Aguilar, Bretaa, Dy, Garcia, Locker

POS 130 C
Passive-Aggresive
Chinas Defense in Relations to their Aggresiveness
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to defend China against the Western claims of its assertiveness in the
international scene. After studying the behaviour of China through content analysis of various scholarly
articles, the researchers found out that the existing literature lacked one crucial thing a Chinese
perspective. All sources studied hailed from a Western background and as a response, the researchers
decided to bridge this gap by introducing a Chinese reaction to the claims. After doing so, the group
found out that contrary to the Western perception of the countrys assertiveness or aggression, China is
merely acting defensively.
The paper begins with an introduction of the realist view of the world. According to the theory,
the world is in a never-ending anarchic state, in which to survive one must act in interests of power. As
such, Chinas methods have been interpreted as moves towards overthrowing the world hegemon in hopes
to gain the seat for itself. Especially with the recent increase in Chinas territorial disputes, the claim
seems to speak for itself. However, according to Chinese scholars, the country is merely sticking to its
principles and defending its core interests and dignity regarding sovereignty, security, and development
issues. As such, the paper develops to use the neorealist view instead, since while classical realism
believes that all states act to gain power, neorealism presumes that actors do what they do to survive.
According to this framework, China is only interested with survival and not necessarily asserting itself to
achieve superpower status. The difference in views stems from the western worlds being accustomed to
democratic ideals. As China is a nationalist, communist country, they act differently from Western
tradition.
The research paper ends by concluding that Chinas actions regarding territorial disputes are only
responses. They do not believe that they are instigating anything, rather they are only adhering to their
constitution.

I.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Classical realism asserts that all states act in interests of power. The will and drive to dominate is

an inherent aspect of human nature.1 In essence then, politics is always a struggle for power.2
By this assumption, it is safe to claim that all major actors in the international scene actively work
towards becoming a superpower. Here, a superpower is a country that has the capacity to project
dominating power and influence anywhere in the world, and sometimes, in more than one region of the
globe at a time, and so may plausibly attain the status of global hegemon. 3 Historically, we saw Great
Britain as the template superpower of the 19 th century. Due to its industrial revolution, the country
achieved superior economic power, creating colonies worldwide and establishing the British pound as the
standard of monetary exchange.4 After the countrys fall after World War II, we saw the United States of
America rise to the status of world hegemon. While other countries were recovering from the war, the
United States did extremely well, eventually establishing the dollar as the new standard in the
international community.5 These two instances show how a countrys economic welfare translates into
bidding power in the international scene.
Arguably, these countries have had their fair share of forcing themselves upon other international
communities. One must only open a history book to see how Britain and the US used their economic
advantage to secure their seat as the top in the world. This phenomenon builds up to the groups interest:
with Chinas rapid and successful economic growth, is it now actively pursuing the position of top
hegemon?
Chinas economy can be likened to that of a transitional yet innovative one. Assuming that the
economy plays a crucial role in determining its behaviour in the international field of relations, its

1 (Baylis, Smith, &Ownes, 2001).

2 (Morgenthau, 1978)
3 China, an emerging superpower?, accessed Oct. 1, 2013,
http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html
4 1 The Economist, Pocket World in Figures (London: Profile Books, 2004), 24.
5 Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States. New York: Harper Perennial
Modern Classics, 2005. Chapter 13, "The Socialist Challange" pp. 321-357

historical context elucidates its shift from a centralized economy during the 20 th century towards a more
market-oriented one at present.
On one hand, it was rather elusive under the hands of the communist regime of the late Mao
Zedong during the 1940s. This was due to the fact that Chinas economy at that time was planned in a
way that economic resources were owned and controlled by the state. It was during this juncture where
prices were regulated through the establishment of trade associations and government revenues were
increased dramatically through the collection of agricultural taxes. 6 In other words, it somewhat adopted
the soviet style of heavy industrialization. 7 Not to mention, this kind of economy is also where scarcity is
apparently persistent. An example of which was the Great Famine in the years of 1959-61 were one of its
main causes was attribute to its decline in food availability. 8 China here was in a way, repressed through
the hands of the government which affected its citizens lives for the worst.
On the other hand, since Maos downfall in the 1960s, its transitional phase was gradual yet for
the betterment of their economy for years to come. Partial, market-oriented reforms were initiated through
the likes of Deng Xiaoping which first began in the countryside and later on, in towns and village
enterprises.9 This were baby steps in which were easily adopted on a larger scale through Chinas
municipalities and cities. But, perhaps their biggest step towards economic reform was through the
creation of special economic zones during 1978. These basically opened China to international trade and
foreign investment which can result to global integration. 10 So, not only was China expanding its
economic growth through its market system but it enabled them to attract foreign capital for the sake of
their economy. Since then, Chinas economy has drastically improved over the course of three decades
where their real GDP has averaged over 9-10% per annum and has become one of the thirds most largest
economy at market exchange rates.11
With all of these being said, this dynamic approach of Chinas economic progress implies its
ability to sustain on its own, plummeting its reliance on authority and more emphasis on autonomy.
6 Yueh, L. Y. (2010). The economy of China. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 11-12
7 Ibid, 26
8 Chai, J. (2011). An economic history of modern China. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 129
9 Yueh, L. Y. (2010). The economy of China. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 27
10 Peebles, G. (1988). 283-284
11 Ibid, 209

Hence, this could in fact, lead to their assertiveness with regards to their territorial disputes with its
neighboring countries with the notion that these lands can aid and further sustain their economic status
perhaps, through the abundance of its natural resources.
However, the view of Chinas new assertiveness is challenging for the reason that a well-defined
definition and valid indicators of such assertiveness is limited. Analysts have used a substantial amount of
synonyms in light of a definition, such as arrogant, belligerent, hard-line, tough, bullying, militant,
truculent, and even revolutionary. Chinas diplomacy implicated to be more threatening, exhibiting more
hostile preferences and expressed these in a conflictual language. 12 Western observers define Chinese
assertiveness as forceful, triumphalist, or arrogant tone in foreign policy pronouncements; the
announcement (or threat to implement) more aggressive or confrontational policies in some areas; or a
combination of both. As early as 2006, Evan Medeiros identified a growing assertiveness in relation to
Chinese foreign policies, and also, with regard to the superpower, the United States, as well. The growing
assertiveness of China, then, was of no surprise to some analysts of Chinas international behavior. 13
Analysts claim that Chinas growing assertiveness can be dated back in 2008, when Wen Jiabao
criticized the US for its economic mismanagement and when the senior Chinese central bank officials
questioned the dollars continued role as the main international reserve currency. There also have been
reports when the Chinese put greater constraints on foreign companies that operate in China, increasing
cyber-attacks of foreign firms that have offices in China and Beijings stern response when Westerners
blamed the Peoples Republic for such attacks, strong resistance to US pressure to appreciate the RMB,
and recent restatements of criticism to Washingtons monetary policy. These are only a few of the
confrontational Chinese statements and actions that relate to these relevant economic issues. 14
With regard to foreign policies, Chinese assertiveness has also increased. During the UN Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen on December 2009, China gave an alleged hard-line, insulting stand
regarding the issue on hand. There have also been tenacious opposition to the UNSC sanctions against
Iran for its nuclear activities; maltreatment given to President Obama when he visited China in 2009, and
other unmatched demands and threats to other nations. 15

12 Johnston, Alastair Iain. "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?." 7-48
13 Swaine, Michael. "Perceptions of an Assertive China."China Leadership Monitor. 1-19
14 Ibid
15 Johnston, Alastair Iain. "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?." 7-48

China has also reacted assertively and even gave a truculent stand on Obamas decisions in 2009
to sell arms to Taiwan and meet with the Dalai Lama. In both occurrences, Chinese officials threatened
retaliatory responses, even gave the US a warning that they would suspend US-China military-to-military
contacts.16
China and Japan
Chinas behavior towards Japan on an international level seems to be escalating into aggression in
the modern times, but the truth is there has been a dispute between the two countries that had been going
on and off for the past 40 or so years. While this review is meant to summarize the articles focus on the
more modern conflict going on, a very brief background history is required to make some sense of the
situation.
In the year 1953, when the USA announced was returning territories to Japan, namely the
NanseiShoto chain of islands, Chinas Republic of China (ROC) government protested. It followed up
with the protest with a request in 1970 for the US not to include the Senkaku islands, and to leave the
issue of who owned the islands open17. The issue of ownership was actually shelved by mutual
agreement in 1978 when both countries negotiated the Treaty of Peace and Friendship 18, but it
deteriorated soon after, and by the 1990s the two countries were in dispute again. The issues came to light
once more after the 2010 incident, where the captain of Chinese fishing trawler that apparently collided
with a couple of Japanese Coast Guard boats who were trying to force it out of the waters around the
island was being detained: while there may have been other circumstances, it is believe China found
Japans public assertions to ownership offensive19.
The main point of interest in the article is found in chapter 4.9, where the economic sanctions
from both sides are described. Ranging from stricter inspections of imports to and exports from Japan,
Japanese companies with investments in China, decrease in tourism and partial consumer boycotts from
16 Swaine, Michael. "Perceptions of an Assertive China."China Leadership Monitor. 1-19
17Drifte, R. (2013). The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China: Between
the Materialization of the "China Threat" and Japan "Reversing the Outcome of World War II". UNISCI
Discussion Papers., pg 16

18Drifte, R. (2013).One cannot but conclude from these accounts that both sides agreed to shelve
the territorial issue while in no way abandoning their claims to the islands, otherwise there wouldnot
have been a normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972 or a Treaty of Peace andFriendship in 1978

19Drifte, R. (2013).What made this incident so serious for the Chinese wasJapan`s very public
assertion of its sovereignty over the islands, by the way it handled theChinese captain and the explicit
denial of the shelving understanding of the 1970s

Chinese citizens of Japanese products 20 (most noticeably automobiles), there have been significant
impacts on the Japanese economy thanks to the incident. The embargo on rare earths, from Chinas point
of view, seemed to have an effect as well: however it was more effective public opinion than economy,
since Japanese companies dependent on the rare earth supplies had already stockpiled and secured
alternate sources before the embargo 21.While there is no hard evidence for the behaviour of China, it is
true that it has already outstripped Japan in terms of GDP 22. This superiority in the context of world
economic standing may have diminished the importance of their economic relationship, and combined
with deteriorating political relations between both countries, left an open door for China to make bolder
moves.
One final view on the topic is that while we may not be entirely certain of who has the better of
whom,a considerable amount of the decision-making will come from the advice experts and others
analysing the situation give based on their interpretations of the situation. It is a possibility that the
current weakness of Japan from the perspective of Chinese analysts may be overrated: at the same time,
however, Japan may be looking at the issue from a purely economic viewpoint, without considering
outside opinions that may factor into the equation23.

China and the Philippines

Overlapping Claims: Philippines vs China:
In 1997, the bilateral dispute of the Philippines and China surfaced when Filipino vessels blocked
Chinese boats from entering the reef in April 30. This incident according to China would obfuscate their
friendly ties. As early as 1935, China has already claimed Scarborough Reef as part of the Zhongsha
Islands. Since then, China has remained firm with their entitlement and believes that since they have
claimed Zhongsha Islands, it follows that the Scarborough Reef is encompassed. In May 1956, the
20Drifte, R. (2013).
21Drifte, R. (2013).
22Drifte, R. (2013).Japan`s economic difficulties since the1990s (and its dependence on economic
interaction with China to cope with thesedifficulties!), and China pushing Japan to No. 3 in world GDP
ranking has diminished theChinese perception of Japan as an economic power house. pg. 47

23Drifte, R. (2013). While Chinese commentators and experts may beinclined to overrate Japan`s vulnerability, their Japanese
counterparts have a tendency to lookat the issues too much in purely economic terms, neglecting the impact of Chinese
emotionsand government propaganda, as well as the wider public`s insufficient knowledge about theoverall impact of bad
economic relations with Japan on China`s own economy.

Philippines remarked that some of the South China Sea islands should be part of their territory because of
proximity, China protested this. China publicized its Declaration on the Territorial Sea which states,
the breadth of the territorial sea of the Peoples Republic of China shall be twelve nautical miles. This
provision applies to all territories of the Peoples Republic of China, including the Chinese mainland and
its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha
Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands and all other islands belonging to
China which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas (emphasis added).
24

This was cited by the author froma document entitled Chinese Islands in the South China Sea by See-

Shao Hsun-Cheng.
The Philippines claim was expressed through the statement of its Foreign Affairs Secretary: we
maintain that the Scarborough Shoal is part of our territory. According to Article 1 of the Philippine
Constitution, the national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all the other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Philippines has exercised sovereignty and effective jurisdiction over Scarborough
Shoal as well as over waters surrounding the shoal. Filipino fishermen have used the area as their
traditional fishing ground and as sanctuary during bad weather. It has been the subject of oceanographic,
reef structure and other marine scientific studies by the Philippines through the University of Philippines
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Scarborough Shoal was used for a long
period of time as an impact range by defense authorities. The Philippines had also operated a lighthouse
on Scarborough Shoal. Philippine laws on smuggling and illegal fishing have been enforced in the area
for a long time. And lastly, Scarborough Shoal has been subject to the laws and policies of the
Philippine government, which were never contested by other parties in the past. 25This was cited by the
author from an online document by Paul Michael Carmania Jaramillo regarding the Scarborough Shoal.
The Philippines established it Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200nm which was measured
by the Presidential Decree No. 1599 in June 1978. 26 With this, the Scarborough Reef lies between the
200nm space and one argument of the Philippines is that the reef is located within their EEZ. In 1997, a
case against 21 Chinese fishermen for illegal entry into Philippine territory was terminated. It was agreed
upon that there is still no legal basis for this case because nothing has been recognized yet. Another
assertion by the Philippines in order to justify their territorial claim for the Scarborough Reef is the
24ZouKeyuan (1999) Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine Relations?
25ZouKeyuan (1999) Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine Relations?
26Presidential Decree No.1599, reprinted in Philippine Yearbook of International Law, Vol.8, 1982, D14-D15.

concept of contiguity. Scarborough Reef is actually closer to the Philippines than to China. However, this
concept of contiguity has been omitted.
It seems impossible that China will drop its claim to Scarborough Reef in the future. According to
the author, the first reason for this is because the reef is the only above-water natural feature in the
Zhongsha Islands. Therefore, the reef is substantial to the Islands, including the Macclesfield Bank. The
Bank and other surrounding shoals are permanently underwater and could not be claimed in international
law. Second reason is that the Chinese claim seem to be more overweening to that of the Philippines in
terms of historical perspectives, this makes China very unlikely to compromise. But in terms of seeking a
peaceful solution, both claims of the Philippines and China are not perfect and despite the superiority of
China it does not mean that they would be able to just claim the reef without query.Furthermore, China
and the Philippines have agreed on solving their disputes by peaceful means because this will help them
build a good and friendly relation. However, if the two sides are inclined to pursue their own selfish
interests and disregarding cooperation, the reef will definitely be a threat to peace and security in the
South China Sea.
On Chinas aggression:
Chinas aggressive assertion over the South China Sea has elevated the security stakes for all
maritime powers that sail through these waters. These have been marked by 3 incidents according to the
author. First, on March 2, patrol boats from China operating in the Philippines Kalayaan Island Group
was ordered to leave the area. Second, on May 26, three China Maritime Surveillance ships was also
ordered to leave the area after it accosted Vietnamese vessels and purposely cut their survey cables.
Lastly, on June 9, a Vietnamese vessel was again confronted which led to another incident of cable cutting
by China.27
International criticism has been provoked by China who has been pushing its sovereignty claims
in the South China Sea in 2009 and 2010. According to Thayer, diplomatic confrontation of China over its
aggressive assertiveness must be acted upon by the ASEAN which rely on transit through the South China
Sea. Also, Diplomatic pressure should be brought to abide on China at the annual ASEAN Regional
Forum meeting. Meanwhile, the Philippines as well as Vietnam, should take steps to be able to enrich
their capabilities in efforts to push for national sovereignty over their EEZ. Their weakness only invites
China to act more aggressively towards them. 28
II.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS & OBJECTIVES

27 Carlyle A. Thayer, Chinas New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea
28 Carlyle A. Thayer, Chinas New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South
China Sea

Our paper asks the question as to whether China is actually defending itself rather than exerting
aggression, as many journal articles and studies tend to claim. The questions we want to answer are the
following:
1. Is Chinas aggression actually defensive in intent?
2. Can their defensive stance be justified by Neorealist perspective?
3. Does their defensiveness have to do with their ongoing territorial disputes with its
neighboring countries such as Japan & the Philippines?
Our objectives for this paper are to define how China is being defensive, and to interpret Chinas
defensiveness based on Neorealist theory.
III.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper will define Chinas defensiveness through the assessment of the RRL with regards to the claim
that it is being aggressive. Using the neorealist perspective defined by Kenneth Waltz, it posits the
assumption that states solely warrant for their survival before pursuing their own goals/interests due to
structural constraints. The structure here, deals with the hierarchical arrangement and distribution of
capabilities. Due to Chinas mass population and progressive economy as of late, it continually strives to
maintain their position towards their engagements. It asserts that the international system is anarchic and
that these states operate according to their logic of self-help which forces them to go into war not as a
mean of attaining power, but because circumstances dictate their necessity to look out for itself and to
advance their interests (for survival) as much as possible. As a result, it is this driving force that they
develop national security from foreign intervention as a means to improve relative power. Chinas actions
then are only to secure their security in the international scene. Their use of force is not predetermined but
rather only a reaction to the anarchic structure.
IV.

METHODOLOGY
The focus of this research is to study Chinas behavior in light of the recent claims that their

attitude towards international relations has been quite assertive. Though much has been said about
Chinas assertiveness, our group would like to show that they are merely being defensive. In order to
assess this stand content analysis through recent scholarly articles (from 2005-Present) have been used.
Main sources for these articles are EBSCO Host, JSTOR, and Google Scholar. We believe that all of these
will help answer our main point of inquiry.
The utilization of content analysis may be the best course of action for the research work since it
allows for a reduction of current information available while making way for researchers like us to
critique and understand the results. Moreover, since we are interested in Chinas behaviour, content
analysis provides a structured approach in evaluating the said variable through related literature and
studies we had done earlier.

Overall, the study will heavily rely on existing data since the study is mainly a critical evaluative
and analytical paper. There will be no utilization of surveys and the like since we are not interested in
finding new data. What we are interested is on understanding the current state of affairs through prior and
current information.
V.

ANALYSIS
Much has been said about Chinas growing assertiveness in dealing with international relations. A

common stand among these different articles is that China is being assertive to claim more power. But the
problem with these articles is that they are solely basing their stand on Western belief and not taking into
consideration the culture and upbringing that of China. The Western observers define Chinese
assertiveness as being forceful and triumphalist or having brash tone in foreign policy pronouncements;
the promulgation of (or threat to implement) more aggressive or confrontational policies in specific areas
or some combination of the two. (Swaine, 2) The Chinese perspective, however, is quite different from
Western views and considerably more diverse. Chinese officials reject the notion that their assertive tone
is tough or confrontational rather, they are merely sticking to its principles and defending its core
interests and dignity regarding sovereignty, security, and development issues, while promoting world
peace and development. (Swaine, 4-5)
There has been much speculation and alarm regarding the rise of Chinese nationalism. As the
continuous rise of Chinese nationalism, the contemporary world views negatively. Nationalism for them
is a course of international aggression. This being the reason that Western observers found an aggressive
China simply because of the existence of nationalism. (Zhao, 1-2) Since the 1980s, pragmatic nationalism
has become the dominant thinking of the Chinese. This thinking highlights three important characteristics
- instrumentality, state-centeredness, and reactiveness - that explain Chinese behavior. (Zhao, 16) This
kind of nationality that the Chinese have nurtured has become their way to utilize to the communist state
in response to both domestic and external challenges. Being instrumental and state-led, China is able to
use nationalism to enhance their political power; and being reactive to international currents, nationalist
sentiments may decrease if perceived external pressure diminishes and China's confidence in international
affairs increases. (Zhao, 23) Though this kind of nationalism is assertive in international orientation and is
particularly powerful when China's national interests or territorial integrity are in jeopardy, it does not
prove that China's international behavior is truly aggressive and assertive. (Shambaugh, 205) Moreover,
Chinese leaders are simply assertive in a sense that they are only defending national interests, particularly
on issues concerning national security and territorial integrity. Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian
characterizes China's defense policy to be "defensive defense policy" which aims to consolidate national
defense, resist foreign aggression, safeguard state sovereignty and maintain national unity and security.
This defensive character has sometimes been misinterpreted as aggressive, for the reason that China is

dramatically sensitive with regard to its national sovereignty. (Zhao, 29) Bernstein and Munro even say
that "China is quick to take offense and to view disagreements that other countries might take more easily
in stride as assaults on national dignity, requiring uncompromising response." (Bernstein and Munro, 42)
But the regimes legitimization has always been based on its ability to defend its national independence
from foreign enemies.
VI.

CONCLUSION
Throughout our research, we have been made to believe that China is becoming more and more

aggressive in dealing with its disputes with the Philippines and other issues. It was generally based on the
viewpoint of Western spectators. In the case of China, they act towards the disputes because they try to
address the actions of other countries. Mainly focusing on the Philippines, China has proceeded to more
firm movements not necessarily because they demand to prove their strengths as a country; it is more of
China trying to defend what they consider should truly be theirs. They feel obliged to act on these issues
as of course they also feel susceptible to the loss of their spaces. The Philippines has been countering to
the claims of China and thus, China feels the need to retort as well.
With this, we believe that China is more of defensive rather than assertive. If we clearly try to
look at it through the perspective of China, we can fully grasp why they have become more selfprotective. It is not necessarily just to display their power but we must also take into consideration their
history, culture and up-bringing as a nation. For example, with the issue of the Scarborough Reef, often
times the Philippines has tried to attack China by trying to prove that they have been illegally entering
this territory and of course China cannot and would not take this nonchalantly. Furthermore, we must not
readily agree that China has been too aggressive with their actions because as a country they will, in their
power, make an effort to preserve their history and culture, if it means taking action against the
Philippines or other countries.

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