ADAPTING ELECTRONIC WARFARE TO RADAR

WAVEFORMS
L. R. Falk
Swedish Defence Research Agency, 16490 Stockholm, lars.falk@foi.se

Keywords: electronic warfare, radar, network, deception,

information flooding

Centric Warfare (NCW) and Network Enabling Capability

(NEC) have been accepted and correspond to a technical
revolution in communication and data storage.

Abstract

From the point of view of electronic warfare this development

Modem methods of electronic warfare must consider that means that the traditional methods of jamming individual
many sources of information are available to sensor systems. sensors and communication lines must be replaced by the
Situation awareness is created in a network of sensors and complex obj ective of disturbing situation awareness. This
human operators by a process analysed in this paper. Each description is general enough to cover many situations, like
step in this process suggests a method of electronic warfare. the traditional problem of protecting a ship or aircraft from
The analysis is based on a division of radars into two basic missiles. In that case the pre-programmed hypothesis and
groups, surveillance and tracking radars, depending on the choices of a target seeker are described in terms of situation
amount of information received. Human knowledge is used in awareness.
surveillance systems and this makes information flooding an
effective method of attack. Distraction with noise and chaff 2 Information from sensors
and deception with decoys may be preferred in other cases.
The conclusions have been tested in trials performed with the The amount of information available to military commanders
increased dramatically after WW1. Electromagnetic waves
Swedish air surveillance system during staff training.
propagate in straight lines over long distances and this allows
one to create sensors like radar and optical system with
1 Introduction
enormous range and great accuracy.
The development of electronic warfare is affected by the large
amount of information available to modem sensor systems. Airborne platforms carrying such long range sensors can
Sensors are organized in networks and can combine data with collect enormous amounts of data by mapping the ground.
They are also useful for early warning and surveillance tasks,
knowledge obtained from human sources.
but in this case the expected number of targets is smaller and
This process has been used for many years in air surveillance human operators must enter the process.
systems and is known to produce good results. A network is
flexible and resilient to jamming because information is Radars and optical sensors are also used to track targets. In
distributed among the nodes. The problem of attacking a this case less information is needed but the time between data
network is addressed by investigating how an optimized updating is shorter. This difference is important, since it
analysis is performed and how it can be affected [1-3].
allows one to divide radars and other sensors into two basic
groups: surveillance and tracking systems use different time
Networks appear in many forms but some conclusions can be periods and deliver different amounts of data.
drawn by applying information theory [1,5,6]. The idea is to
study how sensor information is used and how human A surprisingly small data flow is required to guide a gun or
knowledge is included to improve the result. Traditional missile, usually less than 1000 bits/s [7]. Surveillance radars
electronic warfare is based on locating weaknesses in the deliver considerably more, say 1-1000 Mbits per period of
enemy system. Modem warfare is based on the assumption search, if they are searching for targets. The time of
that the opponent is using methods close to optimum to measurement is longer than for trackers and human operators
analyse available information. Such an analysis leads to are used to introduce knowledge into the process. This
certain general conclusions concerning the future of method allows one to solve complex problems like
electronic warfare.
identifying unknown targets and assessing their intention.
The possibility of having abundant sensor information
analysed in an optimum fashion led to the idea of complete
situation awareness [3]. Military concepts like Network

Anti-aircraft systems fall between these two groups. They

contain both surveillance and tracking systems and are in fact
early examples of networks, just like fighter control and air

surveillance systems. These systems involve several types of

radars and optical sensor with different ranges and accuracies,
which must be combined in a network.
The point is that human operators can affect the process in
surveillance systems since they are slow. Human operators
assist the system by introducing additional knowledge, which
is rarely possible for tracking systems.

3 Analysis of information
The fundamental question is how one can use data in a sensor
network to create situation awareness. This question will be
analysed by considering the optimum process for evaluating
available information.
Shannon's theory of information shows that the optimum
method of processing information under stationary conditions
is to apply Bayesian probability theory [6]. The process is
complicated but in principle one can include various forms of
human knowledge into the analysis.
This theoretical conclusion will be used below, though in
practice one would only use Bayesian processing at certain
stages. The optimal process is very slow and should be
replaced by other methods whenever possible.
From our point of view a sensor network is a system
collecting and processing large amounts of data. Human
information is important but the amount is small and this
makes a description in terms of information useful.
Bayesian analysis prescribes a process which agrees with
common sense [3,6] and is guaranteed to be optimal if the
following steps are used. All information is described in terms
of probability.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

delimiting a problem and defining logically complementary

alternatives (as required by the Bayesian method [6]) is very
hard in practice. One can compare the following tasks that are
presented in raising order of difficulty, where operators have
to decide between:
1.
2.
3.

Targets and non-targets (detection)

Friends and non-friends (FoF)
Threats and non-threats (RoE)

It is difficult to present a logical solution of these problems to

a computer and human operators are thus required, though
computers perform much of the preparatory work. We will
not try to solve this difficult problem, but rather point out how
situation awareness can be destroyed when sensors are
supported by human knowledge.

4 Principles of electronic warfare

The preceding description of how information is used to
generate situation awareness makes it possible to identify
some general principles of electronic warfare.
The basic methods of destroying information are
dissimulation and distraction. Dissimulation consists in
concealing a target, while distraction is used to divert
attention from the object. These principles are used in biology
to interpret how animals act to hide from carnivores. The
same method can be applied to electronic warfare, since
military targets are also isolated objects appearing in
complicated environments. The process of confusing an
opponent is most easily described in a space determined by
the sensors. The structure of an information space will not be
very simple in general, but radars and optical systems are
constructed to produce few ambiguities when a single target
is observed.

Delimit and define all possible alternatives.

Describe their logical relations.
Collect data and assess their uncertainty.
Calculate the probability of all alternatives.
Formulate assessment in terms of probability.
Make a decision based on probability and acceptable
risks.

In this process the last step of forming a decision is separated

from the process of creating situation awareness. It would be
difficult to obtain probability distributions for all alternatives
but this is rarely required in practice.
The point is that the process is separated into two stages.
Human operators only contribute to the first steps (1-2), while
the following steps (3-5) should be handled by a computer.
This is true of tracking systems and missile seekers which are
programmed in advance to handle possible incidents. They
only perform steps 3-5, while surveillance systems must
handle unexpected incidents with the assistance of human
operators. Steps 1-2 are time-consuming, since the process of

Figure 1. A single target in information space.

The simplest way of concealing a target is to use noise or
random signals to cover it. This well-known principle is
disadvantageous when information space is large, which

happens when many different sensors are observing the same

target. It is possible to calculate how unfavorable noise
becomes by comparing the volume of all space with the
Such calculations
observation cells surrounding the
are performed in simple jamming cases to compare the
spectral width of the jammer with the effective spectral width
of the radar signal. Traditional electronic warfare is almost
exclusively concerned with calculations concerning the effect
of noise.
The simplified diagram suggests another form of electronic
warfare based on distraction. If an attractive decoy is formed
it can divert attention from the target by indicating higher
probability for the decoy. This method works both for
surveillance and tracking radars, but information space is
smaller for tracking radars, since they will filter away
unnecessary data. The tactical effect of a decoy is stronger for
a tracking radar, if it is close enough, especially since less
time is available to correct an incorrect decision.

similar to D-day did not work because signals were never

noticed [4]. Decoy operations require detailed knowledge of
the system and consequently long preparation. A typical case
is the Israeli attack in the Beqaa valley in June 1982, where
Syrian anti-aircraft systems were provoked to reveal their
positions by unmanned decoys
A third basic principle obtained from the simplified diagram
is a combination of dissimulation and distraction, produced
by creating several moderately credible false targets that
temporarily divert attention from the real target.
This principle can be used against surveillance radars. The
idea is to overwhelm the system with a large number of
hypotheses that must be tested by human operators that can
handle only a few doubtful targets (usually about one
millionth of the cells observed). If a sufficient number of false
targets is introduced and pass the machine filter they will
occupy the human operators by information flooding. The
basic difference between surveillance and tracking radars is
used here by exploiting that human operators will still handle
logical problems concerning identity and intention.
Information flooding has been successfully tested in trials
performed with the Swedish air surveillance system. This
method requires less detailed knowledge about the system
than decoys. Information flooding is possible if the targets are
sufficiently similar to attract attention and pass the initial
machine filters [1,2].
An interesting point, confirmed by calculation, is that sensor
inputs used to produce false targets must correspond to the
sensors regarded as most reliable by operators. Otherwise
false targets rarely produce any effect.

Figure 2. Decoy and target in information space.

A Bayesian calculation shows that the best method is to use a

single but convincing decoy to divert attention from the real
target. The most famous decoy operation was performed in
preparation for D-day in 1944.
German HQ regarded Calais as the principle target and this
belief was supported by various means. The operation was
successful, but this case must be regarded as exceptional. The
decoy was accepted because the Allies could read the German
secret telegrams and correct their signals to support the notion
that Calais was the real target. The basic reason for success
was that German HQ believed the Enigma cipher machine to
be secure. This belief made the false information obtained
from double-cross spies appear trustworthy since they always
answered the right questions.

It is often difficult to foresee how an opponent would react to

a false target, unless it is an exact copy. Several operations

Figure 3. A real target surrounded by false targets will

distract human operators by information flooding.

This principle is confirmed by tests and simulation. In fact,

classified tests show good agreement with the theoretical
conclusions. The theoretical view presented here should not
be expected to produce new methods of electronic warfare.
This subject has been thoroughly investigated by simulations,
but is useful to understand why certain general principles
seem to apply in all cases. Moreover, the difficulty of
producing effective jamming confirms that sensor networks
are resilient to electronic attacks.

5 Conclusions
Some simple conclusions follow from the analysis.

Noise is simple but often ineffective against large

networks.

Deception requires detailed knowledge and simple

situations.

Information flooding affects human operators.

Networks are resilient to jamming.

The best protection is offered by training the

operators against electronic attacks.

Tests confirm theoretical conclusions.

Acknowledgements
The author is deeply indebted to his colleague Per Hyberg for
numerous discussions during this work. Weare both indebted
to Olle MaIm and Michal Herre at the Swedish air
surveillance system for cooperation and support during
simulator trials in the course of staff training.

References
[1] L. Falk: "The Benefits of Deception", MilTech 2
Conference, Stockholm, pp. 101-108 (2005).
[2] L. Falk: "Jamming the network: The Benefits of
Deception", AOC Conference, London (2006).
[3] L. Falk: "Situational awareness and electronic deception
with historic examples", Stockholm Contributions in Military
Technology 2007, ed. Martin Norsell, pp. 83-98 (2008).
[4] M. Howard: Strategic Deception in the Second World
War (Norton 1990).
[5] P. Hyberg: "Network Centric Warfare and Information
Theory", Journal of Electronic Defense, Vol 28, (Dec 2005).

[6] E. T. Jaynes: Probability theory: The logic of science

(Cambridge University Press 2003).
[7] 1. Kjellgren: "A simple study of the information
requirements for missile guidance", Acquisition, tracking and
pointing XVII, M. K. Masten and L. A. Stockum, Editors,
Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 5082, pp. 77-86 (2003).