ARTICLE IN PRESS

Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

Market-led policy measures for urban redevelopment in Singapore

Sau Kim Lum*, Loo Lee Sim, Lai Choo Malone-Lee
Department of Real Estate, School of Design and Environment, National University of Singapore, 4 Architecture Drive, Singapore 117566, Singapore
Received 16 January 2002; received in revised form 24 December 2002; accepted 16 January 2003

Abstract
This paper analyses the effectiveness and impacts of two market-led policy measures for stimulating private housing
redevelopment in Singapore. The rst measure accorded betterment potential to sub-optimally used land through density incentives.
Subsequently, enabling legislation was enacted to facilitate site amalgamation. Using data from 1994 to 2000, the measures successfully
induced the supply of privately owned land and site assembly through en bloc sales. However, the urban intensication strategies have
resulted in unintended and adverse consequences such as infrastructural pressure, loss of environmental character and accelerated
economic obsolescence. Moreover, policy delivery that relies on private sector capital is highly dependent on market conditions.
r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Urban redevelopment; Market-led policy; Housing; En bloc sales

Introduction
Recent urban policy in many western cities has shown
a shift towards urban entrepreneurialism (Leitner, 1990)
and private sector participation (Jones, 1996). For Hong
Kong as well, publicprivate partnership has become a
prevalent organizing principle in urban policy implementation (Yeh, 1990). This shift reects the states
increasing reliance on private sector investment decisions to trigger off physical redevelopment and urban
rejuvenation. Property-led urban regeneration is then
expected to induce economic growth and bring social
benets to the community (Jones and Watkins, 1996).
In an effort to attract private capital, two strategies
have often been adopted (Tang and Tang, 1999). These
are the formulation of development control policies that
will provide more incentives to encourage property
development and the removal of private sector supply
side constraints. Both strategies were employed recently
in the city-state of Singapore to facilitate the achievement of key planning objectives in the long-term
development of the country.
As with parallel approaches elsewhere, the Singapore
government introduced a new planning incentive in the
early 1990s that relied primarily on private investment
to stimulate urban redevelopment in central-city loca*Corresponding author. Tel./fax: +65-6874-6900.
E-mail address: rstlumsk@nus.edu.sg (S.K. Lum).
0264-8377/$ - see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0264-8377(03)00046-2

tions. Despite institutional differences between Singapore

and other western cities, two common features of their
recent urban policy initiatives towards inner city redevelopment have been an emphasis on the private sector and
an unprecedented faith in the efciency of the market.
But while deregulation and privatization have become
dominant themes of urban policy since the Thatcher and
Reagan administrations (Gafkin and Warf, 1993), it was
only in 1994 that pro-market planning incentive measures
were introduced in Singapore through the Development
Guide Plan (DGP) to supplement government actions.
Prior to that, government intervention and state-led
development have been largely instrumental in effecting
urban development goals despite Singapore being a
laissez faire economy (Zhu, 1997).
In particular, private sector participation in the urban
renewal of Singapore has been largely passive. Under
the Government Land Sales (GLS) program that began
in 1967, sub-optimally used land parcels were acquired
and assembled by the state for comprehensive redevelopment. Developers who bought these land parcels had
to adhere to a stringent set of conditions that stipulated,
among other things, the type of development allowed
and the time-frame for completion (URA, 1995).
Initially, various nancial and tax incentives were
offered to attract investors to bid for the sites. As time
went on, these incentives were gradually withdrawn.
This was because the state owned some 76% of the
aggregate land mass in Singapore and it soon became

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

apparent that the GLS program was the dominant

source of vacant or soft land for development
activities. By comparison, the supply of privately owned
land parcels was small since the ownership of these sites
was often fragmented. More importantly, there were few
incentives for private agents to market and develop the
sites, given the non-trivial land assembly and other
transaction costs involved.
This changed with the release of the rst of 55 DGPs
in 1994. For privately owned sites in many of the
centrally located areas, the DGPs relaxed extant development controls on building density in terms of the
allowable plot ratio or oor area ratio (FAR as it is called
in the US; Seyfried, 1991). The land-use planning density
bonus gave rise to attractive land value enhancement
possibilities that triggered a string of what have been
called en bloc or collective sales. In such a sale, owners of
fragmented interests in land responded to the DGP
inducement of private gains by banding together to sell
their combined sites for redevelopment collectively.
Since the assembly of interests in redevelopment land
was by means of private negotiation, the process was
time consuming and became prohibitively difcult when
more land lots or interests were involved. Particularly
after the onset of the Asian nancial crisis, en bloc sales
ground to a halt. Policy-makers were convinced that the
requirement of a 100% consensus level amongst all
landowners of an en bloc redevelopment scheme frustrated
the development incentives of the DGPs. To remove this
supply side constraint, the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act was passed on 11 October 1999 to allow an en
bloc sale to proceed as long as a majority, rather than all,
of the landowners are in agreement (The Land Titles
(Strata) (Amendment) Act, 1999).
This paper aims to critically evaluate the effectiveness
and impacts of the two strategies outlined above in the
high-density urban context of Singapore. The next
section provides a brief policy background that focuses
on the rationale for the DGP planning incentives and
for the subsequent implementation of the Land Titles
(Strata) (Amendment) Act. We then present an evaluative framework and our assessment of whether the
strategies have achieved their stated policy objectives of
inducing the supply of privately owned land and
increasing private sector site amalgamation for new
urban housing redevelopment. In addition, we analyze
their unintended impacts. The paper concludes with
some implications of using market-led initiatives for
urban housing redevelopment.

The policy measures

In the early 1990s, the planning system in Singapore
underwent substantial changes. The system that had
guided the countrys development over the previous 30

years was found to be inadequate to steer future

development towards the long-term goals of the
government. In a major rationalization exercise,
the national planning and conservation authoritythe
Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA)implemented
a new two-tier planning system. The upper tier
comprised the Revised Concept Plan, a strategic plan
that mapped out the vision for the long-term physical
development of the country. With the completion of the
Revised Concept Plan in 1991, the URA proceeded to
prepare detailed plans called DGPs that formed the
lower tier of the planning system.
DGPs are essentially statutory local plans that
contain details such as land-use zones, development
intensity, transportation networks, open space and
recreational areas and conservation designations that
guide land development in a demarcated area. Singapore
is currently divided into 55 planning areas. For each of
these areas, a DGP was prepared where the broad
strategies contained in the Revised Concept Plan were
translated into operational details at the local level. As
each DGP was completed, it became the reference for
development control and provided guidelines to landowners and developers on the type of use to which their
land could be put (URA, 1991a).
The 1991 Revised Concept Plan sets out the overall
strategy for maximising land use in Singapore (www.
ura.gov.sg). A key objective was to increase the overall
provision of housing land (URA, 1991b). Under the new
planning system, the DGPs will support the Concept
Plan through providing new channels for growth
(Malone-Lee, 1989). More land will be rezoned for
residential use (URA, 1993) and many areas, particularly parcels in locations with enhanced public infrastructure such as improved road or rail systems and
other community amenities, will enjoy enhanced development intensity. Given these higher intensities, sites in
the affected urban areas stood to enjoy positive market
gains in terms of higher redevelopment potential.
However, most of these urban land lots were held under
private and multiple ownership. In some of the older
housing districts in the Central Area, single-family
dwelling units were built on small sites laid out in a
narrow, compact gridlock street pattern. Multi-family
units tended to be on larger sites but many of these did
not cover land areas in excess of 1000 m2.
Prior to the implementation of the new DGP planning
system, the state would identify underutilized sites for
compulsory acquisition by eminent domain rules and
then package them for sale to the private sector through
sealed-bid auctions. This mechanism attracted criticism
on two frontsthe government paid too low a price and
sold at too high a price. Private land owners who lost
their lots felt that the compensation meted out under the
Land Acquisition Act was below market levels (The
Land Acquisition Act (Cap 152), 1985). Yet, when these

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

sites were subsequently put out for tender, the prices

achieved often set new price benchmarks for land sales.
In addition, it was becoming increasingly difcult to
justify the expropriation of private land when the sites
would eventually be used for private development rather
than to further the public good.
In line with the governmental drive towards capital
sovereignty in the late 1980s, planners in Singapore also
adopted free market principles to achieve planning
goals. Rather than have land assembly carried out by
the state alone, the private sector was offered incentives
to amalgamate diverse interests in land under the new
planning system. In doing so, private agents were able to
realize the gains from betterment potential accorded by
the planning vision articulated in the DGPs and thereby
enable redevelopment.
This situation gave rise to the en bloc redevelopment
phenomenon whereby owners of fragmented interests in
land responded to the DGP enticement of private gains
by amalgamating their combined interests for sale and
eventual redevelopment (Lum et al., 2000). The existing
properties may be in a single strata-titled building as
would be the case of multi-family housing or adjacent to
each other as with adjoining single-family units. By
pooling multiple interests in developed land to form a
more attractive redevelopment conguration, an en bloc
sale allowed real estate owners to capitalize on the
marriage value of the en bloc site.
Such efforts however often encountered difculties
especially in developments where numerous owners with
differing interests were involved. Particularly for the
older dwelling units in the central city that were often
signicantly larger than the newer housing stock, many
of the existing owner-occupiers resisted en bloc sales as
comparable substitute homes in the prime areas were
scarce and very costly. Even if complete in-principle
consensus could have been secured for a joint sale,
invariably there were disagreements with regard to the
selling price, the apportionment of the sales proceeds,
the mode of disposal and the timing of events. As a
result, many en bloc sales stalled.
While there was no express statement by policy
makers when the DGPs were released, the intention of
the planning incentives was clearly to encourage private
developers to amalgamate property interests in land to
enable efcient redevelopment and urban rejuvenation.
Under similar measures undertaken by governments
elsewhere, developers had to pay for the planning gain
either by making appropriate local contributions (Bunnell, 1995), by providing public benets from within
their development projects (Sagalyn, 1997) or by
building ancillary facilities (Tang and Tang, 1999).
Likewise, the private sector in Singapore was obliged to
pay for the density bonus through a development charge
that creamed off part of the enhanced value to the
government coffers. In fact, the sites that experienced

the greatest betterment potential were often in areas

where the state had made or was scheduled to contribute
heavy infrastructural investments. If en bloc schemes
were to fail on account of the problems involved in
acquiring properties held under multiple ownership, the
government stood to lose the ability to leverage on its
investments for an optimal level of urban renewal
(Boyle, 1985).
On 11 October 1999, the Land Titles (Strata)
Amendment Act 1999 was enacted with the intention
of facilitating en bloc sales (Sim et al., 2002). Prior to this
measure, all the owners of an estate or building had to
agree to sell because a 100% consensus level was necessary
for the passage of a collective sale. With the passing of the
Act, there is no longer a requirement for all of the owners
to agree. A majority vote is sufcient to carry the deal
through. Majority vote is dened as follows:
(a) If the development is less than 10 years old, not less
than 90% of the owners, according to share values,
must agree to the en bloc sale.
(b) If the estate is more than 10 years old, an 80%
majority will be sufcient.
Proceeds from the sale will then be apportioned
among individual owners in accordance with their
shares of the land interest or the assessable value of
their properties. Where there are disagreements, the
Strata Titles Board (STB) is the body that rules on these
disagreements or objections. The Land Titles (Strata
Titles Boards) Regulations (1999) set out the procedure
for application to the Board, the proceedings of the
Board and other matters such as appeals to the Board
and to the High Court.
By signicantly altering the balance of power between
consenting and dissenting owners, the state has increased the probability of success for an en bloc sale
where a minority of owners may be holding out for
nancial or other reasons. Whilst this raises some
interesting questions on the issue of property rights
(Sim et al., 2002), this paper is more concerned with the
impact of the legal measure towards facilitating private
sector redevelopment efforts. The next section presents
our analysis of the effectiveness and impacts of the DGP
density bonus and the subsequent enactment of supporting legislation.

The effectiveness and impacts of the policy measures

The evaluative framework
We evaluate the policy initiatives in terms of their
intended and unintended impacts. First, we assess how
effective the measures have been in achieving the
governments objectives of inducing the supply of
privately owned land and increasing private sector site

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

amalgamation for new urban housing redevelopment.

Second, we analyze the unintended consequences of the
measures for the built environment.
Typically, the success or failure of a land policy
experiment is determined by making comparisons either
on a spatial or cross-sectional basisbetween affected
land parcels and parcels under a no-action alternative
or on an inter-temporal basisthe same space before
and after policy intervention. In Singapore, both
methods are problematic. The rst requires the existence
of a control area, a condition that cannot be satised
as the policy measures were implemented island-wide.
The second is complicated due to the long duration for
policy execution.
Our approach is to divide the study period from 1994
to 2000 into two separate time-frames coinciding with
the two policy-on situations:
*

Situation I, 19941997: 1994 is the year in which the

rst measure of a new planning density bonus was to
take effect. By late 1997, all residential land dealings
including en bloc sales had stopped as a result of the
economic slowdown triggered by the Asian nancial
crisis. These activities resumed only in 1999.
Situation II, 19992000: The 20-month period from
May 1999 to December 2000 is associated with the
passage of enabling legislation to facilitate land
amalgamation efforts. Although the Land Titles
(Strata) (Amendment) Bill was gazetted only on 3
September 1999, it was evident from the wellpublicized deliberations of a specially constituted
Board (Report of the Select Committee on the Land
Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 19 April 1999) that
policy-makers would change the legal regime in
favour of collective sales (The Straits Times, 1999a,b).

For each situation, we identied all the transactions in

private residential development land that were reported
in the media as well as non-publicized deals that had
been brokered by property consultants. Existing planning parameters and redevelopment details for each land
parcel were examined based on the relevant DGPs and
Master Plans prepared by the URA. Information on
sales prices was extracted from statistics provided by the
Property Research Department of the URA, as well.
The microdata on all the concluded en bloc sales
transactions are presented in Tables 3 and 4 of

Appendix A. We then attempted to answer the following

questions.
Did the measures induce the supply of privately owned
land?
Table 1 presents the quantum of land supplied
through private sector channels. Between October 1994
and November 1997, 97 en bloc deals were concluded
that yielded 90 parcels of residential redevelopment land
covering an area of 367,463 m2. During our second
policy-on period, 52 sites with 335,682 m2 of land were
sold through 54 collective sales. These quanta are
compared to the amounts of land sold by private agents
through non-collective sales. The latter provides the best
available control for contextual inuences over our
study period as these transactions were also originated
by private agents in response to market forces for land
parcels of comparable tenure and use, but typically not
in response to the revised densities. During both policyon periods, collective sales induced a greater land supply
than non-en bloc deals with the difference being more
pronounced in Situation II.
We also compare the en bloc land supply against the
supply of state-owned land. GLS parcels tend to be
larger in size compared to en bloc sites and hence offered
developers greater development exibility. Such land is
sold only on 99-year leases to private sector builders for
high intensity developments with plot ratios of 2.8 or
more. Although the GLS supply may not be an ideal
benchmark, state-owned sites are put up for sale only
when there is perceived demand from developers.
Table 2 presents our results. While the quantum of state
land sold in the earlier policy-on period was about 2.7
times the amount of privately held land supplied through
collective sales, the supply from the en bloc market
dominated state land provision in the second period.
Fig. 1 shows the annual quantum of land from private
sector sales, both collective and non-collective, as well as
from the GLS Program over our study period. There are
two important observations. First, both private and
public land supply are positively correlated to the
strength of the market for private residential property
as proxied by the Residential Property Price Index
(RPPI). Second, the composition of private land supply
has changed quite markedly since the introduction of

Table 1
The supply of private land for private residential development from en bloc and non-en bloc sales
Land supplied (m2)

Average size of plots (m2)

Number of sites

En bloc

Non-en bloc

19941997
19992000

367,462.5
335,682.2

213,567
77,684

Total

703,144.7

291,251

En bloc

Non-en bloc

En bloc

Non-en bloc

90
52

67
22

4082.9
6455.4

3187.6
3531.1

142

89

4951.7

3272.5

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

Table 2
The supply of private land for private residential development from en bloc and government land sales
Land supplied (m2)

Average size of plots (m2)

Number of sites

En bloc

State-owned

En bloc

19941997
19992000

367,462.5
335,682.2

1,477,241
195,519

90
52

Total

703,144.7

1,672,760

142

State-owned

En bloc

State-owned

92
13

4082.9
6455.4

16,057
15,040

105

4951.7

15,931

Fig. 1. The RPPI and the supply of land for private residential development.

the policy measures. Prior to 1994, virtually all the

privately owned land that entered the market was sold
by corporations and single-entity owners. After the
policy incentives were implemented, such land has been
increasingly supplied through collective sales.
Measured against the governments objective of
inducing the supply of privately owned residential
development land, particularly for parcels held
under multiple interests, the rst policy measure of
providing DGP density incentives was moderately
successful. However, its impact in Situation I was
limited by three supply side barriers. First, the problems
encountered in securing unanimity amongst all the
owners capped the number of estates that could be
freed for more intensive and efcient redevelopment.
Second, the difculties in brokering larger deals where
many homeowners were involved, meant that many of
the sites in the earlier sales were small. We present
statistics on site amalgamation later. Third, the trend of
en bloc activity was initially conned mainly to the
prime areas where the revisions in planning parameters
were generally large. Due to the high cost of land in
these areas, there were sizeable capital constraints to
entry and only developers with adequate nancial
resources could acquire such sites.

When some of the supply side barriers were removed

by the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act in
Situation II, the joint effect of the policy measures on
en bloc land supply was evident. In late 1998 and early
1999, the residential property market began to improve.
Fig. 2 shows the marked increase in the demand for new
residential units as the Singapore economy began its
post-crisis recovery. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
this took many developers and even policy-makers by
surprise. As the housing inventories of many producers
were rapidly being depleted, developers who needed to
replenish their land banks began to source new sites.
The economic turn-around also saw demand for
development land from new entrants into the private
housing market. In the absence of GLS, these players
began to source land from private land owners.
En bloc activity began to emerge again in mid-1999.
However, the pace of collective sales gained momentum
only in the third quarter of 1999 when it became clear
that the enactment of enabling legislation to allow
majority rather than absolute consensus for a collective
sale to proceed was imminent. The Land Titles (Strata)
(Amendment) Bill was gazetted on 3 September 1999
and the amended Bill was brought into force on 11
October 1999. In essence, the law overcame site

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

Fig. 2. The RPPI and turnover in the private residential market.

assembly problems and was instrumental in removing

supply side obstacles from deals that would otherwise
have stalled because of dissenting unit owners. This,
coupled with a slow response from the GLS program,
resulted in a signicant supply of en bloc land in the
second policy-on period.
Did the measures induce the amalgamation of private land
sites?
Figs. 3 and 4 present the distribution of the site area
of en bloc parcels corresponding to the two policy-on
situations. For both cases, the distribution is skewed
toward the smaller size range. This is particularly so for
sites assembled in the earlier period. The average size of
these parcels was 4083 m2, a gure that was inated by
the presence of an outlier. Once this exceptionally large
site was removed, the average size fell to 3786 m2
(Fig. 5). In the second policy-on period, the average size
of sites assembled with the passage of enabling legislation was 6216 m2.
Compared to non-en bloc sites, privately owned land
parcels that were assembled through collective sales
were generally larger (see Table 1). While this implies
that the policy package did induce the amalgamation of
private land interests, there is a clear difference in the
size of collective sales sites in the two policy-on periods.
Although the DGP planning bonus triggered a large
number of parcels into the market, the supply that
resulted from the rst policy measure was dominated by
small-scale redevelopment sites. This has important
and unintended implications for the built environment,
an issue that we address below. In contrast, signicantly
larger sites were assembled after the enactment of the
Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act, an instrument

that offered private agents greater leverage for

amalgamating larger tracts of land for redevelopment
purposes.
What are the potential changes in net housing stock?
Since all the collective sales sites will eventually be
developed for housing, we estimated the potential net
effect of the policy measures on the private housing
stock. The last column in Tables 3 and 4 presents the
estimated number of housing units that are likely to be
developed on each of the assembled en bloc sites. Where
there are ongoing or completed projects or in cases
where development plans have been announced, the
actual number of units is reported. Otherwise, we have
assumed that future developments on the collective sale
sites will have an efciency factor of 87.5% (i.e. 87.5%
of the gross oor area will be saleable unit area) and
provide units with an average size of 116 m2.
Table 3 shows that the potential supply from en bloc
sites assembled in the rst policy-on period is estimated
to be around 4829 private housing units. Collective sales
in Table 4 which were concluded in the second policy-on
period are expected to generate another 5512 units. The
net increase in the future housing stock will be smaller
because of the demolition of existing houses. An
estimated 1398 residential units will be lost as a result
of en bloc sales in the pre-Asian crisis period whereas
about 1773 units will be replaced from the sites
amalgamated during our second policy-on period. Thus,
the net addition to supply is some 7170 private
residential units.
Based on an average annual take-up rate of 6500
private housing units over the last 3 years, collective
sales potentially add more than 1 years supply to the

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119
25

Series: AREA

20

No. Of Observations 90

15

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum

4082.917
3078.900
30472.00
462.600

10

0
0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Site Area of En Bloc Parcels (in sq.m.)

Fig. 3. Size distribution of en bloc sites, 19941997.

25

Series: AREA

20

No. of Observations 52

15

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum

6455.425
4221.200
26441.50
967.4000

10

0
0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

Site Area of En Bloc Parcels (in sq.m.)

Fig. 4. Size distribution of en bloc sites, 19992000.

16

Series: AREA

14
Observations 89
12
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum

10
8

3786.410
3053.400
16055.50
462.6000

6
4
2
0
0

2500

5000

7500

10000 12500 15000

Site Area of En Bloc Parcels (in sq.m.)

Fig. 5. Size distribution of en bloc sites with outlier removed, 19941997.

private residential market. However, the total take-up is

a composite number for units built on privately supplied
land and state land sold on 99-year leaseholds.
Considering that the average take-up rate for units built

on privately held land is no more than 2000 units per

annum over the past 3 years, en bloc sites could
potentially contribute about 4 years worth of supply
to the private housing sector.

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

Fig. 6. Newton and Tanglin DGP areas within the central region of Singapore.

However, the timing of this supply will depend on

market viability. Unlike state land sold under the GLS
program, developers who own en bloc sites are not
obliged to complete their residential schemes according
to a prescribed schedule. Indeed, many of the larger
players in the private housing supplier market have
bought these sites with the intention of building a
strategic prime residential land bank for future corporate expansion.
What are the unintended impacts of the policy measures?
Although the policy initiatives have had some
incipient success in achieving their targeted outcomes,
a few adverse impacts have surfaced. This section
presents an assessment of the unintended consequences
of the market-led policy measures based on our
examination of several en bloc hotspots in the Newton
and Tanglin DGPs within the Central Region of
Singapore (see Fig. 6). These areas have seen the
translation of higher FAR intensities into numerous
new developments and the impact of these developments
on the local environment is now evident.
On a positive note, many en bloc redevelopments
have brought about accelerated rejuvenation of residential areas as intended by policy makers. Older dilapidated structures have given way to new and modern
developments that not only optimize land use but have

also resulted in improved amenities for local residents.

In the process of renewal, current planning standards
such as those relating to building spacing, roadwidening, landscaping and the provision of amenities
have been imposed and incorporated. Thus, apart from
higher development intensities in many of these en bloc
areas, better quality housing and housing environments
have been achieved which is in line with the overall
planning objectives.
In certain areas however, urban renewal through
private sector efforts has had other planning impacts,
some of which are less than desirable for the local
environment particularly in the short and medium term.
We identify four such impacts below. Many of these are
common consequences of property-led regeneration
efforts where comprehensive urban renewal tends to
give way to piecemeal redevelopment of urban fragments (McGrew, 1992).
Timing and co-ordination
Under the en bloc sale mechanism, market forces
responding to the prospect of enhanced gains bring
about early renewal of potential sites. Here, the private
developers primary consideration would be based on
commercial motives and market demand, unlike the case
where redevelopment is undertaken by the public
sector. The latter would have to regard overall community needs as well as environmental concerns. Due

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

consideration would normally be given to the proper coordination and phasing of redevelopment efforts to
ensure a smooth and gradual transition from old to new
and from low to high density. Thus, urban renewal
would be comprehensive and systematic rather than ad
hoc and uncoordinated (Healey et al., 1988). We have
found in en bloc sale areas many sites that were
sandwiched between new and more intensive developments, when they themselves for whatever reasons were
either not ready or unable to capitalize on the en bloc
schemes. The result of such unsynchronized development is often a less than harmonious streetscape with an
incongruous mix of new and old developments of
different intensities.
In other instances, particularly in landed housing
areas, sites that were left out of the amalgamation
schemes became isolated or hemmed in by new and
more intensive developments with little opportunity for
redevelopment to similar intensities in future given their
relatively small plot sizes. This has been seen in many
areas where single old buildings sit as environmental
mists amidst new developments.
The long-term planning implication is that optimal
land use will only be attained for certain development
sites in the area, but not for the entire planning area.
These isolated buildings will remain, not only as blots on
the landscape to the detriment of the overall environmental quality of the entire renewed area, but also as
reminders to the community of lost opportunities and
sub-optimal development.
Developments not in tandem with infrastructure
improvements
When urban renewal is undertaken by the state on a
comprehensive basis, public infrastructure and support
services are usually planned and undertaken at the same
time to support the new developments. However, with
en bloc redevelopment undertaken on an ad hoc basis by
the private sector, the ability to tie in with public
infrastructure and services enhancement is rendered
more difcult. This is illustrated in the Balmoral Road
area in the Newton DGP.
One of the planning objectives of the Newton DGP
was to optimize the land use, particularly around the
Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station, by increasing the
total number of housing units by about 3200 units. Most
of the new units will be of the high density category, in
recognition of the proximity of the area to the centrally
located Orchard Road area and its good accessibility.
A closer study of some of the local areas in the DGP
revealed that many of them are quiet well-established
residential enclaves with predominantly single- or
double-storey landed housing, located in attractive local
environments well-integrated with mature vegetation
and are served by narrow local roads. In the Balmoral
Road area, the 1985 Master Plan plot ratio was 1.036.

However, the Newton DGP has rezoned it medium

density with a plot ratio of 1.6 although the area is more
than 200 m from the Newton MRT Station. Building
heights are to be increased to 10 storeys.
Prior to the release of the DGP, the area on both sides
of Balmoral Crescent has around 25 land plots, most of
them accommodating low-rise landed housing developments and a few small blocks of walk-up apartments.
Balmoral Crescent is a 15 m-wide dual carriageway local
access road. While the DGP envisages transportation
improvements to the area at the converging junction
between Clemenceau Avenue North and Newton Circus
as well as future local roads to serve developments on
the vacant land parcels around the Newton MRT
Station, few improvements have been proposed for the
existing local access road networks.
Fig. 7 shows the land plots in the Balmoral area as
well as extant developments on these sites. In response
to the DGP provisions, a total of ve recent en bloc
deals were recorded (marked with small dots) of which
two are under construction. Over 200 new dwelling units
are envisaged from these ve deals to replace the existing
40 odd dwelling units, a ve-fold increase. This is in
addition to the two new developments that have already
taken place (shown with large dots). The change in the
environmental character of the area is now becoming
evident, with the existing two-storey houses sandwiched
between newly completed 10-storey buildings and those
currently under construction. The quiet local road,
which is not expected to be further widened, will carry a
substantially increased trafc load. Further, the junctions with arterial roads are likely to encounter some
congestion impacts during the morning peak hours. This
will be more severe when all the sites are redeveloped.
Changing environmental character
While one of the Revised Concept Plan objectives is to
increase the proportion of private residential dwellings,
it is also intended that there should be greater variety of
housing forms. With the en bloc sales phenomenon
however, we envisage that many of the landed housing
areas will give way to medium to high-rise condominium
developments with the attendant changes in the
environmental character.
A case in point is the Walshe Road area off Stevens
Road. In the 1985 Master Plan, the Plot ratio was 1.036
with a maximum allowable height of two storeys. Prior
to the DGP changes, the area around Walshe Road had
around 20 houses, most of which were two-storey
bungalows on large sites. Walshe Road is a 15m-wide
dual carriageway local road that extends a short
distance from Stevens Road, and branches off from a
T-junction to cul-de-sacs on both sides. The area, shown
in Fig. 8, had a distinctive character with its established
residences integrated amidst greenery, mature trees and
beautiful landscape.

ARTICLE IN PRESS
10

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

Fig. 7. The Balmoral Road area within the Newton DGP area.

Under the Tanglin DGP, the plot ratio was raised to

1.6 and the height control revised to 10 storeys. Through
a series of well-conceived en bloc sales, the house plots
have been amalgamated into four large parcels for highrise condominium developments with over 250 new
dwelling units. With these new developments, a severe
change in the local environmental character has begun
to take place. From an informal cluster of distinctive
dwellings amidst luxuriant vegetation, a new high-rise
environment of glass and concrete monoliths has
emerged as shown in Fig. 9. The dense environment
is clearly felt at street level and rendered harsher given
the sparse vegetation and narrowness of the existing
cul-de-sac.
In other areas, particularly the River Valley belt
which saw much en bloc activity in our rst policy-on
period, amalgamated sites tend to be small. Redevelopment of these small sites often in the form of thin,
needle-shaped buildings with minimal communal facilities is also undesirable. The resulting streetscape is often
unsightly with the densely packed buildings aggravating
trafc congestion problems.
Early obsolescence of buildings
Urban renewal is normally undertaken when buildings or areas are ripe for redevelopment both economically and physically. The en bloc sales phenomenon is a

market response and tends to accelerate redevelopment

for buildings or areas which are available for
redevelopment due to their higher accorded planning
intensities. In effect, their economic life is shortened.
However, they may still be relatively new physically and
therefore of sound structure and could well remain
functional for many years yet. And, if built in recent
years, they would have met the relevant current
planning standards in terms of building set-backs, open
space provision, amenities and compliance with basic
planning and technical (public health, safety, utilities,
landscaping, re prevention, etc.) requirements.
Under these circumstances, their redevelopment,
purely in response to market factors, could be regarded
as wasteful of national resources. In an otherwise
conventional and well-conceived public sector initiated
urban renewal program, these buildings would probably
be phased in for redevelopment only after being given a
substantial run of its physical life. The more deteriorated
buildings, both physically and economically, would
normally be scheduled for redevelopment at the earlier
phases of such a program. The overall impact of the en
bloc sales phenomenon in this respect is the untimely
demolition and rebuilding of newer areas ahead of older
and more deserving areas, certainly not the most
efcient manner of managing land and building
resources.

ARTICLE IN PRESS
S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

11

Fig. 8. The Walshe Road area within the Tanglin DGP area pre-1994.

Fig. 9. The Walshe Road area within the Tanglin DGP area post-1994.

Conclusion
This paper evaluates the effectiveness and impacts of
two recent market-led policy initiatives in Singapore

that sought to encourage the private sector regeneration

of central city residential areas. In accordance with the
Revised Concept Plan, the rst measure provided
density bonuses in terms of higher plot ratios to many

ARTICLE IN PRESS
12

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

private urban sites through Development Guide Plans

(DGPs). Generally, sites that enjoyed betterment
potential were selected based on their proximity to
commercial areas and in line with the development
intensity of surrounding developments. This led to a
series of en bloc sales where diverse interests in land
were amalgamated and sold to private sector developers
for eventual redevelopment.
However, fragmented and multiple ownership of
many urban parcels often frustrated the realization of
the planning gain by private agents as well as the
states urban renewal objectives. The problems of
holdouts and minority objection to the assembly of
private interests were more acute in the central
area where prime land for higher-intensity residential
development was scarce. This resulted in a second
measure in the form of supporting legislation. Essentially, the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act
facilitated en bloc sales by requiring majority rather
than unanimous consent from existing land owners for a
sale to proceed.
Our evaluation shows that the rst policy measure of
DGP density incentives had limited success in achieving
desired planning outcomes. While there was an increase
in the number of private residential sites supplied, the
parcels were predominantly small. This stemmed from
the difculty in land assembly for properties held
under multiple ownership. The second measure
where facilitating legislation was enacted aided land
amalgamation efforts. When both policy initiatives were
in operation, the en bloc parcels supplied were larger
and had generally more efcient congurations. Measured in terms of high quality housing stock, the policy
measures are likely to generate about 4 years supply.
However, as with all market-led conversions, whether
the planning incentives will actually translate into new
developments and when this will take place depend on
effective demand and the state of the private residential
market.
Measured against a broader set of criteria, it is
unclear if the market-led redevelopment measures
are able to achieve the wider objectives of the
Revised Concept Plan effectively without imposing
signicant costs on the supporting infrastructure
as well as on the environment. Some of their
adverse and unintended consequences that are already
evident in central-city locations include: the markets
inability to organize and schedule redevelopment
efforts; the increase in trafc and infrastructure loading;
the loss of environmental character and incompatibility
with the surrounding context; and nally the acceleration of economic, but not functional or physical,
obsolescence.
Several of the negative externalities of en bloc
development can be attributed to the lack of a minimum
lot size requirement. In Hong Kong for example, a FAR

bonus is only given to developers if their redevelopment

reaches a certain threshold size of 400 m2 (Tang and
Tang, 1999). This can reduce the problems associated
with small-scale redevelopment sites. The more difcult
problem is the implementation gap associated with
urban intensication efforts. In land-scarce cities,
infrastructure pressures are amplied by planning
strategies based primarily on density. Unless planners
are clear about and are able to manage the exact
consequences of piecemeal redevelopment, policy delivery will be compromised.
The larger issue is whether the private sector can be
relied upon to achieve urban renewal goals in the future.
During the building boom of the early to mid-1990s,
high values of private residential property provided
an almost ideal lever for securing private sector
participation through zoning incentives. It is unlikely
that the bubble-like conditions prevalent then will be
repeated in the future. Further, en bloc activity thus far
has been focused on much of the older stock that
comprised small low-rise structures often in dilapidated
estates where the betterment premiums have been large
(Lum et al., 1999). At the next level of replacement are
medium-rise developments but the ever more marginal
viability of redeveloping them will make it increasingly
difcult for private developers to undertake such
projects. Despite the early success of the governments
policy measures, it is questionable whether the same
prescriptions will work in the longer term on a sufcient
scale or expeditiously enough to tackle the problems of
urban regeneration.
The Singapore planning system is still in a
period of trial and error in assessing what
strategies can work in delivering long-term development and land use optimization objectives. While its
experiment with urban intensication through en bloc
sales is fairly unique, there are broader implications
for other market-led measures that can be learnt.
Essentially, public sector efforts to implement urban
renewal through market-led redevelopment face
a dual land-use policy challenge. On the one hand,
the state must ensure that sufcient incentives are provided to attract private sector investment. However,
such piecemeal investment by private developers
with the single perspective of prot-maximization is
largely reactionary, uncoordinated and market-determined. For market-led renewal to be sustainable,
planners must concurrently ensure that policy execution
mitigates the detrimental consequences associated with
urban intensication.

Appendix A
The microdata on all the concluded en bloc sales
transactions are presented in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3
Concluded en bloc deals in rst policy-on period
No.

Price
($psf)

New PR

No. of units
(estimated)

7019.2

90.25

1195

853

1.4

74

4697

24.6888

488

349

1.4

16

Oct-94

11A & 13 Nassim Rd

Oct-94

2A-2R Limau Gardens

Oct-94

3 Toh Tuck Lane

Toh Tuck Gardens

Nov-94

Upper Changi Rd North/Tampines Rd

Changi Heights

Dec-94

711 Walshe Rd

5895.7

73.6

1160

725

1.6

56

Jan-95

78,80,y,88 Mount Sinai Drive

Gochek Apts

2950.5

31.23

983

475

2.1

60

Feb-95

17 Tomlinson Rd

Tomlinson Mansion

3104.4

62

1855

442

4.2

29

Mar-95

42 & 44 Kim Yan Rd

7137.8

68.3

889

317

2.8

130

Stevens Rd/Walshe Rd
42 Surrey Rd

11

Mar-95

7 & 9 Ewe Boon Rd

12

May-95

38-38G Farrer Rd

May-95

34 Farrer Rd

May-95

AMALGAMATED SITES

13

18-May-95

2A/B, 4/4A/4B & 6-6E Ewe Boon Rd

14

Jun-95

17 Newton Rd

Jun-95

21 Newton Rd

Lincoln Mansion

16.4
116

405

290

1.4

40

354

NA

NA

105

6351.3

82.38

1205

753

1.6

82

1177.8

14.8

1167

417

2.8

25

3153

27.88

821

513

1.6

38

Farrer Grove

1.6
1.6

Miramar Mansion

4499.6

35.75

738

1989.2

23

1074

2636.7

45.89

1617

461

1.6

48

512

2.1

31

577

2.8

740.7

8.75

1097

392

2.8

AMALGAMATED SITES

3377.4

54.64

1503

537

2.8

71

7667.2

93.3

1131

707

1.6

82

38.2

1413

505

2.8

61

1135

405

2.8

1135

405

2.8

1135

405

2.8

15

Aug-95

Stevens Rd/Walshe Rd/Anderson Rd

16

Aug-95

Newton & Keng Lee Rd

Newton Mansion

2512.3

17

Sep-95

Shanghai Rd

Shanghai Court

1297.7

Sep-95

Shanghai Rd

Shanghai Residence

AMALGAMATED SITES

697.8
1995.4

Sep-95

Butterworth Lane

19

Oct-95

21 Moulmein Rise

20

Nov-95

43 & 45 Moonstone Lane

21

6-Dec-95

27 Adam Rd

22

6-Dec-95

6/A/B/C Balmoral Crescent

23

18-Dec-95

Stevens Drive

24

Jun-96

1C, 3C & 7A Stevens Drive

AMALGAMATED SITES

8839.1

25

Jan-96

1115G Jln Mutiara

1843.4

26

Jan-96

9 & 9A Balmoral Rd

27

9-Jan-96

15 Balmoral Rd

28

13-Jan-96

29

22-Jan-96 to 5-Feb-96

52

2143.7

19.61375

850

304

2.8

49

1207.4

14.35

1104

394

2.8

25

3700.5

24.5

615

293

2.1

76

2937.7

20.01

633

452

1.4

96

2800.7

36.1752

1200

750

1.6

16

Robin Heights &

7202

78.9

1018

727

Fontana Gdns

1637.1

Moulmein Lodge
Adam Gdn

1.4
1.4

25.85

1303

465

1.4

48

2.8

64

1830.0

23

1168

730

1.6

22

3520.1

49.181809

1298

811

1.6

42

12/y/20C Brooke Rd

2454.5

20.2916668

8 Pulasan Rd

1434.2

Balmoral Court

8.2

768

366

2.1

39

531

379

1.4

15

13

18

24.38

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Mar-95
Mar-95

3757.8
30472

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

Cosy Mansions

Site area
(m2)

Price
($psf/ppr)

Address

10

Project Name

Proceeds
($ million)

Date of sale

14

Table 3 (continued)
Project Name

Site area
(m2)

Proceeds
($ million)

Price
($psf)

Price
($psf/ppr)

New PR

No. of units
(estimated)

Date of sale

Address

30

25-Jan-96

10/A/B/C/12/A/B/C Moulmein Rise

31

30-Jan-96

3438C St Thomas Walk

32

Feb-96

Balmoral Crescent

33

Mar-96

8 Balmoral Road

34

28-Feb-96

35/35A/37/37A/y/45A Robin Rd

Belville Gdns

3159.2

43

1265

35

Mar-96

10/G/12/G/14/G St. Martins Drive

St Martins Place

4283.2

57.6

1249

36

Oct-96

4A/4B/6/6A/6B St. Martins Drive

St. Martins Court

1357.3

16.05

1099

785

1.4

May-97

2 St. Martins Drive

1409.4

19.35

1275

911

1.4

AMALGAMATED SITES

7049.9

93

1226

875

1.4

82

1667.4

27.55

1535

548

2.8

36

1799.2

18

929

443

2.1

28

1191.7

13.7

1068

381

2.8

25

St Thomas Apts

1059.7

13.222

1159

414

2.8

23

8400.6

126.6

1400

875

1.6

65

Balmoral Lodge

2025.6

27.5

1261

788

1.6

24

790

1.6

48

892

1.4

28-Mar-96

121 Keng Lee Rd

The Carmina

38

28-Mar-96

8L/y/R Tanjong Rhu Rd

39

29-Mar-96

190 Moulmein Rd

40

Apr-96

17/A/B/C, 15E/F & 15G Shelford Rd

41

23-May-96

11G Shelford Rd

Shelford Condo

4229.1

36.964

812

580

1.4

45

42

14-Jan-97

17E-Y Shelford Road

Shelford Gdns

4129.4

37

832

595

1.4

44

43

Mar-97

11D & E Shelford Road

Shelford Lodge

1765.5

15.4

810

579

1.4

19

Mar-97

406 Dunearn Rd

1373.5

12

812

580

1.4

14

AMALGAMATED SITES

3139

27.4

811

579

1.4

Zhen Sheng Mansion

1806.3

27.1

1394

498

2.8

56

3716.4

37.4

935

668

1.4

39

44

3-Apr-96

6 Sarkies Rd

1710.2

24.8

1347

842

1.6

45

4-Apr-96

20/A/B/C/y/26C Jln Raja Udang

1839.7

20.8

1050

375

2.8

39

46

16-Apr-96

104/y/H Holland Rd

2219.8

16.5

691

493

1.4

23

47

16-Apr-96

11/A/B/13/A/B/15A/15B Shanghai Rd

637.7

8.3

1209

432

2.8

13

48

26-Apr-96

2/A/B/C/4/A/B/C Jln Mutiara

930.1

12.96

1295

462

2.8
2.8

37

15

1250

893

1.4

12

49

Holland Apt

Development site at Jln Mutiara

32

921.7

AMALGAMATED SITES

1851.8
1114.8

50

30-Apr-96

18/A/B/20/A/B St. Martins Drive

51

14-May-96

561 Upper Serangoon Rd

Yardley Court

2421.5

23.6

905

323

2.8

57

52

15-May-96

145D Jalan Korma

Thomson Court

10540.5

207.98

1833

655

2.8

276

53

24-Jun-96 to 3-Apr-97

205 Moulmein Rd

Moulmein Apts

1829.9

40.4

2051

733

2.8

54

27-May-96

207 Moulmein Rd

Angel Court

2040.2

39.3

1790

639

2.8

55

24-Jan-96 to 3-Apr-97

136/A/y150C Moulmein Rd

Thomson Apts

1889.6

40.3

1981

708

2.8

1936

691

2.8

136

31.9

2972

1061

2.8

21

2299.8

31

1252

783

1.6

28

AMALGAMATED SITES

5759.7

56

Jun-96

Hullet Rd

57

27-Jun-96

3 Balmoral Rd

58

11-Jul-96

3 Peck Hay Rd

Peck Hay Court

1219.9

27.82

2119

757

2.8

11-Jul-96

5 Peck Hay Rd

Peck Hay View

1326.9

24.88

1742

622

2.8

Feb-97

7 & 7A Peck Hay Rd

18

2028

724

2.8

70.7

1948

696

2.8

59

AMALGAMATED SITES

Hullet Court

997.3

120

824.4
3371.2

63

ARTICLE IN PRESS

37

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

No.

60

Jul-96

176 Keng Lee Rd & 5 Lincoln Rd

Xiang Court

3182.8

57

1664

594

2.8

60

61

18-Jul-96

2 Tanjong Rhu Rd

Fort Apts

2138.6

24.17

1050

500

2.1

32

62

Jul-96

17/A/B Surrey Rd & 32 Lincoln Rd

1741.7

32.08

1711

611

2.8

32

63

3-Aug-96

26 Paterson Rd

Paterson View

2359

46.89

1847

660

2.8

61

64

10-Aug-96

20, 22 & 24 Shelford Rd

Shelford Apts

7025.7

70.556

933

666

1.4

74

65

Aug-96

18/A/B/20/A/B St. Martins Drive

St Martins Mansion

1114.8

15

1250

893

1.4

Aug-96

23 St. Martins Drive

2259.4

30.4

1250

893

1.4

Nov-96

16, St. Martins Drive

1567.7

21.09

1250

893

1.4

4941.9

66.5

1250

893

1.4

52

66

19-Sep-96

515 & 517 Dunman Rd

Dunman Court

3412.4

36.25

987

352

2.8

69

67

9-Oct-96

Palm Grove Avenue

Zhen Ji Gdn

111

68

4-Nov-96

8, 10, 12, 23 & 25 Grange Garden

69

6-Nov-96

71 & 73 Paterson Rd

AMALGAMATED SITES

4462.8
City Mansions

7453.7

56
94.1535
139

460

329

1.4

1960

933

2.1

57

1733

825

2.1

116

130/A/y/V Cairnhill Rd

Cairnhill Apts

2247.1

60.7701998

2512

897

2.8

134 Cairnhill Rd

Galleria Apts

2057

55.6298

2512

897

2.8

AMALGAMATED SITES

4304.1

116.4

2512

897

2.8

46

71

Nov-96

49 & 51 Leedon Park

9365.6

55.5

551

72

Nov-96

11/A/y/L Martia Rd

Martia Court

5136.4

29.2

528

377

1.4

58

73

Jan-97

Yan Kit Rd

2274.6

26.45

1080

386

2.8

36

74

15-Jan-97

83 Cairnhill Rd

Scotts Tower

3040.3

96.8

2958

1056

2.8

64

75

Mar-97

1 Essex Rd

Essex Towers

3053.4

48

76

Mar-97

140186A Sixth Ave

Avenue Park

16,055.5

77

Apr-97

63, 65, 67 & 69 Cairnhill Circle

78

May-97

4, 6, 8 & 10 Suffolk Rd

79

May-97

49 Devonshire Rd

80

May-97

114 Holland Rd

Chateau de Hollande

2345.4

May-97

114A Holland Rd

Spring Court

1460

522

2.8

52

165.251

956

683

1.4

169

1038.9

25.4

2271

811

2.8

16

1624.1

23.2

1327

474

2.8

33

1280.4

31

2249

803

2.8

23

2325.5

31.8181818

1271

908

1.4

1.4

AMALGAMATED SITES

4670.9

63.3

1259

899

1.4

49

81

30-May-97

14,12A,14A Shelford Rd

4137.3

36.9

829

592

1.4

44

82

9-Jun-97

30 Farrer Rd

10-Jun-97

36 Farrer Rd

1.4

17

876

9.240851

980

714.4

7.5362

980

AMALGAMATED SITES

1590.4

16.777051

980

4220.0

20.2

445

318

1.4

48

12,535.6

77.1

571

408

1.4

134

12.36

1781

83

13-Jun-97

14/y/16C Palm Grove Avenue

84

Jun-97

Sunset Way

85

Jul-97

14,16,20/A/B/C Lor 6 Geylang

86

Jul-97

121 except 9 Taman Warna

16-Sep-97

9 Taman Warna

Clementi Park S C

644.6
6358

78.26

1144

817

496.8

6.11

1144

817

1.4
1.4

AMALGAMATED SITES

6854.8

84.37

1144

817

1.4

112

2-Aug-97

4/A/B/C/y/10C Kay Poh Rd

1307.9

20

1421

507

2.8

28

88

7-Aug-97

36/A/B/38/A/B Draycott Drive

1465.8

39.33

2493

890

2.8

31

89

19-Aug-97

3A/B/C/D & 5A/B/C/D Surrey Rd

703.3

9.74

1287

460

2.8

15

Surrey Ville

15

87

ARTICLE IN PRESS

9-Nov-96
9-Nov-96

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

70

11,303.1

16

Table 3 (continued)
Price
($psf)

Price
($psf/ppr)

New PR

No. of units
(estimated)

Date of sale

Address

Project Name

90

Sep-97

13 Balmoral Rd

Balmoral Green

3291.3

48.5

1369

856

1.6

91

Sep-97

23, 25, y, 37 Cairnhill Circle

3708.2

85

2130

761

2.8

78

92

16-Sep-97

56A/B/C/D/E/F/G, 58 & 60 Gilstead Rd

3013.0

28

863

617

1.4

32

93

Sep-97

Jln Mutiara

1105.2

19.2

1614

576

2.8

108

Jln Mutiara

2410.8

94

Site area
(m2)

Proceeds
($ million)

No.

AMALGAMATED SITES

3516.0

95

17-Oct-97

6 Mar Thoma Rd

1588

96

3-Nov-97

11/11A/11B Suffolk Rd

97

26-Nov-97

174188B Duchess Ave

462.6
Casabella

9951.4
367,462.5

5.582739
84.138
4211.6404

731

261

2.8

34

1121

400

2.8

10

785

561

1.4

105
4829

ARTICLE IN PRESS

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

Total

12.5

40

Table 4
Concluded en bloc deals in second policy-on period
No.

Date of sale

Address

Project name

Site area
(m2)

Duchess Park

Proceeds
($ million)

Price
($psf)

1495.4

13.129

816

5318.1

47

Jun-99

1 & 1A Balmoral Crescent

5-Aug-99

Duchess Rd

5-Aug-99

24 Duchess Rd

1947

14.3

5-Aug-99

AMALGAMATED SITES

7265.1

61.3

4567.9
813.1

5-Aug-99

355 Bukit Timah Rd

Naga Court

Aug-99

40 St Michaels Rd

Amyton Court

2226 Mar Thoma Rd

2794.6

AMALGAMATED SITES

3607.7
2566.5

1.6

No. of units
(estimated)
20

1.4
1.4
560

1.4

77

72.12

1467

698

2.1

72

5.95

1035

1035

370

2.8

54

928

331

2.8

112

80

Aug-99

18 & 20 Lorong Limau

Samford Mansion

1086.2

22, 24, 26 & 28 Lorong Limau

Limau Mansion

1087.4

3038 Lorong Limau

Kim Keat Mansion

1955.6

19.42

1216 Lorong Limau

Prospect Mansion

1167.4

10.78

5296.6

52.88

28.6
21.8

Aug-99

Butterworth & Ipoh Lanes

6047.3

57.84

889

317

2.8

25-Aug-99

8, 2028 Butterworth Lane

3998.6

47.34

1100

393

2.8

10045.9

105.18

973

347

2.8

227

10

26-Aug-99

1 Sunshine Terrace

Sunshine Apts

1942.7

18.8

899

321

2.8

41

11

10-Sep-99

11 Buckley Rd

Buckley Mansion

4096.5

43

975

697

1.4

43

12

15-Sep-99

16, 20, 22 & 22A Duchess Rd

4345.2

37

791

565

1.4

46

13

Sep-99

17 & 19 Trevose Crescent

3001.5

17.5

542

NA

NA

14

Sep-99

315 River Valley Close

Sep-99

River Valley Close

River Valley View

3749.4

73.5

15

Nov-99

1 River Valley Close

Chen Yuan Bldg

1889.0

37.48

1843

658

2.8

AMALGAMATED SITES

5638.3

110.98

1829

653

2.8

119

2117

756

2.8

85

895

639

1.4

44

AMALGAMATED SITES

Dragon Pearl Apt

2.8
2.8

16

17-Sep-99

Devonshire Rd

4036.8

92

17

22-Sep-99

16, 18 & 18A Buckley Rd

4214.5

40.6

18

29-Sep-99

17 Evelyn Rd

Ixora Court

4014.6

84

1944

694

2.8

85

19

Oct-99

4/A/y/E Balmoral Crescent

Balmoral Haven

3296.4

38.3

1079

675

1.6

40

20

Oct-99

46, 48 & 50 Ewe Boon Rd

967.4

21

Oct-99

Mei Hwan View

Goldenhill Condo

24,340.4

175.8

671

22

29-Oct-99

37, 39 & 41 Bedok Rd

Country Park

14,791.8

65.5

411

23

Nov-99

Kim Keat Lane

2601.3

25

24

Nov-99

2549A Kim Keat Lane

3453.9

35.27

25

Nov-99

5 Balmoral Park

3517.1

42

5 Balmoral Park

2.1

15

320

2.1

385

294

1.4

156

2.8

55

949

339

2.8

73

1109

693

1.6

42

ARTICLE IN PRESS

1828 Ipoh Lane

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

6-Aug-99

AMALGAMATED SITES

510

New PR

784

Price
($psf/ppr)

17

18

Table 4 (continued)
No.

Date of sale

Address

Project name

26

2-Nov-99

22,26,28,30,32,34 & 36 Shanghai Rd

27

10-Nov-99

Killiney Rd

Devonshire Court

28

10-Nov-99

Meyer Rd

10-Nov-99

Meyer Rd

Site area
(m2)
2376.4

Proceeds
($ million)
23.8

5405.1

123

First Mansion

10921.0

176

Meyer Tower

7293.7

117

18,214.7

293

AMALGAMATED SITES

Price
($psf)

Price
($psf/ppr)

New PR

No. of units
(estimated)

930

443

2.1

38

2114

755

2.8

114

2.8
2.8
1494

534

2.8

384

948

339

2.8

69

2, 4 & 6 Ah Hood Rd

Balestier Mansion

3272.2

33.39

30

12-Nov-99

Grange Rd & Paterson Rd

Grange Mansion

5090.9

92

1679

799

2.1

81

31

16-Nov-99

Grange Rd

Kim Lin Mansion

11,660.0

251

2000

952

2.1

184

32

17-Nov-99

6 Cuscaden Walk

Cuscaden Tower

3568.6

86

2239

800

2.8

77

33

Dec-99

11 Newton Rd

Newton Point

4254.4

78

1703

608

2.8

90

34

Dec-99

Serangoon Ave 3

Arang Court

605

288

2.1

177

35

Dec-99

St. Michaels Rd & Jln Taman

5900.7

50.35

793

283

2.8

124

36

Dec-99

Carlisle Rd

Norfolk Garden

2909.0

35.7

1140

407

2.8

61

37

Dec-99

Mandalay Rd

Mandalay Court

4513.4

51.7

1064

380

2.8

95

38

11,182.1

72.81

Apr-99

Shelford Rd

Mediterranean

1034.9

10.99

987

705

1.4

11

2-Dec-99

Shelford Rd

Townhouses

4147.2

34.6

775

554

1.4

44

AMALGAMATED SITES

1.4

Dec-99

22 St. Martins Drive

39

10-Dec-99

51 Meyer Rd

Viewpoint Condo

1227.8

14.2

1074

767

1.4

13

7495.7

123.3

1528

546

2.8

158

40

Jan-00

South Buona Vista

Chwee Chian Gdn

41

Jan-00

Elias Rd

Pasir Ris Garden

26,441.5

440

314

1.4

52

615

293

2.1

418

42

Jan-00

13, 15 & 17 Moulmein Rise

43

Jan-00

35101A Mt Sinai Lane

Grenville Condo

19,544.4

44

Jan-00

121A Grange Rd

Grange Garden

1760

838

2.1

67

45

18-Jan-00

West Coast Rd

Tat Lee Court

24,172.3

122

469

293

1.6

291

46

Feb-00

Cairnhill Circle

Cairnhill Court

11,762.1

315

Feb-00

4 Cairnhill Circle

47

Feb-00

Jalan Loyang Besar

48

Mar-00

Evelyn Rd

Seedevi

2441.9

44.6

1697

49

Mar-00

3 Derbyshire Rd

Derbyshire Court

1116.5

13

1082

50

Mar-00

9 & 11 Balmoral Park

Balmoral Park Maisonettes

5656.5

67.2

1104

690

51

Apr-00

12,12A & 12B Nassim Rd

3998.8

53

1231

880

1.4

36

52

Jul-00

Mimosa Walk

Mimosa Court

6159.8

21

317

305

1.04

20

53

Aug-00

20/y/26C Martaban Rd

Martaban Court

1969.4

17.8

840

300

2.8

44

54

Sep-00

Bedok Rd

Prospect Court

3104.9

11.2

335

323

1.04

16

4941.7
1896.5
4227.9

2836.3

AMALGAMATED SITES

14,598.4
Loyang Lodge

Total

4055.0

335,682.2

23.4
175
31.4
157
80.1

1538

549

2.8

40

746

533

1.4

206

2488

889

2.8

5560

18021965

643702

2.8

370375

23552386

841852

2.8

308

254

1.4

120

606

2.8

210

386

2.8

25

1.6

58

15

3748.5693753.569

344

5512

ARTICLE IN PRESS

12-Nov-99

S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

29

ARTICLE IN PRESS
S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

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