.16
It could not be otherwise,since the intelligible
species of the divineintellect are the divine essence itself,17
which is immaterial,and this is the
efficient
cause of the individualcreaturesand of theirown metaphysical
Individualsfall withinthe horizon of divine science because
principles.18
God knowsperfectly
theirmetaphysicalconstituents,
i.e. form,which is
an instantiation
of
of one
the divine ideas, and matter,19
which is their
trueprincipleof individuation.

14Gf.Thomas
STh.I, q. 15,a. 2: "[Deus]enimessenti
amsuamperfecte
Aquinas,
cognoscit:
undecognoscit
earnsecundum
omnem
modum
est.Potestautemearn
quo cognoscibilis
... secundum
secundum
a
cognosci
quodestparticipabilis
aliquemmodumsimilitudinis
creaturis.
autemcreatura
habetpropriam
secundum
Unaquaeque
speciem,
quodaliquo
modoparticipt
divinae
essentiae
similitudinem.
Sicigitur
inquantum
Deuscognoscit
suam
essentiam
utsicimitabilem
a talicreatura,
earnutpropriam
rationem
etideam
cognoscit
huiuscreaturae."
15Gf.Thomas
STh.I, q. 14,a. 8; andq. 22,a. 2, on divine
providence.
16Thomas Aquinas,
STh.I, q. 14, a. 11.
Aquinas,
17Cf.Thomas
STh.I, q. 14,a. 2.
Aquinas,
18Cf.ThomasAquinas,
STh.I, q. 14,a. 11.
19Cf.ThomasAquinas,
STh.I, q. 44,a. 2. See alsoabove,n. 11.

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ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

104
1.2 Duns Scotus

Duns Scotus' discussion of divine ideas shows a completelydifferent

Scotus rejectsthe most common explanation
approach to the matter.20
on many importantpoints,and triesto fitthe theoryinto his general
ideas of individualsfor ideas of species and
philosophyby substituting
theirexistenceto God's thoughtand will. He believesthat
subordinating
the traditionalinterpretation
of St Augustine'sdoctrineis misleading,since
it assumes that God thinksof the possiblesas they(qua ideas) are present in his mind frometernity.Accordingto Scotus, it is just the opposite:the possiblesare present[qua ideas) in God's mindbecause He thinks
of them. Were the common opinion true,divine ideas would be somethingreal, grounded on mental relations,and to a certainextentthey
would be independentof the divine intellect.In fact, the principleof
naturallyprecedes the act of understanding
knowledge(ratiointelligendi)
itselfand is independentof it; thus,if the divineideas were ratonesintelligendi,
theywould precedeand be independentof the act of understanding
imitable.Therefore,the
God thinksof his essence as infinitely
which
by
of his essence,but the
ideas would not be the effectof God's intellection
cause, an unacceptableconclusion:
sint
videtur
Item,contra
sequiquodillaerelationes
opinionem
specialiter
primam
- etper
naturaliter
utestratio,
intellectionem,
reales,
praecedit
quiaratiointelligendi
causatur
perintellecconsequens
quoadnihilquodesteiusutestratiointelligendi,
divina>subrelatione
essentia
si ergo<supple.
necsequitur
intellectionem;
tionem,
in essentia
rationis
nonproducitur
illarelatio
estratiointelligendi
rationis
lapidem,
naturaliter
illamintellectionem.
intellectione
Ergoilia<scilicet
lapidis,
quiapraecedit
Sedillam<scilicet
intellectionem>.
rationis>
relatio
peraliam<scilicet
produceretur
ut
intellectio>
nisiilia<scilicet
nonpraecedit
relationem
rationis>
quaeestessentiae
iliarelatio>
nonproducitur
intellectione>
hac<scilicet
essentia;
(quodcon<supple'
utestratio,et nonperaliquamactionem
eritin essentia
cedunt);
ergoiliarelatio
intellectus.21
As a consequence, Scotus gives a descriptionof the logicalsteps of the
mental process which precedes the free act of creation,throughwhich
God chooses the possiblesthat will become realitiesand gives themesse
reale.These steps are as follows:first,the divine intellectthinksof the
divine essence in itself;second, it produces the ideas of the possiblesin
20Cf.DunsScotus,
Ordinatio
I, d. 30,qq. 1-2;d. 35,q. unica;andd. 36,q. unica,ed.
andLectura
and281-290;
Vaticana
I, d. 35,q. unica,andd. 36,q.
245-270,
VI, 181-90,
XVII,445-53,and468-71.
unica,ed. Vaticana
21DunsScotus,
tode Rijk
Ordinatio
VI, 253.According
I, d. 35,q. unica,ed.Vaticana
ofHenry
ofGhent's.
1975{op.cit.,aboven. 2),208ff.,Scotus'viewis a development

18:22:54 PM

DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
CAUSALITY

105

theirintelligible
and thinksof them;third,the divine
being (esseintelligibile)
intellectcompares its own intellectionsto the intelligibles,and thereby
for each intelligible;fourth,it
producesa mental relation(relatiorationis)
reflectson these mental relationsand knows them as such.22The relationof instabilityplays no decisiverole in this"chain" of mentalactions,
nor do the respectas
rationis
, which,in contrast,were the cause of the mulof
ideas
tiplicity
accordingto St Thomas.
This explanationhas the meritof avoiding the two main problems
- that the
raised by the standard(Thomistic)theory
is,
presencein God
of a pluralityof "things"co-eternalwithhis mind,and the possibilityof
- since the ideas are the
a perfectknowledgeof individuals
i)
objectsproduced by thementalactivityof God, and ii) theyare not ideas of universal
natures,but of individuals(moreprecisely,of all produciblesingularcreaturesthatthe divinemind can conceive):"Iuxta hoc additurquod ideae
divinaemaximeeruntsingularium,
omnia alia
quia distincterepraesentant
a
Deo."23
intelligibilia
Yet Scotus' solutionis weak on one importantpoint: it does not clarifythe relationbetweenthe divine essence which God thinksof "at the
firstinstant"and the ideas of possiblesthat He produces straightafter.
The relationshipbetweenthese ideas and the essence is leftambiguous.
What Duns Scotus seems to suggestis that God produces the ideas of
possiblesas He is able to create thatis to say, as He is omnipotent.In
fact,God createsthe world since He can, and He thinksof everymakable thingbeforecreatingthe world since He is an infinitely
intelligent
agent,and everyintelligentagent acts accordingto some plan.24
22Cf.DunsScotus,
Ordinatio
I, d. 35,q. unica,ed.Vaticana
VI, 258:"Deusinprimo
instanti
essentiam
suamsubratione
mereabsoluta;
in secundo
instanti
intelligit
producit
inesseintelligibili
etintelligit
itaquodibiestrelatio
in lapideintellecto
lapidem
lapidem,
ad intellectionem
sednullaadhucin intellectione
divinaad lapidem,
sedinteldivinam,
lectiodivinatermint
relationem
ad ipsam;in tertio
'lapidisut intellects
instanti,
forte,
intellectus
divinus
suamintellectionem
ad quodcumque
ad
potest
comparare
intelligibile
et tunccomparando
se ad lapidem
quodnospossumus
comparare,
intellectum,
potest
causare
inse relationem
etinquarto
instanti
relarationis;
potest
quasireflecti
superistam
tionem
causatam
in tertio
et tuneillarelatio
rationis
eritcognita.
Sic ergonon
instanti,
- tamquam
- utobiecestrelatio
rationis
necessaria
ad intelligendum
lapidem
priorlapide
et adhucposterior
eritipsa
tum,immoipsa'utcausata'estposterior
(intertio
instanti),
'utcognita',
in quartoinstanti."
quia
23DunsScotus,
libros
Aristotelis
Quaestiones
, lib.VII, q. 15,in: Opera
super
Metaphysicorum
NY 1997,299.
,vol.IV, St.Bonaventure,
Philosophic
Cf.DunsScotus,Ordinatio
I, d. 2, pars1, qq. 1-2,ed. VaticanaII, 174:"Ostenso
essede proprietatibus
relativis
ad ostendendum
ulterius
illiusprimi
infinitatem
entis,
primi
etperconsequens
essede enteinfinito
sic:primo
ostendo
efficiens
procedo
quodprimum

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106

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

2. AurionsCriticisms
1. Auriol accepts the Aristotelianthesis of the absolute simplicityand
actuality{actuspurus)of God; moreover,he also stressesthat the divine
essenceis the onlyproperobject of God's knowledge.On the otherhand,
followingSt Augustine,he acknowledgesi) that there is a pluralityof
knowsany individualcreature(the
ideas in God, and ii) thatHe perfectly
thatdivineideas are univeronly realitiesin the world),notwithstanding
sal. So apparentlyhe seems to admitthe essenceof the Thomistic assessment of the theoryof ideas. In reality,he triesto remove the tension
between the Aristotelianand Christiandemands by diminishingthe requirementsof the Christianhorn of the dilemma,choosingto remainas
as possibleto Aristotelian
faithful
principles,concepts,and schemesrather
than appropriatelymodifythem in order to adapt them to Christian
belief,as St. Thomas did. As a consequence, he rejectsDuns Scotus'
approach to the subject and St Thomas' account of exemplarcausality,
and proposes a different
explanation,where i) much more stressis put
of God, and ii) a new conceptionof the relaon the absolute simplicity
tionshipsbetweendivineessence and ideas, and betweenideas and creaturesis workedout.
2. Aquinas' solutionis unsatisfactory
accordingto Auriol,because St
Thomas' qualificationof ideas as that which is understoodby God is a
which thereforedoes not solve the problem of the
mere petitio
principila
thearguments
of "things"in Him. Further,
"real" presenceof a multiplicity
advanced forexpoundingGod's completeknowledgeof singularsqua such
are ineffective.
Auriol objects: according to St. Thomas' theorythe divine essence
would be simple and compositeat the same time, since Aquinas conceives of divineideas as rerum
eternallyexistingin the essence.
perfectiones
him
idea
is
the
for
each
propermeasure(or pattern)of a
Consequently,
singleset of possibleand/orreal individuals.Therefore,divineideas would
be not only epistemologicalprinciples,but ontologicalalso, and, as such,
entitiessomehow existingin God. This solution
a pluralityof different
etquodsuaessendistincte
estinfinitorum
itaquodsuaintelligentia
etvolens
estintelligens
et ex hoc
estsua intelligentia),
infinitorum
tiaestrepraesentativa
(quaequidemessentia
eritquadruplex
ostensa
Et sic cumtriplici
sua infinitas.
concludetur
secundo
primitate
scilicet
istudquartum
Sedtarnen
eiusinfinitatem.
medium
ad ostendendum
medium,
quod
ex quo sicutex quodammedioaliisadditoconetvolens,
efficiens
estintelligens
primm
35."See also
ad aliquidusquead distinctionem
cluditur
sua infinitas,
quantum
suppono
ibidem
, 175-88.

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CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR

107

to understandhow a
failsto achieve its goal, since it is more difficult
in
an
of
distinct
can
subsist
absolutelysimple reality
plurality
principles
than to understandhow an absolutelysimple realitycan be the model
imitated(similitude*)
else:
by everything
enimdifficultas
et impossibilitas
Sed istemodusdicendi
petitprincipium.
Aequalis
essevidetur
etdistinctae
omnium
rerum
quodinaliquosimplici
perfectiones
propriae
etquodilludsimpliciter
sitsimilitudo
omnium
rerum
praeexistant
propria
perquam
omniainsuadistinctione
etcognoscuntur.
Immoetmaiordifficultas
repraesentantur
videtur
etdistinctae
perfectiones
quodinaliquosimplici
propriae
praeexistere
possint
sitsimilitudo
diversorum.
Sed nosquaerimus
hicquoquamquodunumsimpliciter
modosimplex
Deiessentia
sitsimilitudo
dissimilium
etnumerorum,
ergohocdeclarare
formae
et perfectiones
est
perhocquodin ea praeexistant
propriae
singulorum
declarare.25
difficile,
quiaestmagisdifficile
Moreover,if creatureswere in God like imperfectacts in a perfectone,
in the same way as animal is in man (so St Thomas),26then creatures'
patternswould be in God as his principlesand metaphysicalconstituents
et quidditative
(formaliter
), and thereforeGod would be everythingwhich
He certainlyis, but metaphorically
(translative)
only,insofaras He is the
cause of everything:
animal
continetur
inhomine
formaliter
etquidditative,
undehaecestvera
Praeterea,
'homoestanimal';
minores
etiamnumeri
in maiori,
continentur
binarius
in
utpote
trinario
etpermodum
Sedmanifestum
estquodpropriae
formae
potentialiter
partis.
creaturarum
noncontinentur
inDeo formaliter
etquidditative.
Nonestenimverum
necetiamcontinentur
ibiutpartes
deiquodDeussitlapisvelleo nisitranslative,
tatis.Ergoincongrua
estista:'siccreaturae
suntin Deo quasiactusimperfecti
in
actuperfecto,
inhomine,
sicutanimal
velbinarius
intrinario'.
Etideonecprobatur;
noverit
et qui novitDeumex hoccognoscat
animal,
quamvis
qui novithominem
entiasecundum
rationes.27
proprias
In sum, accordingto Auriol,Aquinas' conceptionof divine ideas hypostatizesthem,so that God's being itselfis nothingbut the "union" of
divineideas. The problemwithsuch a doctrineis the relationship
between
the divineessence and ideas, since these latterare conceived of as constitutive
parts of the former,and the real objects of divineknowledge.
Nor does Auriol agree with Aquinas' affirmations
concerningGod's
understandingof individuals.The Franciscan notes that St. Thomas'
answeris inadequate,since it presupposesthat matteris the principleof
whereas matterin itselfis as common as form,and only
individuation,
25Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars3, a. 2, 795b-796a.
Sent.,
26Cf.Thomas
Summa
contra
Gentiles
I, ch.54; andSTh.I, q. 14,a. 6.
Aquinas,
27Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars3, a. 2, 796a.
Sent.,

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108

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

qua individualizedby quantityis it the effective

principleof individuation.
knowsindividuals
Thus Aquinas is unable to elucidatehow God perfectly
as individuals.His account could justifyonly a knowledgeof individuals
individui
as occurencesof a given type [in ratione
vagi) forinstance,God
could know Socrates only as a man, but not as this man or that man:
enimex Dei activitate
nontollit
difficultatem.
Sed hicmodusdicendi
posQuamvis
sitetexemplar,
nonsolumquoadformam,
sita priori
probari
quoddeitassimilitudo
eosnonestprincipium
indimateria
veroetiamsecundum
immoquoadmateriam,
hocomnibus
indiestindividuata.
Estautemcommune
viduationis
nisiin quantum
etex hac
ex hacmateria
scilicet
viduis
eiusdem
componitur
speciei,
quodquaelibet
omnium
individuorum
et perconsequens
Deus habetsimilitudinem
forma,
quoad
reNontarnen
et quoadformam.
materiam
quoddivinaessentia
perhocprobatur
innatura
conveniunt
suntetdistincta,
sedpotius
individua
utsignata
prout
presentet
individui
et forma,
ex materia
autin ratione
vagi,in
quae componitur
specifica,
etex hacaliex aliquahacmateria
estaliquodhoccompositum
quodlibet
quantum
qua forma.28
St Thomas' theoryof ideas failsto justifyGod's knowledgeof individuut signata),as he is unable to find a suitable conals as such [individua
and thatof
nectionbetweenthe thesisof God's perfectionand simplicity
his directand intuitiveknowledgeof individuals.Auriol points out that
St Thomas' solutioncannot avoid the unwelcomeoutcome of Aristotle's
and Averroes'theologicaldoctrine,accordingto which God, because of
is ignorantof the particularways
his absolute perfectionand simplicity,
of existenceof individuals.29
Aquinas' argumentsagainst this thesisare
28Comm.
offact,
Auriol
d. 35,pars4, a. 3, 817b.Asa matter
inI librum
Sent.,
thought
The form
takentogether.
is theform
andthematter
ofindividuation
thattheprinciple
matter
ofa givenindithematter
as theparticular
playstheactiverolein designating
matter
as theparticular
roleofbeingdesignated
andthematter
vidual,
playsthepassive
as
assumes
In other
Auriol
theform.
ofthatindividual
words,
individuality
byreceiving
For
individuation.
ofproperly
deniesthenecessity
a primum
, andconsequendy
explaining
account
matter
andform)
causesofa thing
sufficiently
him,themetaphysical
(i.e.particular
- cf.Petri
libros
Sententiarum
insecundum,
tertium
Commentariorum
Aureoli
foritssingularity
, quartum
Parssecunda
Romae1605,lib.II, d. 9, pars3, a. 3, 142.
, ed. P. Capullius,
29On Aristotle's
as interpreted
aboutdivine
andAverroes'
thesis
byAuriol
knowledge
dixerunt
d. 35,pars4, a. 2, 813b:"Propterea
inI librum
seeComm.
alii,utPhilosophus
Sent.,
sedsolummodo
utsignata,
et Commentator,
singularia
quodDeusnullomodocognoscit
etatomas
omnes
omnium
etvirtutes
rationes
usquead indivisibiles
specificas
quidditativas
istas
etdemonstrando
ac individuando
nisisignando
itaquodplusscirinonpotest
virtutes,
et perfectioni
bonitati
virtutes.
divinae,
multipliciter
Quod nonestfasaut conveniens
et impervilitatem
Istaenimnotitia
addit,sedforte
perfectionem
quae nullam
probant.
virtutum
et designativa
demonstrativa
nonestponendain Deo; sed notitia
fectionem,
et atomenullam
omnium
addit,sedpotius
perfectionem
cognitarum
specifice
generaliter
habet
istacompleta,
NonenimVeritas
illamquaedam
concomitantur
triangulus
indignitates.
habere
istevelilletriangulus
scietur
si designative
tres<angulos>,
cognoscatur
perfectius

18:22:54 PM

CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR

109

all that He
One can agree i) that God mustknow perfectly
powerless.30
causes and has caused, and ii) that He is the firstcause of everything
whichexists(individualsand theirown metaphysicalprinciplesincluded),
but it does not necessarilyfollowfromthis that He thereforeperfecdy
knowsindividuals.In fact,thisconsequenceis necessaryonlyifwe assume
thatGod knowswhatHe produces(or has produced)as its efficient
cause,
but in thiscase his knowledgewould be dianoetical(scientia
discursiva
) and
not intuitive,
since no effectfallswithinthe essence of its efficient
cause.
This kindof knowledgeis clearlyat odds withGos perfectionand simsinceit impliesa processof reasoningfrompremissesto conclusions
plicity,
and consequentlya multiplicity
of acts of understanding
concerningthe
same object:
sic:cognitis
in quibusconstituitur
essentia
Praeterea,
rei,necesse
arguunt
principiis
estremillamcognosci;
sedmateria
etforma
individuata
suntprincipia
ex
designata
Dei autemcognitio
forquibusconstituitur
singulare
signatum;
usquead materiam,
mametaccidentia
individuantia
cumomniasintvirtualiter
indivina
essenpertinget,
tiatamquam
inprimaorigine
essendi;
ergoDeususquead cognitionem
singularium
Sedhaecratiodeficit,
utpraecedens.
Nonenimcontinentur
istavirtualiter
pertinget.
inDeo,nisiquatenus
estexemplar,
secundum
quiaDeusnonestefficiens
opinionem
istorum
et datoquodesset,noncognoscit
Deusresperhocquod
philosophorum;
estefficiens,
sedproeo quodestexemplar
uniforme
discursive,31
alioquin
intelligeret
huiusmateriae
etillius,
ethuiusformae
etillius;
etideononrepraesentat
uthocvel
absolute
secundum
istos.32
illud,sedtantum
There are only two ways of avoidingthis aporia: i) one can reformulate
the relationshipsbetween divine essence and ideas, and between ideas
and creatures,or ii) one can assume,as Duns Scotus did, that the ideas
are ideas of singularsand not of species. Auriol does not examine this
last hypothesiswhen he discussesScotus' opinion, but in at least one
importantpassage he, like Aquinas, speaks of divine ideas as rationes

tres<angulos>,
et sicde omnibus
sciatur
omnistriangulus
habet
aliis,quamsi absolute
tres<angulos>
illiusvelistius.
Et similiter
de veritate
absquesignatione
incomplexa
patet
nonmelius
scitur
hunctriangulum
veliliumquam
quodquidditas
trianguli
cognoscendo
absolute
sciendo
definitionem."
See alsoforAurioPs
ofintellectual
trianguli
theory
cognitionofsingulars,
Russell
Friedman's
contribution
to thisvolume.
30Cf.Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars4, a. 2, 814b-6b.
Sent.,
31On theconnection
between
as efficient
causeandknowing
ina dainoetical
knowing
enimquodDeusestcausaomnium
wayseethefollowing
(ibid.,
814b):"Concederent
passage
rerum
etitacognoscit
omniainquantum
estsimilitudo
omnium
etcausaexemexemplairs,
noninquantum
suascientia
essetdiscursiva,
noneniminefficiente
efficiens,
plaris,
alioquin
> tantum
tureffectus
sed< supple',
turintuitive
insuasimiintuitive,
cognosci
aliquid
cognosci
litudine
eminenti."
Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars4, a. 2, 814b-5a.
Sent.,

18:22:54 PM

110

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

, so implicitlyrejectingDuns Scotus' approach.33The way he

specificae
chooses to solve the aporia is to redefinethe relationshipbetween the
divine essence and creaturesby introducinga new notion of similarity
(.similitudo
), conceivedof as the complementof the relationof imitability,
whichAurioltakesto be an intrinsicdetermination
of the divineessence.
the rejectionof one of the two particularthesesof
3. Notwithstanding
Duns Scotus' view on the subject,the Subtle Doctor's general proposal
seems to Auriol more convincingthan that of St Thomas, because it is
and actuality,insomore consistentwiththe "dogma" of divinesimplicity
far as it dispenseswith the mentadrelations(ihabitumes
) on which divine
ideas would be groundedaccordingto the Thomistic(and common)opinit is insufficient,
inasmuchas i) it does not explainhow
ion. Nevertheless,
the divine essence,which is absolutelysimple,can be the unique model
fromeach other,and ii)
of creaturesthat are totallydifferent
[similitudo)
it (like Aquinas' position)maintainsthat divine ideas are the object of
God's intuitiveknowledge,albeit a secondaryobject, while the divine
essenceis the primaryand immediateobject of divinecognition,whereas
forAuriolthe divineessenceis the sole object of divineknowledge,everythingelse being knownby it and in it:
istastollit,
deficit
licetin hocverussitquodhabitudines
Sed istemodusdicendi,
necostendit
tamenin duobus.Primoquidemin hocquodnondatmodum
possidisessesimilitudo
cumsitsimplicssima,
bilitatem
essentia,
istius,
potest
quodscilicet
necdeclarat
inter
se qualessuntcreaturae;
simillimorum
quomodo
aliquodsimplex
in repraesentando
contraria.
Secundoveroquia imaginatur
possitesseillimitatum
itaquoddivinus
et repraesentato
quoddivinaessentia
ponatresin esseexemplato
secundario
veroad creaturas
ad essentiam,
intuitus
repraesentatas
primoterminetur
- cuiusoppositum
estostensum.34
terminetur
supramultipliciter
peressentiam
In Auriol's opinion any kind of distinctionbetween God's essence and
divine ideas, even if only a formalone, as Duns Scotus claimed,is not
but also logicallyinconsistent.
only incompatiblewith divine simplicity,
that ideas in God are somehow distinctfromhis essence (and
Affirming
so a secondaryobject of his knowledge)is equivalentto holdingthatthe
image of an object on a mirrorand the "presence"of the object in the
same mirrorare two different
"things"[duo).Creaturesdo not have any
33Cf.Comm.
et
"Deusestomnisentitas
d. 35,pars3, a. 1, 791b-2a:
inI librum
Sent.,
secundum
naturarum
omnium
subsistens
similitudo
eminenter
omnisquidditas
tamquam
estintueri
divinam
essentiam
intantum
etspecificas
aequipolrationes,
quodintueri
proprias
et amplius
et specificas
formas
secundum
omnesnaturas
lenter
aequipollenter
proprias
eminenter."
quam
34Comm.
d. 35,pars3, a. 2, 794b-5a.
inI librum
Sent.,

18:22:54 PM

CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR

111

kind of subsistencein God; thereis no mentalbeing of a creature(the

idea) in God distinctfromthe divine essence. Thereforethe knowledge
of the divine essence qua imitabledoes not cause any object of knowledge distinctfromthe divine essence itself:
Undenondebetintelligi
essentia
resexhibeat
nisiquia
aliter
quoddivina
praesentes,
omnium
rerum
eminens
divino
intuitui
ipsaestpraesentialitas
aequivalens
quantum
inse ipsispraesentes.
sicreaturae
essent
Sicutimagoquaelucetinspeculo
nonaliter
exhibet
faciem
nisiquatenus
estpraesentialitas
Nonenim
praesentem
ipsiusfaciei.
suntduopraesentialitas
faciei
inipsaimagine
etipsaimago;etsimiliter
nonestaliud
in essentia
creaturarum
divinaquamessentia
praesentialitas
ipsa;et ideononponit
creaturas
inesserepraesentato
distincto
a se,necestibialiquarelatio
rationis
medianscircaipsam,
cumnonsintextrema
distincta.35
The onlypossibleconclusionof theseanalysesis thatGod's absoluteperfectionand simplicityare incompatiblewith i) any presence in Him of
somethingin any way distinctfromHimself,and ii) any object of direct
knowledgeother than the divine essence. The pluralityof ideeis must
therefore
be turnedintothe divineessencewithoutthe ideas missingtheir
functionin the economyof creation.
3. Auriol'sTheory
The parsconstruens
of Auriol'stheoryof divineideas and exemplarcausality is aimed at buildingup a new conceptionof Gos essence in relationto creatures,whichcan account forboth the orderedcreationof the
worldand God's perfectknowledgeof individuals.Its keystoneis the new
notionof similitudo
that Auriol worksout. By means of it, he can solve
not onlythe problemof God's completeknowledgeof creatures,but also
the problemof the "presence"in Him of a pluralityof ideas, insofaras
the conceptof connotationemployedby Auriolin thisparticularcontext
entailsthe new notionof similitudo
.
The pointof departureof Auriol'sdoctrineis the convictionthatGod's
essence, althoughabsolutelysimple according to its realityand formal
secundum
remet rationem
principles(simplicissimum
), is by itselfthe unique
standard
and
of
perfect
pattern{exemplar) everysinglecreature,no matter how various and different
theyare fromeach other.36So, according
35Ibid.,795a.
36Cf.ibid.,
796a:"Oportet
similitudo
eminens
etproprium
exemquoddeitasponatur
. . . Deitasestsimilitudo
entitatis.
cuiuslibet
non
plarcuiuslibet
naturae,
propria
specificae
secundum
aliamet aliamperfectionem
aliam
quidem
quamhabeatin se,autsecundum
- utpraedicti
<et aliam>rationem
<thereference
is toSt.Thomas,
inparticular
to STh.

18:22:54 PM

112

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

to Auriol,the divineessenceis the onlyprincipleof divinecreation:ideas

role in it. Nor are theythe principles(rationes)
do not play any effective
- the firstof the two functions
of divine thought
performedby divine
ideas according to Aquinas since divinity(datas)itselfis the necessary
and sufficient
principleof that. Otherwise,eitherGod's essence would
- in the case of its
not reallybe the exemplarcause of everything
being
the substratumof the ideas (substrata
ratio) or it would be divisible in
the case of its being the whole (ratiototalis)compounded by the ideas
themselves:
ad subdeitatis
se haberent
ad rationem
autistaeplures
rationes
Praeterea,
tamquam
Sed non
cuiusessent
auttamquam
ad rationem
totalem
stratam
rationem
partes.
dariprimum,
perse etformaliter,
quiatuncnonessetDeuscausaexemplaris
potest
huiusmodi
rationibus
subiceretur
in
scilicet
modum
sedtantum
substrati,
quantum
per
nonpotest
Rationamque
deitatis
est.Necpotest
darisecundum.
absonum
hocautem
etcomponant,
cumsitratio
inplures
rationes
utdividatur
essetotalis,
quaeintegrent
rerum
sitperaliam
formae.
uniussimplicis
quodDeusexemplar
Ergodarinonpotest
et aliamrationem.37
The main consequence of thispositionforthe problemof God's knowledge of individualsis that the pluralityof ideas becomes a mere pluralityof connotation,since ideas are the creaturesqua presentin the mind
and
of God as indirectlysignifiedby the divine essence itself(connotative
in
terms
of
instantiaSo we can speak of divine ideas only
dmominativ).
tions of that relationof one-to-manyby means of which creaturesare
representedby the divine essence as it is theiroriginand cause. In fact,
manialthoughabsolutelysimplein itself,the divineessenceis nevertheless
which
imitate
it,
fold,if consideredfromthe point of view of the things
since it is the model of all things.For thatreason,God's intuitionof the
divine essence has the divine essence itselfas its unique object, and not
the ideas, but, on the otherhand, directlyknowingthe divineessence is
knowingall the possibles that denominativelyderive fromit. Thus, to
the ontoaffirma pluralityof ideas in God is only a way of affirming
and
the pludivine
essence
link
the
between
and
epistemological
logical
it:
from
creatures
of
originated
rality

- ; immosubunaeteademsimplici
secunvidentur
perfectione,
I, q. 14,a. 6> imaginari
estomnium
dumremetrationem
<ipsadeitas>exemplar
perdeitatem,
quaeimportatur
sedtota
circadeitatem,
secundum
rationem
Nec aliquamultitudo
entitatum.
concipitur
See
circacreaturas
et concipitur
in connotatis
atttenditur
istamultiplicitas
exemplatas."
also:pars4, a. 3, 820a-b.
37Comm.
d. 35,pars3, a. 2, 796b.
inI librum
Sent.,

18:22:54 PM

CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR

113

in connotatis.
sitinse,esttamen
divina
Licetessentia
Quamvis
plures
simplicissima
intuitum
et una sittamre quam
enimessentia,
divinum,
simplex
quae termint
sed
nonquidemterminative,
nihilominus
ea cognita
ratione,
pluradicuntur
cognita,
nonquin
... Et propter
hocradones
incommutabiles
dicuntur
denominative
plures,
sedquiaab ipsaunicaexistente
situnaincommutabilis
ratioinse quidditative,
plura
- sicutapparebit
cumagetur
et connotantur
de multitudine
denominantur
inferius,
idearum.38
This thesisis more radical than the common one maintainedby 13th
and 14thcenturytheologians,such as Aquinas, Henryof Ghent,or Giles
of Rome. They appealed to a sortof non-realmode of existenceof the
divineideas,39originating
fromthe relationsof imitability
holdingbetween
the divine essence and the possible creatures,so that the existenceof
divineideas is purelyof reason.Auriolappears to deny divineideas even
thiskind of existence.Divine ideas are not the indirectobjects of divine
as St Thomas believed,nor is the divine essence like a mirintellection,
ror where theyare presentas images of the possible creatures,so that
God can knowindividualsby reflection.
Were thisthe case, knowinghis
own essence and knowingcreatureswould be two distinct"acts" (so to
kindsof principles
speak)in God, performedby means of two different
a conclusioninconsistent
withdivinesimplicity,
and actuality:
perfection,
Greaturae
nonsuntobiectasecundaria
terminantia
intuitum
relucendo
divinum,
in speculoin divinaessentia,
sicutvidetur
communis.
tamquam
fingere
imaginado
enimaliquidaspicitur
in aliquotamquam
in speculo,
tuncestibialius
Quandoque
actusvidendi
et aliaspecies,
siveratio,
et qua videtur
resin
qua videtur
speculum
ineodemoculosimulspecies
concurrant
etspecies
rei.Sed
speculo,
quamvis
speculi
secundum
sicponentes
divinus
intellectus
intuetur
creaturas
in sua essentia
quasi
relucentes.
videbit
creaturas
speculo
Ergoperaliamsimilitudinem
quamperessenessentia
nonse habebit
utspeculum.
Cumergoperaliamsimilitudinem
tiam,
alioquin
nonvideat
nonsehabeat
creaturas,
patetquodessentia
Praeterea,
permodum
speculi.
Deusnonintelligit
creaturas
Actusenimreflexus
videtur
perreflexionem.
imperfectiorquamdirectus;
sedsi divinus
intuitus
inessendam
ferretur
etdeinde
primo
procedereiad creaturas
videret
eas perreflexionem
quasiperquoddam
speculum,
in speculo,
videntur
reflexam.
quaeenimvidentur
perlineam
Ergoid quodprius.40

38Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars2, a. 2, 777b.
Sent.,
39Cf.
McCordAdams,William
Ockham
, NotreDame,Ind.1987,1037.
Marilyn
40Comm.
inI librum
Sent
to this,Auriolthinks
., d. 35,pars2, a. 1, 774a.In addition
thatthisis thegenuine
intention
ofSt Augustine
whoseconviction
on thisparhimself,
ticular
wouldcoincide
with
Aristotle's
ofdivine
Cf.ibid
., 774b:
point
conception
knowledge.
"Tertia
tioestquodhaecfuit
intendo
etinhoccumPhilosopho
quoqueproposi
Augustini,
scilicet
concordavi^
obiectivo,
quodnihilaliudextraDeumessetin ipsiusintuitu
quinimmo
suiipsius
intuido
essetintuido
omnium
aliorum
eteminenter."
Thus,
aequipollenter
toAuriol,
thecommon
tothismatter
lacksadequate
authoritative
according
approach
supportas well.

18:22:54 PM

114

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

As a consequence,the statementthatGod knowscreatures(or more genfromHimself)is false,if it means that God's

erally,somethingdifferent
intellectionfirstgrasps the divine essence and then creatures,as though
God's intuitionof Himselfand God's intuitionof creatureswere distinct.41
In fact,this interpretation
impliesthat divine ideas are the creaturesas
by God thatis, the ideas are the objects
theyare conceivedof terminative
intendedby God's intellectionas He thinksof creatures.Accordingto
thisaccount,divineideas should depend to a certainextenton creatures
themselvesand have a diminishedformof being (essediminutum
), necessarilydistinctfromthe divine essence which certainlyis not the case.
ThereforeAuriol affirmsthat creaturesare known denominative
by God,
and
accorddivine
that is, by means of a different
essence)
reality(the
itself:
ing to theirrelationof dependence upon the divine essence
estquodaliquiddicitur
Ubiconsiderandum
terminative,
intelligi
aliquidverodenoresestquantum
ad illudessequodhabetpermodum
Terminative
minative.
quidem
ad
denominative
veroquantum
conspicui
quodestesseinanimaetessediminutum;
estet reale.Et licetsiteademres,
illudessequodhabetin re extraquodverum
creasuntidemesse.SicergoDeusnonintelligit
esseetesseintentionale
nontarnen
necin esserealinecin
intuitum
turasterminative,
divinum,
quodipsaeterminent
denovidelicet
divinaessentia,
sedalioterminante,
esseintentionali,
ipsaedicuntur
- sicutsiresposita
nonsolum
differret
secundum
inesseintentionali,
minative
intelligi
enimquod
essereale.Constat
immosecundum
a reexistente
essediminutum
extra,
Utverbi
aliareintuitum
terminante.
nonintelligeretur
tuncresexterior
terminative,42
essereale,,
sicuthabetessediminutum,
haberet
si rosaquae lucetin mente
gratia,
denoexterius
existentes
intuitum
intellectus
ea terminante
rosae,omnes
particulares
et nonminus
minative
dicerentur,
perfecte.43
intelligi
This relationof one-to-many,
holdingbetweenthe divineessenceand the
It also
creatureswhich originatefrom it, is a relation of similarity.44
- even
can
know
individuals
God
how
though mediperfecdy
explains
demonstratio
definitions
their
own
ostensive
). In fact,each
(<
ately,through
to the divine
of
its
own
relation
has
individualas such (signatum)
similarity

41Cf. Comm.
Sent
inI librum
., d. 35,pars2, a. 2, 775a-b:"Anconcedidebeatquod
vero
autaliquidaliudextrase. Circasecundum
creaturas
Deusvereetproprie
intelligat
autaliquidaliud<extra>se subunoquicreaturas
considerandum
quodDeumintelligere
an DeussicintelSi enimquaeratur
subalioverononpotest.
demsensuconcedi
potest,
ulterius
et ex hocprocedat
suumferat
superessentiam,
quodintuitum
ligatcreaturam
ac
et sitibipluralitas
Deuset creatura,
itaquodsintduointuita,
usquead creaturam,
sic
cumDeo in ratione
creatura
etponatin numerum
multitudo
intellecti;
intellectorum,
autaliquidaliudextrase."
creaturas
nullomodoconcedi
quodDeusintelligat
potest
42The edition
doesnotmakesense.
reads:denominative
, butthisreading
43Comm.
d. 35,pars2, a. 2, 776b-7a.
inI librum
Sent.,
44Cf.Comm.
Sent
inI librum
., d. 35,pars3, a. 2, 796a.

18:22:54 PM

CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR

115

essence,since it is one of the infinite

possibleimitationsof God's essence,
fromany
is clearlydistinguishable
its
ostensive
thanks
to
definition,
and,
otherindividualbelongingto the same species,even apart fromits spatial and temporaldeterminations:
nonquidem
omnium
individuorum
Deitasestsimilitudo
signatorum,
appropriata
In quantum
sedmediante
ea etsignet,
demonstratione.
immediate,
quasidemonstret
nonsolum
certum
etdistinctum
inse,sedcumhocdemonenimrepraesentat
lapidem
autdemonstrationem
strabilitatem
hiclapis,in tantum
ipsiuslapidis
quamimportt
divinus
intellectus
hunclapidem
veliliumsignatum.45
intelligit
4. Concluding
Remarks
This surveyof AurioPstheoryof divineideas is too generalto enable us
to drawindisputableconclusions.We can onlytryto formulatesome conjectural ones. Paradoxically,the firstand most importantone is that
AurioPsanalysisof the questionof divine simplicity
is a sort of demolitionof the thesisof the existenceof divineideas. In principio
, thereis only
one divine essence, but posteathere will be many creatures of many
different
types(and therecould be manymore),each imitatingthe divine
essenceaccordingto different
aspectsand degrees.For Auriol,the divine
is sufficient
to justifythispasessence,in its absoluteunityand simplicity,
from
the
One
to
the
His
does
not
reserveany real
sage
many.
theory
functionfor the ideas. The imitabilityproper to the divine essence is
morethanenoughto explainthe productionof creaturesas well as God's
which Auriol speaks of is the
knowledgeof them. In fact,the similitudo
the
of
relation
of
each
creatureis somehowsimcomplement
imitability:
ilar to the divineessence and, conversely,the divineessence is similarto
each creature,since it is its model. God, who does not know anything
but Himself,can therefore
conceiveof each individualin virtue
perfectly
of the factthat each individualis one of the infinitepossible imitations
of His essence.
thisaccountpresupposesthatimitability
is a properfeaUnfortunately,
ture,and not a relationof reason, of the divine essence,otherwiseGod
could not know creaturesby means of his essence. As a consequence,
withinAurioPssystem,creation,46
which is the effectof this imitability,
45Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars4, a. 3, 820a-b.
Sent.,
On creation
anddivine
seeLaugeOlafNielsen,
Dictates
verpowerm Auriol
ofFaith
susDictates
Peter
Auriole
onDivine
andHuman
Power,
Creation,
ofReason:
, in:Documenti
Rationality
e studisullatradizione
filosofica
7 (1996),213-41.
medievale,

18:22:54 PM

116

ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI

- an evident
becomesas necessaryas the divineessenceitself
heresy,which
is the price paid by Auriolforhis fidelity
to Aristotelian
philosophy.This
finalresultshowsonce again the way Christianfaithexceeds its own theof its main conological systems,whenevertheyare simpletranscriptions
tentsinto the termsof a given rigidphilosophicalapparatus.
Universit
deglistudide L'Aquila

18:22:54 PM

Place, Space, and thePhysicsof Gracein Auriol'sSentences Commentary

CHRIS SCHABEL*

Historiansof medieval science have not ignored Peter AurioPs physical

theories,but theyhave not treatedthemin greatdepth either.Earlierin
this centuryPierre Duhem discussedAurioPs doctrineof place and his
theoryof the latitudeof forms,two subjectsof presentinterest,the latter of whichAnnelieseMaier later examined,closelyfollowingDuhem.1
Both historians
elementsin AurioPsopinpointedto novel and interesting
but
three
have
more
accurate
and extensiveinvesions,
things
impeded
in
naturalphilosophyhave
tigationssince that time. First,Oxford ideas
overshadowedParisian science between 1315 and 1335 in the historiography.Second, AurioPsphilosophicalideas, like those of many others,
are to be foundin a theologicalwork,a Sentences
commentary,a genre
which historiansof medievalscience and philosophyhave yet to exploit
Third, the Rome edition of 1596-1605 and in some cases
sufficiently.
even the manuscriptsof AurioPscommentaryleave much to be desired.
Withtheprogressof the criticaleditionof the variousversionsof AurioPs
Sentences
however,we are now in a betterpositionto describe
commentary,
his ideas more precisely.2
* A muchearlier
version
ofthispaperwasgivenat theSIEPMCongress
in Erfurt
in
1997.I thank
theparticipants
fortheircomments,
in particular
William
August,
Duba,
Russell
andCeciliaTrifogli.
Martin
Bauerprovided
a prelimiFriedman,
LaugeNielsen,
ofhiscritical
edition
ofAuriol's
Tractatus
deprinpiis
naturae
, Elzbieta
naryversion
JungPalczewska
andEdithSyllasentmeothermaterials,
andtheUniversity
ofCyprus
gave
financial
assistance.
1 Cf.Duhem1956,224-5(on
andMaier1968,55-6.
place)and509-10(onforms),
As parto theresearch
torthisarticle
andtortheselection
ofmanuscripts
forthe
critical
edition
ofAuriol's
inprimm
I haveediteda substantial
secSententiarum,
Scriptum
tionofq. 35 (i.e.d. 17,q. 2),aa. 1-2,basedon all known
extant
andthe
manuscripts
Romeedition
of 1596.In thissection,
theRomeedition
to be perhaps
theworst
proves
ofthesurviving
15witnesses,
andhasmamy
serious
errors
andlargeomissions
perhomoeoteleuton.Forexample,
d. 17,q. 2, "Utrum
caritas
is labelled
tertia
possitaugeri?"
parsin the
Romeedition
buttheedition
hasno secunda
histori, andthishasconfused
(426bC),
pars
anssuchas Maier1968,55,n. 37,andDuhem1956,509,n. 2 (however
Wood1990,
toquestiones
andnotpartes
375,n. 7,hasa typographical
error,
"pars17").Themss.refer
in anycase.See Appendix
C.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium
, 38,1

18:23:04 PM

118

CHRISSCHABEL

17, questiontwo,of bothhis Scriptum

In distinction
and his laterReportado
on book one of the Sentences
of Peter Lombard, Auriol ostensiblyasks
about the formof grace inheringin a believer:"Can grace increase?"
But grace is quicklyreplaced with "any such form"in the discussion,
which forlater medieval theologianswas about how an accidentalform
in a subject,such as heat in a cup of coffee,could change in intensity
over a certainlatitudeor range. In his almostpurelyphilosophicaltreatment,Auriol develops a new notion of the intensionand remissionof
forms,and inventsa novel concept of place and perhaps space, which
he elaboratesin distinctiontwo, part three,questionone of his Parisian
For thesereasonsthesetopon the second book of the Sentences.
Reportado
ics are treatedhere together.
Aurioland theLatitude
ofFormsin theScriptum
commentarieswas
Book one, distinction17, of later medieval Sentences
devotedto caritas
, i.e. grace,dearness,love, or charity,whatAurioldefines
of the soul and a kind of light."Theologians
as "a certainrighteousness
into two parts:Firsttheytreatedthe propdiscussion
divided
the
usually
erly theologicalaspects of grace, for example its nature. Accordingly,
AurioPs firstquestion in the Scriptum
asks, "Is grace a created habit in
the soul or the very person of the Holy Spirit?"3Second, theologians
asked questionsabout how and 'when5grace increasedor decreased in
a soul, AurioPs particularquestion being "Can grace increase?"These
questionsprovideda forumforauthorsto discussthe physicaland philosophical aspects not only of grace, but also of any formthat inheresin
a subject.This topic was in turnlinkedto questionsinvolvingtime,indivisibles,the infinite,and even local motion.4
I havealsoedited
Auriol's
II, d. 2, pars3, q 1 (textinAppendix
A).Duhem
Reportatio
in//,although
it andmanyofthemanuoftheReportatio
usedthe1605Romeedition
labelsthe
The Romeedition
in quality
edition.
areinferior
to the1596Scriptum
scripts
confuses
instead
ofparstertia,
tertia
; it often
, articulus
quaestio
prima
primus,
quaestio
question
anditis erroofarguments;
first
withthird
person
pluralfortheauthor
person
singular
the
tofollow
so thatitis difficult
thosearguments,
neousingiving
thenumbers
counting
omitAuriol's
it andmostofthemanuscripts
Moreimportantly,
flowofthediscussion.
B.
See Appendix
which
is 25% ofthequestion.
determination,
3 Auriol's
andhisPansian
ofgrace,inbothhisScriptum
discussion
Reportatio
theological
Gf.Detdoff
in somedepthalready.
on bookone,hasbeentreated
1963,22-94,Vignaux
1998,76-108.
1934,43-95,andHalverson
4 Fortheproblem
Paris1315-35,
seeespeofforms
ofthelatitude
including
generally,
in theearly
ciallyMaier1968.We knowmuchmoreaboutParisbefore1310,Oxford

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

119

There were three basic solutionsto the problem of how accidental

formsinheringin subjectscould change in intensityover a certainlatitude. In the principalargumentsand articleone of questiontwo,Auriol
One answerwas thatsomeoutlinesthesepositionsand theirweaknesses.5
how somethingis added to the previouslyexistingform.Thus a man
who has 10 degreesof whitenesslater has 11 degreesthroughsome sort
of additionto the previous10. This has been called the additiontheory.
Anotherresponsewas that the originalformis replaced by an entirely
new form,so that the firstis corrupted.Thus the man's 10 degrees of
whitenessare completelyremoved and replaced by 11 degrees. In the
thishas been called the successiontheory.Finally,others
historiography
what
is involvedis the corresponding
increaseor decrease
suggestedthat
in degreesof the contraryoppositeform,so that,e.g., the man's whiteness increasesat least partiallybecause his blacknessdecreases. This is
knownas the admixturetheory.
Apparentlytherewere not many adherentsto the admixturetheory
beforeAuriol'stime,but he ascribesit to Simplicius"and many others."
This theoryis easilyrefuted.One argumentagainstit is thateven in the
examplecommonlygiven,thatof lightand darkness,the contraryopposite has no positiveexistence.Rather darknessis the lack of light,and
thus cannot increaseor decrease in degrees as a form.6The succession
theory,which Auriol correctlyattributesto Godfreyof Fontaines,who
also has obvidevelopedthe theoryin the contextof transubstantiation,7
ous weaknesses.Auriol'srefutation
builds on Scotus'.8Auriolpresentsan
:
interesting
objectionin his later Reportato
I takesomewaterthatis hotin 3 or 2 degrees.
I positthatsomething
coldcomes
nearitinsucha waythatonedegree
ofthewater's
heatis corrupted.
Thusifthe
sinceaccording
to you
remaining
degreeofheatis newanddidnotexistbefore,
theprioris corrupted,
I askbywhatagentis thatonedegreeofheat,whichyou
Notbytheearlier
hotthing,
sincethepriorheatwasbeing
positas new,produced?
14thcentury,
andNicoleOresmeafter1340.ForOxford,
see theworks
ofSyllaand
Wood1990.ForOresme,
seeOresme1968.
5 Auriol
1596,d. 17,pars3 (i.e.q. 2) (428bB-434bE);
Auriol,
Scriptum
, d. 17,q. 2, a. 1.
6 Auriol1596,d. 17,
3 (i.e.q. 2) (433aF).
pars
7 On Godfrey's
seeSylla1981andWippel1979.As Maier(1968,62-3)corposition,
theRomeedition
ofAuriol's
citesGodfrey's
VII, question
notes,
Quodlibet
rectly
Scriptum
7. Themss.,however,
haveQuestionibus
Maieraccepts
ordinariis.
ofthe
thereading
simply
a '7',perhaps
onthebasisofwhattheedition
shesupplies
has.Sylla(1981,
mss.,
although
thatthecorrect
citation
should
be Quodlibet
XI, question
3.
124,n. 56)shows,
however,
Scotus1959,236-52(d. 17,pars2, q. 1).

18:23:04 PM

120

CHRISSCHABEL
hotthing,
norbythe
at thatinstant,
to you.Norbyanother
according
corrupted
Thusit remains
thatitwouldbe generated
heavens.
diminishing
bythecoldthing
etc.9
is false.Therefore,
it.Butforsomething
to be generated
byitsopposite

refutesthe successiontheorywithan adaptationof Zeno's

Auriolfurther
paradox. Contraryto the successiontheory,"It is impossibleforthe reality, throughwhich the intension,actuation,and perfectionof a form
comes about, to exclude fromthe subject the prior realityof the same
of actual
form."10Most of the reasoningis based on the impossibility
withan accompanyingtreatmentof timeand indivisibles.Auriol
infinites
tacitlyassumes that a complete atomistictheoryof space and time is
unacceptable,and he does not refutesuch a theoryrighthere. Thus he
is freeto show thatin a successiontheorythereare two basic problems.
thereare
First,in a continuouschange (again, Auriolassumescontinuity)
of any form,so that
an infinitenumberof possiblegradationsin intensity
the annihilationof the old formand the creationof the new would have
to occur in realityan infinitenumberof timesin any qualitativechange.
the sucSecond, even grantingper impossibile
Clearly this is impossible.11
of the form,there
cessiontheorywithregardto the gradationsin intensity
of time.If we suppose that
is stilla problemon account of the continuity
at instantA a person's temperatureis 36 degrees,and at instantB just
afterwardsit becomes 37 by succession,Auriol pointsout that our suppositionis flawedbecause therewill always be anotherinstantbetween
A and B when the 36 degreeswill be corruptedbut when the 37 degrees
have not yet been intended,so that the personwill have no heat at all
9 Auriol,
Theol.Fol.536,f.
Staatsbibliothek
Rep.I, d. 17,pars2, q. 2 (Mss.Berlin,
Antoniana
292scaff.
123,ff.82vaxiii,f.73vb;Vatican
47va;Padua,Biblioteca
Borghese
Ponoquodappropinquetur
in tribus
sivein duobus.
gradibus
b): "Capioaquamcalidam
de caliditate
ei frigidum
aquaeunusgradus.
quodcorrumpatur
aliquodintalidispositione
sitnovus
etnonpraefuit,
caliditatis
remanens
Si igitur
pertecorrumpitur,
quiaprior
gradus
Nona
novum
est
caliditatis
unus
ille
a
productus?
quem
ponis
gradus
quaero quo agente
te.Necab alio
secundum
caliditas
calido,
corrumpebatur
proilioinstanti
quiaprior
priori
remittente.
Sedcontrarium
a frigido
per
calido,neca caelo.Restt
igitur
quodgeneretur
etc."
ex contrario
estperse falsum.
se generali
Igitur
10Auriol,
, loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.2 (= Rome436bE):"Quodrealitas
perquam
Scriptum
a subiecto
estquodexcludat
et actuatur,
et perficitur,
forma
intenditur,
priimpossible
formae."
eiusdem
oremrealitatem
11Auriol,
estenimali, loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.2 (= Rome436bE-F):
"Impossibile
Scriptum
in actu.Hoc patetex sexto
etdistinguendo
transir,
quodlibet
signando
quidperinfinita
exhocquodtangeret
moveri
estpunctum
, ubiprobatur
spatium
quodimpossibile
Physicorum
transiret
necessario
sibiaequale,et itaomniapunctaquae cumpertransiret,
perinfinita
distinctae
formae
suntinfinitae
ea. Sed si in motuintensionis
et distinguendo
signando
forma
unadistincta
mutato
esseattingatur
itaquodin quolibet
numeraliter,
numeraliter,
etdistinctim.
formas
transeat
necessario
Ergo
signate
perinfinitas
sequitur
quodsubiectum
formae
numerales
estutinfinitae
ponantur."
impossibile

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

121

an atomisticview of forms,
at thatinstant.So while grantingtemporarily
Auriol denies the necessaryconcomitantatomisticview of time.
Thus Auriol opts for a type of additiontheory.Of the six positions12
Aurioltreats,fourare variationsof the additiontheory.The solutionsof
Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Hervaeus Natalis all involvean increase
of intensity
withoutthe destructionof the previousformor the decrease
in the contraryform,and thus by defaultcan be put under the 'addition' rubric.Auriol,however,rejectsthese theories,assertinginsteadone
of the bases of the classic addition theoryof his Franciscan brothers
RichardofMiddleton,and Scotus:thatwhengraceincreases,
Bonaventure,
it is because a new chunkof grace is added: "Every formis made more
intenseby somethingreal thatcomes to {adveniens)
and participatesin the
Auriol gives severalargumentsexplaining
specificnatureof thatform."13
why this 'reality'must 'come to' or 'arrive',but withoutdefiningadveniens.One mightinferthat it means 'arrivefromwithout',and that the
Franciscantheoryis an 'external' addition theory,in contrastto what
could be termedthe 'internal'theoriesof Aquinas, Henry,and Hervaeus.
Auriol uses supernaturaland natural evidence. For instance,the reality
thatintendsthe formcannot be a part of the subjectin which the form
inheres,because in the case of a soul, whichis the subjectof grace, there
are no such parts. The realitycannot be a part of a dispositioneither,
since in the example of air becoming more illuminated,Auriol claims
that air is alreadyperfecdydisposed (dispositissimus)
with respectto light.
is
not
intended
in
air
because
of
an
addition
with respectto part
Light
of air's dispositiontowardthe form.14
Auriolthen explainswhy thisrealitymust 'participate'or share in the
nature:Only
specificnatureof the form,and not be of a totallydifferent
like can perfectand augmentlike withoutadulteration.Otherwise,if the
nature,the formwould not be intended,"but
realitywere of a different
rather'drawn' to anotherperfectionand combinedwithit, as withform
and matter,"15
thus creatingsomethingdifferent.
Matter is not intended
when perfectedby form.
12Wood1990,374,n. 7, hasnotedthatAuriol
mentions
sixpositions.
loc.at., a. 2, prop.1 (= Rome435bE): Quodommsforma
mtenAunol,Scriptum,
ditur
realeadveniens,
rationem
illiusformae."
per
aliquid
participans
specificam
14Auriol,
a. 2, prop.1 (= Rome436aA):"Nonpotest
autemillareal, he.cit.,
Scriptum
itasesseparssubiecti,
nonhabet,
si loquamur
de caritate;
necparsdisquiaanimapartes
lucis."
positions,
quiaaerestdispositissimus
respectu
nullum
, loc.at., a. 2,prop.1 (= Rome436bC):"Praeterea,
Aunol,
Scriptum
perfectibile
alterius
rationis
dicitur
sedmagistrahi,
ad aliamperfectionem,
et
intendi,
perrealitatem
cumea, sicutpatetde forma
materiae."
componi
respectu

18:23:04 PM

122

CHRISSCHABEL

Auriol maintains,however, that there are also difficulties

with the
Franciscansolutionand so he articulateshis own, probablyunique brand
of additiontheory.16
Here is whereAuriolbreaksnew groundin his positivetheoryof the intensionand remissionof forms,but here also is where
he seems simplyto tailorhis solutionto fitthe commonobjectionsto the
additiontheory.As is oftenthe case, Auriolproceedsby processof elimThis is not to say that
ination,in the end espousinga sortof via negativa.
foritsown sake,or out of a desireto emphaAuriolfollowsthe vianegativa
size divine transcendence,althoughthereis this elementin his thought.
Rather Auriol discardswhat he thinkscannot be the case, and accepts
what remains.It is importantto note that he does not simplyconsider
the alternativesolutionsas incorrect,but he emphasizes that they are
, with the exceptionof the Franciscanaddition theory,
plainly impossible
whichhas some truthto it, althoughnot as it was understoodin Auriol's
time.17What remains aftereliminatingthe impossibilities,
however,is
of
all
the
a
that
definition
avoids
of
solution
pitfalls the other
by
merely
no easily understandablealternative.
positions,while offering
Thus in his defenseof the Franciscanadditiontheory,in eliminating
the possibilitythatwhat is added comes fromwithin,Auriolimpliesthat
it arrivesfromoutside,withouthoweverstatingit or definingadveniens.
When he furthermodifiesthe Franciscanversionof the additiontheory,
'
i.e. 'concantas
Auriol likewiseemploysvague and negativeterminology,

and impraecisemostlyexplainingwhat they do notdo. He has already

shown that somethingreal must arrivethat participatesor sharesin the
specificnatureof the priorform,as the traditionaladditiontheorymaintains,but he remarksthat
andmademoreintense
towhichthelessergraceis perfected
thereality
according
caritas
etpraecisa
discrete
cannotbe a wholegracethatis distinctly
distincte),
{integra
nature
inthereality
andspecific
[ofgrace]as if[itwere]oneseparate
participating
inthereality
andnature
ofgrace
itparticipates
butrather
ofgrace,
piece(individuum)
a certain
so thatitcouldbecalledina way'con-grace'
'reduction',
(concaritas).
through
16Auriol1596,loc.cit
theRomeedition
Citations
from
, a. 2, prop.3 (441aC-442bF).
arecorrected
withms.Vat.Borghese
329(siglum:
Vb),andI repunctuate.
17Auriol,
autemistaopinio
d. 17,q. 2, a. 1 (= Rome435bC-D):"Quamvis
Scriptum,
ad ilium
intelveritatem
si beneintelligatur
. . . nonhabetnihilominus
veritatem
contineat,
earn."
tenentes
currit
hodiesecundum
lectum
quo
18Auriol1596,he.cit.,a. 2, prop.3 (441aB;Vb 221va-b):
iliasecun"Quodrealitas
carnonpotest
et intenditur
caritas
dumquamminor
[Vb 22Ivb]esseintegra
perficitur
ac rationem
realitatem
itasetpraecisa
distincte,
quasiunumindispecificam
participans
caritatis
realitatem
etrationem
viduum
sedparticipai
reductionem,
caritatis,
perquandam
the
Duhem1956,510,and Maier1968,55-6,discuss
ut quasipossitdiciconcaritas."

18:23:04 PM

PLACE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

123

The defenseof thispositioninvolvesprimarilya rejectionof the classic Franciscanadditiontheory,thatgrace itselfis what is added. If grace
were added, accordingto Auriol,then one could separate the grace into
two partsbeforehand,which is impossible.Not only is the added 'grace'
but onlyco-intelligible.
not 'makeable',it is not even intuitively
intelligible,
dividethe augmentedgrace
Even an angelicintellectcould not intuitively
afterintensioninto two graces,because grace is alwaysincreasedas one,
as a unit,to which "somethingof grace" is added, but not grace. Auriol
emphasizesthat the same is true of all formsthat are intensified.19
To illustratethis, Auriol gives several examples, often taken from
Aristodeand Averros.A curvedline does not become more curved,or
air rarer,or earthdenser,by the comingof more curvatureor rarityor
densityso that the line, e.g., becomes more curved by a double curvature.What happens,Auriolmaintains,is thata realitythat 'unseparately'
or 'non-discretely'
(impraecise
) pertainsto the specificnature of curvature
comes to and is added to the curvatureof a line to make it more curved.20
Auriolprovidesarguments
forthis.One relieson theexampleof Tarification.
When Tarification
occurs in a body, thereis a concomitantincrease in
dimensionor quantity,but thereis no 'part' arrivingthat is quantityor
dimensionseparatelyor discretely.
One cannotpointto a part of the new
dimensionthatwas not therebeforeand was added de novowhen we heat
or densificationoccurs,it
up a balloon, for example. When Tarification
occurs throughout.Likewise,one cannot show the new chunk of grace
whichis supposedlyadded when grace increases.21
concaritas
andMaierquitecorrectly
linksit to the
important
aspectofAuriol's
position,
wider
ofindividuation,
which
is beyond
thescopeofthepresent
problem
paper.
19Auriol
., a. 2,prop.3 (441aC-D;Vb 22Ivb):"Undenonestfactibilis
1596,loc.cit
per
se etiamperdivinam
sicquodcapiatessepraecisum
etdemonstratum,
necest
potentiam
intuitive
sedcointelligibilis
itaquodintellectus
nonposset
tantum,
intelligibilis,
angelicus
caritatem
dividere
intuitive
induascaritates,
sedsemper
caritas
auctaoccuraugmentatam
ritsibi,ut unumcui additum
estaliquidcaritatis,
noncaritas,
et pereumdem
modum
estde albedine,
et calore,
et omniforma
intelligendum
quae
augetur."
MAunol1596,loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.3 (441aF-bA;
Vb 22Ivb): Sed linea[44lb] curva
et minus
et lenitas,
et
curva,et similiter
raritas,
suscipit
magiset minusutfiatcurvior,
et sicde aliisquae intenduntur
et remittuntur;
in omnibus
autemhisnonfit
asperitas,
ad illamspeciem
realitatis
Nonenimadvenit
peradventm
augmentum
praecise
pertinentis.
aliacurvitas
lineaeutfiatcurvior
ratione
autaliararitas
curvitatis,
aeri,autdenduplicis
sitasterrae,
sedid quodadvenit
ad rationem
Undecurvapertinet
specificam
impraecise.
tatiadditur
ad curvitatem
fit."
aliquarealitas
pertinens
qua additalineacurvior
21Auriol
Vb 222ra-b):
"Sedmanifestum
estquod
., a. 2,prop.3 (442aB-D;
1596,loc.cit
crescit
et augmentantur
dimensiones
perrarefactionem
quantitas
absquehocquodadveniatparsquaesitpraecise
autpraecise
dimensio.
enimmusto
Rarefacto
etaugquantitas
nonpotest
demonstran
autdimensio
Necenim
mentato,
parsaddita,
quaeantenonfuit.

18:23:04 PM

124

CHRISSCHABEL

In anotherargument,Auriol assertsthat grace is always a unity,but

if one were to add more grace to make a 'bigger' grace, it would lose
that unity.22
Grace, a form,is not like a continuouslydivisiblesubstance
like water. In the case of water,one could add new drops and it would
Grace is a unity,but
preserveits oneness in additionto its divisibility.23
not a divisibleunity,and a biggergrace is as much a unityas the smaller
one, so "the realityby which grace, or whiteness,increasesis nothing
that has discrete[or separate] realityor that discretely[i.e. as a unit of
its own] participatesin the specificnatureof grace."24Moreover,Auriol
holds that if what is added were somehowgrace, and were quantifiable,
then in any continuousintensionof grace one would have to add an
infinitenumberof chunksor atoms (individua
:) of grace, which is absurd.
Again Auriol relieson a denial of atomism,and by extensionthisargument applies to all forms:What is added cannot be the form,or one
would have to admit eitheratomismor an actual infinite.25
atomIf one agreeswithAuriol'sbasic premisesvis--visthe continuum,
and time,one mightnow wonder whetherall theoriesof
ism, infinites,
the intensionand remissionof formsare doomed to failure.The only
option left for Auriol is simplyto say that what is added has all the
dimensiones
iliaestin superficie
autin profundo,
quaefuerunt
quiaubiquereperiuntur
4 Physicorum
UndeCommentator
XXXV,
, commento
ante,et omnessuntaugmentatae.
nonquaelibet
etdensitas
exconstrictione,
fierent
dicitquodsi raritas
parscorporis
recepisetsignificabili
setdensitatem
et raritatem
. . . [Vb 222rb]in qualibet
partedemonstrabili,
et augmentado,
necpotestassignari
estfactamaioratio,
quae
aliquaparsdimensionis
advenerit
de novo."
22Auriol1596,loc.at.,a. 2, prop.3 (442aD-E;Vb 222rb):"Si augmentum
caritatis
esset
rationem
fieret
impossibile
ipsius,
specificam
participantem
praecise
perrealitatem
ali. . . Impossibile
estenimquodrealitas
unitatem
haberet
numeralem
quodauctacaritas
manente."
suapropria
realitate
in aliamrealitatem,
identitatem
transeat
qua
per
23Auriol1596,e.g.loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.3 (442aE-F;Vb 222rb):"Necpotest
insuper
suaultima
secundum
aliquidsui,eo modoquoduaeaquaesecundum
poniquoduniantur
etpartem
conhabens
eritforma
continua
hoccaritas
fiunt
idem,quiasecundum
partem
in suisultimis."
tinuatas
24Auriol
Vb 222rb): . . realitas
1596,loc.at.,a. 2, prop.3 (442bA-B;
perquamaugenecpraecise
turcaritas,
velalbedo,nonsitaliquidhabensrealitatem
participraecisam,
caritatis."
rationem
specificam
pans
25Auriol1596,loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.3 (442bC-D;Vb 222rb-va):
intendens
"Si realitas
rationem
velrealitas
essetindividuum
caritatem
caritatis,
specificam
praecise
participans
. . . [Vb222va]
caritates
infinitae
inanimaessent
actuetdistincte
caritatis,
pernecessitatem
modicoacquiruntur
Manifestum
estenimquod in motuintentionis,
quantumcumque
infinitae.
adhucin potentia
remanent
in potentia,
factaergoacquisitione,
infinitae
partes
- nonenimuniuntur
formalem
ad aliquamunitatem
illaenonconcurrunt
Si ergopartes
ut sintibiinfinitae
sua- restt
se totis,
necsecundum
ultima
formae,
quarum
quaelibet
infinitae."
numeraliter
in se etdivisaab alia;etperconsequens
estindivisa

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

125

advantagesof an added chunk of grace and none of the disadvantages.

thatneeds to be explainedabout the increaseof grace
Thus: "Everything
of a reality
and otherformscan be explained by the coming [adventm)
in
the
that does not discretelyparticipate
and in the
being (entitatem)
specificnatureof the formthat is posited to be made more intense."26
This realityis, of course, 'con-grace', and by extension 'con-form',
whichcomes to and 'non-discretely'
(;impraecise
) participatesin the reality
:'
and specificnatureof grace or the formin question.As with ' indistantic
'
'
in the contextof divine foreknowledge,
in his trinitarian
and indistinctio
we
know
more
about
what
is
not
than
what it actutheology,
impraecisio
an
is.27
Auriol
makes
to
in bringthese
terms
better
ally
attempt explain
and
various
to
his
The
first
ing up
solving
objections
position.
objection
asks what typeof being con-graceis. It mustbe eitherform,or matter,
or a composite;it is none of these;therefore
it is nothing.A second objectionstatesthatany being is intelligible;
but thisreality,con-grace,is supand incomprehensible
to any intellect;so it mustbe
posedlyunintelligible
nothing.Auriolrespondsthatsuch a realityas con-graceis form,or grace,
'by reduction',for"it is somethingof form,fromwhich formarises and
is constituted,"
but it is not a new chunkof form.Moreover,theserealities
are not entitiesdiscretelyand separately( praecise
), so theydo not have to
be intelligible,
but merelyco-intelligible,
and the intellectcomes to know
them throughdiscursivereasoning,not directly.28
One can also object
to
the
basis:
"What
has
been
said gives cause
explicidy
theory'snegative
fordoubt because of the non-discreteness
or unseparateness[impraecisione)
and indistinction
of this type of entity."29
Auriol can only reiteratethe
in his opinpositiveadvantagesof his solution,and how this difficulty,
is the keyword here,and, as withthe many
ion, does not arise.Impraecise
'diminished'or 'reduced'beingsin Auriol'sthought,it is difficult
to grasp.
Auriol's argumentsfor his own solutionto the troublesomeproblem
26Auriol1596,loc.cit
., a. 2, prop.4 (443aA;Vb 222va):"Quodomniaquaedicuntur
de augmento
caritatis
etaliarum
formarum
salvanpossunt
realitatis
peradventm
impraeciseparticipants
entitatem
et specificam
rationem
formae
intendi."
quae
ponitur
27On indistantia
inAuriol,
seeSchabel1994,85-102;forindistinctio
, seeFriedman
1997,
294-310.
28Auriol1596,loc.cit.,
a. 2, prop.4 (445bE-F;
Vb 224ra):"Talisrealitas
estforma
per
reductionem.
Estenimaliquidformae
ex quo constituitur
et consurgit
utdictum
forma,
unumindividuum
formae
. . . sicutergorealitates
huiusmodi
nonsunt
est;nonesttamen
entitates
sicnonsuntdistinctae
intellectu
sed cointelligibiles
tantum.
praecise,
signabiles,
in earumnotitiam
Undevenit
intellectus."
arguitive
29Auriol1596,loc.cit.,a. 2,
estdubietatem
prop.4 (444bC;Vb 223rb):
"Quoddictum
inducit
ex impraecisione
etindistinctione
huiusmodi
entitatis."

18:23:04 PM

126

CHRISSCHABEL

of the intensionand remissionof formsare rathervague, perhaps charso. Nevertheless,it appears that Auriol was sincerein the
acteristically
of
the otherpossibilities,
and thatin the end he thought
process eliminating
and
his con-formsolution, nebulous
negative as it is, solved all the
and was the only positionto adopt. Hence Auriol concludes:
difficulties
thefirst
is peris notadded,butrather
to thissolution
a newessence
According
Nordoesitpositthattheremitted
claims.
as thefirst
fected,
[ofAquinas]
opinion
itsactuality
in theintensified
is actually
contained
form
one,butonlypotentially,
aimed.Norcan anybeenlost,at whichthesecondopinion
[ofGodfrey]
having
thatwhatis added
as somewishtosay.It posits
be addedexcept
thing
perfection,
a pointforwhichothers
to theessence,
is notnothing,
butsomething
pertaining
are
whatall theothers
It is therefore
manifest
thatthismethod
explains
struggle.
tosay.30
andwhattheywereall trying
after,
Place, Space, and Local Motionin theScriptum
In the course of his refutation
of the successiontheory,Auriolhas a long
The contextof the
an
related
on
important
topic: local motion.31
passage
is not excluded
that
the
the
form
of
is
Auriol's
claim
priorreality
passage
to
the
succession
'new5
theory.
by the
realityduringintension,contrary
"The aforesaidpropositionis not conThe sectiongets its own rubric:32
tradictedby what we see in local motion,and it is shown that [local
but ratherthe
motion] is not the successionof 'wherenesses'(ubeitatum),
transferaccordingto parts of a space (magnitudini
)."
This is directedat anonymousfollowersof Godfreyof Fontaines,perof the later exponents
haps includingWalterBurley,the most significant
of the successiontheory.AlthoughAuriol may not have had Burleyin
of the positionand use his
mind, we can take him as a representative
name to designatethe anonymousopponent.33
Justas qualitativechange
30Auriol1596,loc.dt.,a. 2,prop.4 (445aB-C;
hunc
Vb 223va):"Undecumsecundum
vultprima
sicutomnino
novaessentia,
sedprima
nonaddatur
modum
opinio;
perficiatur,
sua
tantum
in intensa,
actualiter
sedpotentialiter
formam
contineri
necponatremissam
sicut
addinisiperfectio,
necpotest
actualitate
contendit;
amissa,
proquo opiniosecunda
ad essentiam,
sedaliquidpertinens
intendunt
proquo alii
aliqui;etponataddinonnihil,
et quod
aliissalvatquodquaerunt,
estquodhiemodusomnibus
manifestum
pugnant,
omneshi dicereintendebant."
31Fora succinct
thelatitude
oflocalmotion
ofmedieval
theories
overview
(andindeed
seeMurdoch
andSylla1978.
offorms)
32Auriol,
turex
nonimpedi
loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.2: "Quodpraemissa
propositio
Scriptum,
sed
in motulocali,et ostenditur
hisquae apparent
successio,
quodnonestubeitatum
translatio
secundum
partes
magnitudinis."
33On Burley's
comesfrom
seeSylla1973,233-8,and1981,126.Theposition
theory,
onthe
inhiscommentary
a discussion
from
Tractatus
, apparently
stemming
Burley's
primus

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

127

is a motionof sorts,as was commonlythought,local motionwas often

or surrounding
considereda changein thepassivecircumscription,
bounda
traversed.
of
the
mobile
Auriol
Scotus'
term
employs
ary,
along path
ubihere forthispassive circumscription,
whichinheresin the mobile like
of local motionrequires
a form.Burley,however,claimsthatthe continuity
thattherebe in the intervening
an
infinite
numberof interspace
actually
or
to
indivisible
the
infinitenummediate,
points qualities,corresponding
ber of (dimensionless)
temporalinstants,since an object in motionis only
mobile,Auriol
whollyin one pointat an instant.Witha three-dimensional
calls these indivisiblepoints or qualities ubeitates.
would
Burley
say that
to
an
AurioPs
actual
infinite
number
of ubeiaccording
positionagainst
tates
Auriol bringsup two ways of
, local motionwould be impossible.34
defendingthe continuityof local motionwithoutresortingto an actual
and the successiontheory,but stillretainingthe traditionalnotion
infinite
of motion involvingthe inherenceof an ubi in the mobile. He argues
that theyfail.35
convincingly
fourth
bookoftheSentences.
If Weisheipl
datedtheTractatus
1968,185-6,hascorrectly
tobetween
1320and 1327,andifhissuggestion
thatBurley's
Sentences
primus
commentary
stems
from
Parisian
in 1319-1320
lectures
is anywhere
in 1316
close,thenAuriol,
writing
at thelatest,
cannot
be replying
to either
oftheseworks.
34Auriol,
a. 2,prop2 (= Rome438aE-F):
"Sedforte
ad omniaistadice, loc.cit.,
Scriptum
turquodperea concluditur
ubeitates
in motulocali.Et
distinctae
quodnonsintinfinitae
tarnen
manifeste
Nonenimdurtunaubeitas
nisiper
apparet
quodimmosuntinfinitae.
unicum
instans.
Necsecundum
se totam,
essetplusquam
quiatuncmobile
perunumininunoubitotaliter,
stans
etperconsequens
nonmoveretur.
Necsecundum
partem,
quiailla
velremaneret
in eadempartemobilis,
etperconsequens
iliaparsnonesset
parsubeitatis
etitanectotum,
cummotototomoveantur
omnes
velponetur
inaliaparte,
mota,
partes,
etsecundum
hocmigrabit
de subiecto
insubiectum,
estcontra
naturam
accidentis."
quod
35Auriol,
"Adhocautemrespon, loc.at.,a. 2, prop.2 (= Rome438aF-bC):
Scriptum,
dentilliquisuntde quintaopinione
recitata
de motuad ubi
superius
quodnonestsimile
etde motuad formam,
mobile
dimittit
totum
ubiprimum
quianumquam
quandomoveturad secundum,
sedsemper
continut
cumsequenti.
Sedhaecsolutio
assumit
praecedens
videlicet
nondimittat
simultotum
ubi.Constat
enimquodubi
impossibile,
quodmobile
estsubiective
inmobili
etlocato,
utAuctor
Sexprincipiorum
dicitquodpassiva
circumscripta
estsubiective
in corpore
Si ergonondimittit
simultotum
sibi
ubi,retinet
circumscripto.
ubeitatis.
ineadempartemobilis
subiective
ubiexstipartem
aliquam
Quaevelremanebit
titprius,
et sicde necessitate
concluditur
ubi,et perconsequodiliaparsnonmutavit
esttotum
quensnonestmota;ea verononmota,necesse
quiescere,
quiatotum
quiescit
ad quietem
utdemonstrai
VII Physicorum.
Si veroubeitatem
illamretinet
partis,
Philosophus
in aliaparteubiantenonfuit,
ubeitas
de subiecto
in subiectum,
migravit
quodimpossibileest.Undenullomodoestverum
totum
ubirelinquat.
quinsimulmobile
dixerunt
aliiquodubihabetsuosgradus
sicutquantitas,
ratione
intrnsecos,
Propterea
fitsuccessio
inmotuad ubi.Sednecistemodus
quorum
sufficit,
quiade iliograduintrinsecoquaerendum
estubiremanet
subiective?
Autenimin parteubifuit,
et perconseettotum
nonestmotum,
autin aliaparte,
etsecundum
hocmigravit
quensparsquievit,
de subiecto
in subiectum."

18:23:04 PM

128

CHRISSCHABEL

So in orderto refutethe successiontheoryand at the same timesafeguard the continuityof motion, Auriol modifiesthe concept of local
motion.Auriolclaimsthatmotiondoes not arisefromthe changefromone
ubi or ubeitasto the next. Instead Auriol concludes that local motionis
- which is the surfaceof the
a change in place (locus)
'resting'body, not
Local
the containingbody across or over (super)a space (magnitudinem)'.
motionis "the fluxof the movingobject accordingto diversepartsof a
space," "just as whiteningis a change accordingto diversepartsof whiteness." The older views of place and local motion,accordingto Auriol,
involve difficult
problemsof indivisibles.Auriol's solutionis to thinkof
local motionas occurringacross a space thatat firstglance appears basiLike
callymathematicalratherthanphysical,i.e. it is pure dimensionality.
to
actual
forms,a space or magnitudethatis traversedis not susceptible
divisioninto discreteparts,and it is certainlycontinuousand not made
Auriolmaintains,is that 'parts' of
up of indivisibles.The only difference,
whitenessinhere in the subject,but 'parts' of a space traverseddo not.
Rather a mobile is transmuted'across' a space. Local motionis nothing
fromone part of a space to anotherpart
other than the transmutation
of the space, not fromone part of an ubeitasto another.36
In sidesteppingthe difficulties
involved in tyinglocal motion to the
ubis, however,Auriolappears to preintensionand remissionof different
sent a rathernon-Aristotelian
concept of local motion,place, and per36Auriol,
est
"Etidcirco
tenendum
, loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.2 (= Rome439aF-bC):
Scriptum
in locum,accipiendo
incunctanter
peripsumnonsuperquodmotuslocalisestdirecte
VI
DicitenimCommentator
sed superficiem
ficiem
continentis,
quiescentis.
corporis
etomne
dividitur
illudPhilosophi
XXXIX,exponens
, commento
quodlongitudo
Physicorum
in ubidividitur
illudin quo esttransmutatio,
perdiviquodspatium
perquodestmotus
in quantitate.
Et subdit
sionem
motus.
quaeestin ubinumeratur
quodtransmutatio
illiusquod
Similiter
etiamquartoPhysicorum
XLIII,dicitquodde ratione
, commento
motus
Et quiade ratione
sedmoveri
movetur
superquiescens.
perse nonestcontineri,
situs
diversitas
motum
localem
ideoconcomitantur
estquodsitsupermagnitudinem,
localis
si magnitudo
contineat
et moti,et circumscriptio,
mobilis
et varietas
commensurationis
suntidinquod
neccircumscriptio
neccommensuratio,
Undepatetquodnecsitus,
mobile.
Undeestfluxus
estdirecte
motus
sedmotus
estessentialiter
localis,
supermagnitudinem.
secundum
esttransmutatio
sicutdealbatio
mobilis
secundum
diversas
partes
magnitudinis,
suntinhaerentes,
Nec estdifferentia
nisiquodpartesalbedinis
diversas
partesalbedinis.
transmutan
dicitur
non.Et hincestquodmobile
veromagnitudinis
supermagnipartes
diciet nonsecundum
tudinem,
quodverodealbatur
magnitudinem,
quianoninhaeret,
Motusergolocalisnonest
etnonsuperalbedinem.
tursecundum
albedinem
transmutari,
nontransmutari
de parte
inpartem
de partemagnitudinis
nisitransmutatio
magnitudinis,
et circumscriptione
in partem
immoexclusaomniubeitate
ubeitatis
ubeitatis,
passiva,
in occidens."
moveri
de oriente
caelumdicitur

18:23:04 PM

SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

PLAGE,

129

Aristotlemaintainedthat
haps also of space.37In book fourof the Physics
a
of
inner
surface
is
immobile
the
containingbody, a common
place
in
wine
a
that
of
the place
jug is the innersurfaceof the
examplebeing
withoutthicknessor
jug. As such, place is in a way two-dimensional,
are
with
this
mostmediethere
serious
definition,
problems
depth.Although
in chapter
were
also
aware
that
val commentators
but
they
accepted it,
Aristotlehad said thatplace is a continuousquantity.
six of the Categories
As this implied the non-Aristotelianexistence of a three-dimensional
incorporealspace, it was usuallyrejectedor portrayedas merelyAristotle's
of the vulgaropinion.Auriol,however,seems to be moving
presentation
towardthe Categories
and departingfromAristotle'sdefinitionof place in
the Physics.Auriol rejects the latterview, using versionsof traditional
These are based on the ultiargumentsthatgo back to Theophrastus.38
mate sphereof the heavens,which has no such passive circumscription,
and the examplesof a boat anchoredon a riverand a towerin the wind,
which do not move locally,althoughtheirpassive circumscription,
i.e.
waterand air, are continuallychanging.Anotherargumentis thatcorpora
gloriosacan move throughother bodies withouttheir givingway; they
have local motionwithoutany change in theirpassive circumscription.39
37Thereis muchrecent
literature
on thesubject
ofplaceandspace.See e.g.Grant
ofDuhem1985,133-291;
1976,1981aand 1981b;thetranslation
1988,1997,
Trifogli
and 1998b;andMurdoch
1998.
1998a,179-208,
38Cf.e.g.Sorabji1988,192.
39Auriol,
. cit.,a. 2, prop.2 (= Rome438bC-439aC):
loe
"Etpropterea
dicenScriptum,
infalsaimaginatione.
dumestquodistudmedium
fundatur
Oritur
haecdifficultas
quidem
exhocquodphilosophantes
hodiemotum
localem
essetamquam
interminm
imaginantur
ad circumscriptionem
Hoc autemomnino
falsum
essesatisapparet.
Constat
passivam.
utCommentator
deducit
movetur
enim,
, quodultima
localiter,
quartoPhysicorum
sphaera
sednonmovetur
ad aliquod
ubiautcircumscriptionem
Nonenimsphaera
ultima
passivam.
habetextrase corpus
ambiens
etcircumscribens.
localisnonesttamquam
ad
Ergomotus
terminm
formalem
etperse ad ubisivead circumscriptionem
passivam.
si motus
localisessetessentialiter
etperse ad ubi,quodestpassivacircumPraeterea,
variatis
diceretur
essemotum.
Sed
scriptio,
passivis
circumscriptionibus,
corpuslocaliter
hocestomnino
falsum.
enimcircanavemaqua et aere,nonestdubium
Variatis
quod
variatae
suntcircumscriptiones
etcontinentiae.
Nihilominus
navisinflumine
nonestmota.
Etsimiliter
aeremcircaturrem
vento
nullus
diceret
motasit
agitante,
aliquam
quodturris
de locosuo.Nihilominus
aercontinens
motusest,et perconsequens
turris
circumscriptionem
et ambiebatur
ab aere.Ergomotus
localisnonest
amisit,
qua circumscribebatur
inubiquodestpassiva
directe
circumscriptio.
si motus
localisessetperse etdirecte
ad ubi,tuneubeitates
etcircumscripPraeterea,
tiones
fluentes
dicerentur
motus
localismaterialiter,
etsubiectum
talisfluxus
dicepassivae
returlocaliter
moveri.
Sed manifeste
videmus
in turrecircaquamfluunt
oppositum
ubeitates
et circumscriptiones
dumventus
mutat
aeremcircaipsam.
continuae,
passivae

18:23:04 PM

130

CHRISSCHABEL

It is fairlyclear what Auriol wishes to say. By claimingthat place is

the mobile's outer surfaceratherthan the container'sinner surface,he
Aristotlehad with his definitionof
can avoid the common difficulties
for
More
this
context,it also providesAuriol with a
importantly
place.
way to deal withlocal motionindependendyof the physicalmediumor
containerby treatingthe space traversedmore abstractlyas a sort of
quantifiableextension.In Auriol's words:
tothepresItis nottruethatthemobile
is moved
from
thepresence
[ofoneobject]
thebeginning
of
thatitis movedfrom
ence[ofanother]
acrossa space,butrather
ad quern
... theend
theterminus
a quoto theterminus
thespaceto theendas from
ofthismotion.40
function
as thetermini
andthebeginning
ofthe[traversed]
spaceitself
This in turn facilitatesAuriol's avoidance of a space composed of real
and infiniteindivisibles,as the successiontheoryholds. Auriol concludes
his discussionby again employingZeno's paradox againstthe succession
So to
theory,thus refocusinghis attentionon the latitude of forms.41
refutethe successiontheory,avoid the problemof indivisibles,and save
the continuity
of motion,Auriol modifiesthe theoryof local motionthat
is tied to the old theoryof place.
inaliudcontinue
etsuccessive,
secundum
mutatur
ab unocontineri
Tuncenimturris
quod
hocsubieca vento.
Ettarnen
turris
nondicitur
continentia
continue
propter
transportantur
nonestperse terminus,
necperse acquisitummotus
localis.
circumscriptio
Ergopassiva
tumpermotum
localem.
moveri
si poneretur
Praeterea,
posset
peraliud,alio
perimpossibile
quodunumcorpus
veroapudcatholiestimpossibile
secundum
noncedente,
quodutique
philosophos,
possibile
moverenvereetlocaliter
cosin corporibus
nonestdubium
quodtaliacorpora
gloriosis,
in
scintillae
tertio
Beatorum
dicitur
tur,namde corporibus
Sapientiae
quod'tamquam
circumestquodtaliacorpora
nonacquirerent
arundineto
discurren.
Sed manifestum
caelisolimoveatur
infra
Undesi corpusgloriosum
spissitudinem
scriptionem
passivam.
sedsolummodo
simultas
neccontinentia,
damneccedentem,
nullaeritibicircumscriptio
etdirecte
localissitessentialiter
etassistentia.
acquisitio
quodmotus
Ergononestverum
ubeitatum
etpassivarum
circumscriptionum."
40Auriol,
nonestverum
loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.2 (= Rome440bE):"Sic igitur
Scriptum,
immomovetur
moveatur
de praesentia
ad praesentiam
supermagnitudinem,
quodmobile
a quoad terminm
ad quem.
a termino
a principio
tamquam
magnitudinis
usquead finem
terminus
a quo,etalia,praesentia
enimumquam
sitterminus
Nullus
dixitquodpraesentia
huiusmotus."
se habent
sicuttermini
ad quem,sedfinis
etprincipium
ipsius
magnitudinis
41Auriol,
"Mobileenimm toto
loc.t., a. 2, prop.2 (= Rome440bF-441aA):
Scriptum,
in
in potentia.
Et quoniam
sedtantum
punctum
perse et distincte,
spationonattingit
mobile
ea distantia,
suntsimuletin eodemsitu,neccaditinter
simultangentibus
puncta
in potentia
illapuncta,
in movendo
quiasuntunumin situ.Necestibi
attingere
poterit
Tunc
expunctis.
essetcomposita
situsdivisus
inactu.Nonsicautemessetsi totadistantia
se
etinter
sedtantum
se habentia
ibiinfinita
nonse tangentia,
enimessent
consequenter
etsecundum
hocformas
essettaliapertransire,
insitu.Propter
distincta
quodimpossibile
si ponerentur
in uno
essetpertransire,
necse contingentes
infinitas
distinctas
impossibile
formae
accidentalis."
motualterationis
autintensionis

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

131

All of the discussionso far has been in the contextof grace and the
latitudo
, i.e. book one, distinction17, of AurioFs Scriptum
, comformarum
is
Auriol
as
in
at
the
latest.
It
to
view
here
1316
pleted
tempting
leaning
towarda concept of local motion as change of positionacross a threedimensional,incorporealspace. Such a radicalbreakfromAristotlewould
have to be expressedmore explicitly,however,and indeed Auriol still
retainsmanyAristotelian
notionshere.Thus whilehe changesthe definition
of place fromthe passive inner surfaceof the containingbody, he preservesthe elementof surfacein the new definitionof place as the outer
surfaceof the mobile. Moreover,Auriol accepts a meaning of ubi and
which still echoes the Aristotelian
ubeitasas 'passive circumscription',
definition
of place.
When Auriol uses the term ubi,however,he oftenmakes a point of
"
" in
writingsomethinglike quod estpassiva circumscriptio
apposition. By
explicitly
definingthe termubiin each instance,Auriolimpliesthatthere
mightbe anotherway to look at ubi. That this is so is clear in a discussionof the categories,in distinction30 of the Scriptum
, where Auriol
from
the
further
ubi
cannot
be constrays
Philosopher.Stricdyspeaking,
nected to circumscription:
Ifonewereto imagine
a flatspace(magnitudinem)
anda manwalking
on it,while
other
there
is no doubtonewouldunderstand
the
bodyhasbeenannihilated,
every
mantochange
aforesaid
placeacrossthatspace,andyethewouldnotbe encircled.
Thesethings
ubi'
s nature
in thecategories.
It is something
first
said,onecaninfer
leftbehind
in thething
in a place(locato
) byplaceperse. 'Placeperse'
(derelictum)
is saidso thatpassive
is excluded.42
containing
Thus excludingthe old definitionof place, Auriol continuesby claiming
thatthisthingthatis "firstleftbehind" "is a fixedsituation(situs)or position (positio
), and if we allow ourselvesto coin a term,it is clear that
'somewhereness'(<alicubitas
), or being here or thereor somewhere,is left
.43
behind." Ubi stricdyspeakingis nothingbut alicubitas
42Auriol1596,d. 30, 1,a. 3 (681aD;Vb 327vb):
"Undesi quisimaginaretur
unam
q.
ethominem
incedentem
omnialiocorpore,
planam
magnitudinem,
superearn,adnihilato
nondubium
hominem
locummutare
quodintelligeret
praedictum
superipsammagniettarnen
nonambiretur.
Hispraemissis,
ratioubi.
tudinem,
colligi
potest
praedicamentalis
Estenimaliquidprimo
derelictum
in locatoa perse loco.Dicitur
autem'a perse loco'
utexcludatur
continentia
passiva."
43Auriol1596,loc.dt.(681aE-bA;
Vb 327vb):
Illudigitur
ab
quodprimo
derelinquitur
ultimo
sivepositio.
Et si liceret
corporis
tangentis,
quodestlocusperse,et situscertus
nomina
alicubitas
siveessehicvelibiautalieubi
. . . Sic
fingere,
patetquodderelinquitur
ratioubiin rectononestaliudquamalicubitas."
[681b]praedicamentalis
igitur

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CHRISSCHABEL

Auriol makes use of some of the same argumentshe had marshaled

against the old theoryof place, e.g. about wine in a jug, a ship on the
water and in the wind, and the sphere of the universe,to supportthe
identification
of ubi with position ratherthan with passive circumscription. By equating ubi with position,for example, Auriol is able to say
that even the universecan have an ubi,since "if someone were to imagine a space outside,in which the universewould be placed," then one
That is to
could say that it was somewhere,or that it had an alicubitas.
in
or
front
or back,
that
the
universe
was
here
one
could
state
there,
say,
ubi.44
are
the
of
or
and
these
down, etc.,
verydifferentiae
up
is a bridge
AurioPs discussionof ubi in distinction30 of the Scriptum
and his more
betweendistinction17, whichhe here citesexplicitly
twice,45
forbook two, where Auriol completes
maturetreatmentin the Reportatio
his break withAristode.There are threesalientpointsin thistransitional
discussion.First,in distinction30 Auriolis leaningto the view thatplace,
locus,is itselfnothingotherthan ubior position,althoughhe stillhas not
or ubior positions,are "immomade thisexplicit.Second, thesealicubitates,
bile in the whole universe" and "the places (loca) of the universeare
immobile,"which retainsAristotle'srequirementthatplace be immobile
but suggestsan un-Aristotelian
notionof absoluteplace and perhapseven
Aristotlewas
he statesthatin the Physics
dimension.46
Third,
incorporeal
This leaves
of
as
a
container.47
conserving
merelyspeaking physicalplace,
Auriol the option of speakingof place withoutqualification,as it really
is. Auriol hintsthathe will later take Simplicius'lead in his commentary
on the Categories',
,
place is not a qualityinheringin a subject;it is thesis
or position,and connectedto quantityas extension.48
44Auriol1596,loc.cit.(681aF-bA;
unammagniVb 327vb):"Sedsi quisimaginaretur
hicvelibi,
statim
tudinem
universum,
extra,
posset
assignare
ipsum
supraquamponeretur
extrinsece
convelinmedio,
inprincipio,
velalicubi
secundum
scilicet
partes
magnitudinis
taliacorpora
... [681b].. . Ex hocenimhabent
quodsinthicvelibi,extraet
tingentis
ubi."See also681bE-F;
veldeorsum,
antevelretro,
sursum
intra,
quaesuntdifferentiae
Vb 328ra.
45Auriol
mquaesdicebatur
1596,loc.dt.(682bF;Vb 328va):"Ethincestquodsupenus
in dubio. . ." and
tionede augmento
secunda,
secundo,
caritatis,
argumento
propositione
inquaestione
iliadecaritatis
"... sicutsuperius
dictum
fuit
augmento."
(683aC;Vb 328vb):
46Auriol1596,be.cit.(682aB;Vb 328rb):
in toto
suntimmobiles
"Etistaealicubitates
etiam
Exquibus
numerum.
saltem
etsinonsecundum
secundum
universo,
provenit
speciem,
dicuntur
immobilia
..."
locauniversi
quod
47Auriol1596,loc.cit.(682aD;Vb 328rb):
hocergopatetquodrhilosophus
"Secundum
con<4 Physicorum>
de locosimpliciter,
sedmagisde locoqualivirtuoso,
nontractat
seu
etphysico."
And(682b):"Nonvaletetiamquinta,
servativo,
quiaesseinlocophysico
ad ubi,nonestab aliquo
inaliquovaseestutique
sedessealicubi,
contineri,
quodpertinet
contineri."
48Auriol1596,loc.cit.(682aF-bA;
ad quanVb 328rb):"Undepositio
proutpertinet

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PLACE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

133

TheDiscussion
ofPlace in theReportationes
At his deathin early1322 Auriolhad not completedpolishinghis Parisian
4
', based on lecturesgiven in 1316-1318. Thus perhaps five
Reportationes
and the writingof
yearselapsed betweenthe completionof the Scriptum
the presentversionof the ParisianReportationes
, duringwhich timeAuriol
became aware of further
implicationsof his opinion,and decided to make
a sharperbreak fromAristotle'sphysics.In distinction17 of the Scriptum
,
Auriol had said that exclusiveof everyubeitate
and passive circumscription,the heavensmove fromeast to west (cf. above, n. 36). A quotation
fromthe correspondingdistinction17 of Auriol's Parisian Reportatio
on
book one, a passage withoutparallel in the Scriptum
, seems to defendthe
need forabsoluteplace and forabsolute motion:
Ifa newpresentness
is theterminus
oflocalmotion,
itfollows
thattheEarthwould
movelocally.
The proof:
Whatcontinually
a newterminus
of
continually
acquires
moveslocally.
ButtheEarthcontinually
a newpremotion,
continually
acquires
sentness
to thepartsofthesky.Therefore,
etc.The confirmation:
It is impossible
fora formal
element
ofmotion
tobe posited
in a subject
andforthatsubject
not
tomove.Perhaps
itwillbe saidthattheEarthdoesnotmove,although
itacquires
a newpresentness,
becauseitdoesnotgetitviaitsownmotion
butfrom
thesky's
motion.
this:Therefore
is nothing
butflowing
Against
beingmovedin theheavens
topresentnesses.
Foriftheformal
ratio
ofmoving
wereflowing
according
according
topresentnesses,
inanything
where
sucha fluxwerefound,
motion
wouldbe found,
sinceofthosethings
thatarethesamething,
oneis notfound
without
theother.49
By treatingplace apart fromthe physicalmedium and presentness,it
seems thatAuriol is adheringto a notionof absolute place, therebynot
only solvingthe problemsconnectedto the intensionand remissionof
the relativity
of motioninherent
forms,but also the difficulties
surrounding
titatem
nonestaliudquamextensio.
Et hincestquodSimplicius
aitde capitulo
de quannondebetaccipisecundum
intellectum
utestspecies
titate,
quodpositio
quantitatis,
quod
necessarium
sitalicubi
seddicitur
sive'thesis'
Latine,
poniea quaesicponuntur,
'positio'
extensionem
Graece,a 'thein',
quodestcurrere
[682b]vel recedere,
quia ut aestimo
Cf.Simplicius
1975,187.17-20.
significat."
49Auriol, Id. 17,
Staatsbibliothek
Theol.Fol.536,f.
Rep.
pars2, q. 2 (Mss.Berlin,
Antoniana
292scaff.
48va;Padua,Biblioteca
xiii,f.74vb;Vatican
123,ff.84raBorghese
sitterminus
motus
continue
moveb): "Si novapraesentialitas
localis,
sequitur
quodterra
turlocaliter.
Probatio:
illudmovetur
continue
localiter
aliumet
quodcontinue
acquirit
aliumterminm
motus
localis.
Sedterra
continue
aliametaliampraesentialitatem
acquirit
ad partes
caeli.Ergo,etc.Et confirmo
estquodponatur
formali
tas
hoc,quiaimpossible
in subiecto
motus
etquodsubiectum
nonmoveatur.
Dicetur
forte
quodterranonmovenovam
illampermotum
suumsed
tur,licetacquirat
praesentialitatem,
quianonacquirit
ad motum
caeli.Contra:
moveri
in caeloestaliudquamfluere
secundum
igitur
praesentialitates.
Namsiformalis
ratio
moveri
esset
fluere
secundum
inquocumque
praesentialitates,
inveniretur
talisfluxus,
necessario
inveniretur
motus,
quia quae suntidem,unumnon
invenitur
sinealio."

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CHRISSCHABEL

in the old view of local motion.Motion is merelyrelativeunlessit is tied

to somethingimmobile.Unless there is an immobilestandard,thereis
no way to claim that the earthitselfis a rest.But what is thisstandard?
of the subThe answeris providedin Auriol'smostfocussedtreatment
on book two of the Sentences
, exacdy where
ject of place, in his Reportatio
It turnsout that Pierre Duhem
we would expect such a discussion.50
alreadyhad somethingto say about this,and untilnow no one has added
to Duhem's briefbut insightful
remarks:
stated
"isnothing
morethanthedeterminate
"Theplaceofa body,"
Aureol,
position
ofthecontaining
hereorthere.
Placeisaccidentally
thesurface
thatthebodyoccupies
in thesetwopropositions.
summarized
hiswholethesis
body."OurFranciscan
in orderthatthebodytowhich
topositsomething
Letus suppose
thatitsuffices
tochange
thatitsuffices
a determinate
itis referred
placein theuniverse,
occupies
willbe formally
identical
itin orderthatthisbodyis changed;
thisthing,
assuredly,
at several
to theplaceofthebody.Nowletus puta bodyin thesameposition
handwewereto change
itwouldbe in thesameplace.Ifon theother
occasions;
thematter
ofthebodywithout
theposition
it,if,forexammodifying
surrounding
withit thevasethatcontains
it,itwouldchange
place.The
ple,wewereto carry
or thesituation
ofthe
morethantheposition
placeofa bodyis therefore
nothing
bodyin theuniverse.
thedifficulties
withrespect
tothemovement
oftheultimate
Thisdefinition
dispels
is notin a placein thesense
The ultimate
thatno bodysurrounds
sphere.
sphere
of
to thelanguage
thatAristotle
givestheword;itdoesnothavean ubi,according
a situation.
And
Porretanus
andDunsScotus.
Butitdoeshavea position,
Gilbertus
in a changeofubi
doesnotconsist
localmovement
, butin a changeofsituation;
theultimate
from
therefore
moving
locally.51
nothing
prevents
sphere
for book two, distincDuhem's discussionconcernsAuriol's Reportatio
tiontwo,part three,questionone, on the natureof place, and is an accurate summaryof Auriol's argumentsfor his firstproposition[143.15145.3].52 Auriol repeats his equation of place and positionor situation
several times later on. As Duhem notes, Auriol's opinion differsfrom
Aristode'sand that of his Latin predecessorsand contemporariesand
insteadrecallsthe theoriesof Damascius and Simplicius.53
Moreover,the
50An earlier
naturae
deprinpiis
ofAuriol's,
theTractatus
treatise
, ed. Bauer,unfortutherelevant
discussion.
doesnotcontain
nately
51Duhem1985,197-8.ByGilbertus
refers
to theauthor
Duhemactually
Porretanus,
to Gilbertus.
wasformally
which
attributed
oftheSexprincipiorum
52ThetextisAppendix
The
insquarebrackets.
topageandlinenumbers
A. I willrefer
ispurenatimmobile
continentis
"Utrum
locussitsuperficies
primum?"
corporis
question,
uralphilosophy,
andshould
be addedtoGrant1994,724,as oneofthecosmological
queslistof400.
is #276in Grant's
Thequestion
tionsAuriol
asksinhisSentences
commentary.
53Gf.Duhem1985,198.On Simplicius's
seealsoSorabji1988,7-21,andAlgra
stance,
butit seemsthatAuriolwas
1995.Theyemphasize
Physics
commentary,
Simplicius's
Cf.Simplicius
on theCategories.
influenced
1975,185.64-187.20.
bythecommentary

18:23:04 PM

PLACE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

135

questionemphasizesthe place (i.e. position,forAuriol) of a body in the

universe,and so, de primoad ultimum
, local motion is change of position
in the universe[143.22-24; 28]. This is, explicidy,a radical break from
Aristode.In fact,it is the common, or vulgar,way of speakingabout
place thatAuriol espouses [145.30-31].
differences
betweenthe earlierScriptum
The terminological
and the later
II
AurioPs
in
the
Reportatio highlight
departure.Although
quotationjust
given Duhem implies that Auriol himselfretained in all contextsthe
traditionaldefinitionof ubi as the passive containerof a body, we have
seen that this is incorrect.Moreover,Auriol appears to abandon some
of his earlierstatementsabout ubeitas.
Whereas in Scriptum
distinction17,
worriedabout argumentsabout infinitenumbersof ubeitates
in his refutationof the successiontheory,he seemed to take the term out of the
discussion,he now states,"That is moved locally which goes fromone
ubeitasto another" [149.13-14]. Auriol is now using the termdifferendy,
not at all fora passive circumscription,
but as yet anothersynonymfor
place, position,or situation:"A body is not moved fromplace to place
unless it goes fromone ubeitasto another. . . When a body is moved
fromplace to place, it is moved onlywithrespectto ubeitates''''
[149.19-22].
Familiarexamples reinforcethe notion of the basic equivalence of the
variousterms;forexample,"a corpus
does not have a container,
glorificatum
but is in a place (foco),"and "the skyis in a place by the factthatis has
a determinate
position"[144.29-32]. So what we see is a gradual shiftto
all
terms
, ubi, and ubeitas
, with position.
equate
involvingplace, i.e. locus
But withrespectto what does one determineplace or positionin the
universe?One mightthinkthatplace or positionin the universeis with
respectto the poles of the world or otherspecificpointsin the heavens,
a knownalternativeopinion,but Auriol rejectsit, attributing
it vaguely
to others,and emphasizingthat the poles are merelyimaginarypoints
[143.10-14; 145.27-29; 147.16]. 'Respect' is in any case the wrongterm
to use, since Auriol explicidystates that if a body's motion were not
ubeitates
, it would eitherbe accordingto something
accordingto different
absolute or some otherrespect: "Not according to somethingabsolute,
because a body changes fromplace to place with every absolute thing
remainingand stayingthe same. Not according to any other respect,"
Auriolstates,"because I ask, what sortof respectis this?"He again gives
the argumentthat an object, in this case a twig,remains in its place
when the air blows around it. The opponentsays that the twigdoes not
change place, because it keeps its same situationand distance(<iistantiam
)
fromotherobjects,to whichAuriolresponds,"This supportsme, because

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136

CHRISSCHABEL

in thisway place is none otherthan situationitselfand position"[149.22whetherwe use the term'respect'or not,locadmotion
35]. Nevertheless,
occurs while 'everyabsolute' staysthe same.
Above I alluded to Auriol's tendencyto reason by processof elimination to an answerthat,while simpleand unified,is oftenvague and negative, as in the case of the latitudeof forms.When possible,however,
Auriol settleson a theorythat is both simple and unified,on the one
hand, and also precise and positive.One sees thisin Auriol's notionof
accountsfor
esseapparens
that,when applied to vision and epistemology,
both 'normal' visual phenomena and 'anomalies'.54Auriol does the same
with place: A theoryof place must not only account for 'normal' circumstances,but also for'anomalies',such as a towerin the wind,a boat
anchoredon a river,the ultimatesphereof the heavens,or even glorified
bodies, all of which have no stable, passive container.Equating place
withpositionin the universedoes just that,forAuriol.But how does one
establishpositionin theuniverse?
which are objectionsto
At this point Auriol gives eight 'difficulties',
Auriol's equating place with position [151.2-20]. These objectionsare
as "the motiongroundedin Aristotle'sdefinitionof place in the Physics
less inneredge of the containingbody," his categorizationof place in the
of place as
, and several other related traditionalcharacteristics
Categories
to
we
can
Auriol's
reconciliation
Here,
finally,
expect
opposed
position.
in Aristotle'sopera
of the apparentlycontradictory
statements
, and Auriol's
explanationof positionin the universe.
thisis exactlywhere the Rome editionand most manuDisturbingly,
one mustknow. . ." and
scriptsstop,adding "because of thesedifficulties
"whether
the
to
the
next
question,
angelswere createdin the
proceeding
Empyreanheaven." The way Auriol appears to finishin the Rome edition leads one to believe eitherthat he will resolvethe eightdifficulties
in the next question,which he does not, or thatAuriolis placingin serious doubt his own opening conclusions,which is odd and would thereforeplace even PierreDuhem's analysisin doubt.In fact,however,Auriol
in his determination
of the article,in a large
does resolvethe difficulties
sectioncontainedin a minorityof the witnesses.
and completesthe picture
Auriol's determinationis most interesting,
in
of
He draws a dis30
the
he had begun to paint distinction
Scriptum.
tinctionbetweendifferent
ways of understanding
'place', and in doing so
54On esseapparens
, seee.g.Tachau1988,esp.89-104.

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PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

137

appears to be defendinghis real opinion as stated above while at the

same timegivinga plausibledefenseof Aristotle'sand the Commentator's
statementsand the common scholasticopinion. One mightfindthis defensedisingenuous,but it is importantto note thatAuriol was willingto
let the author of the Sex principiorum
lose face, sayingthat he "did not
formal
but
definitions, vulgar ones, or perhaps he was
usually accept
confusedbecause he could not see all the formalrationes
of the six prin55
ciples" [153.18-20].
The distinctionis betweenlookingat place physicallyand lookingat
place metaphysically
[151.22-24],and therecan be no doubtthatthemetaconsideration
of place is the most importantone forAuriol. A
physical
physicistlooks at place among the common materialthingsin the world,
withall of theiraccidentsand sensiblequalities[151.29-152.3],investigating
the issue not to get at the formalquiddityof place, but ratherto examine natural
locadmotion.PerhapsborrowingfromSimplicius,Auriolclaims
thatin naturallocal motion,thingsmove to theirnaturalplaces, where
theirplaces are conservedby the containingbody; indeed theirplaces
are the inneredges of the containingbodies, speakingphysically[153.2556
154.4]. If, on the otherhand, one looks at place metaphysicallyand
the
definition
is
subordinateto the metaphysical then
surely
physical
one is interestedonlyin the quiddityof place [151.28-29], abstracted
from
material
In
"I
this
that
the
existing
things[153.7-8].
way,
say
quiddity
of place is none otherthan the ratioof ubiitself,and so quiddativelyplace
is the categoryubi.On account of this,accordingto a metaphysicalconor position. . . Quiddatively,
sideration,
place is nothingotherthanubiitself,
place is not quantity,but somethingthat applies to quantity;that,how"
ever, is situation{situs)itself,or ubi [152.4-8, 13-14]. So place or position is not a qualityinheringin a mobile,or quantityper se, but rather
a passion of quantity[152.24-26; 154.11].
Auriol'sstanceon place perhapsstemsfroma freshlook at Simplicius,
but also growsout of the developmentof and the debates over the distinctionbetweenmaterialand formalplace and the conceptof the immobilityof place. These discussionshave theirroots in the ideas of some
55Auriol
thissamenegative
oftheauthor
oftheSexprincipiorum
in a
expresses
opinion
similar
in Scriptum
context
I, d. 30 (Auriol
1596,682aD),and,in a trinitarian
discussion,
in d. 27 (Friedman
1997,375).
56Algrathinks
thisis a mereexcuseforAristotle's
confused
statements.
Thereis some
discussion
as to whether
Aristode
was talking
of natural
IV or
merely
placein Physics
whether
whoseviewsSimplicius
thathismaster
had
Theophrastus,
givesus,maintained
doneso. Cf.Algra1995,esp.237-42.

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CHRISSCHABEL

English commentatorsfrom the middle of the thirteenthcenturywho

, and in Aquinas
developed Aristotle'sidea as presentedin the Categories
whose opinion in his PhysicscommentaryGiles of Rome adopted and
passed on. In some ways, Auriol's physicaland metaphysicalplace are
analogous to materialand formalplace, but Auriol's doctrineof metaphysicalplace as the positionof a body in the universeindependentof
both containersand 'cosmic termini'goes much further.57
Using his own distinctionAuriol is freeto explain Aristotleby saying
when he definedplace in book four
that the Philosopherspokephysically
of the Physics'.
"The motionlessinneredge of the containingbody." Part
of the definitiongets at the formalquiddityof place in rectoand inprin: It is motionless.But as such it is just like ubi or position,
dpali significato
which is immobile.The rest of the definition,"inner edge of the containingbody," concernsplace as it is connectedwithmaterialthings,i.e.
in obliquo[152.18-153.2].
The upshot is that Auriol,in dispensingwith a considerationof real
to the side, and
objects,is able to put all objectionsand otherdefinitions
and forto say what he reallywants:What place reallyis, metaphysically
in
of
the
the
is
or
situation
universe,
specific
regardless
mally, position
materialthingsin the universe.In thisway place, or position,is immobile and absolute: the place itselfdoes not move. It is only "accidentally
thesurfaceof thecontaining
body" [143.16-17].It thusappearsthatAuriol's
as the outer surfaceof the mobile was
definitionof place in the Scriptum
a temporarycompromiseon the way to equatingplace withposition,not
a quality,but somethingrelatedto quantityas extension.We mighteven
Auriolis hintingat a mathbe warrantedin sayingthatin the Reportationes
an
absolute
or
ematical, metaphysical,
magnitude,
space, not the ultimate
to
the
heavens
attached
of
the
or
poles of the world.
something
sphere
Only thisprovidesthe basis for absolute place. Therefore,althoughthe
withrespect
ultimatesphereof the heavens "is not in a place physically,
to the ratioof containment,it is certainlyin a place reallyand formally"
[154.6-8].

57I willnotgo intothesecompeting

andmaterial
and
theories
here.On immobility
andTrifogli
formal
1988,254place,seee.g.Grant1981a,63-72;Duhem1985,passim;
68, 1998a,201-8,and 1998b,7-22.

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PLAGE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

139

TheReception
Conclusion:
ofAurioVs
PhysicalTheories
In the contextof the latitudeof forms,AurioPs solutionis both indicativeof the lack of consensuson the issue and, perhaps,of the ultimately
unfruitful
way of approachingthe matterthroughgrace. Auriolwas decisive but also vague and ultimatelyconservativewith the intensionand
remissionof forms,whereiconoclasm,perhapsin the greateruse of mathematical analysis,for example, mighthave been more productive.Still,
his opiniondid not go unnoticed:Soon afterAurioPslecturesthe Oxford
FranciscanWilliamof Ockham aimed his defenseof the classicFranciscan
which Ockham quotes
additiontheorysquarelyat AurioPsmodification,
In Paris, however,Francis of Meyronneswas mindful
at great length.58
of AurioPscriticismof the classic theoryof his order and adopted some
of his intent,althoughhe rejectedAurioPsterminology.59
AurioPsopinion on the issue of
Even on a conservativeinterpretation,
place is a departurefromAristotle.Looked at more boldly,and fromthe
point of view of historiansof the ScientificRevolution,one mightsay
thatAurioPstheoryof place and his worriesabout definingabsolutemotionare smallstepson the way to a Newtonianworldview.AurioPsclearest statements,
however,among the last thingshe wrote,are buried in a
and whereit does existit is
sectionthatis absentfrommostmanuscripts,
oftenin lateradditions.This suggeststhathis opiniondid not have much
directinfluence.For example, writingjust afterAuriol, the Carmelite
John Baconthorpe,who aims his entirediscussionof place at refuting
Auriol,goes so faras to quote AurioPsargumentsforhis firsttwo propositions[143.15-144.24; 144.29-145.3] verbatim,but shows no knowledge
of AurioPsdetermination.60
Thus, althoughDuhem claims thatJoannes
Canonicus and, at least indirectly,Ockham and Francis of Marchia
opposed elementsof AurioPsdoctrine,while Burleymay have borrowed
fromit, thisdoes not mean theyhad AurioPscompletetext.61
Still,Ockham's theory,while not as radical as AurioPs,appears to be
closerto AurioPsthan is any of his scholasticpredecessors'or immediate
58Gf.Ockham1977,519-45(d. 17,q. 7),andalsoDuhem1956,511-2.
59Gf.Francis
ofMeyronnes
Sent.
I, d. 18,q. 2, a. 4 (f.78ra),andalsoMaier
1505-07,
toAuriol
on thispoint.
1968,56,whogoeson to mention
Baconthorpe's
opposition
60Cf.Baconthorpe
1618,II Sent
., d. 3, q. 2, a. 1 ("Quidsitlocus?"pp. 484a-487b),
Auriol
on p. 484aB-bA.
quotine:
61Gf.Duhem1985,198-201,
wasprobably
and224-5.Marchia's
210-1,
opinion
expressed
as Duhemheld.
before
andnotvice-versa
Ockham's,

18:23:04 PM

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CHRISSCHABEL

successors'.62
It is not surprisingthatDuhem did not notice this,because
he did not have access to the missingtext.But Nicholas Bonet, writing
about a decade afterAuriol,did have it. Duhem describesBones theory of place in some depth,concludingthat "the real initiatorof his theorywas someonewho immediatelyprecededhim,Williamof Ockham."63
In fact,however,Bones conclusion,which Duhem quotes in full,reads
likea paraphraseof Auriol's'missing'determination.
AlthoughBonet does
not accept the equation of the termspositionand place, he does follow
Auriol'smeaning.64
It is interesting
thatBonet employs'mathematical'in
of
There
are
two ways of takingplace, one physplace
'metaphysical':65
ical by the physicist,
one mathematicalby the mathematician;the physicistconsidersthe natureof the container,ratherthanplace itself,whereas
the mathematiciantreatsthe surfaceindependendyfromall physicalbodies; place for the mathematicianis absolutelyimmobile,althoughit is
mobile for the physicist,and so on.66Finally,Duhem quotes what he
thinksis Bones main point as given in his own Metaphysics
:
62Ockham's
is described
at length
in Duhem1985,207-20,andGrant1981,
theory
67-72.
63Duhem'streatment
ofBonetis in Duhem1985,229-37,
andthequotation
is from
thatBonetdoesnotmention
at thetimeOckham's
237.Duhemassumes
Ockham
because
namewas"theopposite
ofan authority"
(Duhem1985,237).
64Duhemdoesnotrecognize
ofsitus
andlocus
is thelastof
it,butAuriol's
equation
fiveopinions
on theimmobility
ofplaceagainst
whichBonetargues.Cf.Bonet1503,
Naturalis
VIII,c. 4 (f.74vb).
philosophic
65This
intheeditions
orinBonesreading
ofan Auriol
maybe an error
manuscript,
' areoften
becausetheabbreviations
for'mathematicus'
and'methaphisicus
thesame
however,
andfrequently
confused.
66It should
be notedthatBonetmaynothavehadthe'complete'
sincethefirst
text,
A survive
inonlyonewitness.
from
thefollowing
22 linesofAppendix
Compare
passage,
A [152.15-154.20]:
Bonet's
Naturalis
VIII,c. 4 (Bonet
1503,f.75ra)with
phibsophia
Appendix
de locoestduplexspeculatio,
et alia naturalis,
unamathematica
consideratio
"Quoniam
autemde locomathematica
fuitapudAristotelem
cumdiffinit
locumdicensquodest
continentis
immobile.
Consideratio
autemde loconaturali
siclocum
superficies
corporis
enimutnatNaturalis
diffinit
continentis
immobile
primm.
quodestsuperficies
corporis
uralis
estnonconsidrt
rationem
vasis.Omnisautem
locusqui
loci,sedrationem
proprie
habetrationem
vasismobilis
est.Debesigitur
conadvertere
diligenter
quodmathematica
de locoestconsideratio
sideratio
continentis
corporis
primum
absquehocquod
superficiei
naturale
cuiusestillasuperficies.
Undemathematicus
considat
consideretur
corpus
superficiem
in quo corpore
sivesit
aerisambientem
et continentem
noncurando
existt,
immediate,
aervelaliquidaliud,sedprecise
considrt
illamsuperficiem.
Et utsitabsoluta
ab omni
naturali
immobilis
est,quia omniamathematicabilia
(?) suntimmobilia,
quia
corpore
abstrahunt
a motuet a materia
Nec in taliabstractione
estmendacium,
sensibili.
quia
est
considrant
hecpreter
considrt
nonhecsinehis.Ideolocusutde eo mathematicus
mobilis
omnino
immobilis
. . . Secundum
autemconsiderationem
naturalem
est,ettantum
utscilicet
estincorhabetrationem
locinaturalis
vasis,
quia<est>consideratio
superficies
istoet ilio,et illasuperficies
estbenemobilis
et subiective
etobiective
..
porenaturali
Notethatthepassagemaybe corrupt.

18:23:04 PM

SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

PLAGE,

141

in conceptual
Letus first
existence
speakoftheseparation
practiced
(esse
)...
cognito
theintellect
canabstract
a particular
from
formagnitude
can
anysubject,
magnitude
inwhich
itinheres
takeconceptual
existence
without
thesubject
alsotoexist
having
is nothing
thustoabstract
otherthantoconsider
thiswithout
considconceptually;
that.He whoaccomplishes
is notlying.
suchan abstraction
Suchan abstracering
a magnitude
fromanysubject
tionthatseparates
and sensible
matter
is properly
in fact,consider
of bodieswithout
themagnitudes
mathematical;
mathematicians,
toknowin whatwaythesemagnitudes
exist.67
having
Even thispassage,especially
withitsessecognition,
seemsto be an extrapolation
fromAuriol.68If Duhem is rightthat Bonet's positioncould, or would,
otherwisehave been inspiredby Ockham, then perhaps Auriol exerted
some influenceon the Venerable Inceptor'sopinion.69Moreover,Bonet's
wordsin the quoted paragraphare almostwithoutdoubt the inspiration
forFranciscusToletus (1532-1593),whose opinionEdward Grant uses to
illustrate
the Renaissancetrendwithinthe Aristotelian
traditionto undermine the Philosopher'sconcept of place and space.70How Auriol's theory influencedthe course of physicsthen is an interesting
question.
But the presentanalysisis merelya briefand somewhatsuperficial
introductionto some of Auriol's physicaltheories.It is clear, however,
that discussionsof a 'purely' philosophicalor scientificnature can be
foundin theologicalwritings.
Ironically,Auriol'smove away fromAristotle
on the issue of place and space is more purelyphilosophicalthan many
slightlylater departuresin non-theologicalcontexts,which may demonstratethe influenceof the condemnationsof 1277 or at least of the debate
over God's power.71It is also clear, however,that for Auriol the interplay betweentheologyand philosophyis constant,or ratherthereis no
67Duhem1985,236.I havetodisagree,
withDuhem's
claimthatspacewhich
however,
hasessecognitum
exists
within
theintellect.
merely
only
68AtthetimeBonetwas
Auriol's
mostsympathetic
ofanysignificance
reader
perhaps
inthecontext
offuture
so there
(cf.Schabel1994,245-56),
contingents
maybe a general
here.
influence
69It is
thatAlgra1995,230,callsOckham's
"theonlyreally
satisinteresting
position
solution
to theproblem
at issuehere."
factory
[Aristotelian]
70On Toletus,
seeGrant1976,155-9,esp.157,where,
Grantdoesnotgive
although
theLatin,theposition
described
is a paraphrase
ofBonet.I quotefrom
another
edition,
Toletus
modoincommuni
ab hocveliliospaciosin1615,f.122ra:"Altero
abstrahendo,
incommuni
inquo modosuntcorpora;
totius
mundi
abstragulorum
corporum,
spacium
ab hoc vel iliocorpore,
et haecconsiderado
nonestficta,
sed vera.
hendo,inquam,
abstrahentium
nonestmendacium
... etitaconsideramus
hocspacium
abstracSiquidem
tumin communi,
nonhabitorespectu
ad subiecta
sicutmathematicus
consingularia,
in abstracto
sidrt
. . ." Toletusalso knewand refuted
Auriol'sopinion
quantitatem
he assigned
it to certain
moderni.
Cf.Toletus1615,ff.
, although
equating
placewithubi
118ra-band 118vb-119ra.
71On thisissueseee.g.Grant1976andMurdoch
1998.

18:23:04 PM

142

CHRISSCHABEL

division:Theological truthsare scientificdata, and natural phenomena

impact theologicaldiscourse.In the presentcontext,it is perhapsimpossible to tell whetherAurioPsdoctrineof place was developed independently,or grew out of his theoryof the intensionof grace, or even had
its originsin an effortto explain the natureof angels and glorifiedbodies.72It may in the end be a senselessquestion to ask of a systematic
thinkerlike Auriol. In any case it is hoped thatwith the eventualcomand
pletionof the criticaleditionof all of AurioPsSentences
commentary,
withthe editionof more materialof the same genrefromAurioPsimmediate predecessorsand successors,we will be in a betterpositionto put
AurioPsviews in theirproper contextand to properlyinterpretthem.
Nicosia
University
of Cyprus

72Auriol
inbookIV,
bodiesina veryinteresting
treats
theplaceofglorified
discussion
d. 48,parsprima,
Auriol
oftheRomeedition,
qq. 1-3(q. unica,aa. 1-3,in224bD-228aF
is in explicit
withwhatAuriol
1605).Thistreatment
saysin bookII (cf.q. 1,
agreement
butI cannotdetermine
ifthisis Auriol's
ultimate
Thanks
226aA-B),
pointofdeparture.
to LaugeNielsen
forpointing
to thispossibility.

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

143

APPENDIX A
<Petri Aureoli>
<Reportatio

in 2umlibrum Sententiarum>

<DlSTINCTIO2a, PARS3A, QUAESTIO1A>

Utrumlocus sit superficiescorporiscontinentisimmobileprimum?
corporiscon- 5
Quantumad primumarguo primoquod locus sitsuperficies
4 Physicorum
tinentis
, et Commentatorem
primoimmobile,per Aristotelem,
loci.
ibidem,commento41, qui dicit hanc esse completamdefinitionem
In oppositum est quia mutato continente,puta aere circumstante,
4 Physicorum.
mutareturlocus, quod falsumest per Aristotelem,
Dices: non mutatur,quia manet idem formale,scilicetidem respectus 10
ad polos mundi.
mutaturseu corrumpitur
Contra.Mutato fundamento,
respectus;igitur
mutatocontinente,mutaturetiam respectusfundatussuper continensad
polos mundi.
Respondeo. Pono hic duas propositiones.Prima est quod locus per se 15
et primonon est aliud quam positio,puta hic vel ibi. Secunda est quod
Tertioex his inferam
per accidenslocus est superficies
corporiscontinentis.
quaedam quae communiterdicunturde loco.
<Articulus
primus>
20

<Primaconclusio>

Primamconclusionemprobo,primoquia illudest formaliter

ratioloci, quo
circa
dicitur
determinatum
locum in toto
locatum
habere
locatum,
posito
et universo;sed ex hoc quod res habentdeterminatam
positionem,habent
determinatum
situmet locum in universo;igituretc. Maior nota est. Probo
minorem.Pone enim quod corpus aliquod sit in determinatapositione, 25
puta hic vel ibi, et varia, quantumcumque volueris,ipsum continens,
9 est] om.Fb 10formale]
formaliter
om.Pj 22 habere]
esse
PcPgVi 22 circalocatum]
add.DFbPj 24 situm
. . . locum]ino.FcNPgVgX
6 Gf.Aristoteles,
IV, c. 4: 212a20-21
(ALVII 1.2,p. 150,11.6-7). 6 Averros,
Physica
41 (Aris
InAristotel
totelisOpera
cum
Averrois
comm.
Commentariis
, ibidem,
, voi.4, ed.
Physicam
9 Gf.Aristoteles,
Venice1562,ff.139L-140B).
ibidem:
212al2-20(ALVII 1.2,pp. 149,
1. 17-150,1.6).

18:23:04 PM

144

10

15

20

25

CHRISSCHABEL

res semper remanebitin eodem determinatoloco. Similiter,pone idem

continens,puta vas, et varia rationempositionis,hie scilicetvel ibi, non
remanebitidem determinatuslocus; quare etc.
Secundo probo eandem conclusionemsic: motuslocalis per se et primo
est ad locum. Tunc sic: locus per se et formaliter
est illud ad quod primo
videlicet
estmotuslocalis;sed motuslocalisprimoet per se estad positionem,
idem
hic
vel
etc.
Maior
Probo
est
minorem,
ibi; quare
quia
quod
quod
patet.
aerem vel aquam, adhuc terra,si ponereturiuxtainterstitium
circumscribe
lunae, movereturad centrumsicut ad locum; tunc autem centrumnon
esset aliquod continens,sed determinatapositio sive determinatumhic;
quare etc.
Tertio arguo ad idem sic: ilia sunt eadem quorum per se differentiae
sunteaedem; sed differentiae
positioniset loci suntomninoeaedem; igitur
locus idem est quod positio.Maior patet.Probo minorem,quia differentiae
sed
positionissuntante et retro,sursumet deorsum,dextrumet sinistrum;
hae eaedem suntdifferentiae
loci, quia ista est divisioper se locorum:alius
est inferiuset alius superius,etc.
Confirmo,quia hae differentiae
sursum,et deorsum,et huiusmodinon
conveniuntcorpori continentinisi per determinatampositionem;non
autem per continensin quantum continens,quia illud non determinat
sibiquod sitsuperius,nec inferius,
nec aliquam aliam propriamdifferentiam
loci.
Quarto arguo per locum a coniugatis:quia locari est situarisive poni,
igiturlocus est positio.
factamper 'ubi' respondeturpositio,
Quinto, quia ad interrogationem
ut "ubi est?" respondetur,"extra", "intra",et huiusmodi;quare etc.
<Articulussecundus>
<Secunda conclusk

non habet
Secundam conclusionemprobo, tum quia corpus glorificatum
30 continens,et tarnenest in loco.
Secundo, quia caelum est in loco per hoc quod habet determinatam
positionem.
.
manebit
1 remanebit]
PbPjVi 5 ad*]aliudFbPb 7 quod2]om.PbPcVi;si Pj; velexp
14
idem
inv.
13
irw.
8
infra
ad
add.
sunt
Pi;
est]
omnino]
PcPjVi;
iuxta]
Pj
Pj
PjVg
17alius]estadd.NPbX 18et1]om.FcPgPjViX
idemFb 15et2]om.DFcNPbPgPiPjVi
rendetur
etexp.PgPjVi 25 respondetur]
23 locari]etadd.FbFcPbPi;
Pj 26 ut]om.FcN;
inv.FcPgVg31 hoc]om.
i.m.Pg;etPj 26 respondetur]
rendetur
"intra"]
Pj 26 "extra"
FcNPgVg

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

145

sunt in partTertio,quia 'sursum','deorsum',et huiusmodidifferentiae

ibus singulis,et ut sic accidit eis quod sint contiguae,vel continuae,vel
contentae.
<Articulus
tertius>
<Solutioinstantiarum
contrailia quae dicunturde loco>

Tertioprincipaliter
salvo quae dicunturde loco. Diciturenim de loco quod
est quantitascontinuaet distinctaspecies quantitatiscontinuae.Ista volo
declarare,et ut melius videaturpropositum,primo insto et secundo ex
solutioneinstantiarum
propositumostendo.
10

<Instantiae>

<1> Primo sic: propriumest loci conservare;sed conservatioinest loco

per qualitatesactivas et passivas,non per quantitatem;igiturlocus ultra
includitformaliter
quantitatem
qualitates,alias conservarenon inessetloco
7 Metaphysicae.
per propriamrationemloci. Haec est ratioCommentatoris,
<2> Secundo, quia quantitasest accidens absolutumreale; sed locus non 15
est huiusmodi;igituretc. Maior patet. Probo minorem,quia impossibile
est quod idem accidensreale sit realiterin tribus;sed locus potestfundari
in tribussubiectis- puta si idem locatumsitin aere, aqua, et terra,idem
in illis tribus;quare etc.
locus fundabitur
<3.1> Tertio, quia quantitasest formaliterquid absolutum;sed formale 20
loci non est quid absolutum;igituretc. Maior nota est. Probo minorem,
primo quia secundum communemopinionemlocus est ultimumcontinentis.Tune sic: aut est ultimumabsolute,et tunc non differret
nec esset
Aut non absolute,sed sub hac habitudine
quantitasdistinctaa superficie.
in quantumcontinens;et si sic, habeo propositum,tunc enim locus erit 25
respectus.
<3.2> Secundo, quia locus diciturimmobilisquantum ad suum formale;
sed non estimmobilisnisiquo ad distantiam
certamad polos mundi;quare
etc.
Haec sunt dubia quae oriripossuntcirca ea quae communiterdicun- 30
tur de loco.

2 et]om.FbPi 6 salvo]solvoPbVgX,Bac 7 distincta]

cett.
DFbPbPj,Vgac(!);discreta
15absolutum]
om.VgViX 27 suum]situm
Pj; esseadd.Pi 14 noninveni

18:23:04 PM

146

CHRISSCHABEL

<Responsionesaliorumad instantias>

10

15

20

25

30

Nunc solvoad ista.Ad cuiusevidentam

primoponam aliorumresponsiones
dantur
Secundo
communiter.
quae
respondeoiuxta positionemmeam.
dicunt
ad
Quantum
aliqui quod sicut in relationealiud est
primum,
aliud
quod secundumdici, sic in omni
quod est relatiosecundum esse,
et secundum
alio genere est aliquid quod est in tali genere essentialiter
esse, et aliquid quod est in eo tantumsecundumdici. Verbi gratia,sanitas
scientiaet virtutes,
et pulchritudosuntessentialiter
relationes,consimiliter
, et tamen ponunturde genere qualitatis
per Philosophum,7 Physicorum
est secundumdici.
ibidem et in Praedicamentis
, quod intelligendum
Tunc respondentad dubia.
<-l> Ad primum,quod locus non est in genere qualitatis,ratio est quia
si sic, esset in tertiaspecie; sed hoc non, cum tertiaspecies qualitatissit
sensibilisqualitas, quod non convenitloco.
Ad motivmillud,quod de rationeloci est conservare,respondentquod
locato conservati.Non enimconservatur
acciditloco conservareet similiter
in quantumlocatum,sed in quantumtalisnaturaest. Unde acciditlocato,
nam locatumpotestesse ut in
in quantumlocatumest,quod conservetur,
sicut in aliquo sibi convenienti.
loco in aliquo sibi disconvenienti,
Dices: igiturlocus non est de considerationephysici.
Respondentquod immo, in quantum est continuum,et ad ipsum est
primo motus localis sicut ad terminm.
<-2>Ad secundumrespondentquod ad unitatemloci sufficit
contiguitas,
sed ad unitatemlocati requiriturcontinuitas.
Sed secundumhanc conclusionemratioconcluderet,quia vel locus non
haberetproprieunitatemper se, vel si sic, idem accidens fundabiturin
pluribussubiectis.
distincIdeo aliterdiciturquod sunttria ubi, sicutsunttressuperficies
tria
et
ex
ubi, quia tres
tae, scilicetaquae, aeris, et terrae,
consequenti
activae et passivae. Nec est inconveniensidem corpus
circumscriptiones
habere tresubeitatesin tribuspartibussuis, sicut nec habere albedinem
et nigredinemin diversispartibus.
rationes
2 primoponam]ponoprimoFcNPgVgX;
primoponoPiVi 2 responsiones]
om.DPbVi;s.l.Pj; sicexp.Pj 5 in omni]enimin VgX,
DFcNPcPgVg3 communiter]
lociPj 18esseut]esse
Ygpcs.l.;enimN, Pgac;in FcPcPj 15de. . . est]estde ratione
cett.25 quia]quodFcNPbPgVgViX
FbPiPj;solutionem
Y)ac'inv.Y)pc 25 conclusionem]
31 nec]nuncPj
9 Cf.Aristoteles,
VII,c. 3: 246b21-247b29
(ALVII 1.2,pp.266,1.1-267,1.21).
Physica
1.8).
10Aristoteles,
Praedicamenta
, c. 8: 8b25-9a28
(ALI 3, pp. 101,1.35-103,

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

147

Item, non est inconveniensquod idem corpus sit in diversislocis non

distantibusdistantiaalia et alia secundumspeciem.
<-3.1>Ad ultimumdicuntquod formalein loco est continere,quod nihil
absolutumponitsupersuperficiem
corporiscontinentis.Quod patet,quia
si Deus annihilaretcorpuslocatumet retineret
lateracontinentis
distantia,
illud continensnon esset locus, quia locus non est sine locato, et tarnen
nihil absolutumesset corruptumin ipso continente.Dicunt igiturquod
locus est in genere relationissecundum esse, sed secundum dici est in
locati.
generequantitatis.Hoc enim modo non est aliud quam superficies
<-3.2>Ad ultimumdicunt quod locus est immobilis,quia certa distantia ad polos et ad centrumest invariabilis,quantumcumquecontinens
transmutetur.
Contra hoc arguo, quia distantiailla subiectiveest in corporelocante;
tunc igituraut oportetquod accidens migretde subiecto in subiectum,
aut necessario,corruptoaltero continente,corrumpitur
distantiailla.
sunt
illa
Item,poli
quaedam punctaimaginata;igitur distantiaad polos
non est aliquid reale, sed imaginatum;igiturest ens rationis;non igitur
locus eritaliquid reale.
Ideo aliterdiciturquod locus moveturper accidens,non per se, nam
moveturad motumcorporiscontinentis,
et corrumpitur
ilio corrupto,sed
per se non moveturnec corrumpitur,
quia quod per se moveturest per
se in loco, locus autem non est in loco.
Ad probationemigitur,quando diciturquod Aristoteles
dicitquod locus
estvas immobile,dicuntquod ista duo loca censenturesse idem locus pro
eo quod locus est terminusmotuslocalis,quia non quaerereturlocus nisi
proptermotum;sed ista duo non sunt terminusnisi unus. Quod patet,
primoquia locus praecedenset sequens non distantin aliqua magnitudine
interiori;quare ab eodem non potest esse motus in alium; igiturnon
possuntesse duo termini,sed sunt necessariounus terminus.Secundo,
motumeodem motu,etc.
quia idem mobilesupereandem magnitudinem
Dicetur:igiturterraquiescenslocalitermovebitur,quia mutabitlocum
mutatocontinenteet variato.
Respondentquod non sequitur,"hoc corpusest in alio loco quam prius;
igiturestmutatumsecundumlocum",sed sequitur,"igiturvel est mutatum
vel eiuslocusestmutatus".In formisenimrelativis,
ad mutationem
localiter,
relativinon oportetsemperquod fiatmutatioin subiecto,sed sufficit
quod
11et]om.FcNPg 16poli]po<->liPj 24 censentur]
conse<->Fb;consecuntur
Pi 25
X 34mutatum2]
Pb;requireretur
DFbPiX;variaquaereretur]
queretur
DFbVg;quereret
tusVi; mutatus
cett.

18:23:04 PM

10

15

20

25

30

35

148

CHRISSCHABEL

alteram
fiatin termino.Ad hoc igiturquod virganon sit in aqua, sufficit
duorum,vel quod virga sit mota, vel quod aqua sit mota.
Haec sunt quae communiterdicunturab aliis.
<PrimapropositioAureoli contra responsionesaliorum>
5

10

15

20

25

30

Sed ista mihi non placent. Ideo pono duas propositiones.

Prima est quod rationem loci non constituitrelatio sive respectus.
Secunda erit de immobilitateloci.
Primumsic probo: illudnon est formaliter
relatioquo aliquid est formaliterdistinctaspeciessub quantitate.Probo istam,quia speciesconstituuntur
7
sub genereper aliquid quod pertinetad genusper se, per Aristotelem,
sed
locus
est
distincta
formaliter
per proMetaphysicae'
species quantitatis
priam rationemlocabilitatis;igiturratio locabilitatisut sic non est relatio, sed est de genere quantitatis.
Nec valet quod dicuntalii, quod locus est relatiosecundumdici, quia
species,sive secundumesse sive secundumdici, oportetquod constituatur
per aliquid illiusgeneris,alias non essetmagisistiusgenerisquam alterius.
Tum quia ratio mensuraeconvenitper se loco, locari enim est mensurare; sed ratio mensuraeprimo convenitquantitati;igiturlocus primo et
per se est quantitas,non igiturquantitassecundumdici.
Item, locari passive non est relatio,immo est praedicamentumdistinctum'ubi'; igiturex alia parte locare active non est relatio;non igitur per se et primo et secundumesse locus est relatiosive respectus.
Et quod opinio alia dicit de sanitate,quod est ad aliquid, non est
verum.
Et ad Aristotelem,7 Physicorum
, respondeo.Aristotelesvocat ibi 'formas ad aliquid' omnes formasquae consistuntin quadam pluriummedietate, sive quae sunt connexionessive resultationespluriumformaram.
Ad talia enim non est motusquia suntad aliquid, id est quia esse eoram
consistitin quadam medietate pluriumet proportione.Ideo valde aequivoce accipituribi ad aliqui et in proposito.

N
om.perhomoeo.
8 Primum]
N 11-13formaliter
. . . quantitatis
primo
FcPgViX;
primam
Pgac;
12 igitur
om.
. . . locabilitatis]
locatiFcPcVgViX,
(N) 17 locari]
perhomoeo.
FcPgVgX
verbi
lociPgpcs.l.;locusY]ac 21 'ubi'igitur]
Metaphysice
gratia
NPcVgX 25 Physicorum]
FcVgX
11 Gf.Aristoteles,
VII, c. 12: 1037bl7-1038a9
(AL XXV 3.2,pp. 156-157,
Metaphyskae
11.661-685).

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

149

<Secunda propositioAureolicontra responsionesaliorum>

Secunda propositiode immobilitateest quod dicere quod ideo locus est
immobilis,licetvarieturcontinens,quia continensistudet illud non sunt
nisi unus terminusmotus localis, non salvai unitatemet immobilitatem
loci. Arguo enim sic secundumillos de alia opinione:illa censenturunus 5
locus quae sunt terminusunius motus localis; sed continensprimmet
secundumnon suntunus terminusunius motuslocalis,quia non fundant
unum ubi numero; ubi autem est terminusmotus localis; quod autem
non fondentunum ubi numero patet, quia alias accidens migraretde
10
subiectoin subiectum.
Et illa solutioquae daturad illam rationem,quae fortisest contraeos,
videlicetquod quiescensdicereturmoverilocaliter,mutatoet variatocontinente,non valet aliquid ad propositum.Illud enim moveturlocaliter
quod transitde una ubeitatead aliam. Sic est in proposito,quando circa
15
aliquod quiescensvariaturcontinens.
Dices: non mutaturlocalitercorpusper hoc quod transitde una ubeitate ad aliam nisi transeatper mutationemsui; in propositoautem transit per mutationemipsarumubeitatum.
Contra.Non alitermoveturcorpusde loco ad locum nisiper hoc quod
fitsub alia et alia ubeitate.Cum enim dicis quod "verumest quando hoc 20
fitper mutationemcorporis",contra:secundumnihilaliud mutaturcorpus
cum moveturde loco ad locum quam secundumubeitates.Da enim aliud
secundumquod mutetur;non secundumaliquod absolutum,quia stante
et remanenteeodem omni absoluto,corpus mutaturde loco ad locum.
Nec secundumrespectumaliquem alium,quia quaero cuiusmodirespectus 25
est ille; quare etc. Igitursi aer moveaturcirca virgam,eodem modo virga
diceturmoveride loco ad locum sicutsi virgatransiret
de aere in aerem,
aere remanenteimmobili.Igiturvirga tunc mutabitlocum; nullam enim
aliam habetvirganisiipsiusubi, quando continenscirca ipsam
mutationem
30
variatur.
Diciturigituraliterquod virga non mutatlocum, dato quod mutetur
aer circumstans.Ratio est quia retineteundem situmet distantiam.
Sed si sic dicatur,puto quod verumdicatur.Sed hoc accipio pro me. Ex
hoc enim apparetquod locus non est aliud quam situsipse et positio,ut
35
declaratumest in prima conclusione.
3 licet]si FcN;sedPc; quianonX 3 istud
. . . illud]illudFcN,Pgac;et illudPgpc'ilia
localiter
ideoNVgX 20 sub]ab Pj 26-27virga
FcNViX,
VgX 4 localis]
Pgac 4 non1]
inu.PiVgX 29 ipsam]illamFcNPgVgX;
dicetur]
ipsumPb 31 locum]om.FcVgX;s.l.
Pg 34 ipse]om.Pc; illeFcNPgVgX

18:23:04 PM

150

CHRISSCHABEL

Sed quomodo positio est quantitas?

Respondeo. Dico quod positioest quantitasdistinctaa corpore,superficie,et linea, ut salveturquod locus sit quantitasdistincta.Arguo enim
sic: sicut se habent partes superficiei,
vel corporis,vel lineae, sic omne
5 partesad suum,et per consequenstotumad totumsitum;sed pars lineae,
superficiei,vel corporissic se habet ad partem suam situs quod difert
ab ea; unde potestquaelibet pars data suum situmamitere,quare totus
situsdiffera toto corporeet e converso.Resttigiturut positio,quae est
in linea, non sit linea. Et cum sit quoddam continuum,resttquod sit
10 quantitasdistinctaa linea. Eodem modo arguo de situqui est in corpore
et sic de ceteris.
respectusuperficiei,
respectucorporiset de situsuperficiei
Quare universaliter
positioest speciesquantitatisdistinctaa linea,corpore,
et superficie.Haec est intentioPhilosophiin Praedicamentis
, quod singulae
ad
eundem
terminm
corporisparticulae
copulantur,quia obtinenteundem
ideo
est
15
locum;
corpus
quantitasposita. Unde dicitquod quantitates
habentespositionemsunt linea, etc.; non dicit quod sintpositiones.
<ResponsionesAureoli ad instantias>
Tunc ad dubia.
<-l> Ad primumdico quod locus vas, rationeconformisqualitatis,bene
20 conservt,non tamen situsproprie. Quomodo autem distinguatur
locus
vas a loco situ,et positione,infradicam.
<-2>Ad secundumdico quod situsnon est in duobus subiectis.Est enim
in situatoet positout in subiecto,non in ipso continente.
Ideo non numeratur per eum.
25 <-3.1>Ad tertiumpatet quomodo differa superficie.
<-3.2>Ad aliud dico quod situs est immobilis,quia non mutaturnisi ad
tis.
mutationemsituati,non autem ad mutationemconfinen

3 ut. . . distincta]
add.
om.DFcNViVgX4 lineae]ad partes
situsadd.D; ad suumsitum
Fe 5 suumPjac'situm
add.i.m.Pb;sivead situm
add.
add.N; situm
DPgVg,Pj'pc'situm
. . . situs]
X 6 habet]
add.Vi;suisitus
habent
Pi;totum
FcNPgX 6 partem
partem
partes
+ ? Pc; situm
suisitus
situsD; suampartem
add.i.m.supra
Pj (pc)'ad situm
Pj; partem
X 12 Quare]om.FbPi 16 etc]et ibiD; etctamen
Fc; et tamen
PbViX;etcettamen
? Pj 19vas]om.FcNVgX
Vg;et conclusio
13 Cf.Aristoteles,
Praedicamenta
, c. 6: 4b20-5a24
(ALI 3, pp.92,1.30-94,1.3).

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

151

<Articulus
quartus)
<Difficultates
octo>
Sed hic sunt aliquae difficultates.
definiendolocum,4 Physicorum
<dl> Primaest quia Aristoteles,
, dicitquod
locus est ultimumcontinentisimmobile primum,nullam faciens mentionemde situ et positione.Non igiturlocus est essentialiter
positio, vel
Aristoteles
fuitinsufficiens.
dicit quod locus est quan<d2>Item secundo,Aristotelesin Praedicamentis
titashabens positionem;non igiturest positio.
<d3>Tertio,quia tunevideturquod sintduo genera distinctaloci, scilicet
locus vas et locus positio.
<d4>Quarto, quia positio est ordo partium;ordo est relatio;igiturpositio est relatio;igiturlocus est relatio.
<d5> Quinto, quia tunc una species quantitatisesset subiectumalterius,
quia linea subiectumpositionis.
<d6>Sexto,quia quantitascontinuanon est nisi quaedam partibilitas;sed
positionon videtur esse huiusmodi.
<d7> Septimo,quia tunc videturquod locus sit de genere 'ubi'. Positio
enim qua virga dicitursic posita non videturaliud quam quoddam ubi.
<d8>Octavo, quia de rationeloci est continere.

10

15

20

<SolutionesAureoli ad difficultates>
sciendumest quod ratio loci aliteraccipitursePropteristas difficultates
cundumconsiderationem
alitersecundumconsiderationem
metaphysicam,
enim
dfinit
physicam.Physicus
per materiam,non quidem per materiam
est
altera
quae
pars
compositi,quia hoc modo metaphysicusdfinitper 25
materiam,sed debet hic accipi 'materia*pro omni eo quod est extra
rationemquidditatis.Secundum hoc igiturdiflfert
consideratiometaphysial a consideratione
tantummodo
physici,quia metaphysicus
accipitillud
intrinsece
ad
sed
materialia
et
quod
pertinet quidditatem, physicusaccipit

6 et]om.Pj 10loci]locatiFcNVg 14quantitatis]

qualitatis
FcNPg 19qua]quiaFbPi,
loci. . . dictum
Pjac,quePg 151.22-152.14
quodratio
est]Fc;om.ceti,
(cessant
FbNPcPiVgViX)
29 sed]metaphysicus
esp. Fc
4 Cf.Aristoteles,
IV,c. 4: 212a20-21
Physka
(ALVII 1.2,p. 150,11.6-7). 8 Cf.Aristoteles,
Praedicamenta
, c. 6: 4b20-24
(ALI 3, pp. 92,1.30-93,1.4).

18:23:04 PM

152

CHRISSCHABEL

accidentia ac extranea quidditati.Unde concernitin sua consideratione

qualitatessensibilessecundumquas res ipsa est subiectamotui,actioni,et
passioni.
Tunc ad propositum,dico quod de per se quidditateloci non est aliud
5 quam ratio ipsius ubi, et ideo locus quidditativeest in praedicamento
non est
ubi. Quapropterlocus,secundumconsiderationem
metaphysicam,
aliud quam ipsum ubi sive positio.Et nota quod immediatumsubiectum
estquantitascontinua.Unde nihilestsituabileprimoet per se nisiquantum,
ut alibi apparere poterit.Haec est intentioCommentatorisexpressa,5
10 Metaphysicae
, capitulode quantitate,ubi redditrationemquare Aristoteles
Et
ibi non numeratlocum interspecies quantitatissicut in Praedicamentis.
dicit"et fortedimisithie locum quia apud ipsumlocus est de passionibus
quantitatis".Igiturquidditativelocus non est quantitas,sed aliquid quod
accidit quantitati.Illud autem est situsipse, sive est ubi, ut dictumest.
15
Sed secundum physicam considerationem,locus ultra ipsum ubi et
et sic locus physice
situmdicitaliquid materiale,puta ultimumcontinentis,
non est aliquod unum ens per se, sed est unum per accidens ex duobus
praedicamentisaggregatum.Aut si non placet quod sit ens per accidens,
ita quod includatres duorumgenerumin rectoet in principalisignificato,
20 oportetsaltem dicere quod aliquid includat in recto,puta quidditatem
ipsius loci; et in obliquo per modum connotatiincluditillud quod est
materialeipsi loco, scilicetultimumcontinentis.
definivit
locumphysice,dixitquod est ultimum
Et idcirco,ubi Aristoteles
situltimumcontinentis
immobileprimum,non quod formaliter
continentis
25 et quidditative,quia sic esset quantitas secundum substantiamet non
esset passio quantitatis,quod improbatCommentatorubi supra. Unde
4 Physicorum
, definienslocum, capit illud quod est formalein loco in
hoc quod dicit "immobileprimum".Non enim locus est immobilisnisi

5 ratio]lociexp.Fe 7 nota]nonFc 15 Sed]quodubiPbPgPj;quodD 15 locus]et

om.Pb
locusadditPbPgPj;locusadditD 16 dicit]om.DPbPgPj 16 et sic. . . physice]
16 et]ut DFc (om.Pb) 17 est1]sitDFc 18 aggregatum]
Pj 18 Autsi. . .
aggregatis
D 18 Aut]quodPbPg;sed Pj (om.D) 18 placetquod]om.
om.perhomoeo.
accidens]
om.Fc 21 illud]om.PbPgPj
PbPgPj 19 quod]s.l.D; nonadd.PbPgPj 19 generum]
Pb 23 ubi]om.
. . . continentis1]
om.perhomoeo.
22 ipsi]ipsoPgPj 23-24Et idcirco
etadd.Pj (om.Pb) 25 subdfinit
DPgPj(om.Pb) 23 physice]
DPgPj(Pb)23 definivit]
subiectum
subiectum]
DPbPgPj 27 4e] 3 Fc]
stantiam]
inlibrum
comm.12(Averrois
InAristotel
9 Cf.Averros,
V, c. 5 (dequantitate),
Metaphysicam
27
Bern1971,
ed. R. Ponzalli,
V.Metaphysicorum
Aristotelis
Commentarius,
p. 161,11.88-90).
Cf.Aristoteles,
IV, c. 4: 212a20-21
(ALVII 1.2,p. 150,11.6-7).
Physica

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

153

quia situsvel ubi est immobile.Gapit etiam materialecum dicit"ultimum

continentis".
Hiis visis,patet solutioad instantias.
<-dl> Ad primumdictumest statim.
<-d2>Ad secundum respondet Commentator,ubi supra, dicens quod 5
in Praedicamentis
Aristoteles
"intenditnumerarespeciesfamosasquantitatis".
<-d3>Ad tertiumdicendumquod non est nisi unum genus loci, variatum
tamen ut concernitaliquid materialeet ut abstrahitab omni materiali.
<-d4>Ad quartum,dico quod non est idem ubeatio quod relatio,nec distantiadicit formaliter
respectum,sed bene est fundamentumrespectus. 10
<-d5>Ad quintum,non habeo pro inconvenientiquod una quantitassit
subiectumalterius.
Secundo, magis ad propositum,dico quod non sequiturquod infertur,
non est qualitas.
quia locus formaliter
<-d6>Per idem dico ad sextum.
15
<-d7>Ad septimum,concedo quod infertur.
Et si insteturquod auctorSex
dicitquod ubi est circumscriptapassiva a loco procedens,igiprincipiorum
turlocus non est ubi, respondeo:auctor Sexprincipiorum
communiternon
definitiones
sed
vel
vel
formales,
accipit
vulgares, forteperplexusfuitquia
videre non potuit omnes formalesrationessex principiorum,sicut nec 20
forteactioniset passionis,nec positionissive situs,ut alias dixi.
<-d8>Ad ultimum,concedo quod de rationeloci physiciet materialiter
accepti est continere,non autem de rationeloci accepti secundumsuam
praecisamrationemformalemet metaphysice.
Et si quaeras quare consideradophysicaincluditin rationeloci ipsum 25
continens,respondeo:physicusnon habet determinarede loco absoluteut
est quoddam genus entium,sed locum investigatproptermotumlocalem
naturalem.Nunc autem corporanaturaliamoventurad loca sua naturaliter,quia habentconservaliin suis locis. Conservado autem convenitloco

1vel]siveDPbPgPj1 etiam]
veroDPbPgPj5 Commentator]
magister
DPbPgPj5 dicens]
om.D; dicitPbPgPj 5 quod]quiaPj 8 aliquid]aliquodPbPg;ad Pj 9 dico]dicendum
ubialioPg;nulloalioPj 9 nec]utPj 10 dicit]estD; utPb; sitPg
DPj 9 ubeatio]
10respectum]
D; verum
respectus
PbPg 14quia]quodFc 14qualitas]
quantitas
DPbPg,
Fc 17 a] aliquoPgPj 19 accipit]
iter.
attendit
Y)aci.m.216 concedo]
DPbPg;accedit
etadd.Pj 19vel2]nonPg;ideo
Pj 19vel1]om.PgPj 19vulgares]
vulgariter
DPbPgPj;
om.DPbPgPj 21 et]necDPbPgPj 26
Pj 19 quia]quodPbPg 20 sexprincipiorum]
inu.DPb 29 loco]locisPj
respondeo]
quodadd.Pj 27-28localem
naturalem]
5 Averros,
InAristotel
comm.16 (ed.cit.,p. 161,
V, c. 11 (dequantitate),
Metaphysicam
1. 93). 16Cf.Liber
deSexPrincipiis
Gilberto
Porretae
etD. VanDen
, ed.A. Heysse
Ascriptus
1953,p. 20,11.15-16).
Eynde(Mnster

18:23:04 PM

154

CHRISSCHABEL

rationecontinentis,
continentiautem rationespecialiumqualitatumphysicarum. Et idcircototumhoc cadit in aspectuphysici.Circumscribeenim
omnem qualitatema corpore continente,non amplius erit locus secundum physicamconsiderationem.
5
Et si inferas:igiturultimasphaera eritin loco, cuius tarnenoppositum
4 Physicorum
sentiuntomnes physiciet commentatores
, respondeo:verum
est quod non est in loco physicequo ad rationemcontinentiae;tamen
est utique in loco realiteret formaliter.
Quod patet per Commentatorem
contra Avicennam,qui dicit quod ultima sphaera est susceptivamotus
10 localis et situs.Unde ex hoc potestconfirmari
propositum,quia illud est
locus quod est terminusmotuslocalis; sed positio,passio quantitatis,quae
idem est quod ubi, est terminusmotuslocalis; quare etc.
factamper "ubi" respondeConfirmoetiam quia ad interrogationem
tur de loco; quare etc.
Et si arguasquod ubi est locado passiva,locus autemvideturdicereloca15
illud quo corpus dicitur
tionemactivam,respondeo:locus est formaliter
locari, sicut albedo est qua corpus dicituralbum. Sicut igiturimproprie
sic improprie
diciturdealbatio activa nisi ut se tenetex parte efficientis,
tantum.
et metaphoricelocus diciturlocare active.Locat enim formaliter
20 Locatum vero locatur active non a loco, sed a movente.

sensibilium
1 specialium
inv.D; qualitatum
Pg
spiritualium
PbPj;quantitatum
qualitatum]
tenent
2 totum
philosophi
DPg; habentPb 6 physici]
hoc]inv.DPbPgPj 6 sentiunt]
. . . est]quod D 10
commentator
DPbPgPj 10propositum
DPbPg 6 commentatores]
quia]quodPbPgPj(D) 10 illudest]idemPbPg(Pj n.p.l.)11 quod]quiDPb 11pasPj 11 quae]om.Pg; autD; autemPbPj
sio]passivaPgPj
pc 11 quantitatis]
quantitas
Pb 13
eritDPgPj;confirmo
12 ubiest]om.DPbPgPj 13 Confirmo
etiam]confirmatio
rendetur
add.Pj 13-14respondetur]
communen
Pj 15 dicere]habere
interrogationem]
om.
PbPgPj 17qua]om.Pb;s.l.Pj; quoPg 17dicitur]
DPbPgPj 16est]om.D; dicitur
autemDPbPgPj18 se] s.l.Pj; om.PbPg
Pb; estPgPj 17 Sicut]sicPbPgPj 17 igitur]
om.D; metaphorice
et nonalbedinis
add.D 19 et metaphorice]
18 efficientis]
PbPgPj
tamen
inv.PbPgPj 19Locat]locatum
19locareactive]
DPgPj;cumPb
Pj 19 tantum]
nuncadd.PbPgPj
20 vero]om.DPbPgPj 20 locatur]
8 Cf.Averros,
InAristotelu
IV, c. 9, comm.45 (ed.cit.,ff.144E-I).
Physicam

18:23:04 PM

PLACE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

APPENDIX

155

Tradition
forAurioVs
Manuscript
Reportado II, d. 2, pars 3, q. 1
Sigla:
D
B 159 (26vb-28va)
Dsseldorf,Universittsbibliothek,
Fb Firenze,Bibliotecanaz. centrale,conv. soppr. A.3.120 (18vb-19vb)
Fe Firenze, Biblioteca naz. centrale, conv. soppr. B.6.121 (lrb-2rb,
2va-b [no foliation])
N Napoli, Bibliotecanazionale, VII C 3 (121ra-121vb)
Pb Paris, Bibliothquenationale,Latin 3066 (19va-21ra)
Pc Paris, Bibliothquenationale,Latin 15867 (21vb-23ra)
Pg Padova, BibliotecaAntoniana 161 scaff.ix (16vb-17vb; 11Orb)
Pi Padova, BibliotecaUniversitaria1580 (200rb-202ra)
Pj Pelplin,BibliotkaSeminariumduchownego46/85 (130va-131vb)
Vg Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolicaBorghese404 (14rb-15va)
Vi Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolicaVat. lat. 942 (14vb-15vb)
X Roma printededitionof 1605 (49a-52a)
VariantsChart forfirstthree-fourths
of the question [143.4-151.22]:
Mss.
D
Fb
Fc
N
Pb
Pc
Pg
Pi
Pj
Vg
Vi
X

Shared Variants
SingularVariants
Om.>Wds. I | Others Om.>Wds. | | Others

Total Variants
Om.>Wds. | | Others

17 > 43
2 > 2
14 > 41
10 > 29
19 > 63
14 > 16
0 > 0
7 > 22
2 > 3
11 > 40
14 > 14
13 > 19

24 > 56
5>6
30 > 66
23 > 51
25 > 69
21 > 24
10 > 20
11 > 26
4 > 5
26 > 74
25 > 34
26 > 45

27
0
28
51
65
33
22
28
13
41
52
79

7 > 13
3 > 4
16 > 25
13 > 22
6 > 6
7 > 8
10 > 20
4 > 4
2 > 2
15 > 34
11 > 20
13 > 26

11
5
25
18
17
19
19
10
6
30
15
23

38
5
53
69
82
52
41
38
19
71
67
102

There is no clear stemma.On slim evidenceone can group FbPbPcPiPj

against DFcNPgVgViX. Within the lattergroup, Fc and the best, Pg,
show the closest affinities,
most especially at two large omissionsper
homoeoteleuton
of Fc (12 and 9 words)wherePg has the textin the margin.

18:23:04 PM

CHRISSCHABEL

156

Also, the restof the group sharesa major omission(7 words)againstPg

and the othergroup,so it appears thatPg had access to two exemplars,
one fromoutsideits group's tradition.Vg and X may representanother,
inferiorsubgroup,and Vg seems to have a (separate)connectionwithD,
a witnessof average qualityfromthe 15thcentury.For the othergroup,
generallybetter,Fb has few enough errorsthatit could be the exemplar
fromwhichstemall otherwitnesses(but it does not containthe last quarter of the question).73
Pj is also excellent.Unlikethe restof the witnesses,
Pi is not part of the fullquestionson book II, but is includedin a selection of AurioPsphysicaland metaphysicalquestions;neverthelessit has
a good text.Pb is somewhatpoorer.No subgroupsemerge.Rankingthe
groups frombest to worst:PgDViFcNVgX, X having many significant
minor variants;and FbPjPiPcPb, Pb being quite a bit worse. Overall
ranking:FbPjPgPiPcDViNFcVgXPb. In the apparatus of the edition I
quote the singlevariantsof Fb and Pj, and any variantssharedby three
of the otherwitnesses.
The last fourthof the questionis omittedin FbNPcPiVgViX. NPcViX
go straightto the next question,while FbPiVg have lacunae (Fb last 24
lines of column and first20 of the next; Vg last 17 and first17; Pi last
15 plus two entirecolumns).Of those that have more text(DFcPbPgPj),
onlyFc has the firstsection([151.22-152.14]; editionhas completeapparatus),and at one point the next question is begun prematurelybefore
the scribecompletesthe presentone. Pg, withno lacuna, adds "ibi deficit
notabiliter"in the margin,then a sign below witha note "<-> quesitum
in finelibri ad tale signum,"at which sign afterbook II one findsthe
remainderof the question.DPbPj simplycontinuewiththe text,although
skipping,like Pg, the firstpart containedin Fc.
of the question [152.15-154.20]:
Variantschart forlast one-fifth
Mss.
D
Fc
Pb
Pg
Pj

SingularVariants
Om.>Wds. I IOthers
13 > 23
21
1>1
2
>
8
6
28
4 > 11
20
0 > 0
20

Shared Variants
Om.>Wds. | | Others
8 > 10
22
0
0>0
>
31
13
10
11 > 14
38
33
10 > 13

Total Variants
Om.>Wds. || Others
43
21 > 33
1>1
2
39
16 > 41
>
58
15 25
10 > 13
53

73Unfortunately,
ofall.
themicrofilm
forFb is theworst

18:23:04 PM

PLACE,SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

157

I have attemptedto followFc because it is the mostcompleteand appears

to have the best textanyway,in contrastto its textin the main body of
the question.PbPgPj, and to a lesser extentD, oftenagree against Fc.
Pj, a good witnessfor the main part of the question,has the best text
of thisgroup,and Pb continuesto be poor. Pg's and D's textsare worse
In the apparatus for the editionI quote
than in the firstthree-fourths.
the singlevariantsof Fc and Pj and any shared variants.
The reason for the lacunae and the source of the completedtext is
open to speculation.It is the onlyquestionin Pi, which containsselected
physicaland metaphysicalquestions,where thereis a large lacuna. Fb,
the best manuscriptfor the main section,has anotherlacuna of about
one columnat the end of the nextquestion.This suggeststhattheremay
be more such lacunae in the printedversionof book II.

18:23:04 PM

158

CHRISSCHABEL
APPENDIX

Tradition
Manuscript
forAuriol'sScriptumI, d. 17, q. 2, aa. 1-2
Sigla are as in Schabel 1995, 85-6, with the followingadditions:
Sa Sarnano, Bibliotecacomunale,E. 101
Va Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolica,Borghese318
Ve Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolica,Ottob. lat. 995
SingularVariants Shared Variants Total Variants
Mss./Foliation Om>Wds/Others Om>Wds/Others Om>Wds/Others
15 > 44 62
16
13 > 28 46
A (143va-145vb) 2 > 16
>
>
1
14
15 > 50 51
14
49
37
1
Bo (139rb-141ra)
>
>
17 > 23 75
Br (197ra-200rb) 11 15 5
6
8
22
9 > 50
28
28 > 152 88
Fa (143vb-145vb) 19 > 102 60
Pa (116vb-l18rb) 18 > 32 48
8 > 10 24
26 > 42 72
>
>
17
41
18
9
Pe (135vb-138ra) 12
32
21 > 73 35
>
>
41 > 85 223
Sa (189ra-191va) 3
3
52
38 82 171
7
0>0
27
Tr (21lvb-214va) 1>2
20
1>2
10 > 46 28
Va (119va-121ra) 16 > 21 40
26 > 67 68
7 > 18
14
Vb (218vb-221va) 5 > 5
8
12 > 23 22
>
>
31 24
5
13
16
12 > 44 40
Vc (221v-224r) 7
6 > 10 27
Vd (130vb-132va) 14 > 45 34
20 > 55 61
8 > 28
29
22 > 72 79
Ve (113ra-l14va) 14 > 44 50
17
6 > 23
Vn (122vb-124va) 6 > 11
21
12 > 34 38
>
>
14 78
37 81 179
43 > 95 257
X (434b-441a)
6
1
ASaVbX
0>0
2 > 13 8
2 > 13 7
10 > 14 25
10 > 14 20
0 > 0
5
ASaX
> 54 113
>
>
4
4
SaX
50
101
12
25
21
No clear stemmaemerges.Minor shared variantsas a whole show that
BrFaPaPeVaVcVdVeVn in generalare opposed to ABoSaTrVbX. In the
formergroup, FaPeVaVeVn share all or most of an omissionof a 24word rubric,where PaVcVd have the text,but this divisionis not reinforcedby othercommonvariants.Withinthe lattergroup,ABoSaTrVbX,
are the only obvious familiesof witnesses:ASaVbX sometimesread vs.
BoTr and the rest,ASaX share furthervariants,and finallySaX still
and illud/istud).Despite Sa's manyminorvarimore (even on igitur/ergo
in thissectionit was the main exemplarfor
it
is
that
ants,
verypossible
the Rome edition(X). The fact that Rome's editor,Costanzo Sarnano,
was Bishop of Sarnano, makes this scenario even more likely.Ignoring

18:23:04 PM

PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

159

A's one 15-wordomissionper homoeoteleuton

, for which SaX could have
had anothersource,A could in turnbe SaX's exemplar.It then appears
that Costanzo did a faithful
job reproducinghis exemplar,except for
many minorvariants,althoughSaX representa verycorruptbranch of
the stemma(but A, connectedto SaX, is much better).As expected,Vb,
the presentationcopy forJohn XXII, is excellent,but surprisingly
Tr
the
most
reliable
text
of
Bo
is
and
about
as
as
A.
all,
provides
good
branch
frombest to worst:TrVbABoSaX. For the other
Ranking this
grouping,a charitablereading of Vn's marginalia,blurryon microfilm,
makesit the best along withVc and Br, a 15th-century
manuscriptwith
minor
variants
but
few
omissions.
These
three are folmany
relatively
lowed by PaVdPe, all about equal, then Va and Ve, and finallyFa, by
far the worst.
Rough overall rankingof the witnesses:TrVbVnVcBrABoPaVdPeVa
VeFaSaX, the Rome editionbeing the least reliableof the 15. For a section of d. 27, the 12 witnesses(not SaVaVc) are ranked using slightly
different
criteriain Friedman(1997), 365-370, as follows:VbBoVnPaBr
TrAFaPeVeVdX. Using still different
methods for dd. 38-39 (Schabel
are:
[1995], 82-85), they
BrVbPaAVnTrXBoVdFaVePe, althoughA, Br,
Tr, and X would be rankedlower usingboth the presentand Friedman's
criteria.Thus the surprisingthingin d. 17 is Tr's quality,and perhaps
Pa's mediocrity.Vb and Vn are consistently
good, Br is strongin all
and
the
three
that
cases,
among
manuscripts
stop at d. 27 Vc has the
best text.(It mustbe noted that except in the case of Fa and Pe, which
I examined in situ,I have worked entirelyfrommicrofilms,
sometimes
slightlyblurry,especiallyin the margins.)

18:23:04 PM

160

CHRISSCHABEL
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE

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Peter
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derScholastischen
3rd
A. Maier,
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QueiGrundprobleme
Naturphilosophie,
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Times
intheLater
in:
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Middle
Murdoch
1998
Ages,
J. Murdoch,
Infinite
Miscellanea
andA.Speer(eds.),
MediaevaUa
25: Raum
und
J.Aertsen
- NewYork1998,194-205
imMittelalter
, Berlin
Raumvorstellungen
andE. Sylla,TheScience
Murdoch
andSylla1978 J.Murdoch,
, in:D. Lindberg
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intheMiddle
(ed.),Science
Ages,
Chicago1978,206-64
Schabel1994
G. Schabel,
TheQuarrel
with
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Peter
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Debate
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andFuture
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C. Schabel,
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1998

18:23:04 PM

Foundations
Knowingnaturaliter:AurioVsPropositional
CHARLES BOLYARD1

Descarteshad his cogito

and Moore had his hands.Scholasticshad propositionsperse notae.Across timesand traditions,foundationalist
epistemologies demand the mostconcentratedattentionat theirbeginnings.Though
it is unclear whetherAuriol is a foundationalist
in any straightforward
it
is
that
he
certain
too
this
with startingpoints.
shares
infatuation
way,
known
Auriolgivesa sustainedtreatment
of theproblemof propositions
,
throughthemselves
( perse notae)in his Commentaryon Lombard'sSentences
I, d. 2, q. 10.2Here, he asks whethera wayfarercan have knowledgeof
God's existencewithoutthe help of scripturaltestimony:that is, Auriol
is askingwhethernatural theologyis possible.3In the course of his discussion,it becomes apparentthattheseperse knownpropositionsare importantto Auriol,but the extentof theirimportanceis a bit of a surprise.
The simplestway to begin is to look at Auriol'sexamples of propositions known throughthemselves.While it was natural for those of his
period broadly construed(e.g., Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham) to think
of thesesortsof propositionsas self-evident,
analytictruths e.g., thatthe
whole is greaterthanitsproperpart Auriolextendsthischaracterization
considerably.For him, the followingare all examples of per se known
propositions:

1 A draft
of
version
of thispaperwaspresented
at the10thInternational
Congress
inErfurt,
alsogoouttoPaulVincent
Medieval
(1997).Specialthanks
Germany
Philosophy
bothhelpful
andbotherwhograciously
Friedman,
SpadeandRussell
provided
suggestions
all translations
Unlessotherwise
aremyown.
someobjections.
indicated,
2 Themainstudy
ofthistopicis R. Schmcker,
, und
Propositio
perse nota:Gottesbeweis
thesingle
ihrVerhltnis
Aureoli
1941.Thoughundoubtedly
nachPetrus
, Werlin Westfalen
knownthrough
mostimportant
workon Auriol'snotionof propositions
themselves,
thana philosopher.
AddiSchmiicker's
is thatofan intellectual
historian
rather
approach
diswithpropositions
insofar
as theyinform
concerned
he is mainly
tionally,
persenotae
is theconverse.
cussions
ofGod'sexistence,
whilemyconcern
3 PeterAuriol,
Primum
St.
d. 2, q. 10,edited
Sententiarum,
Scriptum
super
byE. Buytaert,
Dei esse
NY 1956,vol.II, 524,22-3:". . . ideoinquirendum
est:Utrum
Bonaventure,
velsitaliquidperse notum."
egeattestimonio,
Vivarium
, 38,1

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2000

18:23:55 PM

KNOWING
NATURAUTER
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

163

Nothingboth existsand does not exist

The skyand the earth exist
Snow is white
God exists

So how are we to explainthisgrouping?It mightbe suggestedthatthese

are the axiomsof his knowledgesystem,propositionsupon whichhe bases
the knowledgeof the truthof all other propositions.Though plausible,
- that God exists
- failsto meet thischaracterization.
the last proposition
For Auriol,the propositionthatGod existsis a syllogistically
derivedconIn orderto understandthe noveltyof thissuggestion,it is best to
clusion.
begin witha look at earlierviews.
AfterexaminingAurioPsmostimportantGreek,Islamic,and Scholastic
influencesin the firstsection,AurioPsown view will be considered,along
with a few potentialweaknessesin his position.It will be shown how
AurioPsrelianceupon psychologicalcertainty,
ratherthan epistemicceris
crucial
for
a
full
tainty,
gaining
understandingof his conceptionof
se
propositions
per notae.
Intellectual
Background
When it came to propositionsknown throughthemselves,AurioPspredecessors gave him much to work with. As usually happened in the
scholasticperiod,such hody contestedissueswere ultimately
to be traced
back to Aristotle.These views were taken as a startingpoint, and they
underwentsignificant
revisionas time passed.
One of Aristotle'smost relevantdiscussionsis found in the first10
In this work,Aristotleprechaptersof Book I of his Posterior
Analytics*
sents his view of what the medievais come to call scientia
, or scientific
For
scientific
is
not
of
Aristotle,
knowledge.
knowledge
particularthings.5
Science deals onlywithuniversal,necessarypropositions
e.g., thatman is
a rationalanimal.Furthermore,
the onlypropositions
thatare trulyknown,
are syllogistically
derivedcon(thatis, thosethatare knownscientifically)
4 Sincethemain
ofthispaperis notexegesis
ofAristotle's
translations
views,
purpose
ofAristotle
willbe takenfrom
TheComplete
Works
1984
, Princeton
J. Barnes,
ofAristotle
Ethics
: 1729-1867).
In thediscussion
Mcomachean
thatfollows,
114-66;
(Posterior
Analytics:
willbe usedinthesenseofAristotle's
'scientific'
notion
of'epistemic'
strongest
knowledge.
in non-syllogistic
contexts
aresometimes
termed
'scientific'
as well,
Though
propositions
thisusageis lessparadigmatic,
anditdoesnotindicate
'true'knowledge
forAristotle.
full,
5 Aristode,
Post.
"Thereis therefore
no demonstration
ofperish1.8,75b24-25:
Anal.,
ablethings
. . ."

18:23:55 PM

164

CHARLES
BOLYARD

elusions.Given thisview, we are naturallyled to the followingquestion:

if knowledgein the fullsense is only of conclusions,and if conclusions
are derived fromprevious propositions,how can we ever ground our
beliefstructure?
Aristodeconsidersand rejectsa view thatallows forthe circularjustification of scientificconclusions.6Instead,he argues that such conclusions
must be based on what he calls principles(<archai
).7 These principles,as
he explains them, are unmediated: they are not derived from earlier
proven to be true.
propositions,and thus they cannot be syllogistically
Consider,for example, the followingargument.

Thus,

(1) Man is a rationalanimal

(2) Rational animals have the capacityfor thought
(3) Man has the capacityforthought

In thisargument,(1) is a principle,(2) is probablya principle(ifit's not,

knownconit can be derivedfromprinciples),and (3) is a scientifically
clusion. Later, scholasticstake a keen interestin Aristotle'sprinciples,
seekingnot onlyto findinstancesof them,but also to explaintheirnature
more fully.
Aquinas followedAristodefairlyclosely,and his conceptionof such
provedto be veryinfluentialDuns Scotus,amongothers,adopted
principles
a refinedversionof Aquinas' theory.Aquinas gives these principlesthe
In his view,such proponame of propositionsknownthroughthemselves.8
sitionsare to be definedby the internalrelationsamong theirparts:they
are propositionsin which the predicate is included in the subject. For
example,the predicates'rational'and 'animal' are includedin the subject
6 Aristotle,
"Andthatitis impossible
todemonstrate
Post.
Anal.,
1.3,72b25-28:
simplidter
for
onwhatis priorandmorefamiliar;
mustdepend
in a circleis clear,ifdemonstration
tothesame
andposterior
at thesametimetobe prior
forthesamethings
itis impossible
..."
things
7 Aristotle,
understandfordemonstrative
Post.
Anal.,
1.2,71b20-23: . . itis necessary
and
andimmediate
whicharetrueandprimitive
to dependon things
ingin particular
oftheconclusion
thanandpriorto andexplanatory
morefamiliar
(forin thiswaythe
Posterior
willalsobe appropriate
towhatis beingproved)."
1.2,71a7-9:
Analytics,
principles
andan immediate
"A principle
ofa demonstration
is an immediate
proposiproposition,
is no other
tionis oneto whichthere
prior."
8 Foran extended
seeL. Tuninetti,
viewofthesepropositions,
discussion
ofAquinas'
"PerSeNotum":
von
imDenken
desThomas
desSelbstverstndlichen
Diebgische
Aquin,
Beschaffenheit
inS. MacDonald,
treatments
Leiden1996.Otherhelpful
Theory
maybe found
(yetshorter)
toAquinas
and E. Stump(eds.)TheCambridge
,
, in: N. Kretzmann
Companion
ofKnowledge
onMind
andinA. Kenny,
, NewYork1993,91.
165-80,
1993,especially
Aquinas
Cambridge

18:23:55 PM

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KNOWING
NATURALITER

'man', and thustheproposition'man is a rationalanimal5is perse known.9

In his view, once someone understandsthe conceptsinvolved,assenting
10One should
comessuddenly(statini).
to theperse knownproposition
notice,
to such a proposihowever,thatan individualknower'sactual relationship
tionis accidental:a proposition
, on Aquinas' view,mightnot be
perse nota,
knownby any human at all (if,e.g., no human has graspedthe requisite
concepts).Yet even in this case, the propositionis stillknown through
to be actualized in thisway. With this
itselfsolelyin virtueof its capacity
in mind,Aquinas distinguishes
betweensuch propositionsknownthrough
- thatis,
thatwouldbe so knowngiventhe
themselves
simpliciter
propositions
- and
circumstances
proper
propositions
actuallyknownthroughthemselves
byus.n But problemswiththisview were pointedout by laterscholastics.
First,givenAquinas' explanationof thisAristotelian
conceptualscheme,
and giventhe factthatthereare some such predicate-subjectpropositions
- which
thatare not knownby us, the notionofperse knownpropositions
reads initiallyas an epistemologicalnotion has in factbeen replacedby
a logical one.12In otherwords,the knowabilityof such a propositionis
subordinatedto its 'perseity',and its abilityto serve as an epistemic
foundation has been weakened.
A second problemwas pointedout by Henry of Ghent, and thisis a
moreseriousone. Henrynoticedthatgiventhisconceptionofperse known
propositions,and given Aristode'sview that scientificknowledgeapplies
derived fromsuch universaltruths,it
only to conclusionssyllogistically
would followthatevery
scientific
conclusionis perse known.13This results
- in
since demonstration
is not a 'productive'mode of reasoning
Henry's
it
in
allows
us
to
tease
out
that
lie
hidden
view, only
predicates
subjects.
And ifthisis correct,Aquinas' notionofperse knownpropositionsdoesn't
do the job it was designedto do: that is, Aquinas' view does not disknownpropositions.In short,
tinguishprinciplesfromotherscientifically
9
Summa
discussed
Ia.2.1.Thestandard
is used
example
byAquinas
Aquinas,
Theologiae
Auriol:
thewholeis greater
thanits(proper)
thinkers,
bymanymedieval
including
part
Posteriora
(iSententiae
super
Analitica
1.5.2).
10Aquinas,
Summa
la.17.3,ad 2.
Theologiae
"
Summa
s. Post.
Anal.1.5.2.Attheveryendofhis
Ia.2.1;Sententiae
Aquinas,
Theobgiae
Posterior
he alsodiscusses
howtheseprinciples
cometous
(11.15.20),
Analytics
commentary
thanbeinginnateandavailable
to all thinkers,
through
(experimentm
). Rather
experience
these
areonlyrealized
human
intellects
their
contact
with
propositions
bylimited
through
theexternal
world.
12Logical,
is castentirely
interms
thatis,inthesensethatthecriterion
ofthesemanticrelationship
between
thepartsoftheproposition.
Thisusagefollows
Schmcker
(1941).
13See Schmcker
1941(op.
cit
., above,n. 2),pp.94-99.

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CHARLES
BOLYARD

by de-emphasizingthe epistemicaspect of per se known propositions,

in explainAquinas' theory,thoughconceptuallycleaner,is less efficacious
our
of
the
structure
knowledge.
ing
Withthissortof pressuremountingagainstAquinas' view,laterthinkers
began to move towardsan alternativeconceptionof propositionsknown
throughthemselves.Richard of Middletonand Williamde la Mare argue
Such propothata perse knownpropositionis one whichis easilyknown.14
sitionsare stilluniversal,but not all universalpropositions,even ones in
which the predicate is included in the subject,are included. Thus for
Richard and William, though a per se known propositionstill depends
betweenits
upon the structureof the propositionand the interrelation
parts,it also depends upon ourrelationshipsto such propositions.15
Scotus moves back towardsAquinas' view, thoughhe adds his own
twistto the issue. His most relevant discussion is found in his Opus
.16Here, Scotus argues (againstHenry of Ghent) that skepticism
Oxoniense
He followsAquinas
can be defeatedwithoutappeal to specialillumination.
as well as in Boethius'
in groundinghis discussionin theviewsof Aristotle,
notion of a 'common conception' (communis
),17insofaras both
conceptio
Aristodeand Boethiusargue thatsuch principlesare knownto all.18Rather
than limitingperse knownpropositionsto those thatexhibitan inclusion
among the terms,as Aquinas did, Scotus broadens the extensionof this
as
class, treatingpropositionsabout which we have certitude(certitudo)
coextensivewithperse knownpropositions.These propositionsare divided
into fourgroups.Propositionsin the firstgroup,thingsknowablesimpliciter
(e.g., that a trianglehas threeangles),are characterizedby an inclusion
Second, Scotus discussesthingsknowable through
among theirterms.19
), as forexample when we know thatthe moon
experience(perexperientiam
is eclipsed.Though thesepropositionsare principles,and thusare among
14Richard
ontheSentences
ofMiddleton
I, d. 3, a. 1,q. 2; and
(d.ca. 1300),Commentary
ontheSentences
William
de la Mare(d. 1290),Commentary
I, d. 3, q. 2, ed. H. Krami,
Mnchen
1989,xxx.
15Foran extended
1941(op.cit
seeSchmcker
oftheseviews,
discussion
., above,n. 2),
100-10.
16JohnDunsScotus,OpusOxoniense
willbe givento
references
I, d. 3, q. 4. Specific
vol.Ill (Vatican1965).
edition
ofhisworks,
theScotusCommission
17Thisnotion
ofcommon
though
goesbackat leastas faras theStoics,
conceptions
hisDe Hebdomadibus,
ed.
knewitonlythrough
themedievais
Boethius,
especially
generally
1973.
Mass.-London
Stewart-Rand-Tester,
Cambridge,
18Scotus,
above,n. 16),135,5-11.
Opus(op.cit.,
19Scotus,
alsogivesthestandAdnotatio
above,n. 16),137,9-138,19.Scotus
Opus:
(op.cit.,
thanits(proper)
'thewholeis greater
oftheproposition
ardexample
part.'

18:23:55 PM

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KNOWING
NATURAUTER

bases of our epistemology,

thefoundational
theymightonlybecome known
to us as a resultof reasoningback fromconclusions,or as a resultof
induction.20
Third, Scotus includes knowledgeof our own actions (e.g.,
'I am awake') in the categoryofperse knownpropositions.21
Finally,things
knownat present
throughthe senses (e.g., 'This is white') are included.
As we will see, Auriol too accepts all of these propositionsas being
perse knownsave group three,which involvesknowledgeof one's own
actions.22
Even so, it will be seen thatAuriol'scriteriaforgroupingsuch
fromthose given by Scotus.
propositionsare different
In additionto theworksof suchwell-known
as Aquinas
Westernthinkers
- theIslamic
and Scotus,therewas anotherindividual
Alhazenphilosopher
who playedan especiallyimportant
rolein Auriol'sintellectual
development.
Alhazen'sopticaltreatisePerspectiv
(P had been influential
among the more
scientifically-minded
philosophersof the 13th century,but Auriol found
that
hadn't been discussedin any significant
there
detail by
something
earlierscholastics.24
Alhazen noticedthata numberof our cognitions,thoughat firstglance
In a way, he anticipatedwhat we now
immediate,are actuallyinferential.
would call worriesabout the 'Myth of the Given'. Rather than always
graspingsensed thingsin an unmediatedway, in his view,we sometimes
These inferences
graspthemthroughsudden,'imperceptible'inferences.25
proceedso rapidlyas to seem immediate,and thuswe usuallydon't notice
thattheyare occurringat all. Auriol,takingAlhazen to heart,realizedthat
manyearlierthinkershad conflatedtwo distincttypesof cognition:noninferential
cognitionand sudden cognition.Though not denyingthatboth
20Scotus,Opus(op.cit
., above,n. 16),143,3-7.ThoughScotusdoesn'tuse theterm
itis clearthatthisis whatis meant.
'induction',
21Scotus,
characterizes
2. Thoughhe usually
., above,n. 16),144,11-145,
Opus(op.cit
ofourownactions
as beingas certain
as perse known
knowledge
(andthus
propositions
notnecessarily
as beingincluded
at onepointheseemstoidentify
thetwo
amongthem),
as well.
22An
ofthisomission
willbe suggested
at theendofthepaper.
23Or explanation
Anexcellent
two-volume
translation
andcommentary
hasbeenprovided
Optics.
aretohistrans, London1989.Allreferences
byA.I.Sabra,TheOptics
ofIbnAl-Haytham
I ofthework.
which
in volume
lation,
appears
24Theimportance
ofAlhazen
toAuriol's
in other
contexts
hasbeenwelldocthought
umented
andCertitude
in theAgeofOckham,
Leiden1988,85-112.
byK. Tachau,Vision
inthecaseofpropositions
Schmcker
notedthisinfluence
known
briefly
Though
through
he incorrectly
theauthor
identified
ofthePerspectiva
as Algazel.(Schmcker
themselves,
1941(op.cit.,
above,n. 2), 155-6).
25Alhazen
discussion
ofthisphenomenon
(anditsvarigivesa wonderfully
thorough
inhisOptics
ousmanifestations)
IL3,paragr.
1-42,ed.Sabra(<op.cit
., above,n. 23),126-38.

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CHARLES
BOLYARD

of thesecognitiontypesmay be (and oftenare) foundin one and the same

of the two.26
cognitiveexperience,he soughtto break the identification
had been fosteredin part by Aristotle'spreviThis mis-identification
ously mentioned discussion of immediate principles.All of Aristotle's
examples of such immediateprincipleswere characterizedas being nonand thus scholasticstended to followhis lead. Auriol's great
inferential,
was
to extendAlhazen's notionthatsome thingsare knowninferinsight
contexts,
entially,yetwitha temporalsuddenness,to otherargumentative
He wanted
of individualthings.27
thosebeyondthe simplesense-perception
and
of manyof theseinferential
to retainthe centrality
sense-perceptions,
he saw a way to include an even more importantpropositionin his class
thepropositionthatGod exists.
knownthroughthemselves:
of propositions
Auriol did not take thispropositionto be innatelyknown,as othershad
done.28Instead,he argued,we can onlyknow of God's existencethrough
a syllogism,imperceptiblethoughit mightbe. In his view, we automatically come to the conclusionthat God existsby noticingthat thingsin
natureare hierarchically
arranged(e.g. gold is betterthan silver,men are
betterthan animals,etc.). And since this hierarchymust have a highest
member,it followsthat a highestgood mustexist namelyGod.29
26Auriol,
d. 3, q. 10,ed. Buytaert
., above,n. 3),vol.II, 557,4-5:". . .
(iop.dt
Scriptum
fora proposition
to be known
andanother
to be immediit is onething
itself,
through
esseperse notam,
aliudesseimmediatam.")
ate."(". . . aliudestpropositionem
27Alhazen
is apparently
totiethisidea
thefirst
scholastic
doesthisas well,butAuriol
inclaimAlhazen
known
themselves.
Auriol
followed
tothenotion
ofpropositions
through
inferen'thewholeis greater
thanits(proper)
part'is derived
ingthattheproposition
ofthisproposition,
see hisOptics
ForAlhazen's
discussion
II.3,paragr.
32-33,ed.
tially.
Sabra(iop.dt
., above,n. 23),133-4.
28E.g.,Anselm.
Anselm's
Aurioltakeshismainopponent
to be thosewhointerpret
AurioltakesotheraspectsofAnselm's
as beinga prion.
Instead,
argument
ontological
a postethatGod'sexistence
canonlybe proven
thathe toorealized
to indicate
thought
structure
oftheworld.
riori
, byappealto thehierarchical
29Auriol,
d. 2, q. 10,ed.Buytaert
., above,n. 3),vol.II, 562,6-16:"We
(op.cit
Scriptum
an imperceptible
takethisproposition
syl[thatGod'sbeingis known
naturally
through
forexamso that,
Forweseeintheuniverse
from
thesenses.
arranged
everything
logism]
And
airthanwater,
firethanair,andheaventhanfire.
thanearth,
ple,wateris better
andgoldthansilver.
thanbrass,
ironis better
thanlead,brassthaniron,silver
similarly,
Andthenourintellect
setsupanend.. . . Therefore
inplants
andanimals.
Anditissimilar
natutheir
humanbeings,
bya sudden
argument
gazeovertheorderofthings,
casting
assuwhichtheycallGod..." ("Hancquidempropositionem
rallycometo a highest,
omniasicdisponi,
videlicet
mimus
ex sensu.Videmus
quodmelior
namquein universo
etsimiliter
feraerquamaqua,ignisquamaer,caelum
estaquaquamterra,
quamignis;
aurumquam
rimiquamplumbum,
auricalcum
quamauricalcum,
quamferrum,
argentum
statuit.
terminm
...
etsimiliter
inanimalibus
etplan
tis.Tuncintellectus
noster
argentum;
Naturaliter
argumento
aspectum
superordinem
quodamsubito
proicientes
ergohomines,
in quodamsummo
. . .").
sistunt
rerum,
quodDeumappellant

18:23:55 PM

TURALITER
KNOWING
NA

169

In additionto theseimportantinfluences,Auriol also took much from

Ethics.
In fact,
Aristotle'sepistemologicaldiscussionsin the Nicomachean
when combinedwithAlhazen's works,thisprovidesthe main impetusfor
Auriol's conceptionof propositionsper se known. As distinguishedfrom
his discussionin the earlysectionsof thePosterior
Analyticsdiscussionsthat
were emphasizedby Aquinas and otherswho followedhim- the Aristode
of the Ethicspresentsa broader notion of firstprinciples.Here, Aristode
thus rejectinghis earlier
allows such principlesto be derived inductively,
insistencethatprinciplesare by natureindemonstrable.31
FurtherAnalytics
more,he laysout othermethodsby whichfirstprinciplesmay be grasped,
includingboth perceptionand 'habituation'.32
This habituationis best understoodin analogy to Aristode'sethical
views,whereinthe virtuousindividualis one who develops the appropriatevirtuoushabits.As he says,"Neitherby nature,then,nor contrary
to naturedo excellencesarise in us; ratherwe are adapted by natureto
receivethem,and are made perfectby habit."33Once extendedto epistemologicalcontexts,the notionsof naturalnessand habituationbecome
quite importantforAuriol.
Withthisin mind,we can now turnto a closerexaminationof Auriol's
explicitdiscussionof propositionsknownthroughthemselves.
AurioVsView
When discussingpropositionsknown throughthemselves,Auriol argues
that thereare two importantdifferences
betweenthese propositionsand
others.First,propositions
knownthroughthemselvescome to us in a flash
[subito).
Though some timemay elapse duringsuch a cognition,thislapse
is imperceptible.34
This is not to say thatall propositionsthatare sudden
30See especially
Book6.
31Aristotle,
Ethics
VI.6, 1139b28-3
1: "Nowinduction
is offirst
Nicomachean
principles
andoftheuniversal
anddeduction
from
universais.
Therearetherefore
proceeds
princiwhich
deduction
whicharenotreached
itis therefore
plesfrom
proceeds,
bydeduction;
induction
thattheyareacquired."
by32
Ethics
"Nowoffirst
Nicomachean
weseesomeby
Aristode,
1.7,1098b2-3-4:
principles
somebyperception,
somebya certain
and others
tooin other
induction,
habituation,
ways."
33Aristotle,
Ethics
II.1, 1103a23-25.
Nicomachean
'subito
'
34Though
hedoesn't
usetheterm
d. 3,
here,thebasicpointis madeinScriptum
ed.
n.
vol.
known
., above, 3),
II, 558,12-4):"A proposition
(op.cit
q. 10, Buytaert
through
itself.
. . is whatcomesimmediately
intothemind
. . ." (".. . propositio
perse nota... est
venitin mentem
. . ."). See alsobelow,
note39.
quaeimmediate

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CHARLES
BOLYARD

whatAuriol(following
in thisway are knownthroughthemselves:
Aristotle)
are notperse known.These typesof sudcalls suppositionsor definitions
den propositionsare posited or assumed to be true,and thus need not
reallybe true. To use AurioPsfavoriteexample, the proposition'an ass
having wings is able to fly'is not known throughitselfsince it is not
true.For Auriol,as forAristotle,universalpropositionsare takento have
existential
import.Thus sincethereare no asseswithwings,theproposition
are not knownthroughthemselves.35
is false.Similarly,obscuredefinitions
in
this
the
distinction
way, he comes to his second charBy explaining
acterizationof propositionsperse known,whichis meant to separatethe
'improper' sudden propositions,mentionedin the previous paragraph,
fromtrue ones. For Auriol,trueperse notaepropositionsdo not require
a teacher.36In otherwords,such propositionscan be knownby an individual, withoutany (at least non-divine)assistancefromother sentient
beings. Even though some per se known propositionsmightbe taught,
theydon't require such teachingin principle.Robinson Crusoe, on his
philosophicallywell-traveledisland,would be just as capable of grasping
As Auriol
these truthsas would a studentin the finestof universities.
in
a
natural
arise
naturaliter
these
,
way.37
propositions
puts it,
Given thistwofoldcharacterization
temporalsuddennessand the nonrequirementof a teacher it becomes a bit clearerwhy Auriol includes
propositions(1) through(4) above among the perse knownpropositions.
Some of them are what we would be more comfortabledescribingas
a prionpropositions
e.g., (1) thatnothingboth existsand does not exist.
35Auriol,
17-21:
d. 2, q. 10,ed.Buytaert
above,n. 3),vol.II, 561-562,
(op.t.,
Scriptum
is
'an ass having
"Fortheproposition
wingscan fly'is nottrue,andyetthepredicate
a
in 'thatthanwhich
Andsimilarly,
in thesubject.
included
'being'is included
although
in its
is evident
itis notbecauseofthisthatthisproposition
be thought',
cannot
greater
et
veraest'asinushabensalaspotest
. . ("Nonenimhaecpropositio
owntruth
volare',
in eo
'esse'includatur
in subiecto;
et consimiliter,
includitur
tarnen
quamvis
praedicatum
insuaverestevidens
nonpropter
hochaecpropositio
nonpotest',
'quomaiusexcogitari
itate. . .").
36Auriol,
d. 2, q. 10,ed. Buytaert
above,n. 3),vol.II, 558,12-3: . .
{pp.cit.,
Scriptum
a teacher."
itself
. . . doesnotrequire
known
a proposition
(".. . propositio
perse
through
nota. . . nonindiget
instructore.").
37Auriol,
d. 2, q. 10,cd.Buytaert
above,n. 3),vol.II, 558,42-3: . .
{op.t.,
Scriptum
illaesunt
manifest
andnaturally
themselves
arepropositions
known
these
through
. . .") Cf.Alhazen,
manifestae
II.3,paragr.
Optics
propositiones
perse notaeet naturaliter
natsoulmustmakeinferences
above,n. 23),137:"... thehuman
39,ed. Sabra[op.t.,
andevident
allsensible
inferences
andinmostcasesperceives
makes
anditalways
urally;
noris oneawareat
ordeliberation,
without
effort
thatareperceptible
byinference
things
ofan inference."
thatone'sperception
is theresult
suchthings
thetimeofperceiving

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KNOWING
NATURAUTER

Some are basic, empiricalpropositions

e.g., (2) thatthe skyexists.But as
we should now realize, others are inferential.The proposition(3) that
snow is white,accordingto Auriol,is reached inductively
by havingcognitionsof many individualwhitesnows. But thiscognitionhappens in a
flash,presumablyafter a sufficientnumber of such individual snows
are cognized.Afterlivingin the world fora period of time,this sort of
inferencebecomes a sudden one. Similarly,the proposition(4) that God
existsis inferred.But again, we don't consciouslyrun throughthe entire
argumentwhen we grasp this propositionper se. So it seems that on
AurioFsview,perse knownpropositionsare propositionsthat are forced
upon us withoutany cognitiveefforton our part. It is this emphasison
the psychological
experienceinvolved,ratherthan the epistemicstatusor
of such propositions,thatsets offAurioPsview most dislogical structure
from
those
of others.Perhapsmostinterestingly,
however,forAuriol
tinctly
- those thatare inferential
some such propositions
requirethe cognition
of priorpropositions.
This allows Auriol to broaden his notion of perse knownpropositions
along lines thatearlierthinkerscouldn't.For them,given theirinsistence
on the Aristotelian
to establisha scientificrole for
model, it was difficult
any existentialpropositions.Afterall, forAristode,principlesare universal propositionssuch as 'man is a rationalanimal'. This mightnot seem
to be much of a problemto twentiethcenturysecular philosophers,but
themedievaisalmostalwaysdiscussedthe issue withan eye towardsdeterminingwhethertheproposition'God exists'is perse known.Some worked
around this apparentdifficulty
by claiming,e.g., that Gos existenceis
includedin his essence,and thusthatthisexistentialclaim at least meets
the Aristotelianrequirementthat principlesshould be necessary.38
But
Auriolfoundthisapproach unsatisfactory,
and he insteadelectedto open
his classification
ofpropositions
knownthroughthemselves
to sensoryexist- ratherthan to workfromontoentialclaims- e.g., (2) 'the earthexists'
ifsimilardefinitional
logicalproofs.In hisview,suchproofsare onlyeffective
claims- again, thinkof his 'wingedass' example- prove the existenceof
their
definedentitiesas well. And since theydo not, neitheris it successful in the case of God.
As a result,AurioPstheorysacrificesboth parsimonyand elegance in
favorof an increasedemphasison the individual'spsychologicalexperience of such propositions.Parsimonyis lackinginsofaras he moves away
38Forexample,
Summa
Ia.3.4.
Aquinas,
Theofogiae

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CHARLES
BOLYARD

fromAquinas' logical notionthatperse knownpropositionsare restricted

to analyticpropositions,and towards
solely(in our modern terminology)
a view encompassingboth analyticpropositionsand empirical,existential
propositions.Similarly,the elegance of a prioriproofsof God's existence
is rejectedin favorof the relativedisorderand contingencyof the a posteriori
, naturalworld.
NotablyabsentfromAurioPsinitialdiscussionofperse knownpropositions (d. 2, q. 10) are those propositionsthat concernone's own mental
states(commonlycalled reflexive
propositions,or in Scotus' case, propositions about one's own actions).Though thinkersfamiliarto Auriol such
as Augustinetake such propositionsas 'I exist' to be known by every
individual,and (in Augustine'scase) immuneto skepticalattacks,Auriol
doesn'tfollowtheirlead here. At firstthisseemspuzzling- whywouldn't
such propositionsbe included in his masterlist?Auriol certainlydoesn't
explicitlyexclude them,and it seems as if such thingswould naturallyfit
with his groupingabove. In response,it mightbe argued that Auriol
doesn'tmentionthembecause theyreallydon't meet his characterization
of propositionsknown throughthemselves.The reason (continuingthis
line of argument)is that Auriol thinksof such reflexivepropositionsas
on the partof the knower.
consciousmentaleffort
requiringa determined,
Auriol
between
(natu
FollowingAverroes,
distinguishes
knowingnaturally
and knowingvoluntarily(voluntarle),
raliter)
placingper se knownproposiIn other
tionsin the formerclass, and excludingthemfromthe latter.39
to
discussions
Auriol
takes
voluntarymenpains distinguish
epistemological
tal activityfromepistemicstates,arguingforexample that "no voluntary
and later, that the firstconadhesion [to a proposition]is scientific"40
39Auriol,
d. 2, q. 10,ed. Buytaert
., above,n. 3),vol.II, 558-9,37-46:
(op.cit
Scriptum
arein
"... m OntheSoulIII, comment
49,theCommentator
things
saysthat:intellected
wedo notknowwhen,
orfrom
as propositions
ofwhich
us in twoways,
either
naturally,
thatareacquired
as intellected
or in whatwaytheyexist;or voluntarily,
where,
things
This
areknown
Butthefirst
intellected
from
first
byus naturally."
things
propositions.
themareknown
is whathe says.Fromthisit is clearthatthosepropositions
through
from
manifest
ofwhichit is notknown
selvesandnaturally
where,
when,andin what
that
waytheycomeintothemind.Butit is agreedthatthisis thecaseforpropositions
notvoluntarily,
butsuddenly."
areconcluded
from
(".. . Commentator
syllogisms
imperceptible
in nobisduobusmodis,
fiunt
III De Anima
commento
49 dicitquodintellecta
quia aut
aut
et undeet quomodo;
sicutpropositiones
naturaliter,
quasnescimus
quandoexistunt,
ex primis
sicutsuntintellecta
voluntarie,
primaautemintellecta
acquisita
propositionibus;
Haecille.Ex quopatetquodillaesuntpropositiones
sunta nobisnaturaliter.
perse notae
inmentem.
veniunt
de quibusnescitur
etnaturaliter
manifestae
unde,quandoetquomodo
nonvoluntarie,
Sedconstat
imperceptibili,
quodsicestde propositionibus
quaesyllogismo
sedsubito
concluduntur.")
40Auriol,
, prooemium,
above,n. 3),vol.I, 141,126.
{op.cit.,
Scriptum
q. 1,ed. Buytaert

18:23:55 PM

173

KNOWING
NATURAUTER

cepts imprintedon the intellectrequire less force (vigor)fromit.41This

distinction
appliesin an importantway to reflexivepropositions.To know
of course),
that 'I exist',I must activelylook at myself(metaphorically,
and this activityis enough to disqualifysuch a propositionon grounds
that it violateshis firstcriterionof per se known propositions:that they
are sudden. Any cognitionof one's own acts would be an effortful
one,
of Auriol's view, and thus such cognitionscould
on this interpretation
forcedupon us in the same sudden way as could his
not be involuntarily
se
known
propositions.42
paradigmper
In a laterdiscussion,however,Auriol does mentionat least some such
reflexive
propositionsas beingperse known:'We are sayingthesewords',
'We are not asleep, but awake', and the claim that everyman knowsper
se of himselfthat 'He is alive'.43Althoughit mightbe suggestedthat
41Auriol,
d. 2, q. 10,ed. Buytaert
., above,n. 3),vol.II, 535,12.
(iop.dt
Scriptum
42Auriol
ind. 3, q. 14.Still,hedoesn't
ever
toa slight
discusses
selfknowledge
degree
As LaugeNielsen
as involving
to thissortofknowledge
refer
perseknown
propositions.
forthisinterpretation
can
further
outina recent
private
correspondence,
support
pointed
thatthesoul
inAuriol's
be found
Quodlibet
, q. 6. There,Auriol
Augustine)
argues
(against
comes
knowitself,
ifinfactitdoesso at all.Sinceintellectual
doesnotalways
knowledge
soulcan'tbe represented
mateandsincetheimmaterial
through
bywayofphantasms,
Giventhisbasicposiit follows
thatthesoulcan'tknowitself.
rially-derived
phantasms,
be
inwhich
caseitobviously
cannot
is noself-knowledge
whatsoever,
tion,either
(i)there
in whichcaseit is unlikely
or (ii)suchknowledge
doesn't
exist,
usually
perseknowledge,
Ifthelatter
is
andsuddenly
forced
is involuntarily
thatself-knowledge
upontheknower.
Seeespecially
beperseknowledge.
cannot
thensuchintermittent
Auriol,
true,
self-knowledge
a proper
intellection
, q. 6, ed.Roma1596,69,ii.C-D:". . . wedon'texperience
Quodlibet
thepossible
But
without
intellect
andphantasms.
ofoursoul,sinceweunderstand
nothing
intellectionem
tothisintellection."
nophantasm
(".. . nonexperimur
propriam
corresponds
nullum
et phantasmate,
sineintellectu
nostrae
animae,
possibili,
quia nihilintelligimus
huicintellectioni.")
autem
, q. 6,ed.Roma
Also,seeAuriol,
Quodlibet
correspondet
phantasma
understand
or rather
i.A: . . thesouldoesnotalways
itself,
1596,70,ii.F-71,
actually
itdepends
inthebody,
itnever
doesso bya proper
act,as longas,existing
upona phanthesoul
addedintellection
seemstoposita certain
eventhough
tasm,
bywhich
Augustine
immonecumquam
actu
se actuanima,
nonsemper
knows
itself.
always
intelligit
videaincorpore
a phantasmate,
existens
quamvis
Augustinus
dependet
proprio,
quamdiu
. . .").
se noscit
turponere
additum,
quoddam
intelligere
quo animasemper
43Auriol,
Aureol
Peter
onDivine
editedin C. Schabel,
, d. 39, art.2 (critically
Scriptum
in Primum
Librum
Sententiarum
distinctions
andFuture
: Scriptum
Contingents
Foreknowledge
du Moyen-Age
de Copenhagen.
Cahiers
de l'Institut
38-39
, in:Universit
grecet latin,
was
65 (1995),63-212,
esp.172,11.491-5;alsoed.Rom1596,895,col.ii.D;thispassage
fallsunder
"Forthatwhich
tomyattention
immediately
Schabel.):
byChristopher
brought
itself
whenwe
it is known
is known
itself.
. . . Forexample
through
through
experience
itis known
thesewordsthatwe arenotasleep,butawake. . . Andsimilarly,
aresaying
thathe is alive."("Illudenimquodimmediate
subexperientia
itself
byanyone
through
istaverba,quodnon
estcumdicimus
est. . . Sicutperse notum
cadit,perse notum
estcuilibet,
in somnis,
... Et similiter,
sedin vigilia
sumus
quodvivit.")
perse notum

18:23:55 PM

174

CHARLES
BOLYARD

Auriol changed his view over the course of his Sentences

or
commentary,
else that he meant to include reflexivepropositionsin his earlierdiscussion,it shouldbe notedthatthe exampleshe giveshere all involvepotenInternalistreflexive
externallyverifiablesituations.44
tiallyintersubjective,
propositions(e.g., 'I am thinking')are still omitted,and thus the basic
distinction
betweenknowledgeas activelypursuedand knowledgeas pasreceived
can be maintained.
sively
In any case, Auriolis stillcommittedto the view thatpassivityon the
part of the knoweris crucialto havinga perse knownproposition.When
combined with another element of his theory,however,an interesting
pictureof the individual'slearningprocessbeginsto emerge.Auriol'ssecond characterization
ofperse knownpropositionsis thattheydon't require
a teacher- thatis, thatan individualis perfectly
capable of graspingsuch
her
on
own.
Thus
it
seems
that
propositions
per se known propositions
are all and only thosepropositionsthatare graspedsuddenlyby an indiheractively
vidual without
them.
Auriolis buildingup the importance
grasping
of the individual'srole in this sort of cognition,movingaway fromthe
requirementthatone can onlygain knowledgein the fullsense fromothers. Simultaneously,
however,Auriol de-emphasizesthe active role that
the individualplays in such cognitions.In other words,Auriol goes to
great lengthsto include the individualknoweras a necessaryingredient
of a proposition'scharacterization
as perse notae
, in oppositionto Aquinas,
while simultaneously
from
the
individual
any activerole in the
removing
process of knowingsuch propositions.
Problems
withAuriol'sView
With this general picturein mind, we can begin to see what sortsof
objectionsAuriol will have to consider,especiallyif judged on foundationalist(e.g., Cartesian)standards.First,we should noticethatthe group
of propositionstakento be perse knownis apt to varyover time.In the
case of the propositionSnow is white', for example, our knowledge
would not be perse untilwe have undergoneexperiencesof a significant
numberof whitesnows,or untilwe have made these inferencessudden
indiones. Given this,and given the different
experiencesthat different
viduals have, it seems thatperse knownpropositionsprovideno common
44Auriolalsolists
in q. 1 ofhisSentences
commenofperseknown
types
propositions
reflexive
Butsincethelistis notcomthere.
andhealsofailstoinclude
tary,
propositions
thisstilldoesnotprovide
conclusive
evidence.
, prooemium,
q. 1,
plete,
(SeeAuriol,
Scriptum
ed. Buytaert
., above,n. 3),vol.I, 171,20-4.)
(op.cit

18:23:55 PM

175

KNOWING
NATURAUTER

groundfromwhich more than one individual,or even one individualat

built into thisgrouping,how
different
times,can work.With the fluidity
are we ever to use such propositionsfruitfully,
knowingfullwell thatour
listmighthave to be changed?
betweenperse known
Second, even ifwe grantthatAurioPsdistinction
a
is
we
are
and
other
sound
stillleftwondering
one,
types
propositions
certainof any such propohow we as individualsare to be epistemically
sition.Afterall, Auriol seems only to be interestedin holdingpsychological certainty
to be crucialto our knowledge.We have been sure of many
in
our
lives,and as Auriol himselfpointsout when discussingthe
things
distinction
betweenintuitiveand abstractivecognition,45
we are sometimes
certainof falsehoods(e.g., that the stickin waterreallyis
psychologically
One suggestionmight
bent).Does Auriolhave a way out of thisdifficulty?
be thatwe should examineour beliefscarefully,
as Descarteswould later
claimto do, so thatwe could be sureour psychological
and epistemological
judgmentscoincide.But givenAuriol'semphasison the unconscious,passive role thatwe are to play in such cognitions,thispath is not open to
us. Any examinationof such propositionsputs theminto an activemode.
- which deals
If Auriol's discussionof intuitiveand abstractivecognition
- is to
almost exclusivelywith physicalobjects, ratherthan propositions
be takenas indicativeof his view of propositions,thenwe are leftin this
skepticalquandary.If,on theotherhand,we are to breakthelinkbetween
the cognitionof the two different
sortsof entities,then what else are we
use
to
to guide us? Must we simplytake a reliabilistline, placing faith
in the activityof our cognitiveprocessesin the overwhelmingmajority
of cases, as Aristotlewould do? Though perhaps not as philosophically
thisis as far as Auriol will allow us to go.
satisfactory,
A thirdproblemarisesfromthesecond.If Auriolis correctin identifying
thiscommonfeatureof our sensoryknowledgeand our knowledgeof God,
thenwe have weakenedthepossiblity
ofknowingGod considerably.
Rather
than strengthening
such knowledgeby using the impressivetide of being
'knownthroughitself',Auriolseems to have dilutedthe forceof the characterizationto such a degree that knowledgeof the divine is no more
certainthan our sometimesfallaciousknowledgeof the externalworld.

45Fora fuller
ofintuitive
discussion
andabstractive
1 ofmysoon
seechapter
cognition,
tobe completed
dissertation,
, and.
Knowledge,
Certainty
Propositions
perse notae:a Study
ofPeter
Auriol
a fewinterpretive
refinements
I suggest,
(Indiana
University,
Beyond
Bloomington).
Tachau1988(op.dt
introduction
to thisissuewithrespect
., above,n. 24) is an excellent
toAuriol's
thought.

18:23:55 PM

176

CHARLES
BOLYARD

Conclusion
We have now come to the point at which our originalquestionmay be
answered:What place do perse knownpropositionshold in Auriol'sworldview? We should firstbrieflyrecountwhat theyare not. First,theyare
not simplyhis broadest characterizationof true propositions.We must
workto gain some knowledge,and propositionsreached in thisactiveway
fail to meet the criterionof suddenness.Second, they are not simply
unmediated,firsttruths.As we have seen, imperceptibleinferencescan
take place, and these can have all the psychologicalforceof unproved
and perhaps unprovable
propositions.Such propositionsare not necessarilyfoundationalin an epistemicsense, even if theyare psychologically
foundational.
Instead,AurioPsperse knownpropositionsare best describedas 'core'
similarin many respectsto what contemporary
philosophers
propositions,
in Auriol's
Such propositions,
of science such as Lakatos have discussed.46
in
but
our
an
role
inferences,
view,certainlyplay
theyare not
important
unmediated.
not
be
and
need
the
first
they
always
propositionsknown,
And, as with Lakatos, the core has some degree of fluidity:
propositions
can enter and exit the core. They enter if, throughexperience,they
become sudden.And theycan exit the core if the knowerfailsto remember them. Despite such similarities,
however,Auriol does not share the
beliefof some contemporary
philosophersthat truthis a relativenotion.
For him, everypropositionknownthroughitselfis true simpliciter.
Auriol'stheoryof propositionsperse notaestandsalone not only forits
ties to innovationsin Islamic optics,but even more forits willingacceptnatureof much of our psychologicalexpeance of the hidden,inferential
rience. Rather than using this realizationto undercutour pretensionsto
as later philosopherssuch as Hume have been inclinedto do,
certainty,
Auriol
he insteadturnsthe argumentto everyone'sadvantage.If anything,
confirms
insists,the existenceof such involuntary,
syllogisms
imperceptible
rationalstructureof our naturalinstinctsforknowing.
the inherently
Bloomington
IndianaUniversity

46See I. Lakatos,
Research
andtheMethodology
, in:Imre
ofScientific
Programmes
Falsification
andtheGrowth
andAlanMusgrave
Lakatos
1970,
, Cambridge
ofKnowledge
(eds.),Criticism
91-196.

18:23:55 PM

PeterAuriolon Intellectual
of Singulars
Cognition
RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN*

Peter Auriol returnedseveral timesto the problem of how the human

intellectcognizessingulars,i.e. how we forma concept that graspsjust
one extra-mental
object, e.g. Socrates or Plato or this white thing.He
deals withthisissue at lengthnot only in his early Scriptum
superprimum
Sententiarum
that we have of
, but also at severaljuncturesin the reportatio
his lectureson II Sent,from1317/18.1The problemat issue is mostclear
withregardto materialsingulars:how can the immaterialintellecthave
acquaintancewith materialbeings and features?If the intellectis what
deals withthe universaland immutable,how can it have directacquaintance withchangingmaterialconditions?Once thisbasic questionis raised,
however,severalrelatedquestionsarise as well. For example: do human
worldas they
beingsreallyunderstandthingsexistingin the extra-mental
i.e.
as
without
intellectual
Further,
exist,
singulars?
really
cognitionof
materialsingulars(or any singular,forthat matter),how could an intellect ever forma syllogismthat includesa singularas one of its terms?2
* Thisarticle
as a papergivenat theErfurt
ofSIEPMin August
originated
congress
I received
comments
from
ScottMacDonald,
Claude
1997,where
Dumont,
helpful
Stephen
ChrisSchabel,
andEleonore
SincethattimethepaperhasbeencomPanaccio,
Stump.
mented
on byPerniile
andLaugeNielsen.
toall.NB: I do notnecMythanks
Harsting
theorthography
orpunctuation
ofanytextthatI use.
essarily
respect
1 On AurioPs
seetheintroduction
In whatfollows,
allreferences
tothisvolume.
works,
to bookII ofAurioPs
Sentences
areto thetextcontained
in: Petrus
Aureoli,
commentary
insecundum
librum
ed. Rome1605.I concentrate
belowon AurioPs
Sententiarum,
Reportatio
treatment
ofthisissuein hisScriptum
inprimum
Sententiarum
from
, d. 35,part4; passages
thistextin whatfollows
aretakenfrom
a preliminary
edition
thatI havemadebycolthe1596Romeedition
oftheScriptum
withms.Vat.,Borghese
lat.
lating
(= X, 804a-26b)
329(= Vb,ff.380va-389vb).
edition
ofthistextis available
on theinterMypreliminary
netas partofTheAuriol
(= http://www.igl.ku.dk/~russ/auriol.html).
Homepage
2 Several
difficulties
makethisproblem
stillmorepressing.
God- a purely
theological
- mustknowsingulars
intellectual
substance
andtheir
or elsehowcouldhe punactions,
ishorreward
with
hisomniscience?
Further,
justiceandhowwouldweexplain
guardian
- again,intellectual
- mustknowtheir
substances
wards.
HenceGodandsomesepangels
aratesubstances
musthaveintellectual
withsingulars.
On God'sknowledge
acquaintance
ofsingulars,
seeA. Conti'scontribution
to thisvolume.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium
, 38,1

18:24:05 PM

178

RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN

Here I will examine the way in whichAuriol deals withhuman intellectual cognitionof singulars,both his analysisof the problemsassociated
with the issue and his solutionsto those problems.It will emerge that,
forAuriol,human beingsformconceptsof singularsonly in cooperation
with the imaginationand its product,the phantasm.The phantasmis a
necessarycomponentin the intellectualcognitionof singulars,because the
of the
imagination"designates",i.e. marksor brands,the representation
singularin the phantasmwitha featurewithoutwhichthe intellectcould
not forma concept of the singularas singular.Thus, forAuriol,human
beings have an abstractintellectualcognitionof singulars.
in AurioVsThought
of theProblem
Origins
Auriol'sparticularcontributionto the debate on intellectualcognitionof
singularshas its originsin two of the most basic principlesof his metaphysics,principlesthat he affirmsand justifiesin many places throughout his work. On the one hand, accordingto Auriol,only individuals
I use the termsinterchangeablyhave real,extra-mental
existence.
singulars,
On the other hand, Auriol insiststhat individualsof the same species
have utterlysimilarintelligibilities:
individualsof the same species direct
the intellectto formexactlythe same conceptsabout themselves,
withno
differences.
Now, the questionarisesforAuriol:ifindividualsof the same
how can there be intellectual
species have utterlysimilarintelligibility,
with
as they
the individualsthat reallyexistextra-mentally
acquaintance
are individuals?
It mustbe stressedhere at the outset,that Auriol is dealing withthe
questionof how an individualis knownas an individual,not withwhat
about an individualmakes it an individualin extra-mentalreality.That
is to say, the questionis: how do we have a concept of a singular?not:
indihow does a singularcome about? As to the source of extra-mental
noththere
is
none:
there
is
Auriol
that
viduation,
repliesunequivocally
ing throughwhich a singularis a singular.There are, for example, no
individuatingpropertiesadded or attached to the species,human being,
in order to bring about the singularhuman beings,Socrates and Plato.
In saying this, Auriol is clearly turninghis back on a view that was
held on this issue by a number of Franciscanintellectualsbeforehim:
thatindividualsarise on account of a positiveindividuating
propertythat
contractsthe species to the individual.The best knownadherentof this
, but otherFranciscan
typeofviewis Duns Scotuswithhis theoryof haecceitas
and
Matthew
of
authors,e.g.
Roger Marston,also held this
Aquasparta

18:24:05 PM

OF SINGULARS
ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION

179

typeof view.3In contrastto them,forAuriol,individualsare simplyindividuals,distincton theirown account. As Auriol writes:"every thing,
reseo quodest, singulariter
insofaras it exists,existsas a singular"(omnis
est).4
But thisverypositioncreatesa problemwhen we turnto the way that
individualsare cognizedas individuals.Auriolis fullyaware of thisproblem. As he writesin the contextof discussingthe way an angel can have
intellectualcognitionof singulars:
Ifwesuppose
thata species
is contracted
toindividuals
added
through
something
- so thatthereis something
as somemaintain
in oneindividual
ofwhichnothing
similar
in another,
canbe found
thenthequestion
[ofthewayan angelcanknow
is unproblematic,
becausewe canclaimthattheangelwouldunderstand
singulars]
itsownsimplerepresentation
thatexistsin the
everyindividual
through
(speciem)
. . . but,as I haveshown
intellect.
thisposition
is untenable.5
elsewhere,
angel's
The problemput most basicallyis that thereis no intelligibleproperty
fromany other singular
by which one singularof a species is different
of the same species.As Auriol remarksin the quotationabove, if somethingcould be foundin one individualof which nothingsimilarcould
be foundin anothertherewould be no problem:we could in that case
individualson account of these dissimilarindividuatingpropdistinguish
In
erties. the period beforeAuriol, positingthat singularswere known
as singularsthroughtheirindividuatingpropertywas a not an atypical
3 See on later-medieval
of individuation,
theories
in
J.J.E.Gracia(ed.),Individuation
Scholasticism:
TheLater
Middle
andtheCounter-Reformation
, 1150-1650, Albany1994and
Ages
forScotus
inparticular,
A. Wolter's
article
inthesamebook:John
DunsScotus
(b.ca.J265;
d. 1308),271-98;Auriol
is notdealtwithin Gracia'sbook.Further
information
on late
13th-century
Franciscan
ideason thesubject
ofindividuation
canbe found
inJ.E.Lynch,
TheKnowledge
toVital
duFour
29 (1969),
ofSingular
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
Things
According
271-301
andG.R.Payne,
Intuition
Revisited
versus
Cognitive
ofSingulars
(Matthew
ofAquasparta
41 (1981),346-84;especially
the
Studies,
B.J.F.Loner
gan),in:Franciscan
Lynchcontrasts
Franciscan
tackwithAquinas'
viewson thesubject.
Auriol
dealsat somelength
withthe
- andespecially
- in II Sent.,
issueofindividuation
withScotus'ideason thetopic
d. 9,
q. 3, aa. 1-3,ed. Rome1605,109-17.
II Sent.,
d. 9, q. 3, art.3, ed. Rome1605,114aF:"Quaeroergoquidsitprincipium
individuations.
Etsineargumentis
Ponohictrespropositiones.
Primaestquod
respondeo.
realiter
nullaest,cumquaeritur
ad rationem
loquendo
quaestio
quidadditindividuum
omnis
reseo quodest,singulariter
et
est;eteo ipsoquodestindifferens
speciei,
quoniam
communis
ratioestconcepta.
Ideoquaerere
aliquidperquidres,quaeextraintellectum
nihilestquaerere."
est,estsingularis,
5 II Sent.,
d. 11,q. 4, art.4, ed.Rome1605,147aF-bB:
"Si ergoponatur
quodspecies
contrahatur
ad individua
utquidamdicunt,
sicquodaliudsitin uno
peraliudadditum,
cuiussimile
nonpossitreperiri
in alio,tuncquaestio
nonhabetdifficultatem,
individuo,
estquodAngelus
individuum
quiatenendum
quodlibet
intelligent
perpropriam
speciem
eiussimplicem
inintellectu
suoexistentem.
. . . Sedquiaaliasostendi
illamnon
opinionem
..
possestare.

18:24:05 PM

180

L. FRIEDMAN
RUSSELL

Franciscanmethodof explainingintellectualcognitionof singulars.Thus,

the Franciscanpositionon the principleof individuationdescribedabove
was utilizednot onlyto explainindividuationitselfbut also to explainthe
With AurioFsrejectionof any formof
intellectualcognitionof singulars.6
individuatingproperty,he has also rejected this way of explainingthe
intellectualcognitionof singulars,and he maintainsthat,in termsof their
individualsof the same species are utterlysimilar.In factintelligibility,
below- Auriolholds thatindividualsare utterly
and thiswillbe significant
in general, not just theirintelligisimilarin termsof their cognoscibility
force at the level
all
their
since
exhaust
representational
they
bility,
of the most special species; thus,he claims that individualscan only be
cognizedas distincton account of theiraccidents.7The problemof intellectual cognitionof singulars,then,is simplya facet of the problemof
cognitionof singularsin general:forAuriol,singularsin and of themselves
are invisibleto cognitivefaculties.
To returnto the specificquestionof intellectualcognitionof singulars:
Auriol's claim that individualsof the same species have utterlysimilar
is groundedin his view that each reallydistinctindividual
intelligibilities
.
has several utterlysimilarquidditativeelements,called by him rabones
Take the example of Socrates and Plato:
ofsubto theratio
ofcorporeality
and Plato]add theratio
. . . because[Socrates
ofanimal[that
andto theratio
ofbody[thatof] sensibility,
andto theratio
stance,
andPlato
therefore
Socrates
butaddtorationality
nothing,
absolutely
of]rationality,
thesameratio,
haveutterly
) distinct.8
(realiter
although
theyarereally
that Auriol describesin this passage are in some sense disThe rationes
tinct(or at least can be conceived of as distinct)fromeach other,but
theyalso meld or convergeinto each otherso that everyindividualhas
6 Thebasicstudy
isC. Brub,
ofsingulars
theories
ofintellectual
ofmedieval
cognition
dead
au moyen
La connaissance
del'individuel
1964,whichdoesnot,however,
, Montreal
ge
See alsoLynch1969(op.cit.,
withAuriol.
above,n.3).
above,n. 3) andPayne1981(op.cit.,
7 Scriptum
"non. . . individua
perhuius, d. 35,q. 4, art.1, (X, 812a;Vb,f. 384ra"b):
naturas
immoperproprias
tantummodo
modiaccidentia
suas,sed
realiter,
distinguantur
nisiquatenus
aliter
distincte
Nonenimpossunt
cognosci
peristacognoscitive.
distinguuntur
in ratione
autemdistingui
Nonpossunt
in aliquosuntdissimilia.
quod
specifica,
propter
in accidentibus
dissimilia
dumreperiuntur
propriis."
distinguuntur
8 Auriol,
ad rationem
, d. 2, q. 1, art.4: . . . quia <Sorteset Plato>addunt
Scriptum
et ad rationem
et ad rationem
rationem
substantiae
sensibilitatem,
corporis
corporeitatis,
Sortes
nihiladdunt;
autem
etad rationabilitatem
animalis
idcirco,
rationabilitatem,
penitus
in: PeterAuriol,
realiter
eiusdem
et Platosuntpenitus
rationis,
quamvis
distinguantur."
St. Bonaventure-Louvained. E. Buytaert,
Sententiarum
, 2 volumes,
Scriptum
super
primum
vol.1,sec.9, n. 69,p. 493,11.87-91.
Paderborn
1952-56,

18:24:05 PM

OF SINGULARS
ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION

181

ultimately
just one: its ratio.This ultimateratiolies at the level of the most
the individualhas.
specialspeciesand encompassesall of the otherrationes
For Auriol,then,the ratioof the mostspecial species is an indivisibleratio
Now, the most impor[ratioatoma),not subject to furtherspecification.9
tant thingto know about these rationes
, besides the fact that they are
in
of
the
similar
individuals
same
utterly
species, is that they are the
for
extra-mental
or
bases
concepts.Upon intellectualacquaingrounds
intellect
to formone certainconcept,and this
ratio
directs
the
each
tance,
of itself,
is because a ratiocan make an intelligiblerepresentation
[species)
intellectualacquaintance.10These rationes
, then, are
therebyfacilitating
utterlysimilarproperties,and the ratioof the most special
intelligible,
of everyindividual.
is
the
species
aggregateintelligibility
TheIntellectual
toAuriol
ofSingulars
Cognition
According
This, then,is how the problemof intellectualcognitionof singularsarises
forAuriol:no individualhas an intelligiblepropertythat could set it off
fromother individualsof the same species. How then can the human
intellectknow an individualin its individuality?
Accordingto Auriol,a
- not
the
can
be
intellect,but by any cogonly cognized
singular
just by
as
it
and
nitivepower11
is singular
incommunicable,if it is cognized in
a particular,determinedposition[situs).A singularcognized in thisway,
so thatit is distinctfromeveryothersingular,is called by Auriola "signed
singular"[signatum
singulare):
It is impossible
foranyrepresentation
or likeness
to represent
a signed
sin{species)
anddeterminately
in contrast
to every
other
ofthe
gulardistinctly
signed[singular]
it represents
it in a certain
sameratio
, unless
(), so thattherepresentaposition
tioncomesaboutbywayofintentional
lines. . . Forifa representation
were
(species)
9 E.g.,Auriol,
II Sent.
thetheyd. 9, q. 3, ed. Rome1605,lllaC-D, arguing
against
makes
individuals
ofthesamespecies
distinct
from
eachother:
orythata positive
property
nonessetratioatoma.Ratioest,quiatuncratiospecieiesset
"Item,
species
specialissima
essetgenus.
ratiorespectu
differentiarum.
...
Item,tuncspeciesspecialissima
possibilis
individuum
essetunaspecies."
etiamquodquodlibet
Sequeretur
10FormoreonAuriol
ontheratio,
seeR.L.Friedman,
textreferences,
including
Conceiving
andModifying
Some
Modist
Roots
Auriol's
Formation
, in:G. Marmo
Reality:
ofPeter
ofConcept
Theory
Verba.
Auriol
Turnhout
onIntentions
and
1997,305-21and id.,Peter
(ed.),Vestigia,
Imagines,
Essential
inLanguage
Predication
andR.L. Friedman
, in:S. Ebbesen
(eds.),Medieval
Analyses
andCognition
toAuriol's
useofratio
Forthebroadbackground
, Copenhagen
1999,415-30.
,
seeL.M.de Rijk,A Special
Useofratioin13thand14thCentury
, in:M. Fattori
Metaphysics
andM.L. Bianchi
Intellettuale
Internazionale
, Lessico
, Rome
(eds.),Ratio.VIIColloquio
Europeo
1994,197-218.
11Cf.aboveat andaround
n. 7.

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182

RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
abstracted
sucha modeofrepresenting,
from
it wouldbe indifferent
to eachand
ofthespecies;
forsingulars,
sincetheyhaveultimately
thesameratio
,
every
singular
aresimilar.
. . . Nowthislikeness
insofar
as itis an
[i.e.therepresentative
likeness],
indifferent
is appropriated
as itreplikeness,
individual]
[toa signed
onlyinasmuch
in a linearway,at theendofwhich[line],either
resents
closebyor
intentionally
further
willbejustas many
which
is cognized.
Andthusthere
away,is setthething
andpositionally
as there
arerepresentations
distinct
things
[species)}2
represented

The basic problempointed out in this quotation,we have seen before:

all individuals of the same species have an utterlysimilar aggregate
theirratio,and theythereforemake utterlysimilarreprecognoscibility,
sentations.Thus, in order to have cognitionof a particularindividualit
is necessaryto add to the representation
of thisindividualsome feature
or mark that sets it apart fromall otherindividualsof the same species;
the individualmust be cognized as "signed" (.signatura
). This means for
Auriolthatthe individualis cognizedas placed in a unique position(situs),
and it is the uniquenessof the positionthat makes the representation
of
the signed singularunique to it and distinctfromall other representationsof individualsbelongingto the same species.AurioPsexample here
is of a spatial position,but he makes it clear that situatingor positioning a singulartemporally at some unique point in time, e.g. now or
then servesthe same purpose forthingsthatexistin time,such as individual sounds.13What the signed individualis equivalentto on the linguisticplane, accordingto Auriol,is attachinga demonstrative
pronoun
to a noun, saying'this stone' or thathuman being'. The demonstrative
pronounservesto singleout a thingas being in a certainposition,mak12Scriptum
estenim
, d. 35,pars4, art.1,prop.1,(X,806a-b;
Vb,f.381va):"Impossibile
etdeterminate,
distincte
quodspecies
aliquavelsimilitudo
representet
singulare
signatum
contra
omnealiudsignatum
eiusdem
nisirepresentet
illudsubcertositu,itaquod
rationis,
abstraheretur
fiatpermodum
intentionalium
linearum.
... Si enimspecies
repraesentatio
sina talimodorepraesentandi,
illiusspeciei,
ad quodlibet
ipsaessetindifferens
singulare
iliasimilcumsintultimate
eiusdem
similia
sunt.
. . . appropriatur
rationis,
gularia
namque,
modolineari
itudoquaein quantum
similitudo
indifferens
est,nisiquatenus
repraesentat
in cuiustermino
etitaquot
intentionaliter
resquaecognoscitur;
propevellongestatuitur
resrepraesentatae
et situaliter
distinctae."
suntspecies
toterunt
13Scriptum,
"Estautem
consid. 35,pars4, art.1,prop.1,(X,807a;Vb,ff.381 -382ra):
estpriusetposterius,
sivenuncettunc
derandum
quodilludquodestsitusinpermansivis
in successivis.
Undesi dentur
duosonisimillimi,
unusheret alterhodie,nonpoterunt
eosnumeraliter,
nisiquatenus
apprehendecognosci
quodistesonuset ille,distinguendo
ab eadem
uthicetibi,si fuerint
turilleuttuncetisteutnunc.Nonenimdistinguentur
ita
nonsolumestsituativa,
Etpropter
hocdemonstrativa
etdesignativa
campana.
cognitio
secundum
diversum
immoestetiamhoc modoquantitativa
situm,
quoddiffrt
quod
Et hincestquodconsuevit
differre
secundum
nuncet tuncsivesecundum
potest
tempus.
hicet nuncvelalterum
illorum."
See also
dicicognitionem
individui
concernere
signati
n. 30.
below,

18:24:05 PM

ON INTELLECTUAL
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OF SINGULARS

183

ing what would otherwisebe universal e.g. human being unique: 'this
human being'.14The mere fact of demonstrating,
by saying,e.g., 'this
human being', makes the apprehensionapply to only one singular.
The last quotationtranslatedabove supplies us with another important piece of information:the position (situs)of the signed singularis
"intentional".For Auriol,thismeans thatit is generatedexclusivelyby a
cognitivepower.15Thus, the signed singular'spositionis imposed upon
it throughan act of the cognizingsoul, settingthe cognized thingin a
certainpositionin relationto the cognizeritself.This act of the soul is
called by Auriol "designating"or "demonstrating"the thing.Although
sometimesthe intentionalpositionof the signed singularis an adequate
of its real position,thisis not necessarilythe case; we can
representation
see why,ifwe imaginewithAurioltwo similarand equal signedglorious
bodies(corpora
gloriosa
), thatare in the same physicalpositionat once; then:
in terms
oftheir
indeedtheywouldbe in
theycouldnotbe distinct
(situ),
position
thesameplacewhether
andnevertheless
onewouldnotbe theother
hereorthere,
in reality
andsomeone
couldsay:"thisbodyis not
(realiter),
[them]
apprehending
in
thatone".... [ina caselikethis]ofnecessity
theoneapprehending
byspeaking
andhe willposition
onebodycloserin relation
thiswaywillvarytheposition,
to
as whenhe says:"this(hoc)
buttheotherfarther
himself,
away,as whenhe
body",
. . . On account
ofthis,
itis obvious
thattheposition
says:"isnotthat(illud)
body".
withwhich
wearedealing
hereis notrequired
tobe real,rather
itis an intentional
theindividual
thatterminates
andtheapprehension.16
position
(termint)
14Scriptum
omne
, d. 35, pars4, art.1, prop.1, (X, 806b;Vb 381va"vb):
"Praeterea,
virtute
illiuscognitionis
cognoscens
aliquidpropria
distinguit
ipsumab omni
cognitione,
duohomines
in coloreet figura
alioquocumque.
Sed si ponerentur
simili
ac quantitate,
etuniversaliter
inomniaccidente
tamanimaequamcorporis,
constat
quodquiillosimaunumdistinguere
nonpossunt
ab alionisicognitione
demonstrativa
et situativa,
ginantur
intra
se 'quamvis
dicendo
scilicet
istisintsimillimi,
istetarnen
nonestille' Dicendoautem
'istum'
et'ilium',
unumhicetreliquum
'hunc'et'illum'
demonillic,
vel,sidiceret
poneret
strarei
huneuthicetillum
utillic.Pronomina
enimdemonstrativa
sunta differensumpta
tiissitus,
ab 'hic'adverbio
loci.
quia'iste'ab 'istuc'et 'ille'ab 'illic',et 'hic'pronomen
illiduohomines
autemmodoconsiderarentur
nondisQuocumque
perconsiderationem,
unusab alio,nisiperconsiderationem
certitudinaliter
etdesigdemonstrativam
tinguentur
nativam
eorumin diverso
alium.Ergopatet
situ,immoqui acciperet
unum,acciperet
nonpotest
inquantum
etindividuum
nisi
huiusmodi,
quodsingulare
apprehendi
signatum
subdeterminata
distantia
situali."
cognitione
ipsum
designante
15On Auriol's
in itshistorical
ofintentionality
seemostrecently
K.H.
context,
theory
Existence
atParis
Notion
, 1250-1320
Tachau,Some
, in:S. Ebbesen
ofthe
ofIntentional
Aspects
andR.L.Friedman
1999(op.dt
andtheliterature
referred
tothere.
., above,n. 10),331-53,
16Scriptum
dicetur
, d. 35,pars4, art.1, prop.1, (X, 807a;Vb,f. 381vb):"Sedforte
in eodemsitusignata
duocorpora
siindividua,
quoddatoquodessent
utpote
gloriosa
insitu,immoessent
ineodemhie
miliaetaequaliaessent
tuncnonpossent
simul,
distingui
veleodemilluc,et tarnen
unumnonessetaliudrealiter,
et possetdicereapprehendens
'hoccorpus
nonestillud'.
Si utique
siedicatur,
nonvalet,
quiapernecessitatem
apprehendens

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184

L. FRIEDMAN
RUSSELL

Knowing a singularas signed,i.e. in a particularpositionwith respect

to the cognizer,has nothingnecessarilyto do withthe actual positionof
the singularitself,it is a way of cognizingor of apprehendingthe sinaut apprehendendi
).17As we saw above, an individgular (moduscognoscendi
ual's representation
that otherwisewould indifferently
(species),
represent
is
individual
of
the
or
made
unique to the
any
species, "appropriated"
the object,
individualby the soul's act of designatingor demonstrating
settingit at the end of one particularintentionalline. More specifically,
Auriol claims that the soul, throughdesignatingthe object, creates an
intentionallinear or positional opposition(oppositio
situalis)between the
since
and
one
the
only
straightline falls
object,and,
apprehendingpower
betweentwo points,the object of cognitionis made completelyunique.18
To take an example: the cognizingsoul sets Plato at the end of one line
and Socrates at the end of anotherline, and, by varyingthe positionat
which theyare representedto be in relationto the cognizer,theirrepresentationsare renderedperfectlydistinct;theyhave been represented
An integralcomponentin Auriol's view is, of
as "signed" singulars.19
course, that cognizerscan and do designatethemselves:this is the only
way that the cognizingsoul could create the linear oppositionbetween
in ordine
ad se,utcum
situm
variabit
et corpusunumpropinquius
situabit
sicdicendo
... Ex quo
dicet'hoccorpus',
aliudverodistantius,
utcumdicet'nonestilludcorpus'.
nonoportet
sedestsitusintentionquodsitrealis,
patetquodillesitusde quo hicagitur
et apprehensionem.
. . Fora similar
alisqui termint
individuum
thought
experiment,
seealsoabove,n. 14.
17Fortheseterms,
see,e.g.,below,nn.25,30.
18Scriptum,
"Sicigitur
, d. 35,pars4, art.3, (X, 819a;Vb,ff.386 -387ra):
patetquocumsint
modocognoscibile
sitindividuum
dissimile,
signatum
quodnullomodoestalteri
Taliaquidem
nondistinguuntur
eiusdem
distineti.
per
gradus
specifici
quantitative
partes
facta
secunsedpersimilitudines
exsituali
similitudinem
oppositione
aliquam,
appropriatas
duopuncta
Namsitualiter
cuminter
dumrepraesentationem.
tantum
unumuniopponitur,
duaespecies,
et imaginarie,
ducipossit.
tantum
una rectalinea,et realiter
Quapropter
similitudinis
in idem,ratione
tamensitualis
estex se et ratione
ducerent
quae quantum
in aliud.Haec autemrepraesentativa
nonestaliudquam
ducunt
oppositio
oppositionis
reiinsituincommunicabili,
estaliudquamrem
demonstratio
necrepresentative
opponere
illamsignare
etdemonstrare,
et perconsequens
incommunicabilem
reddere."
etrlato
d. o5,pars4, art.) (X,l9b;Vb,t. ol ): . . . licetenimcortes
Scriptum,
et distincta
in se,quia tamenapprehensio
fitperaliquamassimilacertasintindividua
eandemet apprefacient
assimilationem
sunt,necessario
tionem,
ipsaveroin se similia
et
lineaecaditinterSortem
nisitantum
demonstrativam
hensionem,
quae permodum
inter
Platonem
eteandem
tiam.Talesenimappreetsimiliter
poten
cognitivam,
potentiam
inter
necessario
erunt
distinctae
inter
trestrminos
scilicet
hensiones
situatos,
quiacadunt
ac Sortem;
situalitas
lineaab
et Platonem
et intentionalis
quodsi tolleretur
potentiam
ad simillima,
nec
necessario
esseteademquia terminaretur
huiusmodi
apprehensione,
numeraret
ea."

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ON INTELLECTUAL
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185

itselfand the object of cognition.20

Further,as we saw above, Auriolconsidersa temporalas opposed to a spatial signationto be possible(indeed
necessaryin the case of sounds); moreover,he sometimesmentionssingularsbeing signedaccordingto pyramids,therebyintroducingthe possibilitythat individualscan be signedin threedimensions.21
AurioPsemphasishere on the activityof the apprehendingpower,necessarilycreatingan intentionalline or linear oppositionin everycognitionof a singular,fitsin extremely
well withhis broadernoetics,in which
encounter
involves
the
creationof esseapparens
any cognitive
by the cogwhen
it
the
of
into
intentional
object cognition
puts
being.22
nizingsoul,
Cognitivepowersby theirverynatureare active forAuriol,and thisappears clearlyin his theoryof intellectualcognitionof singulars.Moreover,
AurioPsemphasison the activityof the soul in designatingor demonstratinga singularalso makes sense in the contextof AurioPsthoughton
individuationas I have presentedit. Because "everything,insofaras it
exists,existsas a singular",every signed individualis an individualin
realitywhetheror not it is subject to the designation,the positioning,
thatmakesit signedand distinctly
cognizable.Auriolthusclaimsthatthe
soul's designationis merelyan accidentalrelationadheringto the signed
singular,and it has no bearingon the factthat the singularis singular.23
In fact,Auriolmaintainsquite the opposite:it is a resultof the factthat
the singularis singularthat it can be signed in the firstplace; distinct
thingsby theirverynaturecan be cognized by some cognitivepower as
distinct,because "just as a thingrelatesto being, so it relatesto being
cognized."24A signed individual,then,is composed of a substrate the
20See below,
n. 30.
"Necpotest
, d. 35,pars4, art.2, (X,814a-b;Vb,f.385ra):
appropriali,
E.g.Scriptum
nisiinquantum
estautpyramidalis
inrepraesentando,
linealis
nonquidem
repyramidalis
etinrepraesentando,
sedintentionaliter
secundum
hocenimdeterminai
sibiterminm
aliter,
a quoderivata
estrealiter
etad quemintentionaliter
terminatur.
Necaliter
indiproprium
viduahabent
in repraesentando."
nisisintperhuncmodum
materiales
distinctas,
species
22In general
on thissubject,
andCertitude
in theAgeof
see esp.K.H. Tachau,Vision
Ockham:
andtheFoundations
, Leiden1988,89-104.
ofSemantics
Optics,
Epistemologa
23Scriptum
, d. 35,pars4, art.1, prop.3, (X, 809b;Vb,f. 383ra): . . quia demonstrableautessedesignabile,
relatio
videtur
accidens
Sortes
ipsiSorti,et perconsequens
nondistinguitur
a Platone
autperhocquoddesignetur
in
distincte,
peressedesignabile
actu.. . . Undeactualis
demonstrado
individuum
importata
per'istuvel 'illuattingit
estet distinctum
subquodammodoqui nondatsibiformaliter
disquodin se certum
tinctionem
etcerti
tudinem
in se,sedtantummodo
in ordine
ad cognoscentem."
24Smptumi
d. 35,pars4, art.3,prop.1,(X,818b;Vb,f.386vb):
estautem
"Impossibile
esseentiapluradistincta
ea discernere,
quinaliquacognoscitiva
potentia
possit
quiasicut
se habetresad esse,sicad cognosci."

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RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN

- and the intentional

invisible
reallyexistingindividualthatis cognitively
designationor positioningthat makes it accessible to human cognitive
Here we can returnto AurioPsexample of two gloriousbodapparatus.25
ies occupyingthe same physicalspace and being in everyway similar
and equal: even given theirabsolute similarity
we can sign themby settwo
lines.26
them
different
intentional
ting
along
Implicitin AurioPsaccount
is thatwe can recognizethatthe two gloriousbodies are indeed two distinctindividuals,but thatwe do not have consciousaccess to thatinformation untilwe have designatedeach of the two bodies and cognized
themas signed.Beforewe can have consciousaccess to information
about
a singularas singular,designatingmust take place, and thisis the result
of the activityof the cognizingsoul.27This is true at the level of the
senses,wherethe similitudeof the object is firstencounteredby the soul.28
Moreover,it is trueof the imagination,whichdesignatesor demonstrates
is set
the individualin a phantasmin whichthe singular'srepresentation
What is common
along an intentionalline leading fromthe cognizer.29
to the exteriorsenses and the imaginationis the factthat theydeal with
the materialworld,and thus can cognize quantitydirectly.
And with this,it would seem thatwe are back where we started:the
problemof the intellectualcognitionof singulars.The imaginationis the
last facultythat deals direcdywith materialthingsas such, creating,as
we have just seen, a phantasmthatrepresentsthingsin variouspositions
in relationto the cognizer.How, then,can theabstractintellect
understand
the materialconditionsthat the imaginationimposesupon the singular?
The judgementby whichan object is positionedalong an intentionalline
25Scriptum
"Undelapisparticularis
, d. 35,pars4, art.3,prop.2, (X,821a;Vb,f.387vb):
non
similitudinem
perquamsensus
apprehendendo
ipsumdicit'hunclapidem',
imprimit
habeatsimilitudinem
insensu.
ad id quodimportt
demonstratio
quod'hiclapis'quantum
sedconsequitur
modum
. . . hoctotale
Nonenimtenetse ex parteobiecti,
cognoscendi.
ex re quae
. . . nonestaliudquamaliquidconstitutum
lapidem'
importatum
per'istum
exactiva
demonstratione
demonstratur
etexpassiva
demonstratione
circaremderelicta[m]
inintellectu."
similitudinem
hocutique
totale
habere
sensus
propriam
apprehendentis;
potest
26See
above,n. 16.
27Scriptum
autem
, d. 35,pars4, art.3, (X,821b;Vb,f.388ra):Constat
quodimpossihabere
similitudines
velappropriatas,
nisiperilium
modum
bileestressimillimas
proprias
et situaliter,
de quo dictum
estsaepe.Individua
verosignata,
materialiter
repraesentandi
interipsaconad id quodsunt,similia
sunt,et primadissimilitudo
reperibilis
quantum
Ex hocenimhabent
ex signatione
et demonstratione
animaesentientis.
quodsint
surgit
hocpossunt
et demonstrata
et quoddicantur
'ista'vel 'illa',et propter
passivesignata
haberesimilitudines
proprias."
28See,e.g.,above,
n. 25.
29See on theroleoftheimagination
andphantasm,
below,
e.g.,nn.32,33,and35.

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187

- that the
is a quantitativeor materialjudgement
quantityis intentional
does not alter that fact.Yet, because the intellectis an abstractpower,
and because "the mode of operatingfollowsthe mode of being", the
and incorpointellectcan only understandabstracdy,non-quantitatively,
a
itself
nor
it
can
neither
hence,
cognize the
designate singular
really;
a
of
of
intentional
the
conditions
position
signed singular.30
quantitative
Indeed, it is preciselythe possibilityof cognizingquantitythat Auriol
claims distinguishes
the imagination'sact fromthe intellect's:that the
of
object cognitionoccupiesa positionis part and parcel of the act of the
imagination;the act of the intellect,on the otherhand, abstractstotally
fromposition.31
How can intellectualcognitionof singularsbe explained
whentheintellectcan neitherdesignatea singularitself(sincethatinvolves
a materialjudgement)nor even understanddirectlythe materialjudgementsof the imagination?
Auriol admits the problem,and claims in response that the human
intellectcan only cognize a signed singularwhile workingtogetherwith
the imaginationand its productthe phantasm:
individual
evenbydemonstrating
thesigned
intellect
cannot
understand
... thehuman
andneither
a separate
canitunderstand
sinceitis [itself]
andpositioning,
power,
30Scriptum
"Sed manifestum
, d. 35,pars4, art.1,prop.1, (X, 807a-b;Vb,f. 382ra):
etdemonstrativa
estquodtalisapprehensio
rei,ponensremin esseintentiondesignativa
hicvel
subcertosituautsubcertosuccessionis
aliautinesseapprehenso
termino,
utpote
taleestquantitativum
talisveliudicium
ibi,autnuncveltunc;omnis
apprehensio
inquam
cuius
sublineaimaginaria
demonstrativum
Sic enimtaleiudicium
intentionali.
quantitate
ab ipso
hicvelibi,velnuncveltunc,utquasiquaedamlineaprocedat
terminus
dicitur
'tunc
'tunefuit';autin posterius,
utcumdicitur
utcumdicitur
in prius,
apprehendente
utcum
autinsitum
'nuncsit*;
etsimul
utcumdicitur
eri;autindirectum
propinquum,
'illehomo';autin eundem
utcumdicitur
'istehomo';autin distans,
dicitur
reflectendo,
estet quodnotitia
linearis
utcumdicitur
'ipseego'.Ex quo patetquoddemonstrativa
nonquidemquodsintibilidamiudicium
apprehendendi,
quoadmodum
quantitativum
talis
esttalis.Ergononcompetit
neaetalesreales,
sedquiamodusiudicandi
apprehensio
etnon-quantum
servaret
etincorporeae,
alioquin
incorporeum
potentiae
non-quantitativae
modusoperandi
et quantum,
et nonsequeretur
in sua operatione
modumcorporeum
et nonCumigitur
sitabstracta,
modum
essendi.
intellectiva
quia incorporea
potentia
nihil
ab istomodocognoscendi,
et perconsequens
estquodabstrahat
quanta,necesse
videlicet
'hanclinem'vel 'hanc
demonstrando
velsituando,
dicendo
potest
cognoscere
velquantilinem
sedabstrahendo
vel'hominem
istum';
concipit
simpliciter
quantitatem'
modum
materialem
et quantitativum."
haberet
tatem
velhominem,
cognoscendi
alioquin
31Auriol,
II Sent.,
d. 17,art.2, ed. Rome1605,241aC-D: Undeex hocpossumus
inobiecto
concernit
intellectus
etimaginations,
actum
quiaactusimaginations
distinguere
retinentem
se exparte
etstando
hic[ed.:sic]velibi;nondicositum
situm,
putaponendo
estsitualis,
etconcernit
hocmodo
itaquodmodus
suusferendi
sedexparteactus,
obiecti,
Actusverointellectus
situtextrapartem.
situm
et proportionem
partium,
quia partem
in obiecto
suo."
abstrahit
ab omnisituetproportione

18:24:05 PM

188

RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
and directly
without
or signing
...
[thesignedindividual]
precisely
demonstrating
Forno onefinds
becauseit is conjoined
withthephantasm.
thathe cangraspan
individual
lineunlesshe says'thisline'or 'thisman',i.e. bydesignating,
norcan
thatperson
drawa distinction
between
twolinesexcept
withrespect
todiverse
posiifthoselinesaresimilar.32
tions,

What Auriol needs to explain,then,is the way that the human intellect
and imaginationwork togetherin the intellectualcognitionof singulars.
As we have seen, it is the imaginationthatsignsthe individual,i.e. makes
thejudgementby which the representation
of the singularis set along a
intentional
line.
as
Further, appeared above, making or even
unique
this
directlyunderstanding typeof materialjudgementis barredthe intellect. On the otherhand, accordingto Auriol,thereis no difficulty
involved
in the intellectunderstanding
thatanotherpower has designatedan individual, i.e. recognizingthat the imaginationhas designatedthe individual withoutdirectlyunderstanding
the designationitself.How? The signed
singular,as already mentioned,is a compositeof the signationimposed
by the cognizingsoul on the reallyexistingsingular,on the one hand,
and the reallyexistingsingularthat acts as a substrateforthe signation,
on the other. The intellecthas as its object the representation
of this
whole composite;the imagination'ssignationis an integralpart of the
that cannot be separated out.33Here is the crux of the
representation
an
as
of the signed singular
theory:
integralpart of the representation
that the intellectreceives,the imagination'smaterialact can be understood "abstractly"by the intellect.Auriol claims that the intellectcan
understandabstracdyany materialcondition
quantity,position,line,dis-

32Scriptum
. . Intellectus
vero
, d. 35,pars4, art.1,prop.3, (X,810b;Vb,f.383rb"va):
humanus
individuum
nonpotest
etiam
demonstrando
etsituando,
cum
signatum
intelligere
sitpotentia
sednecpotest
illudintelligere
nondemonstrando
etdirecte,
separata,
praecise
. . . quia cumphantasmate
Nullusenimexperitur
se posse
equesignando
coniungitur.
ad individualem
vel'hunehominem'
lineam
attingere
quindicat'hanclinem'
designando,
necpotest
differentiam
inter
duaslineas,
nisipenesdiversos
sisintsimiliae
..
situs,
ponere
scriptum
estquod
, d. 35,pars4, art.1, (X, 813a;Vb,f. 384 ): Undeimpossibile
haecalbedosignata,
nisialteroduorum
modorum.
. . . Secundoveroper
apprehendatur
actum
actum
veldesignare;
ethocmodo
aliquem
attingentem
primum,
quiestdemonstrare
nihilrpugnt
et signatum.
Et haecestmens
demonstratum
quinintellectus
apprehendat
etCommentatoris,
utallegatum
estsupra,
cumdicunt
Philosophi
quodintellectus
experiformam
mentatur
estprimo,
et perse et immediate,
formam
vero
quaecommunicabilis
hancsingulrem
nonprimo
necperse,sedmediante
actuvirtutis
nonquiimaginativae,
demmediante
eo formaliter,
cumintellectus
nonpossitinformali
peractum<virtutis>
sedmediante
eo obiective,
huiusalbedinis
eteius
imaginativae,
quiaactusdemonstrative
in ratione
terminus
concurrunt
uniusobiecti
dumintelligit
etapprehendit
intellectus
hanc
tam."
albedinem
demonstra

18:24:05 PM

ON INTELLECTUAL
OF SINGULARS
COGNITION

189

tance, etc.- hence it can understandthe imagination'sact abstractly.34

What he seemsto be gettingat here,is that,since the intellectcan understand materialconditionsin the abstract(e.g., length,but not three or
fourmeters),it can understandthata representation
is set along an intentionalline (i.e. has been designatedby the imagination),withoutunderstandingthe actual lengthof the line or the positionof the object. The
intellect,then,can understandthe act of the imagination,but not in a
quantitativemanner;simplyput, the intellectunderstandsthattherehas
been a materialjudgementmade by the imaginationand that thisis an
presentedto the intellect.
integralpart of the compositerepresentation
From knowingabstractlythat thereis a compositemade up of the sinthe human intellectarrives
gularplus theimagination'sact of designating,
- that is to
at knowledgeof the singularas it is singular
say, knowledge
of the substrateof the imagination'sact of designating
througha process
in Auriol's terms.The intellectreasons
of discursivereasoning:arguitive
back discursively
to the substrateof the act of the imagination,like so: X
has been signedby the imagination,therefore
thereis a singularX. Thus,
a
discursive
the
intellect
have what Auriol calls
can
through
process
abstractcognitionof the singular.35
While Aurioldoes not spell out the psychologicalprocessthatleads to
thisabstractknowledgeof the singularwithall the detail thatone might
34
"Etiterum
, d. 35,pars4, art.1,(X,808a;Vb,f.382rb):
Scriptum
patetquidestdictum
intellectum
a condicionibus
abstrahere
abstrahit
cum
materialibus,
quidemnonobiective,
nullasitmaterialis
nonpossit,
condicio
et situm
et
quamintelligere
quiaet quantitatem
linem
ac distantiam
etomnealiudquoddicatur
sedabstrahit
modaliter
materiale,
quantumad modum
linearedesignativum
cognoscendi,
quia nonhabetiudicium
atquedemonstrativem
et situale.
Patetetiamquidestdictum
condicio
materialis
a qua abstrahit
et quantitativus."
intellectus,
quianonestaliudquammodussitualis,
corporeus,
, d. 35,pars4, art1,(X, 811a;Vb,f.383va): . . nonestverum
Scriptum
quodomne
a condicionibus
abstrahatur
materialibus
necab essehicet nunc;
obiective,
intelligibile
immointellectus
omnem
materialem
etattribuere
alteri."
condicionem
potest
intelligere
35Scriptum
"Undepatetquod
, d. 35,pars4, art.1, prop.3, (X, 810b;Vb,f. 383va):
nonintelligitur
individuum
ab intellectu
exclusaomnisignaconiuncto,
percertitudinem
tioneautdemonstratione,
tarnen
subhuiusmodi
ab intellectu
signatione
cognoscitur
quasi
in suoiudiciodemonstrativo
existente
istius
lineae
arguitive,
namqueimaginatione
arguit
velilliusquodestsubstratum,
sive<quod> demonstratum
peristudetilludestaliquidin
se certum
etdistinctum,
differens
Et itaquodamiudicio
ab essesignabili
etsignato.
nonsubstrata
nontarnen
nisiinrespectu
demonstrativo
ad signationem,
conindividua;
attingit
haecduo,illudscilicet
cipitenimnondemonstrando
atquesignatur
quoddemonstratur
et in quantum
Et secundum
hocintelligit
demonstratur.
individuum
perimaginationem
certum
et distinctum
in ipsophantasmate,
modotamenimmateriali
et abstractive;
nec
et distinctionem
ad signaeiusab omnialio,nisiin respectu
umquam
percertitudinem
tionem
Et itapotest
diciquodintelligit
quamfacitimaginado.
ipsumquodammodoper
coniunctionem
cumphantasmate,
velmagisproprie
perarguitionem."

18:24:05 PM

190

RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN

it is clear that the agent intellectplays a pivotalrole

wish, nevertheless,
forhim in bringingabout our conceptsof singulars.Accordingto Auriol,
when we have intellectualacquaintance with any thing whatsoever,
we can form two completely differenttypes of concepts about that
thing.One extra-mentalthingcan serve as the basis for a whole set of
universalconcepts:these are conceptsof the thingas it is, to one degree
or another,similarto otherthings;moreover,theseuniversalconceptsare
characterizedby the fact that theycan be derivedfromeach other,as
one sees in a PorphyrianTree.36The same extra-mentalthingcan also
give rise to a different
type of concept: a concept of the thingas it is
similar
nor dissimilarto otherthings.Auriol claims that
neither
singular,
- universal
these two typesof concepts
conceptsand conceptsof the sinand can in no way be derived
different
gular as such are fundamentally
fromone another; they belong to two different
orders.37And it is the
that
"transfers"
the
from
order
to order,38forming
intellect
thing
agent
the basis forthesetwo different
kindsof conceptsby processingthe phantasmfromtheimaginationin two different
ways,and sendingtheprocessed
further
on to the possibleintellect.If the agent intellectsiminformation
ply abstractsfromthe phantasmand presentsthe abstractedinformation
to the possibleintellect,what resultsis one of the universalconceptsthat
can apply to the thingin question.If, on the otherhand, the activeintellect workstogetherwith the phantasm,then the concept of the singular
results.The intellect,then,understandsthe universalper se and directly,
which
as opposed to its understandingof the singularin its singularity
the
intellect
as
we
have
is,
seen, throughdiscursivereasoning.39
Thus,
36On Auriol'stheory
see Friedman
1999
of theformation
of universal
concepts,
., above,n. 10).
(iop.cit
37II Sent.,
sub
d. 9, art.3, ed.Rome1605,114bF-15aB:. . eademrespotest
concipi
etqualitativo;
unoquidem
reiutresestabsolute,
et aliosimilitudinario
duplici
conceptu,
...
necunusaliumincludit.
ethicsuntduoconceptus
etomnino
ordinis,
disparati,
duplicis
unusestde reutsimillima
aliusveroestde renecut
alteri,
Illi,dico,conceptus,
quorum
unuseorumnonse
similis
sedestreiin se absolute,
estalterirei,nectamendifferunt,
Sed conordinis.
ad alterum,
sedsuntomnino
et alterius
habetperadditionem
disparati
autemindividui
estde re
alterirei,conceptus
estde re ut simillima
ceptusspecificus
in se."
absolute
38Scriptum
ordointen, d. 35,pars4, art.1,(X,808b;Vb,f.382va): . . cumsitduplex
aliusverouniverunusindividualium
etsingularium,
tionum,
signatae,
quaesuntformae
remde ordine
inordinem,
intellectus
salium,
simpliciter,
agenstransfert
quaesuntformae
The same
a signatione
formam
cumformam
abstrahit
simpliciter."
signatam
reliquendo
statement
can be foundat,e.g.,II Sent
., d. 9, q. 3, art.3 (ed. 1605,115bD),II Sent.,
d. 11,q. 4, art.1 (ed. 1605,141aE),II Sent.,
d. 17,q. 1, art.1 (ed. 1605,231aD).
39Scriptum
diversi"Undepatetqualiter
, d. 35,pars4, art.1, (X, 810b;Vb,f.383rb):

18:24:05 PM

ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION
OF SINGULARS

191

understandsthe "vague individual"(individuum

vagum
), e.g. a human being
in
a
line
the
same
or
(ialiquishomo)
(aliqua linea),directly
way that a universalis understood:the conceptof the vague individualis sharedamong
a group of singularsand is thereforethe intellect'sproperobject.40If the
possibleintellect,however,is presentedwitha species of the vague individualjoined togetherwith the species of the imagination'ssignation
all as part of the same object of the intellect,as we saw above- then
throughthe abstractintellectionof the act of the imaginationand thereafter discursivereasoning, the intellectunderstandsthat there is an
extra-mental
thingthat served as the object of the imagination'sact of
In thisway, the intellectformsthe conceptof a singular.
demonstrating.41
Conclusion
For PeterAuriol,thereis a threestep processby which a human being
has intellectualcognitionof a singular:1) unconsciousrecognitionof singularity(thistakes place at the level of both sense and imagination);2)
with a perfecdy
designation i.e. markingthe singular'srepresentation
which
can
be consciously
its
feature,through
singularity
distinguishing
in
the
intellect, conjunction
apprehended by the imagination;and 3)
withthe phantasmproducedby the imagination,has abstractintellectual
cognitionof the singularthroughdiscursivereasoning,by reasoning"since
etsingulare,
universale
universale
mode<intellectus>
intelligit
perse et
namque
intelligit
non
sedpotiusabstrahendo,
illudcumphantasmate,
nonconiungendo
intuitive,
quamvis
etperconiunctionem
cumphantasmate,
veroarguitive
nisiinphantasmate;
quia
singulare
unumab aliodistinguere
nisirefindividuum
iudicium
nonposset
persuumimmateriale
cumdemonstratione."
materiale
erendo
ad individuum
quo apprehenditur
ipsum
40Scriptum
, d. 35,pars4, art.1, (X, 812b;Vb, f. 384 ): "Sic igitur
patetquomodo
est
intellectus
noster
perse sicutet universale,
singulare.
Vagumenimintelligit
intelligit
autdesignando,
sedabsolute
demonstrando
enimcommunicabile,
neccognoscibile
absque
verosubstratum
nonintelligit
nisi
seulineali.
materiali
etdemonstrativo
iudicio
Singulare
interactumimaginationis
differentiam
quo dicimus,
designativum
imaginando
ponendo
terminatur."
'istam'
vel'illam',
etilludad quodtalisactusdemonstrativus
albedinem,
41Scriptum
estenimloquendo
, d. 35,pars4, art.1,(X,812a;Vb,f.384ra): . . verum
in intellectu,
individuum
de intellectu
nostro
repraesentat
quodspecies,
quaeimprimitur
linea
velaliquam
lineam
Si ergodebeat
hominem
intelligi
pedalem.
utpote
vagum,
aliquem
ethocoportet
. . . quodrecipiat
repraesentantem
signationem
quamfacit
speciem
signata,
lineaevagaeet signationis
et sicperspeciem
alicuius
coniuncti,
imaginariae
imaginado,
sedperimanonquidem
menslineam
hancsignatam,
perintellectum,
signatam
intelligit
et tamensignare
eamnonpotest.
remsignatam,
et sic intellectus
intelligit
ginationem,
licetnonreprein intellectu
hocergopatetquomodo
Secundum
possibili,
species
recepta
illiusactusquo res
tamen
nisiindividuum
sentet
perspeciem
signato
vagum,
appropriatur
..."
illasignatur,
qui estactusimaginationis

18:24:05 PM

192

L. FRIEDMAN
RUSSELL

X has been designatedby the imagination,

therefore
thereis a singularX".
Auriol'stheoryof the intellectualcognitionof singularsseemsto involve
at least one clear problem,and this is not the only contextin Auriol's
thoughtin which this problem arises: his insistencethat individualsare
signed with intentional
position,and that in some cases this intentional
not
does
position
adequately representthe individual'sactual position.
This is, as we have seen, a necessarypart of Auriol's theory.But, how
can we be sure when the positionwith which we are dealing reflectsa
real stateof affairsand when it merelyreflectsthe way we cognizedthe
extra-mentalsingular?This is a difficulty
that Auriol does not seem to
have addressed,but it certainlyappears to create problemsfor the reliabilityof our knowledge.42
On the otherhand, Auriol'stheoryis of intereston at least two planes.
On a philosophicalplane, againstthe backgroundof a conceptualisttheory of universais,Auriol lays out a quite elaborate mechanismfor the
generationof concepts of singularsby the human intellect.For Auriol,
the singularis primary,and he rejects the explanationcurrentin the
Franciscanorder forboth individuationand for how human intellectual
cognitionof singularscomes about, providinginsteadan explanationthat
eschews any intelligibleindividuatingproperty.Forminga concept of a
singularas singular,according to Auriol, is not somethingthat we get
"automatically"as an integralpart of cognizingthe singular;ratherit is
a special way of cognizing the singular,in which the intellectworks
togetherwiththe imaginationand its product,the phantasm.
The factthatAuriol decidedlyrejectsthe tack thatscholarsof his own
Franciscan order had taken when it came to individuationand to the
intellectualcognitionof singularsis itselfa point of intereston a historical plane. It is also significant
thatthe theoryto whichAuriolturnsbears
some comparisonto Aquinas' theoryabout the intellect's"conversionto
the phantasm".For Aquinas, as forAuriol,the human intellectof necessitydepends on the phantasm for its knowledgeof singulars,linkinga
universalconcept to a particularthingby turningback to or reflecting
on the phantasm.Aquinas, however,leftthe relationshipbetweenintellect,imagination,and phantasmratherundeveloped;Auriolgivesa more
42Otherscholars
havenoticed
thatAuriol
seemstobe basically
unconcerned
aboutthe
of hisuse of intentional
, above,
sceptical
implications
being,see Tachau1988(op.cit.
n. 22),andespecially
D.G. Denery,
TheAppearance
andtheExperience
Peter
Aureol
ofReality:
of
Error
55 (1998),27-52.
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
Perceptual

18:24:05 PM

ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION
OF SINGULARS

193

elaborateaccount of just how the intellectdepends on the imagination

and its product,the phantasm. Thus, Auriol's theorycan be seen as
a detailed alternativeto the positionheld on the subject by a
offering
numberof prominentscholarsin his own order, a detailed alternative
thattakessome inspirationat least fromthe rival Thomistictheory.43
Copenhagen
of Copenhagen
University
Institute
and Latin
for Greek

43Eleonore
with
bearscomparison
outtomethatAuriol's
theory
Aquinas';
Stump
pointed
onAquinas.
material
tosendmeunpublished
shewasalsokindenough
Stump's
Aquinas's
de Philosophie,
204
Account
Mechanisms
, in:RevueInternationale
ofIntellective
Cognition
ofthe
be noted,
thatAuriol
does
hasbeenofparticular
(1998),287-307,
helpto me.It should
contrast
in Scriptum
examine
, d. 35,pars4, art.1 andsetsit in direct
position
Aquinas'
thusthe
tothatofWilliam
de la Mareandhisfollowers
Vb,f.381ra*va);
(X, 805a-806a;
I plan
ofthetwotheories.
ownpresentation
Auriol's
word'rival'thatI useherereflects
in whichI will
herein a morecomprehensive
offered
to expandon theremarks
study
in their
historiandcognition
moregenerally,
Auriol's
ideason concept
consider
theory,
cal context.

18:24:05 PM

Scotuson Freedom
and theFoundation
of Ethics.
1
An Utrecht
Contribution

ANTONIEVOS

The Research
Group
JohnDuns Scotusfirstpublicizedits workin Contingentie
en Vryheid.
LecturaI 39 in 1992. This studycontainsa Dutch translation
2
of and commentary
on Scotus' Lectura
I, distinction39. The background
ofthisresearchconsistsof some specificproposalsforrenewingtheresearch
on Scotus5philosophyand theology.In 1994 a re-workedEnglishverwas published.3Translation,comand Freedom
sion, entitledContingency
aim
at
and
introduction
mentary
presentingthe systematiccontentof
LecturaI 39 as a cornerstoneof Scotus' theologyand philosophy.
This claim,of course,entailsin itselfa widerprogramme.As forScotus'
work,we may continueto explorenew partsof it fromthe viewpointof
its systematiccentre,the so-called theoryof 'synchroniccontingency'.4
as furtherelaborationsof this
We presenthere fournew contributions
approach:
1. 'The Scotian notionof naturallaw' (by A. Vos)
I 44' (byH. Veldhuis)
2. 'Ordainedand absolutepowerin Scotus' Ordinatio
3. 'The theoryof divinepermissionaccordingto Scotus' Ordinatio
I 47'
E.
(by Dekker)
4. 'Freedom in regard to opposite acts and objects in Scotus' LecturaI
39, 49-54' (by N. W. den Bok)
1 Manythanks
toprof.
dr.Timothy
Nooneandprof.dr.Richard
whohelped
Muller,
ofthissetofcontributions
us a greatdealwiththetranslation
intoEnglish.
2Johannes
I 39, Ingeleid,
DunsScotus,
envryheid.
lectura
en vancomvertaald
Contingentie
H. Veldhuis,
voorzien
doorA. VosJaczn.,
A. H. Looman-Graaskamp,
mentaar
E. Dekker
en N. W. denBok,Zoetermeer
1992.
3John
DunsScotus
I 39, Introduction,
andFreedom.
Lectura
and
Translation
, Contingency
H. Veldhuis,
A. H. Looman-Graaskamp,
E. Dekker
and
Commentary
byA. VosJaczn.,
N. W. denBok,Dordrecht/Boston
/London
1994.
4 Thisexploration
alsoimplies
anewthecomplex
Scotianterminology.
In
mapping
A. VosJaczn.,
DunsScotus
, Leiden1994thewholeofScotus'systematic
Johannes
theology
is described
thesamepointofview,sc. thetheory
of'synchronic
An
from
contingency'.
ofthistheory
andFreedom
canbe found,
., above,n. 3),
(op.cit
explanation
e.g.,in Contingency
ofNicodenBokin thisissue.
23-33.See alsothecontribution
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium
, 38,2

18:17:05 PM

196

ANTONIE
VOS

The firstcontribution
discussesthe foundationof Scotus' ethics.The thesis of thisessay is thatthe Scotian use of the term'lex naturae'mustbe
in termsof the functionswhich 'ratio' and 'naturalis'have in
interpreted
the contextof Scotus' language of argumentation.A rationaturalis
, it is
found,is a necessaryargument,whichnecessarilylinksnecessaryand selfevidentpremisseswith theirconclusion.The foundationof the Scotian
and contingent
concept of natural law is the distinctionbetween necessary
ethics. The law of nature consistsof the principlesof necessaryethics.
This concept of naturallaw can be enlargedin the sense thatwhat can
be derived fromthese principlesis consideredto belong to the natural
law also.
In LecturaI 44 the young Duns Scotus explains conciselythe wellknown distinctionbetweenabsolute
and ofdained
I
power, and in Ordinatio
44 he elaboratesthistheme.In thesecondessay,VeldhuisanalyzesOrdinatio
I 44 and refutes
nominalistic
and theirreproachthatScotus'
interpretations
is
and
theory spiritually
ethicallyerroneous.
The thirdcontribution
treatsDuns' theoryof divinepermission.Since
the Lecturaends with distinction45, furtherinvestigations
of Duns' theof
divine
will
have
to
consult
the
Ordinatio
The
ory
(I 46-48).
theoryof
divine permissioncomes up for discussionin I 47. The question to be
consideredis whetherdivinepermissionis an act of will. Dekker follows
Scotus' argumentationand distinguishes
between two theories:firstly,
a
of
effective
and
non-effective
and
a
of
theory
willing,
secondly, theory
the negationof the positiveact of will. The second theoryseems to be
best fromboth an historicaland a systematical
point of view.
The last contribution
sketchesan aspect of the systematicbackground
of the theoryof synchroniccontingency.Searchingforthe cause of contingencyin thingsScotus turnsto the divinewill and introducesa twofold
freedomof the will (sc. freedomin regard to opposite acts and that to
follows(sc. diachronic
oppositeobjects)fromwhicha twofoldcontingency
and synchroniccontingency).Scotus' exposition,outliningthe fourpossible combinations,is not very perspicuous.The main reason for this is
his introductionof the aspects immutability
and mutability,
and
infinity
finitudeinto the exposition,most likelybecause in Scotus' terminology
'contingency'is always relatedto factualstatesof affairs.
Utrecht
Facultyof Theolog))
University
of Utrecht

18:17:05 PM

The ScotianNotionofNaturalLaw
ANTONIE VOS

1. Introduction
The complicatedhistoryof the concept of naturallaw has not yet been
written.In standardsurveysof the concept, ideas fromancient Greek
and Hellenisticphilosophydominate the scene. Given the centuriesof
Christiandevelopmentof the concept that intervene,this general backgrounddoes not make it easy to locate adequately Duns' place within
thishistory.
In a broad sense natural
law is a rule of action derivedfromthe essential characterof reality and what is at stakehere depends on the ontoof 'essential5and 'reality'.If naturallaw is invoked
logical interpretation
as a standard,what kind of rule is being invoked?Does the validityof
this kind of rule consistin being invokedor is realityas such law-like
and natural?The decisivepoint is whetherbeingnaturalhas to be seen as
an ethical or political rule in its own rightor whethernature itselfis
sociomorphicand social realityis natural.1Of course, the historyof the
notionof naturallaw is tighdylinkedup with the historyof the concept
or determinism,everyof nature{natura).Accordingto necessitarianism,
thingis consideredto be necessary,law-likeand natural. This absolute
is the hard core of everyimportantmovementof ancient
necessitarianism
philosophy,apart frompatristicphilosophy and even the philosophyof
the churchfathersonlydepartsfromit on an intuitivelevel. Nevertheless,
view of life
patristicthoughtis quite clear in rejectingthe deterministic
and realityin ancientreligionand philosophy.
This kind of naturallaw approach is clearlyexpressedby the Roman
philosopherCicero (106-43 BC): True law is rightreason in agreement
1 See E.W.Beth,Metafsica
enAlgemene
over
enwetenschap
in:Door
causaliteit,
beschouwingen
totwijsheid.
Assen1964,28-36and 74-81.Gf.E.W.
Verzamelde
Studien,
wetenschap
wijsgerige
De wijsbegeerte
derwiskunde
vanParmenides
totBolzano
Beth,
1944,5-92,
, Antwerpen/Nijmegen
H.L.A.Hart,Theconcept
, Vienna
oflaw,Oxford1961,and Ota Weinberger,
Rechtslogik
1970.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium
, 38,2

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198

ANTONIE
VOS

with nature;it is of universalapplication,unchangeableand everlasting;

it summonsto duty by its commands,and avertsfromwrongdoingby
its prohibitions.2
We may place thesekey notionsof law, reason
and
, truth
naturewithinthe contextof Platonistor Aristotelian,Stoic or Plotinian
thoughtand we shall find that the same fundamentalpattern of an
absolutelynecessaryrealitystillobtains.
It is, however,a remarkablefactthatthe historyof Westernethicshas
a significantalternativeat its disposal; it is even more remarkablethat
thisalternative
whichis presentedby themain line of thoughtofAugustine,
In fact,thisfeature
Anselmand Duns Scotus has been largelyforgotten.
of the historysignals a one-sidedview, well illustratedby a continuing
emphasis of scholarshipon the influenceof Thomism and neothomism
in later European thought.Indeed,
it wastheachievement
ofSt. ThomasAquinasthathe managed,
within
a certain
ofthought,
tosolvewhatmight
framework
be calledthe'selectivity'
ofnatproblem
ural-law
ontotheStoicprinciple
of'Follow
nature'
theAristotelian
bygrafting
theory
ofnature
as a teleological
Thegeneral
ofthelawofnature
system.
concept
principles
known
theiruseofreason,
are,St. Thomasargued,
equallyto all through
though
withthederivative
inpractical
areexercises
notspeculative
which
reason,
principles,
thesameconsensus
be expected.
cannot
aredivided
intonat(. . .) Thatphenomena
uralkinds,
thateachnatural
kindis distinguished
ofan essence,
bythepossession
thattheessence
an end,thatvirtue
are necessarily
and
linked
stipulates
- theseare somegoodness
withthefulfillment
of theseends
of theassumptions
behindSt.
Thomas'lexnaturae
.3
AlthoughThomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus share substantialviews of
thePatrimonium
fideion the intuitivelevel,theirtheoreticaloutlookis quite
different.4
Moreover,Scotus' trainingat Oxford at the close of the thirteenthcenturydiffersmarkedlyfromThomas' experiencein Paris more
than one generation earlier. In spirituality,Bonaventure is the most
influential
masterin the huge Franciscanmonasteryof Oxfordwherethe
authorityis Henry
youngJohn Duns matured;in ontology,the weightiest
of Ghent,while Oxford followsits own semanticaland logical tracks.

2 See MarcusTulliusCicero,
De republica.
Confer
law
Natural
, in: The
DouglasSturm,
X, NewYork/London
1987,318-24.
of
religion
encyclopedia
3 Richard
law
Natural
, V, NewYork/London
Wollheim,
, in:TheEncyclopedia
ofPhilosophy
1967,451-2.
4 See A. Vos,Kennis
in
enNoodzakelijkheid.
Eenkritische
vanhetabsolute
euidentialisme
analyse
entheologie
DunsScotus
2 and 7, and idem,Johannes
, Kampen1981,chapters
wijsbegeerte
DS), Leiden1994,chapters
11 and 12.
(abbrev.:

18:13:54 PM

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THE SCOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL

199

In the next sectionthe spiritualbackgroundof Duns' personal ethicsis

sketched.In section 3 we presentthe bare outlines of Scotian ethics.
the key words of Duns' theoreticallanguage with a
Section 4 interprets
in ethics:ratio
viewto his languageof argumentation
,
, ratioerronea
, ratiorecta
In
and
section
5
ratio
naturalis
rationecessaria
se
, propositio
per evidens,
persuasio.
this technicallanguage formsthe foundationin explainingthe natural
'
'
' natural
law expressionsHexnaturalis
) and
law), lex naturae(law of nature
(
'
context.
Section
6
solves
within
the
ethical
'rectaratio
Quinton's
(right
reason)
and Harris'sproblemswith the relationshipbetweennecessaryand contingentethics.Section 7 treatsthe Scotian solutionof the problemof dis'
4
pensationfromlaw, beforewe conclude with the last section Perspective
(section8).

2. Duns' Spiritual
Background
Duns' personal spirituality
enjoys a strongtheoreticalfooting.Thus his
has
its
own existentialcolour. In Scotus' view,God
foundation
theological
is good and his doing is doing well. Since, moreoverhis 'doing' is not a
privateinterest,we cannot be of a privateinterestto Him. Therefore,
we all have to be made freefor God. He does not spoil anybodyand
He does not favourany personabove another.We have to love Him for
Himself,withoutimmediateself-interest,
inspiredand absorbed by the
of his character.In Duns' expositions
endlessgoodnessand attractiveness
on hope, charity(love) and faithhe indirectlysketcheshis own spiritual
life. The argumentregularlypasses on to the personal 7' and is supportedby his own longingand intenseexpectationin order to reach out
communicative.
to Him who is absolutelygood and infinitely
The experienceof faithshows that hope is distinctive.We live from
expectationand what we expect is as such somethinggood. Expectation
is built on desire. He who is infinitely
good, arouses our desire most
intensely.Such a desire can be hope or can be despair. In the experience of faithGod is present,in the experienceof hope He is absent,but
He who cannot disappoint,is then presentin our expectationsof the
One who is hoped for,just as an expectedone is- as the expectedonepresentin our longingsforher or forhim: That is hope. It is orientated
to God because of God's personallovelinessand not in order to be used
by us. We cannot manipulateHim whom we are longingfor.According
to Scotus,we all experiencethe longingthatHe will be ours. He has to
be our God. In the midstof the argument,Scotus offersa verypersonal
sentence:I do not give up the act of desiring!'Thus hope is a very

18:13:54 PM

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ANTONIE
VOS

personal act of the will as love is too. By way of contrast,believingis a

kind of seeing,understanding
and knowing.It is, like knowledgeof faith,
an activityof our intellect.5
Besides Duns' personalspirituality
we have the Oxonian situationof systematic theology.The qualities of Oxonian theologyin particularand
systematical
thoughtin generalare exceptionalabout 1300, althoughthey
have been largelyforgotten.
Here theologicalthoughtshows
unfortunately
a remarkablebalance of spiritualrichnessand biblical solidity,philosophical depth and existentialtruth.
The Church is thereto conquer the world; grace is therein order to
save; theologyis therein orderto save philosophy.Augustinehad framed
the programmeof christianphilosophyand the Oxonian Franciscanstried
to masterthe problem of doing philosophy.Fourteenth-century
Oxford
went on to keep high academic standardsand reformational
inspiration.
Bradwardineand WyclifFefollowedthe lead of Duns' thought.Within
thisbroad contextDuns Scotus' thoughtflourished.
The conceptualstructures of Duns' thoughtyield the theoreticalbackgroundof his ethics,
which formsthe systematicalcontextof his idea of naturallaw.
3. EthicalStructures
It is a pity that Duns' ethicsis not well known.Like many otherareas
of his thought,his ethical thoughtnever reached completion.Nevertheless it is impressive.It is built on the main methodologicaldistinction
of
Duns' systematicalthought:the distinctionbetween necessary
and
theology
contingent
theology.
Notonlyknowledge
ofnecessary
tothisdoctrine,
butalso(knowlpropositions
belongs
consists
of
Indeed,forthegreatest
edgeof) contingent
propositions.
parttheology
contingent
propositions.6
The turningpoint of Scotian logic and ontologyis the idea of thepossibilelogicm.
Both the concept of synchroniccontingencyand the concept
of necessarytheologyare based on it.7 Duns' personal theoryof syn5 See DS 64-9.
6 Lectura
nontantum
necessa, Prologus,
111:"Adistamdoctrinam
pertinet
cognitio
sedcontingentium,
immomaxima
estde contingentibus".
riorum,
pars
theologiae
7 Scotus'maintexton
is Lectura
I 39. It is translated
andcommented
in
contingency
A. Vos,H. Veldhuis,
A.H.Looman-Graaskamp,
E. Dekker
andN.W.denBok,John
Duns
Scotus.
Lectura
I 39- Contingency
andFreedom
and in particular
, Dordrecht
1994,passim,
33-36.

18:13:54 PM

THE SCOTI
ANNOTIONOF NATURAL
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201

chroniccontingency
The divineessence
pervadesthewhole of his thought.8
is both the firstsubject of the necessarytruthsof theologyand of the
ones.9One alreadyfindsthe main methodologicalstructureof
contingent
and
necessary
contingenttheologyillustratedby an ethicalexample in
Scotus' Prologus
to his Lectura
:
I saythatthere
arenecessary
truths
aboutwhatis contingent,
because
Therefore,
A stone
isfalling
down
is contingent
andyettherearenecessary
truths
aboutfalling,
forexample,
thatit
looksforthecentre
andthatitfallsdownaccording
to a straight
line.In thesame
way,
I loveGod
is contingent
andyettherecan be a necessary
truth
aboutit,forexample,
thatI
mustloveGodaboveall.
Thisthesis
canbe proven
as follows:
'Godis the
onewecanthink
greatest
of'
I mustloveHimin thehighest
He is lovable
aboveall.Therefore,
Therefore,
way.
In thiswayI canhaveknowledge
ofcontingent
Thenthisknowledge
propositions.
in itsfirst
contents
it is nota content
in
really
regards
contingent
object,
although
thefirst
sense.Yetit concerns
truths
whichcanbe derived
from
continnecessary
gentpropositions.10
In termsof this basic distinctionbetween necessarytheologyand contingenttheologywe may assertthat withDuns thereare also two kinds
of ethics:necessary
ethics
and contingent
ethics
. Thus necessaryethicsis a part
of necessarytheologyand contingentethicsis a part of contingenttheology.Alreadyat thisstage we may suggestthatthe incisiveproblemsof
the statusof the commandsof the decalogue and the nature of revocation of law will be treatedin termsof this distinction.11

3Lectura:
8 See A. Vos,Thetheoretical
centre
andstructure
ina newkey
,
ofScotus
Philosophy
in: ViaScoti
ad
mentem
Duns
Scoti
Rome
I,
1995,455-73.
methodologica
Joannis
9 See Lectura
Prologus
114and 118.
10Lectura
suntveritates
necessariae,
Prologus
172:"Ideodicoquodde contingentibus
estlapidem
et tamende descensu
eiusveritates
descendere,
necessariae,
quiacontingens
utquodapptit
centrum
etquoddescendit
secundum
linem
rectam.
mediligere
Similiter,
Deumestcontingens,
et tamende hocpotestesseVeritas
ut quoddebeam
necessaria,
Deumdiligere
Ethocdemonstrative
concludi
sic:'Deusestquomaius
superomnia.
potest
nonpotest';
estsumme
summe
debeoeumdiligere.
Et sic
cogitali
igitur
diligibilis;
igitur
secundum
hocpossum
habere
scientiam
de contingentibus.
Istaigitur
scientia
estverecirca
in primoobiecto,
contentum
nonsitprimoibicontentum,
et tamen
contingens
quamvis
estde verisnecessariis
concludi
de contingentibus."
Cf.themuchlaterparquaepossunt
alleltextin Ordinatio
III 27 (= OpusOxoniense
III 27) in thefirst
article
ofthebodyofthe
- See AllanB. Wolter,
DunsScotus
onthewillandmorality
D.G. 1986,
, Washington
question
and425(English).
424(Latin)
11See DunsScotus'OpusOxoniense
III 37; IV 17.Thistextis highly
so we
reliable,
couldin factrefer
to thosetexts
as Ordinatio
III 37 andIV 17.

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ANTONIE
VOS

Besides Duns' renewal of ontologyconsistingof his own elaborationof

the theoryof contingency,
the othermain ingredientof his ethicsis the
Anselmianrevolutionin the historyof ethics.The Anselmiancontribution centresaround the distinctionbetween the agreeable good (bonum
commodum
The
) and the good of justice or righteousness
(bonumiustitiae).
firstkindof goodnessis relatedto what we feelto be pleasantand agreeable to ourselves.It presupposesthe spontaneousand almost instinctive
experienceof: that'snice!This kind of ego-centredgoodnessis constitutive
of the whole of ancientnon-Christian
ethics.For Anselmthe second kind
of goodness is decisive:The truegoodnessis good, because the objective
goodness of the otherappeals to us, absorbs us and draws to absorb, to
respectand to love it. In depth its characteris definedby being in line
iustus
' as rectus'
withdivinegoodness.Anselminterprets
: right,straightor
not bent or crooked.Anselmdid not despisethe firstdimension,but concentratedon the second one. John Duns took over this distinctionand
saw thatthe firstkindof goodnessis not moralat all, neitheris it immoral.
It is to be reckonedwith as a real human phenomenon,but ethicscan
only be based on moral goodness.Such ethicalgoodnessfocusseson the
otherand the Other, withina framework
of ontologicalcontingency.
Thus thereis a double shiftfromego-centredness
to orientationtoward
the other and the neighbourand fromnatural inclinationto an openended deed. Alongtheselinesbeing
freebecomesa centralnotionof Scotus's
ethicsand anthropology,
but it is also a distinctively
newconcept.Freedom
in thissense is not any longeropposed to sin (Anselm),but preciselysinningpresupposesfreedomand so being freeis essentialto a human person.12Beingfreeis, of course,also essentialto God, but He is impeccable
too: He does not sin in any possibleworld. How are the ethicaldimensions relatedto his essence and will? In orderto be able to answersuch
substantialquestions we have to have more insightin Duns' ethical
language.
4. Aspects
ofSystematic
Language
4.1 Introduction:
an analytical
familyof terms
In philosophyDuns Scotus only recognisesas philosophywhat we might
call 'necessary
.13 In theologythingsare different.
In theology,
philosophy'
12See foran elaboration
ofthispoint,
andHenriVeldhuis,
Freedom
e.g.,EefDekker
andSin.Some
Observations
ofTheology,
3 (1994),153-61.
, in:European
Systematic
Journal
13Necessary
is thatpartofphilosophy
which
consists
ofnecessary
philosophy
propositions.

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203

contingencyis decisiveand the theoreticalframeworkof contingencyis

used to build up an alternativemethodology.The importantrole of necessarypropositionsor statesof affairsin theologyis revealedin termsof
the contextof the basic phenomenonof contingentpropositionsor states
of affairs.This role yieldsthe solutionto a fundamentalproblemin eth'ius naturae
' and
ical theory,namely,that of key termslike Hexnaturae",
'ratiorecta
' Let us firsttryto elucidate the meaningof these terms:
'
'lexnaturae
law,natuurwet,
),
Naturgesetz
[natural
4iusnaturai
and
Naturrecht)
(natural
law(
!),natuurrecht,
'
diewahre
reason
rechte
'ratio
recta
, dejuiste/
rede,
Vemunfl).
(right
I proposeis thatthe semanticalbackgroundof theseterms
The hypothesis
lies withthe terms
'
'ratio
naturalis
'
naturalis
'consequentia
and
'ratio
necessaria
'.
These termsbelong to a true familyof termsand we need an introduction of some othermembersof this analyticalfamilyof terms.In order
to eventuallyexplainthe notionof rationaturalis
, we need to explain ratio,
and propositio
ratio
ratio
ratiorecta/
demonstrativa,
necessaria,
erronea,
argumentum
nota
as
well.
se
per
4.2 Ratio
4Ratio'
enjoyedan impressivecareerin philosophicaland theologicalLatin
duringthe Middle Ages. A wide spectrumof meaningsis found in the
literature:computation,calculation,account; reason, account (to render
account for,to give reason for);amount; proportion,proportionatesum;
underlyingprinciple,definition;aspect, characteristic;manner,arrange '
ment, method; argument,theory;motto and reason. Moreover, ratio
relatesto otherimpressivefamiliesof words, countingas key members
'notio
' and '
'15
termslike 4ideaV4 'forma
' 'conceptos',
'intentici*,
species

14See L.M.de Rijk,Untournant

deGand,
in:
dansl'usage
dumot
ideachezHenri
important
Rome1990,
Internazionale.
Attia curadi M. Fattori
e M.L. Bianchi,
Idea.VI Colloquio
89-98.
15See Idea(foregoing
Attia curadi
note),and Ratio.VII ColloquioInternationale.
M. Fattori
e M.L. Bianchi,
Rome1994.

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ANTONIE
VOS

With regardto philosophicalusage, De Rijk's summaryof important

' is
uses of 4ratio
was used
quite helpful.Since the timeof Boethius,'ratio*
to indicateone specificcharacteristic,
be it essentialor accidental,thata
c '
thinghas in common with another thing.Moreover, ratio may signify
the completenatureof a thing.'Distinguishing
severalrationes
in one and
the same thingis a procedurewhichis typicalof man's intellectualcapability.This procedure formsthe backbone of many philosophicaland
theologicalargumentsconcerningGod and the entitiesoccurringin the
outsideworld.'16In thislighttranslationsto be preferredare: aspect,charThese last aspects are especiallyrelevantto Duns' philos,feature.
acteristic,
'
'
intertwined:
ophical usage. For him, two aspectsof ratioare particularly
the argumentline,based on the line of logicalaspect,in conjunctionwith
' shines
the ontologicalaspect. The argumentationaldimensionof ' ratio
out, in combinationwithessentialaspectsof what thereis and what there
is to be known.
Thus, the Sitz imLebenof the considerationis the range of the analytical

:
meaningsof ratio'
of'Ratio*
is:
(1) WithDunstheregular
rangeofmeanings
a) analysis;
b) argumentation,
argument;
characteristic;
c) structure,
aspect,
and
d) concept
account;
e) reason,
ground.
For thisreason,a firstcriticalremarkfitsin here. As much as the transin the modernrationalistic
lation reason
sense of Vernunft
rede
{raison,
) is not
ratioAnselmiin most cases 'reason
' is not
in
the
case
of
,
adequate
very
'
'17 In general,it would be misleadingto transadequate in translatingratio
' and ' rationecessaria
' with naturalreasonand
late termslike 'rationaturalis
reason
Ratiois primarily
a ratioand a ratiois an argu, respectively.
necessary
mentor analysisprovidedby somebody,just as 'ratioAnselmirefersto an
(or the)argumentprovidedby Saint Anselmand 'ratioRichardimeans an
argumentelaborated by Richard of Saint Victor. On this fundamental
level the meaningsa) and b) are to be applied.18
16L.M.de Rijk,A Special
Useofratioin13th
and14thCentury
, in:Ratio
cit.,
Metaphysics
{op.
at 218.
above,n. 15),197-218,
esp.
'
'reddere
17An exception
in theexpression
is thecaseof'ratio
rationerr
which
occurring
means:toaccount
for.
18An
ofDuns'useof'ratio
Anselmi
is tobe found
I 2, 9. Cf.also
inLectura
example
I 2, 35 andOrdinatio
Lectura
I 2, 11and35.Examples
ofhisuseof'ratio
Richardi
are
to be found
inLectura
I 2, 41 and 123andOrdinatio
t 2, 180.

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4.3 Ratio recta and ratio erronea

1
'
Againstthis technicalbackgroundthe terms ratiorecta!and 'ratioerronea
have to be explained:
recta
is a correct
or a correct
(2) A ratio
argumentation
analysis.
When we act in such or such a way, thereare many factorsto be reckoned within accountingfora specificact: the possibilityand the object,
the end and modality,the time and place of the act.19A necessaryconditionforthe moral goodnessof an act is the requirementthatan agent
can elucidateits goodness.20
The argumentation
under considerationcan
or
Ratio
recta
and
ratio
erronea
make a pair21and thus
go right go wrong.
we can go rightin the firstcase and we can go wrong in the second
case:
erronea
is a wrong
a wrong
ora wrong
(3)A ratio
argument,
argumentation
analysis.
4.4 Ratio necessaria
' with 'rationecessaria
5
Our next step is to contrastthe term 'rationaturalis
'
againstthe backgroundof the meaningsof ratio"explained above. The
' is
term4rationaturalis
used by the youngDuns in LecturaI 42,
extensively
treatingthe questionwhetherdivine omnipotencecan be demonstrated
withhelp of a 'naturalargument'(rationaturalis
).22Here Duns also drawsthe
distinction
between
rationes
necessariae
and rationes
demonstratives
:
important
19Ordinatio
I 17, 62: "Bonitas
moralis
actusest... includens
debitae
aggregationem
ad omniaad quaehabetproportionari
ad obiectum,
ad
proportionis
(putaad potentiam,
ad tempus,
ad locumet ad modum),
et hocspecialiter
utistadictantur
a ratione
finem,
rectadebereconvenire
actui:itaquodproomnibus
docerequodconvenientia
possumus
- quibuscumque
actusad rationem
rectam
estquapositaactusestbonus,
etquanonposita
' is an
- nonestbonus."'Habet
aliisconveniat
in
Duns'
Latin.Some
interesting
anglicism
have'debet'
andthetranslation
mustbe: 4hasto*.
manuscripts
20Ibidem
: "Quantumcumque
actussitcircaobiectum
si nonsitsecundum
qualecumque,
rationem
rectam
inoperante
inoperando),
rectam
actus
(putasi illenonhabeatrationem
- plenedictantem
nonestbonus.Principaliter
actusad rationem
rectam
ergoconformitas
- estbonitas
de circumstantiis
omnibus
debitis
istius
actus
moralis
actus."
Cf.Ordinatio
I 17,
ad actumquisitconformis
rectaerationi,
si recta
64: "Exhoc- ex consequente-inclinat
ratioinsitoperanti."
21See Ordinatio
I 17, 65: "Idemenimhabitus
in natura,
ex actibus
qui generaretur
abstinentiae
elicitis
cum
ratione
ineliciente,
erronea
manens
essetpost
recta,
postcumratione
virtus
abstinentiae
et priusnonhabitus
nonfuitratiorectaabstinendi;
vitutis,
quamdiu
nectarnen
estcircailiumhabitm
in se,sedtantummodo
nunccorliunaliquidmutatum
etpriusnon."
gitur
prudentiae
' is usedin the
22In Lectura
I 42 'ratio
naturalis
following
: 1,4, 7, 10,12,13,14,15,

18:13:54 PM

206

VOS
ANTONIE
We haveto saythathaving
a necessary
and(having)
a demonstrative
argument
argument
to thesamething.23
(. . .) do notamount

Two kinds of commentshave to be made: terminologicalremarksand

commentson the level of argumentationtheoryitself.First,we present
comments.Withinthe contextof the theoryof argusome terminological
' and ratiodemonstrativa
' are
mentationthe termsrationaturalis
synonymous.
*
In Lectura
I 42 the expressionsperrationem
and 'natur
aliter
naturalem
cognosct
are
used
If
cognosct
synonymously.24 Duns states that somethingcannot
I 42, 18), then he can conbe demonstrated
[Lectura
bya naturalargument
clude in a parallel way that in such cases the argumentsare not demonI 42, 19). In sum:
strationes
[Lectura
is a ratio
demonstrativa.
(4) A demonstratio
In the same sectionhe elucidatesthe distinction
betweena rationecessaria
and a ratiodemonstrativa
and just the analysisof that sectionis linkedup
: Can divine omnipotencebe demonwith the firstsectionas its responsum
strated
P The answerseems to be affirmative,
forthere
argument
by a natural
St.
are necessary
of
Anselm
and
Richard
of
Victor
to
be
cited in
arguments
I 42, 1-2). Duns, however,rejectsthese arguments;
its favour[Lectura
Duns' rebutnecessaryargumentsdo not sufficeto build up demonstrations.
tal basicallyconsistsof the distinctionbetweena necessary
and a
argument
as
it
is
called
this
whereas:
demonstrative
time,
argument5
demonstrativa
(ratio
(5) A demonstrative
argument
(ratio
) is thesameas a natural
argument
naturalis
).
Thus in factDuns simplystatesthatnecessary
and natural
argumentsdiffer,
but how?
are more simple than naturalarguments
Because necessary
, we
arguments
attention
to
necesthe
difference
them
first
between
by
paying
approach
Duns acknowledgesnecessaryargumentswithoutany blemsaryarguments.
' occurs
I 42 4ratio
18and 19.In Ordinatio
naturalis
inthefollowing
: 1,6, 9, 11,14,17,
and
21
22.
20,
23Lectura
I 42, 19.The fulltextis quotedin note26 below.
24Compare,
I 42
I 42, 1, 4, 7, 10,12, 13, 14 and 15-16.In Ordinatio
e.g.,Lectura
naturalem
demonstrar?
and'perrationem
as 'naturalit
ostend
cognosci/
cognosci/
probari/
expressions
I 42, 4 wemeettheexpresIn Ordinatio
areinterchangeably
usedevenmorefrequently.
' which
WithDuns
sion*expuris
naturalibus
isvery
wellknown
from
Renaissance
philosophy.
itmeans:ex purisnaturalibus,
sc.rationibus.
25Lectura
I 42, 1-2and 19.

18:13:54 PM

LAW
NOTIONOF NATURAL
THE SCOTIAN

207

ish concerningvalidity,but according to his terminologythey are not

:
in the sense of demonstrations
proofs
andcompletely
whicharenecessary
are madeabouttheTrinity
Manyarguments
whichlead
andyettheyarenotdemonstrations
validargumentatively,
(demonstrationes)
thepropositions
which
because
oftheconclusion,
andevident
toa certain
knowledge
known.26
arenotevidently
andon which
function
as premisses
theydepend,
Such necessaryargumentsare characterisedby the double requirement
of the necessityof the premissesand of the logical necessityof validity,
for the theoryof the immanentTrinitybelongs to necessarytheology
necessaria
) and, moreover,the point of validityhas been explic(theologa
are to be definedas
So
stated.
necessariae)
(rationes
arguments
necessary
itly
follows:
arededuced
in which
conclusions
necessaria
is a validargument
necessary
(6)A ratio
from
necessary
premisses.
are at stake:
Thus, regardingnecessaryargumentstwo simplerequirements
between
the
connection
of
the
the
first, necessity
premissesand
logical
the conclusionand, second, the necessityof the involvedpremisses.If
are fulfilled,
the conclusionmustbe necessarytoo.
thesetwo requirements
The firstrequirementis of a logical nature- to be combinedwithontological implications and the second requirementis an ontologicalone.
The premisseshave to state an ontologicalnecessityand theyentail the
feaconclusionin virtueof logical necessity.The fundamentalontological
26Lectura
fiunt
circaTrinitatem,
I 42, 19:"Undemultaargumenta
quaesuntnecesfacientes
cret tarnen
nonsuntdemonstrationes
in arguendo,
sariaet nonestdefectus
a quibusdependent,
immediatae
non
tamevidentiam
de conclusione,
quiapropositiones
thesamedistinction
Dunsmakes
the
Without
suntevidenter
notae."
introducing
explicitly
I 42, 16:
in theparallel
textofOrdinatio
ofargumentation
samemovein terms
theory
areindeednecessary
andhavesufficient
thetheory
oftheTrinity
sucharguments
from
butnotsufficient
inordertoprove
force
(adprobandum)
argumensomething,
argumentative
trueandnecessary
in orderto demonstrate
tative
force
theyarenotevidently
something:
ismade:"Concerning
I 42, 15.InLectura
I 42, 19a similar
distinction
Ordinatio
compare
and(having)
a demonstrative
a necessary
thefirst
wehavetosaythathaving
argument
argument
Thereado notamount
tothesamething.
which
leadstoan evident
conclusion,
argument
in thewaythatit leadsto a
is onlyevident
sonis thata derived
(mediata)
proposition
ifthedirect
on whichit
(immediata)
(ifitwereaccepted),
proposition
proof
(adprobandum)
rationem
wereevident."
TheLatinreads:"Adprimam
depends,
(sc.thederived
proposition)
etrationem
demonstratvam
evidenter
necessariam
dicendum
quodnonestidemhabererationem
nisi
nonestevidens
ad probandum,
nampropositio
mediata
concludentem,
(siacciperetur)
- essetevidens."
- a qua dependet
HereScotusexplains
immediata
veryclearly
propositio
The first
andmediata
kindof
oftheexpressions
immediata
themeanings
propositio.
propositio
as a premiss.
as a premiss
andtheseconddoesnotfunction
functions
proposition

18:13:54 PM

208

ANTONIE
VOS

ture is necessity
and the fundamentallogicalfeaturewhich governsa neces{logicalnecessity).
saryargument,is validity
or natural
Moving on to the meaningof demonstrative
arguments,we see
that Scotus adds to the concept of a necessaryargumentthe condition
of 'evidentknowledge'.So, an epistemological
featurestillto be definedis
added to the logicalfeatureof validityand the ontologicalfeatureof the
necessityof the premisses.Hence, there are necessaryargumentswhich
can 'prove' something,althoughtheirpremissesare not 'evidently'true
I 42, 21).27
and necessary(Ordinatio
4.5 Propositioper se nota
In order to see the specificdifference
betweennecessaryand naturalarwe
the
still another (and last) important
need
introduction
of
guments
c
I 2 part 1 Duns elucinotd.
In Lectura
term:
se
propositio
per
epistemological
dates the natureof a self-evident
propositionis
perse notae).28
proposition(ratio
The self-evident
characterof such a propositiondepends on knowingthe
termsused. The truthof a self-evident
propositionis evidenton the basis
of the knowledgeof the termsand the involvedcertaintyis only based
on somethingof the propositionitself.29
Therefore,it cannot be derived
fromthe outside,as it were. The main idea is that the con(mendicata)
A selfcept of the predicateis entailedby the termin subjectposition.30
is
evident
to
be
certified
from
two
sides:
From
for
the
itself,
proposition
knoweris certainof it on account of the contentsof the termsthemselves; fromthe side of other terms,because a propositioncannot be
Thus
derivedfromother
terms,if it must be true on account of itself.
27We canalsoapproach
A fallacy
thesamephenomenon
from
theopposite
direction:
be true.It is
cannot
is an argument
whichshowssomething
andso a fallacy
impossible
in orderto substantiate
it. Supposethereis a
to deliver
a 'natural
argument
impossible
I 42, 21).Sucha propunfalsifiable
which
is argumentatively
(See Ordinatio
proposition
is either
ofitsterms
canshow,oritturns
outto
osition
trueas theanalysis
immediately
evident.
from
terms
whicheventually
areimmediately
be a conclusion
28Lectura
I 2, 13.
29See Lectura
est
I 2, 14: "Adintellectum
persenotai)
primi(sc.theratio
propositionis
sciendum
quaecumque
quoddicitur
propositio
perse nota,perly'perse' nonexcluditur
estperse notanisihabeatur
terminorum,
causa,quia nonnotitia
quia nullapropositio
causaet ratioquaeestextraperse consedexcluditur
notitia
terminorum;
quaecumque
estperse notaquae
terminorum
ceptus
propositionis
perse notae.Et ideoillapropositio
habetveritatem
nonhabetnotitiam
aliunde
sedillaquaeex terminis
mendicatam,
cognitis
etquaenonhabetcertitudinem
evidentem
nisiex aliquoin se."
30See Lectura
I 2, 15-19.Section19yields
"Iliaigitur
est
a finesummary:
propositio
etnonmendicatam
ex evihabetevidentiam
terminorum
perse notaquaeex solanotitia
dentiaaliorum
conceptuum."

18:13:54 PM

LAW
ANNOTIONOF NATURAL
THE SGOTI

209

or the
itsowntruth
on thebasisofthecontents
warrants
persenota
(7)A propositio
ofitsterms.
meanings
4.6 Ratio naturalis
'
'
makes up the
This elementof Scotian, and medieval, evidence
(evidentia)
The logical
natural
and
a
difference
betweena necessary
argument.
argument
foundationof (1) and (6) togetherwith
demonstrativa
is a ratio
(4)A demonstratio
and
is thesameas a natural
(ratio
argument
demonstrativa)
{ratio
argument
(5) A demonstrative
naturalis)
'
withthe help
of 'natural
{rationaturalis)
argument
providesforthe definition
of the additionof (7):
in whichthenecesandlogically
validargument
naturalis
is a necessary
(8a)A ratio
andself-evident
is derived
from
necessary
premisses.
saryconclusion
of the necessarypremissesis the feature
The featureof the self-evidence
which accountsfor the distinctivecharacterof a naturalargument
, a ratio
naturalis.
4.7 Proof
formthe only kind
Of course we cannot conclude that naturalarguments
based on proven
not.
certain
of
Necessaryarguments,
Certainly
arguments.
premisses,and argumentsbased on contingenciesprovide us very often
with certainty.Indeed, Duns would not like to deny this. Many argumentsfromScotus' theologyon the Trinityare in factproofsaccording
'
'
to modern terminology,
althoughthey are definitelynot demonstrations
which considerssuch argumentsas
according to Scotian terminology,
'
*
or
ostender
which
e).
(
prove probare
arguments
or ratiodemonstrativa)
selfratio
In the idea of demonstration
naturalis
(
contrasted:If thereis any proof
are specifically
evidenceand derivability
of a particularpropositionpossible, then that propositioncannot be a
is
self-evident
one.31Thus we see that the Scotian notion of selfevidence
in
down
to
and
fact
boils
strict
underivability.
extremely
is an underivable
proposition.
(9) A self-evident
proposition
31Lectura
intelI 2, 20: "Nondicitur
propositio
perse notaquiaestnotacuicumque
notitiam
intellectui
natisuntfacere
lects,sed(. . .) termini
concipienti
perse evidentem

18:13:54 PM

210

VOS
ANTONIE

4
With the help of the termspresentedsofarit is easy to define rationatuis by definitiona necessary
ralis*in an alternativeway: A rationaturalis
has
to be added to it in order
time
at
the
same
but
something
argument,
and the componentto be added to
to make it up for a naturalargument
it is, what I would like to call, absolute
; absolute
derivability
derivability
presupposes the provabilityof a conclusionwhile the premissesare eventuAccordingto this line of argument(8a) can be specified
ally underivable.
in termsof (9), and then we obtain:
conclusion
is
in whichthenecessary
is a necessary
naturalis
argument
(8b)A ratio
underivable
and(absolutely)
from
derived
premisses.
necessary
eventually
These resultsshed a ratherdifferent
lighton the problemwhetherspecific
propositionsfromthe philosophyof religionand the philosophicaltheory
or proven.In many cases Duns
of divine propertiescan be demonstrated
remarksthat such propositionscannot be demonstrated
, althoughtheycan
betweendemonbe proven
or shownto be true.If we overlookthe difference
and neglectthe specificdomain of Duns' argumentation
and probare
strare
that such and such theologicaltruthscannot be
the
statement
language,
makes
a ratherdifferent
demonstrated/
impressionfromwhat Duns in
proven
fact triesto say and seems to inviteto fideismand theologicalauthoritarianism.But Duns only scores a veryspecialisedpoint in termsof the
theoryof argumentation:
demonstrationes.
naturales/
setofrationes
tothespecific
doesnotbelong
andsuch
anargument
Such
'
In thislightwe have also to translatepersuasiowith 'proof' in the modern sense of the word.32It is decisivein studyingDuns' epistemological
evaluationsto realise that valid argumentsbased on provable premisses
/demonstrations
are not called 'proofs'
by Duns.33In factjust the oppositeis
true. The youngJohn Duns enlargedthe range of debatable and prov-

demonterminos
potest
perse notos;et ideonullaestperse notaquaealicuiintellectui
stran."
32See Lectura
I 42, 19.
33Concerning
is withI onlypointoutthatAnthony
thisproblem
Quinton's
allegation
animated
'Whatis clearis thatalthough
outanyground:
bythesamekindofgeneral
dethatfirm
effective
Scotustookthefirst
as Aquinas,
intent
rationalistic
stepstoward
reasonthatwasthe
faith
andphilosophical
ofrevealed
thedomains
between
marcation
disrational
to eliminate
andthattended
ofOckham's
fundamental
philosophy
principle
British
See hislemma
truth
ofreligious
cussion
, in: TheEncyclopedia
of
philosophy
altogether'.
seebelow,
1967,372.Formoreon Quinton,
6.
, I, NewYork/London
Philosophy

18:13:54 PM

THE SGOTIAN
LAW
NOTIONOF NATURAL

211

The decisivepointis not a mentalor psychoable truthswithintheology.34

nature,because if
logicalfeature,but one of a logicaland epistemologica]
andprovability
oneanother,
exclude
(10)Self-evidence
then
is an underivable
(9) A self-evident
proposition
proposition.
Along these same lines we also have to interpretthe expressionsholding
') and asserting
byfaith('assentire
perfiderri*
).35
(<only
) byfaith('de) (sola)fidetenere
Duns' thesisthat a certaintheologicalpoint cannot be demonstratedor
not:probare
!)36has oftenbeen takento mean thatDuns
proven(demonstrare,
subscribesto fideism(Gilson). However, again and again the systematic
is one takenfromthe theoryof argumentation:
point of such statements
If somethingcannot be demonstrated
, it may be self-evident
, and if it is neitherdemonstrablenor self-evidentin the specialisedsenseswhichDuns
Therefore,the
imposeson theseterms it mightbe held (only)by faith.37
taken
from
or
is
a
one,
epistemology the theoryof
point
classificatory
and is no evidence for any fideismor irrationalismon
argumentation,
Duns' part. A score of such theologicalpoints could be proven according
toDuns, if we would take 4to prove' in ourmodem
sense.The modernissue
of (im)provability
is here not at stake.
5. ScotianEthicalLanguage
The phenomenonof a dualityof necessity
and contingency
we observeagain
in ethicalmatters.The dualityof necessary
ethicsand contingent
ethicsconstitutesthe methodologicalellipse of Scotian ethics. It is the key to a
of Scotus' natural
reasonand natural
law terminology.
properunderstanding
34InDSi
11: 'GodDrienig',
I defend
theviewthata great
chapter
partofDuns'trinitarian
tothephilosophical
ofGod.
alsobelongs
theology
theory
35See,e.g.,Lectura
I 42, 17:"Ideodicoquodsolafidetenendum
estDeumsicesse
I 2, 23: "Omnisassentiens
andLectura
velcredulitateum
aut
perfidem
omnipotentem"
alicuicomplexioni,
habetapprehensionem
demonstrationem
terminorum."
36Cf.Lectura
I 2, 242.
I 42, 19 andOrdinatio
37See Lectura
I 2, 23: "Quaelibet
cuilipropositio
perse nota,estnotaex terminis
betintellectui
sedhaec'Deuses- intelligendo
terminos;
concipienti
perDeumnonhanc
essentiam
sedintelligendo
quamnosconcipimus,
conceptum
aliquemquemnosde hac
- veletiam'Deusestinfinitus'
essentia
vel'ensinfinitum
est',nonestnotaex
concipimus
terminis
nonestperse nota.Maiorpatet.
cuilibet
Minorostenterminos;
concipienti
igitur
ditur:
omnis
assentiens
autdemonstrationem
velcredulitatem
alicuicomplexioni,
perfidem

18:13:54 PM

212

ANTONIE
VOS

On the ethical level, the point of view of de legenaturaeconstitutesthe

centreof definingelementarytermsof necessaryethics.However,what
does it mean accordingto Duns that somethingis valid in termsof naturalreasonand naturallaw {de legenaturae
)? The analyticaland semantical
the
of
sections
to the line
functions
as an introduction
exposition
previous
of reasoningin distinction37 of LecturaIII.38 There the ethical question
runs as follows:
Do allcommands
tothelawofnature?
belong
We finda veryshortanswer to the questionabout naturallaw in Lectura
III. In dist. 37 we read:
Whatis known
onaccount
oftheterms
before
used,is structurally
(inaturaliter
) known,
anyactofwill(volition).39
In his personal solutionDuns makes a numberof importantpoints.For
the momentI only select those elementswhich directlyconcern Duns'
technicalterminology:
Wemaysaythatsomeelements
tonatural
lawas they
follow
from
itsproper
belong
In thiswaythey
tonatural
lawevenifthere
werenounderstanding
principles.
belong
norwill.In thissensetheDecalogue
is no partandparcelofnatural
law.Whatis
ofa correct
tonatural
elements
will,doesnotbelong
law,butother
(good)in terms
tonatural
from
thefirst
ofpraclaw,becausetheycanbe derived
belong
principles
ticalphilosophy.40
This definition
is verysimpleand basic.41In Lectura
III 37, Duns embarks
on definingprecisely*delegenaturae
' What belongs to naturallaw necessarily followsfrom the fundamentalaxioms in ethics. Such derivable
propositionsare necessarilytrue,because theyare deduced fromneceshabetapprehensionem
sednosassentimus
huic'Densestvelex fidevelex
terminorum;
termini
ante
etdemonstrationem;
sed
demonstratione;
igitur
prius
apprehenduntur,fidem
exapprehensione
terminorum
nonassentimus,
autdemonquiatuncnontantum
perfidem
strationem."
thehelpful
excursus
on simple
inLectura
I 2, 24-31.
Compare
concepts
38See for
theliterary
ofLectura
III DS 55-57.Codex206 ofBalliolCollege
identity
contains
a veryreliable
text.
(Oxford)
39Lectura
III 37, 13: "Item,que suntnotaex terminis,
suntnaturaliter
notaante
omnem
actumvoluntatis."
Dunsmakesthisstatement
in refuting
theideathatthecommandsoftheDecalogue
as suchembody
first
ofethics.
principles
40Lectura
III 37, 16:"Potest
autemdiciquodaliquasuntde legenature
utsequentiaexpropriis
taliaautemetsinullus
necvoluntas
suntde lege
intellectus,
esset,
principiis,
nature.
Et sicnonestDecalogus
de legenature.
non
recta,
Que autemsuntex volntate
de legenature,
sed alia suntde legenature,
quia suntbeneconsonacumlegenature,
stantcumprincipiis
quia
primis
practicis."
41
themiddle
is a complicated
because
endeavour,
Studying
periodofScotus'thought
there
is no reliable
editedtextofReportado
Parisiensis
IV (1303).See DS 49-53.

18:13:54 PM

THE SCOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL
LAW

213

sarypropositions.Of course the ethicallynecessaryprinciplesare themselves also part of natural law, as Duns explicitlystates earlier in this
quotation,where he refutesan alternativetheory.
In a typically
Scotianway necessarytruthand willare connected.What
is necessarilytrue,is trueeven if therewere no mind,nor will. Goodness
in termsof willor a volition(an act of willing)does not belongto thegoodness of 'the law of nature',because the law of natureis true 'beforeany
' known and
act of will' {anteomnem
actumvoluntatis)*2
Its truthis 4naturally
this 'naturally(structurally)'
being knownis being known on account of
the termsthe propositionunder considerationconsistsof. So the necessarytruthof suchbasic propositions
dependson the analysisof theinvolved
terms.The necessityof such propositionsis analyticalin the broad sense
of the word 'analytical'.Therefore,'what is known on account of the
termsused, is naturally(structurally)
known(beforeany act of will)':43
Whenwe applythispattern
to theethical
theresult
is as follows:
content,
'Whenwe completely
leaveouttheactofwillandtheintellect
ofGodgrasps
the
ofthoseprinciples,
it grasps
thepowerandcorrectness
terms
ofthose(prin(then)
an actofwill.'44
before
ciples)
Basicallya truthis naturally(natur
aliter)true,because it is true in terms
of the intrinsicnatureor structureof the propositioninvolved.Thus the
'
'
'
'
meaningsof naturaand naturalishave to be elucidatedin a logical-analyticalway and not in termsof an absolutisticand unpersonalconcept
of nature
derivedfromcosmology.Naturaltruths
are truthswhich are true
in termsof themselves
. A 'recta
, they are true in termsof theirownnature
' is a
ratio
piece of correctreasoningwhichoriginatesfroma correctbasis.
Conclusions
Preciselyin these termsDuns definesin ethicswhat he calls a truthde
' is the
The analyticalmeaningof 'rationaturalis
legenaturae.
key to explainwhat
de
is
true
naturae/
aliter.
natur
this
ing
lege
Definitely
key is not an
absolutenotionof natural
law or absolute
reason
. In thisanalyticaland conand stripsoffthe old notion of naturallaw.
ceptualvein, Duns simplifies
42Lectura
III 37, 13.See note39.
43Ibidem.
44Lectura
III 37, 13:"gitur,circumscripto
omniactuvoluntatis,
cumintellectus
Dei
terminos
illorum
virtutem
illorum
et rectitudinem
apprehendit
principiorum,
apprehendit
anteactum
voluntatis."
The lastpartofthissection
runsas follows:
velvoluntas
"Igitur,
necessario
vulthoc,si estrecta,
cumintellectus
dicitilludesserectum,
veleritnonrecta,
si discordet."

18:13:54 PM

VOS
ANTONIE

214

If the correctreasoningis builtupon a necessarybasis whichis also selfevident

), then it constitutesa rationaturalistThis self-evident
[perse nota
in ethicsby a specificidentity:the essence of the perbasis is constituted
sonal characterof God.
Thus Scotus' treatmentpresentsan importantchapterin the history
of the conceptof naturallaw, because he getsrid of the notionsof absolute
reasonand absolute
law of ancient Greek and Hellenisticphilosophy.
Ethics
and Contingent
between
6. Quinton
and Harrison theRelationship
Necessary
Introduction
The main foundationof Scotus' ethical structurebelongs to the most
pressingproblemsof his ethics.In generalit is suggestedthat his theory
foundationsof his ethics
of will and freedomis one of the mostdistinctive
and thisis patentlytrue. However, in thislightthe paradoxes of contingency,will and freedomare seen as the roots of his ethics,and many
ofwilloverintellectto be thebasic element.According
considerthepriority
to thisview the freedomof the act of creationruns parallel to the role
what is good. During a centuryof neoscholasof freedomin constituting
tic revivalthischarge has been repeatedagain and again: Only the will
constitutesmoral truth:
ofJohn
to themoralphilosophy
themostpersistently
Perhaps
recurring
objection
inthenew
inhisarticle
DunsScotusis voicedmostsuccinctly
byAnthony
Quinton
:
ofphilosophy
Encyclopedia
is not
so moraltruth
aregoodbecauseGodwillsthemandnotviceversa,
'Things
reason.'46
to thenatural
accessible
we have treatedin section3, and in
However, the conceptualstructures
ethicsare
ethicsand contingent
the
distinction
between
necessary
particular,
the
Harrisian
ethics:
of
Scotian
the solutionto such well-knownpuzzles
neutral
, the Quintonian
propositions.
fallacyand the notion of ethically
paradox
an
of
is
and
Scotism'
'Duns
Scotus
section
impressive
part
Quinton's
overviewof Britishphilosophyfullof remarkableinsightsand judgments47
45See thesections
4.4-4.7.
46AllanB. Wolter,
Native
, in: Marilyn
ofScotus
fieedom
ofthewillas a keytotheethics
DunsScotus
Adams
McGord
1990,148, Ithaca/London
ofJohn
theology
(ed.),Thephilosophical
British
I,
, in: Theencyclopedia
ofphilosophy
162,at 148,quoting
Anthony
philosophy
Quinton,
NewYork/London
1967,373.
47Quinton
1967(<op.cit
., above,n. 46),369-96.

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THE SGOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL
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215

and his general attitudeis certainlynot unfairto Duns. "It was John
Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308), the firstmajor Britishphilosophersince
Erigena and perhaps the most powerfulphilosophical intellectof the
Middle Ages, who initiateda new systemof ideas which led English
thoughtin a freshdirection,away fromthe conflictof Aristotleand Augustine".48
Quinton points to Scotus' fertileinnovationsof terminology.
In spite of this prudentinsightfulness,
the complex terminologyis not
natural
reason
and Duns definitely
takenintoaccount.Quintonhypostatizes
would not followhim in this direction.Accordingto Quinton's analysis
Duns separatesgoodness
and necessity
, but as we have seen above, Duns
does not linkgoodnessand will fromsuch an extremelynominalisticbias.
This allegation of an absolute connection of will and goodness is an
unwarrantedclaim which does not only run throughthe whole history
of neothomistic
histhought,but also dominatesthe nineteenth-century
of
tory Westernphilosophy.
In a sense,C.R.S. Harris's two volumeson Duns Scotus (1927) are a
phenomenonin Scotisticscholarship.Scotianado not count many monographswhichtryto describethe whole of Duns' philosophyor the whole
of his theology.Neitheris Oxford fertilein producingworkson his life
and subtleworks.Harris realized all this and carried out his huge proentitledLes comject. 1927 was the same year as C. Balic's dissertation,
mentaires
deJeanDuns Scotsurles quatrelivresdes Sentences
.49When we look
at the list of worksaccordingto Harris righdyattributedto Duns, we
discerna gulfbetweenhis orientationand Balic's text-critical
work.The
immenseproblemof spuriousworksand of the reliabilityof the text of
the authenticworksdo not seem to botherHarris verymuch, except in
a late note or appendix.50
Although'Duns was above all thingsa metaphysicianand speculative
Harris devotes
theologian,and his interestin ethicswas onlysecondary',51
a long chapterto the moral and politicalphilosophyof Scotus. He takes
as an antipode of Duns' thoughtThomas Aquinas', and his departure
pointis the assumedmedievalreconciliationof philosophyand theology.
here Harris is quite receptive:
Nevertheless,
48Quinton
1967(op.cit.,
above,n. 46),372-3.
49tude
etcritique
, 2 vols.,2med.,Louvain1927.
historique
50Harris[DunsScotus
inMedieval
, vol.I: ThePlaceofDunsScotus
, vol.II: The
Thought
Doctrines
theworkofKarlWerner
, Oxford
ofDunsScotus
Philosophical
1927)stillappreciates
of1881,whileMaurice
de Wulfhadalready
ofthesuperficiality
ofWerner's
complained
in 1900.
contributions
51Harris1927(op.citabove,n. 51),II, 305.

18:13:54 PM

216

ANTONIE
VOS
withsomedegree
The boundary
linebetween
wasmarked
reasonand revelation
on thefrontier
linecouldbe
ofclarity,
and fora timeat leastan openconflict
Butthecaseofethics
different.
Instead
ofdogma
avoided.
wassomewhat
ofa system
whichwaspartially
reconcilable
withthenewly
Aristotelian
metaphysics
imported
insucha wayas nottocontradict
tooobviandwhichcouldat leastbe interpreted
which
theprinciples
ofreason,
there
existed
a moraltradition
wastoo
already
ously
theethics
ofGreecetoadmitquiteso satisfactory
a
definite
andtoodifferent
from
partition.52

So scholasticism
ethicallypresentsa more thanusuallyheterogeneouspicwithAnselm's
ture.Harrisalso discernsthatScotusshowsa greateraffinity
of
doctrine
the
will,
metaphysical
while
oftherationalistic
ethic
ofthePhilosopher.
atthesametime
theform
preserving
ofhisownmaking,
Hiswholeethical
is thushaunted
theory
bya vastinconsistency
thedomain
ofnatural
itself.
Forwhilehedoesnotdenytherational
within
morality
ofthemoral
tomakeitdependent
onthedivine
nature
law,theattempts,
nevertheless,
in hisdoctrine
which
hasrendered
ofthiscontradiction
will,anditis thepresence
itso peculiarly
to one-sided
susceptible
misinterpretation.53
Harris himselfis rathercriticalof a one-sidedvoluntaristic
interpretation
of Duns' ethics.His proud point is thatmost criticshave overlookedthe
decisive antinomywhich reignsin Duns' ethical philosophy."Yet it is
only by recognizingits existencethatwe can account forhis statements.
In spite of thisseriousdefect,it must,however,be admittedthatScotus'
ethicalteachingrepresentsin some importantrespectsa distinctadvance
upon that of his predecessors,inasmuch as he bringsout more clearly
the moral significanceof the freedomof the will."54
AnthonyQuinton overlookedthe pivotalrole of necessarytheologyand
necessaryethicswithinScotian thoughtand thusthe essentialinteraction
betweennecessaryand contingent
propositionsin Scotus' theoriesof intellect, will and ethics.If we miss one of the two banks,we cannot build
discernedthe
the bridge.In contrastwith Quinton, Harris had fruitfully
kernelof Scotus' ethicalphilosophy,
whilestressing
theso-calledAnselmian
core of his ethics:
himtograpple
more
willanddesire
enables
between
Hisinsistence
onthedistinction
ofethical
andlendshisthinking
withthepsychological
analysis
problems
adequately
ofmoralexperience
thanwasdisplayed
a deeperinsight
intothefacts
byanychristianthinker
sincethedaysofAugustine.55

52Harris1927(op.cit
., above,n. 51),305-6.
53Harris1927(op.cit
., above,n. 51),307-8.
54Harns1927
above,n. 51),II, 303.
55Harris1927(op.cit.,
, above,n. 51),II, 303.
(op.cit.

18:13:54 PM

LAW
THE SCOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL

217

On the one hand Harris sees the independentimportanceof the distinctionbetweenwill and desireand thereforethe proper role of the will
in the theoryof action and in ethicsand on the other hand he warns
not to look at Duns as a simple voluntarist.Therefore,he judges the
of Landry and Jourdain,Schwane and Wernerto be misinterpretation
taken.Moreover,he discernsthe second bank: Scotus' statementthatthe
with 'rightreason'. So far,so
goodnessof an act depends on conformity
that
the
of both banks conHarris
concludes
but
then
conjunction
good,
stitutesa contradiction.So Harris replaces the dilemma of an arbitrary
voluntarismby the antinomyof a frankinconsistency.'It is only by a
frankrecognition
of thisantinomythatwe can hope to avoid the onesided
in which his teachinghas so oftenbeen distorted'.56
interpretation
However, if the illnessdoes not exist,there is no need of a one-sided
to be cured. Duns does not work with an exclusivedisinterpretation
intellect
and will. The key lies in the distinctionsbetween
of
junction
and
necessary
contingentpropositionsin ethics. There is a realm of
by contingentacts of will.Both
necessaryentities,whichis not constituted
dimensionsof necessityand contingencyin ethics are themselvesnecessary. The systematicalupshot is that there is no separated theoretical
heaven of 'the rightreason'. This heaven is demythologizedand made
empty,for 'natural reason' and 'rightreason' are both adequately unpacked in termsof logical,ontologicaland epistemologicalcharacteristics
of propositions.
of our sections3 and 5 solve the HarrisianparaThe ethicalstructures
dox. This paradox itselfturnsout to be a paradox. It is a paradox that
of Duns' ethicsand theoryof willshow so many
traditional
interpretations
There is no gulf or antinomybetween will and reason.
deficiencies.57
There is only the indispensabledistinctionbetween necessaryand contingentpropositionsand the rightways in which knowledgeand will can
'
'
'
be related to them. 'Ratio necessaria
, rationaturalisand ratiorecta!are
relatedto certainlogical, ontologicaland epistemologicalcharacteristics
of arguments.The will fillsin the realm of contingency,constitutedby
' have
what is not necessary.Moreover, 'naturallaw' and ' naturalreason
different
completely
meaningswithDuns in comparisonwiththeAristotelian
and (neo)thomistic
tradition.

56Harris1927(op.citabove,n. 51),II, 335.

57Confer
andV: *Wil'
IV: 'Ethiek'
DS, chapters

18:13:54 PM

ANTONIE
VOS

218

The solutionlies in the basic distinctionbetween(.synchronic

) contingency
and (.synchronic
ethicsand necessary
, the basic conceptsof contingent
) necessity
cannot be will-dependent.
ethicstoo. In termsof necessaryethicsgoodness
Even contingentethicalpropositions,e.g.
(13)a lovesGod
are based on a conjunctionof necessary
Godis
propositions{e.g.Necessarily,
to be loved)and contingenttruths{e.g.a exists;a knowsGod). The necessary propositionsthemselvesare not will-dependent.
However,thereare also ethicallyopen propositions,
belongingto conWill and goodnessare onlylinked,
tingentethics.They are will-dependent.
if theycan be linkedand mustbe linked.They can be linkedand must
ifthe situationis contingent
be linkedintrinsically,
and open. Nevertheless,
a decisionmustbe made and accordinglyit can only be made in agreement with the best possible will. This basic point can be appropriately
illustratedwith the sabbath command. There is no intrinsicelementof
a particularday, which entailsthe sanctification
of a particularday. This
particularchoice mustbe made by divinerevelationas the Bible as documentof revelationtellsus.
Summingup: The Harrisianfallacyis an unwarranted
allegationagainst
the structureof Duns' ethics.This general systematicbias is quite forof the fallacyhas two aspects:
eign to Scotus' mind. Thus the refutation
The necessarygood cannot be willed(in the sense of being based on the
decisionof the will) and the contingentgood can only be constituted
by
God. So Harris' and Quinton's complaintand charge are unfounded.
Duns' ethicsis not based on 'voluntarism'in the simplisticsense of the
word.
7. EthicalRevocation
In Die Bestimmungder ratiolegisbei Thomas von Aquin und Duns
Scotus'58BertholdWald sees the essentialdivergencebetween Thomas
Aquinas and Duns Scotus in the perennialconflictbetweenrealismand
idealism in philosophy.In termsof idealism the weaknessof realismis
to be seen in claimingreal insightinto the true nature of things.Thus
58Berthold
undDunsScotus.
derratio
beiThomas
vonAquin
%ur
Wald,DieBestimmung
legis
oder
Zimmermann
der
Kontinuitt
mittelalterlicher
Naturrechtstheorien
, in:Albert
Frage
Inkompatibilitt
Mensch
und
imMittelalter
York1992(= Miscellanea
andAndreas
Natur
, Berlin/New
Speer(eds),
at 681.
Mediaevalia,
21),662-681,

18:13:54 PM

THE SCOTIAN
LAW
NOTIONOF NATURAL

219

it is liable to skepticalcriticisms.Here the theological voluntarismof

Scotus comes to the fore.Duns looks for freedomfor theologicalpropositions,but the choice of such a philosophicalstartingpoint cannot be
decided in a philosophicalway. In spiteof thisdeep divergencethe practical differences
betweenAquinas and Duns are seen to be verylimited.59
To my mind the remedyis to be foundin a far reachingreversalof
viewpoints.If Duns' logical and analyticalapproach is seen as a metathe entiredilemma of idealism and realism
physicaldemythologisation,
Duns
does
not
vein of the natural
disappears.
speak in a substantialist
law (.Naturgesetz
and Naturrecht)
and the naturalreason at all. In the same
sense there is no rock-bottomphilosophy.There are only sound and
unsoundargumentsand thereis necessaryand contingenttruth,both to
be discoveredin a contingentway. The ontologicalstructureof Scotian
his ethics. The basic
thoughtis not to be neglectedin reconstructing
a
of
between
importance
comparison
Aquinas and Duns is not to be
looked forin practicaldifferences,
although,forinstance,the differences
in the theoryof slaverymust not be minimized.On the contrary,they
are substantialones.60In generaltheyshare the same patrimonyof faith,
but the decisivepoint is whethertheirtheoreticalcontributionsexplain
or underminewhat theyboth believe.The problemof ethicalrevocation
is just a case of it.
Duns' criticismof Thomas Aquinas' theory61
is preciselythathis ethics
cannot explain the ethical characterof the divine command in Genesis
22. In thiscase the problemis not raised by a specifictheoryof Thomas
or Duns in the firstinstance,but by the biblical evidence. If the command of Genesis 22 restson 'historical'and ethical revelation,the sixth
command of the Decalogue must be contingent.Aquinas' theological
explanationis not acceptable to Duns,62because according to Thomas
Aquinas this particularcommand belongs to the natural law. So Duns
59Wald1992(op.cit
., above,n. 58),680-1.
60See Wolter
1986{op.cit.,
above,n. 10),114-23and522-33andDS, 99-101.
61SeeKlaus
DasIsaakber
denStatus
desNaturgesetzes
beiThomas
von
,
Hedwig,
Opfer.
Aquin
DunsScotus
undOckham
1992{op.cit.,
at
, in: Zimmermann-Speer
above,n. 58),645-661,
647-651.
62Thelogical
coreofThomas'
hasbeenadequately
formulated
argumentation
byKlaus
zieltaufdenBegriff,
"Die Kritik
umdenes letzlich
die dispensatiti,
dieHedwig:
geht:
- dieallgemeine
nachThomas
NormderGerechtigkeit
nicht
whrend
verndert,
dagegen
derEinzelfall
demGesetz'entzogen'
werden
kann.DieseKonstruktion
istfurScotusnicht
mehr
annehmbar"
1992(op.cit.,
thepointofScotus'
above,n. 61),651).However,
(Hedwig
evaluation
oftheThomasian
at issueis nota historical
meh
argumentation
('nicht
), buta
one:The involved
is invalid.
derivation
logical

18:13:54 PM

220

ANTONIE
VOS

concludes that it must be a part of necessaryethics.However, a necessarytruthof ethicscannot be revoked,or dispensedwith.When thereis
alternativebiblical information,
contingencyseems the only logical way
out and Duns utilizesthisway out.
Modern systematictheologyhas alternativemeans of handlingsuch a
dilemma available, i.e. to treatit in a purelyhistoricalway, but the historicalway of thoughtwas not available in the Middle Ages.
8. Perspective
The specialistliteratureon Duns Scotus is familiarwith a rich harvest
of paradoxes and antinomiesDuns mightbe blamed for. The general
cause of such allegationsis that the logical and ontologicalcentreand
structureof Scotus' thoughtare overlooked:The theoryof synchronic
of Scotus' theologyand philstructure
contingency
shapes the systematical
and
semanticalfieldswhichyield
features
constitute
These
logical
osophy.
Thus
his
characteristic
terms.
to
many traditionaltermsreceive
meaning
'
are the most disnew meanings,of which logical'and 'potency/
possibility'
tinctiveexamples.
Exact exposition of Scotus' thought shows again and again that
qualificationslike Voluntarism'and 'Scotism' easilymiss the point. Here
theoryand life,head and heartpointintothe same direction.His scientific
passion consistsof truthand consistency.The whole of truthas he sees
it, is anchored in basic propositionsabout God and the essentialpropositionsabout God are necessary.If true,it is impossiblethat theyare
false. On the same level the fundamentaltruthsof Duns' ethicsare to
hold out a hand to each
be located. Faith and logic (reason/reasoning)
otherboth in the necessarytheoryof divinepropertiesand in necessary
ethics.
This basic dimensionsolves the allegationsof paradox and antinomy.
Exploring Duns' philosophical language points the way to consistent
philosophy;exploringDuns' theologicallanguage pointsthe way to con3 chartranscendent
sistenttheology.Ludger Honnefelder'sthesisin Scientia
63L. Honnefelder,
in
undRealitt
derSeiendheit
Dieformale
Scientia
transcendem.
Bestimmung
undderNeuzeit
desMittelalters
derMetaphysik
1990,XI-XII:"In zunehmendem
, Hamburg
alseinedenkerische
Maerwies
sichvorallemseineMetaphysik
eigenen
Ranges,
Leistung
bezeichunddiealsderzweite
zurcksteht
diehinter
derdesThomasnicht
groeEntwurf
mitderaristotelisch-arabischen
netwerden
mu,zu derdieAuseinandersetzung
Metaphysik
damitauchdieVoraussetzung
Deudicher
alszuvorwurde
fhrte.
im 13./14.Jahrhundert

18:13:54 PM

LAW
NOTIONOF NATURAL
THE SCOTIAN

221

acterizesDuns' ontologyof contingencyas the second startof the grand

metaphysicaltraditionin the West. I do not only subscribeto thismain
thesisof Kluxen64and Honnefelder,but I would also like to generalise
thisthesisinto the view thatDuns' philosophyand theologyconstitutea
new and consistenttheoreticalstartof the grand traditionof philosophy,
theologyand ethicsin the West.
Utrecht
Facultyof Theolog)}
University
of Utrecht

sichtbar
frdas bergewicht,
da imSptmittelalter
nichtdiethomistische,
sondern
die
Schulegewann,
seies in FormdermitAntonius
FranzvonMayronis
scotische
Andreas,
- oftepigonalen
- Fortfhrung,
u.a. beginnenden
sei es in FormdermitWilhelm
von
Ockham
einsetzenden
kritischen
Transformation."
64See W. Kluxen,
Thomas
unddiePhilosophie
von
vonAquin
, in:W. Kluxen(ed.),Thomas
der
imphilosophischen
1975,221-8,andid.,DieOriginalitt
, Freiburg/Mnchen
Aquin
Gesprch
skotischen
Einetypologische
hominis
etregnum
D. Actaquarti
, in:Regnum
Metaphysik.
Betrachtung
Scotistici
Romae1978(= Studiascholas2 vols.,ed.G. Brub,
internationalis,
Congressus
tico-scotistica,
6-7),I, 303-13.

18:13:54 PM

' Ordinario I 44
Ordainedand AbsolutePowerin Scotus

HENRI VELDHUIS

1. Introduction
The distinctionbetweenpotentia
ordinata
and potentia
absolutawas a much
discussedthemein later medievaltheologyand philosophy.The content
and usefulnessof these conceptswere disputed.It is clear, however,that
the distinctionwas introducedin the firstplace to be able us to indicate
that God, throughhis potentia
absoluta
, could have acted otherwisethan
He factuallywills to do and factuallydoes.1
The distinctionis also a much discussedtopic among medievalistsof
our century.Many hold the opinionthatthe distinction
betweenabsolute
and ordained power led to theologicaldeviations,especiallyduringthe
fourteenth
century,in which the reliabilityof God's characterand the
of
reliability created realitywould no longerbe guaranteed,forit would
implythat God could deviate fromthe order he created before.
The heart of this critiqueis as follows.The originalfunctionof the
and potentia
distinction
betweenpotentia
ordinata
absoluta
was to explainthat
God could have created, by his potentiaabsoluta
another
,
physical and
moral order than He factuallydid. Given the order of thiscreated realwhich
absolutaonly is a hypotheticalrealm of possibilities,
ityhis potentia
were not realisedand neverwill be. OtherwiseGod would deviatefrom
his earlier intentionsand fromthe order to which He decided before,
which would implicateunreliability
and arbitrariness
of God and of the
order which He created.
Later on in medievaltheology,however,one took over what is called
ofpotentia
absoluta
(thephrasewas introducedby Ober'operationalisation'
absoluta
as a capacitywhichreally
man).2Theologiansstartedto see potentia
1 Cf.fora
ordinata
and
oforigin
anddevelopment
oftheconcepts
potentia
description
TheDialectic
intheHighandLateMiddle
W.J. Courtenay,
absoluta
Ages,
ofOmnipotence
potentia
andOmnipotence
inMedieval
in:T. Rudavsky
Omniscience
, Dordrecht/Bos(ed.),Divine
Philosophy
in: Historisches
Wrterbuch
der
ton/Lancaster
absoluta/
ordinata,
1985,243-69;id.,Potentia
undK. Grnder,
Bd. 7, Darmstadt
1989,1157-62;
id.,
, Herausg.
v.J. Ritter
Philosophie
A History
andordained
1990.
andVolition.
Power,
ofabsolute
Capacity
oftheDistinction
Bergamo
2 Cf.H. A. Oberman,
: LateMedieval
toEarly
ViaAntiqua
andViaModerna
Prolegomena
Vivarium
, 38,2

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2000

18:14:18 PM

POWER
ANDABSOLUTE
ORDAINED

223

is or can be actualised by God. Thus miracles can be interpretedas

examples of God's acting by his potentiaabsolutaagainst the order He
Himselfestablishedby his ordainedpower. During the laterMiddle Ages
absolutawould have gone
ofpotentia
speculationson the operationalisation
Gos
as far as fundamentally
reliability for example by the
disputing
questionwhetheror not God can lie or deceive.
In a considerablepart of the literatureon this issue, moreover,John
Duns Scotus is seen as the one who took an importantif not theimporabsoluta.In his
tant initiativeto this fatal 'operationalisation'of potentia
in
Brink
that
Scotus' thinkG.
van
den
dissertation
God,
poses
Almighty
ing the originalmeaningof the distinction"is turnedcompletelyupside
down" and that"he preparedthe way fora more scepticistinterpretation
of the distinction".3
is to show that thisnegativejudgmentof
My aim in thiscontribution
Scotus' workon the distinctionbetweenabsolute and ordained power is
groundless.I hope to prove that,on the contrary,Scotus
argumentatively
a
of what in general is seen as the original
correct
gives
interpretation
functionof the distinction,
namelya theory,which expressesthe contingencyof created realityand the freedomof the divine will. In connectionwiththisit will be shown,thatthereis no reason forweightyethical
reproaches,and that Scotus does not pave the path fornominalisticthewould be damaged. My
ories in which God's reliabilityand truthfulness
I 44
a
of
Scotus'
own
theoryin Ordinatio
startingpoint is close analysis
(sections2-4). A short evaluation in the light of the above mentioned
reproachesat his address (section5) and a conclusion(section6) follow.
2. Theory
ofSynchronic
Contingency
thanHe has orderedthemto be made?".4
"Can God makethingsotherwise
It is thisquestionthatmakes Scotus elaborateon the distinctionofpotentia ordinata
and potentia
absoluta.We see, therefore,
that Scotus startswith
to Wyclif
M. Wilks(eds.),From
Ockham
Oxford
, in:A. Hudson,
1987,
Reformation
Thought
at 462.
445-63,
3 G. vandenBrink,
God.
A study
doctrine
, Kampen1993,
ofthe
ofdivine
Almighty
omnipotence
A Scotist
between
God's
andOrdained
Absolute
79,80.Cf.alsoa.o.:E. Randi,
Way
ofDistinguishing
Powers
M. Wilks
Ockham
toWyclif
Oxford
, in:A. Hudson,
1987,43-50,at 44,
(eds.),From
XII andtheAbsolute
50. E. Randi,Ockham
Power
46
, John
, in: Franciscan
Studies,
ofGod
at 209f.
205-16,
(1986),
4 Ioannis
I 44,363:"Utrum
DunsScoti
Vaticana1963,Ordinatio
Omnia
VI, Civitas
Opera
deuspossitaliterfacere
resquamab ipsoordinatum
esteas fieri."
See foran English
ofOrdinatio
I 44: DunsScotus
ontheWillandMorality
andTranslated
translation
, Selected

18:14:18 PM

224

HENRIVELDHUIS

the question which lies behind the originalmeaning of the distinction.

Scotus too gives an affirmative
answerto thisquestion and he also uses
the distinction
ofpotentia
ordinata
and potentia
absoluta
to articulatethatGod
could have created realitydifferent
fromhow He did it factually.Or, to
the distinctionis used to articulatethe
expressit somewhatdifferently,
of
will
Gos
as well as the contingencyof created
contingency
creating
reality.
We shouldalso recognizethatcontingency
of createdrealitywas elabodiscussed
before
in
I 39. In the Ordidistinction
rately
by Scotus,namely
natiothisdistinction
is lacking,but no doubt its main lines can be traced
in LecturaI 39.5 It is importantto discuss this distinctionbriefly,even
more so when we see that at the end of Ordinatio
I 44 Scotus himself
refers
to
the
he
in
I 39.
before
explicitly
explanation gave
In I 39 the question is asked whetherGod can have certainknowledge of futureand contingentstates of affairs.In the contextof his
answer to this question Scotus introduceshis so-called theoryof 'synchroniccontingency'.6
The heart of thistheoryis the thesis,that a state
of affairs
is
if forthevery
samemomentthatp is true(hence
p contingent,
thetermsynchronic)
is possible.Contingency
not-p
onlyis guaranteed,accordnot only
ing to Scotus,if the oppositestate of affairsis a real possibility,
for an earlieror later moment,but also for thesamemoment.
Then, in I
Scotus
reveals
the
fact
that
the
of
is
the
39,
contingency reality
ontologica! basis forthe freedomof the divinewill and also forthe freedomof
man's will.
We will defendthe thesisthat Ordinatio
I 44 is nothingelse than Scotus'
own applicationof his theoryof synchroniccontingencyto the distinction betweenabsolute and ordained power as it already had been used
withan Introduction
D.G. 1986,254-61.See
O.F.M.,Washington
byAllanB. Wolter,
fora French
translation:
O. Boulnois
etsonombre.
De Pierre

Lombard
(ed.),La puissance
Luther
etprsents
O. Boulnois
, Textestraduits
a.o.,Paris1994,279-85.
par
5 See fora Dutchtranslation
withcommentary
ofLectura
I 39:Johannes
DunsScotus.
envrijheid.
I 39, Ingeleid,
Lectura
vertaald
en vancommentaar
voorzien
door
Contingentie
A. Vos,H. Veldhuis,
A. H. Looman-Graaskamp,
E. Dekker
en N. W. denBok,Zoetermeer1992.TheEnglish
translation:
DunsScotus.
andFreedom
with
, Translated
John
Contingency
an Introduction
A. Vos,a.o.,Dordrecht/Boston/London
andCommentary
1994.
by
6 Thistermwasintroduced
DunsScotus.
Some
byA. Vos,Onthephilosophy
ofthe
young
semantical
andlogical
andMetaphysics.
Semantics
Studies
ded, in:E. P. Bos(ed.),Mediaeval
aspects
icated
toL. M. deRijkj
Ph.D. ontheoccasion
at
, Nijmegen
1985,195-220,
ofhis60thbirthday
on Scotus'theory
ofsynchronic
en
213.See foran exposition
A. Vos,Kennis
contingency:
Eenkritische
vanhet
absolute
inwijsbegeerte
evidentialisme
entheologie
, Kampen
Noodzakelykheid.
analyse
1981,81-7,269-74.

18:14:18 PM

ANDABSOLUTE
ORDAINED
POWER

225

in the tradition.In the lightof quaestioI 44 and Duns' own theoryof

in I 39 this could of course be expected.
contingency
3
3. 'Potentia
absoluta'in theLightofScotus
ordinata/
of Contingency
Theory
In I 44 Duns firstposes that the distinctionof potentia
ordinata
and potentia absolutacan be applied to "everyagent actingintelligently
and volunwith a rightlaw, but does not have to
tarilythat can act in conformity
do so of necessity".7
Defined like this the distinctioncan be applied to
both God and man. This is quite remarkablecomparedto othermedieval
theologians,who apply the distinction
only to God. However,when seen
in the perspectiveof the theoryof contingencyas it was developed by
Duns himself,this is just a matterof course; for,as Duns proved in I
39, the contingencyof realityis not only the basis for the freedomof
God's acting,but also forman's freedomto act.
betweenpotentia
ordinata
and potentia
absoluta
Concerningthe difference
Duns then uses the so-called 'canonisticinterpretation':8
ordinata
potentia
means "it can act in conformity
witha rightlaw"; potentia
absolutameans
"it can act beyond or against such a rightlaw".9 As said before,man
too has potentia
absolutaat his disposal. In this connectionDuns adds a
distinction.
While man can act inordinately
veryimportant
againsta certain law or orderby his potentia
absoluta
can
God
act
,
only
ordinatelyby
his potentia
absoluta.By definitionGod always acts ordinately.
Let us now returnto the quaestioof this distinction:"Can God make
thingsotherwisethan he has orderedthemto be made?" Scotus' answer
is affirmative
and containsthe followingaspects:
1. God has the possibility
to choose anotherthan the factualstate of
affairswithinthe orderHe himselfestablished.This concernsalternativity
within
the order of ordainedpower.
7 I 44, 3: "In omni
etvoluntatem,
conformiter

agente
perintellectum
potente
agere
rectaeet tarnen
nonnecessario
conformiter
legi
agerelegirectae".
8 Cf.forthis'canonistic
ofthedistinction
ordinata/
absoluta:
interpretation'
potentia
potentia
1985(op.cit
1990(op.cit
., above,n. 1),251v.,264v.; Gourtenay
., above,n. 1),
Courtenay
92-5.
9 Scotuscalls
from
ordinata
Tacerede iure',acting
from
absoluta
acting
potentia
potentia
Tacere
de facto'
toGourtenay
1985[op.cit.,
above,n. 1),276,n. 43,
(I 44, 3).According
theterms
'de facto'and 'de iure'originally
wereusedin connection
with'impotentia'.
Therecan be an 'impotency'
basedon legallimits
limits
('de iure')or on physical
('de
Understood
likethattheterm'de facto'doesnotconcern
absofacto').
actualising
potentia
luta
, as VandenBrink1993(op.cit.,
above,n. 3),79 suggests.

18:14:18 PM

226

HENRIVELDHUIS

2. Besides this,God has the possibility

to choose otherfactualstatesof
affairsin accordance with a new order,which deviatesfromthe order
thatwas establishedby Him before.These otheror new statesof affairs
are not just somethingdone at random,but expressionof a new order
as it is establishedby God. So potentia
absolutais a termwhich has its
in
to
relation
the
meaning
factuallyexistingorder. It concernsnot-realised possibilities
ordinata.
, which are outsidethe establishedorderofpotentia
As soon as God actualisesthese possibilities,
theybelong to a new order
of potentia
ordinata.10
3. In the lightof I 39 it is importantto notice that alternative,but
not-realisedpossibilitiesof both ordainedand absolutepower are realand
forthe actual reality.The possibilities
ofpotentia
absosynchronic
possibilities
lutaconstitutemore than a realm which was only initiallyopen forGod
when He createdand whichwould no longer
For
compriserealpossibilities.
if theywere not real logical and ontologicalpossibilities,
any factualstate
of affairswould be necessary,which Scotus neverwould defend.On the
and potenbetweenpotentia
ordinata
contrary,elaboratingon the distinction
tia absolutaDuns once more aims at a consistenttheoryof contingent
reality.By doing so he explicitlyguards and unfoldsthe originalfunction of the distinction.One even can say that the originalmeaning of
the distinctionofpotentia
ordinata
and potentia
absolutagetsa consistenttheoreticalbasis only in Scotus' explanation.11
There is a limitedsense in which the accusation that Duns 'operationalize the potentia
absolutais correct.However, we must realise that
this is about an 'operationalisation'as he had already done it in Lectura
I 39, in which he convincinglyproves that the contingencyof created
realityand the freedomof the divineand human will both essentialelementsof christiandoctrine only can be guaranteedin a theoryof synchroniccontingency.Scotus operationalises
absolutaby posing that
potentia
thereis a real possibility
forthe oppositeof any contingentstateof affairs.
Reality is an openreality,and God has access to this open universeof
possibilitiesby his absolute {andordained)power. Below attentionwill be
given to the questionwhetheror not this opennessis threateningGos
reliabilityand the reliabilityof creation'sorder.
10Cf.Lectura
I 44, 3: "quiapotest
etaliamstatuere."
legemmutare
11Herewe cannot
endorse
conclusion
1990(op.cit
., above,
Courtenay's
(Courtenay
n. 1),102):"However
muchonemight
I 44] into
wishto bring
thispassage[inOrdinatio
withthewayScotus
usesthedistinction
ofabsolute
andordained
conformity
power
throughouttherestofhisworks,
itstands
hisnormal
outas a radical
from
departure
usageand
from
thetheological
tradition
ofwhichhe wasa part."

18:14:18 PM

ANDABSOLUTE
ORDAINED
POWER

227

4. Two Modesfor God toAct Ordinately

In 9 of Ordinatio
I 44 Scotus discussestwo ways accordingto which it
can be said that thingshappen ordinately.The firstway ('Uno modo,
law, which is valid forall situaordineuniversali')is the way of a general
"
tions of a certain kind, e.g. the law everyimpenitentsinner must be
damned". The otherway ("Secundo modo, ordine particulari")concerns
in which a general law is applied to an individual
an individual
judgment,
"
the
situation,e.g.
expression thismurdereris to die".
In connectionwiththisdistinction
Scotus poses in 10 that God does
not only have alternativepossibilitiesat his disposal for individual
situahis
but
that
He
can
to
also
deviate
from
tions,
absoluta)
(according
potentia
another
laws
order.
Scotus
that
God
general
by establishing
emphasises
also acts ordinatelyin the lattercase.
Afterhis explanationof how we can speak in two ways about events
that happen ordinately,Scotus remarksin 11 that we only speak of
in relationto an order which is valid on the basis of a
ordinata
potentia
law and not in referenceto one specificcase.
general
Next Duns illustrates
the distinctions
made withthe help of two examwhich
a
of
for the interpreter.
series
difficulties
ples,
pose
They can be
understoodas follows.The startingpoint forthe examplesis the factual
situationof a persistent
sinnerwho willbe condemnedby God. This condemnationby God is a contingent
act, which as such supposes that the
state
of
affairs
(salvation of the sinner) is a real possibility.
opposite
is
to
Duns
this
indeed the case; this real possibilitycan exist
According
by ordainedor absolutepower.
Within
the contextof potentia
ordinata
, which is expressedby the general law that only convertedpeople can be saved, God can give the sinner so much grace (thoughHe will not do it factually),that the sinner
will be converted.Then God can save him in accordance withthe establishedorder.In thisindividualcase God would act accordingto the universallaw of his ordainedpower.
But whataboutJudas?He alreadyhas been condemnedby God through
a certainjudgment.Which alternativeis possibleforJudas,presumedthat
he is factuallyunconvertedand he is factuallycondemned?As it concerns a state of affairsin the past, accordingto Duns there is no such
withinthe orderof Gos ordainedpower, forthen He would
possibility
act againstthe generallaw that unconvertedsinnerswill be condemned.
absolutaGod stillcan establishanotherorderand
However,by hispotentia
saveJudas in agreementwiththatorder.This salvationofJudas- which

18:14:18 PM

228

HENRIVELDHUIS

as a specificevent goes against the earlier establishedorder- then has

an orderedpositionamong a new orderestablishedby God. In thisway
God always acts in an orderlymanner.12
We see thatin both examplesof the sinnerand ofJudas,Scotus makes
timeplay a significant
part,in our view,withoutgood reason. In the case
of the sinner,who could be saved withinthe order of potentia
ordinata
,
Duns speaksof a stilllivingsinnerwho will remainunconverted,
but who
coulddrawn towardconversionby God in the future,even if God factually will not do so. Judas already died unconvertedand condemned.
of God's potentia
ordiHowever,withregardto the synchronicpossibilities
nataor potentia
absolutaforan unconvertedsinner,time does not play an
essentialpart. The two alternativepossibilities
ofpotentia
ordinata
and potentiaabsoluta
are therefore
available bothforthe formersinnerand forJudas.
Thus it was also possible forJudas to be convertedby God withinthe
order of potentia
.
ordinata
Duns ends his explanationof the modes in which God acts ordinately
withthe importantremarkthat thepossibility
that God has accordinghis
ordainedor absolutepower,was explainedin distinction
I 39. His qualifier,
"withoutactuallywillingthe opposite of what he now wills,"13is crucial
here; in other words, the fact that there are other real possibilitiesfor
God, does not mean that He actualisesthese possibilities!
5. GodAlwaysActsOrdinately
Concerning the distinctionof potentiaordinataand potentiaabsolutathe
strongestreproach against Duns is that he paves a path toward a way
of thinkingin which God's actingattainsan arbitraryand unpredictable
characterand in which creation'sstructurebecomes unreliable.Such a
reproach has weightyethical and spiritualimplications,inasmuch as it
12M. McGord
Adamsexplains
Scotus'Ordinatio
I 44 in William
Ockham
, Vol.II, Notre
Thereshepoints
at theproblem
howScotus'opinion
that
Dame,Indiana1987,1190-8.
Godalways
actsaccording
laws(although
a givensystem
ofgeneral
lawsmayfrom
general
timeto timebe changed
can accordwithevents
which
byanother
system)
(as miracles)
deviate
from
them(cf.1195 ff.).
Scotushowever
doesonlyspeakofa general
orderinconnection
withGodspotentia
ordinata.
Thisgeneral
orderofhispotentia
ordinata
is notso generalthatGod(according
to hispotentia
absoluta
it in specific
situations
) cannot
replace
by
another
order.
Thisnewordermayexistforonlyonemoment
or a short
butit
period,
doesnotmeanarbitrariness;
it is order,
becauseit is established
byGod and as such
related
to hisessential
wisdom
andjustice.
goodness,
eiusquodnuncvult."
I, 44, 12:"nonvolendo
oppositum

18:14:18 PM

ANDABSOLUTE
POWER
ORDAINED

229

of faithin God and consistentethwould underminethe trustworthiness

ical behaviouron the basis of that faith.
in our opinion.We menSuch accusationsagainstScotusare unjustified
tion two importantfeaturesin Scotus' theologywhich make a scepticalabsoluta
ordinata
and potentia
nominalistic
explanationof his theoryon potentia
impossible.
First,Duns' most importantintention,in both I 39 and I 44, is to
make clear that contingencyand freedomonly are guaranteedif there
are synchronic-alternative
Realitywas not only initiallyopen
possibilities.
at the 'moment'of God's act of creating;it is so at any moment.This
does not mean, however,that alternativepossibilitiesfactuallywill be
realised.Concerningone particularfactualstate of affairsthis is impossible, for two opposite statesof affairscannot be the case at the same
moment.Nor willeveryalternatively
possibleorderbe realised.Moreover,
absolutaan alternativeorder,thereis
if God would create by his potentia
no reason to assume thatHe does not guaranteethe coherencewiththe
orderHe establishedbefore.
absoluta
concernsall non-contradictory
Second, Duns positsthatpotentia
absolutacomprisesthereforeevery possible
statesof affairs.The potentia
ordinata
is a subset. This
state of affairs,of which the region of potentia
in
is
conflict
with
God's essence,
affairs
which
that
state
of
every
implies
with his essentialgoodness,wisdom and justice, is impossible,a point
absolutaas well. Therefore,
whichis valid forthe realm of God's potentia
laterspeculationsabout the questionif God can lie, can, as far as Duns
is concerned,be finishedratherquicklyby the remarkthatthisis impossible. On essentialpointsGod's actingis structured
by his essence,so that
for
a
of
thereis no reason
scepticalinterpretation God and of realityas
between
it is createdby Him. By thiswe touchupon an essentialdifference
God cannot.
God and men: man can act inordinately,
A concreteillustrationof Scotus' opinion can be found in his ethics,
ofpotentia
ordione out of manyareas in whichScotus uses the distinction
whichare so direcdy
There are commandments
nataand potentia
absoluta}*
connectedwith God's essence that these are necessaryand cannot be
absoluta.An example of this is the
changed,not even by God's potentia
to love God. There are othercommandments
whichcould
commandment
or forwhich could have been given otherones. An
have been different
14See forScotus'use of thedistinction
in hisdoctrine
I 17,
ofjustification
(Lectura
Duns
A. Vos,H. Veldhuis,
E. Dekker,
N. W. denBok,A. J. Beck,Johannes
61-103):
Teksten
over
Godenwerkelijkheid
en ingeleid,
Zoetermeer
Scotus.
1995,29-52.
, vertaald

18:14:18 PM

230

HENRIVELDHUIS

example of these is keepingthe seventhday as a day of rest.From his

ordained power God could have chosen another day and then this
commandmentwould stillhave been in accord with Gos goodness.15
6. Conclusions
Let us summarisethe precedingdiscussionin some conclusions.
ordinata
and
Scotus' theoryand use of the distinctionbetweenpotentia
an
and
of
his
of
absoluta
are
elaboration
theory synpotentia
application
chronic contingency.One can only understandthe correctmeaning of
absolutain the lightof this
Scotus5so-called 'operationalisation'of potentia
does not open a door to
This
synchroniccontingency.
operationalisation
a scepticalnominalism,but it is a consistentextrapolationof his theory
ordinata
and potentia
absoluta.
of contingencyto the distinctionofpotentia
By
thisthe originalfunctionis not turnedupside down, but on the contrary
it is saved.
The criterionthat God's acts cannot be in conflictwithhis essence- is a sufficient
a criterionthat Duns himselfapplies explicitly
guarantee
of his theology.Or put differently:
against a nominalisticinterpretation
the reproachthatScotus' theoryof absoluteand ordainedpoweris spiritually and ethicallyerroneous,cannot be sustained.
Utrecht
Facultyof Theology
of Utrecht
University

15Cf.on therelation
Wolter
hismorallawsandhisessence:
between
God'sacting,
Freedom
1986(op.cit
Native
., above,n. 4), 13-5,22-3,29; A. B. Wolter,
oftheWillas a Key
DunsScotus
totheEthics
in:A. B. Wolter,
,
O.F.M.,ThePhilosophical
ofJohn
Theology
ofScotus,
A. Vos,De ethiat 159-62;
IthacaN.Y./London
ed. M. McCordAdams,
1990,148-62,
44 (1993),17-32;A. Vosa.o. 1995(op.cit
sche
vanDunsScotus
.,
, in:KerkenTheologie,
optie
above,n. 14),85-92.

18:14:18 PM

The TheoryofDivinePermission
3 Ordinario I 47
to Scotus
According
EEF DEKKER

1. Introduction
The questionsas to whetherGod permitssin and why He does so, have
played a significantrole in the historyof Christian thought. These
If we want to analyse a theologian'stheory
questionsremainsignificant.
of divine permissionof sin, the question must firstbe answered what
exactlypermissionamountsto. In otherwords,we have to considerour
notionof permissionbeforeapplyingit to the case of permissionofsin.
More particularly,
the questionwhetheror not an act of permissionconsistsin an act of will is an importantone. For if God permitssin, does
He willit, and if He willsit, does thismean thatHe is the cause of sin?
betweenat least two notionsof permission
Moreover,one mustdistinguish
relevanthere. One is deontic
permission,well-knownin deonticlogic and
ethics.It says thatsomethingis permittedif thereis no moral obligation
to preventit. The otheris what I callfactualpermission.That is, roughly,
the case if a stateof affairsis factualwhile some person had the power
and means to avoid it, but does not want to avoid it.
This articleprovidessome commentsupon Scotus' main texton permission,and, in an Appendix,an Englishtranslationof it. The textcan
be foundin Ordinatio
I 47.1 Here, Scotus answersthe questionabout the
relationshipbetweenpermissionand volition.First,and most important,
we will analyse the distinctionquite closely,and in the course of this
analysismy main conclusionswill emerge.One of the more importantis
thatScotus has in facttwo theoriesof permission.Secondly,I will make
some further
systematiccommentsupon the itemsfound.

1 Thereexistsa Dutchtranslation
of and commentary
on thistext,published
in:
A. VosJaczn.,
H. Veldhuis,
E. Dekker,
N.W.denBok,A.J.Beck(eds.),Johannes
Duns
Scotus
Godenwerkelijkheid
over
yTeksten
, Zoetermeer
1995,77-85.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium,
38,2

18:14:28 PM

232

EEF DEKKER

Two Theories
2. Sketch
ofPermission
of Scotus1
I 47 is whetheror not the divineperThe questiondiscussedin Ordinatio
missionis an act of will. On the one hand, permissionmustbe such an
act. For as Scotus implieshere and explains elsewhere,only by having
an act of will can God have certainknowledgeof futurecontingents
e.g. that thisperson will sin ( 1). An object mustbe knownin order to
be permitted.2
But, on the otherhand, permissionis one of the fivetraditional 'signs' ( praeceptio,
consilium
, permissio,
3), whichcannot
operatio
prohibido,
count as genuine acts of the divinewill ( 2). How can thisdilemmabe
solved?
Scotus startshis explanationby sketchinga small part of his general
theoryof willing( 3). This general theorywas given in I 39.4 He conand thensubsequendyappliesthe results
centrateson the humanwillfirst,
of his analysisof the human will later on to the divinewill.5
Our volition,says Scotus, can be twofold,namelyto will a thingand
to not-willa thing.'To not-wilP{nolle)a thingis to will thatit is not the
case. In my view Scotus uses thisexpressionin orderto have a clear disnonvelie)and to have a will whichis
tinctionbetweennot having a will (3
directedtowardthe non-existenceof something{nolle).He does not stress
thispoint,but seems to regardit as sufficiently
explainedby sayingthat
2 Gf.Ordinatio
I 47, 5. Anexplanation
oftherelationship
between
divine
knowledge
in Lectura
II d. 34-37.See also
anddivinewillcanbe found,
offuture
e.g.,
contingents
' ParisLectures
in:AllanB. Wolter
AllanB. Wolter,
onGod's
Scotus
Events,
Knowledge
ofFuture
Ithaca
McCordAdams,
DunsScotus
The
, ed. Marilyn
O.F.M., Philosophical
ofJohn
Theology
N.Y./London
1990,285-333.
3 Theseare theexpressions
and severalothers.
Cf. Peter
usedby PeterLombard
19713,I d. 45 cap.6 (195),p. 310;
inIV Libris
Distinctae
Sententiae
, Grottaferrata
Lombard,
howI d. 45 c.a.;S.Th.I q. 19a. 12.Variant
a.o. Scriptum
ThomasAquinas,
expressions,
Bonaventure
andothers.
ever,areusedbyScotus(seebelow),
4 Ordinatio
waspubandtherefore
I 39 hasbeenregarded
as notwritten
byScotus,
recent
research
A ofvol.VI oftheVatican
Edition.
inAppendix
lished
However,
byprof.
A of
B. Noonehas shownthatit mustcountas byScotus.See Manuscript
Timothy
PalatinaMS
Bibliotheca
Alnwick's
Determinationes
, VaticanCity,Biblioteca
Apostolica,
T.B.
G. Gi,A.B.Wolter,
edition
ofthistextis forthcoming:
1805,fol.104r.A critical
the
NY. See especially
Alnwick
Noone(eds.),Guillelmus
, Determinationes
, St. Bonaventure
I 39 into
from
Ordinatio
in thispublication.
We havetranslated
Introduction
keypassages
I 39 desJohannes
DunsScotus
inderOrdinatio
undKontingenz
German:
seeA. Vosetal.,Freiheit
,
I 39 is
translation
ofLectura
AnEnglish
61 (1998),99-136.
in:Wissenschaft
undWeisheit,
I 39.See 48-54,transanditssystematic
contents
arethesameas in Ordinatio
available,
andN.W.den
E. Dekker
A.H.Looman-Graaskamp,
H. Velduis,
latedin A. VosJaczn.,
1994,
andFreedom.
Lectura
1 39,Dordrecht/Boston/London
DunsScotus,
Bok,John
Contingency
108-129.
5 A procedure
whichScotususesmoreoften,
e.g.,in I 39.

18:14:28 PM

THE THEORYOF DIVINEPERMISSION

233

both acts (to will and to not-will)are what he calls 'positive'acts. We

thiswiththe help of a square of oppositionforthe will,for
can interpret
the uppermostcornerpointsof such a square show the 'positive' acts.6
The lowThe leftone is volition,the rightone is nolition(a 'not-will').7
the voliof
the
ermostcornerpoints,
of,
successively,
negations
consisting
tionand the nolition,willbe addressedlateron. An example Scotus gives
in a case in which the object forvolitionand nolitionis the same is: to
love and to hate.
Scotus then goes on to make a furtherdistinction,which applies to
both volitionand nolition( 4):
in
can be distinguished
bothactsin ourselves:
We can [again]distinguish
'willing'
thatbywhichit notonly
We call'effective
andineffective
effective
willing'
willing.
butimmediately
actualises
it,ifit canactualise.
pleasesthewillto willsomething,
somethatbywhichit notonlynot-willing
notWe call'effective
impedes
willing',
is thatbywhichthe
butcompletely
it,ifitcan.'Ineffective
willing'
destroys
thing,
doesnotactualise
wanted
it,
pleasesin sucha waythatthewillnevertheless
thing
thenot-wanted
isthatbywhich
thewillcoulddo so.'Ineffective
not-willing'
although
the
itto be,although
in sucha waythatthewilldoesnotprevent
thing
displeases
willcoulddo so.8
and
or as ineffective,9
Both volitionand nolitioncan be takenas effective
An
amounts
effective
volition
thus,we have fourpossiblecombinations.[1]
to an act of will plus the factualrealisationof the thingwilled. [2] An
6 Alsoat other
is not.
is a positive
actandnonvelie
clearthatnolle
placesScotusmakes
DunsScotus
ontheWillandMorality
inAllanB. Wolter,
,
See,e.g.,Ord.IV 49 as itappears
D.C., 1986,192.
Washington
7 A complete
squarelookslikethis:
sWp

sW-p

s-Wp
s-W-p
forthe
a subject;
W: operator
forwilling;
constant,
p: constant
(s: individual
denoting
in front
of
actsarethosein whichthereis no negation
So the'positive'
objectwilled).
ofNicodenBokas wellas in
*W' Pleasenotethatin thecontribution
theoperator
for'nolle'whilehereitis used
andFreedom
above,n. 4),s-Wpis reserved
cit.,
(op.
Contingency
for'nonvelie'.See alsobelow.
8 "Et
invelieefficax
et rernisin nobispotest
utveliedistinguatur
distingui,
utrumque
sedsi potest
nontantum
essevoliti,
'velieefficax'
sum:utdicatur
complacet
quovoluntati
dicitur
inesse,statim
efficax'
volitum
statim
qua nontanponit;itaetiam'nolitio
ponere
illuddestruit.
'Voluntas
remissa'
estqua
sedsi possit,
omnino
tumnolens
aliquid,
impedit
nonponitilludin esse,licetpossit
itaplacetvolitum,
ponereillud
quodtamenvoluntas
illudesse,licet
nolitum
in esse;'nolitio
remissa'
estqua itadisplicet
quodnonprohibeat
I 47,in: Opera
Omnia
arefrom
Allquotations
Ordinatio
, Vol.VI (Vatican
Edition),
possit."
Rome1963.
9 HereI translate
I takeitas neutral,
thatis tosay,
as 'ineffective'.
theLatin'remissus'
andthelike.
a connotation
ofinaccurateness
without

18:14:28 PM

234

EEF DEKKER

ineffective
volitionis the act of will in the case of non-realisation
of the
willed.
an
Scotus
ineffective
volition
is
not
the
However,
thing
explains,
a
resultof a lack of power
for
to
realise
the
willed
must
be
,
power
thing
assumed as well.
[3] is parallel to [1], witha nolitioninvolvedinsteadof a volition.In
nolitioncan be seen as the effective
non-realisationof
[3], the effective
the not-willedobject. [4] An ineffective
nolitionapplies to a not-willed
object that is realised,althoughit could have been stopped frombeing
realised.There is, parallel to the case of the ineffective
volition,no lack
of power involved.
Subsequently,permissionof an evil thingis then definedin termsof
thisfourthcategory,the ineffective
nolition( 5).
- the
In ourselves
an 'ineffective
seemsto be- strictly
therefore,
not-willing'
spoken
ofan evilknown
thataboutwhich
byme.Foronedoesnotsaytopermit
permission
orthatwhich
I knownothing,
is donebysomeone
elseandwhich
pleasesme- no,
thatwhichI knowto be badlydonebysomeone
else,butwhichI do notprevent,
I permit.10
Scotus also observes,as we see, that the object which is permittedmust
be known
to us, since we cannot reasonablybe said to permitthatwhich
we do not know.
BeforeScotus applies his distinction
to the divinewill,he firstattaches
it to the well-knownmedieval doctrineof the signavoluntatis
(commonly
applied to the divine will only; Scotus widens its scope). How are the
in acts of will connectedto the fivesigns?In the case
fourdistinctions
of [1], the effective
volition,thereare two signsto be connected.Firstly,
if it is about just one person willing,the sign is fulfilment
(adimpletio).
Secondly,if thereare two personsinvolvedand the effectstemsfromthe
will of the otherperson,it is a precept(praeceptio
). To [2], the ineffective
volition,apply perhaps, Scotus adds counsel (consilium),
persuasionor
advice. To [4], the ineffective
volition,apply permission(of course),and
nolition,appliesprevention(prohibitio
dissuasion,and to [3], the effective
).
All thisdoes not look immediately
obviousto someonewho is acquainted
with the standard Lombardian and Thomist interpretation
of the five
not
the
the
For
Scotus
does
widen
of
scope
only
signs to apply
signs.11
themto the human will as well as to the divinewill,but he also re-inter10"In nobisigitur
- proprie
- videtur
mali
nolitio
remissa
dicta
essepermissio
alicuius
illudde quonihilscio,velilludquoditafitab alio
quodscio:nonenimdicorpermittere
- sedilludquodscioab aliomalefieri,
sednonprohibeo,
hocpermiti."
quod
placetmihi,
11Cf.
aregiven.
note3, in whichsomereferences

18:14:28 PM

THE THEORYOF DIVINEPERMISSION

235

in this respectI
prtsthem to some extent.One of the characteristics
take to be the fact that he does not allow a deontic
meaning of some of
For
the signs,but only a factualmeaning.12 instance,'precept'is not that
which is prescribedbut not necessarilyobeyed, but that which is factufunctions
mainlyto show
allyobeyed.I thinkthatScotus' re-interpretation
that his thinkingdoes fitin with more traditionalthoughton the matter,in which thereis supposed to be an account of the signavoluntatis.
thatthe fourdifferent
Scotusresumesby stating,in carefulformulations,
acts of will apply to God ( 7):13
suchthat,as oneact
to applyto God,namely
couldbe supposed
Thisdistinction
ordissimilitude
innercontrareity
andnot-willing
ofhimis willing
(andthiswithout
thatitis about'effective
inthatact),so itcouldbe saidofsomeofthewilled
objects
is
thatthatwilling
and in thesamewayaboutsomenot-willed
objects,
willing',
- butofother[not-willed]
it cannotbe said.Andthen
effective
objects
not-willing,
tothoseobjects,
withregard
itcouldbe saidthatGodhasan ineffective
not-willing
toprevent
doesnot-will
in sucha waythatHe nevertheless
which
He doesnot-will
Andinthiswaythe
ofGodcanbe calledhispermission.
andthisnot-willing
them;
to the
withrespect
to thedivine
actin Godrelates
will,in so faras it is regarded
object.14
not-willit.15It does
So, for God to permitan evil act is to ineffectively
He factuallydoes
not please God that evil acts happen, but nevertheless
not preventthemfromhappening.
Scotus was carefuland hesitantabout the applicationof permissionin
thisway to God's will. In fact,in the next paragraph( 8) he startsoff
by saying:"If this solution,however,does not please (because the notwillingof whateveris the case, could seem to be attendedwitha certain
of thatvolitionand will),thenit can be said . . ."
sadnessand imperfection
Scotus seems eitherto formulatehis own worryor that of his readers.

12Anexception
in 8. Cf.note18.
occurs
13Careful,
sincemostverbsarein theirrealis
onlythelastclause
'poneretur');
('posset',
mood('potest
tensenon-coniunctive
a present
contains
dici').
14"Sedistadistinctio
possetponiin Deo, itaquodsicutunusactuseiusestvelieet
in ilioactuin se),itaponeretur
veldissimilitudine
nolle(ethocsinecontrarietate
super
nollesuumsuperquaedamobiecta
et similiter
eiusvolita'velieefficax',
obiecta
quaedam
Dei remissa
dicinolitio
non.Ettuncposset
autem
nolita,
efficax,
respectu
super
quaedam
Dei
et haecnolitio
nolietea prohibere;
illorum
obiectorum,
quodtarnen
quae-itanoliet
sicse
transit
dicipermissio
eius, etitaactusin Deo,inquantum
superobiectum,
potest
divinam."
habetad voluntatem
15Leaving
as 'nollepro'nolitio
remissa'
thatScotusexplains
asideforthemoment
with 4) or,as
should
be 'nonprohibere'
which
hibere',
(inaccordance
stricdy
speaking
seemto have,'nonvelieprohibere'.
somemanuscripts

18:14:28 PM

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EEF DEKKER

For is it not the case that somehow it sounds strangeto say that God
God seems to restrainhis willing
can will or nill somethingineffectively?
to grasp; divinewill and realitydo not seem to cohere.
in a way difficult
Scotus thereforeprovidesanothersolution,albeit verybriefly.This soluact of willing(i.e. the absence of a
tion takes into account the negative
volitionor nolitionproper)instead of the positiveact. He says:
is the
'outside
[God]'(orthesign)is thatwhich
[. . .] itcanbe saidthatpermission
which
is a sign
Thisis thepermission
thedivine
is against
butwhich
result,
precept.
willitself
ofthedivine
will;butto this[sign]in thedivine
onlythenot
corresponds
whichis thenegaor thenotnot-willing,
to happen,
to prevent
something
willing
notpositive.16
actandtherefore
divine
tionofa positive
Permissionis now taken as the 'sign' of not not-willing.Scotus does
and ineffective
not need any furtherdistinctionsinto effective
here, for
between positiveand negativeacts of will does the
now the difference
work.Here we can apply a 'complete' square of opposition,fornow the
lower cornerpointscan be used.17
Anotherfeatureof thisparagraphis thatwe see Scotus payingimplicit
and factualpermission.He says
betweendeontic
attentionto the distinction
thatthatwhichis permittedis againstthe divineprecept.That is to say,
that which is deonticallynot permittedcan be- but of course need not
be- factuallypermitted.Some sins are in fact the case, while forbidden
by God, and yet theyare not preventedto come into existence,while
permitted.18
The nextparagraph( 9) adds anotherimportantdetail to thissecond
theoryof permission.God's permissionwas perceivedas an act of not
but Scotus proceeds by adding a positivesecond-orderact of
not-willing,
will. He says:
notin this
be understood
should
to allow'[volens
Andwhatis called'willing
sinere]
butthatHe hasa reflexive
He permits,
ofthatwhich
willing
waythatHe hasa direct
offers
act:forhisintellect
beingwillsinorsinstohiswill,
[thefact]thatthishuman
willthatthat
aboutthis(forHe cannot
andfirst
hiswilldoesnothavea volition
doesnotwill
hiswillwhich
He canunderstand
human
sin);secondly,
beingcommits
16"... potest
estquodeffectus
extra(velsignum)
diciquodpermissio
sit,quodtamen
- etistaestpermissio
voluntatis
estcontra
divinae;
divinum,
quaeestsignum
praeceptum
alinisinonvelieprohibere
divina
huicautemnoncorrespondet
aliquidin ipsavolntate
nonest
etperconsequens
actusdivini
sivenonnolle,quodestnegatio
positivi
quidfieri,
positivus."
17See alsonote7. Notnotis thelowerleftcornerpomt
(s-W-p).
willing
18Here,'precept'
in
with'precept'
in contrast
mustbe takento be a deontic
notion,
6. Cf.note12.

18:14:28 PM

THE THEORYOF DIVINEPERMISSION

237

andthenHe canwillthathiswillwills'notwilling
this'.In thiswayitis said
this,
thatHe willingly
allowsand voluntarily
and voluntarily
allows,willingly
permits
. . .'9
permits.
That is to say: God wantshis will not to have a volition.Scotus develthe expressionof Lombard and
ops thisthoughtas a way of interpreting
or
Augustine:'volens sinere' ('willingto allow').20It is not about a direct,
will- such a will God cannothave concerningsin- , it mustbe
first-order
about a reflexiveor second-orderact of will. The fact that God cannot
willsin seemsto be the reasonwhythe firsttheoryis not the best account.
In the firsttheory,thereis and remainsa positiveact of divine willing
concerningsin. In the second, there is only a negativeact, combined
witha positivesecond order act that has as object not sin itself,but the
negativeact of will.
3. Further
Comments
Systematic
In this section,I proceed by makinga few briefand tentativeremarks
about Scotus' theorizing.
A firstremarkconcernsthe factthat Scotus switchesfromone theory
to another.The second theorybetterexplains the way in which God's
will is and remainsconnectedto factualstatesof affairs.There is no systematicambiguity
about theway God willsand does not will,forinstance,
a sinfulhuman act. He does not will the sinfulact itselfin a directway,
but has a volitionabout the absence of His directwill. In thisway God
is involvedwith,but not responsiblefor a creaturelysinfulact. In the
firsttheoryGod seems to restrainin a way difficult
to grasp.
A second remarkapplies to the second theory.The basic concept of
thatis, not willingto prevent(s-W-p).
permissionhere is 'not not-willing',
We may ponder about the usefulnessof a combined concept of permission as it is used, for instance,in Aquinas' theoryof permission.He
19"Et quoddicitur'volens
hocpotest
nonquodhabeatvelierectum
sinere',
intelligi
circailludquodpermittit,
sedactumreflexm:
offert
enimvoluntati
suaehuncpeccaturumvelpeccare,
et primovoluntas
eiuscircahuncnonhabetvelie(velieenimipsum
haberepeccatum
nonpotest);
secundo
voluntatem
suamnonvolentem
potest
intelligere
- etitadicitur
velievoluntatem
suam'nonveliehoc',
volens
sinere
et
hoc,ettuncpotest
voluntrie
volens
etvoluntrie
..
sinere,
permittere
permittere.
20Thisexpression
occurs
in Lombard's
I 46 cap.3 (199)section
Sententiae,
11,p. 316;
I 47 cap.1 (204)sect.2,p. 322;cap.2 (205)sect.1,p. 323.SeealsoAugustine,
Enchiridion
,
in:Joseph
Barbel(ed.),Enchiridion/
Dsseldorf
Handbchlein,
1960,cap.96 (p. 160)and 100
(p. 168).

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EEF DEKKER

definespermissionas 'not willingand not not-willing',that is, not willing

an object and also not willingto preventthatobject (s-Wp & s-W-p).Let
us call this theorythe two-operatortheory.21
Scotus has a reminiscence
of thisdefinition
in his statementof the counter-argument,
in which God
is said to have will nor not-willwithrespectto sin,22but in Scotus' own
answerthistwo-operator
differtheorydoes not play a role.23A systematic
ence occurs:in Scotus' one-operatortheoryall thingswhich are willed(in
the first-order
mode and effectively)
are also permitted
(thisfollowsfroma
quick glance at the square of opposition);in Aquinas' two-operatortheory one cannot say such a thing.A state of affairsseems to be either
willed or permitted.24
In deonticlogic, permissionis generallytaken to be the weak deontic
operator(-O-),25whilethe notionof the combinationof two deonticoperators (-O & -O-), is called 'deontic indifference'.
If a state of affairsis
it
is
it
also
but
is
if
a state of affairsis
not
true
that
,
,
permitted
obliged
it
is
also deonticallyindifferent.
So here we have a parallel of
obliged,
factualand deonticpermission:the one-operatortheoryof Scotus has its
in the deonticpermission,the two-operator
counterpart
theoryof Aquinas
and othershas its counterpartin deonticindifference.
Third: Later traditionapplies the term Voluntas remissa',borrowed
fromthe firsttheorygiven by Scotus, to the Thomistnotion of permission as a two-operator
theory.For instance,the Dutch theologianJacobus
21Notethat
doesnotrefer
to second-order
actsofwill.A sec'two-operator
theory'
ond-order
actofwillcanoccurbothin a one-operator
andin a two-operator
If
theory.
we taketheformulas
as a characteristic,
wehavethefollowing:
is a one-opersW(s-W-p)
atorsecond-order
first
is a two-operator
ordertheory,
andsW(s-Wp
theory,
s-Wp& s-W-p
& s-W-p)
is a two-operator
secondordertheory.
ForAquinas'textssee,a.o.,S.Th.Ia
sedvult
q. 19 a. 9 ad 3: "Deusigitur
nequevultmalafieri,
nequevultmalanonfieri:
malafieri;
De Maloq. 2 ad 4: [. . .] dicendum,
permittere
quodDeusnequevultmala
sed tarnen
hocipsumvultquodestse nonveliemala
fieri,
nequevultmalanonfieri;
et nonveliemalanonfieri."
fieri,
22 1: "... nequeenimhabet,respectu
velievelnolle.. . ."
illius[se.peccator],
23Interestingly
in theReportata
I 47 q. 2 (Opera
Parisiensia
Omnia
, ed. Wadding
enough,
tom.Xl.i237b)wefinda textinwhich
itisstated
thatpermission
isintermediate
between
andnot-willing,
so thetwo-operator
In Latin:"[. . .] permittere
de se nulwilling
theory.
lusactusest;sedmedium
inter
velie
& nolle:
illudenimDeuspermittit
fieri,
quodnonvult,
necnolitfieri."
sincethequality
oftheRep.Par.is notyetestablished,
wemust
However,
ifit shouldturnoutto be thecasethatthetextis
abstain
from
thistext.Nevertheless,
thenwe couldexplain
thedifference
between
theRep.andtheOrdinatio
Scotus',
'genuine
in terms
ofdevelopment
in Scotus'thought.
24sWpcontradicts
& s-Wp.So either
s-Wp,andtherefore,
sWpalsocontradicts
s-W-p
is thecase,or s-W-p& s-Wp.
sWp
25'O' is theoperator
for'obliged'.

18:14:28 PM

THE THEORYOF DIVINEPERMISSION

239

Arminius(1559-1609) speaks about the Voluntasremissa'while obviously

26As faras
and not not-willing.
to the conjunctionof not-willing
referring
of the firsttheoryof Scotus did
I have been able to check, the contents
not receivevery much attention.This seems to be understandable:he
does not seem to be satisfiedhimselfand proposesa second theory,which,
of the two (<le., froma systematic
moreover,is the more fruitful
point of
view).
Utrecht
Facultyof Theology
of Utrecht
University

26See myRijker
enpredestinatie
indetheologie
vanJacobus
Arminius
danMidas.Vryheid}
genade
1993,113-22.
), Zoetermeer
(1559-1609

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240

EEF DEKKER
Appendix:
I 47
Translationof Ordinatio

Is divinepermissionan act of the divinewill?

1 Regardingthe forty-seventh
distinctionI ask whetherdivine permission is an act of the divinewill.
It seems to be so:
For otherwiseGod would not know withcertaintythat this [person]
willsin (sinceHe does not knowfutureand contingentstatesof affairs
withouta decision of his will); but regardingthe sinnerHe does not
seem to have an act except permitting
him to sin (since He has, in
that
will
to
neither
nor
act,
Therefore,if 'to permit'
not-will).
respect
is not an act, God is not certainof the futuresin of this [person],
because then thereis no decision of his will wherebyHe knowsthe
futureand contingentstate of affairswith certainty.
2 Againstthis:
Permissionis enumeratedtogetherwiththe othersignsof the divine
will; but a preceptis not an elicitedact of the divinewill. Much less,
is permission.
therefore,
[Scotus' answerto the Quaestio]
3 I answer:
We can distinguish
a twofoldact of will in ourselves,namely,willing
and not-willing,
and both are a positiveact. If theyhave the same
object,theyare contraryacts,whichis also expressedin otherwords:
'to love' and 'to hate'.
4 We can [again] distinguishboth acts in ourselves:'willing'can be
in effective
willand ineffective
willing.We call 'effective
distinguished
will
that
which
it
not
the
will
to
by
only
pleases
ing'
something,but
if
it
can
call
'effective
not-willactualises
actualise.
We
it,
immediately
which
that
it
not
ing',
by
only not-willingly
impedes something,but
completelydestroysit, if it can. 'Ineffective
willing'is that by which
does
the thingwantedpleases in such a way thatthe will nevertheless
not actualiseit, althoughthe will could do so. 'Ineffective
not-willing'
is that by which the not-wantedthingdispleasesin such a way that
the will does not preventit to be, althoughthe will could do so.
an 'ineffective
seems to be- strictly
5 In ourselvestherefore,
not-willing'
- the
speaking
permissionof an evil knownby me. For one does not
to
that
about whichI knownothing,or thatwhichis done
say permit

18:14:28 PM

THE THEORYOF DIVINEPERMISSION

241

by someoneelse and whichpleases me no, thatwhichI know to be

badly done by someone else, but which I do not prevent,I permit.
6 The sign of an effectivevolition,if it happens immediatelyby the
will,is fulfillment,if by [the will of] another,it is a precept.The
willing in ourselves is perhaps a 'counsel' or
sign of an ineffective
not-willingis perpersuasionor advice. The sign of an ineffective
of
an
effective
not-willingis premissionor dissuasion,and the sign
vention.
7 This distinction
could be supposedto applyto God, namelysuch that,
as one act of him is willingand not-willling
(and this withoutinner
in
that
it
could be said of some
or
dissimilitude
so
contrarei
act),
ty
of thewilledobjectsthatit is about 'effective
willing',and in the same
that
that
notsome
not-willed
about
objects,
willingis effective
way
- but of other
it
And
then
cannot
be
said.
[not-willed]objects
willing,
with regard
it could be said that God has an ineffective
not-willing
to thoseobjects,which He does not-willin such a way that He neverthelessdoes not-willto preventthem; and this not-willingof God
can be called his permission.And in thisway the act in God relates
to the divinewill,in so faras it is regardedwithrespectto the object.
of
8 If thissolution,however,does not please (because the not-willing
whateveris the case, could seem to be attendedwith a certainsadness and imperfection
of that volitionand will), then it can be said
thatpermission'outside[God]' (or the sign)is thatwhichis the result,
but whichis againstthe divineprecept.This is the permissionwhich
is a sign of the divinewill; but to this [sign]in the divine will itself
correspondsonly the not willingto preventsomethingto happen, or
the not not-willing,
whichis the negationof a positivedivineact and
not positive.
therefore
9 And what is called 'willingto allow' [volenssinere
] should be understood not in thisway that He has a directwillingof that which He
permits,but that He has a reflexiveact: for his intellectoffers[the
fact] that this human being will sin or sins to his will, and firsthis
will does not have a volitionabout this(forHe cannot will that that
humanbeingcommitssin);secondly,He can understandhis willwhich
does not will this,and then He can will that his will wills 'not willing this'. In this way it is said that He willinglyallows and volunpermits.[. . .]
tarilyallows,willinglypermitsand voluntarily
the
to
[answer
argument]

18:14:28 PM

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EEF DEKKER

10 To the firstargumentit was said in distinction4127 in which way

there is no foreseeingof God of a futuresin only because of the
factthatHe knowsthatHe will permitsomeone to sin untilthe end
(and thus, that he eventuallywill be condemned), but it is also
requiredthatHe knowsthatHe will cooperatein the act of sinning
and not cooperate with that act of which the omissionis a sin of
omission. However, in addition to both kinds of permission,God
foreseesthatHe does not will thatthis[person]sins.Thus it becomes
clear in which way the divine permissionis an act of will and in
which way it is not.

27Thisconcerns
I d. 41 n. 50.
Ordinatio

18:14:28 PM

Freedom
in Regardto Opposite
Actsand Objects
in Scotus3Lectura I 39, 45-54
NICO DEN BOK

In Duns Scotus' analysisof the notion of contingencyin 45-54 of

I 39 the distinction
Lectura
betweenfreedomof the will in regardto opposite actsand freedomof the will in regard to opposite objects
plays an
and
role.
The
article
an
offers
important
fascinating
present
analysisof
thisrole.1Beforethe centralissue of my contribution
can be formulated,
I have to sketchthe contextof discussionin LecturaI 39, 45-54 which
is a relativelyindependent,almost'monographic'sectionwithinLecturaI
39 as a whole.
1. Lectura
I 39, 45-54
DistinctionI 39 of the Lectura
discussessome questionsconcerningGod's
of
future
knowledge contingent
things.In itscentralsectionScotusobserves
that there is contingencyin things( 39-40) and asks: Where does it
come from?His answeris: fromGod. What, then,in God is the cause
in things?It cannotbe God's intellect;
of contingency
it mustbe God's will
But
how
divine
will
is
the
the
cause
of
in things?
( 41-43).
contingency
In orderto understandthis,Duns says,let us concentrateon the human
will ( 44). Thus, in 45-52 Scotus gives an analysisof the human will
and its freedom.Subsequently,he makes the transitionto be expected
( 53-54) by explicatingwhich structuralelementsof the will found in
the analysisof the human will are also presentin the divinewill.
1 Cf.John
DunsScotus,
andfreedom.
Lectura
I 39, introduction,
translation
and
Contingency
H. Veldhuis,
A. H. Looman-Graaskamp,
E. Dekker
and
commentary
byA. VosJaczn.,
N. W.denBok,Dordrecht/Boston/London
1994,commentary
pp. 109-129,
esp.Ill, 113,
to Duns' theory
of synchronic
see
115,123.For a shortintroduction
contingency,
3
H. Veldhuis,
DunsScotus
inLectura
I 39 anditstheological
theory
ofsynchronic
contingency
impliin:L. Sileo(ed.),ViaScoti
: Methodologica
admentem
DunsScoti.
Atti
delCongresso
cations,
Joannis
Scotistico
9-11marzo
thediaInternazionale
, Roma
1993,Rome1995,571-6.Unfortunately,
usedin thisarticle
weremixedup during
theprinting
grams
process.
Theyappearcorin Contingency
andFreedom
however,
, 24-6.
rectly,
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium
, 38,2

18:14:39 PM

NICODENBOK

244

Scotus starts,in 45-46, by statingthat the human will is free in

threerespects:in regardto oppositeobjects
, in regardto oppositeactsand
in regardto oppositeeffects.
He immediatelyremarksthatthe thirdaspect,
freedomin regardto oppositeeffects,
is secondary.Most likely,he means
- which is consecutive
is willingobjects beingactualized
that willingeffects
As is clear from 53 (secondsentence),Scotus
to willingthe objectsitself.2
considersthis aspect of freedomto obtain forthe divinewill too, where
it plays the same consecutive(and executive)role. Scotus confineshimselfto the two remainingaspects: the will's freedomin regardto opposite acts and objects.3
In 47 Scotus proceeds by statingthat fromthisthreefold(or in fact
follow4
and a twofoldpossibility
twofold)freedoma twofoldcontingency
namely,on the one hand, a contingencyand a possibilitywhich can be
called diachronic(cf. 48, firstsentence,'successive
') and, on the other
a
can
be
called synchronic(cf.
a
and
which
hand, contingency
possibility
50, firstsentence,'non est secundumquod voluntashabet actus successive, sed in eodeminstanti').
We are now able to sketchthe main structureof 45-54:
45
45-46
47-52
53-54

in things:
The divine
willcauseofcontingency
how?
in things:
willas causeofcontingency
thehuman
Studying
in regard
andacts
to opposite
(a) Freedom
objects
andtwofold
(b)Twofold
contingency
possibility
of(a) and(b) to thedivine
will.
Application

When we make a close-upof section(b), we can say thatDuns successively

discussesthe fournotionsinvolved:
contingency
diachronic 48
synchronic 51-52 <

possibility
48
49-50

i
'

2 The samething
to
It canbe reduced
an effect:
or not-willing
canbe saidofwilling
internal
relaof
the
an
Cf.
E.
Gilson's
or
actualized).
analysis
object
being
not-willing
willing
'si cettetroisime
andeffects:
in regard
to opposite
tionsbetween
freedom
acts,objects
la deuelleen dcoule travers
forme
ne se confond
de libert
pas avecla premire,
doncaussi
desobjetsopposs,
entre
estchoisir
carchoisir
entredesactesopposs
xime,
ad opposita
actus
ad oppositos
fondela libertas
des effets
Ainsi,la libertas
opposs.
produire
Introduction
in:id.,JeanDunsScot.
la libertas
ad oppositos
et,parcettedernire,
effectus'
objecta
sespositions
Paris1952,586-7.
fondamentales
3 Willing
as: sWpands-Wp.Willing
actscanbe formalized
objects:
opposite
opposite
for
'W' is theoperator
a subject;
constant,
denoting
sWpandsW-p.V is an individual
fortheobjectwilled.
is a constant
willing;
'p'
4 47,at theend:"... sedex hocquodhabetlibertatem
ad actusoppositos,
respectu
To mymind(cf.
etcontingentia."
torumconsequitur
obiectorum
duplex
possibilitas
opposi

18:14:39 PM

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ACTSANDOBJECTS
FREEDOM
TO OPPOSITE

245

Article
2. Question
ofthePresent
The issue of the presentarticleis Scotus' view on the two aspects of
freedomas it can be derived fromhis analysisin 45-54. How preciselyare the notionsof contingencyand possibilityconnectedwithfreedom in regard to opposite objects and opposite acts respectively?
This
connectionseems problematicsince we can make two observations.
, thereare fourpossiblecombinationsof diachronicand
(I) Systematically
on the one hand and freedomin
and possibility5
synchronic
contingency
regardto oppositeacts and oppositeobjects on the otherhand6:
willssomething,
it can at a latermoment
not(1) Whenthewillat onemoment
willthatthing
willssomething,
it can at a latermoment
will
(2) Whenthewillat onemoment
itsopposite
willssomething,
itcanat thesamemoment
not(3) Whenthewillat onemoment
willthatthing
willssomething,
itcanat thesamemoment
will
(4) Whenthewillat onemoment
itsopposite
Scotusconsidersstatements
(1) and (2) applicableto the human will ( 48),
but not to the divine will ( 53). For unlikethe human will, the divine
andFreedom
to 'in ista
., above,n. 1), 113)'ex istalibertate'
(op.cit
Contingency
( 47) refers
totali
libertate
voluntatis'
in regard
to opposite
actsandfreedom
in
( 46),so to freedom
toopposite
andnottofreedom
in regard
toopposite
(andeventoeffects),
regard
objects
voluntatis'
is,again,bothkindsoffreedom.
objects
only.Cf.also 49: 'illalibertas
5 Contingency
andpossibility
aretreated
forreasons
ofsimplicity.
Laterinthis
together
their
section
willbe elucidated.
respective
meanings
6 Formalized:
diachrony
synchrony
in regard
freedom
to opposite
& Ms-Wt2p sWtlp
acts
& Ms-WtIp
sWtlP
freedom
in regard
to opposite
& MsW|2-p sWptl
& MsWt-p
objects sWtlp
- unlike
In theseformulas
thoseusedin Contingency
andFreedom
(<
op.citabove,n. 1),n. 46,
which
arealsousedinsomearticles
theResearch
DunsScotus
49-50,
published
by
Group
John
- in all fourcasesthetime-index
sofar
is connected
withW. Foran explanation
ofthis
' text
seebelow,
section
n. 17ff.
connection,
, especially
fiomScotus
Answering
We canseethatall fourpossibilities
shown
in thescheme
arepossible
(non-contradicIn fact,
indeed.
ifonlythepossibilities
oftheleftcolumn
werepossible
andthoseof
tory)
theright
onewereimpossible,
onecandeducethatwilling
ornot-willing
p or -p at one
moment
must
be necessary.
In other
diachronic
(andhenceatevery
words,
moment)
single
- whether
as such
thatofvarious
actsandobjects
or thatofvarious
contingency
objects
be butreduced
tosynchronic
ifsynchronic
grasped
byoneact(cf.n. 19)- cannot
necessity
is considered
to be impossible.
Scotus'analysis
doesnotexplicitly
showthis
contingency
sideofthecoin;yet,it is verymuchat thebackofhismindandit is mosthelpful
in
a morecomplete
oftheimpact
ofhisanalysis.
Cf.Contingency
elucidating
understanding
andFreedom
above,n. 1),Introduction,
(op.cit.,
p. 20f.

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NICODENBOK

will can have only one act (forthisreason it is immutable);therefore,

for
Gos will there cannot be more than one moment.7Statement(3) is
most explicitlyapplied to the human will ( 51-52), and implicitly
to the
divine will ( 54, see the example: 'nolle lapidem esse'). Statement(4) is
explicitlyapplied to the divinewill ( 54); on its applicationto the human
will Scotus is silent.I conclude that Duns most likelyconsidersall four
possibilitiesto be valid forthe human will; forthe divinewill, however,
he considersonly (3) and (4) to be valid.
Scotus does notstraightforwardly
offer
(II) In theprocedure
of exposition
this- correct
result
of
his
The
combinafour
systematic
analysis.
possible
tions are subsequendyintroducedin a ratherloose and somewhatindirectway. Initially( 48), freedomin regardto oppositeacts is onlyconnected withdiachroniccontingencyand possibility.
Yet, later on freedomin
to
is
acts
also
with
and
connected
regard opposite
synchronic
contingency
for the human will ( 51), and for the divinewill ( 54, this
possibility,
becomes clear in virtueof the examples
of divinewillinggivenby Scotus).8
Freedom in regard to opposite objects is not only relatedto diachronic
and possibility
( 47, humanwill),but also to synchronic
contingency
( 53,
divinewill).Moreover,duringScotus' analysisfreedomin regardto opposite acts and freedomin regardto oppositeobjectsalternate,whereasthe
rationalefor these alternationsis not clear.9
7 Scotus
It is receptive
givesa reasonforthehumanwill'smutability:
('receptiva',
to Wolter
thisqualification
willis crereflects
thefactthatthehuman
46).According
ated
buttherecipient
ofthisimmanent
', 'forwe arenotonlythecauseofourvolition,
actionas well'.SeeDunsScotus
onthewillandmorality
withanintroandtranslated
, selected
duction
AllanB. Wolter,
D.C. 1986,10.
by
Washington,
8 See 54: "voluntas
in
divinaunicavolitione
vultinaeternitate
esseetpotest
lapidem
velielapidem
aeternitate
nonessevelpotest
nollelapidem
esse."The divine
will'sfreedomto opposite
actsis illustrated
toopposite
esse';itsfreedom
by'nollelapidem
objects
is exemplified
'velielapidem
nonesse'.
by
9 A survey
oftheoccurrences:
Freedom
in regard
to opposite
human
will
acts
46
"
"
objects
47 (beginning) "
"
acts& objects
47
"
"
('via'. . . acts) 48 (first
sentence) "
objects
"
acts
48 (lastsentence)

acts
50 and51
.
.
will
.
53
and
54
divine
(and acts)
objects
For 48,cf.Contingency
andFreedom
cit.
115:in theexam, above,n. 1),commentary,
(op.
andhating
actsinstead
Scotusseemsto think
ofopposite
of,as announced
pleofloving
at theoutset
of 48,opposite
ForScotus,
or hating
however,
something
objects.
loving
in the
can be considered
to be an objectofthewill.In general,
something
'objectum'
13thcentury
is a termprimarily
a grammatical
derived
from
a linguistic
context;
object
canontologically
be an objectoran act.

18:14:39 PM

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TO OPPOSITEACTSANDOBJECTS
FREEDOM

247

It seems that Duns

Is there an explanationfor these alternations?10
could have presentedthe fourpossiblecombinationsin a less complicated
way; so why does he presentthem in the way he does? Does he feel
unsure about the rightconnectionbetween contingencyand possibility
on the one hand and freedomin regardto oppositeobjects and acts on
the other?Or has he discoveredthe factthatsynchroniccontingency
and
can be connectedwithbothaspectsof freedomduring
his analypossibility
sis?11Perhaps it is just a matterof exposition?Or may be thereis still
anotherexplanation?
BeforeI can formulatemy answer to these questionsI need to clarifythe centralnotionsjust mentionedas used by Scotus. What does he
mean by the contingency
of things?For Duns, somethingis contingent
when
it is factualbut can be non-factual.12
So the question'What is the cause
in things?'obviouslyasks 'What is the causeof thefactualof contingency
of
can be non-factual?Diachronic
that
ity things
contingencymeans that
when somethingis factual,it can be non-factualat a latertime. Synchronic
means thatwhen somethingis factual,it can be non-factual
contingency
at the sametime.13Instead of 'something'we can write,forexample, 'the
will havingan act' or 'the will having an object'.
10Textual
alternation
notnecessarily
entails
shifts
orswitches
inthediscourse.
systematic
Thealternations
andtheir
arepointed
nature
outbyW. A. Frank,
possibly
problematic
' Quodlibetal onthewill
DunsScotus
D.C. 1982,
John
Teaching
(Ph.D.dissertation)
Washington,
andbyA. Vos,Thomas
enDunsover
degoddetijke
wit
vanhetwerkgezelschap
, in:Jaarboek
ThomasvanAquino1983,Utrecht
andFreedom
cit
1983,17-20.Cf.Contingency
., above,
(op.
n. 1),109,111and 115.
11In thislastcasethetextofLectura
I 39, 45-54wouldshowtheideaofsynchronic
instatu
nascendi.
Thisseemstobe confirmed
works
contingency
bythefactthatinhisother
Scotus
doesnotrecur
tothealternations
between
in regard
freedom
toopposite
actsand
as advanced
in Lectura
I 39. One couldinterpret
thisbyassuming
that
opposite
objects
the'final'
viewoftheLectura
on thismatter,
mostclearly
in 54, appearsto
emerging
havebecometheirstartingpoint.
in textsearlier
thantheLectura
Dunseven
Moreover,
denies
see Contingency
andFreedom
cit.,above,n. 1),5f.
explicidy
synchronic
contingency;
(op.
Asweshallseein section
3 below,
entails
thatsynchronic
myinterpretation
contingency
is indeed
inLectura
I 39 (andmaybe forthefirst
butprobably
not'instatu
present
time),
nascendi'.
12For
andfactuality,
see Contingency
andFreedom
cit.,above,n. 1),Introcontingency
(op.
29. In themodern
notion
ofcontingency
is notincluded.
duction,
factuality
13See forinstance
in quo voluntas
habetunumactum
50: . . in eodeminstanti
in eodemetproeodempotest
habereoppositum
actumvolendi.
. . The terms
volendi,
'diachronic'
and'synchronic'
arecoinedbyA. Vos,Onthe
DunsScotus.
ofthe
philosophy
young
Some
semantical
andlogical
Semantics
andMetaphysics.
Studies
, in:E. P. Bos(ed.),Mediaeval
aspects
dedicated
toL.M.deRijk,
Ph.D.ontheoccasion
1985,195-220.
ofhis60thbirthday,
Nijmegen
timeVos proposed
thisterminology
wasin hisThomas'
enDuns'theorie
over
de
(Thefirst

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NICODENBOK

What is meantby thepossibility

mentionedby Scotus?Both Scotus and
mostof his contemporaries
and predecessorsagree on the idea thatsomebe both factualand non-factual.
Unlikemany
thingcannotsimultaneously
of them,Scotus does not conclude fromthisthatdiachroniccontingency
and possibilityare the onlypossible kind of contingencyand possibility.
Diachronic contingencyand possibilityare possibleindeed,forwhen the
will has an act or object at one moment,it is possiblethat the opposite
(act or object) isfactualat a later moment.Scotus,however,is convinced
that thereis stillanothercontingencyand possibility.
If somethingis the
case at one moment,itsoppositecanbe the case at theverysame moment.
Applied to the will: If the will has an act or object at one moment,it
cannot-actor have the oppositeobject at the same moment.When something(act or object) is factual,the simultaneouspossibility not: factual- of its
ity
opposite(act or object) is a genuinepossibility.14
3
3. Answering
fromScotusText
In orderto explain the particularsuccessionin introducingthe fourpossible combinationsof freedomin regard to opposite acts/objectsand
we should realize, firstof all, that freedomwith
diachrony/synchrony
or objects is not the centraltheme of 45-54.
to
acts
regard opposite

vande werkgroep
alwetendheid
ThomasvanAquino,
Utrecht
1982,
, in:Jaarboek
goddelijke
ofcontingency,
on Scotus'innovation
ofthenotion
alsopublished
59-60.)S. Knuuttila
butindependently
ofVos.Theformer
usesdifferent,
more'phenomenological'
terms
(like
See hisTime
inscholasticism,
in:S. Knuuttila
'statistical'
instead
of'diachronic').
andmodality
the
chain
Studies
inthehistory
, Dordrecht/Boston/London
ofideas
(ed.),Reforging
great
ofbeing.
Modalities
in medieval
York
, London/New
1981,117-37.Gf.also S. Knuuttila,
philosophy
1993,Iff.and 139-49.
offacin thesimultaneity
In an earlier
Duns'specific
insight
stageofScotus-research
DunsScot
tualandpossible
volition
seems
tohavebeennoticed
, 587:
bye.g.E. Gilson
(Jean
le contraire
de ce qu'elleveutde causerle con"Unevolont
estdonccapablede vouloir
the
traire
de ce qu'ellecause,dansle temps
mmeo ellele veutet cause."However,
sucha sentence
is stillambiguous.
Moreover,
expression
'capablede' in thissentence
tobe a paraphrase,
nota clarifying
ofwhatcanbe readinScotus'
appears
interpretation
of
thesystematic
text.Lastbutnotleast,Gilsondoesnotshowthathe realized
impact
in sucha sentence;
infact,
he explicitly
whatis meant
saysthathe didnotfinda specific
in Scotianthought
).
(seehisIntroduction
system
14Scotusdemonstrates
ofthestatement
in twoways:(a) byan analysis
thispossibility
thegrammaticalat thesamemoment'
'Thewillwilling
at onemoment
cannot-will
using
and
distinction
of'sensus
divisionis'
and'sensus
(seefurther
Contingency
logical
compositionis'
thatwilling
andnot-willing
arenonFreedom
, above,n. 1),115,12If.);(b)byshowing
(op.cit.
andFreedom
essential
ofthewill(seefurther
, 119f.).
Contingency
properties

18:14:39 PM

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IN REGARD
TO OPPOSITE
ACTSANDOBJECTS

249

This distinction
is not studiedforits own sake; it is adduced in order to
the
notion
of contingencyinvolvedin (free)willing.
analyze
Of course,thisdoes not explain the particularsuccessionin question.
There may be a very plausible reason for it, however. I have already
remarkedthatScotus,explainingthe cause of contingency
in things,searches
for the rationale of a specificproperty:their non-necessaryj actuality
.
Consideringthispoint of departureit seems a matterof course that he,
afterhavingintroducedthe twofoldfreedom,primarilythinksnot onlyof
twofactualacts of willing,both for the human will ( 46) and for the
divinewill ( 53), but also of twofactualobjectsof willing,again both for
the human will ( 46) and for the divinewill ( 53). In between( 49of one factualact
52) and at the end ( 54) Duns shows the compatibility
and itspossible
as
well
as
that
of
one
factual
opposite,
object and its possible opposite
both
for
the
human
will
and
for
the divine will.
again,
Thus, the opposites
, act and object, are in factintroducedas beingfactual,
whereasonly later does it appear that theycan also be possible.
This departurefromfactuality
introducesa complicationin the analywhich
seems
to
be
sis,
responsibleforsome alternationsin Scotus' exposition.Startingthe discussionof the human will in 45-47 and of the
divinewillin 53 Scotus immediatelyobservesan asymmetry
betweenfreedom in regardto oppositeacts and that to oppositeobjects withrespect
to the factualityof these acts and objects respectively.In freedomin
whereas in
regardto oppositeacts, he says, thereis some 'imperfectio',
freedomin regardto oppositeobjects thereis not. What does he mean
by this?A 'perfectio'is, generally,a qualityor propertythatmakessomethingmore complete.In 53 it is clearlysuggested,in particular,thatif
a will needs two factualacts, willingand not-willing,
in order to will all
that it wills,the will is less 'perfect'than a will which can will all that
it wills by one factualact. A will is more complete if it is capable of
is that the posgraspingall its objects in one act. Thus, the asymmetry
of
an
and
sibility factually
having object factually
havingits opposite(by one
act) as such is a completingfeaturefor the will (see 46), whereas the
possibilityoffactually
having an act of will and factually
having its opposite is not.
A will complete
in all respects
is immutable(withregard to its act) and
infinite(withregardto its objects).15Such a will is the divinewill,which
15For 46 the
of'autem'is ofsomeimportance.
Howexactly
is freeinterpretation
domin regard
to opposite
in regard
to opposite
acts?My
objects
opposedto freedom
reconstruction
ofScotus'
train
ofthought
wouldbe thatthedistinction
ofone-many
objects

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NICODENBOK

is capable of factuallywillingboth an object and its opposite- and in

fact an infinitenumber of objects and its opposites
by one act (see
16The human
will
can
one object by
will, however,which
factually
53).
act forfactuallywillingits opposite.
one act, needs another
whichScotus
of diachrony-synchrony,
We mightadd thatthe distinction
and infinityconnects with the distinctionsof immutability-mutability
finitude,showsper implicationem
(Duns does not explicitlysay it), another
completingfeatureof the will: the possibilityof having a factualact or
of its opposite.This 'perfecobject whilesimultaneously
havingthepossibility
tio' is an essentialfeaturenot only of the divine will, but also of the
human will.
theextradistinctions
ofimmutabilithatsystematically
Now it is remarkable
and
do
not
really complicate the correct
ty-mutability infinity-finitude
in relationto freedomin regardto oppoview on diachrony-synchrony
siteacts and objects.Concerningfreedomin regardto oppositeacts there
is no complication,since both forthe divinewill and forthe human will
the oppositeof one factualact is synchronically
possibleand hence, that
factualact itselfis synchronically
contingent.
Concerningfreedomin regardto oppositeobjects thereseemsto be a
complication,but it can easilybe solved. Discussingthe divinewill,in
willed
53 Duns thinksof an object and its oppositebothofwhicharefactually
by the one act of the divinewill. In 54, however,he thinksof an object
thatis factually
willedby the one act of the divinewill whereasits opposite
kindsof opposite
is possibleand can be willed. So Duns has two different
in 53
in
The
mentioned
mind:
opposite
objects fobjectumoppositum')
is factual,whereas the one mentionedin 54 is possible.17As we have
and
thatfactually
comesto Scotus'mindfirst,
willing
objects
bythenotion
accompanied
ifwilling
It wouldnotbe perfect,
is in itself
theiropposites
however,
perfect.
something
Conentailmanyactsofthewill,andhencemutability.
wouldnecessarily
manyobjects
in itself,
itmustbe possible
is notimperfect
ifwilling
an objectanditsopposite
versely,
canbe willed
thatwilling
byoneactofthewill.
manyobjects
16 45: "Voluntas
estliberaad obiecta
actibus
. . . mediantibus
enimnostra
oppositis
willwhich
canonlyhavetwofacthatthehuman
entails
..." This'mediation'
opposita.
moments
tualopposite
actsat successive
objects
( 46),canonlyhavetwofactual
opposite
willis capableofcomthehuman
moments
too( 47).Wemayaskwhether
at successive
willthenumber
thedivine
unlike
morethanoneobjectin onevolition;
anyway,
prising
willcangraspis limited.
ofobjects
whichthehuman
17We can observe
ofa
ofan objectofthedivinewill,thinks
thatScotus,thinking
in 54).Obviously
he does
ofa stone(seehisexample
liketheexistence
object,
specific
to theone
willas oneobjectcorresponding
notthink
ofall thatis willedbythedivine
willed
cannot
befactually
act,sinceforsuchanobjectitsopposite
bythatoneact(ofcourse,
ofeternity
is still
that
at theonemoment
possible).
willing
opposite

18:14:39 PM

FREEDOM
IN REGARD
TO OPPOSITEACTSANDOBJECTS

251

seen in the paragraphsabove, foran object and itspossibleoppositethere

is no problem:Because of synchronic
contingency
theycan both be willed.
With regardto an object and itsfactualopposite,Scotus makes clear
thatbecause of the infinity
of God's will theyboth can be willed at one
momentby one act of the will. But we must be carefulhere: although
an object and its opposite can both be factually
willedat the same time,
cannot
be
at
both
the
same
time.
Does
this make theirfacthey
factual
tual existencenon-contingent
afterall? This problem,however,can consisc
18
be
if
solved
we
take
the
tently
objects to be time-indexed'. Duns' way
of puttingthingsis unproblematic,
because his'time-index'obviouslyonly
refersto the momentat which the divine will factuallywills an object
and its opposite,and not to the momentsat which theythemselveswill
be factual.We can extend his analysisby applyinga time-indexto the
objectsthemselvesas well. We will have to maintainthatat one moment
an objectand itsoppositecannotsimultaneously
be factual.This can consistentlybe done; for if the object and its opposite are both to exist
because God factuallywillsboth of them,thisis possibleonly if the object
is to existat onemoment
and itsopposite
at another.
So althoughin thiscase
both an object and its oppositeare factuallywilled at the same moment
(the one momentof eternity),the object is willedfor one moment (of
time)and its oppositeis willedfor anothermoment(of time).19At each
momentforwhich an object is willed its existenceis synchronically
consince
for
that
moment
its
can
be
willed.
The
same
tingent
very
opposite
obtainsforeach momentforwhichtheexistenceof itsoppositeis willed20.21
18Gf.Contingency
andFreedom ., above,n.
125(esp.n. 52).
19In orderto showthisI (op.cit some1),commentary,
andimpossibilities
to
recapitulate possibilities
proper
human
anddivine
In formulas:
willing.
& s-Wt|p)
(1) M (sWtlp
is invalid
forboththehuman
andthedivine
will.
(2)M(sWtlp&sWtl-p)
is indeedinvalid
forthehuman
takenin a specific
itis validfor
will,whereas
respect
thedivine
when
havea time-index
forsuccessive
moments.
will,
namely,
p and-pthemselves
In thiscasepdmeans:
at moment
1 (p factually
at moment
p beingactual(ized)
1).
existing
We canreformulate
(2) as
(3) MsWtl(p&-p)
which
is validforthedivine
willifitmeans
& -pt2).
(4) M sWtl(ptl
20In formulas:
notonly
& M sWtI-Ptl,
(5) sWtlPtl
butalso
& M sWtlPt2
(6) sWtl-pt2
is valid.Theseformulas
arein factvariants
ofthetwopossibilities
mentioned
in the
column
ofthescheme
in n. 6.
right
21Thereis stillanother
- a terminological
to be mentioned
one.As we
complication

18:14:39 PM

252

NICODENBOK

So for the structureof Gos willingwith respectto the contingency

of its objects thereis no systematicproblem.All objectsand theiroppositesfactuallygraspedby the one act of the divinewill are synchronically
contingent.Scotus has answeredhis main question;forof course,created
thingsare factuallywilled objects of the divine will. Their contingency,
theirnon-necessary
is caused by Gos executivepower which
factuality,
followsthe determination
of his will. Since Gos will can have onlyone
act, theircontingencycan only be synchroniccontingency.
4. Conclusion
and Two Extrapolations
in thingsScotusturnsto the divine
Searchingforthe cause of contingency
will and introducesa twofoldfreedomof the will, namely freedomin
regard to opposite acts and freedomin regard to opposite objects; he
states that fromthis twofoldfreedoma twofoldcontingencyand possibilityfollow,namelya diachronicand a synchronicone. When checking
thepossiblecombinations
of freedomin regardto oppositeacts and objects
on the one hand and diachronyand synchronyon the other,Scotus'
expositionis not very perspicuous,mainly because he introducesthe
and mutability,
and finitude.The reason
aspects of immutability
infinity
forthisintroduction
mostlikelyis his notionof contingency
whichincludes
factuality.
We are now in a positionto derive two interesting
extrapolationsof
Scotus' view on freedomin regard to opposite acts and objects: conave seen,Scotus'viewis thatboththehuman
willandthedivine
willcanhavean act
ofwilling
whilesimultaneously
thepossibility
oftheopposite
act.However,
this
having
is notexpressed
in parallel
terms
, forhe doesnotspeak
(correct)
systematic
parallel
ofthe
divine
willas having
thepossibility
ofan opposite
act('actum
Thisterm
isused
oppositum').
inn. 13), 51 (lastpartoflastsentence:
will;see 50 (quoted
onlyforthehuman
"oppositosactusde volntate
absoluta
and 54 (first
acceptacumnotapossibilitatis")
partof
first
sentence:
nolleilludet potest
habereactumoppositum").
The sameexpres"potest
sionis alsoappliedto thehuman
willonlyin Quaestiones
inmetaphysicam
IX, q. 15,cited
from
DunsScotus
onthewillandmorality
, 150:". . . potest
agerehuncactumveloppositum
and'nolitio'
or
actum,
agereetiamvelnonagere".ForGod he onlyspeaksof'volitio'
'veliealiquid'and'nonveliealiquid'.
areslighdy
different
in thecaseofopposite
Things
In 54,studying
thedivine
taken
will,Dunsdoesnotspeak
objects.
o/"
'objectum
oppositum'
from
a systematic
wellcouldhavedoneso.
synchronically,
although
pointofviewhevery
he doesnotspeakofa synchronic
withrespect
to the
However,
'objectum
oppositum'
human
willeither.
So forsomereasonScotusdoesnotapplytheterms
'objectum
opposi- bothtaken
- to
tum'and'actusoppositus'
as opposites
which
aresynchronically
possible
thedivine
will.Thereason
cannot
be that'actus'connotes
so that'actusopposifactuality,
tus'mustrefer
toa factual
act.Ifthiswerethereason,
'actusoppositus'
couldnot
opposite
be appliedto thehuman
willeither.

18:14:39 PM

FREEDOM
IN REGARD
TO OPPOSITEACTSANDOBJECTS

253

cerningthe simplicityof the divine willingand concerningunivocityof

the conceptof will.
(1) In 54 thereis a remarkput between brackets.Here Duns says
that the divine will 'is identicalwith' ('eadem cum') his (one) volition.22
Since he explainsthisremarkby sayingthatGod's will cannot have both
an act and its opposite,the identityor simplicity
meantcannotbe a strict
one: It obviouslyallows forat least two importantdistinctions.23
inasmuchas the divinewillfactually
(a) There mustbe some complexity
and
their
graspsmanyobjects
opposites.Scotus' identification
apparently
refersto the subject-sideof the divinewill ('it is the same will that wills
various objects'),not to its object-side(the objects and oppositesthemselvesare not the same as the will).We can also say thatforDuns 'will'
refersto potencyand act of willing,not to 'that which is willed'.
(b) Althoughtherecan only be one divine act of will ('unica volitio',
53-54), its alternativeis synchronically
possible and hence, theremust
be two 'levels' in divinewilling,a contingentand a necessaryone.24For
what God willscan be not-willed,but he cannot be withoutwill. So the
act of will is contingent,
but the (potencyof) the will itselfis necessary.25
This means that the identification
Scotus refersto allows fora non-necessaryrelationship(betweenthe will and its act), so that not even strict
equivalenceof the propertiesto be identifiedis requiredforthe identity
he has in mind.26
(2) Scotus' analysisentailsthat thereis a univocal core in the concept
of human and divine willing.Both the human will and the divine will
22 54: ". . . itavoluntas
licetnonpossit
habereactusoppositos
divina,
(quiavoluntas
esteademcumsuavolitione),
..
23Dunswould
callthem'distinciones
a parterei'.
formales
probably
24Cf. 54:will
'inactuprimo'
and'inactusecundo'
andFreedom
.,
(seeContingency
(op.cit
above,n. 1),commentary,
127f.).
25Thisdistinction
between
twolevelsor dimensions
ofwilling,
a necessary
anda conforthesubject-side
ofGod'swilling.
one,obtains
Yet,itmusthaveitscounterpart
tingent
initsobject-side
ofGod'swillare(synchronically)
contintoo,foralthough
manyobjects
there
arenecessary
ofhiswillas well(for
thedivine
instance,
gent,
certainly
objects
essence).
cannot
be not-willed.
Necessary
objects
One hasto findanother
oftheidentity
involved
explanation
('eademcum')ifit turns
outtobe truethatforScotus
is nottermed
Suchan explawilling
necessary
objects
'willing'.
nation
couldbe,forinstance,
thatthedivine
will'is (present
in)'theonesynchronically
actofwilling
sense'onewith'or 'thesameas').
contingent
(inthis
26IfScotus'notion
ofidentity
as usedin thiscontext
('eademcum')wereinterpreted
as strict
thewillnecessarily
in Godas oneofHis
(inthemodern
identity
sense),
existing
essential
wouldnecessarily
itsvolitions.
Thenthere
wouldnotbe synproperties
produce
chronic
in (created)
after
all.
contingency
things

18:14:39 PM

254

NICODENBOK

can be definedas a potencythatwhile havingan act can synchronically

have the oppositeact and whilehavingan object can synchronically
have
the oppositeobject. If 'will' is definedin thisway, we can say thatboth
God and man have a will,or thathavinga will (in thissense) is a propertycommon to God and man.
There are incommunicablefeaturesof divine and human willingtoo.
In human beings one object of the will requiresone act of the will,but
in God one act of the will can comprise numerousobjects, opposites
included. Moreover, the divine will can have only one act of will (is
immutable,eternal),whereas the human will can have many acts of will
(is mutable,successive).27

27See forsomeobservations
thehistory
ofboththetermandtheconcept
concerning
inregard
'freedom
toopposite
acts/
inAugustine:
NicodenBok,Freedom
objects'
ofthewill.
A systematic
andbiographical
onhuman
sounding
ofAugustine's
, in:Augustiniana,
thoughts
willing
44 (1994),237-70,
II (2),VI andVII (3);inBernard
ofClairvaux:
id.,Human
esp.section
anddivine
inthetheology
A systematic
freedom
ofBernard
, in:Bijdragen,
ofClairvaux.
analysis
tijd'
schrift
voorfilosofie
entheologie,
54 (1993),271-95,
II; inOckham:
id.,Scotus
esp.section
a (postmodern
Some
theory
ofcontingency
from
perspective:
ofthenotion
ofconimportant
developments
DunsScotus
, in:Sileo1995(<
.,' above,n. 1),431-44,section
tingency
after
II; in Surez
op.t
andMolina:E. Dekker,
Thereception
inMolina
andSurez
ofScotus
, in:
theoiy
ofcontingency
Sileo1995{op.
cit.,above,n. 1),445-54.

18:14:39 PM

and Remission
Oresmeon Intension
of Qualitiesin His Commentary
on Aristotle's
Physics
ST. KIRSCHNER

The purposeof thispaper is to give an account of how Oresme understood the intensionand remissionof qualities in his Commentaryon
. In order to avoid misunderstandings
it must firstbe
Aristotle'sPhysics
stressedthatthe QuestionsV.6 to V.9, which are to be consideredhere,
of the intensityof qualido not deal with the geometricrepresentation
ties inheringin a substance,a notionthat is well knownfromOresme's
"Tractatusde configurationibus
qualitatumet motuum"but is onlybriefly
} Rather,
and incidentally
touchedupon in his Commentaryon the Physics
the point of discussionin Questions V.6 to V.92 is, how the intension
and remissionof a qualitytakesplace, thatis- to mentiononlytwo com- whetherthereis in
mon theories
,
any instantof alterationanotherqualor
accidental
form
or
whether
the intensionoccurs by adding new
ity
of
to
an
the
already existingone.
parts
quality
The question,how the intensionand remissionof qualitiesoccurs,was
a "fundamental
Aristotlehimproblemof scholasticnaturalphilosophy".3
selfdid not pay much attentionto the problemof intensionand remission of qualities.In the eighthchapterof his CategoriesAristotlesays:4
"Qualifications[xa rcoux]admit of a more and a less; for one thingis
called more pale or less pale than another,and morejust than another.
Moreover,it itselfsustainsincrease (for what is pale can still become
paler) not in all cases though,but in most". With the latter remark
Aristotleraises the problem5whetherconditionslike justice and health
1See Stefan
Kommentar
desAristoteles.
mit
Oresmes
Kommentar
Nicolaus
zurPhysik
Kirschner,
Edition
derQuaestionen
3 und4 deraristotelischen
sowie
vonvier
zuBuch
zuBuch
Quaestionen
Physik
5, Stuttgart
1997,26-7,457-8.
2 Foran edition
oftheseQuestions
seeKirschner
1997(op.cit
., above,n. 1),395-417.
3SeeAnneliese
derscholastischen
Maier,%wei
, 3rded.,Roma
Naturphilosophie
Grundprobleme
1968(= Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
derSptscholastik,
2).
4 Aristotle,
The English
translation
is derived
fromTheComplete
, 8.1026-30.
Categories
Works
TheRevised
ed.Jonathan
Vol.1,NewJersey/Oxford:
Translation,
Barnes,
Oxford
ofAristotle.
Princeton
Press,1991,17.
University
5 Aristotle,
la2.
, 8.10b30-l
Categories
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2000

Vivarium,
38,2

18:14:48 PM

256

ST. KIRSCHNER

admit of a more and a less. Thus it is doubtfulwhetherwe can say that

one justice is more a justice than anotheror whetherwe have to say that
one person has justice more than another,whilejustice itselfdoes not
admit of increase or decrease. Aristodedoes not come to a decision in
this question and confineshimselfto the statement6that "at any rate
thingsspoken of in virtueof these (qualities)unquestionablyadmit of a
more and a less: one man is called more grammaticalthananother,juster,
healthier,and so on." A furtherdiscussionof the problem of intension
of qualitiesdoes not occur. The same holdsforAristotle's
cursoryremarks
in the Physicson changes froma lesser to a greaterdegree of a quality
and vice versa.7
UnlikeAristotlethe scholasticphilosophershad a stronginterestin the
and remissio
of qualities.In the beginningthisinterest
problemof intensio
was theologically
motivated.The originlies in a questionraisedby Petrus
Lombardus (ca. 1100-1160) in his famous"Sentences",which deals with
the way in which the charity{caritas)of man increasesor decreases.8In
the course of time thisproblemwas transferred
upon the sensuallypersuch
as
colours
and
so on.9
heat, cold,
ceptiblequalities
But the questionwas not onlyhow to conceivethe intensionof a quality,such as heat, but one had also to explain transitionsbetween contraryqualitiessuch as hot and cold. Hence thereis a connexionbetween
the problem of intensio
and remissio
and the question whethercontrary
such
hot
and
can
inher
in a substancesimultaneously.
as
cold
qualities
AccordinglyOresme treatsthese topics together.Under the premisesof
four different
views he discusses the questions,whetherand, if so, in
which way contraryqualities inhere in a substancesimultaneously(see
esp. Qu. V.6), whetherthe intensionof qualitativeformsoccursby addition of degreesor parts of the qualityor whetherin each instantthere
in which way intermeis a completelynew form(see Qu. V.7), further,
diate qualitiesbetweencontrariesare composed of these contraries(Qu.
V.8), and, finally,whetherthe intensionof a qualityentailsa simultaneous remissionof its contrary(Qu. V.9).
6 Aristotle,
fromTheComplete
Works
translation
derived
, 8.11a2-5.English
of
Categories
Aristotle
, 17.
7 See Aristotle,
, V.2.226b1-8.
Physics
8 See Maier1968
reads:"utrum
question
(op.citabove,n. 3), 12-5.ThetitleofPetrus'
in homine
habeatur
concedendum
sitquodspiritus
sanctus
et magisvelminus
augeatur
veldetur";seeMagisti
Petri
inIV Libris
editio
Lombardi
Parisiensis
Sententiae
distinctae,
Episcopi
Tom.I, ParsII [LiberI etII], Grottaferrata
tertia,
1971,Lib.I, Dist.17,Cap.5, p. 146.
9 Fora detailed
andremissio
seeMaier
on thehistory
oftheproblem
ofintensio
study
1968(op.cit.,
above,n. 3),3-109.

18:14:48 PM

ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ORESME
ON INTENSION

257

What makes Oresme's discussionon the intensionand remissionof

is that he does not only deal withcommon theoqualitiesso interesting
new
a
but
introduces
ries,
opinion,which is based on a specificview on
the ontologicalstatusof accidents.Section I of thispaper will be devoted
to Oresme'sdiscussionof threecommontheories,among themthe "addition theory"and the "succession-of-forms
theory".In section II will be
treatedOresme's view on the ontologicalstatusof accidents,which is a
prerequisitefor his own theoryof the intensionand remissionof qualities,whichwill be describedin sectionIII.
and Remission
Theories
Discussion
1. Oresme's
of theIntension
of ThreeCommon
of Qualities
In the beginningof his discussionOresme sets forthfourdifferent
opinand which he intendsto apply
ions which appear to him magisrationales
to the problemsmentionedabove. Let us confinethe discussionin this
sectionto the firstthreeopinions;the fourth,to which Oresme himself
subscribes,needs a longerconsiderationand will be discussedin section
III. Since Oresme gives in Qu. V.6 only a briefaccount of the various
views,10the followingsurveycontainsnotionswhich become clear only
in the subsequentquestions.
The firstview maintainsthataccidentalformsof contraryqualitiescan
in theirsubject,provided
and in a different
existsimultaneously
intensity
of both qualthata certain(but hypothetical)
sum of degreesof intensity
ities remains constant.With regard to the intensionand remissionof
qualities this view holds that the intensionor remissionoccurs by the
additionor loss of partsor degreesof the quality.Since Maier's studies11
thistheoryis commonlyreferredto as the "additiontheory".
In contrastto the firsttheorya second view holds that contraryqualin one and the same subject,but follow
itiesdo not existsimultaneously
each other. In Qu. V.8 Oresme claims that accordingto this position
10Qu. V.6,42-52(Quotations
ofquestions
andlinesin thisandthesubsequent
footinfootn.
refer
totheedition
mentioned
videntur
notes
1):"Tuncde [opinione]
<questione>
essequattuor
Primaestquodtalesforme
videntur
essesimul
magisrationales:
opiniones
suntsimul
Secunda
estquodnumquam
nisisuccessive
unapost
subesseremisso
etintenso.
suntsimulnecestunaperunumtempus
etposteaalia,
aliam.Tertiaestquodnumquam
inquolibet
secundum
seddumestalteratio
instanti
estnovaforma
sui,etillaest
quodlibet
suntsimul
Gualterii
quodnullomodocontraria
Ms.].Quartaest,utcredo,
opinio
[guarterii
nisisolumin respectu,
necestibimedium
sicutinter
sursum
et deorsum,
et in quolibet
estnovum
sednonsicutimaginatur
tertia
instanti,
accidens,
quo estalteratio,
opinio."
11Maier
1968(op.cit
., above,n. 3).

18:14:48 PM

258

ST. KIRSCHNER

the intensionand remissionof qualitiesoccursby changesof the subject's

dispositionfor the quality and not by an addition or loss of parts or
degreesof the quality.
As a thirdview Oresme discussesthe "succession-of-forms
theory",12
accordingto which in everyinstantof an intensionthereis a completely
new accidental form.The foremostproponentof this view was Walter
who appears in the textas "guarterius".14
Burley,13
The firsttheory,as describedby Oresme in Qu. V.6 and V.7, is mainly
based on the followingprinciples:
1. Contraria
maxime
distantia
, like hot and cold or black and white,have
maximumdegreesof theirpossibleintensity,
thatis, the latitudo
or range
of possibleintensities
of thesequalitiesis finite.15
Oresme emphasizesthat
only contrariesof this kind are to be discussed.16Neverthelessin the
course of the discussionhe speaks only of active qualities.
2. In the case of active qualitiesa remissionof one quality,say heat,
in a subject can only be broughtabout by introductionof its contrary
quality,that is cold, and vice versa. Similarlyan intensionof heat (by
certain degrees) entails a simultaneouscorruptionof cold (to the same
amount).17Accordinglymaximum heat means the absence of any cold
12The terms
vonderSukzession
or "LehrevonderSukzession
"Theorie
derFormen"
derFormen"
werecoinedbyMaier1968(op.ciL,
above,n. 3).
13SeeHerman
and,
Intension
andRemission
Walter
the
, in:Speculum,
Burley
ofForms
Shapiro,
Maier1968(<op.t
34 (1959),
EdithD. Sylla,TheOxford
413-27;
., above,n. 3),66-8,337-40;
Calculators
andtheMathematics
andMeasurement
1320-1350.
New
ofMotion
Physics
byLatitudes,
York/London
1991,106-11.
14
hand(Ms.Sevilla,
Biblioteca
alsothemarginal
notebyanother
Capitular
Compare
f.60ra):
"tertia
burlei".
7-6-30,
y Colombina,
oppinio
15Qu. V.6, 122-129:
sciendum
estquodtalis
"Prodeclaratione
huiusopinionis
primo
in infinitum
intensionis
nonesset
estdivisibilis
intensive.
Patet,
quiaalitermotus
qualitas
utdictum
continuus.
Secundo
intensive,
est,quia
quodnonestininfinitum
augmentabilis
et e conaliternonessetmaxima
et quandounaintenditur
distantia,
[et]aliaremittitur
et
secundum
divisionem
verso.Tertioquodtotaeiuslatitudo
velintensio,
queestinfinita
finita
sicutestin divisione
voluntrie
intensive,
peraliquosgradus
equales,
potest
signari
continui
velcelicontinue
celi."
signando
gradus
16Qu. V.6, 21-24:"Quarto
maxime
dicuntur
modo<contraria>
due forme
positive
ineodemgenere,
etremissibiles,
sicutcaliddistantes
exquosequitur
quodsuntintensibiles
in proposito."
et iliomodosumitur
contrarietas
itasetfrigiditas,
albedo<et> nigredo,
17Qu.V.6,53-74:"Ideoperordinem
suntistevie.Prima
ratioest<prob>abilr
tractande
conioretfacilior
estprimo
proprie
postultimam,
proqua supponendum
quodintalibus
Secundoquodin
trariis
estdaresummum;
distare<n>t.
patet,quia aliternonmaxime
contrariis
sicutcaliditas
activis
unumnonremovetur
nisiab agente
contrario,
perfrigidietstatim
contrarietatis.
Tertiosupponatur
tatem,
quod
quiaomnisactioestratione
patet,
nisiex
intendit
inducere
corrumpere
aliquod<activum>
aliquidprimoet nonintendit

18:14:48 PM

ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ON INTENSION
ORESME

259

increasein heat by condensationis net possible.18

and vice versa.A further
of possibledegreesof each of two contraryqual3. The total latitudo
itiescan be arbitrarily
dividedinto some equal degrees,e.g. 10.19
From theseprinciplesit can easilybe deduced that the total latitudines
of possibledegreesof two contraryqualitiesare equal and that the sum
total of the actual degrees of two contraryqualities inheringin a subof possible degrees
stance must always be the same. If the total latitudo
of each of two contraryqualitiesis e.g. subdividedinto 10 degrees,then
in one and the same subcontraryqualitiescan onlyexistsimultaneously
if
to
the
number
of 10, e.g. 8 degrees of
add
their
ject
single degrees
heat and 2 degreesof cold. Combinationslike 1 degree of heat and 1
degree of cold are not possible.20
velpotest
et ideosimiliter,
si corrumpit
aliquid,
consequent^
quodetiamaliquidinducit
summa
Tuncestprimaconclusio
nonremittitur
nisi
educere
de potentia.
quodcaliditas
nisia contrario
et itade aliis,et probatur,
inducatur,
frigiditas
quia nonremittitur
per
inducitur
scilicet
in materia
velalia
secundam
contrarium,
frigiditas
suppositionem,
igitur
remitti
scilicet
calidSecundo
forma,
quia,sipotest
aliquantulum,
quiahocagensintendit.
itassineinductione
etadhuc,etsic
tuncnonvidebitur
ratioquinadhucpotest
frigiditatis,
totali
tertollisineinductione
contrarii.
Secundaconclusio
estquodcaliditas
non
potest
de 'x' ad 'xii'
intenditur
nisifrigiditas
Probatur,
quia,si intendatur
aliquacorrumpatur.
tan<tun>dem
remitti
sinecorruptione
alicuius
sineinductione
igitur
poterit
frigiditatis,
Ex quosequitur
alicuius
conclusionem.
corollarie
quod
frigiditatis,
quodestcontra
primam
in talibus
fitperadmixtionem
alterius
sicutdicit
intensio
et remissio
contrariis
contrarii,
Aristoteles
tertio
, III.5.119a27-28]
[Aristoteles,
Topica
quodilludestalbius,
quod
topicorum
estnigro
impermixtius."
18See Oresme's
answer
hocarguitothefollowing
objection
(Qu.V.6,75-78):"Contra
insummo
sinea<d>mixtione
ettarnen
tur,quiaignisestcalidior
frigiditatis,
perrarefactionem
et condensationem
velpermotum
adhuccaliditas
et tarnen
nulla
intendi,
potest
et adhucpotest
Similiter
in aqua nullaestcaliditas,
et
infrigidari
frigiditas
corrumpetur.
"Adprimum
Oresme
diciquod,si caliditas
(83-91):
ignisnonest
congelari."
replies
potest
alicuigradui
tuncipsaestsumma
necpotest
intendi,
quiaiammaxime
permixta
frigiditatis,
distat
a summa
nonpotest
frigiditate,
igitur
perprimam
suppositionem.
magis<intendi>
Etcumdicitur:
<et cetera>,
diciquodbenefietactivaetsen'siigniscondensatur'
potest
- sicutsi
sibilis
hocquoderitunitus
sed ex hocnonintenderetur
magis,
magispropter
tactui
tunc
tactui
calido
et
minus
condensetur,
aliquodtepidum
magis
apparebit
frigefieri
- , sed
calidoapparebit
ettarnen
estquod<simul>calefiat
etfrigefiat
calefieri,
impossibile
in condenso
suntqualitates
etitadicode aqua,si congeletur."
quia
magissensibiles,
19See thepassagecited
15.
underfootnote
20Qu. V.6, 130-146:
"Ex quo sequitur
corollarie
unius
primoquodtantaestlatitudo
unumintroducitur
contrarii.
aliud.
contrarii,
Patet,quia corrumpendo
quantaalterius
habereplusquam10
Secundoquodmateria
estcertecapacitatis,
ita,quodnonpotest
autde unoautde alioautde ambobus;
de uno,habetunum
ideo,si habetnovem
gradus,
contrariis
habetequaliter,
dealio,et<si> 'viii'etcetera.
Tertio<quod>depropriis
semper
etpropter
hocdicitur
huius[implicitly:
., VII.4.249a3-12]
septimo
Phys
quodcomparationes
nonfiunt
circagenera,
sit
quianihilestmagisequalealteroqualitatibus
primis,
quamvis
calidum.
materia
habeatequaliter
de
quinsemper
magis
Quartoquodnonpotest
separari
illis.Quintoquodpotest
habereamboremisse
et intense.
Sextoquodnonpotest
ambo

18:14:48 PM

260

ST. KIRSCHNER

With regard to the way in which the increase or decrease of a qualoccurs by additionor loss of degreesOresme confineshimity'sintensity
selfto a ratherbriefaccount,which is mainlybased on an analogywith
thatOresme does
It is noteworthy
the increaseor decrease of quantities.21
in his account of the additiontheorybetweenessentialor
not distinguish
formaland materialor accidental (or individual)parts of the quality's
accidentalform.As A. Maier pointed out,22the purpose of this distinction, which was introducedby William of Ware, was to take into considerationthat an increase in the intensityof a qualitydoes not involve
an intensionof the quality'sspecificnature,since heat remainsheat irrespectiveof how intensiveit is. By statingthat the intensiononly takes
is avoided.
place in the material,but not the essentialparts,thisdifficulty
However,in Oresme'saccountthereis no traceat all of such a distinction.
of a
Nearly the whole discussionin Qu. V.7 comprisesthe refutation
which
are
the
addition
seriesof counter-arguments
nearly
theory,
against
completelyderivedfromWalterBurley'streatise"De intensioneet remisAs proponentsof the addition theorycan be mensione formarum".23
and WilliamOckham.26However,
tionedDuns Scotus,24
JohnDumbleton25
in order to understandOresme's discussionrightly,one has to bear in
'x' caliditates
cum10frigidhabere
estmateriam
remisse
habere,
<quia>,sicutimpossibile
<ita> impossibile
esthabereunumcumunoprecise,
itatibus,
posquiatunc<materia>
essecalidainsummo,
necdecenter
setseparali
ab eisnechaberet
posset
semper
equaliter
etsimsursum
estquodaliquidsitsimpliciter
sicutpatetexemplo;
unde,sicutimpossibile
et
unumpedemsursum
estquodaliquidsitsecundum
itaimpossibile
deorsum,
pliciter
in semidiametro
mundi."
sicutpotest
unumpedemdeorsum
tantum,
imaginan
per
21Qu. V.7,50-64:"Tuncestconclusio
istismodisfitintensio
peraddiquodsemper
sicutestin
et remissio
<et> gradusad gradum
tionem
deperditione,
partisad partem
estaddiIstudpersuadetur,
albedine.
caliditate,
lumine,
quiasicut<in> extensione
primo
itavidetur
utpatetde augmentatione,
tiopartis
ad partem
extensive,
quodin intensione
SecundodicitCommentator
id estgradualiter.
fitadditiopartispostpartem
intensive,
a.
M.
In
Frankfurt
Venetiis
1562
V, Comm.6, f. 21OD]
.,
1962),
Phys
(repr.
[Averroes,
ibieritplusde unoquamde alio,
ex extremis,
ergoequaliter
quodmediacomponuntur
dicitur
talesgradus.
et hocnonnisisecundum
Exemplariter
quodactiofita proportione
mot<iv>am
secundum
etmotus
mixti
maioris
igipredominantem,
qualitatem
inequalitatis
in eodem,et hocnonestnisiquiaibisunt
habetaliudexcedere
turunumcontrarium
comalterum
etplures
confirmari,
quiaomneexcedens
Quodpotest
gradus
partes.
plures
sensicutvidemus
etcumhocex aliquoaddito,
estexcessum,
ex tanto,
quantum
ponitur
videtur
aliamintensive,
excedat
inqualitatibus;
sibiliter
quodexceergo,si aliquacaliditas
a subiecto."
estforma
distincta
<si> iliaqualitas
ethocmaxime,
denssitcomposita
intensive,
22Maier1968(op.cit.,
above,n. 3),48ff.
23Forthereferences
seeKirschner
1997(op.cit.,
above,n. 1),402-5.
24See Maier1968(op.cit
., above,n. 3),50ff.
25See Sylla1991(op.cit.,
above,n. 13),207-11.
26See Maier1968(op.cit
andPlace
Motion
Herman
, Time
., above,n. 3), 74ff.;
Shapiro,
/Paderborn
toWilliam
1957,88-91.
, Louvain
ofOckham
according

18:14:48 PM

ANDREMISSION
ON INTENSION
OF QUALITIES
ORESME

261

mind thatcharacteristic
forthe firstview is the combinationof the thewith
of
the
idea that contraryqualitiescan existsimultaneaddition
ory
in
ously one and the same subject. One of the supportersof this view
was Buridan.27
Oresme regardsthe firsttheoryto be the most probable.28He argues
thataccordingto thisopinion it is easy to conceive how the intensio
and
a
as
the
remissio
increase
or
conis produced by gradual
decrease, and,
how the intensio
trariesare regardedto existsimultaneously,
of one qual's rather
entails
the
remissio
of
its
Oresme
However,
ity
contrary.29
despite
addition
has
to
in
assessment
of
the
one
bear
mind
that
positive
theory
he prefersanothersolution,as will be shownlater.Accordingto the second of the above mentionedtheoriescontraryqualitiesdo not existsimultaneouslyin one and the same subject,but followeach other.Moreover
it is statedthat the intensionand remissionof qualities does not occur
by an additionor loss of partsor degreesof the quality,as the addition
theoryheld, but by changes of the subject'sdispositionfor the quality.
Finally,in the case of a hot body becomingcold, the heat, reduced in
the wayjust described,all at once {totasimul)ceases to existand the cold
all at once beginsto exist.
It is difficult
to identify
real proponentsof thisview. William Ockham
held that contraryqualitiesdo not existsimultaneously,
but followeach
other in a subject,30so that, if somethingchanges from cold to hot,
firstthe whole coldnessvanishesbeforethe heat is introducedinto the
27See Acutissimi
reuerendi
buridani
subtilissime
octo
philosophi
Magisti
Johannis
questiones
super
Aristotelis
etreuise
A magistro
libros
dullaert
degandano
antea
phisicorum
diligenter
recognite
Johanne
in facsimile
1509(reprinted
Frankfurt
am Main1964),Qu. III.3
, Parisiis
nusquam
impresse
a. III.5.
28Qu. V.6,53-54:"Ideoperordinem
tractande
suntistevie.Primaratio[thatis the
first
etfacilior
view]est<prob>abilior
postultimam
[thatis thefourth
view][. . .]." Qu.
ofthepassagethetextoftheedition
has beenslightly
V.9, 152-157
(inthebeginning
ad secundum,
scilicet
de quesito,
est,comparando
changed):
"Quantum
primosciendum
simulesse,<est> probabilior
quattuor
quodprimatrium,
opiniones
que ponitcontraria
etsecundum
earnestfacile
intensio
fitperadditionem
ad gradum
videre,
qualiter
gradus
etqualiter
e converso
remissio
etqualiter,
suntsimul,
si unumintenquando<contraria>
alterum
et e converso."
datur,
remittitur,
29See thesecond
citedin theprevious
footnote.
passage
30See Ockham's
inlibrum
secundum
sententiarum
Quaestiones
, ed. byG. Gi andR. Wood,
St.Bonaventure,
N. Y., 1981(= Guillelmi
de Ockham
OTh,Vol.V),Qu. 7, 137,1.23 to
Summula
naturalis
St.Bonaventure,
N. Y. 1984
138,1.11;idem,
, ed.byS. Brown,
philosophiae
de Ockham
inlibros
OPh,Vol.VI),BookIII, Ch.23;idem,
(= Guillelmi
Expositio
Physkorum
Aristotelis
F. Kelly,G. Leiboldand
, ed. byR. Wood,R. Green,G. Gi,J. Giermek,
G. Etzkern,
St.Bonaventure,
N. Y. 1985(BookIV-VIII[= Guillelmi
de Ockham
OPh,
Vol.V]),BookVI, Ch.6, 499,1. 12ff.;
seealsoShapiro
1957(op.citabove,n. 26),79-82;
McCordAdams,William
Ockham
, 2 vols.,NotreDame,Indiana1987,729-31.
Marilyn

18:14:48 PM

262

ST. KIRSCHNER

in the marginof the ms. an unknownhand noted

subject.31Accordingly,
"secunda oppinio occham".32However, thereis no furtherconcordance
betweenthe second theoryand Ockham's view,since Ockham conceived
the intensionand remissionof qualitiesto occur accordingto the addition theory,33
while the second theoryspeaks of changes in the subject's
as
disposition cause of the increase or decrease of the quality'sintensity.
This last point reminds us of views like that of Thomas Aquinas or
AegidiusRomanus, who consideredthe intensionor remissionas a result
of the different
extentto which the subjectparticipatesin the qualitative
form.34
However,the term"participado"is completely
lackingin Oresme's
attributedto a
exposition.Hence the second theorycannot be definitely
certainauthor.
Oresme declaresthe second opinion to be irrational,35
mainlybecause
of the difficulties
which arise if such alterationsare to be explained in
which thereis a transitionbetweencontraries,forinstancewhen a cold
body becomes hot. It would take too long to describethe discussionhere
in detail. Only one of the numerousobjectionsagainst the second theory shall be mentionedhere:36Providedthatsomethingundergoesa uniformalterationfrommaximumcold to maximumhot, the caliditasmust
be introducedeitherin any but the last instantof the calificado
or in the
last instant,when the body reaches the highestdegree of heat. However,
if the latteris the case, the body will appear alreadyveryhot at a time
where thereis stillonlycoldnessin it. This contradiction
resultsfromthe
fact that on the one hand accordingto the premisethe transitionfrom
cold to hot is uniform,but on the otherhand, when the caliditas
is introduced in the last instant,therecan be no heat in the body in the time
31See Ockham,
inlibrum
secundum
OTh V, Qu. 7, 137,1.23 to
Quaestiones
sententiarum,
naturalis
138,1. 11;idem,Summula
, OPhVI, BookIII, Chap.23,321,11.76-81
philosophiae
andChap.31,339,11.3-8;id.,Expositio
inlibros
Aristotelis
, OPhV, BookVI,499,
Physicorum
1.31 to 500,1.37).
32Ms. Sevilla,
Biblioteca
f.60ra.
7-6-30,
y Colombina,
Capitular
33McCordAdams1987(<
., above,n. 26),713-23.
op.cit
34See Maier1968(iop.cit
., above,n. 3),23-30.
35Qu.V.8,116-118:
"Proistis
evadiconcedendo
rationibus,
quamvis
posse<n>t
quedam,
videtur
tamenquodiliaopiniositirrationalis,
inconvenientia,
que videntur
quiarationes
suntmagisapparentes
quamsolutiones."
36Qu. V.8, 102-107:
in 'a' inaliquoinstand
medio
Autcaliditas
introducitur
"Quinto.
autultimo,
essesumme
Si dicatur
calidum.
quandoincipit
quodin ultimo,
ergosimiliter
eritde frigido
in 'b',etsic'a' apparebit
ethabebit
et'b' valde
valdecalidum
frigiditatem
habenscaliditatem;
si in medioaliquo,tunccaliditas
intendetur
erit
frigidum
postquam
etcumnonsitresistentia,
debetintendi."
introducta,
sequitur
quodsubito

18:14:48 PM

OF QUALITIES
ANDREMISSION
ON INTENSION
ORESME

263

before,since accordingto the premisesof the second theorycontraries

in theirsubject.37The firstalternative,that
do not exist simultaneously
thecaliditas
is introducedin some instantotherthanthelast of the calificado
,
is likewiseincompatiblewiththe assumptionof a uniformalteration,for
in thiscase the caliditas
should reach immediatelyits highestdegree,since
thereis no contraryqualityin the body whichcould serveas a resistence.
The thirdof the views treatedby Oresme is Burley's succession-offormstheory.Oresme deals with Burley'sview verybrieflyand without
any real discussion.At once he statesthatBurley'sopinion is irrefutable,
but nevertheless,
apart fromother objections,he thinksit to be inconveniensthatduringan alterationthereshouldbe generatedin a smallamount
numberof things(ras),for,accordingto Burley'sview,
of timean infinite
in everymomentof an alterationthere is a new accidental formand
each of theseformsis a realityof its own.38
Viewon theOnto
2. Oresme's
logicalStatusofAccidents
In orderto understandOresme's own solutionto the problem of intension and remissionof qualitieswe have to considerfirsthis specifictheory of the ontologicalstatusof accidents39which he develops in some
and whichhe applies to variousprobquestionson book 1 of the Physics
lems of naturalphilosophyin his Physics
commentary.
forOresme's view on accidentsis thathe does not conCharacteristic
or modi
sider them as accidentalforms,but only as so-called condiciones
of the substance.But this does not mean that accidents are identified
withthe substance,just as Ockham identifiedthe quantityof a substance
withthe substanceitself.Rather,for Oresme accidentsare distinctfrom
the substance,but theyrankon a lower ontologicalstatusthan the commonlyaccepted accidentalforms.
37One hastoremember
viewa lack
to theusualAristotelian-scholastic
thataccording
andheatarelookeduponas
orreduction
doesnotmeanheat,sincecoldness
ofcoldness
twoindependently
existing
qualities.
38Qu. V.8, 119-123:
non
"Ideoalia via est,quamponitGualterius,
quodcontraria
sicutisti
suntsimulnecmanetiliomodoeademforma
pertotamunamalterationem,
estnovaqualitas.
non
inaliquoinstanti,
dumestalteratio,
sedcontinue
Quamvis
ponunt,
inconveniens
res
illamopinionem,
tamen
videtur
contra
demonstran
quodinfinite
posset
inparvotempore
tura calido."
producn
39Seeforthefollowing
and
cit.
Kirschner
1997(iop.
, above,n. 1),38-41;
JeanGeleyrette
Oresme
d'tre
Edmond
desdegrs
chezNicole
, in: ArabieSciencesand
Mazet,La hirarchie
8 (1998),45-65.
Philosophy,

18:14:48 PM

264

ST. KIRSCHNER

Oresme expounds his ontologyof accidentsfor the firsttime in Qu.

1.5, wherehe discusseswhether"ens" is said univocallyof substancesand
accidents. There are presentedthree major opinions on the nature of
accidents,the thirdof which Oresme himselfholds:
Secundonotandum
unomodoquodsit
potest
quodaccidens
imaginari
tripliciter:
veraforma
licetnonintrinsece,
itaquod
inherens
substantie
sicutforma
substantialis,
sitveraessentia
demonstrata
<in>divisibilis
et extensa
ad [repet.
ad] extensionem
subiecti
et proprie
nomine
substantivo
[subiectivo
Ms.]sicut[proprie]
significabilis
<communiter>
Secundomodoquod
imaginatur
[imaginabantur
Ms.]de albedine.
accidens
nullomodopreter
animam
sitaliaresab ipsasubstantia
sedsolum
subiecta,
sitipsasubstantia
taliter
se habens
secundum
diversa
quodde ea dicuntur
predicata,
etsicaccidens
nonessetaliuda substantia
nisipredicatum,
etistomododicunt
aliqui
accidente
Tertiavia alia estet posset
Ms.]de quolibet
exceptaqualitate.
[antiqui
nonessetpropria
forma
extensa
velin<h>erens
secundum
imaginari
quodaccidens
vel predicatum
vel terminus
iuxtasecundam
viam,nec solumsubstantia
primam
viam,sedessetaliquidtaleesseauttantum
esse;verbigratia
quodalbedononesset
aliudquamalbumesse,quodproprie
concretum
cumisto
significaretur
pernomen
infinitivo
'esse'etpernomenadiectivum.40
The firstview regardsan accident- as is the case with the substantial
- as a real
formitself
form,which inheresin the substance(veraforma
demoninherens
substantie
sicutformasubstantialis)
and which as a veraessentia
stratacan be signifiedby a nomen
substantivum
, e.g. "albedo". The second
view holds that an accident is nothingelse but the substancebehaving
in such a mannerthatvariousthingscan be predicatedof the substance,
which means that accidentsare in realitynothingdistinctfromthe subwiththe substance.41
The thirdopinstance,but are completelyidentified
ion is that to which Oresme himselfsubscribesand accordingto which
accidentsare not real forms.
For Oresme a qualityis nothingelse but the taleesseof the substance,
e.g. whitenessis the essealbumof the substance.In an analogous way the
esse.Extendingthese observationsto
quantityof a substanceis its tantum
all accidentsOresme finallyconcludes:
esse'aut
estaut'tantum
Ultima
conclusio
estquodomneaccidens
proprie
loquendo
'taleesse'aut'ad aliquid<esse>' autaliquodtale,que nonsuntsignificabilia
procommuni
necaliquonomine
substantivo
[. . .].42
priealiquo<termino>

40Ms.Sevilla,
TheorthogBiblioteca
7-6-30,
y Colombina,
Qu. 1.5,f.3rb"va.
Capitular
intoclasfrom
theSevilla-Ms.
hasbeenchanged
inthisandthefollowing
citations
raphy
of"e" fordiphthongs.
sicalusage,except
forthewriting
41Anneliese
undMechanik,
Maierbriefly
treats
thisviewin ^wischen
, Roma
Philosophie
derSptscholastik,
1958(= Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
5), 329-30.
42Ms. Sevilla,
Biblioteca
7-6-30,
y Colombina,
Qu. 1.5,f.3va.
Capitular

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ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ON INTENSION
ORESME

265

Oresme prepareshis conclusionby arguingthat under the assumption

thatan accidentis a real form"ens" would be said in a univocal manner of both accidentsand substances,since "form"would be said of both
substanceand accident,so that an accident would be a vereens like a
of
substance.But thiscontradictshis conclusionthat "ens" is said equivoce
accidentsand substances,since substancesexiston theirown, while accidentsexistonly insofaras theybelong to a substance.43
In Qu. 1.6 Oresme draws attentionto anotherproblemwhich would
followif accidentswere, like substances,vereresor vereentia.For, in this
case the productionof an accident would be- like the productionof a
- a
substance
generation,since a generationproceeds fromnon-beingas
such to being as such. But such an equal statusof accidentsand substances is unacceptablefor Oresme. Thereforehe thinksthat the productionof an accidentis justlycalled alterationand not generation,since
thereis no new res, which comes into existence,but an already existing
resachievesa new property.44
- or at least for a later
An importantrole for the development
justification of Oresme's theoryof the ontologicalstatusof accidentsis played
, where Aristodedraws a
by a passage in the fourthbook of the Physics
increasein a circle'scura
and
the
between
the
of
body
parallel
heating
vature.45
Aristotleexplains:46"For as the same matterbecomes hot from
and cold frombeing hot, because it was potentiallyboth, so
cold,
being
too fromhot it can become more hot, thoughnothingin the matterhas
43Ibid.,
etcumcorconclusio
estista,quamdicoprobabiliter
Qu. 1.5,f.3va:"Secunda
estforma
videtur
accidens
seu
etestquodde intentione
rection,
philosophi
quodnullum
in notabili
essentia
secundum
viamexpositam
[seethepassagecitedabove,corprimam
Hoc probatur
modum.
to footn.
primoquiasequitur
40] siveprimum
quod
responding
itadiceretur
contra
ensessetunivocum
conclusionem,
quiasequitur
quodforma
primam
etconvenientiam,
naturalem
similitudinem
desubstantiali
etaccidentali
quiautraque
propter
licetuna de proprie
et forma
<accidenconsimiliter
informaret,
[propeMs.]et cetera,
The first
to whichOresme
si quiscogitet."
talis>essetvereens,utvidetur,
conclusion,
de substantia
reads(f.3va):"Prima[conclusio]
estistaquodensdicitur
refers,
equivoce
et veredicitur
de substantia
<et> secund<ari>o
de
et accidente
[. . .] itaquodproprie
accidente."
44Ibid.,
estquod,si accidens
essetveraresvelvere
"Secunda
Qu. 1.6,f.4rb:
propositio
accidentis
enssignificabile
substantivo
esset
nomine
Ms.],tuncproductio
[subiectivo
generado
quiaessetde nonessesimpliciter
[velessetvereadd.].Patetperdefinitionem
generationis,
etpropter
Et ideoaccidens
hoceiusproductio
ad essesimpliciter.
nonestenssimpliciter
vel
valdeproprie
dicitur
alterado,
quiaresnonperhoceritin esse,sedres,que preerat
hocdicitur
alterado."
unumesseetposteaaliudesseetpropter
erat,habebat
prius
45See Aristotle,
, IV.9.217a33-b8.
Physics
46The English
fromTheComplete
Works
translation
is derived
, TheRevised
ofAristotle
Vol. 1,NewJersey/Oxford
Translation
1991,369.
Barnes,
, ed.Jonathan
Oxford

18:14:48 PM

266

ST. KIRSGHNER

become hot thatwas not hot when the thingwas less hot;just as, if the
arc or curve of a greatercircle becomes that of a smaller,whetherit
remainsthe same or becomes a different
curve,convexityhas not come
of
in
to exist anythingthat was not convex but straight(fordifferences
of the quality);nor can we get
degree do not depend on an intermission
in
a
which
both
heat
and whitenessare not preof
flame,
any portion
sent." With referenceto thispassage Oresme shows that the quantityof
a substanceor a qualitylike whitenessis no independently
inherentform,
it is true,but neverthelessit is not identicalwith the substanceeither.
The reason is thataccordingto the cited passage the same is trueof the
or albedoof a body, and it cannot be
circuitas
of a circleand the quantitas
circulo
nor would Aristotleconis a formainherens
imaginedthatthe circuitas
and circle are the same.47
cede that circuitas
Oresme oftenuses the term "condicio" or "modus" to characterizethe
ontologicalstatusof accidents.For him motion,to be in a place (essein
, are such condiciones
loco),and the quantityof a substance,its essetantam
.48In the questionson the intensionand remissionof qualitiesthe
or modi
term "condicio" or "modus" does not occur, but in Qu. 1.16 Oresme
rerum
countstheessealbumamongthecondiciones
significabiles.
affirmative
explicitly
The termjust mentioned,"condicionesrerumaffirmative
significabiles",
which Oresmes puts forindicatesa furthersubdivisionof the condiciones
betweencondiward in Qu. 1.15 and 1.16. In Qu. 1.15 he distinguishes
47Oresme
ofthediscussion
on thenature
of
occurs
in theframework
's argumentation
status
ofquanAs thethird
ofthree
different
viewson theontological
a body'squantity.
himself
towhich
hesubscribes
thefollowing
Oresme
(Qu.IV.15,46presents
opinion,
tity
necaliquaforma
nonestipsasubstantia
54): "Tertiavia estAristotelis
quodquantitas
et
ut tricubitam
scilicet
substantie,
talis,sed estquedamcondicio
ipsamessequantam,
ubiponit
veliein quartohuius[Aristoteles,
etistudvidetur
cetera,
IV.9.217a33-b5],
Phys^
modononestimagiad circulum;
ad subiectum
et de circuitate
de qualitate
exemplum
concederet
necetiamAristoteles
inherens
circulo
nandum
situna forma
quodcircuitas
in quibusconcedit
velrectitudo
et circuitas,
et circuitas
quod
quodidemessetcirculus
et aliudestessecurvum,
et ideo,ut aliasdictum
aliudestesserectum
est,ensdicitur
For
de substantia,
et de taliesseaccidentali."
de ilio,quodvereest,scilicet
equivoce
1997(op.t
ofquantitas
seeKirschner
onthenature
Oresme's
discussion
., above,n. 1),138Sicutaliquidestmagisetminus
inQu. V.9,71-77:"Quarto.
occurs
43.A similar
passage
sedquiafitactuillud,
tali
minus
rarum
aut
durum
sine
et
curvum,
compositione,
magis
ita
sicutpatetquartohuius[Aristoteles,
IV.9.217a33-bl6],
Phys.,
quoderatin potentia,
Aristoteles
inaliis,sicutalbedine,
videtur
calido,
ponit
quiasimilitudinem
nigredine,
frigido,
et etiamnullaratioprobatalbedinem
IV.9.217a33-b5],
Phys^
quartohuius[Aristoteles,
et
et etiame converso,
et raritate
essealiuda substantia
quinprobathocde curvitate
voluntarium."
et raritas
<non>'estdictum
'albedoestunaforma
ideodicimus
quod
48See Kirschner
1997(op.
cit.,above,n. 1),52-61,73-6,121,141-2.

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ANDREMISSION
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ORESME
ON INTENSION

267

etnegdonesaffirmative
like "Sortemcurrere",condiciones
significabiles
affirmative
is called "rest"
ativelike"Sortemposse moveriet non moveri",whichcondicio
merenegative
like "Sortemnon currere".Naturallythe
(<quies
), and condiciones
conditionsto the purelynegdegreeof beingdeclinesfromthe affirmative
ative ones.49In Qu. 1.16 Oresme proposes a furthersubdivisionof the
and condiciones
relative.
absolute
affirmative
conditionsin condiciones
Amongthe
affirmative
conditionsOresme countsall the accidentswhichare acquired
perse by a motion,e.g. an alteration,and are not onlya sequel to motions.
The whitenessor the essealbumservesas an example. In contrastto this
and equality,whichare not
relativeconditionsare relationslike similarity
a
but
are
se
consequencesof motions.50
acquired per by motion,
Afterthisoutlineof Oresme's ontologyof accidentsattentionmustbe
drawn to a seriousproblemwhich arises fromhis view: if accidentsare
of the substance,it
not real accidentalforms,but only modior condiciones
is clear thatnot even God could separate themfromtheirsubject,since
or modiof a substancecan existwithit is not imaginablethat condiciones
out the substance.But thisstandsin contradictionto the wonder of the
Eucharistwhich happens in the momentof consecrationwhen the substance of the bread is changed into the substanceof the body of Christ,
while the bread's accidentsremain.
49Ms. Sevilla,
Biblioteca
7-6-30,
Qu. 1.15,f. llrb:"[...] est
Capitular
y Colombina,
sicutpatetprimohuius[...]:
unadistinctio
et equivoce,
quod'ens'dicitur
multipliciter
in thisquestion
whether
theprivation
is an
discusses
unomodoad propositum
[Oresme
talisquodunomodoaccipitur
'ens'proaliquoperse existente,
essedivisio
ens'potest
estens,sicutSor,et
<sicut>individuum
etsictotum
de genere
substantie
demonstratum,
Secundomodoaccipitur
'ens'vel'esse'proessenhoc,quiahabetoperationem
proprie.
velforma,
etsicdicuntur
essemateria,
tiaaliqua,sicutpropartesubstantie
manus
forma,
etalbedosecundum
communem
Tertiocapitur
viam,et istemoduspossetsubdividi.
pro
sicutest'Sortem
currere'.
sicutprocondicione
affirmativa,
complexe,
Quarto
significabili
affirmative
et negative,
verbigratia
procondicione
quasi<h>ypothetica
significabili
estquedamcondicio,
'Sor<tem>
etnonmoveri'
possemoveri
quedicitur
'quies',etomnis
extendi
ad condicionem
continetur
subistomodo.Ulterius
mere
possetlargius
privatio
<sicut'Sortem>
noncurrere'
vel'intellegentiam
nonmoveri'."
negativam,
50Ibid.,
estprimo,
utpatuit
inaliaquestione,
Qu. 1.16,f.1lva:"[. . .] notandum
<quod>
multi
suntgradus
etaliquod
illorum
membrorum
subdividi.
Suntenimquedam
entis,
potest
rerum
affirmative
etdplices,
condiciones
etper
significabiles,
quiaquedamsuntabsolute
sicutestalbedovelessealbum,
et sicde aliis.Aliesuntrelase acquisibiles
permotum,
<et> equalitas,
sicutsimilitudo
nonperse,sedcontive,
quesuntacquisibiles
permotum,
sicutpatetseptimo
huius[Aristoteles,
et
secutive
., VII.3.246blO-17],
Phys
peraccidens,
alierespectu
sicutpotenillarum
sicutpaternitas,
futuri,
quedamsuntrespectu
presents,
coniuncta
starecumforma,
et
tia,et ideoquedamestpotentia
actui,qua materia
potest
de quadicitCommentator
aliaestseparata,
formam,
quapotest
recipere
quodcorrumpitur
in a<d>ventuforme.
Secundonotandum
estquodcondiciones
absolute
magisproprie
referred
tointhefirst
notabile
dicuntur
essequamrelative
("utpatuit
[. . Thedistinction
footnote.
in aliaquestione")
is thedistinction
citedin theprevious

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268

ST. KIRSCHNER

Oresme touchesthis problem only verybrieflyand in passing at the

whetheran accidentcould
end of Qu. 1.6, wherehe discussesthe dubitatio
be separatedfromthe substance:
Et quia
a substantia.
essetseparabile
accidens
Ultimadubitatio
possetesseutrum
ideo
et ipsehocnegat,
ut mihividetur,
philosophum,
posuiistamviamsecundum
contradictionem
nonimplicaret
etforte
naturaliter
hocestnegandum
quod
loquendo,
sicut
nihil
essetalbum,
essealbumessetettarnen
quodessealbumSor<tis>remaneret
miraculum.51
et
hoc
non
per
permanente,
ipso
So Oresme firstrefersto Aristotleforthe propositionthatunder natural
conditionsaccidentscannot be separated fromthe substance("ista via"
means Oresme's own view). But this was held also by those who consideredaccidentsas real accidentalforms.Of much more interestis the
question,whetheraccidents could be separated at least supernaturally,
But concerningthisproblemOresme only
that is by Gos intervention.
it
that
declares
perhaps would implyno contradictionthat an esse
briefly
albumwould exist althoughnothingwould be white,e.g. that by a miracle the essealbumof Sortes would remain while Sortes himselfwould
not. Oresme's vague answer,introducedby "forte",is by no means satand his evidentlack of interestin thiscentralproblemis striking.
isfying,
The problematicaspects of Oresme's view on accidentsbecome even
clearer before the backgroundof the condemnationby which in 1347
the Universityof Paris declared 41 thesesofJohannesde Mirecourtas
errors.Article27 read as follows:"Quod probabile est in lumine naturali non esse accidentia,sed omnem rem esse substantiam,et quod, nisi
essetfides,hoc essetponendumet potestprobabiliterponi."52The problem whichis touchedupon in thisarticleis the same as describedabove.
If one holds that in realitythere are no accidents,but only substances,
it is logicallyimpossibleand thereforecannot be broughtabout even by
God, that in the Eucharistthe bread's accidentsremain afterthe tranof the bread into the body of Christ.
substantiation
Oresme did not identifyaccidentswith the substance,it is true,but
as describedabove, his own view involvesthe same probnevertheless,
51Ibid.,Qu. 1.6,f.4vab.
52In theedition
Parisiensis
Universitatis
Chartularium
andE. Chatelain,
, Paris
byH. Denifle
it wasarticle
vol.II, 611,thisis article29. Originally
27, butafter1347
1889-1897,
condemnation
from
another
which
stemmed
articles
addedfurther
ofOrvieto
(see
Ugolino
der
zurNaturphilosophie
undMechanik
A. Maier,Zwischen
, Roma1958(Studien
Philosophie
deMirecourt,
desJean
Diezwei
96;Friedrich
Apologien
Stegmller,
5),331,footn.
Sptscholastik,
5 (1933),43, 201).The edition
et mdivale,
ancienne
de Thologie
in: Recherches
by
list.
is basedupontheamplified
andChatelain
Denifle

18:14:48 PM

ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ON INTENSION
ORESME

269

lems withregardto the Eucharistand thus will also have been affected
by the condemnation.Hence it is probable that Oresme's Commentary
on the Physics
was composed beforethe condemnationof 1347.53
and remission
3. Oresme's
to theproblem
ownsolution
ofintension
ofqualities:
succession
ofcondiciones
Oresme does not confinehimselfto a discussionof the threetheoriesdescribedin sectionI. For him the above-mentionedadditiontheoryis only
the secondbest solution.Hence A. Maier was wrongto statethatOresme
additiontheory.54
subscribestotallyto the usual scotistic-occamistic
Rather,
him is the most reasona
for
Oresme argues for fourthopinion,which
able and simplestof all55and which he probablydeveloped himself.56
In Qu. V.6 Oresme gave the followingbriefaccount of the fourth
opinion:
suntsimulnecestibimedium
nisi
Quartaest,utcredo,
quodnullomodocontraria
inrespectu,
solum
sicutinter
etdeorsum,
etinquolibet
sursum
instanti,
quoestaltertertia
sednonsicutimaginatur
atio,estnovum
accidens,
opinio.57
The expression"sed non sicutimaginaturtertiaopinio" refersto Burley's
view that in everymomentof an intensionor remissionthereis a new
accidentalform.The fourthopinionis discussedin Qu. V.9 and may be
characterizedby the following:
1. Qualitieswhichare commonlyconsideredas accidentalforms,such as
heat and cold, are no such forms.Rather,theyare nothingelse but the
taleesseof the substance,e.g. whitenessis nothingelse but the essealbum.
Oresme adds thatcommon sense givesus the same idea if it is not used
to the contrary.
53Maierhadalready
cometothisconclusion;
seeDie Vorlufer
Galileis
im14.Jahrhundert
,
2nded.,Roma1966(= Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
derSptscholastik,
1),323.
54Gf.Maier1968(op.cit
top. 86).
., above,n. 3),358(addition
55Oresme
thatin comparison
whichhe considered
states
withthefirst
as the
theory,
bestamong
thefirst
three
is morereasonable
andsimpler
thefourth
theory
(Qu.
opinions,
et facilior
"Secundo
sciendum
nec
V.9, 157-162):
quodquartaopinioestrationabilior
facere
unusgradus
autqualiter
autgeneratur
difficultates,
oportet
qualiter
prius
corrumpitur
sunt
sediuxtaearnaliquid
secundum
intendi
nonestnisiaccedere
simul,
aliquam
qualitatem
etapproximari
ad summum,
si estdaresummum,
velquodilludfiatmagistale,etremitti
estfieri
minus
taleet recedere
illamqualitatem."
ab esseperfecto
secundum
56Compare
Biblioteca
themarginal
notinthehandofthemanuscript
note,
(Ms.Sevilla,
f.60ra):
nicolaior[..
Colombina,
7-6-30,
Capitular
y
"quarta
oppinio
57Qu. V.6,49-52.

18:14:48 PM

270

ST. KIRSCHNER
Probatur
intercontraria.
Tuncestprimaconclusio
quodnullaestveracompositio
etcaliditas
etCommentatoris
etcetera
non
dictis
Aristotelis
albedo
quod
primo
quiaexmultis
patet
nonestaliudquam
esse
sunt
talesresettales
immo
albedo
skutcommuniter
forme
imaginatur,
album
etiam
datsensus
naturalis
ad oppositum'
nonconsuetus
, sicut
ergononestibialiqua
velplurium,
taliscompositio
duarum
rerum
quiaunaresnonhabetnisiunumesse
subunogenere,
sicutessecoloratum.58

This briefremarkby Oresme on the ontologicalstatusof qualitieslike

whitenessand heat is intendedas a reminderratherthan an independent account of his specificontologyof accidents.But it is understandable that Oresme does not go into detail here, since he has already
expounded his ontologyof accidentsin book I. Moreoverhe has already
applied his ideas to severalproblemsof naturalphilosophy,such as the
natureof motionand quantity.59
2. Intermediatequalitiesbetween contraries,such as lukewarm,are not
composed of the contraries in this case cold and heat but are just as
In one of the proofsforthisconunmixedand simpleas the extremes.60
clusion Oresme draws on an analogy to local distances,comparingthe
contrarietas
between hot and cold to the contrarietas
localisbetween
formalis
the
and
below
and
that
medium qualabove (sursum
)
(deorsumf1 arguing
between
hot
and
cold
as
and
is
ity
simple as the middle
uncomposed
place between above and below.62From this it followsthat thereis no
real medietas
, but onlya relativeone, as in the case of proportions.Oresme
this
by an example: lukewarmis more similarto hot than cold is
proves
to hot and also more similarto cold than hot is to cold, so thatwe have
the same situationas in the case of the local distancebetweenabove and
below,wherethe mediumis called above withrespectto below and below
with respectto above.63

58Qu. V.9,55-61(italics
mine).
59See
Kirschner
1997(<
., above,n. 1),52-76,138-43.
op.cit
60See thefirst
conclusion
cited.
just
61"Above"meanstheregion
oftheelefireand"below"theregion
oftheelement
mentearth.
62Qu. V.9,61-67:"Sicutestincontrarietate
ad hocimaginandum
locali,itaquantum
etdeorsum
cominter
sursum
nonestmagis
estincontrarietate
sedlocusmdius
formali;
habet<minus>de locoin medioquam
necetiammobile
quamlocusextremus,
positus
et
unaestsursum
etaliadeorsum
inextremis
nechabetduasvelocitates,
partialiter
quarum
inter
calidum
etfrigidum."
immo
estimaginario
eteodemmodoestde medio
remisse,
ficta,
63Qu. V.9,78-92:"Secunda
etmedietas
non
conclusio
estquodibinonestcompositio
<est>vera,sedrelativa
etinaliis.Hocprobatur:
sicutinproportionibus
solum,
<tepidum>
ex quo concludo
et etiamfrigido
estsimilius
calidoquamsitfrigidum
quamsitcalidum,
etdeorsum,
unde
<inter>sursum
sicutindistinctione
quodomnino
quoadhocestsimile
deoralterius
dicitur
sursum
et respectu
uniusdicitur
illud,quodestin medio,respectu

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ANDREMISSION
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ON INTENSION
ORESME

271

3. In everymomentof such an intensionor remissionthereis a new tale

esse
, but no new accidentalform,as Burleyheld.
velaliud
inquolibet
instand
estnovum
estquod,dumestalterado,
Tertiaconclusio
mobileestin alioet in alio
sicutedamin motulocalicontinue
et aliudaccidens;
habetaliudessequale,nec ex hoc
locoet habetaliudessein loco,ita similiter
turtalesresveltalesforme.64
resgenerentur,
quianonimaginan
sequitur
quodinfinite
It is understandablethatOresme considersthe fourthopinionas the simplest of all, since it is easy to imagine how in the case of an intension
new taleesseand thusapproaches
ofa qualitythesubjectacquirescontinually
the maximumof this quality,providedthat there is such a maximum,
All the
while in a decrease of intensityit departsfromthe maximum.65
of
a
or
of
new
from
an
addition
quality
parts degrees
problemsarising
to an already existingaccidental formof this quality are thus avoided.
In the same way it can be explained how the intensionof one quality
entailsthe remissionof its contrary,since the mediumqualityis denoted
withrespectto both contraries,so thatthe approach to one contrarynecOresme furtherstatesthat,as
essarilyinvolvesrecedingfromthe other.66
it is the substancethat has in everymomenta new taleesse
, e.g. a new
that
the
whiteness
is
intensified.
be
said
it
albumesse
cannot
,
Only
properly
tur".67
it can be admittedto say "albedo intendi
forreasonsof breviloquentia
omnesauctoritates,
Et perhocpossunt
sum,sicuttepidum.
que sonant
quodibi
glossari
admitti
mathematicorum
et ad modm
sitcompositio
veledamproportio,
quodin
potest
velsic,nonquodibisint
caliditatis
et quattuor
frigiditatis
aliquocalidosuntsexgradus
etdeorsum>
inter
sursum
se <distincte,
sedsicutindistinctione
dueresvel10secundum
etper6 a sursum;
ideohabere6 caliditates
distat
a deorsum
dicimus
quodperquattuor
insummo.
dicoquodsicut
a caliditate
Iuxtahocedamcorollarie
estdistantia
perquattuor
ita edamimaginandum
estin aliiscontrariis,
estnobilior
locussursum
quamdeorsum,
Aristoteles
sicutinnuit
et gravitas
et densitas,
assimilatur
deorsum
ideofrigiditas
primo
1.3.340b19-21]."
methaurorum
[Aristoteles,
Meteorologica,
64Qu. V.9,93-97.
65See thepassagecitedabove(footn.
55).
66Qu. V.9, 162-167:
utrum
secundum
hocexponendum
esttitulus
"Tertio
questionis,
ad unumconet cetera,
id est,si aliquidpossitaccedere
unumcontrarium
intendatur
ab alteroet secundum
illudfiat
trarium
et fierimagistale,quin[quandoMs.]recedit
et quosecundum
minustale,quia,dumestin medio,denotatur
utrumque
respective
sicutetiamaerdiciutpatetquintohuius[Aristoteles,
., V.1.224b32-35],
dammodo,
Phys
etdeorsum
tursursum
diversimode."
67Qu. V.9,167-175:
intennullaqualitas
"Exhocinfero
quodproprie
loquendo
quarto
conditur.
Patet,quiaetiamnondicitur
quodalbedofiatmagisalbedo,sedsubiectum
estprius,
velremissius
intensius
tinue
denotatur
tale,sicutmagisalbum,
quia,sicutdictum
et essealbumintensius,
sicutde
nonestidemnecin totonecinparteessealbumtaliter
etideoilladifficultas
nonestidemesseiniliolocoetmagis
locosursum
etdeorsum
sursum,
autadveniens
intendatur
utrum
albedopreexistens
estex ficta
qua queritur
imaginatione,
id
admittatur
autcomposita
ex illis,quiapropter
quodalbedointenditur,
breviloquentiam
est'illudfitmagisalbum'."

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272

ST. KIRSCHNER

With his well-elaboratedtheoryOresme succeeds in avoidingnumerous ontologicalproblemsand neutralizingsome disputesconcerningthe

simultaneousexistenceof contraryqualities and theirreciprocalbehaviour duringintensionand remission.Thus the statementthatintermediate qualities between contrariesare not composed of these contraries
makes the questionof the simultaneousexistenceof contrariesfromthe
startirrelevant.
In particular,Oresme's specifictheoryof the ontologicalstatusof accidentsprovesto be veryusefulin the problemof intensionand remission
of qualities.Since forOresme the qualitieswhichare to be intensified
or
remittedare not accidentalforms,that is, not real things(res),but only
condiciones
or modes of the substance,he need not fearthe objectionthat
in the course of an intensionor remission,duringwhich thereare continuallynew intensitiesof qualities,an infinitenumber of thingswould
be generated.In contrastto thisBurley'ssuccession-of-forms
theory,accordto
in
which there is
ing
every momentof an intensionor remissiona
new accidentalform,while the formerceases to exist,is subject to this
betweenBurley'sand Oresme's view
objection.This importantdifference
is alreadyindicatedby a remarkin Qu. 1.6, one of the questionswhere
Oresme expoundshis theoryof the ontologicalstatusof accidents.Oresme
there brieflyspeaks about the problem of intensionand remissionand
becomes
book,namelythat,whensomething
anticipatesa resultof thefifth
in
it
has
instant
a
new
esse
album.
remarked
that
whiter,
every
Having
could
be
raised
many arguments
against this view and that Burley
("Gualterus")solved them,Oresme adds that Burleywould have solved
themstillmore easilysecundum
istamviam(by "ista via" Oresme means his
own theoryof the ontologicalstatusof accidents).68
Indeed, Oresme is in
an advantageousposition,since with his "succession-of-condiciones
theory" he can hold a successiontheory(the additiontheoryis forOresme,
as we have seen, only the second best solution)withouthavingto admit
the disadvantagesof Burley'ssuccession-of-forms
theorywhich operates
with accidentalforms.
betweenOresme's and Burley'spositionthereis
Amongthe differences
stillanotherpoint which is of some interest.In holdingthat intermediate qualitiesbetweencontrariesare not composedof the contrariesOresme
68Ms. Sevilla,
Biblioteca
b:"[. . .] ideo,
7-6-30,
Capitular
y Colombina,
Qu. 1.6,f.4ra
dicitur
intendi
velfieri
continue
habetaliudetaliudesse
magisalbum,
quandosubiectum
estaliudessealbumintense,
<et> aliudestessealbumremisse,
nec
undetotaliter
album,
essent
contra
solvit
unumcomponitur
ex alio.Modomulterationes
hoc,sedGualterus
istamviam."
eas et adhucsolve
retfacilius
secundum

18:14:48 PM

ON INTENSION
ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ORESME

273

is of thesame opinionas Burley.However,thereis a remarkabledifference

concerningthe questionwhetherand how the contrariesand the intermediatequalitiesdifferon the species level. For Oresme contraryqualitieslike cold and heat belong to the same genusproximum
, forwhichthere
is no comprisingterm.69
Concerningthe subdivisionof thegenusproximum
into speciesOresme is undecided. He mentionsthreealternatives:it can
eitherbe statedthat in everymomentof an alterationfromcold to hot
thereis a new speciesor thatmaximumhot and maximumcold are two
separate species and the whole intermediaterange a thirdone, which
differs
secundum
magisetminus.The thirdalternativeis to regardlukewarm
as one speciesand the whole rangefromlukewarmto maximumhot and
fromlukewarmto maximumcold as two otherspecies.70
As thispassage shows,Oresme obviouslydid not want to go so faras
Burleydid, who clearlystated in his "tractatusprimus"71that contrary
qualitieslike heat and cold, whitenessand blacknessand so on belong
to the same speciesspecialissima
;72in fact,for Burleycold is nothingelse
than lack of heat.73Though Oresme's second of the above mentioned
69Qu. V.9, 175-180:
sunteiusdem
"Quintosequitur
quodcontraria
generis
proximi,
sicutcolores,
et cetera,
in quibusdam
nonsitnomenimpositum,
sicut
quamvis
sapores
caliditas
<et> frigiditas;
nonhabetnomen
etestdifferentia
inter
genuseorum
impositum,
etcontrarie,
estpersenegatione,
sicutsilentium
privative
opposita
quiaprivado
significabilis
estnonsonare,
natural
doesnotknowany
ergo."IndeedAristotelian-scholastic
philosophy
term
like"temperature"
which
wouldcomprise
thephenomena
ofcoldandheat.
general
70Oresme's
remarks
occuras an answer
to thefollowing
dubitatio
(Qu. V.9,98-100):
"Sedad declarationem
huiusdubitatur
iliacontraria
et mediadifferunt
primo,
qualiter
et quandodebetdicicalidum
et quandofrigidum."
Oresme
specieet quandointenditur
"Adprimam
diciquodsemper,
dumintenditur
calidireplies
(Qu. V.9, 113-123):
potest
sicutin quantitate,
dumaliquidaugetur,
estsemper
continue
tas,estaliaet aliaspecies,
in aliaspecie,
est
., III.5.206a3-5]
quiadicitAristoteles
[Aristoteles,
Phys
quodbicubitum
aliaspecies
a tricubito,
et itadiceretur
de distantia
localiinter
sursum
etdeorsum.
Aliter
diciquod,sicutsursum
estunaspecies
etdeorsum
ettotum
intermedium
estalterius
potest
differens
itade calido,frigido
secundum
et medio.Adhucpotest
speciei
magiset minus,
dicialiterquodtepidum,
in medio,estunaspecieset totum
adversus
quodestomnino
calidum
estaliaetversus
latitudinem
secundum
alia,etillamediahabent
frigidum
magis
etminus
sicutestde proportione
et <ex> hocpatet,
inequalitatis,
quandohocdebetdici
calidum
et quandonon."
71Forthe
motives
which
ledBurley
to compose
thistractandforitsmajorcontents
seeSylla1991(op.cit
M. de Rijk,Burley's
So-called
Tractatus
., above,n. 13),70-95;Lambertus
an Edition
"Utrum
contradicho
sitmaxima
, with
Quaestio
primus
"9in:
oftheAdditional
oppositio
34 (1996),161-91.
Vivarium,
72See theedition
ofBurley's
"tractatus
in Sylla1991{op.cit.,
above,n. 13),
primus"
483-520
(fourth
conclusion).
[471-520],
73See Burley,
"Tractatus
above,n. 72),p. 491:"Dicoergoquodcalor
{ed.cit.,
primus"
et frigus,
albedoet nigredo
et universaliter
omniacontraria
que habentfierisuccessive
circaidemsubiectum
ensinactusunteiusdem
Etdicoquodfrigiditas
speciei
specialissime.
adistud
etabsolutum
infrigiditate
nonestnisicaliditas
remissa."
quantum
quodestpositivm

18:14:48 PM

274

ST. KIRSCHNER

alternatives
approachesBurley'spositionit was onlyBurleywho definitely
traditionalview that cold and heat are separate entities.
the
rejected
It is uncertainwhetherOresmeknewBurley's"tractatus
primus"inwhich
the latterexpounded his view of the specificunityof contraries.But it is
quite obviousthatOresme was familiarwithBurley's"tractatussecundus",
as the discussionin Qu. V.7 shows, since nearly all of the arguments
raised thereagainst the additiontheorycan be foundin Burley's"tracIt is therefore
tatussecundus".74
quite probablethatOresme knewBurley's
"tractatusprimus" as well. And even if he did not, he certainlyknew
about Burley'sexceptionalview, as is indicatedby the followingremark
in Qu. V.8: "et ideo dixeruntaliqui quod contrariasunteiusdemspeciei".75
To summarize:in treatingthe problem of intensionand remissionof
qualities,which belonged to the fundamentalproblemsof medievalnatural philosophy,Oresme applies his specifictheoryof accidents,according to which a qualityis nothingelse than the taleesseof the substance,
of the substance,but not a real accidentalform.
which is only a condicio
For Oresme the addition theoryis only the second best solution.He
prefersanother view, developed probably by himself,which could be
-condiciones
called "succession-of
theory",accordingto whichin everyinstant
of an intensionor remissionthereis a new taleesse
, thatis a new condido.
Oresme thus succeeds in avoidinga major problemwithwhich Burley's
succession-of-forms
theoryis confronted.While the succession-of-forms
theoryimpliesthatduringan alterationan infinitenumberof things,the
accidentalforms,is generated,Oresme need not fear thisobjectionsince
or modirank on a far lower ontologicallevel than accidental
condiciones
forms.However, although Oresme did not identifyaccidentswith the
have
substance,article27 of the condemnationof 1347 will nevertheless
also been applicable to his own view on the ontologicalstatusof accidents,so that his theoryon the intensionand remissionof qualitieswas
deprivedof its ontologicalbasis.
Mnchen
derNaturwissenschaften
Institut
fr Geschichte
Mnchen
Universitt
Ludwig-Maximilians-

74Forthereferences
1997(<
seeKirschner
., above,n. 1),402-5.
op.cit
75Qu. V.8, 134-135.

18:14:48 PM

Reviews
etduMoyen
La sirne
dansla pense
etdansl'artdel'Antiquit
Age.
Leclercq-Marx,
Jacqueline
ClassedesBeauxchrtien
Du mythe
, Acadmie
Royalede Belgique,
paenau symbole
ISBN 2-803
1-153-X
Brussels
1997;XI + 373p.; 188+ 178illustrations
Arts,
us withmanyfascinating
reliefs
on capitals,
etc.,stillpresents
sculpture,
Romanesque
in comtheir
Gothicimages,
that,so far,havenotyetyielded
precise
meaning.
images
us.
Thus
the
Gothic
ofa
understandable
to
more
human
and
more
seem
image
parison,
saintis represented,
comes
evenifwe cannot
at oncesaywhichparticular
saint,
always
The monsters
acrossas a human
episodes.
being;thesameis trueforGothicnarrative
to come
andhybrid
so often
seenin Romanesque
creatures
seem,in contrast,
sculpture
to us.Thereare,of
a worldthatliesin thedistant
from
pastandthatis unintelligible
as e.g.gardevils
orjustmonstrous
forms
Gothic
buttheyareclearly
course,
monsters,
thewallsofa Gothiccathedral.
which
werecreated
to leadtherainwaterfrom
goyles
withthemostfantastic
combinaButwhatdo all thosedifferent
creatures
Romanesque
are notalways
and
mean?Theysurely
devilswhohavecometo tempt
tionsofforms
menandwomen.
Christian
frighten
creature
The sirenis onesucha Romanesque
thatis stillintriguing
us. It is thereas
of Santo
cloister
a magnificent
birdwomanon somecapitalsof thefamous
alluring
faceandwith
de SilosinSpain,oras a hideous
repulsive
beingwitha ferocious
Domingo
itstaillegsapartas on a capitalin thecathedral
ofModenain Italy.Theyarereprewitha female
ofa bird.The
sented
as beings
upperhalfanda lowerhalfin theform
as a fishtail,eventwotails.Thoughtheupperpart
lowerhalfis alsooften
represented
is mostly
malesalsooccur.
female,
ofthe
The sceneofOdysseus
boundto themastofhisshipto resist
theallurements
willalsobe wellknown
is wellknown.
The fishsirens
to those
songsofthebirdsirens
whohavevisited
theRomanesque
churches
ofe.g.Burgundy.
We comeacrosssirens
not
andminiabutalsoin otherartforms
suchas mosaics
onlyin Romanesque
sculpture,
inliterary
wecanreadaboutthem
texts
andreligious
tracts.
tures.
Further
Leclercq-Marx
in an all comprehensive
dealswithall thesesirens
andveryexhaustive
study.
In the"Introduction"
theauthor
follows
thelineofsuch
literally
saysthatherstudy
theUniandart,as on Galatea(byH. Drrie),
letters
studies,
comprehensive
combining
corn(byJ.Einhorn)
orAlexander's
ascencin
Shefurther
takesas
(byCh.Settis-Frugoni).
herexamples
authors
whotriedto showthesurvival
oftheantique
thefamous
godsin
E. Panofsky,
theMiddleAgesandtheRenaissance,
suchas K. Weitzmann,
W. Oakshott,
AndI mustsay,thereader
willnotbe disappointed.
We haveherea
F. Saxlandothers.
notbe
thatonecanandwillconsult
veryrichstudy
againandagainandthatwillsurely
fora longtimetocome.
superseded
In thefirst,
The workis divided
intofourchapters.
"D'Homer Hygin.Sourcedu
theattention
is on thefirst
sirens
as mentioned
thme",
byHomerandtheirinfluence.
Cleardescriptions
oftheirform
halfwomanhalfbird,comelaterthanthe
as hybrids,
first
sometimes
is already
a fish
vases.In theearlyphasesthere
depictions,
e.g.on Greek
inphilowitha woman's
Theirmeaning,
as expressed
head,butbirdsirens
predominate.
andhistorical
canbe bothevilandpositive.
occur
texts,
Theyoften
sophical,
mythological
infunerary
as attendants
contexts
ofthesoul.Gradually
theyaremoreandmoreseenas
withtheauthor
badqualities
anditis as temptors
ofthetruth,
Tseudo-Heraclites',
having
thatthey
intheMiddleAges.Yettheynever
as symbols
disappear
gaina widespreading
ofphysical
attractions.
In a secondchapter,
chrtiennes
"Desorigines
dessixpremiers
juivesauxconceptions
weseethat'siren'is usedas a
sicles.
Du demondu dsert
au symbole
de la tentation",
Vivarium
, 38,2

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

18:14:58 PM

276

REVIEWS

translation
oftheOld Testament
demonfigure
ofLilith.
Yetin late-antique
artandliterature
thepositive
remain
to be seen.In patristic
textswe see thatantique
qualities
and poetsare equatedwithsirens,
whichshouldbe avoided
rhetoricians,
philosophers
becauseof therefined
buthollowphrases
theyuse.Sirensare also dealtwithin the
and laterthebestiaries,
wherein themanymoralinterpretations
ofanimals
Physiologus,
thataregivensomenewideascropup in so faras sirens
aresometimes
as
interpreted
ofheresy
andareseenas expressions
ofantifeministic
ideas.In thischapter
we
symbols
alsocomeacrossthefirst
in a clearly
ofsirens
Christian
context:
on a Coptic
depictions
relief
from
ofthefourth
in the
or fifth
century
Herakleiopolis
Magna-Ahman
preserved
in Recklinghausen,
Ikonen-Museum
It concerns,
twosirens
Germany.
strangely
enough,
witha fishtailcarrying
crosses
on a necklace.
The third
"Du VIIeau Xe sicles.
traces
formes
anciens,
nouvelles",
chapter,
Concepts
ofthebirdsirento thefishsiren.
the.transition
Thefirst
fishsirenin theChristian
West
to occurin an IrishorAnglo-Saxon
Liber
is paid
Monstrorum
ofc. 800.Attention
appears
toa possible
connection
between
ofsea creaCopticandIrishartandtheomnipresence
inCelticculture.
tures
themythographical,
andsymbolic
allusions
remain
Although
literary
connected
as theyarewithwaterghosts.
The iconograpagan,themorphology
changes,
to occur,asfemmes
continue
andjustas Roman
physeemsto waver.Birdsirens
fatales
butthefishsirenis moreandmoregetting
theupperhand.
ornaments,
The lastandlongest
"XIe-XIFsicles.
l'heroine
Du symbole
antifministe
chapter,
first
dealswiththecontinuing
existence
ofbothforms
nexttoeachother
compatissante",
as wellas oftheseveral
ofthese.The medieval
interpretations,
good,bad or a mixture
innovations
areseenin themorerealistic
thatonehasactually
as creatures
forms,
seen,
oras 'sirnes
creatures
from
farunknown
butwithhuman
compatissantes',
strange
regions
traits.
The secondpartofthechapter
dealswithall thekindsofsirens
that
extensively
aretobe seeninRomanesque
thedistribution
ofdifferent
acrossdifferent
sculpture,
types
andthemorphological
to thedifferent
artforms.
The manyillustraregions
adaptations
tionsin thebook,188dispersed
in thetextandan extra178in a supplement
arehere
The thoroughness
in theexplanation
ofthemanyliterary
texts
in theforveryhelpful.
merpartofthestudy
is matched
herebythesoundattention
thatis paidtotypically
arthistorical
ofform
andmaterial.
aspects
In theoldchurch
ofOurLadyat Maastricht
inTheNetherlands
in
there
is a capital
theapsewiththedepiction
oftwomalebirdsirens
in twigs.
Theyareholding
entrapped
a fishin oneanda shieldin theotherhandandtheyareopposedto eachother
as in
In a recent
combat.
extensive
E. denHartog("In themidstofnations
. . . The
article
ofthechoircapitals
in thechurch
ofOurLadyin Maastricht",
iconography
Z^chrift
fur
thesemalesirens
as "symboliz(ing)
62 (1999),pp. 320-365)
Kunstgeschichte
heresy
interprets
or unorthodoxy"
ofheresy
andun(p. 336)."Theywarntheonlooker
dangers
against
is a purely
withthe
one,dealing
orthodoxy"
study
(p. 338).Den Hartog's
iconographical
Maastricht
to theexclusion,
ofpractically
all
capitalseries,
exceptfora fewminiatures,
othercomparable
theMaastricht
mentions
depictions.
Leclercq-Marx
capitaland even
The lastauthor
as
theMaastricht
sirens
reproduction.
givesa photographic
justtreats
sirens
sirens.
DenHartog's
strange
maybe coramongmanyother
strange
interpretation
butthepurely
doesnot
ofa very
restricted
series
ofcapitals
rect,
iconographical
approach
convince
thereaderas thestudy
is themorepersuaofLeclercq-Marx
does.The latter
ofa sculpted
sivebecause
ofitsbroadsurvey,
intoaccount
allkinds
ofaspects
taking
capofan everchanging
ofa particular
scene
ital,thelongtradition
idea,theiconography
and theinfluence
offact,
offormal
and material
oftheartform.
As a matter
aspects
ofsirens
andsculpted
as suchneveroccurin isolation.
depictions
capitals
Den Hartogmentions
an in-depth
An
on sirens
De sirenibus.
study
(S. de Rachewiltz,
intoSirens
Homer
toShakespeare
London
, GarlandPublishing
Inc.,NewYork/
from
inquiry
wasapparently
notknown
toLeclercq-Marx,
herbibliography
runs
1987),which
although
to35pagesoftides.
De Rachewiltz's
dealswith
texts
Dante,
study
mainly
literary
including

18:14:58 PM

REVIEWS

277

thechange
inwhich
on "Christian
buthasa chapter
andShakespeare,
Boccaccio
Sirens",
in theSacramentarium
His first
fishsirenis found
is treated.
intofishsirens
ofbirdsirens
ofthefourth
first
fishsirenis a Copticstonerelief
ofc. 780;Leclercq-Marx's
ofGellone
inthecreation
influence
Herideaofthegreat
as mentioned.
orfifth
Anglo-Saxon
century
On thewholethelatter
is notfoundwithDe Rachewiltz.
offishsirens
anddiffusion
Homeric
oftheoriginal
forms
as deviations
author
tends
toseemostlaterChristian
idea,
ofthesiren.
De Rachewiltz's
ofthepureantique
intent
as he is on thesurvival
concept
aresome
alsobecausethere
in thebookunderreview,
omission
a strange
remains
study
are
sirens
as
far
as
studies.
Yet
the
two
between
other
minor
Romanesque
discrepancies
as faras I cansee.
harmLeclercq-Marx's
doesnotseriously
theomission
concerned
study,
ofsirens,
It willbe hardto findrepresentations
ones,whichhave
sculpted
especially
in
as on a capital
I wouldsay,theycanbe found,
But,naturally
escaped
Leclercq-Marx.
roman
etsonsymbolisme
Lebestiaire
Belleville-sur-Sane
, Chtillon-sur-Chalaronne
(F.-P.Formas,
Deux-Svres
inSaint-Maixent,
(A.Tcherikover,
Romanesque
High
1998,p. 43),ona capital
c. 1090-1140
inthe
1998,plate17)oronpilgrim's
, Oxford
badges
Duchy
ofAquitaine
sculpture
1000laatmiddeleeuwse
enProfaan.
& A. Koldewey,
, Rotterdam
insignes
Heilig
(H.vanBeuningen
to knowthatnotso longago a wall
moreinteresting
It is probably
1993,pp.252-253).
from
before
inthewestporchofCorvey,
hasbeendiscovered
885,depictdating
painting
andSkyllaandwitha birdsirennextto it.Thisseemingly
inga scenewithOdysseus
undKultur
der
is interpreted
church
classical
scenein an earlymonastic
(seeKunst
purely
Paderborn
exhibition
LeoIII. In Paderborn,
undpapst
KarlderGrosze
catalogue,
Karolingerzeit.
hero.
ina general
1999,pp.583-585)
wayas a sceneofa virtuous
the
andthe366 illustrations
extensive
mentioned
Nextto thealready
'Bilbiographie'
andsome
desoeuvres
a 'Catalogue
a 'Tablede concordance',
bookcontains
reproduites'
willcertainly
be thehandbook
Thisvery
four'Indices'.
study
byLeclerc-Marx
stimulating
foryearstocome.
on medieval
sirens
Nijmegen

HarryTummers

A Social
Portrait.
CamintheEarly
Fourteenth
Parisian
Scholars
William
Century.
J. Courtenay,
in Medieval
Life
Studies
Press,1999,pp. xix+ 284 (Cambridge
University
bridge
4.
andThought
41) ISBN0 52164212
ofmoney
outa collection
ofPariscarried
In late1329or early1330theUniversity
topay1/2bursa
eachofwhomwasobliged
itsmembers,
from
, a bursa
beingthe
among
inquestion
wouldordinarily
theperson
sumofmoney
spendonfoodandas pocket-money
in a sillycase
weretocoverlitigation
ofthecollecta
in oneweek.Theproceeds
expenses
between
the
in a confrontation
andending
in a student's
rapeofa jongleuse
originating
withcolThepersons
entrusted
ofprinciple.
ofParisonmatters
andthebishop
university
menlived,notwheremanyuniversity
thedistricts
first
wentthrough
themoney
lecting
andwhattheypaid,iftheypaidon beingvisited
street
bystreet,
ingdownthepersons
Somelaterdaythosewhohadnotbeenat homeor hadnothadany
bythecollectors.
at a fixed
to thecollectors
themselves
occasion
cashreadyon thefirst
spotto
presented
themselves
and
in theordertheypresented
dues.Theirnameswereregistered
paytheir
withtheamount
paid.
from
a docureconstructed
hasconvincingly
thatWilliam
Suchis thestory
Courtenay
II of
involume
inprinciple
since1891whenitwaspublished
ment
thathasbeenknown
ThiscomParisiensis
Universitatis
Chartularium
Denifle
andChatelain's
famous
, atpp.661-671.
A major
andmoney
received.
ofstreets,
thecollectors'
contains
persons
registration
putus
in
the
14th
introduced
the
was
of
obstacle
to a correct
already
understanding computus
itwerepartly
whenthetwoquiresthatconstitute
misfolded,
disassembled,
partly
century
oftheEnglish
oftheproctor
to form
theregister
documents
andthenboundwithother
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2000

Vivarium,
38,2

18:14:58 PM

278

REVIEWS

and
Nation.
Denifle
andChatelain
didnotrealizethattheleaveshadbeendisarranged,
so published
a seriously
thefactbefore
disordered
text.Nobodyseemsto havenoticed
makesthetextmuch
whosere-edition
withtheoriginal
orderre-established
Courtenay,
morecomprehensible
anda muchmorevaluable
document.
historical
Now,forthefirst
itcanbe seentowhat
itreceives
a firm
dateofcomposition;
now,forthefirst
time,
time,
extent
itshowsthecomposition
oftheuniversity
andnow,forthefirst
(high)
population;
itcanbe usedas a mapofthescholars'
Paris.
time,
takeshisreaderwithhimfora guidedtouroftheQuartier
Latinofca.
Courtenay
tolivein
therouteofthecollectors.
He showsus howmasters
1330,following
preferred
ofrent-taxation
thecloseneighbourhood
oftheir
howthesystem
schools,
byhouserather
to whichmasters
thanbysmaller
unitswasintimately
linked
witha practice
according
a wholehouseandsupplemented
rented
theirmeagre
income
to students.
bysubletting
comHe investigates
theinstitution
ofuniversity
thegeographical
andsociological
collectae,
ofthebodyofscolares
us witha "Biographical
withthor, andprovides
register"
position
ofuniversity
members.
information
abouta largenumber
oughprosopographical
factsthatappearfromGourtenay's
and
reconstruction
Amongthemanyinteresting
a
of thecomputus
I maymention:
included
interpretation
(a) The university
population
ofrichpersons,
number
someofwhomwerenoblemen
whosurely
werenot
significant
actumeanteverto graduate,
taxation
basedon eachperson's
bursa
(b) The progressive
Whereas
mostcontributions
wereintherange1-3sous(1 soubeingtheminallyworked.
somewereof20 sousormore,
France
thelargest
imum),
(c)Also,whileNorthern
provided
from
there
wasnotonlya fairnumber
ofpersons
other
partoftheuniversity
population,
butalsoa noticeable
from
Northern
contingent
Italyandthe
partsofNorthern
Europe,
IberianPeninsula,
withtheSouthern
in thefaculty
of
groupmainly
occupied
European
medicine.
Thisis a richbookthatwillbe ofgreathelpto future
of
research
on theUniversity
in a clearandgoodEnglish
I haveonlya few
written
Paris,andit is,ofcourse,
style.
ofcriticism.
points
edendi
of
is thetotallackofinformation
abouttheratio
Mymostimportant
objection
thecomputus.
To whatextent
doesorthography,
and
paragraphing
punctuation,
spelling,
ofthe
two-dimensional
etc.correspond
Whatis thefunction
to theoriginal?
arrangement
- [. . .] ? Bylooking
I gathered
thematetheedition
thatusually
squarebrackets
through
rialin squarebrackets
oftheeditor's
consists
emendations
comments,
proposed
including
oftheimmediately
text.Butwhatam I todo withthefollowing
from
p. 218?
preceding
de Maulinea
Magister
Johannes
> 8 s. sol.
Dominus
de [Maulinea]J
Sigerus
I gather
that
thatinsomewaythemanuscript
indicates
JohnandSigerpaid(solverunt)
8 sous(solidos),
andthatthesumcovered
bothofthem.
ButI do notknowhowthemanbraces?
thatfact.Doesitcontain
similar
toCourtenay's
indicates
Quite
something
uscript
andonefrom
thesecondtermostlikely
onelinefrom
thefirst
entry
perhaps
possibly,
in a common
ofmoney
theindication
paid.Butthisis guessminating
point
justbefore
into
I trust
whichin theedition
hasbeentranslated
work.Anyhow,
thereis something
I amindeeper
withthesquarebrackets
in'Dominus
de [Maulinea]'.
braces.
waters
Sigerus
I knowthat,
scholars
usesquare
toEuropean
someAmerican
medieval
contrary
practice,
"dominus
brackets
forinsertions,
butamI toimagine
thatthescribe
wrote
sigerus
simply
which
theeditor
thensupplied?
de"andforgot
toaddthenameoftheplacefrom
where,
Or wasthetextwritten
in sucha waythatthereaderoftheoriginal
canseewhatthe
to "Magister
edition
doesnotshow,namely
that"Maulinea"
arc
koivo
Johannes
applies
de" andto "Dominus
de"?
Sigerus
butmoreimporTo mytastethebookcontains
toomuchrepetition
ofinformation,

18:15:07 PM

REVIEWS

279

in thewealth
ofinformation
aboutpersons
andplaces,thereaderis notwarned
tantly:
thattheauthor
hasnotbeenequally
meticulous
withall thepeoplementioned.
thecollectors
found
"Prior
Berdoniss
cum
Thus,in theViens
Ospitaliorum
amongothers
suisrebellibus"
and"Dominus
de Vombernk,
aliasde AltoMonte"(p. 226).In thesubis listedunder"students
de Vombernk
andmasters,
jectindexp. 284 dominus
foreign,
butneither
he northeprioroccursin thebiographical
or anywhere
German",
register
elsein thework.
Which
institution
wasthegoodpriorpriorof?"Berdoniss"
is noteasily
an abbreviated
In thatcase,
A misspelt
Or,morelikely,
interpretable.
genitive?
adjective?
= "ofBerdoues"
oneshould
read"Berdonensis"
ofAuch).
Andwhatdoes
(diocese
perhaps
+ sociis
"cumsuisrebellibus"
mean?A name+ cum
is usually
followed
, i.e.
bya numeral
"NNwithso manyboarders".
The explanation
in a footnote
on p. 226
maybe hidden
totheeffect
"Refused
topay,university
thatthescribe
hasaddedan "+" meaning
priva (secondary)
should
be suspended",
ofa sumpaidsuggests
thatafter
ileges
though
entry
a whiletheprior
hadbetter
So,"thepriorandhisrebels"
thoughts.
maymean"theprior
andhisboarders,
declined
toobeytheorder
tocontribute."
AsGourtenay
who,likehimself,
theLordofVombernk
hasrealized,
mustbe a misspelt
German.
Butwhere
didhe come
from?
The addition
Whatis hidden
under"Vombernk"?
"aliasde AltoMonte"suggests
hewasa "vonHohenberg"
Theidentification
ofthis
(inmodern
HighGerman
spelling).
is notdevoidofinterest,
forhe surely
wasnotjust
man,orat leastofa probable
origin,
hepaidtheenormous
contribution
of30 sous,bigger
anybody:
byan orderofmagnitude
thanthatofordinary
scholars!
Minorpoints:
On p. 10 theChartularium's
"ab Universitte
Paris."is quotedin theincorrect
form
"abUniversitte
Parisiense"
instead
of"ab Universitte
A similar
Parisiensi".
error
occurs
at p. 49 n. 1.
On p. 39 thecomputus
itself
is quotedas having
"coram
instead
ofthecorrect
portam"
"coram
thatoccurs
intheedition
thisas "before
porta"
p. 222.Courtenay
p. 39 translates
thegate"andseesthisas an indication
thatsometimes
thecollectors
received
from
money
scholars
butwholivedelsewhere.
I doubtthat.Atp. 222weread
theymetinthestreet,
"Dominus
GuidocoramPortaJacobi"and twoentries
later"Simonde Suciacum4
- obviously
sociispropeportam"
we in bothcaseshavean indication
ofaddress
"close
to PorteSt.Jacques",
himself
and,in fact,thisis theinterpretation
givenbyGourtenay
onp. 66.
Atp. 49 innote1 there
theunedited
is a quotation
from
ofNotreDame,startregister
le Fourbeur
filius
fuitabsolutus".
translates
ing"Item,
Johanninus
Johannis
Gourtenay
I propose
sonofJeanleFourbeur".
sonofJohannes,
leFourbeur".
'Johanninus,
"Johanninus,
A little
laterin thequotation
we read"iuravit
in curiaParisiense,
ubieratdetentus
in
eorum
EvenoHohicet Ivonede Gurianotariis
nostris
ad hoca nobis
presione
magistro
incuriaParisiens*',
Hereoneshould
read"iuravit
ubieratdetentus
inpresione,
deputati".
coram
EvenoHohicet Ivonede Curianotariis
nostris
ad hoca nobisdeputatii".
magistro
tomostnative
ofEnglish
doesnotanglicize
all medieval
Contrary
speakers
Courtenay
Christian
names.A French
willappearas "Jean"in thisbookrather
thanas
Johannes
Thiscourtesy
isnotextended
toother
nations
thantheFrench,
anditgoes
"John".
though,
toofarwhenpopeJohnXXII appears
as "JeanXXII" in note3 at p. 50, anditgoes
fartoofarwhen
Dacus(JohnofDenmark)
becomes
Johannes
"JeanDacus"on p. 172.
In vicoHarpethecollectors
Andreede Suetia,canonicus
"Otto,magister
registered
Londonensis
cum3 sociis"
toCourtenay's
edition
according
p. 221.On p. 69 thisis interas "magister
Ottoandhispupil,Andreas
ofSweden",
andon on p. 87 we read
preted
"Andreas
from
Sweden
wasoneofthree
orfour
students
withmaster
OttoofLund,
living
alsofrom
A footnote
Sweden".
on p. 87 callsattention
to thestrangeness
ofthemaster,
withhisstudent,
andsuggests
thatthis
Otto,beingidentified
Andreas,
byhisassociation
wasin somewaya prominent
maymeanthatAndreas
person
(repeated
p. 133).Thisis

18:15:07 PM

280

REVIEWS

so strange
it mustbe wrong.
thetownofLundandthesurroundthatI think
Further,
ofScaniadidnotbecomeSwedish
till1658,before
thatScaniawasDanish
ingprovince
and untilthereformation
in 1536theholderof thesee of Lundwasarchbishop
of
Denmark.
"ofLund"suggests
a closer
withthetownthanweneed
Moreover,
relationship
a canonofLundis mostlikely
tohavebeena Dane,buthe neednoteverhave
assume;
beento Lund.Finally,
in thecomputus
oftheform
, entries
"Name,title"
generally
signal
thattheperson's
status
is suchthathe is,or couldbe thought
to be,exempt
confrom
tribution.
Thusatp. 218'Johannes
deMolines,
nonscolares."
Beatus,
"Nicolaus,
Reginaldus
SanctiBenedicti".
On theotherhand,we findseveral
ecclesiastical
Johannes,
capellani
withtheirtitlealone,thus"Canonicus
unusde Carnoto"
dignitaries
registered
(p. 228),
"Archidiaconus
de Chalons"
tomethatwemaybe dealing
with
(p. 229).Allthissuggests
threepersons:
Andrew
ofSweden,
anda canonofLund.Admittedly,
this
Otto,master
leavesthegenitive
"Andree"
anditmeansthatwemustgiveupCourtenay's
unexplained,
tentative
identification
with
theAndreas
Freuati
deSmalandia
Swedish:
[a province
(Modern
in Southern
Swedenbordering
on thethenDanishScania],whoincepted
in
Smland)
ofthename"Andrew",
thelatter
factis no realobjection.
1339;butgiventhepopularity
To getridofthedifficulty
withthegenitive
we might
consider
thepossibility
thatonly
twopersons
arelisted:
OttoAndree
ofSwedenandthecanonofLund.In that
master
casethescribe
hadfirst
toenter
Otto'sacademic
itimmetide,buttheninserted
forgotten
after
theChristian
namebefore
thisis thenicest
diately
addingthepatronymic.
Perhaps
solution
sincethecomputus
usesa Christian
name(like"Otto")quitealonewithout
rarely
or toponymie.
tide,family
name,patronymic
Somewhere
thecollectors
an "Ancelmus
found
ifwe areto trust
medici",
Courtenay
Sincethismakes
nosense,
andsinceAnselm
(edition
p. 231,indexp. 263s.v.Anselmus).
is oneoutofeightpersons
whoarenotedto havepaid"simul
xvisol.","medici"
must
refer
to thewholegroup,
or at leastto Anselm
andthefourwhoprecede
himin the
A litdeabove,on thesamepage,wefinda morewealthy
in medicina"
group.
"magister
whopaid8 sousall byhimself.
notjustAnselm
butthewholeofhisgroupto
Adding
therepresentatives
ofmedicine
ofthefaculty
that
observation
onlyreinforces
Courtenay's
tradetended
tostick
whenitcametochosing
areas
peopleofthesameacademic
together
oflodging.
On p. 236 thecomputus
has"In domomagisti
Dachiisiiiisuntsocii".Now,
Johannes
in thefirst
mustbe an error.
On p. 172thepassageis citedwiththe
place,Johannes"
andCourtenay
thedotting
continues
ofthetwominims
in
"Johannis",
expected
"despite
"Dachiis"theentry
"is probably
a reference
to thecollegefounded
forscholars
from
Denmark
from
histestamentary
bymaster
JeanDacus,canonofSteGenevive
bequest
in October1275."Thiswasalsothetheory
ofHeinrich
i anden
Roos("Danske
filosoffer
halvdel
afdet13.rhundrede",
7 rk.6. bd.:497-519,
Kirkehistoriske
1968,at
Samlinger
we can readsomething
different
thanthe"Dachiis"
offered
p. 502),butunless
byboth
andDenifle
& Chatelain,
thetheory
mustbe dropped.
is no possi"Dachiis"
Courtenay
blewayofspelling
at thetimewouldbe pronounced
"Daci",which
[datsi],
[dasi]orthe
"Dachiis"
cannot
evenbe a dative
like,butnever[daki].Forthesamereason,
plural"for
Danes".Courtenay
seemsto think
thatin spiteofthetwodotsoverthei's,"Dachus"
couldbe meant.
Thatwouldbe an unusual,
butunderstandable,
variant
orthographical
of"Dacus"(pronounced
caretoindicate
taken
that
, butnotonlyhasthescribe
[dakus])
he meant"ii"andnot"u",thenominative
"Dacus"makes
no sense.So, muchas I hate
to losefourcompatriots,
I think
"Dachiis"
mustbe master
vernacular
John's
(andthereforeundeclined)
I cannottellwhichlanguage
it comesfrom.
It is
name,though
family
notlikely
tobe Danish.
StenEbbesen

Copenhagen

18:15:07 PM

BooksReceived
A Medieval
SummaZoologica.
Translated
Albertus
OnAnimals.
andannotated
by
Magnus,
Baltimore
K.F. Kitchell
2 vols.JohnHopkins
Press,
University
Jr.& I.M. Resnick,
andLondon1999xlii& 1827pp. ISBN0 801848237
Walter
undEpochenstil
imlateinischen
Mittelalter
, IV: Ottonische
Berschin,
Biographie
Biographie.
n.Chr.
n. Chr.Hiersemann,
Dashohe
Mittelalter
Erster
Halbband:
920-1070
, 920-1220
undUntersuchungen
zurlateinischen
desMittelalters,
1999(Quellen
Stuttgart
Philologie
Bd 12/1)xiii& 272pp. ISBN3 777299219
Bochumer
undMittelalter
vonB. Mojsisch,
, herausgegeben
Jahrbuch
fiirAntike
Philosophisches
R. Rehn.Bd3 (1993)288pp.ISSN 1384-6663.
Contents
M. Stemich,
O. Pluta,
(Beitrge)'.
Vorsokratische
als Seelentherapie?
Das Beispiel
Heraklit.
and
; B. Mojsisch,
Ayo
Philosophie
RoleofLanguage
TheConstitutive
inPlato's
emovffiT].
; J. Halfwassen,
ofKnowledge
Theory
DerAufstieg
alsTranszendieren.
hchsten
beiPiaton
und
M. Enders,
zum
Pbtin;
Philosophie
Prinzip
undUnendlichkeit
Gottes
inderlateinischen
Patristik
sowie
imphilosophischen
und
Allgegenwart
Denken
des
Mittelaters
onDivine
Illumination
; M.L.Fhrer,
;
theologischen
frhen
Henry
ofGhent
Zdisiaw
discuts
etla censure
d'Orlans
Kuksewicz,
Quelques
problmes
thologiques
parGilles
de1277'M. Lenz,Himmlische
DieBeweisbarkeit
vonGlaubensstzen
nachWilhelm
von
Stze:
- Beweise
Ockham
Aristoteles:
Ideen
derAkademiker.
iev/
ber
bersetzt
; (Materialien)
IJepi
vonA. Graeser
undmiteinerEinleitung
versehen
vonA. Malmsheimer;
Albert
der
Grosse:
De animalibus,
liber
Quaestiones
XV,quaestiones
1-9;11/berdieLebewesen
,
super
Buch
undbersetzt
vonB. Mojsisch
undmit
XV,Probleme
1-9;11' Herausgegeben
einer
versehen
vonS. Schulz;
Miscellanea,
Rezensionen,
Einleitung
Neuerscheinungen,
Autorenverzeichnis
Namenregister,
Olivier
tre
etreprsentation.
Unegnalogie
dela mtaphysique
moderne
l'poque
deDuns
Boulnois,
Scotus.
Presses
Universitaires
de France,
Paris1999538pp. ISBN 2 13 0504566
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-ge
etlatin
: B. Schartau
& Chr.
, 67 (1997)288pp. Contents
grec
A Small
Treatise
onthe
P. Harsting,
TwoRenaissance
Phthorai;
Troelsgrd,
ofthe
Interpretation
Translations
Rhetor
ontheMonody'
A. de Libera& I. RosierCatach,Les
ofMenander
del'analyse
delaformule
dela consecration
; Chr.Fleler,
enjeux
logico-linguistiques
eucharistique
Twomanuscripts
ontheMetaphysics:
Paris,BN,lat.16131andDarmstadt,
ofBuridan
Hessische
Simon
s Institutiones
insacram
Lu&HB,Hs 516; C. Marmo,
ofTournai'
paginam.AnEdition
about
& H.A.G.Braakhuis,
; S. Ebbesen
ofHisIntroduction
Signification
est; I. Rosier-Catach
tantum
unum
Anonymi
Erfordernis
(- Roberti
Kilwardby?)
Sophisma
& S. Ebbesen,
TwoRoberts
andPeter
ofSpain
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-ge
etlatin
: F.S. Pedersen,
The
, 68 (1998)312pp. Contents
grec
Toulouse
A listofManuscripts.
Tables:
Adcorrectionem
calendarii
. . . The
; Chr.Schabel,
toClement
VI'sInitiative*
EliasofNabinaux,
Chr.Schabel,
Background
Archbishop
"Testimonia
" ofNicosia,
andtheIntellectual
Medieval
; B. Schartau,
ofLater
History
Cyprus
ofByzantine
III; D. Mur,Anonymus
musical
onEquivocation
Texts
on
; S. Ebbesen,
practice,
Pragensis
Part.
II. Ca.1250-1310
& corrigenda
to CIMAGL59-67
; Addenda
Equivocation.
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-ge
etlatin
: Traits
duXIIesicle
, 69 (1999)262pp. Contents
grec
surla symbolique
desnombres
: Odonde Morimond
Amletica
numerorum
et
(1116-1161),
rerum
inTheographyam
(III). Edition
critique
princeps
parH. Lange
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyenetlatin
: P. Harsting,
More
, 70 (1999)423 pp. Contents
Agegrec
Evidence
Translation
Rhetor
ontheMonody
; A. Jung,TheLong
oftheEarliest
ofMenander
Melismas
in theNon-kalophonic
K.M. Fredborg,
(Promisimus'.
AnEdition
Sticherarion'
;
'
S. Ebbesen,
D'Orvillensis
onAristotle's
Anonymus
Commentary
Categories
A.V.Canale,Herejas
enLa Iglesia
El octavo
libro
delasEtimologas
deIsidoro
y sectas
Antigua.
deSevilla
Universidad
Pontificia
Madrid2000(Publicaciones
de
Comillas,
y susfuentes.

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000

Vivarium
, 38,2

18:15:20 PM

282

BOOKSRECEIVED

la Universidad
Pontificia
Madrid.
SerieI: Estudios,
Comillas,
78)278pp.ISBN84
8970871 1
TheChanging
Tradition.
Women
in theHistory
&
, ed. Chr.MasonSutherland
ofRhetoric
R. Sutcliffe.
ofCalgary
Alberta
1999vii& 279pp.ISBN
Press,
University
Calgary,
1 55238008 4
AnneAshley
Measure
Greatness.
TheIntensive
1250-1650.
ofa Different
Davenport,
Brill,
Innite,
Leiden/Boston/Kln
1999(Studien
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
67) XV& 438pp. ISBN90 04 114815
Dietrich
vonFreiberg.
seiner
und
Neue
Perspektiven
Philosophie,
Theologie
Naturwissenschaft.
Freiberger
10.-13.Mrz 1997.Herausgegeben
vonK.H. Kandier,
B. Mojsisch,
Symposium:
F.-B.Stammktter.
B.R. Grner,
1999(Bochumer
Studien
Amsterdam-Philadelphia
zurPhilosophie,
28) 287pp. ISBN90 60323556
e studi
Documenti
sullatradizione
medievale
, 8 (1997)568 pp. ISBN 2 503 505511
filosofica
Contents
: L.P. Gerson,1EniaxpO(pi]
andMeaning,
I. Hadot,Aspects
npavtv:History
dela thorie
dela perception
sensation
sensation
commune
chezlesnoplatoniciens:
(aoQr)<ji),
sensibles
communs
etconscience
desoi(ovvao0r'oiq)'
(Koivf}
aoOrioi),
(icoiv
aio9rxa)
J.M. Narbonne,
Aristote
etle mal
Theprovenance
; F.M. Schroeder,
ofthe"DeIntellectu"
atributed
toAlexander
d'Aristote
R. Bods,
Le texte
desCatgories
etle
ofAphrodisias;
grec
duCommentaire
dePorphyre,
Were
Aristotle's
Intentions
inwrittmoignage
H.J.Blumenthal,
inLateAntiquity
Plotinus
andAlexandria
: Scholastic
?,J.Whittaker,
ingthe"Deanima"
forgotten
intheSecond
andThird
Centuries
Non-discursive
inPlo; J. Bussanich,
Experiences
Thought
'
- G. Maclsaac,TheFinalSection
tinus
andProclus
Steel- F. Rumbach
Proclus
; C.
of
onthe"Parmenides
". A Greek
the
Retroversion
Latin
Translation
K.
Commentary
;
of
Verrycken,
'
F. Hudry,
L'hebdomade
etlesrgles.
SurviPhiloponus
ofPlato's
Interpretation
Cosmogony,
dudbat
vances
scolaire
d'Aristote
H. Hugonnard-Roche,
LesCatgories
comme
alexandrin',
introduction
la philosophie
deSergius
deRes(ain(f 536);
, dansuncommentaire
syriaque
R. Brague,
Laphilosophie
laThologie
dans
d'Aristote
LeParadis
delasagesse
; R. Arnaldez,
dumdecin
(Aix
b.Rabbn
Th.-A.Druart,
Ethics
al-Tabar;
Al-Frb,
, andFirst
;
Intelligibles
D.L. Black,
Avicenna
ontheOntological
andEpistemic
Status
ofFictional
Beings;
J.Janssens,
Creation
andEmanation
inIbnSn;C. Baffioni,
Sullaricezione
di dueluoghi
di Platone
e
Aristotele
D. Urvoy,
Uncurieux
avatar
d'unmythe
danslelitIwn
negli
al-Safa3;
platonicien
' "Short
tralisme
d'IbnHazm;A.L. Ivry,
Averroes
onAristotle's
"Deanima";
Commentary"
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L'influence
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latin
delaphilosophie
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chezThomas
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cognoscivus;
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ClaudePanaccio,
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zusammen
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Wissenschaftliche
Darmstadt
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500pp.& 4 KartenISBN3 534 113209
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inderTheologie
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Seung-Chan
Sprachphilosophie
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