Studia Politica 2014 XIV 1-Libre

Romanian Political Science Review
vol. XIV, no. 1

2014
The end of the Cold War, and the extinction of communism both as an ideology
and a practice of government, not only have made possible an unparalleled
experiment in building a democratic order in Central and Eastern Europe, but
have opened up a most extraordinary intellectual opportunity: to understand,
compare and eventually appraise what had previously been neither understandable
nor comparable. Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review was
established in the realization that the problems and con cerns of both new and
old democracies are beginning to converge. The journal fosters the work of the
first generations of Romanian political scientists permeated by a sense of
critical engagement with European and American intellectual and political
traditions that inspired and explained the modern notions of democracy,
pluralism, political liberty, individual freedom, and civil rights.
Believing that ideas do matter, the Editors share a common commitment as
intellectuals and scholars to try to shed light on the major political problems
facing Romania, a country that has recently undergone unprecedented political
and social changes. They think of Studia Politica. Romanian Politica Science
Review as a challenge and a mandate to be involved in scholarly issues of
fundamental importance, related not only to the democratization of Romanian
polity and politics, to the great transformation that is taking place in Central
and Eastern Europe, but also to the make-over of the assumptions and prospects
of their discipline. They hope to be joined in by those scholars in other countries
who feel that the demise of communism calls for a new political science able to
reassess the very foundations of democratic ideals and procedures.
UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
vol. XIV, no. 1

2014
STUDIA POLITICA
(ISSN 1582-4551)

is published quarterly by the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Bucharest
an dis printed and mailed by Bucharest University Press
International Advisory Board

Mauro CALISE (Universit Federico II di Napoli), Dominique COLAS (IEP Paris)
Jean-Michel DE WAELE (Universit Libre de Bruxelles)
Jean-Michel EYMERI-DOUZANS (IEP Toulouse)
Raffaella GHERARDI (Universit degli Studi di Bologna), Guy HERMET (IEP Paris)
Marc LAZAR (IEP Paris), Ronald H. LINDEN (University of Pittsburgh)
Pierre MANENT (EHESS Paris), Leonardo MORLINO (LUISS Roma)
Gianfranco PASQUINO (Bologna), Cristian PREDA (Universitatea din Bucureti)
Antoine ROGER (IEP Bordeaux), Giovanni SARTORI (New York)
Marco TARCHI (Universit di Firenze)
Editor
Alexandra IONESCU
Editorial Board
Andrei NICULESCU, Mihai CHIOVEANU, Ruxandra IVAN
Caterina PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Claudiu TUFI
Matei DEMETRESCU
Editorial Staff
Irina HRICU (editor)
Emeline-Daniela Avram (desktop publisher manuscript & cover graphic)
Facultatea de tiine Politice, Universitatea din Bucureti

Revist nregistrat n BDI
Contents
ARTICULI ...........................................................................................
RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY, A Critical Assessment of the Concept of

Europeanization in Light of the State of the Union ...........................................
FLORIN N. FENIC, OANA I. ARMEANU, Does Education Make Voters More Leftist or
More Rightist? A West vs. East Cross-Regional Analysis .................................
29
IONU APAHIDEANU, Unicameralism versus Bicameralism Revisited. The Case of

Romania ............................................................................................................
47
DNU-FLORIN SANDOVICI, Republicile non-arabe din Orientul Mijlociu. Orientri

geopolitice i de securitate n perioada post-Rzboiul Rece .............................
89
RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU, Libert, ordre et gouvernement, entre Anciens et Modernes.

Du modle politique roumain (1821-1830) .......................................................
111
RECENSIONES ..................................................................................
133
MAURO CALISE, Fuorigioco. La sinistra contro i suoi leader, Laterza, Roma-Bari,

2013 (ALEXANDRA IONESCU) .............................................................................
135
FABIO BORDIGNON, Il partito del capo. Da Berlusconi a Renzi, Maggioli Editore,

Santarcangelo di Romagna, 2013 (SORINA SOARE) ...........................................
141
ABSTRACTS .......................................................................................
149
AUTORES ............................................................................................
153
A Critical Assessment of the Concept

of Europeanization in Light
of the State of the Union
RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY
INTRODUCTION
As many scholars of EU integration, we belong to those who have at least
once embraced Europeanization and demonstrated in a paper that our object of
study may it be an organization, an institution, a policy, an actor, a
phenomenon, or a country etc was subject to a Europeanization process. Since
the late 1990s, Europeanization has become a catch-all label for investigating
all kinds of transformations (allegedly) induced by the economic and political
unification of the European continent. Today, we believe, the dramatic state of
the Union calls for a collective effort among the scholarly community to
understand how we can better account for the problems that the EU and its
Member States are facing. While journalists, various observers or even ordinary
citizens are speculating on the collapse of the EU, there is a need to re-examine
what we mean by Europeanization and, according to a well-known phrase, how
we know when we see it. This article is a first attempt to take up the debate with
those who have been prominent in theorizing and driving this research agenda,
those who have been inspired by it and have contributed to it, as well as those
who have been more critical. Our main argument is that, after an extremely
productive decade where thousands of academic articles and books on
Europeanization were published, we, students of the EU, are still in search of
Europeanization: the concept, the causes and the effects connected to
Europeanization remain, to a large extent, dark matters.
The study of EU integration has long been driven by the question of the
drivers of integration. Besides this debate, complementary research agendas have
emerged. Together with multi-level governance, Europeanization has been a
central concept in this respect. While the definition of Europeanization has fed a
vivid academic debate1, it is today mostly understood as the impact of EU integration
1
Claudio M. RADAELLI, Whiter Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive

Change, European Integration Online Papers, vol. 4, no. 8, 2000, pp. 1-28; Johan P. OLSEN,
10
on domestic political systems. This impact has been studied in relationship with
the three fundamental dimensions of political science: the politics, policies and
polities of the EU Member States and even of non-EU countries. While they
made a substantial contribution to the theorization of Europeanization, scholars of
politics have agreed that although triggering processes of national institutions2
and modifying the opportunity structures for interest groups3 the impact of
integration on political competition in the national arenas remained modest.
Findings have been more significant in the realm of public policy: numerous
case studies have brought evidence of policy change as a result of the
implementation and translation of EU policies4. Besides formal adjustment to
new EU provisions, scholars have also focused on the cognitive and normative
adaptation of actors and policy communities, including local and regional authorities5.
One of the main claims here is that Europeanization has a differential impact,
depending on the existing national structures and agents. The Europeanization
of national polities has called for more mitigated results. On the one hand, many
scholars have found only a weak Europeanization of national public spheres6.
On the other hand, many scholars have provided accounts of the disruptive
effect of EU integration on national democracies, especially as far as simple
polities are concerned7 and the re-composition of centre-periphery relationships
in recomposed multi-level governance in Europe8.
The Many Faces of Europeanization, ARENA Working Paper, 2002; Robert LADRECH,
Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis, Party
Politics, vol. 8, no. 4, 2002, pp. 389-403; Thomas POGUNTKE, Nicolas AYLOTT,
Robert LADRECH, Kurt R. LUTHER, The Europeanization of National Party
Organizations: A Conceptual Analysis, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 46,
no. 6, 2007, pp. 747-771.
Yves MENY, Pierre MULLER, Jean-Louis QUERMONNE, Adjusting to Europe: the Impact
of the European Union on National Unstitutions and Policies, Routledge, London, 1996.
Rosa S. SALGADO, Cornelia WOLL, L'Europe en action: l'europanisation dans une
perspective compare, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2007; Richard BALME, Didier CHABANET,
European Governance and Democracy. Power and Protest in the EU, Rowman & Littlefield,
Lanham, 2008.
James CAPORASO, Maria G. COWLES, Thomas RISSE, Transforming Europe.
Europeanization and Domestic Change, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London,
2001; Bruno PALIER, Yves SUREL, LEurope en action. Leuropanisation dans une
perspective compare, LHarmattan, Paris, 2007.
Romain PASQUIER, Cognitive Europeanization and the Territorial Effects of Multilevel
Policy Transfer: Local Development in French and Spanish Regions, Regional & Federal
Studies, vol. 15, no. 3, 2005, pp. 295-310.
Ruud KOOPMANS, Paul STATHAM, The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media
Discourse and Political Contention, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
Vivienne A. SCHMIDT, Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Polities, Oxford
University Press, Oxford & New York, 2006.
Beate KOHLER-KOCH, Rainer EISING, Hans HERMAN, Jan W. VAN DETH, The
Transformation of Governance in the European Union, Routledge, London, 1999.
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A Critical Assessment of the Concept of Europeanization in Light of the State of the Union
11
While it has brought an impressive sum of knowledge about political

processes in the EU, the literature on Europeanization also displays a number of
problems and contradictions which fall under two related aspects. The first is the
tension between Europeanization as a broad research agenda and Europeanization
as a concept. For sure, the pioneers of Europeanization were soon aware that
Europeanization is not captured by, nor does it fully constitute, any single
explanatory term9. However, the numerous scholars inspired by Europeanization
have mostly understood it as middle-range explanatory theory, relying on EU
integration as an independent variable and, hence, have sought to trace specific
domestic changes to developments emanating from the policy-making output
and/or decision-making style of the European Union10. The second contradiction
is related to the connection between Europeanization and the EU. While most
scholars acknowledge that the political transformations under way in Europe
cannot be solely accounted for by the constraints created by the institutional
framework of the EU alone, only a very small number of them have engaged
with explanatory factors unrelated to the former. The consequence of those two
methodological problems is a hiatus between, on the one hand, the desire to
explain a process of deep (structural) transformation, and, on the other, a focus
on mechanisms and agents that turn out not to be conducive to such an impact.
Our objective here is neither to provide for a state of the art of
Europeanization research nor to deny the relevance of what has been
accomplished by Europeanization scholars. Rather, it is to provide a critical and
reflexive assessment of this research. We are aware that many of the arguments
put forward here are not completely new and some have been addressed by
scholars of Europeanization themselves11. Those reflexive remarks or mitigated
results scattered in the literature have nevertheless failed to trigger a broad
reflexive debate concerning the unsolved problems related to the
Europeanization approach. Such a reflection shall not remain in abstracto or
simply for the sake of feeding epistemological discussions. These issues are
important because they have influenced the way scholars have interpreted and
conveyed out there, i.e assessments of EU integration in the real world of
political actors and decision-makers. In this respect, we will examine the
consequences of methodological biases in two areas that are paramount for what
we call the current state of the Union, namely democracy and economic
9
10
11
Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Claudio RADAELLI, The Politics of Europeanization,

Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 333.
Robert LADRECH, Europeanization and National Politics, Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 2010, p. 2.
Paolo GRAZIANO, Maarten P. VINK (eds.), Europeanization. New Research Agendas,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008; Claudio M. RADAELLI, Theofanis EXADAKTYLOS,
Research Design in European Studies: The Case of Europeanization, Journal of
Common Market Studies, vol. 47, no. 3, 2011, pp. 507-530.
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12
integration. The first and second section of this paper deal with the problems
related to Europeanization as a concept (section 1) and as a causal explanation
(section 2). Section 3 explains how some methodological biases have arguably
led to the over-estimation of the effects of Europeanization. For doing so, we
address two main issues at stake in the EU today; namely the democratization
and socio-economic reforms in Southern Europe.
IN SEARCH OF A CONCEPT: UROPEANIZATION

INSIDE AND OUTSIDE EU STUDIES
An Old Concept:
The Historical Dimension of Europeanization
Europeanization is an old trans-disciplinary concept. Its origins can be
found far beyond the recent scholarship on EU integration. Analyzing its
genesis in a historical sociological perspective, it appears that Europeanization
is not a new phenomenon that can be bracketed in the present12. Trying to
better capture the evolution of its meaning, scope and content, different stages
of Europeanization have been identified in a historical perspective: a period of
European self-realization (which ends in 1450), a period of proto Europeanization
(1450-1700), a period of incipit Europeanization (1700-1919), the period of
contemporary (inward) Europeanization (1919 to present) and a period of
contemporary (outward) Europeanization (starting with 1945). Comparing
them, Flockhart argues that each stage of Europeanization is characterized by
different ideational structures, agents, processes and diffusion patterns13. The
reality depicted by each stage is certainly not the same because the political and
social reality to which they refer is substantially different. Meanwhile,
Europeanization has always been understood as variety of political, social,
economic and cultural processes of transformation. A careful examination of the
old definitions attributed to the concept leads to the conclusion that the term has
kept its original meaning over time, regardless of the emergence and
development of the political regime of the EU. Europeanization is an ongoing
process across time and space, which has changed over time in response to
different structural conditions and changing agent identities14.
12
13
14
Trine FLOCKHART, Europeanization and Eu-ization? The transfer of European Norms

across Time and Space, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 48, no. 4, 2010, p. 788.
Ibidem.
Ibidem, p. 793.
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Inward and Outward Looking

Initially, Europeanization referred to an outward-facing process:
For a long time, the term was primarily used with regard to non-European
spaces, to conceptualize the Europeanization of the world, mainly as part of the European
processes of expansion which took place from the early modern period onward15.
This outward dimension of Europeanization corresponds to the Enlightenment

when the West, considered as superior in terms of values and developments,
fascinated intellectuals and political elites from the periphery of the continent.
They borrowed the Western state political system, administrative and organizational
practices, institutional and constitutional forms of political development. In
Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 19th century, Europeanization
designated the political will to catch up with the economically well-developed
West16. In the first part of the 20th century, Europeanization or Westernization
denoted the political, social, economic and intellectual transformation17 under
the influence of industrialized societies.
In recent years, Europeanization has been conceptualized as an inward
process but the difference between the inward and outward Europeanization is
thin. For example, the definition provided by Kohn in 1937 concerning the
Europeanization of the Orient is not totally different from the well-known and
extensively used definition of Europeanization provided by Radaelli. According
to Kohn:
The process of transformation, to which the term Europeanization refers, consists
of the adoption and adaptation of forms of life and production which were first developed
among the intellectual classes and the rising bourgeoisie in certain western European countries18.
Even if the recent understanding of Europeanization is no longer limited

to the forms of life and production, the similitude with the current meaning of
the term is obvious. For Radaelli, Europeanization is seen as a
processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared
15
16
17
18
Ulrike VON HIRSCHHAUSEN, Kiran K. PATEL, Europeanization in History: An Introduction,

Martin CONWAY, Kiran K. PATEL (eds.), Europeanization in the Twentieth Century.
Historical Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010, p. 5.
Keith HITCHINS, Form i fond: intelectualii romni fa cu Europa. 1860-1949, in
Ramona COMAN, A.M. DOBRE (eds.), Romnia i integrarea european, Romanian transl.
by Sorina-Raluca Bobu, Anca-Gabriela Alexa, Institutul European, Iai, 2005, pp. 59-95.
Hans KOHN, The Europeanization of the Orient, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 52,
no. 2, 1937, p. 259.
Ibidem.
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14
beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions
and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and
public policies19.
If the previous definition refers to a diffuse source of change, the third

part of the paper will show that the emergence of the EUs political regime does
not mean that we are in the presence of a homogenous driver of change in
content and scope. Inward or outward looking, the definitions of
Europeanization share a number of similarities: a) they both designate a
process; b) imply different degrees of change; c) Europeanization is not
uniform; d) it is not unidirectional; e) has no fixed geographical boundaries; f)
is not just about Europe because Europeanization never occurs in isolation.
Transdisciplinary and Common Ontological Grounds

Europeanization has the advantage of bringing together scholars from
different disciplines with a common interest in this process of change.
Historians, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists share bottom up
and top down approaches. Anthropologists look at everyday experiences in
interaction with the EU, the EU interaction with local communities, wine
growers and the EU, the Iberian fisher-man and EU policy or the
appropriation of EU symbolism 20 . Historians have extensively studied the
impact of European integration on the nation State21 and focused on the social
construction of the EU22. Sociologists are more concerned with the diffusion of
norms and ideas from below and from above in relation with policy making in
the EU. They pay particular attention to the broader societal processes that
might lie behind the EU impact in national contexts23. This heterogeneity does
not alter the ontological statements on which they are based. What these
literatures have in common is the attempt to offer macro explanations about the
impact of the EU on its Member States (and beyond) on the basis of micro and
meso analyses. They reveal the mechanisms that give rise to the patterns to be
19
20
21
22
23
Claudio M. RADAELLI, Whiter Europeanization?...cit., p. 4.

John BORNEMAN, Nick FOWLER, Europeanization, Annual Review of Anthropology,
vol. 26, 1997, p. 498.
Alan S. MILWARD, George BRENNAN, Frederico ROMERO, The European Rescue of
the Nation-State, University of California Press, Berkley & Los Angeles, 1992.
Nicolas VERSCHUEREN, Ractions syndicales aux premires heures de lintgration
europenne, in Amandine CRESPY, Mathieu PETITHOMME (eds.), LEurope sous
tensions. Appropriation et contestation de lintgration europenne, LHarmattan, Paris,
2009, pp. 197-208.
Adrian FAVELL, Virginie GUIRAUDON, The Sociology of the European Union: An
Agenda, European Union Politics, vol. 10, no. 4, 2009, p. 552.
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15
explained and the variation in time and space. One problem, however, seems to
be that studies on Europeanization have so far tended to reproduce the
complexity of empirical reality, rather than provide tools to simplify and
explain it. Europeanization as a concept still has little heuristic value for
categorizing, modeling and explaining the complex and intertwined processes
of transformation at play in Europe and beyond.
IN SEARCH OF A CAUSE: RESEARCH DESIGNS

AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The Top-down Model: EU Integration
as an Independent Variable
Following some pioneering studies, Brzel and Risse put forward a threestep model that became quite prominent in the Europeanization literature.
According to this framework, Europeanization results from: a) a necessary gap
(or misfit) between domestic arrangements and models promoted by the EU,
thus resulting in adaptational pressure24 ; b) facilitating actors in the national
arenas who see themselves empowered by the new opportunity structure
provided by the EU and/or are engaged in a process of socialization and
learning; c) their mediation leads to an impact on national political processes,
that can be conceived as absorption, accommodation or transformation25. The
following paragraphs explain that non-benign problems arise at each of these
three steps.
Fit or Misfit: Does it Really Matter?

The original argument about the goodness of fit claims that adaptation
depends on the fit between European provisions and the national institutional
arrangements: the more similar the policy models, the higher the compliance,
the faster the implementation26. This hypothesis was nevertheless criticized on
24
25
26
Tanja BRZEL, Thomas RISSE, When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and
Domestic Change, European Integration online Papers, vol. 4, no. 15, 2000, pp. 1-24.
Ibidem.
Christopher KNILL, Andrea LENSCHOW, Coping with Europe: the Impact of British
and German Administrations on the Implementation of EU Environmental Policy,
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 4, 1998, pp. 595-614.
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16
empirical grounds27. Considering a larger number of variables, Brzel and Risse

hypothesized that a misfit can be overcome by adaptational pressure from
above, such as infringement proceedings, or from below, in the form of
domestic mobilization 28 . Therefore, they practically reversed the argument
while claiming that an important misfit was likely to result in a large degree of
change. Today, these two understandings of the argument co-exist in the
literature. Even in its most sophisticated forms, the goodness-of-fit argument
displays little empirical robustness, as a review of the literature testing this
hypothesis demonstrates 29 . More recent works about the impact of EU
integration on national Parliaments, for example, show that the existence of a fit
or misfit does not determine the extent and the nature of change in the
legislative-executive relations 30 . There are therefore strong doubts as to: a)
whether the existence of a misfit is a necessary condition and thus a predictor
for change, b) whether a strong misfit is more likely to impede or fuel change,
c) whether it is a relevant starting point for the analysis. In any case, in fact it
seems that it is domestic actors preferences that are decisive.
We see further methodology-related reasons to wonder about the
heuristic usefulness of the goodness of fit. Firstly, the existence of a misfit
between the models prescribed by the EU and domestic policies becomes
increasingly problematic over the course of integration, and thus less and less
relevant as an analytical tool. Since most policy areas are today no longer
untouched by integration, the misfit is becoming confused with the outcome of
implementation, as it appears in recent textbooks on EU integration31. Secondly,
and consequently, the question to be considered is ontological. What is the
reality to be observed in order to determine the degree of fit and misfit? If the
misfit constitutes the point of departure in this theoretical model, then the
methodological aspects of this concept should be carefully considered in order
to avoid tautology. The gap between the national and the European level could
be measured in different ways. It is not so much problematic when scholars
27
28
29
30
31
Markus HAVERLAND, National Adaptation to European Integration: the Importance of

Institutional Veto Points, Journal of Public Policy, vol. 20, no. 1, 200, pp. 83-103.
Tanja BRZEL, Thomas RISSE, When Europe Hits Home cit., p. 3.
Ellen MASTENBROEK, Michael KEADING, Europeanization Beyond the Goodness of
Fit: Domestic Politics in the Forefront, Comparative European Politics, vol. 4, no. 4,
2006, pp. 331-354.
Tanja BRZEL, Carina SPRUNGK, The Goodness of Fit and the Democratic Deficit in
Europe, A Review of Vivien A. Schmidt: Democracy in Europe. The EU and National
Polities, Comparative European Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, 2009, pp. 364-373; Emiliano
GROSSMAN, Nicolas SAUGER, Political Institutions under Stress? Assessing the
Impact of European Integration on French Political Institutions, Journal of European
Public Policy, vol. 14, no. 7, 2007, pp. 1117-1134.
Frdric MERAND, Julien WEISBEIN, Introduction lUnion europenne, De Boeck,
Brussels, 2011, p. 139.
vol. XIV
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17
generate and use their own indicators (for example infringement procedures,
delay in transpositions etc.) for evaluation. However, the evaluation reports
produced by the European Commission and international organizations such
as the World Bank or the OECD are used by numerous scholars, for example
in connection with Eastern enlargement (see section 3). Here the political nature
of these reports leads to question the reliability of data. From a scientific point
of view, neither the official acknowledgement of success in transformation32
nor the distinction made by international organizations between laggard and
front runner countries can be taken for granted. Thirdly, the fit and misfit are,
to a certain extent, socially and politically constructed, as the need for change is
not only perceived among European decision-makers. Policy problems
identified by the European Commission are often influenced by strategic usages
of Europe by domestic political and social actors. A careful investigation of
what is considered as a European source of change or an adaptational pressure
can therefore be the result of the interaction between European, international,
and domestic actors and take the form of the institutionalization at the EU level
of specific domestic claims. These methodological remarks lead to the
conclusion that the goodness of fit should be an object of investigation rather
than the point of departure of a scientific analysis.
How to Measure to Impact of the EU?

Once the black box of the domestic arenas has been opened in order to
detect the mediating factors related to domestic agents, the last step in the topdown Europeanization framework consists of assessing the impact of EU
integration on domestic structures and arrangements. The outcome of policy
change has mainly been conceptualized as inertia, absorption, accommodation,
and transformation. However, as Radaelli and Pasquier recently argued, what
one researcher may classify as adaptation may look like transformation to
another 33 . While it is possible to establish a set of indicators to assess the
degree of change, too few researchers spell them out explicitly. Here again,
serious methodological issues arise as to how to measure the outcome. In this
respect, one well-known criticism is that it has excessively focused on if not
overestimated the impact of the European variable in contrast with, on the one
hand, endogenous drivers of change within the domestic political realms34 and
32
33
34
Robert LADRECH, Europeanization cit., p. 39.

Claudio M. RADAELLI, Romain PASQUIER, Conceptual Issues, in Paolo
GRAZIANO, Maarten P. VINK (eds.), Europeanization. New Research Agendas,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008, p. 40.
Cornelia WOLL, Sophie JACQUOT, Les usages de lEurope: acteurs et transformations
europennes, LHarmattan, Paris, 2004.
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the impact of globalization, on the other35. Few scholars have actually sought to
disentangle the net effects of EU integration 36 ; most likely due to the
important methodological challenges involved. As Saurugger suggested 37 , a
more rigorous measure of Europeanization would require, for example, a) the
systematic use of comparison in order to isolate the factors of change involved
with the domestic contexts, and b) the incorporation into research designs of
control variables in order to determine whether the transformations in actors
behavior assigned to Europeanization can also be observed outside the realm of
EU politics. This implies a certain amount of data triangulation because some
primary as well as secondary sources may be misleadingly geared towards the
EU. When one looks at the Europeanization of collective action, for example, a
number of case-studies based on qualitative data such as interviews with NGOs,
union representatives and MePs, press material etc. revealed how transnational
dynamics and networks can be activated in the multi-level realm of the EU38.
However, as pointed out by Favell and Guiraudon39 , large scale quantitative
studies are also needed to understand the overall weak level of Europeanization
of collective action. In a nutshell, the top down model of Europeanization
entails crucial methodological challenges. While some but actually only very
few scholars have attempted to address these challenges, many have turned to
alternative and more complex accounts Europeanization.
The Interactive Model:

Feed-back Loop and Circular Causality
As students of Europeanization have consistently claimed, domestic
actors preferences could not be derived from changing opportunity structures
and the response to adaptational pressures was neither passive, nor automatic.
This led a number of scholars to question the top-down nature of
Europeanization and to develop interactive theoretical accounts 40 . In this
perspective, Europeanization is the result of constant interactions between the
35
36
37
38
39
40
Martin RHODES, Globalization and West European Welfare States: a Critical Review of
Recent Debates, Journal of European Social Policy, vol. 6, no. 4, 1996, pp. 305-327.
David LEVI-FAUR, On the Net Policy Impact of the European Union Policy Process:
The EU's Telecoms and Electricity Industries in Comparative Perspective, Comparative
Political Studies, vol. 37, no. 1, 2004, pp. 3-29.
Sabine SAURUGGER, Europeanization as a Methodological Challenge: The Case of Interest
Groups, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, vol. 7, no. 4, 2005, pp. 291-312.
Amandine CRESPY, Qui a peur de Bolkestein? Rsistances, conflit et dmocratie dans
lUnion europenne, Economica, Paris, 2012.
Adrian FAVELL, Virginie GUIRAUDON, The Sociology of the European Union,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011, p. 137.
Bruno PALIER, Yves SUREL, LEurope en action... cit.
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national and the European level, or even of horizontal diffusion processes where
the EU as such is not necessarily involved41. These theoretical developments have
featured a so-called normalization of European studies, i.e the incorporation of
concepts and theories from comparative politics, public policy and sociology.
One claim is that Europeanization is the result of policy feedback42. This entails
that EU policies not only impact domestic policies, but once established, they
also alter resources and preferences among domestic actors, and feed back into
further shaping of EU policy43. Another claim has been made by sociologydriven scholars who have depicted Europeanization in terms of strategic usages
of Europe by domestic actors44.
The focus on micro-sociological processes and agency, mostly through
in-depth case studies, led to a complexification of research designs rooted in
theoretical eclecticism. Sociological concepts have often been combined with
the central tenets of neo-institutionalism or constructivism and one could even
argue that the focus on domestic actors preferences and politics was at the core
of Ernst Haas neo-functional account of early integration. This development
stemmed from the view that Europeanization research had to consider multiple
feedback loops and complex causal relations45 Instead of going from the EU to
the domestic arenas, the causal arrows multiplied and were placed in all
directions. This research became even less understandable in the language of
dependant and independent variables. Rather it relied on analytical and
sociologically informed narrative accounts of the multiple and complex
interactions among the relevant social and political actors as well as between
them and European actors.
Some methodological dangers arise here too, as it becomes even more
difficult to break the loop of circular causality and strike the balance in the
trade-off between proximity to empirical reality and the explanatory power of
an argument. It also became even more difficult to understand what was specific
to the EU: if Europeanization is merely a policy transfer, diffusion or emulation
that can also take place on a horizontal basis or in countries that are not
members of the EU (such as Switzerland or Norway), what remains of the
41
42
43
44
45
Bastien IRONDELLE, Europeanization without the European Union? French Military

Reforms 1991-96, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 10, no. 2, 2003, pp. 208-226;
Pauline RAVINET, La coordination europenne la bolognaise, Revue franaise de
science politique, vol. 61, no. 1, 2011, p. 23.
Paul PIERSON, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change,
World Politics, vol. 45, no. 4, 1993, pp. 595-628.
Tanja BRZEL, Shaping and Taking EU Policies: Member State Responses to
Europeanization, Queen's Papers on Europeanization, vol. 2, 2003, pp. 1-15.
Cornelia WOLL, Sophie JACQUOT, Les usages de lEurope cit.
Claudio M. RADAELLI, Sabine SAURUGGER, The Europeanization of Public
Policies: Introduction, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice,
vol. 10, no. 3, 2008, pp. 213-219.
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20
impact of the EU itself? As Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009) have found out in
their quantitative review of the Europeanization literature, research designs today
are dominated by rich sets of variables and complex causality versus parsimony.
Again, it seems that scholars have tended to reproduce the complexity of
the phenomenon under study, instead of capturing it in their research design.
This way of using the methodological pluralism was a kind of bricolage, in
which both the reader and the researcher must avoid the danger of being
overwhelmed by a large number of concepts and variables and losing the
possibility of discovering controlled relationships46.
The following section explains that these issues are crucial not only from
a methodological point of view; they matter with respect to our empirical
assessment of the reality of European integration.
IN SEARCH OF EFFECTS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

FROM THE STATE OF UNION
The puzzling and gloomy state of the Union today comes as a brutal
affront the theoretical debate about Europeanization. In order to support and
illustrate the issues addressed above, the following section focuses on how
Europeanization has been used as a concept and as a framework to explain and
understand the outcomes of democratization in the new Member States of the
EU and the economic integration in Southern Europe. Those two examples offer
two paramount and contrasted areas for development of the EU; they also offer
contrasted areas for the assessment of Europeanization, as economic integration
can be considered as relying on more objective interests and data. Our analysis
shows that, in both cases, methodological biases led to an over-estimation of
Europeanization. Our argument is that if scholars respond to shortcomings or
anomalies by simply relabeling them rather than providing an explanation, our
understanding of Europeanization will always be partial.
Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe

The former candidate countries represented a promising empirical field to
test the hypotheses of Europeanization. First, according to many, the adoption
46
Arend LIJPHART, Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, The American
Political Science Review, vol. 65, no. 3, 1971, pp. 682-693.
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21
of EU rules implied the most massive international rule transfer in recent

history47. Second, the external incentives set by the EU were reinforced by the
asymmetry of power between the EU and the CEECs48, which hypothetically
creates strong convergence toward EU policy models. Third, applying the
Europeanization conceptual framework to the former communist countries
strengthens the assumption according to which the degree of adaptational
pressure generated by Europeanization depends on the fit and misfit
between European institutions and domestic structures 49 . In the same vein,
Brusis argued that
the lack of consolidated institutions may facilitate the incorporation of EU rules because
the given formal institutional arrangements are not embedded in a social and cultural
infrastructure and are therefore more amenable to institutional engineering50.
We witnessed a surge of promising scholarship covering a wide area of

topics, including actors and their field of action, public policies and institutional
reforms. Approaching the process of change in the post-communist context in
terms of Europeanization became not only fashionable but also a prt porter
conceptualization, supposedly enabling researchers to understand and explain
how the EU effects structures and its impact on agencies. One open question
still remains: To what extent has the EU been decisive for shifts in the choice of
these institutional policies?
EU conditionality is the main mechanism explaining adaptation and
compliance 51 . Adaptation is enacted because it contributes to the overall
stability and functioning of the EU. Therefore, the literature on Europeanization
applied to Central and Eastern Europe corresponds to a functional analysis.
Conceived in this way, it supposedly explains the phenomenon in terms of its
beneficial effects for both the political regime of the EU and the continuation of
47
48
49
50
51
Frank SCHIMMELFENNIG, Ulrich SEDELMEIER, Governance by Conditionality: EU

Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of
European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 4, 2004, pp. 661-679.
Ana E. JUNCOS, Europeanization by Decree? The Case of Police Reform in Bosnia,
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 49, no. 2, 2011, p. 372.
James CAPORASO, Maria G. COWLES, Thomas RISSE, Transforming Europe cit.
Martin BRUSIS, European Union Enlargement and the Europeanization of Eastern
Europe: Research Puzzles and Policy Issues, Zdenka MANSFELDOVA, Vera
SPARSCHUH, Agnieszka WENNINGER (eds.), Patterns of Europeanization in Central
and Eastern Europe, Kramer, Hamburg, 2005, p. 24.
Heather GRABBE, How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality,
Diffusion and Diversity, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 6, 2001, pp. 1013-1031;
Geoffrey PRIDHAM, Assessing Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe:
The European Dimension, Acta Politica, vol. 41, 2006, pp. 342-369; Bernard STEUNENBERG,
Antoaneta DIMITROVA, Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: the Limits of
Conditionality, European Integration online Papers, vol. 11, 2004, pp. 1-22.
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the modernization/adaptation process at the domestic level. As in any functional

analysis, scholars of Europeanization identified a few mechanisms to show how
the needs of the EU system influence domestic structures and agencies. The
ultimate aim of these studies was to provide a macro explanation of
transformation based on an analysis at the level of individual activity, which
reveals the mechanisms that give rise to the pattern to be explained.
Once we begin looking for such mechanisms, we observe that they
include norms, incentives, rhetoric, rules, blaming and shaming tools, financial
suport, monitoring all of which received ample attention in the literature52 and
they revealed the complexity of the puzzle for empirically minded scholars.
Considering conditionality as an independent variable, stable and emanating
from the top, led to overestimating the impact of the EU in CEECs. Scholars
showed that conditionality is neither something emanating from the top53, nor a
clear-cut independent or intervening variable and does not fit narrowly positivist
framework54. What was considered as a European source of change was, in
reality, the result of the interaction between European, (international) and
domestic actors or the institutionalization at the EU level of specific domestic
claims. Therefore, the usage of conditionality as mechanisms calls for examining
how it is framed. Conditionality is, like Europeanization, a process in itself55.
Treating conditionality as a uniform variable is highly problematic56. In
any field related to political criteria and democratization, the common feature of
EU conditionality is the lack of models around which to converge. Regional
policy and administrative and judicial reforms pillars of the State and of the
rule of law are hard cases for conditionality doubters. Certainly, the EU
offered an important legitimizing force for selling these reforms to the
CEECs electorate57; but, despite its insistence on the speed of transformation,
the choice of tools through which the conditions are to be achieved remained
very much in the hands of domestic political elites. The absence of an EU
52
53
54
55
56
57
Heather GRABBE, European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire,

International Political Science Review, vol. 23, no. 3, 2002, pp. 249-268.
Ramona COMAN, Rformer la justice dans un pays post-communiste. Le cas de la
Roumanie, ditions de lUniversit de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2009.
James HUGHES, Gwendolyne SASSE, Claire GORDON, Conditionality and Compliance
in the EUs Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national
Government, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, 2004, pp. 523-551.
James HUGHES, Gwendolyne SASSE, Claire GORDON, Enlargement and
Regionalization: the Europeanization of Local and Regional Governance in CEE States,
Helen WALLACE (ed.), Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration, Palgrave
Macmillan, London, 2001, pp. 145-178.
Rachel A. EPSTEIN, The Paradoxes of Enlargement, European Political Research, vol. 4,
no. 4, 2005, p. 388.
Dimitris PAPADIMITRIOU, David PHINNEMORE, Europeanization, Conditionality
and Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania,
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, 2004, p. 662.
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23
model in these fields is a reflection of the strength of national traditions across

the old EU Member States58. As Goetz pointed out:
The differential impact of European integration on the administrative
arrangements of current member states has more to do with the relative weakness of
European integration as an independent source of domestic institutional change than with
the strength of national administrative cores or traditions59.
In these cases, the EU could be an intervening variable but, according to

Goetz, it explains little on its own. The Europeanization hypothesis is correct
in maintaining that the EU opened up a critical juncture for reform 60 .
Conditionality explains the timing and the integration of the EU dimension in
domestic politics. However, what lies behind the formal compliance deserves
better attention.
Several authors pointed out that the institutions of the former candidate
countries had been affected by the EU accession process. According to
Ladrech61, the impact of the EU on the domestic politics and institutions of the
post-communist states has been profound. It has been argued that the
enlargement process strengthened the executives in their relation to parliament
sand empowered judicial institutions 62 . However, there is no weight of
empirical evidence to support these assumptions. Recent works promote a more
cautious approach with regard to the power of the EU to change polity in the
former communist countries 63 . In recent years some scholars took a more
skeptical view on this matter. Certainly, the EU conditionality proved to be
effective when the EU coerced the countries reluctant to compliance with the
threat of exclusion (Slovakia under Meciar), postponing accession (Romania
and Bulgaria), or cutting financial support (Bulgaria). The European
Commission sanctioned inertia and rewarded any form of absorption and
accommodation. These examples show the primacy of material incentives in
producing rapid formal outcomes and undermine constructivist claims about the
power of norms and socialization.
58
59
60
61
62
63
Ibidem, p. 623.
Klaus H. GOETZ, Making Sense of Post-communist Central Administration:
Modernization, Europeanization or Latinization?, Journal of European Public Policy,
vol. 8, no. 6, 2001, p. 1040.
Conor O'DWYER, Reforming Regional Governance in East Central Europe:
Europeanization or Domestic Politics as usual, East European Politics and Societies,
vol. 20, no. 2, 2006, p. 222.
Robert LADRECH, Europeanization... cit., p. 109.
Ibidem.
James HUGHES, Gwendolyne SASSE, Claire GORDON, Europeanization and
Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of
Conditionality, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2004.
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24
Europeanization and Socio-economic Reform

in Southern Europe
Until those countries were hit by the crisis, the Europeanization of
Southern Europe and their integration into the Eurozone was one of the success
stories of EU integration. Many scholars have insisted that Europeanization led
to more diversity than convergence and that Southern Europe was still facing
country-specific challenges in order to cope with the European Monetary Union
(EMU). However, roughly considered, the prevailing narrative was one of
modernization of the Southern periphery 64 . Although the limits of
Europeanization have been increasingly pointed out 65 , the accumulation of
literature on Europeanization tended to emphasize the transformations at stake:
scholars spoke of a new Italy66, of the latest Spanish miracle67 or, in the
case of Greece, of suitable accommodation68. And in fact, in some specific
policy areas such as environment or social policy scholars found some
empirical grounds for claiming that there is no Southern problem69 and that
the South was slowly adjusting to EU policy patterns70. In fact, the scattered
findings in the literature are often mitigated or even contradictory. Today,
scholars, decision-makers and public opinions alike are faced with the brutal
reality of the failure of Europeanization of socio-economic policies in the
southern members. How can we explain that, generally speaking, the stress on
Europeanization has obscured the resistances to it?
Part of the answer, we believe, lies in methodological aspects in the
Europeanization literature identified in the previous sections of this paper:
conceptual fuzziness, a strong focus on mechanisms and difficulties to measure
outcomes. It has been too quickly assumed that the mere existence of
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Georgios A. KAZAMIAS, Europeanization and the Southern

Periphery, Routledge, New York, 2001, p. 2.
Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Dimitris PAPADIMITRIOU, The Limits of Europeanization:
Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008.
Marco GIULIANI, Europeanization and Italy: A Bottom-Up Process?, South European
Society Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, 2000, pp. 47-72.
Gonzalo CABARELLO, The Institutional Foundations of the Spanish Economic Miracle,
1950-2000. A New Institutionalist Approach, Warwick Research Euro-workshop,
University of Warwick, 8-19 July, 2002, pp. 20-40.
Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Greece and EMU: a Suitable Accommodation?, in Kenneth
DYSON (ed.), The Euro at 10: Europeanization, Power, and Convergence, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 165-181.
Tanja BRZEL, Why There Is No Southern Problem. On Environmental Leaders and
Laggards in the European Union, Journal of European public policy, vol. 7, no. 1, 2000,
p. 141.
Steen MANGEN, The Europeanization of Spanish Social Policy, Social Policy &
Administration, vol. 30, no. 4, 1996, pp. 305-323.
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25
mechanisms lead to deep transformation. In this perspective, a lot of research

has been devoted not only to formal mechanisms but also to informal and
cognitive mechanisms of Europeanization. What seems to remain, however, is
that large sections of domestic socio-economic as well as normative structures
have proved resilient to Europeanization. While, as we will see below, some
traces of such an assessment can be found in the literature, this needs to be
investigated more in depth.
First of all, we explained that various understandings of Europeanization
coexisted in the literature, which can be roughly divided into two types: a broad
definition, featuring a deep process of change related to the social and cultural
transformation in a core Europe and its diffusion towards an even larger
territory; and a narrow definition, depicting the impact of EU policies on the
national states. This is not benign in the sense that the two do not necessarily
require an investigation of the same explanatory variables. However, it has been
consistently assumed that Europeanization, as an outcome, represents a process
of major structural transformation71 and that it called for identification of the
structural impact of the EU 72 Hence, the causal relationship between the
independent variable the EU and the outcome structural transformation
is already embedded in the concept of Europeanization itself and more assumed
rather than investigated.
These problems have been reinforced by a focus of the causal
mechanisms at stake. While identifying mechanisms (rather than variables) is
not problematic as such, these mechanisms did not allow for the identification
of a) what the relationship between EU policy and domestic agencies were and
b) whether the impact of such mechanisms was structural (or deep) and c)
whether a structural impact should be seen in agents behavior or in institutional
and policy arrangements, or both. One central hypothesis is that outcomes are
highly dependent on the existence of the commitment devices available for
the EU to impose policies upon countries where the misfit is considered to be
important: the more coercive the instruments, the greater the impact of the EU,
not least because the availability of strong constraints allows domestic actors to
elaborate more efficient strategies and gather reform coalitions susceptible to
overcoming veto players73. But it is not clear whether this can be qualified as
structural change. In the Greek case, agents behavior constitutes a structural
impediment to reform:
Institutional roles are undermined by structural deficiencies, cultural norms, and
conflict of interests [...] An embedded culture of clientelism pervades the states
71
72
73
Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Georgios A. KAZAMIAS, Europeanization and the Southern

Periphery, Routledge, New York, 2001, p. 3.
Ibidem, p. 10.
Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Greece and EMU cit..
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26
relationship with wider society, exchanging favors and interests and undermining liberal
values of the separation of institutional roles and values74.
In contrast, in the Italian case, Europeanization is often depicted as a

bottom up process in which domestic reformers were able to take advantage of
an opportunity window, for example, to push for the reform of the pension
system 75 . And overall, it has affected the internal arena by changing the
attitudes of domestic policy actors rather than by imposing reforms on the
political structures76.
Where coercive mechanisms were not directly available to the EU and
domestic reformers, cognitive and normative adaptation or learning were
supposed to lead to Europeanization. In the realm of social policy, for instance,
a catch up scenario was found in Greece and Spain, notably through the open
method of coordination77. Economic reform in Italy within the framework of
EMU has been connected to the diffusion of the sound finance paradigm among
Italian elites78. Legitimizing ideas and discourses about joining EMU played a
major role in Europeanization. But here again, it is not clear to what extent
these ideas have been institutionalized and whether learning has led to deep
changes. As Featherstone and Papadimitriou state:
The role of the state in the economy, the scope of the welfare state, and the
functions of social policy and education diverge across member states for historical
reasons. Europeanization has produced no convergence on those fundamental issues79.
The main explanation here is that most, if not all, the southern periphery
states were importing the policy paradigm against the background of isolated
indigenous support for its key principles80. One can therefore wonder whether
we should not recast diversity as an outcome of Europeanization into diverse
structures as a main impediment to Europeanization. One of the most
enlightening studies concerning the impact of EMU on the national arenas
conducted by Dyson and his associates in 2008 re-directs the attention towards
fundamental variables such as material factors (size and openness of economies,
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
Ibidem, pp. 200-201.

David NATALI, Europeanization, Policy Arenas, and Creative Opportunism: The
Politics of Welfare State Reforms in Italy, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11,
no. 6, 2004, pp. 1077-1095.
Marco GIULIANI, Europeanization and Italy cit..
Anna M. GUILLEN, Bruno PALIER, Introduction: Does Europe Matter? Accession to
EU and Social Policy Developments in Recent and New Member States, Journal of
European Social Policy, vol. 14, no. 3, 2004, pp. 203-210.
Claudio M. RADAELLI, Discourse and Institutional Change: the Case of Italy in the
Euro-Zone, Queens Papers on Europeanisation, vol. 5, 2000, pp. 1-27.
Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Greece and EMU cit., p. 337.
Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Georgios A. KAZAMIAS, Europeanization cit., p. 12.
vol. XIV
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27
endogenous capacity of firms), time (date of entry, path dependencies) and

political cultures81. Talking about the future of the Euro area, they formulated
the strikingly premonitory conclusion that much depends on whether
exogenous shocks and leadership failures expose the stronger or the weaker
parts of its economic and social foundations82.
CONCLUSION
Over the past 15 years, students of the EU have found that
Europeanization was everywhere, even where there was no hard law or specific
policy models at stake, and even where the EU itself was not involved. The
starting point of this article was the provocative claim that, in spite of the
accumulation of a spectacular amount of literature, we are still in search of
Europeanization. We believe that the current state of the Union, calls for a
re-examination of the transformation processes under study. Our main argument
is that a number of methodological issues, especially with regard to
Europeanization as a concept and Europeanization as a causal explanation, have
led to misleading assessments of the impact of the alleged impact of European
integration on national policies, politics and politics. This argument was
illustrated with problems and contradictions emerging from the literature on
democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and economic
integration in Southern Europe, on the other. The purpose of this article is
neither to provide a new recipe for the analysis of Europeanization, nor to
advocate a specific methodological or theoretical approach against others.
Rather, our reflections lead us to a number of conclusions which could feed a
reflexive debate among the scholarly community as to how to deal with the
puzzles that arise in the current state of the Union in order to avoid an
overestimation of the role played by the EU. These are:
1. Europeanization, as a concept can be best understood as a process of
deep transformation in Europe. This is in contradiction to a narrow
understanding of Europeanization focused on the EU as the main
independent or explanatory variable. While this is one of the many
dilemmas that scholars have to face, the implicit co-existence of these
two understandings of Europeanization in research designs has led to
a hiatus between the explanatory variable and the impact: either deep
81
82
Kenneth DYSON (ed.), The Euro at 10: Europeanization, Convergence and Power,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 413.
Ibidem.
vol. XIV
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28
transformation was at stake but could not be attributable to the EU, or

the EU was found to have a limited impact.
2. In this respect, one of the problems is that the span of time considered
in our studies on Europeanization is too short. Most of the
contributions are in general based on recent developments at the EU
and domestic level. The attempt to explain and understand is
simultaneous to the phenomenon observed. What is challenging is not
only the interaction between actors and the feedback effects, but also
the difficulty to distinguish between the phenomenon and its context.
The impact of EU policies should therefore be more systematically
put into diachronic perspectives.
3. A further problem is that studies focused on the EU have identified
causal mechanisms of formal and informal change that, most of the
time, did not lead to any deep (or structural) impact. In the realm of
socio-economic reform in southern Europe, for example, the
mediation of paradigms guiding EU policies and the corresponding
policy arrangements themselves have only been assimilated
superficially; while the economic, political and ideational structures
proved to be highly resilient.
4. Therefore, we conclude that Europeanization, as a result of EU
integration, is mainly functional: it is a strategic, selective, and
temporary answer in a given moment to a given need. For example,
regarding democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, judicial
reforms are a tool in order to ensure the effectiveness of the internal
market. Regional policies are also functional in the sense that they are
required in order to implement the structural funds. Similarly, socioeconomic reform in Southern Europe could be only prompted in the
run-up of accession to the Eurozone and came to a stalemate afterwards.
As all these issues are involved in the current crisis, in the political
responses and policy recipes formulated and enforced by European and
domestic elites to tackle the current crisis of the Eurozone, the Europeanization
agenda should still have a long life.
vol. XIV
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Does Education Make Voters

More Leftist or More Rightist?
A West vs. East Cross-Regional Analysis*
FLORIN N. FENIC, OANA I. ARMEANU
Fifty years ago, Lipset observed general phenomenon of democratic

politics: parties were primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle
and upper classes1, with the right as the party of the haves and the left as the
party of have-nots. Is this phenomenon equally true today? Do elections
continue to be a democratic translation of the class struggle? If the answer is
yes, is it equally applicable to post-industrial countries with well-established
credentials, and emerging democracies, such as those from the post-Communist
region? Or does the answer have to be nuanced from one region to another? Last,
but not least, did the meaning of class itself change in any way in recent years?
Scholars have shown that economic and social changes in post-industrial
nations are reflected in their politics, with the new politics of post-material
concerns increasingly competing with the old politics of class and purely
material interests2. The left side of the political spectrum in these polities is now
dominated by a cosmopolitan and libertarian new left. On the other hand, in
Eastern Europe, the effect of lesser development in conjunction with political
and institutional legacies is that, for the time being, political life is dominated
by a rather conservative, authoritarian and nationalist old left3.
Our research adds to the abovementioned findings in two ways. The vast
majority of studies so far are cross-sectional; therefore, they cannot give a direct
measure of the magnitude of change. Moreover, there are few cross-regional
*
1
This research was supported by a CNCS-UEFISCDI grant, project number PN-II-ID-PCE2011-3-0669 (Change and Stability in Romanian Electoral Behaviour, 2009-2014).
Seymour Martin LIPSET, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Doubleday, New
York, 1960, p. 230.
Ronald INGLEHART, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and
Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997; Herbert
KITSCHELT, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
Milada VACHUDOVA, Liesbet HOOGHE, Postcommunist Politics in a Magnetic Field:
How Transition and EU Accession Structure Party Competition on European Integration,
Comparative European Politics, vol. 7, no. 2, 2009, pp. 179-212.
30
comparisons that look at both post-industrial democracies and lesser developed,

emerging democracies. Our study does just that. We focus on the demand side,
and we analyze the changes in the sociological and ideological profile of the
electorate of mainstream left in a post-industrial democracy (France), and a
post-communist democracy (Romania) during the last two decades.
POST-INDUSTRIALISM, POST-COMMUNISM,
AND SUPPORT FOR LEFT: WEST VS. EAST
Up until the 1960s, democratic politics was dominated almost
exclusively by class conflicts, so all political questions [were reducible] to
their bearing upon one crucial issue: how much government intervention in the
economy should there be?4. Socialist and social-democratic parties were, at
that time, more radical in terms of economic policies they endorsed, which
made them less palatable for middle-class voters taste. Things started to change
in the following decades. Mainstream left parties became more moderate, and
conservative socialism became the dominant ideology of major parties in
Western democracies5.
We believe that the most telling indicator of this ideological drift is the
extent of change experienced by left-wing parties whether, and to what extent,
the constituents and ideology of these parties have indeed become new left;
thus, we study changes in the profile of left constituencies in Eastern and
Western Europe. Daniel Bell described a fundamental shift in the relation
between class and power, with political position and technical skill becoming
more important than wealth and property. According to Bell, the engine driving
these structural changes is education, which has become the major way to
acquire the technical skills necessary for the administrative and power-wielding
jobs in society6. This makes a Weberian conceptualization of class, related to
life chances, a more useful analytical device than its alternative, the narrower
Marxian definition of class as merely a function of the relation to the means of
production. Therefore, we decided to focus on education rather than class as a
measure of socioeconomic status.
4
5
Anthony DOWNS, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row, New York, 1957, p. 116.
Arend LIJPHART, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government
in Twenty-One Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984, pp. 31-33.
Daniel BELL, The Dispossessed, in idem (ed), The Radical Right, Doubleday, New
York, 1964, p. 21.
vol. XIV
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Does Education Make Voters More Leftist or More Rightist? A West vs. East Cross-Regional Analysis
31
Education is not just a proxy for class, with better educated people having
better incomes and jobs than people with less education. On the one hand,
increased economic affluence in post-industrial democracies has worked
primarily to the advantage of the right, since people who are better off tend to
oppose redistribution. Yet on the other hand, another effect of increased
affluence is that younger generations are better educated than the old ones.
Better education makes people more tolerant and cosmopolitan, and this has
benefited the moderate left7. This process is paralleled by a process of change of
the meaning of Left and Right itself in political discourse8, with New Politics
issues gaining increased salience. In recent years, the major cleavage in Western
democracies is pitting a conservative right against a libertarian left9.
In Eastern Europe, the main axis of party competition in Eastern Europe is
orthogonal to that from Western Europe10. Survey data indicates that in the West
the natural constituency of the New Left, post-materialists voters, are not too
concerned about the extent of government ownership of industry; in Eastern Europe,
post-materialists are far more favorable than other groups to moving away from state
ownership of business and industry11. Therefore, the latter group is more inclined to
support a libertarian right, rather than a libertarian left though this kind of left
is missing in most Eastern European countries anyway (see the Annex, Figure 1).
Within the post-Communist region, an important explanatory variable for
the differences between the types of left we see is what ODonnell and
Schmitter called the balance of power between hardliners and softliners prior to
the transition to democracy12. In places where softliners had the upper hand, as
it happened in Poland or Hungary, economic (and even political) reforms
started before 1989; after the transition, the natural step for the former
governing parties was to transform into genuine social-democratic parties, with
an ideology and social base that resembles their Western counterparts. Where
the government before the transition was dominated by hardliners, as it
happened in Romania or Bulgaria, there were no reforms before 1989, and the
successor parties had a much harder time overcoming the legacy of the past13.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Ronald INGLEHART, Modernization and Postmodernizationcit., pp. 237-266.

Russell J. DALTON, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced
Industrial Democracies, 4th ed., CQ Press, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 121.
Herbert KITSCHELT, The Transformation cit.
IDEM, The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe, Politics and Society, vol. 20,
no. 1, 1992, pp. 7-50; Gary MARKS, Liesbet HOOGHE, Moira NELSON, Erica EDWARDS,
Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure,
Same Causality, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 2, 2006, pp. 155-175.
Ronald INGLEHART, Modernization and Postmodernization cit., p. 262.
Guillermo ODONNELL, Philippe C. SCHMITTER, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, The Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, MD, 1986, Chapter 3.
M. Steven FISH, The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist
World, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1998, pp. 31-78.
vol. XIV
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32
Consequently, we develop a typology of dominant left-wing parties in the

East and West, based on their ideology and constituents. On the one hand, we
have Old Left parties such as the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSD),
which is still largely unreformed, paternalistic, conservative and authoritarian, a
reflection of politics in a relatively underdeveloped post-Communist country,
with a harsh regime before 1989. Romania is still less reformed than Poland,
largely because the country was governed mostly by the Social Democrats, who
were, and continue to be, rather lukewarm towards reforms. On the other hand,
we have New Left parties such as the French Socialists and (especially) Greens,
representative of the electoral alignments characteristic for an advanced postindustrial nation. Then we have more ambiguous cases, like the Polish Socialists or
the American Democratic Party. In the first case, the party and the Polish
society itself have moved further toward modernization and reforms than their
Romanian counterparts; at the same time, the countrys level of socioeconomic
development, together with its relatively high conservatism, may explain why
Polish Socialists do not look yet like a full-fledged New Left party at least in
terms of their constituency. The American society is also more conservative
than other post-industrial nations14, and this explains why the Democratic Party
is rather in-between an Old Left and a New Left position (see the Annex, Figure 2).
Figure 2 confirms the above considerations. In Romania, electoral support
for PSD in the 2000 parliamentary election drops from a 55 percent high among
voters with elementary education or less to a 26 percent low among voters with
higher education. In France we see the opposite pattern of support, with the vote
for Jospin and Mamre in 2002 being about ten percentage points larger among
voters with higher education than among voters with elementary education.
MOVING (OR NOT) FROM OLD POLITICS

TO NEW POLITICS
What follows is a longitudinal analysis of data from several surveys of
French and Romanian voters. This analysis will show that the profile of the
electorate of the moderate left in France has changed significantly, shifting from
an old left electorate in the late 1980s to a new left electorate. However,
there was little change in the profile of the constituents of Romanias left which
continues to be, as it was at the beginning of competitive elections in the early
1990s, an old left electorate.
14
Ronald INGLEHART, Christian WELZEL, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy:

the Human Development Sequence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 65.
vol. XIV
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33
France: The Left Moves from Old Politics

to New Politics
If we look at France, we see that in the 1980s, as indicated by a 1988
survey, the less educated voters positioned themselves to the left of better
educated voters a pattern consistent with an old politics type of electoral
alignment (see the Annex, Figure 3).
The one partial exception to this general pattern, an exception for which
we do not have a good explanation at this point, is that the most right-wing
voters were not those with higher education, but those with a high school
(baccalaureate) degree. Be that as it may, by 2002 the general pattern is reversed:
the better educated voters position themselves in a more left-wing position than
less educated voters, suggesting a shift from old politics to new politics.
This shift was further reflected in partisan preferences. In Figure 4, we show
partisan support for left in France as a function of education in 1988 and 2002,
expressed as ratios (percent of vote for left within the group divided by the percent
of vote for left in the whole electorate). A ratio larger than one indicates that the
group is overrepresented in the electorate of the left, and a ratio smaller than one
indicates that the group is underrepresented (see the Annex, Figure 4).
We see a similar evolution as in Figure 3: in the late 1980s, the French
moderate left had a predominantly old politics electorate, in which voters
with little education were overrepresented. Currently, it has a new politics
electorate, and well educated voters are now overrepresented.
Finally, we may ask ourselves to what extent the ideology of this
electorate is indeed a new left ideology. To answer this question, we used
factor analysis15 of the 2002 survey data in order to obtain a two-dimensional
mapping of the main partisan constituencies in France (see the Annex, Figure 5).
What we see, without any need for rotating the solutions 16 , are two
clearly identifiable factors: an Old Politics factor, related to economic policies
(profit, privatization), and a New Politics factor, related to xenophobia
(agreement with the statements there are too many immigrants and some
races are better than others), authoritarianism (support for the reintroduction of
15
16
Factor analysis is a data reduction technique that explores correlations between a large
number of variables (in this case, the survey questions) in order to reduce them to a
smaller number of dimensions, called factors (here, the Old Politics and New Politics
dimensions). If we see two uncorrelated factors emerging, and if the questions about
economic questions have high loadings on one dimension, and the political questions
have high loadings on the other dimension, then the hypothesis about the two-dimensional
nature of competition is confirmed.
Typically, researchers use a technique called rotation, which makes the output more
understandable and facilitates the interpretation of factors (David G. GARSON,
Statnotes: Factor Analysis, http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/factor.htm, accessed
December 1, 2008). We only used this technique for Romania; for France, the results
were clear-cut, making the rotation unnecessary.
vol. XIV
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34
the death penalty) and moral conservatism (negative views of homosexuality).

The greatest distance along the first dimension is that between Communist
voters on the left and liberal voters on the right; the second dimension separates
especially the archetypal New Politics constituencies, Greens and voters of the
National Front. If we look at the average policy position of voters grouped by
education, our expectations are confirmed. Better educated voters are indeed
more rightist on economic policies compared to less educated voters, though
only marginally so. But the distance between these groups is much larger along
the second dimension, where voters with higher education are in the same
position as Green voters, and voters with elementary education are located close
to the average position of extreme right-wing voters.
Romanian Left: Trapped in Old Politics

For almost twenty years, since the very beginning of competitive elections in
post-Communist Romania, the Social Democratic Party had a monopoly over
the left side of the political landscape in Romania (albeit it presented itself under
various names). Whether by deliberate choice or because of structural constraints
(we suspect it is a mix of both), the party started in an Old Left position in 1990
and has remained there ever since. One telling proof is the speech delivered on
December 13, 2004 by the former Prime Minister Adrian Nstase, the candidate
of the Social Democratic Party to the presidency of Romania, in which he
acknowledged his defeat. According to Nstase, the profile of his constituency
was primarily rural, old, and poor, a constituency in need of more than just help
for development it was a constituency in need for help to survive17.
Figure 6 (see the Annex) illustrates the substantial impact of regional
development on electoral support for the candidate of the left in the first round of
that particular election. In the more developed counties, where about three out of
every four inhabitants has access to piped water, Nstase captured only about
one-third of the total vote. In the less developed counties, where the vast majority
of the population does not have access to piped water, Nstase won a majority,
approaching 60 percent of the total vote in the poorest counties. Then it should come
as no surprise that Romanian have-nots continue to identify with, and vote for, the left.
The data in Figure 7 (see the Annex) confirms that this is indeed the case.
Less educated voters continue to place themselves in a more left-wing position
than the average Romanian voter, as they did in the early 1990s. As a matter of
17
Rezultatul votului [] arat c, n prezent, exist dou Romnii. n primul rnd, este
vorba de o Romnie urban n cretere, cu o solid component liberal, [] care ateapt
de la stat mai degrab anse dect sprijin; aceasta este Romnia care l-a votat pe Traian
Bsescu. Dar mai exist i o Romnie rural, cu oameni n vrst i oameni sraci, care
are nc nevoie de ajutor nu doar pentru dezvoltare, ci i pentru supravieuire; aceti
oameni au avut ncredere n mine. (Adrian NSTASE, Vom sprijini proiectele lui
Traian Bsescu, Revista 22, vol. 14, no. 771, December 16-23, 2004).
vol. XIV
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35
fact, the distance between the left-right self-positioning of voters with little
education on the left and that of voters with higher education on the right has
increased. This continuity is further reflected in voting patterns. The strong and
negative correlation between education and support for left is as visible today as
it was in the early 1990s. The voters with little education continue to be
overrepresented in the electorate of the Romanian SDP, while the voters with
good education continue to be underrepresented (see the Annex, Figure 8).
How well are these patterns of electoral support matched by the policy
positions of various constituencies? To answer this question, as in the case of
France, we use factor analysis of survey data to map Romanias most important
partisan constituencies, as well as social and demographic subgroups (as a
function of education, age, and residence, urban or rural)
What we see in Figure 9 (see the Annex) is that there are important
similarities, but also equally important differences, between Romania and
France. It is immediately apparent that the main line of cleavage in Romania is
indeed orthogonal to Frances main alignment, with the moderate right-wing
constituency being more liberal (politically, that is) than the constituents of the
Social Democratic Party. Another important difference is that the first
dimension, related to economic policies, appears more important the second, the
opposite of what we saw in France, another indication that, unlike in France,
Romanias political life continues to be dominated by Old Politics conflicts (we
compared the eigenvalues of the two dimensions in each case as a proxies for
the relative salience of the two dimensions). Last, but not least, there are important
differences along both dimensions between the policy positions endorsed by
voters with little educations and those of voters with good education. Overall,
the data confirms the Old Politics image of the Romanians Social Democrats, a
party based primarily on older, rural, poor voters with little education.
CONCLUSION
Our main goal in this paper was to analyze two cases, one from Western
Europe (France), the other one from Eastern Europe (Romania), and test the
New Politics vs. Old Politics theory, which predicts that the electoral
alignments in the two regions are different: a libertarian left versus a
conservative right in the West, a conservative left against a libertarian right in
the East. A closely related point would be the expectation that better educated
voters, i.e., the most libertarian and cosmopolitan segment of the electorate,
would tend to favor the left in the West and the right in the East.
Our longitudinal analysis of survey data confirmed these expectations. In
France, the ideological landscape is unambiguously two-dimensional, and the second
dimension separates most clearly Green voters from extreme right voters, as the
vol. XIV
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36
New Politics theory would predict. We saw how, in the last decades, the better
educated voters have become more leftist, in terms of both their self-placement on the
left-right continuum, as well voting. This is in spite of the fact that, if we look at the first
dimension, voters with higher education are actually more right-wing than voters with
less education. However, this appears to be more than compensated by the former
groups policy preferences on the second, New Politics dimension, which makes
them the natural constituency for the left. France appears as a typical case of a postindustrial nation, with a libertarian left that has a middle-class, well-educated constituency.
In Romania, thing are very different. It is still a rather underdeveloped society,
not only when compared with Western post-industrial nations like France, but even
when compared to other post-Communist countries from Eastern Europe. World
Bank data show that, while virtually all (99 percent) of Bulgarias rural population
has access to improved water sources (and, moreover, this has been the case for
more than two decades), in Romania this is still a distant goal (only 76 percent do so)18.
This is in a country where 47 percent of the population continues to live in villages19,
and urban-rural disparities are comparable to those found in many Third World countries.
In one analysis of social underdevelopment in the Third World, Handelman noticed
the gap between urban centers, where at the close of past century, 72 percent of the
population had access to proper home sanitation and rural areas, where that figure
fell to 20 percent 20 . That means a 52 percent gap between urban and rural.
Although we do not have disaggregated figures for Romania, we believe a good
proxy is the proportion of the population without access to running water. The
numbers were 12.3 percent for urban and 84.3 percent for rural a 72 percent gap21.
Clearly, such major structural problems have political consequences. In
spite of its membership in the Socialist International, the policies endorsed by
the Romanian PSD are a far cry from those of the French Socialists, or even
those of their Hungarian or Polish counterparts. The electorate of the PSD is
also different from the electorate of those parties; PSDs core constituency
resemble more that of the Russian Communist Party, whose support decreases
with urbanization, educational level, and family income and increases with the
voters age22 As of now, we dont see much evidence that the economic, social
and political transformations of the last two decades, including Romanias
accession to the EU, are pushing the PSD away from its Old Politics position
toward a New Politics position.
18
19
20
21
22
World Bank, World Development Indicators: Bulgaria, http://data.worldbank.org/cou

ntry/bulgaria#cp_wdi; World Development Indicators: Romania, http://data.worldbank.
org/country/romania#cp_wdi; accessed April 11, 2014.
World Bank, World Development Indicators: Urban Development, http://data.worldban
k.org/topic/urban-development; accessed April 11, 2014.
Howard HANDELMAN, The Challenge of Third World Development, Prentice Hall,
Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2006, p. 8.
United Nations Development Programme, A Decade Later: Understanding the Transition
Process in Romania. National Human Development Report Romania 2001-2002, UNDP,
Bucureti, 2003, p. 125.
Timothy J. COLTON, Transitional Citizens. Voters and What Influences Them in the New
Russia. Cambridge, MA and London: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 78.
vol. XIV
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ANNEX
Authoritarian-particularist politics
n
o
i
t
i
t
e
p
m
o
c
y
t
r
a
p
f
o
s
i
x
a
n
i
a
M
Left (redistribution)
n
o
i
t
i
t
e
p
m
o
c
y
t
r
a
p
f
o
s
i
x
a
n
i
a
M
Left libertarians
Right authoritarians
e
p
o
r
u
E
n
r
e
t
s
e
W
n
i
Right (market allocation)

e
p
o
r
u
E
n
r
e
t
s
a
E
n
i
Left authoritarians
Right libertarians
Libertarian-cosmopolitan politics
Figure 1. Linkages between Libertarian/Authoritarian and Market/Nonmarket
Dimensions in Eastern and Western Europe
Source: adapted from Herbert KITSCHELT, The Formation of Party Systems in East Central
Europe, Politics and Society, vol. 20, no. 1, 1992, p. 17.
38
60
50
Percent vote for left
E - elementary
V - vocational
40
HS - high school
HE - higher education
30
SC - some college
C - college graduate
20
P - postgraduate degree
10
E V HS HE
E V HS HE
HS SC C P
E V HS HE
Romania
Poland
US
France
(PSD 2000)
(SLD-UP 2001)
(Kerry 2004) (Jospin + Mamere 2002)
Figure 2. Education and Vote for Left in Four Countries
Romania: vote for the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in the November 2000 Senate election.
Poland: vote for the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) Labor Union (UP) coalition in the
September 2001 election for the Sejm.
US: vote for the Democratic candidate John Kerry in the November 2004 presidential election.
France: vote for the Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin and the Green candidate Nol Mamre in
the April 2002 presidential election.
Data sources:
Romania: IMAS 2000 parliamentary election exit poll data, <http://domino.kappa.ro/imas/hom
e.nsf/HomeEng>, accessed January 15, 2001.
Poland: Aleks SZCZERBIAK, Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties Electoral
Strategies and Bases of Support, Europe Asia-Studies, vol. 55, no. 5, pp. 729-746
(Table 2, p. 746).
US: Larry SABATO, The Election That Broke The Rules, in IDEM (ed.), Divided States of America:
The Slash and Burn Politics of the 2004 Presidential Election, Pearson Longman, New
York, 2006 (Table 3, p. 108).
France: CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP. 2003. Panel lectoral franais 2002 [Computer file]. Paris:
Banque de Donnes Socio-Politiques CIDSP.
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2014
3.5
3.6
high school
higher education
3.8
vocational
Electorate
3.7
39
2002
("New Politics")
elementary
vocational
1988
("Old Politics")
elementary
3.4
Electorate
higher education
high school
3.9
4.0
4.1
Rightmost = 7
Leftmost = 1
Mean left-right self-positioning (1 to 7 scale)

Figure 3. Education and Left-Right Self-Positioning of Voters in France, 1998 and 2002
Coding:
Elementary education: mean scores for respondents with elementary education or less (sans
diplme or Certificat dtudes Primaires).
Vocational: mean scores for respondents with vocational training (Ancien brevet, B.E.P.C,
Certificat daptitude professionnelle (CAP), Brevet denseignement professionnel
(BEP), or BAC denseignement technique ou professionnel).
High school: mean scores for respondents with a general baccalaureate degree or some
college (BAC denseignement general, BAC + 2 ans ou niveau BAC + 2 ans).
Higher education: mean score for respondents with a university degree (Diplme de
lenseignement suprieur (2me ou 3me cycles, grande cole)).
Electorate the mean score for the entire sample.
Source: results computed by authors using the following datasets:

Roy PIERCE, French Presidential Election Survey [Computer file], ICPSR version, Ann Arbor,
MI, 1988.
CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP, Panel lectoral franais 2002 [Computer file], Banque de Donnes
Socio-Politiques CIDSP, Paris, 2003.
vol. XIV
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40
Ratio*
1.2
Education:
0.8
Elementary .
Vocational
0.6
High school
Higher ed
0.4
0.2
2002
1988
("Old Politics")
("New Politics")
Figure 4. Education and Electoral Support for Moderate Left Presidential

Candidates in France, 1988 and 2002 (Ratios)
Note: the ratio is computed by dividing the support for left within a certain educational group by
the support for left in the population as a whole. A ratio larger than 1.0 indicates a higher
level of support within that group compared to the population as a whole, and a ratio
lower than 1.0 indicates a lower level of support.
For example, the first column on the left corresponds to a ratio of 1.12, obtained by dividing 56.8
percent (the total vote intention for moderate left candidates in the first round of the 1988
French presidential election) by 52.5 percent (the vote intention for the same candidates in
the whole French electorate).
The data refers to the moderate left candidates in the 1988 and 2002 elections. We followed the
typical approach of French scholars, who distinguish between extreme left (Workers
Struggle, Revolutionary Communist League, Workers Party) and moderate left
(Communists, Socialists, Greens, Radicals), and we only looked at the latter.
In 1988, this included Franois Mitterrand (Socialist), Andr Lajoinie (Communist), Antoine
Waechter (Green), and Pierre Juquin (Communist splinter).
In 2002, the moderate left candidates included Lionel Jospin (Socialist), Jean-Pierre Chevnement
(Citizens Movement), Nol Mamre (Green), Robert Hue (Communist), and Christiane
Taubira (Left Radicals).
Source: ratios computed by authors using the following datasets:

Roy PIERCE, French Presidential Election Survey [Computer file], ICPSR version, Ann Arbor,
MI, 1988.
vol. XIV
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41
'New Politics' (Factor 1 - eigenvalue 2.6)
1.0
Le Pen (National Front)

too many immigrants in France
reintroduce the death penalty
some races better
elementary education
.5
homosexuality not ok
abandon EU
Chirac (UMP/Conservative)
60+
vocational
profit
privatization
46-59
30-45
0.0
Bayrou (UDF/Centrist)
Madelin (Liberal)
Jospin (Socialist)
Hue (Communist)
high school
18-29 yrs old
"democracy works"
political interest
-.5
Mamere (Green)
higher education
-1.0
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1.0
Old Politics (Factor 2 eigenvalue 1.4)

Figure 5. Two-Dimensional Policy Mapping of Partisan Constituencies in France.
Factor Analysis of 2002 Survey Data (Unrotated Solutions)
Questions:
Political interest Q 3, Est-ce que vous vous intressez la politique ?.
Too many immigrants in France Q 39.2, Il y a trop dimmigrs en France.
Homosexuality not ok Q 39.4, Lhomosexualit est une manire acceptable de vivre sa sexualit.
Reintroduce the death penalty Q 39.5, Il faudrait rtablir la peine de mort.
Some races better Q 39.7, Il y a des races moins doues que dautres.
Abandon EU Q 57, Si lon annonait demain que lUnion europenne est abandonne,
prouveriez vous de grands regrets, ou un vif soulagement?.
Profit and privatization Attitudes toward profit (Q 59.7) and privatization (Q 59.8):
Pouvez-vous me dire, pour chacun de ces mots, sil voque pour vous quelque chose de
trs positif, dassez positif, dassez ngatif ou de trs ngatif ?.
Democracy works Q 6, Diriez-vous qu'en France la dmocratie fonctionne trs bien, assez
bien, pas trs bien ou pas bien du tout?.
We saved the scores for the two factors as new variables, and then computed the mean score for
each constituency or social group mapped in the graph.
Constituencies: mean scores for the voters of each major presidential candidate.
Groups:
18-29, 30-45, 46-59, 60+: mean scores for the voters aged 18-29, 30-45, 46-59, and over
60, respectively.
Elementary education: mean scores for respondents with elementary education or less (sans
diplme or Certificat dtudes Primaires; score 1 or 2 for Q 111B, Quel est le
diplme le plus lev que vous ayez obtenu?).
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42
Vocational: mean scores for respondents with vocational training (Ancien brevet, B.E.P.C,
Certificat daptitude professionnelle (CAP), Brevet denseignement professionnel
(BEP), or BAC denseignement technique ou professionnel scores 3, 4, 5, and 6 for
Q111B).
High school: mean scores for respondents with a general baccalaureate degree or some
college (BAC denseignement general, BAC + 2 ans ou niveau BAC + 2 ans scores
7 or 8 for Q111B).
Higher education: mean score for respondents with a university degree (Diplme de
lenseignement suprieur (2me ou 3me cycles, grande cole) score 9 for Q111B.
Botosani
Giurgiu
VasluiTeleorman
50
Iasi
40
Constanta
Bucharest
Alba
Bihor
Arad
Mures
20
30
Satu Mare
Cluj
Sibiu
Timis
Brasov
Buzau
Olt
Vrancea
Ialomita
Dimbovita
Calarasi
Vilcea
BrailaBacau
Neamt
Dolj
Galati
Suceava
Arges Mehedinti
Maramures
Bistrita-Nasaud
Gorj
Prahova
Tulcea
Salaj
Hunedoara
Caras-Severin
b = 0.47
Covasna
Harghita
10
Percent vote for Nastase (2004, 1st round)
60
Source: data analysis performed by authors using the following dataset:

We obtained the factors using the principal components method (in SPSS).
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Percent without running water (1992)
Figure 6. Regional Underdevelopment and Support for Left in the First Round of the 2004
Presidential Election in Romania
Source: computed by authors using data from

BIROUL ELECTORAL CENTRAL (Central Electoral Commission), Preedinte Voturi Valabil
exprimate pe circumscripii electorale, http://www.bec2004.ro/rezultate.htm, accessed
March 26, 2008;
UNDP ROMANIA, A Decade Later: Understanding the Transition Process in Romania. National
Human Development Report Romania 2001-2002, UNDP, 2003 (Table 4, p. 131).
vol. XIV
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5.2
5.4
5.6
5.2
5.4
5.6
43
higher education
Electorate
5.8
6.0
6.2
6.4
Most right-wing = 10
higher education
1993:
high school
elementary
vocational
Electorate
Most left-wing = 1
high school
2006:
vocational
elementary
5.8
6.0
6.2
6.4
Most right-wing = 10
Most left-wing = 1
Mean left-right self-positioning (1 to 10 scale)

Figure 7. Education and Left-Right Self-Positioning of Voters in Romania, 1993 and 2006
Source: computed by authors using the following datasets:

ICCV (Institutul de Cercetare a Calitii Vieii/the Institute for the Study of the Quality of Life),
Valori fundamentale europene 1993 (European Values, 1993) [computer file],
RODA (Arhiva Romn de Date Sociale/Romanian Social Data Archive), Bucureti, 2003;
THE FOUNDATION FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY, Barometrul de Opinie Public octombrie
2006 (Public Opinion Barometer, October 2006 wave) [computer file], 2006, available at
http://www.fundatia.ro/?q=node/1303.
vol. XIV
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44
1.6
1.4
Ratio*
1.2
Education
1
Elementary
Vocational
0.8
High school
0.6
Higher education
0.4
0.2
1992-93
2006
Figure 8. Education and Electoral Support for Left in Romania, 1992-93 and 2006 (Ratios)
See Figure 4 for an explanation of how we computed the ratios.
1992-93: the survey was carried in 1993, but the question referred to the respondents vote in the
1992 parliamentary election. We considered as left vote a vote for PDSR.
2006: the question was If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, how would you vote?.
We considered as left voters those responders who declared that they would vote for the PSD.
Source: computed by authors using the following datasets:

ICCV (Institutul de Cercetare a Calitii Vieii/the Institute for the Study of the Quality of Life),
Valori fundamentale europene 1993 (European Values, 1993) [computer file], RODA
(Arhiva Romn de Date Sociale/Romanian Social Data Archive), Bucureti, 2003;
vol. XIV
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2014
Authoritarian
45
.8
strong leader
homosexuality religion
.6
democracy
Ext "right" (PRM)
.4
nationalism
order
Left (PSD)
60+
rural
.2
"Populist" (PNG)
elementary
Communism
45-59
Right (PNL/PD/DA)
vocational
freedom
inequality
30-44
state intervention
-.2
urban
Libertarian
"New Politics" (Factor 2; eigenvalue = 1.5)
-.4
high school
18-29
higher education
-.6
-.6
-.4
-.2
.2
.4
.6
Left
.8
Right
"Old Politics" (Factor 1; eigenvalue = 2.4)

Old Politics (Factor 1 eigenvalue 2.4)
Figure 9. Two-Dimensional Policy Mapping of Partisan Constituencies in Romania.
Factor Analysis of 2006 Survey Data (Rotated Solutions)
Questions:
Communism: whether the respondent thinks Communism is a good thing (COM1. Dup
prerea dumneavoastr, comunismul...?).
Democracy: we used a question about multipartyism as a proxy for pro-democratic values
(respondents favoring a political system with two or more parties) versus anti-democratic
values (respondents favoring a political system with one party or no political parties):
PP17. Dvs. credei c ar fi mai bine ca n Romnia...?
Freedom: whether the respondent thinks freedom is more important than equality (V9,
Egalitatea este mai important dect libertatea versus Libertatea este mai important
dect egalitatea).
Homosexuality: whether the respondent is in favor of a law against homosexuality (V19.1.
Homosexualitatea trebuie interzis prin lege).
Inequality: what the respondent think about income inequality (is it good or bad?); V10,
Diferenele ntre venituri ar trebui s fie mai mici, versus Diferenele ntre venituri ar
trebui s fie mai mari pentru a ncuraja efortul individual.
Order: whether the respondent agrees with the statement that order is more important than
individual freedom (V21.2, Pstrarea ordinii publice este mai important dect respectarea
libertii individuale).
Religion: whether the respondent favors the compulsory teaching of religion in public schools
(V19.10. n colile de stat orele de religie trebuie s fie obligatorii).
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46
State intervention: the respondents position on the issue of state versus individual
responsibility for individual welfare (V12, Statul ar trebui s i asume mai mult
responsabilitate pentru bunstarea fiecruia versus Fiecare individ ar trebui s i asume
mai mult responsabilitate pentru propria bunstare).
Strong leader: whether the respondent agrees with the notion that Romania needs a strong leader
(V21.4, Romnia are nevoie de un conductor puternic, care s fac ordine n ar).
We saved the scores for the two factors as new variables, and then computed the mean score for
each constituency or social group mapped in the graph.
Constituencies: mean scores for the would-be voters of the major parties and political alliances at
the moment when the survey was carried (October 2006); UDMR (the Hungarian Democratic
Union) was excluded from the analysis.
Groups:
18-29, 30-45, 46-59, 60+: mean scores for the voters aged 18-29, 30-45, 46-59, and over
60, respectively.
Elementary: mean scores for respondents with less than vocational education.
Vocational: mean scores for respondents who finished a vocational school (coala profesional).
High school: mean scores for respondents with a high school degree (liceu) but less than
higher education.
Higher education: mean scores for respondents with a higher education degree (facultate).
Source: computed by authors using the following dataset:
We obtained the factors using the principal components method with Varimax rotation (in SPSS).
vol. XIV
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Unicameralism versus Bicameralism Revisited

The Case of Romania
IONU APAHIDEANU
INTRODUCTION
A recurrent public debate topic in Romania, especially since the
November 22, 2009 referendum, the uni- vs. bi-cameral antinomy represents not
a mere technicality, but an integral part of a broader and consequential question
rooted in political philosophy, a quest(ion) of how to design the state
institutional architecture best suited to foster democracy, security, and prosperity.
Hence not at all coincidentally, in the overwhelming majority of cases
worldwide, the one- or two-Chamber structure of the legislature is codified
constitutionally1, unlike other issues, considered of secondary importance and
subsequently regulated by law, such as number of legislators, Parliament
headquarters, or organization and procedures of the legislatures committees.
Of additional importance for countries in transition, such as Romania, in
an extensively shared acknowledgment that an effective and representative
legislature is critical to the long-term success of any democratization process2,
how many Chambers a good Parliament should have remains even today3 an
extremely controversial issue in constitutional law and political science as well,
as each of them the unicameral model, and the bicameral one presents even
1
Examples: Poland art. 95(1): Legislative power in the Republic of Poland shall be
exercised by the Sejm and the Senate; Belgium art. 36: The federal legislative power
is exercised jointly by the King, the House of Representatives and the Senate; France
art. 24(2): It [the Parliament] comprises the National Assembly and the Senate; Brazil
art. 44: The legislative power is exercised by the National Congress, which is composed
of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate; Romania art. 61 (2): Parliament
consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate; Sweden chapter III, art. 1: The
Riksdag consists of a single chamber.
James KETTERER, From One Chamber to Two: The Case of Morocco, Journal of
Legislative Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 2001, p. 135.
A subject of discussion already in the mid-19th century; see for instance John Stuart Mill
quoted in Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN, Senates and the Theory of
Bicameralism, in IDEM, (eds.), Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World,
Ohio State University Press, Columbus, OH, 1999, p. 1.
IONU APAHIDEANU
48
generically and theoretically, let alone in specific local realities, both strengths
and weaknesses, both advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore, it often
happens that each debating side argues the superiority of its preferred model by
the very same criteria employed by the other side, from for instance adequate
representation4, to enhanced quality of the law-making process5, or how to best
cope with the executive and bureaucratic dominance and subsequent pressure
exerted on Legislatives in the age of globalization.
Moreover, and not confined to Romania, the public (and sometimes even
the academic) debate seems regrettably often biased by partisan positioning and
abundant logical fallacies. To randomly begin with, much of the criticism
directed prima facie against bicameralism in its entirety seems, at a closer look,
rather a reproach against one aspect of one particular type of bicameralism, the
latters current variety worldwide being highly spectacular, as I will detail
below. For instance, one of the most favoured arguments, i.e. unicameralism
being clearly less expensive and as such preferable to the doubling of resources
(e.g., money, time, energy, human resources) absorbed by bicameralism refers
actually, partially recognizable already in the previously underlined word, to the
as I shall conceptually clarify below congruent subtype of a two-Chamber
Parliament and not to the bicameral generic model in toto. The same applies,
although in a different direction, to Benjamin Franklins widely quoted, despite
(or exactly because of) its obvious logical fallacy, formulation that a legislative
body divided into two branches is like a carriage drawn by one horse in front
and one behind pulling in opposite direction.
Furthermore, some of the arguments promoting unicameralism are not so
much in favour of unicameralism as rather critically directed against (and
usually one particular subtype of) bicameralism and vice-versa, as visible for
instance in the already negative construction of the argument that
unicameralism bears no duplication, no divided accountability, and/or no
redundancies, unlike, obviously, bicameralism.
This does not mean that methodological debate flaws would be confined
within the unicameralists camp. Its opposite side perpetrates equally easy
recognizable logical fallacies, ranging, for instance: from a combination of
4
See for instance M. Cotta, who, attempting to elaborate a structural-functional framework

for Parliaments comparison, concluded four decades ago that in terms of representation, a
second Chamber may provide the possibility of a greater diversity of parliamentary
personnel and a more accurate representation, while nevertheless being criticizable as a
deviation from the ideal model of representation, and simultaneously generating possible
debates with regards to the representational weight assigned to the legislatures different
components (Maurizio COTTA, A Structural-Functional Framework for the Analysis of
Unicameral and Bicameral Parliaments, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 2,
no. 3, 1974, pp. 219-221).
With unicameralists appraising a presupposed superior fluency and celerity of law adoption,
versus bicameralists emphasizing the quality assurance role exerted by a second Chamber.
vol. XIV
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Unicameralism versus Bicameralism Revisited. The Case of Romania
49
argumentum ad baculum and slippery slope with an odour of anecdotal

evidence in rhetorical interrogations like why not directly reduce everything to
a 10-seat unicameral Parliament, so we dont have to worry anymore about
costs? to the dicto simpliciter type, as for example the repeatedly emphasized
correlation between population size and the type of Parliament structure 6 ,
conveniently omitting not only the worlds largest state China, but also
Indonesia, or, in Europe, countries like Ukraine or Turkey, all with unicameral
Parliaments, despite their considerable population size7; or, from a blurring of
the delineations between fundamental types of arguments8, when for instance
arguing in a rather prescriptive manner the empirically undisputable strong
covariance of a federal type of state structure and a bicameral Parliament
structure9, to a pervasive form of argumentum ad naturam, in the analogy that
two eyes, read parliamentary Chambers, see better than a single one.
As for Romania in particular, the substance and quality of the debate have
been further deteriorated over the recent years by the interaction of two,
causally related, aggravating factors: on the one hand the constantly and
severely low public confidence in the Parliament institution, in comparison to
both other national institutions and the European average; on the other hand, the
intense political exploitation of the topic, denounced as such especially by
opponents of the Constitutional revision project towards a shrunk unicameral
Parliament10, although one objective observer might easily argue the same about
both sides involved.
8
9
10
See for instance Dan Pavel, who claims unicameral legislatures would be typical to small
states and former Communist countries (Puterea legislativ punctul slab al democraiei
consensuale, Sfera Politicii, vol. 17, no. 140, 2009, p. 15).
Or, in the opposite direction, conveniently neglecting the empirical fact that second
Chambers are to be nowadays also found in dwarf states such as Grenada (109.590
inhabitants in 2013), American Samoa (54.719), Antigua and Barbuda (90.156), Bermuda
(69.467), Saint Lucia (162.781), or Palau (21.108).
I.e. factual-descriptive, causal-explicative, evaluative-normative, and strategic-prescriptive.
Notice for instance the difference between these two assertions: (a.) We mention the fact
that in federal states, bicameralism is mandatory [italics in the original] (Claudia GILIA,
Reformarea sistemului constituional romnesc o prioritate?, Studii de drept romnesc,
vol. 54, no. 2, 2009, p. 163) vs. (b.) Unitary nations tend to establish unicameral parliaments,
while federal nations tend to create bicameral assemblies (Samuel C. PATTERSON,
Anthony MUGHAN (eds.), Senates cit., p. 10). Similarly to the latter approach, Bogdan Dima
acknowledges the statistically striking covariance between state- and Parliament-structure,
but rejects its relevance, as a countrys option for a uni- or bi-cameral model is one that
envisages, or should ultimately envisage, the effectiveness of the legislative act (Bogdan
DIMA, Parlament bicameral versus parlament unicameral, Sfera Politicii, vol. 17, no. 140,
2009, pp. 18-36).
Who accused president Bsescu of populism, following the latters initiation of the 2009
referendum regarding the restructuring of Romanias Parliament into a unicameral one, of
maximum 300 seats.
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IONU APAHIDEANU
50
In this context, my paper essentially aims at critically revisiting the

classic uni- vs. bi-cameralism debate in order to elaborate an operational synthesis
of arguments and counterarguments applicable to the case of contemporary
Romania. Subsidiary to this goal and confined geographically mostly to Europe,
the research starts by addressing the quasi-unanimous interpretation of
Parliament structure as largely the resultant of historical experiences, which
condition the option for either uni- or bi-cameralism both objectively and
subjectively (in the form of historically-modelled public perceptions of one
particular type of Parliament structure), and respectively not only directly, but
also mediated by other intermediary variables, such as a certain shared
definition of the nation (e.g. ethnic or civic) and of the (nation-)state, the
configuration of social stratification, the degree of ethnic diversity etc.11
Secondly, in order to precondition the rigorousness of the debate, I will
employ a sum of concepts and methodological instruments meant to facilitate
the differentiation of multiple (sub) types of bicameralism occurring in reality,
motivated on this enterprise by one scholars critical observation that recent
theoretical expositions of the benefits of bicameralism are based on implicit assumptions
that second chambers [all] have... three attributes12 symmetry; congruence; an
adequately perceived legitimacy. Accordingly, the next part of my study addresses
the actual uni- vs. bi- debate in a structure-process format, specifying each time
to what particular form of bicameralism one perceived strength or weakness
actually refers, absolutely, or relatively to unicameralism, and simultaneously
distinguishing between actual arguments in favour of one particular model, by
contrast to what would rather be qualified as criticism of the opposite model.
Finally, the last part covers Romania roughly along the same analysis
units, starting with the identifiable historical factors of the current parliamentary
configuration, continuing with an exploration of its advantages and
shortcomings in light of the previous conceptual clarifications, and ending with
an evaluation of the main arguments applicability to it.
EMPIRICAL APPROACH (CIRCUMSTANTIAL

GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS)
Starting from the aforementioned essentially undisputed view among
field scholars, i.e. that the uni- or bi-cameral structure of todays Parliaments is
conditioned to a significant degree by each countrys historical background,
11
12
See, among multiple studies on such issues, George TSEBELIS, Jeanette MONEY,
Bicameralism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997.
Meg RUSSELL, What Are Second Chambers For?, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 54, no. 3,
2001, p. 456.
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51
which influences it both directly and indirectly, the map below highlights a
reasonably juxtaposed model of unicameral, respectively bicameral dominance,
with the first model seemingly preferred in the North and also in Europes
mostly former Communist South-Eastern periphery, where Romanias current
two-Chamber model stands out as an exception.
Map 1. Europe by Structure of National Parliaments, 2014.

Legend: [1] = unicameral; [2] = bicameral
Corroborating geography and history allows a reinterpretation of the

above map in terms of five juxtaposed clusters of states. In the West,
bicameralism represents the preferred option in: (a) old states (usually former
empires) emerged out of the feudal order of the Middle Ages (United Kingdom,
France, Spain, and Portugal as an exception), where bicameralism, associated to
federal/regional state structures, was meant not only to facilitate parliamentary
representation of the commoners in order to diffuse social tensions and prevent
the undermining of public trust in the state, without, however, endangering the
aristocracys interests13, but also to accommodate the pre-existing diversity and
13
The latter benefiting from a dominant position in the upper Chamber, where aristocrats
could exert a veto on policies voted in the lower Chamber (George TSEBELIS, Jeanette
MONEY, Bicameralism, cit., p. 32; Michael CUTRONE, Nolan McCARTY, Does
Bicameralism Matter?, in Barry R. WEINGAST, Donald A. WITTMAN (eds.), The
Oxford Journal of Political Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. 357-372).
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IONU APAHIDEANU
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dynamically balance the interests of the former previous states and communities; in
broad terms, these legislatures represent vestiges of the past; and in (b) states
emerged or unified more recently, during the 19th century (Germany, Italy,
where, in E. Gellners terms, a high culture and an idea of a nation preceded the
state, respectively Belgium, Switzerland, and even Ireland, where bicameralism
was perceived as a reasonable and viable compromise between the multiple
historically evolved local/regional identities and the newer state-construction).
Comparatively, unicameralism characterizes: (c) the Scandinavian cluster,
where Denmark and Sweden have abandoned their initial two-Chamber formats
(in 1953 and 1969-1970), a transition also adopted by Iceland (1991), thus joining
the early 20th century emerged independent states Norway and Finland (plus the
self-administered territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands); (d) the relatively
clear-cut cluster of the European microstates (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino,
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein), relics of a distant path, most of them monarchic;
(e) Central and Eastern Europe, where (with the exception of Poland, and, as
successors to former empires, Russia and Turkey), all states have, in historical
terms, only recently gained their independence, most having unicameral Parliaments,
albeit with the considerable, and differently explainable exceptions of: Russia
and Belarus out of the former USSR; Poland and the Czech Republic in
Mitteleuropa; respectively Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania in the Balkans.
Significantly enough, the historical background of each country
conditions its option for a certain Parliament structure not only objectively
(directly or mediated by other intermediary state variables, as for instance state
structure), but also subjectively, by modelling certain perceptions and
preferences for one of the two models, a thesis supported by abundant case
studies undertaken in the field: in Portugal for instance, a second Chamber is
largely associated by public opinion with the authoritarian regime of Salazar14;
in Spain, where a unicameral legislature was first introduced by the rather
liberal Constitution of 1812, there is still a conventional wisdom that
associates unicameralism with liberalism, despite the Senate having been
revoked by the Republican Constitution of 1931 15 ; in Central and Eastern
Europe, the post-Communist restoration of second Chambers was largely
14
15
Antonio Marongiu explains bicameralism in relatively similar determinist terms as

rooted historically in the highly stratified societies of the Middle Ages and [reflecting]
the communal spirit of the medieval world (Antonio MARONGIU, Medieval
Parliaments: A Comparative Study, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1968, p. 54).
Philip NORTON, Adding Value? The Role of Second Chambers, Asia Pacific Law
Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2007, p. 6.
Martinez SOSPEDRA quoted by Carlos Flores JUBERIAS, A House in Search of a
Role: The Senate of Spain, in Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN (eds.),
Senates cit., p. 261.
vol. XIV
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53
tributary to the resurgence of liberal ideas16, while in the particular case of

Romania, as it has been frequently argued, the 1990 reestablishment of
bicameralism was meant not only as a return to tradition, but also as a specific
means to antagonistically differentiate the new Parliament from the former
unicameral Communist one.
Global Trends
Zooming out of the European to the global level and focusing, for reasons
of time and space available, solely on the geographical dimension, without
taking any historical considerations into account, a 2013 exhaustive overview of
parliamentary structures throughout the world captures an approximate average
ratio of 60%-40% between uni- and bi-cameral national legislatures.
By area, except for the Pacific-Area conglomerate, unicameralism seems
the most favoured system in somehow counter-intuitively Europe (in 68%
of its independent states, although the ratio is more balanced within the EU),
while bicameralism ranks as the preferred option only in the aggregate
Americas area (chosen by 56.4% of its independent countries).
In terms of trends, an examination of the scholarly literature in the field
prima facie suggests an ascending trend of the unicameral model: whereas in
1980 David M. Olson was ascertaining that the countries worldwide divide
almost equally between those with unicameral legislatures and those with
bicameral, or two-Chamber, Parliaments 17 , roughly three decades later, the
Quebecker political scientist Louis Massicotte firmly concluded that bicameral
legislatures are vastly outnumbered by unicameral ones 18 , emphasising
nevertheless: There is no clear trend either toward or away from bicameralism.
16
17
18
Bernard CHANTEBOUT apud Cynthia CURT, Modele bicamerale comparate.

Romnia: monocameralism versus bicameralism, Transylvanian Review of
Administrative Sciences, vol. 19, no. 1, 2007, p. 22.
David M. OLSON, The Legislative Process: A Comparative Perspective, Harper & Row,
New York, 1980, p. 21.
Louis MASSICOTTE, Legislative Unicameralism: A Global Survey and a Few Case
Studies, The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 2001, p. 151.
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Table 1
Worlds States and Self-administered Territories
by Parliament Structure, 2014 (Own Survey)
1 = unicameral; 2 = bicameral; () = self-administered territories having a legislative body,

plus the Holy See; [] = aggregate percentages (states and self-administered territories).
A more detailed diachronic approach however highlights a rather

complex evolution:
Table 2
Global Overview of Uni- vs. Bicameral Parliaments Ratio Over the Last Three Decades
1980
50.0
BiUni- 50.0
1992
35.0
65.0
1997
33.8
66.2
2001 2007 2009 2012* 2013a* 2013b

35.4 39.7 40.1 40.4
40.7
41.1
64.6 60.3 59.9 59.6
59.2
58.9
* includes Slovenia as bicameral; excludes Kosovo (Based on: for 1980-2013a on Inter-Parliamentary
Figures (IPU)19; 2013b own exhaustive survey of 202 independent states as of Febr. 15th, 2014).
19
As quoted by: David OLSON, The Legislative Process cit., p. 21 for 1980; George
TSEBELIS, Bjornerick RASCH, Patterns of Bicameralism, in Herbert DOERING,
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55
The figures suggest that, whereas during the 80s, unicameralism had
registered an ascending trend, as for instance Lijphart20 was stating, and as the
corroboration of the 1980 and 1992 data would actually confirm it, over the last
fifteen years the trend has been visibly reversed in favour of bicameralism,
whose percentage among states worldwide has steadily increased from 33.8% in
1997 to about 40.7% at the moment of this writing. Yet, keeping in mind that
such relative frequencies are influenced by the number (and identity) of the
countries annually surveyed by the Inter/Parliamentary Union, and hence by for
instance any new wave of emerging independent states (as was the case of
Yugoslavias and USSRs dismemberments at the beginning of the 90s)21 and
their initial option for one legislature model or the other, a heuristically more
valuable perspective would probably be facilitated by a monitoring of concrete
switches from uni- to bicameralism or the other way around.
Thus, leaving aside distant examples such as New Zealand (1950) 22 ,
Denmark (1953) 23 , or Sweden (1969-1970) 24 and focusing on the last two
decades, I have identified only five clear cases of countries that turned from bito uni-cameral legislative structures: Iceland (1991) 25 , the Central African
20
21
22
23
24
25
Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe, St. Martins, New York, 1995, p. 365 for
1992; Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN (eds.), Senates cit., p. 8 for
1997; Louis MASSICOTTE, Legislative Unicameralism cit., p. 151; Meg RUSSELL,
What Are Second Chambers cit., p. 442, and Andrs MALAMUD, Martn COSTANZO,
Subnational Bicameralism: The Argentine Case in Comparative Perspective (paper
delivered at the XIXth World Congress of IPSA, Durban, June 29-July 4, 2003), p. 2 for
2001; BBC news for March 2007; Bogdan DIMA, Parlament bicameralcit., p. 21 for
2009; own monitoring of IPU website for July 2012 and May 2013a.
Arend LIJPHART, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
Twenty-One Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984, p. 92.
Out of the 30 independent states emerged since 1990, 13 have opted initially for a
bicameral legislature (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Namibia, the Czech Republic, Palau, and South Sudan, plus the
merger-resulted states Germany (1990) and Yemen (1990)), while the other 17 established
unicameral Parliaments (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia (for a justification of its classification, see below), the Marshall Islands, Eritrea,
Micronesia, and Timor-Leste.
See Keith JACKSON, The Abolition of New Zealand Upper House Parliament, in
Lawrence D. LONGLEY, David M. OLSON (eds.), Two into One: The Politics and
Processes of National Legislative Cameral Change, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991,
pp. 43-76.
See David ARTER, One Thing Too Many: The Shift to Unicameralism in Denmark, in
Lawrence D. LONGLEY, David M. OLSON (eds.), Two into One cit., pp. 77-142.
See Bjrn Von SYDOW, Swedens Road to a Unicameral Parliament, in Lawrence D.
LONGLEY, David M. OLSON (eds.), Two into One cit., pp. 143-201.
See Edward SCHNEIER, Iceland, in George Thomas KURIAN (ed.), World
Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures, vol. I, (Congressional Quarterly),
Washington, DC, 1998, p. 314.
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Republic (1991-1993), Peru (1992-1993)26, Venezuela (1999-2000), and Croatia

(2001). By comparison, the number of states having switched to a two-Chamber
legislature format has so far reached at least fourteen, thus confirming the
above-identified trend at global level: Poland (1989), Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1990), Haiti (1990), Russia (1990), Romania (1990), Mauritania (1992),
Lesotho (1993), Kazakhstan (1995), Uzbekistan (1995), Morocco (1996),
Nigeria (1999), Tajikistan (1999), Republic of Congo (2002), and Tunisia
(2005), to which one might add Slovenia, where in 1992 the National Council, a
rather advisory and supervisory body has been established, and Malawi, whose
1994 and 2004 Constitutions stipulate the existence of an attribution-stripped
Senate. In addition, six countries have registered a switch-reversal, returning to
their initial bi- or uni-cameral format: Zimbabwe switched in 1989 to a
unicameral Parliament, only to reintroduce the Senate in 2005; Afghanistan has
returned to a bicameral model after the overthrow of the Taliban regime; in
Madagascar, the Senate (1958-1975), abolished during the Second Republic
(1975-1993), was restored within the Third one (1993-present); South Africas
Senate was dissolved in 1981, reintroduced in 1994, and finally replaced by the
National Council of Provinces in 1997, thus keeping the bicameral legislative
structure; after gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan switched in 1991 to a
bicameral legislature, only to return to a unicameral format in 2007; Nepal
turned in 1990 to a bicameral Parliament, replaced in 2008 by a unicameral
legislative body, which however remains suspended since 2012.
The Uni- versus Bi- Dimension in Europe

in Relation to Other Variables
One of the mainstream conclusions reached by field scholars states a
positive mathematical relation between on the one hand the option for
bicameralism, and on the other hand the geographic and demographic
dimension of the country, and, furthermore, its federal structure, while multiple
authors also take into account as factors ethnic diversity, respectively EU
membership, which would seem to favour the two-Chamber model27.
26
27
See William W. CULVER, Peru, in George Thomas KURIAN, World Encyclopedia of

Parliaments cit., pp. 537-538.
See, inter alia, the above quoted works of P. NORTON, C. CURT, A. MALAMUD and
M. COSTANZO, M. RUSSELL, B. DIMA, or Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of
Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale
University Press, New Haven & London, 1999.
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Table 3
Uni- and Bi-cameralism in Extended Europe in Relation to Other Variables, 2013

Variable
State
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
BiH
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
FYROM
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kosovo
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Montenegro
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
San Marino
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
FRACE
QE
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
Rep.
Princ.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Mon.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Mon.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Princ.
Rep.
Duchy
Rep.
Rep.
Princ.
Rep.
Mon.
Mon.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Mon.
unitary
unitary
unitary
federal
unitary
unitary
federal
federal
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
federal
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
regional
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
federal
unitary
unitary
unitary
unitary
regional
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
parl.
parl.
-pres.
parl.
-pres.
-pres.
parl.
parl.
-pres.
parl.
presid.
parl.
parl.
parl.
-pres.
parl.
-pres.
-pres.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
-pres.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
parl.
-pres.
-pres.
-pres.
-pres.
parl.
-pres.
-pres.
-pres.
parl.
3,001.40
85.3
2,974.20
8,221.60
9,590.20
9,625.90
10,444.30
3,875.70
9,981.60
4,475.60
1,155.40
10,162.90
5,580.50
1,266.40
5,266.10
2,087.20
65,951.60
4,555.90
81,147.30
10,773.00
9,939.50
315.3
4,776.00
61,482.30
1,847.70
2,178.40
37.1
3,515.90
514.8
411.3
3,619.90
30.5
653.5
16,805.00
4,722.70
38,383.80
10,799.30
21,790.50
142,500.50
32.4
7,243.00
5,488.30
1,992.70
47,370.50
0.0962
0.6856
0.0414
0.1676
0.1766
0.2903
0.5554
0.6115
0.4003
0.1917
0.3722
0.5016
0.191
0.4618
0.1245
0.5213
0.1514
0.2894
0.1585
0.1302
0.1443
0.1128
0.2298
0.0781
0.1472
0.5674
0.4513
0.289
0.5761
0.0906
0.3756
0.6838
0.6894
0.342
0.1076
0.0642
0.0198
0.194
0.3464
0.574
0.3105
0.2538
0.2942
0.4182
0.1856
0.7883
0.0813
0.3052
0.3185
0.4909
0.8735
0.8958
0.6776
0.3548
0.6612
0.8511
0.3554
0.8045
0.2423
0.7921
0.2794
0.4864
0.3009
0.2604
0.2765
0.2256
0.4084
0.1487
0.2944
0.8098
0.9027
0.5209
0.7613
0.1755
0.5813
0.7838
0.7838
0.5296
0.2226
0.1263
0.0396
0.3553
0.5742
0.8544
0.551
0.4645
0.5208
0.6852
vol. XIV
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2014
IONU APAHIDEANU
58
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
U. K.
Ukraine
1
2
1
2
1
Mon.
Rep.
Rep.
Mon.
Rep.
unitary
confed.
unitary
regional
unitary
Y
N
N
Y
N
parl.
presid.
parl.
parl.
-pres.
9,119.40
7,996.00
80,694.50
63,395.60
44,573.20
0.1976
0.5315
0.4317
0.2892
0.3644
0.3601
0.7543
0.716
0.424
0.6452
A = number of national legislatures Chambers; B = government form: Republic (Rep.);

Monarchy (Mon.); Principality (Princ.); C = state structure: unitary; federal; regional;
confederal; D = EU membership: yes (Y); no (N); E = government system: parliamentary
(parl.); presidential (presid.); semi-presidential (-presid,)28; F = state population for
July 2013 (in thousands), as estimated by the CIA World Factbook 201329;
FRACE = ethnically applied fragmentation index Taylor-Hudson; based on data regarding ethnic
structure of states by the CIA World Factbook 2013; calculated as
,
where i is the proportion of people who belong to the ethnic group i within the total population,
out of a total number of N different ethnic groups. FRACs value span is [0-1), with the value 0
indicating a perfectly 100% homogenous population, while any increase in the number of groups
translates into higher values of the index;
QE = ethnically applied polarization index of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol; based on data
regarding ethnic structure of states by the CIA World Factbook 2013; calculated by using the
same coding as above, as
,
it measures the normalized distance of a particular distribution of groups (in this case, ethnic)
from a perfectly bimodal distribution. Its values range from 0 (i.e. in the case of a homogeneous
population) to 1 (i.e. in the case of a 50%-50% distribution of two groups)30.
28
29
30
Confronted with the widely acknowledged problems of defining semi-presidentialism, I

chose to develop my above classification based on Maurice Duvergers definition: A
political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which established it
combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage,
(2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime
minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in
office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them (Maurice DUVERGER,
A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government, European Journal of
Political Research, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, p. 166).
See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. Data for France and
Sweden are taken from the Population Statistics website (http://www.populstat.info).
Data for Denmark are estimates of the local Statistics Office (http://www.statbank.dk),
while the figures for Italy are taken from the Worldstatesmen website (http://www.wo
rldstatesmen.org/Italy.htm). All data have been retrieved Febr. 2014.
For Spain, both FRAC and Q are measured linguistically. For Turkey, both values
represent averages of the estimation ranges provided by the World Factbook.
vol. XIV
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59
Out of the seven variables taken into account in the above 2013
radiography of extended Europe, the bi- vs. uni-cameral dimension appears to
be in: no noteworthy mathematical relation with form of government (grosso
modo monarchical or republican), nor system of government (parliamentary,
presidential, or semipresidential)31 or ethnic polarization32 ; weak to moderate
relation with the dichotomous variable EU membership33, and ethnic diversity:
contrary to the relatively widespread assertion that an option for a bicameral
Legislative would be correlated with a higher ethnic diversity of the state
population, both uni- and bicameral legislature states stretch over the entire
fragmentation scale; out of the ten most ethnically fragmented countries in the
extended European realm, only 3 (Bosnia, Belgium, and Switzerland) have
bicameral Parliaments; similarly, the difference in terms of average country
values is also insignificant (FRACE reaches an un-weighted average of 0.29 for
the bicameral cluster vs. 0.32 for the unicameral one); finally, a restructuring of
FRACEs value range into quartiles (from Q1 lowest to Q4 highest) confirms
the existence of a relationship, one however significantly weak:
FRACE quartile
Parliament
Bicameral
Unicameral
Total
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Total
R2 (trend)
10
3
13
7
5
12
8
4
12
8
4
12
33
16
49
(-).263
(+).100
Still, Parliament structure is highly correlated with state structure and

population size:
State structure
Parliament
Bicameral
Unicameral
Total
Federal / regional
Unitary
Total
9
0
9
7
33
40
16
33
49
In terms of state structure, the strongly correlated bi- vs. uni- option
manifested in Europe (where all federal or regional states have bicameral
legislatures, while more than 4/5 of the unitary states Parliaments are
unicameral) closely replicates the global pattern; my own exhaustive 2013
31
32
33
66.6% of the parliamentary systems have unicameral legislatures, compared to 70.6% of

the semipresidential ones, while the only two cases of presidentialism prevent any
generalizing conclusion.
The increasingly arranged quartiles of ethnic polarization present the following
occurrence of unicameralism: 76.9%; 50%; 66.6%; 66.6%.
The ratio is visibly more balanced within the EU (55.6% unicameral vs. 44.4% bicameral)
than outside of the Union (81.8% vs. 18.2% a disproportion remaining high even when
filtering countries with populations smaller than 750,000 71.4% vs. 28.6%).
vol. XIV
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IONU APAHIDEANU
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survey of official national government and Parliament websites and a few dozen
online country data directories administered by various international agencies
and institutions has identified worldwide only five federal states that stand out
as exceptions, having unicameral legislatures: Comoros, the dwarf states of
Micronesia and Saint Kitts and Nevis, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela34.
Conclusively, bicameralism seems indeed identifiable with federal systems,
where representation and geography entwine35, although, as it has been duly
noticed, roughly 2/3 of todays parliaments are operating in unitary systems36.
As for population, the correlation seems equally spectacular. The
strikingly opposed slopes of uni- and bi-cameral Parliaments distribution by
country population quartiles thus converge towards confirming the mainstream
conclusion of scholars, namely that the bigger the state population, the more the
bicameral, respectively less the unicameral legislatures37:
Population
Parliament
Bicameral
Unicameral
Total
Q1*
Q2
Q3
Q4
Total
13
13
2
10
12
5
7
12
9
3
12
16
33
49
R2
(trend)
(+) .978
(-).994
The European pattern closely respects the global one: out of the most
populated twenty countries of the world, three quarters have bicameral
Parliaments and only five (China, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Iran, and Turkey 38 )
unicameral ones. As to average populations, comparing the 10 most populated
countries with unicameral legislatures to the corresponding bicameral, the latter
category records 285.8 million, considerably higher than the average 197.4
million registered as an average for unicameral systems.
34
35
36
37
38
Where the 1999-adopted Constitution of 1999 merged the former Congreso and Senado
into a single 165-seats Asamblea Nacional. See full English text at http://www.venez
uelaemb.or.kr/english/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf (last accessed March 2014).
Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN (eds.), Senates cit., p. 22.
Ibidem, p. 10.
Meg Russell for instance inventories, for 1996, a global average of 47 million population
for bicameral states vs. a 24 million one in unicameral states, while out of 22 federal states
surveyed, 18 had bicameral legislatures, as compared to only 40 of the 156 states (Meg
RUSSELL, What Are Second Chambers cit., p. 444, n. 6).
All cases subject to open debate in terms of democracy. As for the bicameral systems, it
should be noted, almost all are federal states, which raises questions about the dominant
independent variable population or state structure.
vol. XIV
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61
SETTING THE RULES OF DEBATE:

UNI- VS. (WHICH) BI-CAMERALISM?
As stated in the introduction, the accurate pre-definition of terms seems
critical to any meaningful debate oriented not only towards mere comparisons,
but also towards the identification of proper remedies to any undesirable status
quo. One of the frequent shortcomings affecting the quality of the uni- vs.
bicameral is fundamentally rooted in the inherent difficulty to define the
bicameral model. Thus, whereas the meaning and definition of unicameralism
are satisfactorily simple in both comprehension and explanatory power, i.e. one
(and only one) legislative assembly, any equivalent enterprise regarding
bicameralism remains flawed by an unbalanced uniqueness vs. similarity
tension, failing to capture the extreme variety of todays bicameral legislatures
throughout the world.
Addressing this crucial difficulty, Meg Russell for instance follows
Lijpharts classic framework, which I shall address below, in that she also pinpoints
(a) symmetry (i.e. reasonably strong powers, as otherwise upper Chambers
would have insufficient leverage over government) and (b) incongruence
(distinct composition) as requirements for an effective bicameralism;
however, looking especially at the UK and Canada as living proofs that the first
two are insufficient, she adds a third element represented by (c) an adequately
perceived legitimacy, only to critically notice: Recent theoretical expositions
of the benefits of bicameralism are based on implicit assumptions that second
Chambers have these three attributes39. This implicit assumption being often
invalidated in reality, in the following I shall summarize a set of specific
conceptual elements meant to operate relevant distinctions among various types
of bicameralism, which I shall consequently apply to Romanias EU context, as
a methodological prerequisite for the actual, consequently addressed,
unicameralism versus bicameralism debate.
In what could be considered as the seminal scholarly work in the field,
Arend Lijphart 40 has introduced the critical terms of congruence (referring
basically to the political makeup) and symmetry (referring to the balance of
powers) as instruments in analyzing bicameral Parliaments Chambers. In a
more refined version 41 , attempting to measure parliamentary distribution of
power, the same author develops a three-tier index of bicameralism, comprising
the corresponding dimensions: (a) bicameral vs. unicameral (depending on the
number of Chambers); (b) depending on the power balance between the
39
40
41
Meg RUSSELL, What Are Second Chambers cit., p. 456.

Arend LIJPHART, Patterns cit.
IDEM, Democracies... cit.
vol. XIV
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IONU APAHIDEANU
62
Chambers symmetrical, moderately symmetrical, respectively (extremely)

asymmetrical (depending on the (moderate) equality of constitutional powers
and democratic legitimacy); (c) depending on the similarity of the Chambers
political makeup, congruent (Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy) vs. incongruent
(e.g. Germany, Spain, France).
In the same spirit, although with a slightly different terminology, Giovanni
Sartori42 has instrumented Chamber power and structure as variables in elaborating
a typology of bicameral systems: depending on the first variable, bicameralism
may be weak or asymmetric (in case of unequal power, e.g. the UK), strong or
symmetric (when the Chambers power is almost equal, e.g. Germany), or, at
the extreme end, perfect (i.e. complete equality of the Chambers powers, e.g.
Italy); by the second variable, Sartori dissociates between undifferentiated
systems (with both Chambers identical in nature, representing populations, or
sharing the same electoral method, e.g. the Czech Republic, Romania, Italy), or,
otherwise, differentiated systems (e.g. Austria, Belgium, the UK).
In relation to the first dimension, among various factors identified in the
literature that foster incongruence, the most important four would be: (a) selection
procedure of the Chambers members: while the overwhelming majority of the
worlds second Chambers are directly elected, the selection method of upper
Chamber members may differ significantly from one country to another: direct
election (e.g. USA, Australia, Argentina); indirect election/appointment, by
local/regional/state governments or legislative assemblies, or electoral colleges,
who in turn elect/appoint the upper Chambers members (e.g. Austria,
Germany, Russia); appointment by the head of state (e.g. Bahrain, Jordan);
mixed selection, with some of the members directly elected, others indirectly
and/or appointed (current Afghanistan, Belgium, India); (b) tenure (length and
simultaneousness), various countries introducing at least one difference, e.g.
France (6 years for senator (1/3 of them renewed every 3 years) vs. 5 for deputies),
the Czech Republic (6 (1/3 renewed every 2 years) vs. 4), Australia (6 (of which
1/2 renewed every 3 years); (c) eligibility minimum age requisite usually
higher for upper Chambers members (e.g. 30 vs. 18 in Canada; 35 vs. 23 in
France; 40 vs. 25 in Italy); (d) Chamber size upper Chambers are usually
smaller than corresponding lower ones.
The EU member states bicameral legislatures seem equally diverse in
terms of their (in-)congruence; on the basis of an empirical research operated in
the 90s in Western Europe, Tsebelis and Rasch, who prefer the more refined
instrument of distance to the classic incongruence, concluded that,
[while] existing procedures of upper and lower Chamber selection in all but two
countries (Iceland and Norway) dont guarantee small ideological distances (or
42
Giovanni SARTORI, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures,

Incentives and Outcomes, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1994, pp. 183-189.
vol. XIV
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63
congruence), [] however, examination of the post-World War II results indicates that

distances between upper and lower houses have been small in other three countries:
Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy43.
Eighteen years later, my own investigation of the political makeup of all

the 12 EU member states bicameral legislatures, based on official Parliaments
websites, shows not only a preservation of the incongruence in the cases
identified by the aforementioned authors, but also that the two out of the three
newest member states bicameral Parliaments (Poland and Romania) also have
congruent Chambers, which means that at the time of writing 7 (out of 12) EU
member states have bicameral incongruent Parliaments: Austria, the Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the UK:
Table 4
Contemporary Variety of EU Bicameral National Legislatures by Different Criteria44
Variable
State
(Chamber)
Austria
(Bundesrat)
Belgium
(Senaat,
Senate)
Czech Rep.
(Sent)
France
(Senate)
Germany
(Bundesrat)
Ireland
(Seanad)
43
44
Upper Chamber
selection method
Congruence
Resolution of
inter-chamber
disagreements
State:
federal /
regional
no
navette
(lower house
decisive)
yes
yesa
navette
yes
no
upper house
decisive
no
Indirect: appointed by state

parliaments, proportionally
to state population
40/71 direct proportional
21 appointed by regional
parliaments
10 co-opted by (other)
senators
hereditary for Kings
childrena
Direct (1/3 elected every 2
years)
Indirect: appointed by
electoral college (1/3 elected
every 3 years)
Indirect: appointed by state
governments proportional to
population
49/60 directly elected by
universities from
candidates of vocational
panels;
11/60 appointed by prime
minister;
no
no
no
navette
(followed by
joint committee
or lower house
decisive)
yes
no
no
George TSEBELIS, Bjornerick RASCH, Patterns of Bicameralism, cit., pp. 365-390.

Ibidem, pp. 369-370 (own adaptation, update and adding on the basis of state Constitutions).
vol. XIV
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IONU APAHIDEANU
64
Italy
(Senato)
Netherlands
(Eerste
Kamer)
Poland
(Senat)
yes
Indirect by 12 provincial
councils
yes
Direct majority province

vote
yes
Romania
(Senat)
Direct, mixed electoral

system
yes
Spain
(Senado)
208/257 direct
49/257 appointed by
regional legislatures
no
United
Kingdom
(House of
the Lords)
a
315 direct proportional;

3 lifetime senators
appointed by the
President;
Hereditary and appointed by

the Queenb
no
navette
navette
(upper house
decisive)
upper house
decisive
thematicdefined
distinction
between first
notified and
decisional
Chamber
navette
(followed by
join committee)
navette
(lower house
decisive)
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
The so-called Butterfly Agreement of 2011 has decided on abolishing, starting with
2014, the direct election of the Senate, which is to become a smaller-sized assembly
of the regional Parliaments45.
As of March 1, 2014: 668 life peers, 87 hereditary peers, and 26 bishops46.
In terms of symmetry, the overwhelming rule indicates an asymmetry in

favour of the (universally directly elected) lower Chamber47, with the worlds
bicameral Parliaments distributed along a continuum from extreme asymmetry
(e.g. the UK, where the lower House of Commons may override the decisions
of the Lords, whose attributes have in time become merely consultative, one
might even say ceremonial) to a quasi-perfect symmetry (e.g. Italy, or Romania
prior to the 2003 Constitution revision).
Aside from specific, explicit Constitutional and/or legal provisions regarding
the Chambers powers in terms of concrete attributes and prerogatives, the
general asymmetry in favour of lower Chambers48 is primarily reflected in the
45
46
47
48
See the official Dutch text of the agreement at http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sect

ions/home/NLdirupo.pdf (retrieved September 2013).
See the official legislature website information at http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lordsand-offices/lords/composition-of-the-lords/ (retrieved March 2013).
Ioan MURARU, Mihai CONSTANTINESCU, Drept parlamentar romnesc, Gramar,
Bucureti, 1994, p. 44.
The lower Chamber majority required to overrule an upper Chambers veto differing
between countries. In Slovenia for instance, the upper National Council can veto within 7
vol. XIV
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65
mechanisms employed to reconcile inter-Chamber differences, empirical studies

of European bicameralism having so far identified an upper Chamber as
decisive in only two cases the Netherlands and Poland49. Tsebelis and Rasch50
have identified various such mechanisms applied to solve a bill adoption dispute
between Chambers: (a) establishing of a joint committee/mediation (e.g. Germany,
Romania prior to 2003); (b) the navette/shuttle system, as a mechanism of
sending a bill, as modified, from one Chamber to the other, each making an
offer that the other either accepts integrally, or modifies it and subsequently
makes a counter offer, a system which: (b1) can continue indefinitely (e.g.
Belgium, Italy51); or (b2) end immediately (e.g. Netherlands, where the upper
Chamber can either fully accept, or entirely reject the lower Chambers proposal;
continue for a finite number of rounds (e.g. France, Spain, UK, Austria);
(c) non-reconciliation, when the power of each Chamber is regulated by the
Constitution or the law depending on the nature of the issue debated (functional
partitioning of the Chambers as in Romania post-2003, or South Africa).
Broadening the approach beyond the (a-)symmetry and (in-)congruence
dimensions, Philip Norton52 fundamentally dissociates, as far as parliamentary
Chambers are concerned, between functions (i.e. representation and reflection)
and capacity, the latter comprising, together with formal powers (the
correspondent of [a-]symmetry) and composition (the correspondent of [in]congruence), also political will, a factor which is influenced by the local
political customs and traditions developed in time, and which indeed seems
largely neglected, despite its potentially crucial implications, inclusively on the
very significance of congruence and symmetry53.
In reference to Nortons distinction between a de jure vs. a de facto
dichotomy between constitutional designation and institutional design,
Slovenia seems a peculiar case; its Slovenias 2000-adopted Constitution 54
stipulates, along the 90-seats National Assembly (Dravni zbor) as the (main)
legislative state authority, the existence of a 40-seat National Council (Dravni
49
50
51
52
53
54
days any bill adopted by the lower Chamber, which can however override the veto by a
simple majority, whereas in Russia, the State Duma is required a 2/3 majority to reject the
Federation Councils veto.
George TSEBELIS, Bjornerick RASCH, Patterns of Bicameralism, cit., p. 371.
Ibidem.
Not coincidentally, the two EU member states with the highest post-War governmental
instability.
Philip NORTON, Adding Value?... cit., pp. 7-8.
See for instance the statement of the former Canadian senator Keith Davey: Although we
are not elected, we can block any and all legislation passed by the duly elected House of
Commons. Not that we would ever use our powerful veto, given our unelected status. If
we did, it would immediately be taken away from us, and so it should be (Keith
DAVEY, The Rainmaker: A Passion for Politics, Stoddart, Toronto, 1986, p. 306).
Chapter IV, art. 80-95 and 96-101(official bilingual text available at http://www.pf.unimb.si/datoteke/janja/Angleska%20PT/anglesko-slovenska_urs.pdf, last accessed 30th May, 2013).
vol. XIV
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66
svet), which, in the absence of a specific, expressis verbis, provision of the

Constitution, is often interpreted by scholars as a second legislative Chamber.
However, since article 96 of the Constitution defines the latter as the
representative body for social, economic, professional and local interests and
stipulates its organization by law, while art. 97 drastically limits its
prerogatives, making it essentially an advisory, and not a legislating body55, I
have chosen to consider it a unicameral type56.
Finally, integrating a multitude of criteria ranging from historical
emergence to selection procedures of members, Dietrich Trnhardt identifies no
less than nine currently existing versions of bicameralism: 1.) nobility second
Chamber bicameralism, of medieval roots (e.g., UKs House of Lords); 2.) the
Federal Senate, as a US trademark later imported in Latin America,
Switzerland, Australia, or the Philippines; 3.) with a territorial-base indirectly
elected second Chamber (e.g. France); 4.) the German model of the Bundesrat;
5.) the guild/corporate based model, nowadays (after the abolition of the
German Senate) occurring only in Ireland; 6.) the appointed upper Chamber
model, typical to former British colonies (e.g. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Fiji, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Jamaica, or Trinidad Tobago;
7.) the second legitimate forum model (e.g. Japan, Australia); 8.) the identity
solution (e.g. Italy); 9.) quasi-bicameralism (e.g. Nebraskas state legislature)57.
STRUCTURAL-PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS
OF THE DEBATE
Aside from what exactly should be compared, meaning unicameralism
versus what type of bicameralism, the immediately arising question refers to
what features of the two systems to compare, in the larger and more significant
context of the all-encompassing question of What makes a good institution?.
55
56
57
The National Council may for instance propose law drafts to be adopted by the National
Assembly; convey to the National Assembly its opinion on certain matters; ask for
National Assembly re-examination of an adopted law prior to promulgation; require the
calling of a referendum, or inquiries on certain matters of public importance; respectively,
when asked by the National Assembly, it must express its opinion on individual issues.
For a more detailed analysis of the Slovenian case, see Alpr Zoltn SZSZ, Sistemul
politic din Slovenia: aspecte ale tranziiei, Europolis, vol. 1, no. 1, 2002, p. 123.
Contrary to the IPU, who list Slovenias Parliament as bicameral.
Dietrich TRNHARDT, Mehr Demokratie oder mehr Gewaltenteilung?, in Christiane
FRANTZ, Klaus SCHUBERT (eds.), Einfhrung in die Politikwissenschaft, Lit,
Hamburg, 2010, pp. 91-111.
vol. XIV
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67
Given the topics relevance already a century and a half ago, the constitutional
law literature devoted to the unicameralism versus bicameralism debate has in
time witnessed innumerable and simultaneously extremely diverse accounts of
both models arguments and counterarguments, advantages and disadvantages,
strengths and weaknesses, spanning from psychological conjectures, as for
instance the assumed risk of conflict, or at least rivalry, which might be
generated between two Chambers, to incredibly technical arguments related to
the structure and procedures of parliamentary subcommittees; or from
arguments of political philosophy nature, such as the theory of checks and
balances in party-dominated political systems, to, derived from economics,
attempts to establish institutional performance indicators and accordingly
hierarchize the two models.
Based on works written in the field by both scholars and practitioners, the
following synthesis structures the debate by each comparative analysis unit (i.e.
the comparison criteria employed), while also distinguishing among arguments
in the true meaning of the term (positive arguments in favour of one model),
criticism of the other model (negative arguments), respectively counterarguments,
or criticism rebuttal.
UNICAMERAL [1]
Sovereignty
Argument:
One people, one representation.
BICAMERAL [2]
Critique:
Forcibly divides sovereignty, which is unique,
indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptible58
Rebuttal:
1. The critique is normative and
prescriptive, stating what would be good
and what should be done, instead of what
is: in a 21st century prominently marked
by interdependence, intergovernmental
and supranational structures, all states
have partitioned sovereignty.
2. Even if so, its not the sovereignty of the
people, but its representation that would
be (conventionally) divided59.
58
The French Constitution of September 4th, 1791, in accordance to the philosophical line
initiated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it
inalienable, is indivisible; for will either is, or is not, general (The Social Contract or
Principles of Political Right, 1762, II, ii). The idea marked a long time mainstream of
uninterrupted continuity in political thought, and has been embraced as such even in the
aftermath of World War Two by the patriarch of Realism in International Relations, Hans
J. Morgenthau: Sovereignty over the same territory cannot reside simultaneously in two
different authorities, that is, sovereignty is indivisible, where sovereignty is the supreme
legal authority of the nation to give and enforce the law within a certain territory (Hans J.
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Comment:
The Rousseau-inspired, long time juridical and political mainstream view on sovereignty has
in time lost both its descriptive and explanatory power. In the age of globalization, which
fosters a dismantling of the national in favour a transnational rearticulating of territoryauthority-rights subsets60, and all the more within the European Union, (traditionally nation-)
have been targets of a triple attack: 1.) top-down, by supranational integration; 2.) bottomup, by seceding movements and local identities; 3.) on the horizontal, by migration.
Consequently, sovereignty has ceased to be a dichotomous variable (i.e. sovereign or not?),
becoming an ordinal one (i.e. sovereign to what extent?).
Representation
Philosophy:
Singular, unified representation of one people.
Critique:
Fails to capture contemporary societies
diversity and properly represent it.
Rebuttal:
Inopportunity; aside from cases of federal
structure, states cannot, or should not, invent
a new Parliament Chamber for each of the
innumerable cleavages occurring in
contemporary society.
Argument:
In the context of todays increasingly
complex and fragmented societies, [2]-ism
represents the optimal format for adequately
representing different sets of interests, which
a [1] legislature might ignore, e.g. state,
region, ethnicity, occupation. Philosophically,
the idea of bicameralism is rooted in the
principles of pluralism and consensus as
crucial features of democracy.
Critique:
1. Ibidem;
2. Elitism: if upper Chambers are elected
indirectly, let alone appointed, and,
furthermore, they represent local and
elite interests and also control the power
to dissolve the government61, there
arises a risk of them representing rather
notables than the people, hence the
subsequent cost of a democratic deficit62.
Rebuttal:
Truly democratic regimes are pluralistic and
prevent the tyranny of the majority.
Critique:
3. In the context of the generalization of
Constitutional Courts, the relevance of
59
60
61
62
MORGENTHAU, The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered, Columbia Law Review,

vol. 48, no. 3, 1948, p. 316).
Article 2(1) of Romanias 2003 Constitution for instance stipulates: The national
sovereignty shall reside with the Romanian people that shall exercise it by means of their
representative bodies, resulting from free, periodical and fair elections, as well as by
referendum (official translation on the Parliaments website).
See Saskia SASSEN, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 2008.
James P. KETTERER, From One Chamber to Two cit., p. 136.
Ramona DUMINIC, Andreea DRGHICI, A Few Considerations on the Structure of
the Romanian Parliament within the European Context, AGORA International Journal of
Juridical Sciences, vol. 5, no. 2, 2010, pp. 73-79.
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upper Chambers representation systems

is further questioned by the formers
control replacement of the type of
political censorship previously exerted by
the upper Chambers63.
Rebuttal:
The functional differentiation between
Constitutional Courts, who exert a
Constitutional control, and Parliaments, who
legislate, is and will remain preserved.
Comment:
Except for federal states, which apply a combination of the national and territorial representation
principles64, or, to a lesser degree, states structured in regions, the crucial factor of adequate
representation and responsiveness to diverse societal issues and interests lies fundamentally
not in the number of legislating bodies, but in the electoral system65. Ethnic minorities
interests do not require a separate legislative Chamber; their representation in a unicameral
legislature can be regulated by quotas or systems of proportional representation66.
A second Chamber seems of limited usefulness in unitary states, and all the less so in those
with homogenous populations and weak local identities.
With the necessary amendment that in the overwhelming majority of cases, second Chambers
are powerless in revoking a government on their own (and vice-versa), the second critique
against the bicameral model raises indeed a fundamental question of whom and why to
legislatively represent. In terms of responsibility, the unicameral model favours the majority
rule, while the bicameral one restrains it, favoring pluralism.
Civic participation
Argument:
Argument:
Transparent and simple to be understood
Bicameralism offers more debate forums, more
and followed, unicameralism encourages
opportunities of deliberation, more hearings etc.,
broad public participation in legislative
where individual citizens and their representative
decisions.
organizations can participate freely67.
Comment:
Whether or not participation is perceived as a burden in bicameral systems, as some
unicameralists argue, remains a debatable conjecture68 in the absence of comprehensive
63
64
65
66
67
68
C.P.A.R.P.C.R., Raportul Comisiei Prezideniale de Analiz a Regimului Politic i Constituional

din Romnia: Pentru Consolidarea Statului de Drept, C.H. Beck, Bucureti, 2009, p. 43.
Ion DELEANU, Instituii i proceduri constituionale n dreptul romn i n dreptul
comparat, C.H. Beck, Bucureti, 2006, p. 613.
Tom TODD, Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy Debate,
Minnesota House of Representatives, Research Department, St. Paul, MN, 1999, p. 2.
For instance, art. 62(2) of Romanias Constitution guarantees a seat in the Chamber of
Deputies for each of the officially recognized national minorities whose representative
organization fails to surpass the standard electoral threshold; in Cyprus, even if the
provision still cant be put into practice because of the protracted crisis over Northern
Cyprus, the fundamental laws art. 62(1) guarantees a proportional 2/3-1/3 representation
of the Greek and Turkish communities in the unicameral House of Representatives.
Both arguments listed by Tom TODD, Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures cit., p. 10.
And so does, generically, the legislators responsibility towards their electors, although
some authors argue for instance that, even in its highly congruent version, it increases the
likelihood of direct, consistent contact between legislators and electors, so that citizens
petitions are heard (ibidem, p. 2).
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empirical studies comparing civic participation in uni- and bi-cameral systems, studies that
would also need to take into account a multitude of interfering independent and intermediary
variables, ranging from instance from the broader element of the countrys dominant political
culture to the technical issue of the hearing committees work program.
Checks and balances
a) Intra-parliamentary
Critique:
Concentrates, instead of separating and
balancing, power within the legislature; risk:
Parliament becomes arrogant, acts
autocratically and arbitrarily69.
Rebuttal:
A unicameral legislature is already checked
and balanced not only by the executive and
judicial branches, in full compliance with
Montesquieus principle, but also controlled
by the electorate, Constitutional courts, and
various international and supranational
agencies and institutions.
Counterargument:
The above are unreliable instruments of
control; they are no substitute for the
safeguard of restraining the legislatures
power by dividing the legislature itself in a
bicameral structure that fosters self-criticism
and enhanced detection of error.
Argument:
The need to divide power, even intraparliamentary, so that the Chambers mutually
deter/coerce themselves from becoming
authoritarian, or from supporting such a
regime. Thus, the utility of the second
Chamber lies in its potential veto player
role. Philosophically, bicameralism reflects a
transposition at intra-parliamentary level of
the checks and balances principle.
Critique:
1. Bicameral systems also concentrate
power, but in the hands of a few
influential members, like those who serve
in important committees and those who
appoint them.
2. Moreover, even if the second Chamber
expresses a veto, the lower Chamber is
decisive in almost all countries, so that
the upper one seems once more redundant
from the herein discussed criterion.
Rebuttal
1. The critique implicitly refers only to
incongruent and symmetrical bicameral
systems. In all other cases, the second
Chamber remains redundant70.
2. Globalization is an age of executive,
bureaucratic, and judicial dominance,
when the problem with legislatures is
infirmity, not prowess71; concentration
of power in a one-Chamber Parliament
restores the proper balance among the
three branches of Government.
69
70
71
In John Stuart Mills words: A majority in a single assembly, when it has assumed a
permanent character [] easily becomes despotic and overwhelming, if released from the
necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority
(apud Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN (eds.), Senates cit., pp. 12-13).
Especially in asymmetrical and congruent systems, when the problem isnt in having two
Houses, its having one that is so in thrall to the whims of the minority (E.D. KAIN,
Unicameralism Is Fine, but So Is Bicameralism without a Filibuster, American Times,
May 19th, 2010, p. 3).
Tom TODD, Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures cit., p. 6.
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Comment:
The bicameralists competitive advantage thesis that, since it deliberates (usually, but not exclusively)
on what the first one has done72, the second Chamber may exert the function of administrative oversight as
a subset of its reflective role73, seems rather prescriptive and tacitly assumes inter-Chamber incongruence;
in the more general conclusion of Meg Russell, Recent theoretical expositions of the benefits of
bicameralism are based on implicit assumptions that second Chambers [all] have these three attributes
[i.e. symmetry, incongruence, and adequately perceived legitimacy]74. Equally true, unicameralists
seem to ignore a multitude of other political system variables inter-Chamber (in-)congruence, (un-)
regulated transparency and accountability of parliamentary activity, party discipline etc.
a) Between the Legislative and the Executive
Argument:
Reflects government policy more efficiently
and coherently.
Critique:
Misbalanced executive-legislative power
relation in favour of the government, even
more so if party and executive leaderships
coincide, as a parliamentary and governing
majority will never willingly overthrow its
own government.
Rebuttal:
Aside from the aforementioned external
instruments and agencies controlling the
legislative, in the other direction, the political
identity of Parliament majority and
government reflects vox populi and,
furthermore, ensures the political systems
stability and functionality.
Argument:
Provides enhanced oversight and control of
the Executive; for reasons related to
eligibility age, tenure, selection procedures,
etc., members of second Chambers are more
independent of the executive, and
subsequently more effective in controlling it.
Critique:
Generally speaking, the partitioning of the
Legislative reduces its authority and effectiveness
in relation to the executive. Moreover, the above
argument refers strictly to incongruent
bicameral Parliaments. Even so, and even when
not considering the risk of instability (or,
alternatively, of institutional gridlock), the issue
seems rather two-faced: a second Chamber may
theoretically be more autonomous in relation to
the executive, but the latter can rely on the other
Chamber, always elected and thus of superior
legitimacy, to counter the influence of the first.
Rebuttal:
One obstacle to government abuse is still
better than none. And generally speaking,
more legislators, committees and leaders
mean inherently more capacity and expertise,
and therefore greater authority and
independence in relation to the executive.
Comment:
As it has been duly noticed, members of governing parties in parliamentary lower Chambers must
tread a difficult line balancing the roles of checking the executive branch whilst supporting their
party in power75. In the aggravating context of the globalization-led pressure exerted on legislatives
in favour of executives76, the paradox that the very system intended to ensure Parliaments control
over the executive has led to exactly the opposite flow of control77 suits the unicameral systems
72
73
74
75
76
77
Philip NORTON, Adding Value?... cit., p. 7.

See Robert PAKENHAM, Legislatures and Political Development, in Allan
KORNBERG, Lloyd D. MUSOLF (eds.), Legislatures in Developmental Perspective,
Duke University Press, Durham, 1970, pp. 521-582.
Meg RUSSELL, What Are Second Chambers cit., p. 456.
Ibidem, p. 447. Not coincidentally, Aristotle, who prefaced the theory of the separation of
powers, Locke, who explicated it, and Montesquieu, who developed it, all have written their
works before the historical emergence of political parties.
Saskia SASSEN, Territory, Authority, Rights cit.
David M. OLSON, Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View, M.E. Sharpe,
Armonk, NY, 1994, p. 77.
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par excellence, where the common sense critique advanced by bicameralists seems supported
by empirical evidence worldwide.
Equally true, the bicameralist argument refers, as in so many other cases, specifically, although
not explicitly to incongruent and symmetrical bicameral Parliaments, in which the upper
Chamber usually cannot revoke a government, but is able to at least exert some pressure on the
lower Chamber, by raising awareness of and co-interesting the public opinion.
Accountability and transparency
Argument:
One single legislative body solely and
entirely responsible to the people.
Compared to [2] systems, [1] are transparent,
with fewer elected officials to monitor and
hold to account, and with no scapegoat.
Legislative procedures are easy (or at least
easier by comparison) to understand and
follow by electors, which further enhances
the legislators attentiveness and responsibility.
Critique:
Undermines accountability of individual
legislators by clouding their responsibility for
decisions.
Rebuttal:
Bicameralism practices a dual accountability,
analogous to the one within presidential
systems, where electors vote separately for
the head of the executive and for the legislative,
both responsible for determining public
policy and accountable to the electorate.
Counterargument:
The analogy implies distinguishable
responsibility, applicable only to symmetric
and directly elected Chambers, which are a
rarity. In congruent bicameral systems of
unitary systems, the term redundancy is far
more appropriate; if control of the two
Chambers is divided, then the second in the
words of Abb Sieys is mischievous,
because it challenges the accountability of the
first78. If two Chambers disagree and either
fail to resolve their difference, or resolve
them through doing deals, who then do the
electors hold to account for the outcomes of
public policy?79.
Rebuttal:
To diffuse Government authority is to diffuse
responsibility. Most of todays legislatures
are not unicameral, nor entirely elected by
uninominal voting, let alone by first-past-the-post
electoral systems, so that the responsibility of
each legislator will always remain ambiguous.
Eliminating the second house, though it may
change tactics, wont end strategy, but will
only make it adapt. MPs will continue to
jockey to improve their bargaining position
78
79
80
Apud Rod HAGUE, Martin HARROP, Comparative Government and Politics. An

Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 306.
Philip NORTON, Adding Value?... cit., pp. 11-12.
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73
and to yield / divert responsibility.80

Transparency
Argument:
The simplicity and transparency of the
unicameral model reduces the influence of
professional representation of powerful
interests and enhances the influence of less
organized and moneyed citizens; additionally,
it avoids inter-Chamber negotiations
concealed behind the curtain81
Critique:
More complicated, less transparent,
susceptible to favouring illegitimate interests.
Rebuttal:
Bicameral Parliaments may be less
transparent and simple, but paid lobbyists
need the support of a larger number of
leaders, committee chairs and MPs.
Comment:
Accountability and transparency are also conditioned by other variables of the specific political
system, such as civic activism, directness and regularity of voter-legislator contact, party
discipline, the degree of overlapping between the upper and the lower Chambers legislators
constituencies, national regulations of the lobbying activity etc. Furthermore, and hinting at the
in part sterile character of the debate over accountability, the representative, and not
imperative, nature of todays political systems means that the accountability of legislators
materialises exclusively in them being not re-elected, a pressure further diminished in the case
of indirectly or appointed legislators.
Legislative stability
Argument:
The identity of parliamentary majority and
executive branch in terms of political
makeup reflects the peoples will and
guarantees stability.
81
82
83
84
85
86
Argument:
1. Especially incongruent and symmetrical
bicameral systems produce more stable
decisions: more autonomous in relation to
both the executive and the electorate82,
second Chambers may act as a brake to the
first one, which is elected directly, for
usually shorter terms, and subsequently
more prone to radicalism83; thus, the upper
house provides a sober second thought84 a
Ibidem, p. 3.
As a resultant of different selection method (frequently indirect, implying less susceptibility
to both constituency and executive pressures), higher minimum age eligibility requisite
(meaning they will tend to have better formed views and be at a later stage of their careers),
usually longer terms etc.
Whereas second Chambers are described occasionally as modern Elders Councils, able to
address topics in a less partisan manner (see Bogdan DIMA, Parlament bicameral. cit., p. 30.
John MacDONALD, the first Canadian prime minister, apud Meg RUSSELL, What Are
Second Chambers cit., pp. 450, 451.
Ibidem.
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valuable asset in an otherwise partydominated Parliament85.

Critique:
Aside from referring only to (highly)
incongruent systems, the underlying principle
that passions of the lower chamber would be
restrained by wiser, more conservative
representatives of wealth and property in the
Senate is a relic of history86.
2. Incongruence additionally acts as a
stability supplier, as it contributes to
overcome the production of cyclic majorities87.
Comment:
Of a rather exceptional nature, the bicameralists argument applies only to incongruent and
simultaneously and reasonably symmetrical legislatures, with differentiated tenures. In todays
EU for instance, out of twelve bicameral legislatures, at most half of them meet cumulatively
the two criteria (Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, and Spain88). Moreover, as
with previous arguments, this one requires a contextualization by other characteristics of the
specific political system, including the electoral system.
The normative argument regarding cyclic majorities not only needs a much broader approach
in terms of Condorcets paradox, but also questions almost directly alternation in power as a
theoretically fundamental pillar of democracy.
Efficiency
a) In terms of money and other resources
Argument:
Smallest possible costs to government and
taxpayers.
Critique:
1. Subversive implicit assumption that
unicameral automatically means less
legislators89, which is not necessarily the case;
2. A reduction of numbers inherently
endangers the decision-making quality
(see below).
Critique:
Redundancy; duplication of consumed
resources.
Rebuttal:
1. The critique applies only to highly
congruent systems, with no functional
inter-Chamber partitioning;
2. The cost of a legislature represents a tiny
fraction of the aggregate cost of state
government is this tiny possible
discount worth the risk of compromising
the quality of decision-making?90.
Comment:
The bicameralist criticism of the unicameralists widespread logical fallacy seems justified.
Actually, for the top ten most populated unicameral and bicameral systems, the first category
87
88
89
90
Andrs MALAMUD, Martn COSTANZO, Subnational Bicameralism cit..

To which one might add Frances moderately asymmetrical and incongruent legislature
(as classified by Arend LIJPHART, Democracies cit., pp. 192 f.f.).
An assumption sometimes even explicit (though usually referring contextually to congruent
bicameral parliaments in unitary states), e.g. smaller, less costly to operate (Tom TODD,
Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures cit., p. 11); halving of electoral sinecures
(Ion DELEANU, Instituii i proceduri constituionale cit., pp. 613-614; own italics added).
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75
registers a higher average number of MPs (687.1 vs. 604.5).

Equally true, citizens in unicameral systems seem better represented in terms of the combined
parliamentary representation norm (i.e. 1 member of Parliament to how many country
inhabitants), which is even more intriguing when considering that, at least in federal states,
upper Chambers represent states/regions, which implies a further reduced representation of the
people in the lower Chamber as compared to unicameral systems.
Table 5
Top 10 Most Populated Bicameral, Respectively Unicameral Systems by Number of Legislators,
Country Population and Aggregate de facto Parliamentary Representation Norm
Country
India
U.S.
Indonesia
Brazil
Pakistan
Nigeria
Russia
Japan
Mexico
Philippines
average
Bicameral Systems
Popul.
Repres.
MPs
(mil.)
norm (k.)
790
1,220.8
1,545.3
535
316.7
519.9
692
251.2
362.9
594
210.0
338.4
446
193.2
433.3
469
174.5
372.0
616
142.5
231.3
964
127.3
132.0
628
116.2
185.0
311
105.7
339.9
604.5
285.8
446.0
Country
China
Bangladesh
Vietnam
Iran
Turkey
South Korea
Tanzania
Ukraine
Uganda
Iraq
average
Unicameral Systems
Popul.
Repres.
MPs
(mil.)
norm (k.)
2,987 1,349.6
451.8
350
163.6
467.6
500
92.5
184.9
290
79.8
275.4
550
80.7
146.7
687
48.9
71.3
357
48.3
135.2
450
44.6
99.0
375
34.8
92.7
325
31.9
98.0
687.1
197.4
202.2
Based on data provided by Parliaments websites and CIA World

Factbook 2013.
However, aside from pure numbers of legislators, what additionally and
more importantly counts is the aggregated cost related to the Parliament, be it
uni- or bi-cameral, and not so much absolutely, but proportionally to other
indicators such as GDP, average national income, etc.
b) In terms of functionality
Argument:
Decisive, timely, effective.
Quicker enactment of proposed legislation,
no time-consuming inter-Chamber
differences to reconcile, no navettes, no joint
committees, no re-examination.
Critique:
Speed per se, at the expense of quality and/or
responsibility? Speed and attention are
91
Critique:
Likelihood, even if only for psychological
reasons (i.e. inter-Chamber jealousy, friction,
rivalry, thus making law adoption difficult,
sometimes even impossible) of decisional
gridlock (in congruent) or at least of a
slowing down (in incongruent systems) of the
law-making process, and, finally, to debatable
solutions of divergence management91.
Ion DELEANU, Instituii i proceduri constituionale cit., p. 613.

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inversely proportional.
Rebuttal:
(Quasi-perfect) congruent and symmetrical
bicameral systems are extremely rare.
Moreover, divergences may actually reflect
the (different) view(s) of the people.
Comment:
Efficiency needs to be addressed two-dimensionally, not only objectively, in terms of possible
standardised performance indicators, but also and crucially subjectively, in terms of the
public opinions perception. Additionally, Philip Nortons above-mentioned distinction
between function, capacity, and political will of a parliamentary Chamber seems extremely
useful, the third one being a critical factor of the likelihood of legislative delays or gridlocks.
Decision-making quality
Critique:
Unicameralism doesnt possess the safety
valve against flawed legislation that a
second Chamber provides.
Rebuttal:
1. Adopted laws are constitutionally
controlled and subject to judicial
contestation, while legislators can, and in
the case of flawed legislation, should,
reintroduce a new bill correcting the
previous one.
2. Moreover, legislators of a unicameral
system are able to proceed thoroughly and
carefully, as they are relieved of the need
to move legislation through a cumber
stone process involving two houses.
3. If truly needed, safety valves can be
engineered within the single Chamber,
without generating a new Chamber for
this sole purpose.
Counterarguments:
1. Prevention is better than cure; the
above-mentioned are merely instruments
of a posteriori control, when the harm has
already been done.
The constructive deterrence/coercion exerted
by a second Chamber is probably more effective
than the above-mentioned lack of pressure.
92
93
94
95
96
97
Philosophy:
Two eyes are better than one92.
Arguments:
1. When it comes to critical decision-making,
redundancy has an institutional
value93, becoming a virtue94.
Providing a second opinion95, an upper
Chamber multiplies opportunities for
debate and reflection and facilitates a
more deliberative approach to legislation,
thus preventing/hindering the passage of
flawed legislation.
Counterargument:
a.) Not rarely, bicameral legislatures are
forced to take shortcuts and use fast track
proceedings that condense committee and
floor debate and eliminate opportunities
for deliberation and reflection;
b.) Quite contrary to theory, experience
shows that the presence of a second
house encourages and enables legislative
carelessness96, each Chamber relying on
the other to correct mistakes or reject the
flawed bill;
2. Able to postpone law adoption, the second
Chamber offers a protection from the first
Chambers possible legislating excess.97
Giovanni SARTORI, Comparative Constitutional Engineering cit., p. 251.

Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN, op. cit., p. 15.
Kenneth C. WHEARE, Legislatures, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p. 140.
Bogdan DIMA, Parlament bicameral cit., p. 30.
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77
Counterargument:
Introducing a new problem does not solve the
initial one (since there is no a priori reason to
assume the second Chamber would differ in
attitude, all the less in congruent systems).
3. Even the congruent type of bicameralism
might improve the efficiency of decisionmaking, as it enhances the informational
process98.
Comment:
Aside from Sartoris obvious argumentum ad naturam, both argumentation lines omit the
crucial factor of the legislators necessary, or at least desirable, expertise; if the second
Chambers members are equally (un-)expert in the matter to be legally regulated, multiplying
numbers is not the solution, since legislators will, at best, follow the recommendations of their
advisors, or, at worst, either dont care, or adopt a populist solution. This punctual observation
in turn opens a wholly new, generic, and consequential discussion about legislators eligibility
and expertise and about the complexity of the legislative activity in todays societies.
Customs and tradition:
This argument, already exemplified above, within the approach of historical factors on Parliament
structure, does not develop along the uni- vs. bi-cameral debate line, but within each country, and
reflects entirely different alignments. For the particular case of Romania, the elements of tradition
shall be discussed in the next part of the study.
To conclude to the here completed inventory of nine main structural and

procedural criteria instrumented in the comparative analysis of unicameralism
and bicameralism, a first necessary remark emphasizes the above clarified
necessity to distinguish, for each employed criterion, to which type of
bicameralism the argument refers, each of them featuring a specific set of
arguments and counterarguments. Thus, the incongruent and symmetric version
of bicameralism seems the only one reasonably superior to the unicameral
model. At the same time, any admissible comparison needs to expand from
beyond an in vitro approach towards taking into account a multitude of
interfering independent variables characteristic to a specific pair of political
system and culture.
Essentially, the debate seems unsettled by five criteria: sovereignty with
the unicameralists criticism of the bicameral model reasonably refuted; civic
participation in regard to which it doesnt seem clear which of the two models
encourages/discourages more the involvement of citizens in the legislative
process; the legislative stability, although, at least empirically and refrained to
Europe, unicameralists appear to make a stronger case; the quality of the
98
See James R. ROGERS (An Informational Rationale for Congruent Bicameralism,

Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 13, no. 2, 2001, pp. 123-151), who builds a game
theory model with informational uncertainty and perfectly identical chambers in terms of
their political makeup.
vol. XIV
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78
decision-making, with each of the two cases credibly refuted by the other
debating side; respectively customs and tradition, an entirely subjective criterion
to be instrumented within each country, and not in a trans-border format.
As for the remaining four indicators, bicameralists make a compelling
argument in favour of their model in terms of representation within federal or
regional states (whereas in unitary homogenous states without prominent local
identities, a second Chamber seems redundant, as argued by the unicameralists),
while the incongruent and symmetrical type of a two-Chamber Parliament
seems also superior to the unicameral model in that it ensures a more efficient
checks and balances mechanism, at least between the executive and the
legislative branches. Oppositely, the compelling argument for a unicameral
legislature is the need to ensure accountability 99 , while efficiency seems at
least theoretically riskier, or harder to be achieved within bicameral legislatures.
THE CASE OF CONTEMPORARY ROMANIA

The current, according to many opinions undesirable, status quo in terms
of Parliament structure and especially functionality is a resultant of both
historical factors and a post-1989 publicly perceived elites incapacity and/or
lack of political will towards increasing the effectiveness of Romanias
institutional architecture in general, and of its Parliament in particular.
Historical Background of Romanias Parliament Structure100

Departing from the previous community assemblies of unicameral type
that had extensively represented social categories on a census-vote-basis prior
99
100
Philip NORTON, Adding Value?... cit., p. 11.

The following represents an extremely summarizing approach. For a broader historical
overview, see Keith HITCHINS, A Concise History of Romania, Cambridge University
Press, New York, 2014, pp. 112 f.f. For a narrower approach of the political system
during the Communist Regime, see Dennis DELETANT, Romania under Communist
Rule (2nd ed.), The Center for Romanian Studies; Civic Academy Foundation, Iai,
Oxford, Portland, 1999. Ioan Stanomir provides an excellent summary of Romanias
Constitutional evolution in The Temptation of the West: The Romanian Constitutional
Tradition, in Mihaela CZOBOR-LUPP, J. Stefan LUPP (eds.) Moral, Legal and Political
Values in Romanian Culture, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy,
Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 75-97. For a comparison of post-Communist and interwar
Romania especially in regard to electoral systems, see Cristian PREDA, Romnia
postcomunist i Romnia interbelic, Meridiane, Bucureti, 2002.
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to the reign of Al.I. Cuza, the 1866 Constitution, largely inspired by the Belgian
one of 1831 101 , attributed legislative power jointly to the monarch and to a
bicameral National Representation (art. 31), comprising the Assembly of
Deputies and the Senate (art. 32)102. The system displayed incongruence, as the
deputies tenures lasted four years, while the senators were in part de jure
members and in part elected by census suffrage for an eight-year mandate, half
of them being renewed every four years.
Adopted in the aftermath of World War One, Greater Romanias 1923
Constitution103 preserved the bicameral, asymmetrical and incongruent structure
of the Parliament, made up by: the Assembly of Deputies, comprising members
elected by universal, equal, direct, mandatory and secret vote (art. 64) for a
four-year term (art. 62), the age requisite being minimum 25 years (art. 66(c));
the Senate, which combined territorial, socio-occupational and religious
representation criteria, comprising: (a) elected members, by the same procedure
and for the same tenure as deputies, but with a minimum age required of 40
years): one senator for each county, indirectly elected by county and local
councils (art. 69); one senator per county per occupational category, elected by
the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Labour, and Agriculture (art. 70); one
senator for each state university, elected by and from within their professors
(art. 71); (b) a variety of de jure members104.
King Charles IIs 1938 Constitution preserved the bicameral legislature
structure, its article 31 stipulating: The legislative power is exerted by the King
through the agency of the National Representation, which is divided in two
assemblies: the Senate and the Assembly of Deputies. The two Chambers
differed significantly in terms of selection procedure, political composition,
number of seats, tenure, and powers, making the envisaged parliament highly
incongruent and asymmetrical: Deputies (required to be at least 18 years old
and practice agriculture, manual labour, commerce, industry, or intellectual
occupations) were elected on the basis of a uninominal system, by a secret,
mandatory and freely expressed vote for a six-year term (art. 61); the half-sized
Senate comprised three categories of members: (a) appointed by the King; (b)
de jure members the (adult) heir apparent; princes of the Royal Family; the
Romanian Orthodox Patriarch and Metropolitans; the heads of officially-recognized
101
102
103
104
Ioan STANOMIR, The Temptation of the West cit.,. pp. 87-88.

See text of the 1866 Constitution at http://www.cdep.ro/ pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act
_text?idt=37755 (retrieved March 2014).
Full Romanian text at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=1517
(retrieved March 2014).
Among which: the heir apparent (starting with his 18th birthday); the state-recognized
religious denominations; the president of the Romanian Academy; for prime ministers and
ministers having served for at least four, respectively six years, former Armed Forces
chiefs of staff etc. (art. 72-73).
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religious denominations; (c) elected members, by the same procedure as

deputies, but for a 9-year tenure, 1/3 of them renewed every 3 years (art. 63-64).
After World War II and Marshal Antonescus dictatorship, marked by a
suspension of any parliamentary activity, bicameralism was briefly reinstated in
1944, only to be replaced in 1946105 by the emerging Communist power with a
unicameral Great National Assembly, confirmed as such by the Constitutions of
1948 (art. 37), 1952 (art. 22), and 1965 (art. 42), in what represented a typically
Communist marionette-legislature.
Bicameralism was re-established after the regime change of 1989, by the
Provisional Council for National Unitys Law-Decree No. 92 of March 14, 1990, a
de facto provisional Constitution whose article 3 referred to the Parliament as
comprising the Assembly of Deputies and the Senate106. The new state of fact
was confirmed by the 1991 Constitution, whose article 58(2) Parliament
consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate 107 was preserved in
article 61(2) of the 2003-revised version of the fundamental law108.
The Current Problem-situation

The rationale underlying the 1991 option for bicameralism has been
explained in the literature as both a return to pre-Communist tradition and a way
of articulating a new constitutional identity by legitimizing the differentiation
from the Communist unicameralism and, with disregard however for the
Senates traditional role of elites and specialized representation, so that the
countrys transition legislature became and remained highly congruent. Partly
acknowledging this problem, the 2003 Constitution revision, abolishing the
inter-Chamber mediation procedure and establishing a law-defined, themerelated, albeit arbitrary, differentiation between a first notified, reflective and a
second, decisional Chamber, has managed to alter the previous quasi-perfect
egalitarianism only to a minor degree109.
105
106
107
108
109
Prime minister Petru Grozas Law Decree of June 17, 1946, abolished the Senate, a
decision reconfirmed by the new Electoral Law of July 15, 1946.
Romanian text at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=7528 (retrieved
March 2014).
English text at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act1_2&par1=3#t3c1s1a58
(retrieved March 2014).
For other information about Romanias parliamentary history, see, inter alia, Tudor
DRGANU, Drept constituional i instituii politice. Tratat Elementar, Lumina Lex,
Bucureti, 2000, pp. 90-91; Sorin BOCANCEA (coord.), Constituia Romniei. Opinii
eseniale pentru legea fundamental, Institutul European, Iai, 2012; Cynthia CURT,
Modele bicamerale comparate... cit., p. 28; Bogdan DIMA, Parlament bicameralcit.;
Claudia GILIA, Reformarea sistemului constituional... cit., p. 164.
Cynthia CURT, Modele bicamerale comparate... cit., p. 30.
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81
The public debate and, consequently, the academic one, have been
reignited in 2009, when President Traian Bsescu successfully initiated a
referendum, simultaneously with the first round of the presidential elections, in
which he was participating for a second term, regarding two issues: the
establishing of a unicameral Parliament and a reduction of parliamentary seats
to at most 300. The results marked a landslide victory of the president and his
supporting party against essentially all other political parties and alliances: in a
total turnout of 50.94%, no less than 77.78%, respectively 88.84% of the valid
votes approved the unicameral, respectively size reduced Parliament
Constitutional initiative110. However, despite the magnitude of popular support,
the initiative registered no legally-required follow up in a Parliament where all
parties openly boycotted the revision project.
Finally, after a spectacular, though negative-vote-based, victory in the
parliamentary elections of 2012, the new parliamentary and governing majority
of the Social-Liberal Union, which had already changed the electoral law
towards establishing a now-in-session 588-seats parliament, initiated its own
Constitution revision project which, however, doesnt consider any Parliament
size reduction, nor a change of its bicameral structure, despite some, admittedly
marginal, public voices insisting on it.
Apart from the decision-making and the public agenda as well, the
academic community quasi-unanimously agrees on the status quos
undesirability, although opinions vary significantly as to what the best remedies
to the acknowledged problem-situation would be. Thus, quite unique throughout
Europe, the Romanian bicameralism type has been widely classified as
egalitarian in both fundamental dimensions, i.e. congruence and symmetry, by
both local and foreign scholars111.
Various measurement instruments, advanced in time by various scholars
and practitioners as well, do confirm this almost axiomatic opinion. Focusing
her study on Latin Americas bicameral Parliaments, but with worldwide
applicability, Mariana Llanos for instance elaborated in 2002 two indexes of
parliamentary incongruence, respectively symmetry, which I find useful for any
inter-country comparison along the parliamentary dimension. Llanos first index
comprises ten dimensions representing institutional mechanisms and procedures
that foster incongruence: 1.) electoral system 1.a) districts and formula;
110
111
Meaning that even large chunks of the opposition candidates voters approved Bsescus
initiative. For more data, see the validation decision of the Constitutional Court at
http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/geztcmbrge/hotararea-nr-37-2009-referitoare-la-respectarea-proced
urii-pentru-organizarea-si-desfasurarea-referendumului-national-din-data-de-22noiembrie-2009-si-la-confirmarea-rezultatelor-acestuia (retrieved March 2014).
See, inter alia, Arend LIJPHART, Modele ale democraiei... cit., pp. 192-193; Cynthia
CURT, Modele bicamerale comparate... cit., pp. 28-30; Ioan MURARU, Mihai
CONSTANTINESCU, Drept parlamentar cit., p. 72; Tudor DRGANU, Drept
constituional cit.
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1.b) minorities special representation; 1.c) appointments; 1.d) indirect

elections; 2.) Chambers size; 3.) requisites for being elected in the upper
Chamber 3.a.) age; 3.b) other requisites; 4.) tenure; 5.) Chambers renewal
5.a) synchronicity of renewal; 5.b) simultaneousness of election. The second
index comprises six dimensions corresponding to institutional mechanisms and
procedures that foster inter-Chamber symmetry: 1.) legislative attributes of the
upper Chamber; 2.) origin of the bills; 3.) resolution of disagreements;
4.) executive control instruments 4.a) investigation and interpellation;
4.b) one Chambers (usually the upper one) participation in appointments;
4.c) bicameral division of tasks for impeachment112.
Transposing Llanos instruments, Romanias Parliament would register
average scores of 6 in terms of incongruence, on a scale from 0 (extreme
congruence) to 26 (extreme incongruence), respectively 16 in terms of
symmetry, on a scale from 0 (extreme asymmetry) to 18 (extreme symmetry),
figures that classify it as extremely symmetrical and highly congruent, in what
thus represents a quantifiable confirmation of an overwhelming opinion already
expressed in time by scholars.
A text analysis of the 2003 Constitution easily highlights this profoundly
egalitarian format; stipulated by the fundamental law, the two Chambers
display: an identical selection method (universal, equal, direct, secret and freely
expressed vote) (art. 62(1)113; An identical mixed electoral system applied
(art. 62(3) and subsidiary electoral law); a simultaneousness of their
elections (art. 63(2), which further enhances the congruence derived by the first
two provisions 114 ; an identical (constituency) representation type of mandate
(art. 69) 115 , translatable in equal legitimacy and authority; an identical and
overlapping 4-year tenure (art. 63(1); an equal independence in both internal
organization and budgeting (art. 64(1)-(5)); identical and simultaneous reunions
in twice-a-year ordinary sessions (art. 66(1); an identical term-prolongation
regulating framework (art. 63(2); an identical incompatibility set (art. 71); an
112
113
114
115
Mariana LLANOS, El bicameralismo en Amrica Latina, paper presented at the Tercer

Congreso Latinoamericanistas Europeos, Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2002; pp. 354-355, 359,
364
(http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/dconstla/cont/2003/pr/pr20.pdf,
last accessed 25 April 2014)
Unlike for instance the relatively similarly congruent case of Poland, where senators are
elected by a majority vote on provincial basis, while members of the Sejm are elected for
an equal 4-year term, but on the basis of a complex system of proportional representation.
Unlike the system of the Czech Republic, where deputies serve a 4-year term, while
senators a 6-year one, with one third of them renewed every two years (see article 16(1)-(2) of
the Constitution of the Czech Republic at http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/laws/199
3/1.html (last accessed March 2014).
Unlike the otherwise similar case of the Italian Parliament, whose Chambers share the
same electoral system, but, specifically, the senators are elected on a regional basis
(articles 56-57 of the Italian Constitution, available at http://www.senato.it/docum
enti/repository/istituzione/ costituzione_inglese.pdf, last accessed March 2014).
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83
identical parliamentary immunity (art. 72); an identical right to legislative

initiative, both Chambers being able to adopt laws, decisions, and motions,
provided an (identical) absolute majority quorum (art. 67).
This combined high congruence and symmetry, not even mitigated by
such minor differences as the ones regulated in the Czech, Italian or Polish
types of bicameralism, has been criticized especially for perpetuating inefficient
and redundant parallelisms 116. Even a detailed research in Constitutional
provisions relevant to the issue highlights a mere five noteworthy, but actually
rather formal than substantial, differences between the two houses:
a.) The minimum age eligibility requisite 23 years for deputies vs. 33
for senators (Constitution art. 37(2));
b.) The interim of the Presidency office, assigned, in order, to the
President of the Senate, and then to the one of the Chamber of
Deputies (Constitution art. 98(1)) a difference related rather to
people than Chambers;
c.) The presence, confined to the Chamber of Deputies, of a
representative for each officially recognized national minority whose
organization doesnt overcome the standard electoral threshold
(Constitution art. 62(2)) the only de jure and a priori inter-Chamber
difference in terms of political make-up, the others being usually
generated by the political migration phenomenon;
d.) The Chambers sizes, calculated on the basis of an every-four-years
changing law that regulates the representation norms of deputies
and senators:
Table 6
Romanias Post-1989 Number of Parliamentarians
by Chamber and Legislature117
MPs
Legislature
1990-1992
1992-1996
1996-2000
2000-2004
2004-2008
2008-2012
2012 present
116
117
Deputies
Senators
No.
No.
396
328
343
345
332
334
412
76.9
69.6
70.6
71.1
70.8
70.9
70.0
119
143
143
140
137
137
176
23.1
30.4
29.4
28.9
29.2
29.1
30.0
Total
515
471
486
485
469
471
588
Ramona DUMINIC, Andreea DRGHICI, A Few Considerations... cit., p. 76.

Parliament website figures (http://www.parlament.ro).
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e.) The specific prerogative of the Senate to validate the Superior

Council of Magistracy members elected by general assemblies of
magistrates (Constitution art. 133(2)).
Aside from these few minor differences, all deliberation and legislation
topics subsumable to what might be considered national interest require joint
sittings of the two Chambers, in which (22) cases it has been justifiably
argued the legislative virtually functions as a single-Chamber Parliament118:
debate of the proposed government programme and list, and expressing a vote
of confidence (Constitution art. 103(3)); adoption of a motion of censure (no
confidence vote) (art. 112(1)); debate of the programme, general policy
statement, or bill upon which the government takes responsibility (art. 114(1));
re-examination, upon request of the President, of a law passed (114(4));
examination of reports issued by the Supreme Council of National Defence and
of those of the Court of Audit (art. 65(2-g) and 140(2)); appointment of
intelligence services directors (art. 65(2-h)); receiving the message of the
President of Romania (art. 65(2-a)); approval of State and Social Security
Budget (art. 65(2b); swearing-in of the elected president (art. 82(2)); issuing of
a declaration of war, or of total or partial mobilization (art. 62 (2c,d)); adoption
of cease-fire decision (art. 65(2e)); appointment of the Ombudsman and
presentation of his/her reports (art. 65 (2i) and 60); impeachment of the
President for high treason (art. 96(1)); suspension from office of the President
(or the interim one) (art. 95(1) and 99); approval of the National Strategy for
Defence (art. 65(2f)); approval of the state of emergency or siege established by
the President (art. 93(1)); adoption of the deputies and senators statutes, their
emoluments and other rights (art. 65(2j)); fulfilment of any other prerogatives
which require joint sittings by Constitution or Standing Orders (art. 65(2k)),
such as adoption of other declarations, messages or bills of political nature,
proclamation of referendum results, celebration of certain national holidays or
commemorations etc.119
This set of objective shortcomings is doubled by the subjective
component of public opinion and confidence in the legislature, one of constant
extremely low values in comparison to both the average European values and
the other national institutions or organizations surveyed. The following diachronic
overview of Romanian public confidence in the parliament, measured over three
waves of the European Values Survey highlights both the relative and absolute
low confidence expressed since the regime change of 1989.
118
119
Tudor DRGANU, Drept constituional cit., p. 90.

The last three situations have been identified by Emil BOC, Cynthia CURT, Instituii
politice i proceduri constituionale n Romnia, Accent, Cluj-Napoca, 2006, p. 73.
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85
Table 7
Public Trust in Institutions over the Last 3 EVS Waves,

Romania and Europe Average
Institution
EVS wave
Church RO
Church Europe
Armed Forces RO
Armed Forces Europe
Justice system RO
Justice System Europe
Press RO
Press Europe
Parliament RO
Parliament Europe
Civil service RO
Civil Service Europe
Education system RO
Education system Europe
Police RO
Police Europe
1990
1999
2008
72.3
52.1
82.2
46.1
47.7
51.1
27.8
39.2
20.8
42.5
30.6
40.4
79.2
63.0
45.1
59.1
82.7
53.6
82.6
57.3
40.1
45.0
38.5
38.6
19.2
35.3
27.3
40.0
79.4
70.5
45.4
56.4
86.2
59.1
76.2
63.3
41.4
49.0
43.5
37.0
24.0
39.4
30.7
47.6
74.0
67.9
54.8
62.1
RO = Romania: EU = Europe sample average

(% of a great deal + quite a lot confidence within valid answers)120
It is in this very context of both objective shortcomings of the legislature

and its subjective negative perception by the public, that Romanian
constitutionalist Ion Deleanu, launched a virulent critique of the current
Romanian Parliament:
In its current, artificially built form, featuring some novelty juridical fictions,
such as the adoption of a law by its non-adoption, it offers an exemplary paradox: formally,
arithmetically, it is a perfect bicameralism, as there are two and thank God! only two
Chambers; functionally, it is a radically imperfect bicameralism, as only of the Chambers
issues the final legislative verdict. It is one of the most striking contradictions, one pro
domo admitted with nonchalance by those who wanted to salvage their seats. But it is also
one of the most unbearable situations, the two Chambers doing nothing else other than
doubling the anyway exorbitant, indecent, cynical costs and the incompetence,
mammothizing the extra casting121,122.
120
121
122
EVS integrated database available and operational (March 2014) at http://zacat.gesis.o

rg/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5, last accessed
25 April 2014).
In the cinema meaning of the term. In the original Romanian expression: mamutiznd
figuraia.
Ion DELEANU, Instituii i proceduri constituionale cit., p. 188.
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Even the application of the aforementioned criteria of a comparative

unicameral versus bicameral analysis remains futile. Thus, the generic
bicameral models strongest two arguments do not apply to this country context
as: firstly, Romania is a unitary state and, furthermore, ethno-linguistically and
religiously highly homogenous, while local/regional identities seem reasonably
weak; secondly, in terms of checks and balances, the remarkably high
congruence of the current legislative structure, associated with the same
supermajority within both houses, implies a minimal legislative pressure
exerted on the executive. A contrario, the strongest unicameralist argument, i.e.
accountability, combined with public perception, further speaks against the
status quo, as do the every-four-year parliamentary elections, whose dominant
feature seems to be a negative against, type of vote. In terms of efficiency, the
current system may be effective in that it isnt affected by gridlocks, but this is
achieved on the expense of the legislatures independence in relation to the
executive, whereas in economic terms, disrespecting the 2009 referendum
results and divergent to the steady population decrease 123 , the Parliaments
aggregated size has been expanded in 2012 from 471 to 588 legislators.
As for the other generally employable comparative criteria, the public
participation in and monitoring of the legislative activity remains severely low,
while the legislature offers no discernible reason to believe it might try to
ameliorate the situation; the quality of decision-making, regardless of any
possible objective measuring, is rather completely irrelevant given the public
perception of it; the sovereignty argument of unicameralists is exiled as
caducous by article 148(2) of the Constitution. At the end of the day, the only
noteworthy justification of todays unicameral configuration is formulated
along the customs and tradition criterion and lies in the 72 years (1866-1938) of
bicameralism of Romanias pre-1989 history.
CONCLUSIONS
Essentially controversial institutions, second Chambers and, subsequently,
the option for a unicameral or a bicameral Parliament, will most likely remain
the subject of intense debate in the academic fields of Constitutional Law and
Political Science for mainly five reasons: firstly, some of the very defining
characteristics of second Chambers, as for instance a particular political theoryrooted type of representation, one significantly different from the unicameralists
one people one sovereignty one representation philosophy; secondly, the
123
According to the National Institute of Statistics, from 21.680.974 in 2002 to 19.042.936 in 2011.
vol. XIV
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87
spectacularly high variety, in terms of both structure and procedures, of todays

roughly eighty bicameral legislatures worldwide and the virtual impossibility to
conceptually unify them into a single model opposable to, by contrast, the
parsimonious unicameral one; thirdly, in terms of structural and procedural criteria
of comparative analysis, the consequential dilemma of the inseparable strengths
and weaknesses of any existent or imagined legislature structure type a
dilemma roughly translatable as accountability plus efficiency (appraised by
unicameralists) versus representation plus checks and balances (argued by
bicameralists); fourthly and subsequently, the impossibility to mathematically
model the classic debates arguments and counterarguments into a standardized
methodological instrument that would enable a ranking of the unicameral and
multiple bicameral models; finally, the significant and largely acknowledged
fact that legislature structure represents a dependent variable, a resultant of
multiple strongly interrelated and highly country-specific factors of both
objective and subjective nature, ranging from history-bound state structure to
population size.
The last reason may thus explain, in terms of the uniqueness vs. similarity
tension, why even a monitoring of the last two decades roughly twenty
switches from unicameral to bicameral structures and vice-versa, although
capturing a relatively clear trend in favour of bicameralism, does not add
explanatory power, nor comparative usefulness, since in the majority of those
cases, scholars and practitioners have identified various other country-specific
factors of the Parliaments subsequent institutional performance.
From the same empirical point of view, Romania, whose bicameralism
stands out as an exception in its neighbourhood, respects essentially all of the
correlations between legislature structure and other state variables monitored
throughout Europe, while its unitary state structure does not represent an
anomaly, since, although federal states highly correlate with bicameral
parliaments, the majority of the two-Chamber legislatures worldwide are
actually located in unitary states.
Leaving empirical aspects aside, a structural-functional approach to the
countrys current bicameral configuration however pinpoints it as an extremely
peculiar case, unique at least among European bicameral systems, one that,
employing any of the above-detailed conceptual and methodological instruments,
is classifiable as severely ineffective. Thus, in terms of the symmetry-congruencelegitimacy analytical triad, apart from its extreme symmetry, insignificantly
altered by the 2003 Constitution revision, it fosters a remarkably high
congruence, which remains unaddressed as such, not even by some minor
electoral or representational adjustments like the ones operated in the congruent
bicameral systems of Italy, the Czech Republic, or Poland. Subsequently
affected by numerous redundancies and parallelisms, completely disjointed
from the fundamental rationale of the bicameral model, i.e. to represent
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IONU APAHIDEANU
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different interests, and additionally contextualized by a severely low public trust

in the institution, Romanias current bicameral structure ultimately fails, even in
appealing to most important two arguments developed in favour of the
bicameral model: both its Chambers, quasi-identical in their political makeup,
represent constituencies, while in terms of checks and balances, the governing
majority controls both Chambers, which translates into a misbalancing of the
Legislative-Executive power relation in favour of the latter. Thus, eventually,
any other format, from the pure unicameral to the ideal incongruent and
symmetrical bicameral one, seems preferable to the Romanias current
parliamentary structure.
Essentially, the countrys legislative problem lies not in a lack of
solutions. Aside from various recommendations for generically increasing the
Parliaments effectiveness and functionality, scholars and practitioners alike
have advanced over the last two decades a multitude of proposals regarding the
bicameral format, aimed mostly at diminishing the degree of inter-Chamber
congruence, and ranging: from differentiating the selection method of the
Chambers members to introducing a Chamber-separated, administrative-territorial,
respectively national representation; or from a mere reduction of parliamentary
seats with the preservation of the bicameral structure, to entirely eliminating all
the instances, classifiable as of national interest, in which the two Chambers
act as a de facto unicameral Parliament. The problem lies rather in the lack of
political will.
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Republicile non-arabe din Orientul Mijlociu

Orientri geopolitice i de securitate
n perioada post-Rzboiul Rece
DNU-FLORIN SANDOVICI
Sfritul Rzboiului Rece a fost marcat temporal de momentul

destrmrii Uniunii Sovietice la 25 decembrie 1991. n Orientul Mijlociu, acest
moment a generat confuzie, nesiguran i team n rndurile statelor i
regimurilor ale cror legitimitate i supravieuire politic, economic i militar,
fuseser bazate pe sprijinul URSS.
n cadrul statelor Orientului Mijlociu, republicile non-arabe (Israel,
Turcia, Iran) reprezint o categorie aparte de actori regionali, a cror
apartenen la sistemul de relaii geopolitice al zonei a fost contestat de unii
analiti politici, ndeosebi arabi1.
Istoria ultimelor decenii a dovedit ns c o mare parte dintre evoluiile
regiunii, precum conflicte armate, competiii pentru zone de influen politic i
economic, procese politico-diplomatice (ex.: procesul de pace israeliano-arab)
.a. au avut la origine fie contradicii ale acestor state cu vecinii lor arabi, fie
evenimente inter-arabe n desfurarea crora Israelul, Turcia i Iranul au fost
atrase sau au jucat un anumit rol n perioada premergtoare, n timpul sau dup
ncheierea lor.
Divizarea lumii arabe ntre state moderate, aliate Washingtonului i
state ale rezistenei, care se opun strategiei americane n zon, are la baz n
primul rnd raporturile speciale ale Israelului cu SUA.
Faptul c Iranul i Turcia de astzi sunt motenitoarele imperiilor Otoman
i Persan, care au dominat regiunea Orientului Mijlociu timp de mai multe
secole, influeneaz nc att percepia arabilor despre aceste state ct i
manifestrile regimurilor de la Teheran i Ankara pe plan regional, suspectate
uneori de reflexe imperiale. Afirmarea n ultima perioad a Turciei i a
Iranului ca puteri regionale i creterea vizibilitii lor n plan politic, economic
i de securitate va amplifica competiia dintre ele i va obliga ceilali actori ai
zonei s se adapteze noii realiti geopolitice.
Jamil MATAR, Ali Al-Din HILAL, The Arab Regional System: A Study of Inter-Arab
Relations, 3rd ed., Dar al Mustaqbal al-Arabi, Beirut, 1983, pp. 30, 33.
90
Concentrndu-se asupra metodelor adoptate de cele trei republici nonarabe pentru asigurarea propriei securiti n contextul raporturilor de putere
regionale, articolul de fa i propune s analizeze doar un aspect al locului pe
care-l ocup Turcia, Israelul i Iranul n ecuaia geopolitic a regiunii.
Revoltele declanate n lumea arab la nceputul anului 2011, denumite
generic Primvara Arab i consecinele acestora asupra raporturilor dintre
statele zonei constituie un subiect de actualitate, abordat deja cu interes de
analitii politici regionali i internaionali. Un capitol interesant al acestor studii,
asupra cruia se concentreaz succint i acest articol l constituie msura n care
schimbrile aduse n regiune de Primvara Arab vor determina modificri ale
strategiilor adoptate de republicile non-arabe pentru a-i asigura propria securitate.
ncadrarea politicilor republicilor non-arabe n teoriile

privind relaiile dintre state
Stephen Walt, un reprezentant de frunte al neorealismului, n spe al
realismului defensiv (scopul politicii externe promovate de un stat l constituie
asigurarea propriei supravieuiri i nu maximizarea profitului, aa cum afirm
John Mersheimer, reprezentantul realismului ofensiv 2 ), dezvolt i
perfecioneaz teoria realismului structural a lui Kenneth Waltz3 i susine c
statele mici i mijlocii au la dispoziie trei metode pentru a-i asigura
supravieuirea sau impunerea voinei lor asupra altor state4.
Prima dintre acestea, echilibrarea (balancing) are n vedere att realizarea
unor aliane ntre statele cu potenial mic i mijlociu pentru a echilibra raportul
de fore cu un hegemon regional, ct i valorificarea instrumentelor proprii de
putere, constnd n capaciti politico-militare, economice, tehnologice,
demografice, de resurse naturale etc. care s le maximizeze capacitile de a
face fa unei ameninri externe. Este vorba deci despre un dublu efort de
echilibrare, unul pe plan intern i altul n raporturile cu alte state, aspect
remarcat anterior i de Kenneth Waltz5.
A doua posibilitate are n vedere alinierea (bandwagoning) cu un actor
internaional sau zonal puternic i convenirea unor raporturi bilaterale speciale
John MEARSHEIMER, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton and Company,
New York, 2001, pp. 156-157.
Kenneth WALTZ, Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security,
vol. 25, no. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5-41.
Stephen WALT, Aliances in a Unipolar World, World Politics, vol. 61, no. 1, January
2009, p. 104; IDEM, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,
International Security, vol. 9, no. 4, 1985, pp. 3-43.
Kenneth WALTZ, Theory of International Politics, Mc Graw-Hill, New York, 1979, p. 168.
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care, dei n esen au un caracter dezechilibrat, asigur statului cu posibiliti

reduse o protecie pe care nu i-o poate realiza cu mijloace proprii.
A treia metod se numete destindere (dtente) i presupune dezvoltarea
voluntar de relaii panice cu alte state, pentru reducerea tensiunilor. Destinderea
nu exclude echilibrarea statului respectiv cu state care au decis s se alieze
pentru a descuraja o eventual agresiune.
Dei au contat pe protecia pe care le-a oferit-o relaia special cu SUA,
n cazul Israelului i Turciei, sau cu URSS, n cazul Iranului, toate aceste trei
state i-au luat msuri ca, n ultim instan, s poat rspunde unei ameninri
exclusiv prin mijloace proprii, dac din diferite motive nu pot beneficia de
protectorul pe al crui sprijin conteaz n mod obinuit. n mod aparent, avem
de-a face cu o politic de echilibrare, care prevede luarea de msuri att pe plan
intern ct i pe plan extern pentru descurajarea unei eventuale agresiuni. La o analiz
mai atent ns, politicile promovate de republicile nearabe pot fi calificate tot
att de bine, cel puin n cazul Israelului i Turciei, drept politici de aliniere.
Ambivalena politicilor acestor state rezult din faptul c autorii teoriilor
despre motivaiile formrii alianelor nu au pus suficient n eviden i varianta
n care un stat, dei n principiu conteaz pe protecia hegemonului zonei, nu-i
permite s elimine eventualitatea n care nu va putea profita de sprijinul acestuia,
fiind obligat s se bazeze pe propriile capaciti pentru a se apra de o eventual
ameninare. Aceast situaie este evident n cazurile Israelului i Iranului.
n ceea ce privete Turcia, confuzia din acest punct de vedere este i mai
mare, deoarece este vorba despre un membru al Alianei Nord-Atlantice
(NATO), ceea ce ar trebui s-l ncadreze n politica de echilibrare, ca stat care
recurge la aliana cu ali parteneri regionali pentru a-i asigura securitatea.
Numai c Turcia este o ar al crui teritoriu se ntinde pe dou continente,
Europa i Asia, iar NATO, dup cum i arat i numele, este o organizaie euroatlantic. Aa cum se va vedea n continuare, dac pe plan european postura de
membru al Alianei este util Turciei i i garanteaz securitatea, n raporturile
regimului de la Ankara cu statele din zona Orientului Mijlociu situaia se
complic. NATO evit implicarea n contradiciile zonei, pornind de la premiza
c orice intervenie poate modifica raportul regional de fore i poate amplifica
sentimentele antioccidentale i antiamericane ale popoarelor regiunii.
Iranul este, la rndul su, un caz atipic. Din politica de echilibrare, Iranul
a adoptat ntrirea capacitilor interne pn la un nivel care s-i asigure
suficiena posibilitii de reacie la un eventual atac extern. De asemenea,
aliana strategic cu Siria, stat vecin cu Israelul, a conferit regimului de la
Teheran, pn la declanarea crizei siriene la nceputul anului 2011, un
instrument de descurajare n raporturile cu potenialii adversari, dintre care cel
mai important a fost SUA. Iranul a adugat ns dimensiunii externe i un
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aspect care este denumit n literatura de specialitate drept metoda beleaguering6,

respectiv, o atitudine preventiv-ofensiv, de organizare de aciuni destabilizatoare
pe teritoriul statului considerat surs a ameninrii, inclusiv utilizarea unor
entiti non-statale. Iranul pune astfel n valoare organizaiile Hezbollah, Hamas,
Jihadul Islamic .a., incluse de SUA i de UE pe lista gruprilor teroriste. Prin faptul
c dispune de un anumit nivel de protecie, cel puin politico-diplomatic, din
partea Rusiei, se poate afirma c Iranul a optat i pentru o politic de aliniere, fr
ns ca relaia Teheranului cu Moscova s poat fi considerat de subordonare.
Opiunile geopolitice i de securitate ale Turciei

Turcia este un exemplu de stat aflat la intersecia unor zone de mare
interes geostrategic, ceea ce a constituit, n acelai timp, un avantaj i un
inconvenient pentru conducerea de la Ankara. Pn la mijlocul secolului trecut,
interesul puterilor regionale i internaionale pentru acest spaiu s-a concretizat
n ncercri de interferen n evoluiile interne din Turcia. Dup cel de-al
Doilea Rzboi Mondial, Turcia s-a orientat fr ezitare spre o relaie de aliniere
n raport cu SUA, pentru a balansa presiunile URSS de a atrage Ankara n sfera
sa de influen. n acelai context, Turcia a devenit n 1952 membru al NATO,
ceea ce i-a conferit o garanie solid de securitate.
Teoretic, aceast situaie ar trebui s confere conducerii de la Ankara un
anumit confort din punctul de vedere al descurajrii unor poteniali agresori. n
realitate, n istoria ultimei jumti de secol, Turcia a fost obligat s fac fa
unor provocri multiple, avnd n vedere raporturile tensionate cu Grecia,
persistena unor litigii teritoriale cu Cipru, vecintatea i competiia pentru
influen regional cu Iranul, apropierea de zonele de tensiune i de instabilitate
din Irak i Siria, atentatele la securitatea intern executate de gruprile
extremiste kurde din Turcia i din regiune etc.
n perioada Rzboiului Rece, Turcia a evitat implicarea n disputele din
lumea arab, a ncercat s nu antagonizeze Iranul i a promovat o politic de
cooperare cu Israelul (Turcia a fost primul stat cu o populaie majoritar
musulman care a recunoscut Statul Israel, n 1949). Relaiile dificile ale
Turciei cu Siria au avut la baz considerente istorice (cedarea de ctre Frana, n
1939, a provinciei Hatay, aparinnd Siriei, n schimbul meninerii neutralitii
regimului de la Ankara n cel de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial) i au ajuns la un
Chong JA IAN, Revisiting Responses to Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The

Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Singapore, noiembrie 2003, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP5
4.pdf, accesat la 23.12.2013.
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moment dat (1998) foarte aproape de conflict, datorit sprijinului acordat de

regimul de la Damasc liderului PKK, Abdullah Oalan.
Rzboiul din Golf a readus Turcia n centrul interesului Occidentului de a
avea un aliat de ncredere la porile Orientului Mijlociu. Politica Turciei n
perioada care a urmat sfritului Rzboiului Rece a evoluat de la o atitudine
relativ discret n raport cu contradiciile din zona Orientului Mijlociu, la un
comportament activ, menit s pun n eviden aspiraiile regionale ale
regimului de la Ankara. Motivaia acestei schimbri trebuie cutat i n
evoluia vieii politice interne din Turcia, unde Partidul Islamist al Bunstrii
(Refah) condus de Necmetin Erbakan a obinut, n alegerile legislative din
decembrie 1995, majoritatea n Parlament mpreun cu Partidul Calea Dreapt
i a dobndit capacitatea de a controla activitatea guvernului7. Din acel moment,
Erbakan a lansat o politic de refacere a relaiilor cu lumea islamic, inclusiv cu
vecinul Turciei, Iranul.
Dup alegerile parlamentare din 2002, care au adus la guvernare Partidul
Justiiei i al Dezvoltrii (AKP), politica extern a Turciei a nregistrat o pagin
nou, exprimat plastic de Ahmat Davutoglu, consilierul de politic extern al
premierului Erdogan, prin celebra formul zero probleme cu vecinii8. Premierul
Tayyep Recep Erdogan a reluat cu curaj ofensiva politico-diplomatic i mai
ales economic n direcia statelor arabe, politic pe care unii analiti politici
americani au denumit-o cu simpatie neo-otomanism. Din acel moment, Turcia
a creat impresia c se ndeprteaz de Occident9, avnd n vedere i refuzul UE
din 1997 de a include aceast ar ntr-un proces de aderare la care au fost
invitate zece state europene, ntre care i Cipru. n realitate, noua conducere
turc a mbinat demersurile de ameliorare a raporturilor cu statele Orientului
Mijlociu cu cele de aderare la UE, obiectiv pe care guvernul condus de Erdogan
l-a urmrit cu convingere, acceptnd implementarea unor msuri impuse de
organismele de la Bruxelles (diminuarea controlului armatei asupra evoluiilor
politice, acordarea unor drepturi culturale i lingvistice minoritii kurde etc.).
Dup 2009, strategia regimului de la Ankara n raporturile cu statele
regiunii a cunoscut o modificare major i neateptat. Turcia a reuit, prin
cteva metode soft, s se apropie n doar civa ani de lumea arab i islamic,
n pofida eecurilor sistematice suferite n cadrul acestui demers n ultima
jumtate de secol. Preul pentru aceast reuit l-a constituit ns deteriorarea
grav a raporturilor cu Statul Israel, cu care de peste o jumtate de secol Turcia
7
Sabri SAYARI, Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s, Journal of Palestine Studies,
vol. 26, no. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 44-55.
Formula zero probleme cu vecinii nu este complet nou, fostul preedinte al Turciei,
Kemal Ataturk, lansnd nc din anii 1930 sloganul pace n interior i pace n lume.
Beatrice GIBLIN, La Turquie, puissance rgionale mergente?, Gopolitique de la
Turquie, Herodote, Revue de Gographie et de Gopolitique, Trim. I, nr. 148, 2013,
http://www.herodote.org/spip.php?article563, accesat la 15.02.2014.
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ntreinuse relaii foarte bune. Intervenia One minute a premierului Erdogan

pe timpul discursului preedintelui israelian Shimon Peres la Forumul
Economic de la Davos din 2009 a avut un efect electrizant n ntreaga lume
arab. Aceast atitudine extrem de critic la adresa Israelului, coroborat cu
incidentul din 31 mai 2010 n care a fost implicat nava Mavi Marmara (Gaza
Freedom Flotilla), soldat cu uciderea de ctre comandourile de coast israeliene
a nou activiti pentru pace, l-a transformat pe Erdogan ntr-un adevrat erou al
lumii arabe i islamice.
Din acel moment i pn la nceputul anului 2011, cnd au izbucnit
revoltele n lumea arab, Turcia a devenit un susintor fr rezerve al
palestinienilor n disputa cu Israelul, un mediator ntre Occident i Iran n
privina programului nuclear al regimului de la Teheran i un promotor al unei
cooperri economice extinse cu statele arabe. La momentul respectiv, Turcia
prea capabil s realizeze un spaiu de cooperare economic i politic cuprins
ntre Damasc i Casablanca10. Aceast perioad de realizri fr precedent n
politica extern turc a pus n eviden rolul pe care este capabil s i-l asume n
regiune un stat care mprtete cu statele din Orientul Mijlociu aceeai religie
i multe elemente de cultur i tradiii, avnd n acelai timp n comun cu statele
europene un sistem democratic funcional i o economie de pia performant.
Turcia a demonstrat astfel c aceast combinaie dintre islam i democraie,
considerat pn atunci imposibil, este realizabil.
Evenimentele din Tunisia, Egipt, Libia, Yemen i Siria, de la nceputul
anului 2011 au ntrerupt ns acest proces, care i-a bazat succesul pe
legitimitatea performanei economice, pe susinerea triadei islam-naionalismdemocraie, de mare interes n dezbaterile actuale din lumea arab i pe o
atitudine extrem de critic la adresa Israelului. ntrebarea care se pune n acest
moment este dac Turcia va fi capabil s continue aceast politic, dup
stabilizarea situaiei n Siria i n celelalte state arabe.
n opinia noastr, situaia regional pe termen scurt i mediu nu ofer
Turciei un spaiu prea mare de manevr n domeniile politic, economic i mai
ales de securitate. ncetarea conflictului din Siria i stabilizarea deplin a
situaiei din aceast ar este puin probabil s se produc n urmtoarea decad.
Evoluiile din Egipt, Yemen i Libia nu sunt nici ele foarte ncurajatoare.
Turcia s-a angajat, mpreun cu Qatarul, n sprijinirea fr rezerve a
formaiunilor i partidelor politice derivate din gruparea islamist Fraii
Musulmani, care urmresc cucerirea puterii n statele afectate de Primvara
Arab11. n Tunisia i Egipt, aceast politic a dat roade la un moment dat. n
Siria, n pofida tuturor presiunilor interne i externe, regimul preedintelui
10
11
Jean MARCOU, Turkey's Foreign Policy: Shifting Back to the West After a Drift to the
East?, International Policy and Leadership Institute, 8th ed., Paris, 2013, pp. 2-8.
Denis BAUCHARD, Le Nouveau Monde Arabe. Enjeux et Instabilits, Andr Versailles
Editeur, Paris, 2012, pp. 222-238.
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Bashar al-Assad se afl nc la putere, iar excesele comise de formaiunile

islamiste extremiste n zonele aflate sub controlul lor au determinat o parte a
populaiei s trateze cu rezerve perspectiva prelurii puterii la Damasc de ctre
militanii islamiti.
Evenimentele de la Cairo i Tunis demonstreaz ns c partidele
islamiste, care au preluat modelul AKP din Turcia, au ntmpinat dificulti n
gestionarea situaiei politico-economice i sociale extrem de dificile din rile
respective. n Egipt, reprezentanii Friei Musulmane au fost nlturai de la
putere i au trecut n opoziie, recurgnd din nou la desfurarea activitii n
condiii de clandestinitate. n Tunis, Partidul Enahda a acceptat jocul
democratic i a fost obligat s coopereze cu alte partide i formaiuni politice,
avnd n vedere complexitatea procesului de tranziie i ateptrile foarte mari
ale populaiei. Raporturile Turciei cu autoritile de la Cairo sunt tensionate, iar
cu cele din Tunisia sunt n curs de a fi conturate.
n plus, guvernul premierului Erdogan s-a confruntat cu proteste violente
pe plan intern, la mijlocul anului 2013, fiind criticat de opoziie i de o mare
parte a populaiei tocmai pentru atitudinea sa pronunat islamist, n contradicie
cu tradiia secular, kemalist, a rii.
Un alt element care s-ar putea sa cntreasc greu n balana refacerii
relaiilor cu statele arabe l constituie ameliorarea raporturilor Turciei cu Statul
Israel. n martie 2013, urmare a eforturilor de mediere depuse de preedintele
american Barack Obama, premierul israelian Benjamin Netanyahu a cerut scuze
omologului su turc Recep Tayyep Erdogan pentru incidentul Mavi Marmara i
a promis compensarea familiilor victimelor12. Cele dou pri au convenit s
readuc relaiile diplomatice la nivelul anterior incidentului (retrimiterea
ambasadorilor) i s reia contactele i cooperarea pe toate planurile. Este de
ateptat ca acest proces s fie desfurat, cel puin n faza iniial, cu o anumit
discreie. Chiar dac cele mai multe dintre statele arabe nu vor obiecta la
ameliorarea relaiilor turco-israeliene, cu att mai mult cu ct unele dintre ele
(ex.: Iordania, Egipt, n mod neoficial Qatar) ntrein relaii diplomatice sau
comerciale cu Statul Israel, unul dintre cele trei motive care au determinat
acceptarea Turciei n lumea arab (adversitatea fa de Israel) nu va mai exista.
n plus, Arabia Saudit s-a decis, la mijlocul anului 2013, s-i asume
postura de lider regional, ntr-un context n care potenialii contracandidai erau
preocupai de problemele lor interne (Egipt, Irak, Siria), de raporturile dificile
cu comunitatea internaional (Iran) sau de limitrile impuse politicii lor externe
de conflictele existente n statele vecine (Turcia). Fiind susinut n acest proces
i de SUA, inta principal a aciunii Arabiei Saudite o constituie gruparea
12
Michael J. KOPLOW, Why Israel and Turkey Got Back Togethe.The Coming
Cooperation on Syria and Energy, Foreign Affairs, Published by the Council on Foreign
Relations, March 23, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139076/michael-jkoplow/why-israel-and-turkey-got-back-together, accesat la 23.03.2014
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islamist Fria Musulman, care i are originea i baza n Egipt, dar dispune
de ramificaii n toat lumea arab i islamic. Primul rezultat al acestei aciuni
a fost o lovitur de stat n Egipt, care l-a nlturat de la putere pe preedintele
Mohamed Morsi, provenit din rndurile militanilor de frunte ai gruprii.
Eecurile nregistrate de partidele i formaiunile politice afiliate Friei
Musulmane n Egipt, Tunisia i Libia au determinat o parte dintre liderii
acestora s se delimiteze de gruparea-mam din Egipt. Turcia, care prin
premierul su Tayyep Recep Erdogan s-a erijat n postura de susintor fervent
al acestor grupri, va avea dificulti n continuarea acestei strategii, ntr-o
perioad n care Ocidentul nu mai pare convins c democraia poate fi introdus
n lumea arab prin intermediul islamismului politic promovat de gruparea
Fraii Musulmani.
Combinaia islam-democraie, pe care Partidul Justiiei i al Dezvoltrii
(AKP) aflat la guvernare la Ankara prea s o fi aplicat cu succes, a nceput s
fie contestat chiar i n Turcia. Arabia Saudit a confiscat Turciei, cel puin
pentru moment, prghiile de influen n lumea arab, profitnd de faptul c
guvernul turc a schimbat vectorul economic (n promovarea cruia beneficia
deja de autoritate) cu ideologia islamist, intrnd astfel pe un teren n care
Riadul dispune de o legitimitate incontestabil.
n concluzie, politica extern promovat de conducerea de la Ankara n
perioada care a urmat Rzboiului Rece corespunde mai mult modelului
omnibalancing evocat de Steven David13, cu o precizare legat de specificitatea
aplicrii acestei metode n cazul Turciei. Spre deosebire de alte state din
Orientul Mijlociu, Turcia nu a apelat la aceast strategie datorit unei stabiliti
interne fragile, determinat de contradiciile dintre regim i populaie sau pentru
asigurarea supravieuirii regimului. Aciunile destabilizatoare ale organizaiilor
extremiste kurde au obligat ns guvernele care s-au succedat la conducerea rii
s acorde securitii interne o atenie cel puin egal cu cea rezervat respingerii
ameninrilor venite din exterior.
n domeniul aciunilor practice pentru implementarea acestei strategii,
politica extern a Turciei poate fi divizat n dou perioade clare: perioada
1990-2010 asigurarea echilibrului ameninrii (balance of threat); perioada
2010-2013 urmrirea profitului n raporturile cu statele arabe (balance of
interest). Sprijinit n ambele perioade de SUA, putem afirma c Turcia a urmat
politica de aliniere, dar apartenena sa la NATO o plaseaz i n postura de stat
care a aplicat politica de echilibrare. De aceea, ncadrarea strict a strategiei
externe a Turciei ntr-o singur formul evocat de teoriile relaiilor
internaionale este practic imposibil. Evoluia raporturilor dintre state continu
s furnizeze teoriei relaiilor internaionale o multitudine de situaii inedite, care
13
Steven R. DAVID, Choosing Sides, Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,1991, p. 11.
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pun la ncercare eforturile politologilor de a ncadra politica extern a actorilor

internaionali ntr-unul dintre curentele acceptate. Realismul i neorealismul
sunt contestate parial sau completate de teoriile instituionaliste, care prezint
politica mondial ca pe un sistem de interdependen complex, n care
nivelurile statal i sistemic, evocate de realiti i neorealiti, sunt completate cu
alte niveluri de analiz, care exced cadrul inter-statal al raporturilor dintre
actorii internaionali14.
Astfel, dincolo de statutul su de membru al Alianei Nord-Atlantice,
guvernul de la Ankara a contat ntotdeauna pe relaiile sale speciale cu
Administraia american. La rndul su, Washingtonul a manifestat i manifest
interes ntr-o relaie foarte bun cu conducerea turc, din motive bine ntemeiate.
Prin potenialul politico-militar i economic de care dispune n prezent, Turcia
este un factor stabilizator la Marea Neagr, controleaz ieirea dinspre Marea
Neagr spre Marea Mediteran, echilibreaz influena Federaiei Ruse n zona
Caucazului i ofer servicii importante Alianei Nord-Atlantice 15 . Aceste
aspecte demonstreaz faptul c, n afara cadrului neorealist de manifestare a
relaiilor Turciei cu partenerii si euro-atlantici, bazat pe intrumentele balanei
de putere (aliniere, echilibrare), raporturile din cadrul sistemului de relaii
internaionale pot depi cadrul interstatal, pe care instituionalitii nu-l contest,
dar pe care-l completeaz cu nivelurile transguvernamental i transnaional.
Orientrile geopolitice i de securitate ale Statului Israel

Statul Israel este posesorul uneia dintre cele mai bine dotate i instruite
armate din lume, beneficiaz de un sprijin american consistent pe plan politic,
economic i militar, evideniat i de obinerea, n 1989, a statutului de aliat
major non-NATO (major non-NATO ally) al SUA. Dispune de mijloace
impresionante de descurajare, inclusiv de armament nuclear i de capaciti de
reacie la o eventual ameninare. La nivelul anilor 1980, doctrina strategic
israelian pornea de la premisa c toate statele arabe erau poteniali inamici, c
orice nfrngere putea distruge Statul Israel, dar nicio victorie nu era suficient
pentru a pune capt conflictului cu statele arabe i, n consecin, viitorul
Israelului va consta ntr-o stare perpetu de beligeran cu vecinii si arabi16.
n timpul Rzboiului Rece, Israelul a fost considerat un partener al SUA
n promovarea strategiei de ngrdire (containment) fa de URSS i aliaii si.
14
15
16
Robert KEOHANE, Joseph NYE, Power and Interdependence, Scott, Foresman,

Glenview, 2001, p. 25.
Nikolas K. LAOS, International Security in the Post-Cold War Era, Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 4, December 1999-February 2000, p. 4.
Yoav BEN-HORIN, Barry POSEN, Israels Strategic Doctrine, Rand Corporation
Publication, Santa Monica, 1981, pp. III-VI.
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Dup destrmarea Uniunii Sovietice, valoarea strategic a Israelului, din

punctul de vedere al politicii americane de ngrdire a influenei Moscovei n
zon, s-a diminuat. Decidenii politico-militari americani se puteau concentra
acum asupra altor zone, precum Golful Persic, printr-o politic de dubl
ngrdire (dual containment) a Iranului i Irakului. Cooperarea dintre SUA i
URSS pentru implementarea formulei teritorii contra pcii a permis
organizarea conferinei de la Madrid (1991)17.
Lovirea teritoriului israelian de ctre rachetele Scud lansate de armata
irakian n timpul primului rzboi din Golf (1990-1991) a creat politicienilor
israelieni convingerea c securitatea Statului Israel nu se mai poate baza doar pe
capacitile interne i pe sprijinul SUA. Shimon Peres, premierul i apoi
preedintele Statului Israel, arta n acest sens c
att timp ct un nou Saddam Hussein poate aprea oricnd n lumea arab, iar rachetele
cu raz lung de aciune pot lovi teritoriul israelian din orice col al Orientului Mijlociu,
metoda descurajrii militare trebuie nlocuit cu cooperarea economic, acomodarea [n.n.:
cu statele vecine] i lansarea de negocieri cu statele arabe18.
n politica extern israelian, raporturile cu statele arabe ocup un rol

deosebit de important. Acestea au rmas tensionate, n pofida unor demersuri
intense ale conducerii de la Tel Aviv de a obine recunoaterea Statului Israel de
ctre vecinii si arabi. Israelul a ncheiat acorduri de pace cu dou dintre cele
patru state arabe vecine, respectiv, cu Egiptul (1979) i cu Iordania (1994).
Negocierile de pace desfurate n mai multe etape cu Siria (1994-1996, 19992000 i 2008) nu au condus la rezultatele ateptate. Pn la declanarea crizei
siriene, n martie 2011, Israelul condiiona desfurarea de tratative de pace
serioase i sincere cu regimul de la Damasc de
ncetarea sprijinului acordat [n.n.: de ctre Siria] terorismului, ncetarea sponsorizrii
organizaiilor Hamas i Jihadul Islamic, ncetarea livrrii de armament gruprii libaneze
Hezbollah i a aciunilor de destabilizare a Libanului, ncetarea sprijinului acordat
aciunilor teroriste din Irak i abandonarea legturilor strategice ale Siriei cu regimul
extremist din Iran19.
Raporturile Israelului cu Libanul, cel de-al patrulea stat arab vecin, sunt
influenate de controlul exercitat de Siria asupra evoluiilor politico-militare din
17
18
19
Jostein BROBAKK, After the Cold War: Structural changes and Israeli-Palestinian
Rapprochement, The Fourth Conference on Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle East in a
globalizing world, Oslo, 13-16 august 1998, http://www.smi.uib.no/pao/brobakk.html,
accesat la 26.02.2014,
Shimon PERES, The New Middle East, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1993, pp. 2-8.
Pagina de internet a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Israelului, capitolul Foreign
Affairs, subcapitolul Israel-Syria Negociations, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign Policy/
Peace/Guide/Pages/Israel-Syria%20Negociations.aspx, accesat la 04.08.2013.
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aceast ar i de aciunile violente declanate periodic de gruparea libanez

iit Hezbollah asupra unor zone din nordul teritoriului israelian, situate n
apropierea frontierei comune.
Dup ncheierea Rzboiului Rece, armata israelian a executat o nou
aciune militar n Liban (aprilie 1996, Operatiunea Strugurii Mniei), pentru
a rspunde provocrilor Hezbollah. Aceast operaiune nu a pus capt atacurilor
tot mai dese i mai violente ale militanilor Hezbollah asupra trupelor israeliene
din sudul Libanului, ceea ce va determina conducerea de la Tel Aviv s decid
retragerea unilateral a armatei israeliene din Liban, n mai 2000. Srbtorit n
Liban ca o mare victorie a rezistenei mpotriva ocupaiei israeliene, retragerea
israelian nu a adus ns pacea la frontiera dintre cele dou ri, astfel nct
Israelul va recurge la un nou atac asupra Libanului, n iulie 2006. Riposta
extrem de drz i de eficient a militanilor Hezbollah la atacul aviaiei,
trupelor terestre i blindatelor israeliene n Liban-Sud a creat, pentru prima dat
n istoria recent a Orientului Mijlociu, impresia c armata israelian nu este
invincibil i c lupta de gheril poate oferi anse de victorie unei grupri
armate cu efective reduse, inferioar ca dotare dar cu un moral extrem de ridicat,
cu o foarte bun instruire militar i beneficiind de o pregtire minuioas a
terenului pe care-l apr.
Organizaia pentru Eliberarea Palestinei a recunoscut Israelul n 1993,
anterior semnrii acordurilor de la Oslo. n pofida mai multor runde de
negocieri desfurate n perioada care a urmat, palestinienii i israelienii nu au
ajuns la un acord de pace. Problema palestinian continu s se afle pe lista
prioritilor conducerii israeliene i s constituie un element de vulnerabilitate
pentru Statul Israel i pentru SUA n toate demersurile de depire a unor crize
aprute n lumea arab i islamic.
Intre Israel i Maroc au existat o serie de contacte la nivel nalt, n
deceniile 1970 i 1980. Regele Hassan al Marocului a jucat n aceast
perioad un rol de catalizator discret n procesul de pace israeliano-arab.
Delegaii compuse din specialiti marocani i israelieni s-au ntlnit, n cadrul
unor reuniuni secrete sau oficiale, pentru a discuta aspecte de securitate, diplomaie,
agricultur, transporturi i jurnalism. La 22 iulie 1986, prim-ministrul israelian
Shimon Peres s-a ntlnit cu regele Hassan, la palatul acestuia din Ifrane, n
cadrul primei ntlniri oficiale dintre un lider arab i un premier israelian. n
1994, Israelul i-a deschis o reprezentan diplomatic (oficial, nu era o
ambasad) n Maroc, iar n 1995 regele Hassan a mediat negocieri de pace ntre
Israel i palestinieni. Chiar dac ntre cele dou state nu mai exist n acest
moment relaii diplomatice, raporturile Israelului cu Marocul au fost n general
mai bune dect cu majoritatea statelor arabe20.
20
Palestine Facts, Israel-Marocco Relationship, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_196

7to1991_hassan_peres_1986.php, accesat la 23.03.2014.
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Statul Israel a stabilit relaii comerciale cu Qatarul n 1996. n pofida

raporturilor apropiate ntreinute de conducerea de la Doha cu organizaiile
Hamas i Hezbollah, oficialii israelieni au meninut contactele directe cu
Emiratul Qatar. Premierul Shimon Peres a vizitat Qatarul n 1996, inaugurnd
un birou israelian de interese comerciale la Doha. Ministrul israelian al
afacerilor externe, Tzipi Livni, a vizitat Qatarul n aprilie 2008 i a realizat
ntlniri oficiale cu Emirul, cu primul-ministru i cu ministrul petrolului i
gazului. n mod oficial, biroul israelian de interese a fost nchis n 2009, dup
operaiunea Plumb ntrit executat de armata israelian n Fia Gaza21.
Un alt stat arab cu care Israelul a reuit s stabileasc relaii diplomatice a
fost Mauritania. n 1999, Mauritania a fost cel de-al treilea stat arab care a
recunoscut Statul Israel (dup Egipt i Iordania) i a stabilit relaii diplomatice
cu acesta. n urma conflictului din Fia Gaza (decembrie 2008-ianuarie 2009),
Mauritania i-a rechemat ambasadorul din Israel i a expulzat personalul
ambasadei Israelului de la Nouakchott. n martie 2010, relaiile dintre cele dou
state au fost ntrerupte22.
n lumea arab, Israelul a cutat dintotdeauna s menin relaii apropiate
cu populaia de origine kurd. Aceste raporturi au fost fcute publice n 1980,
cnd premierul israelian Menachem Begin a anunat trimiterea de ajutoare
umanitare i consilieri militari minoritii kurde din Irak. n viziunea oficialilor
de la Tel Aviv, sprijinirea comunitii kurde din nordul Irakului permitea
exercitarea unei presiuni asupra celor mai importani adversari arabi ai
Israelului, respectiv, Irak i Siria. Dup cderea regimului preedintelui irakian
Saddam Hussein (2003), prezena israelian n Regiunea Autonom Kurdistan
din nordul Irakului s-a manifestat prin investiii economice i contacte frecvente
cu oficiali ai Guvernului Regional Kurdistan23.
Dintre statele regiunii, Israelul a ntreinut raporturile cele mai apropiate
cu Turcia. n anii 1970 i 1980, relaiile economice i cooperarea militar
israeliano-turc s-au intensificat foarte mult. n perioada care a urmat
Rzboiului Rece, relaiile israeliano-turce au nregistrat o dezvoltare fr
precedent pe toate planurile, culminnd cu un acord de liber-schimb i dou
21
22
23
Matthew MACHOWSKY, Qatar-Israel relations, A Historical Overview, MidEast

Journal, 19 mai 2011, http://www.matthewmachowski.com/2011/05/qatar-israel-relatio
ns.html, accesat la 23.03.2014.
Mauritania Formally Severs Diplomatic Ties with Israel, Haaretz, 21 martie 2010,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/mauritania-formally-severs-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-1.26
5115, accesat la 23.03.2014.
Sattar AL-SA'AD, Barzani's Role in Israel's Presence in Iraq's Kurdistan, Interviu
publicat la 03.08.2013 n Lighthouse Viewer, http://lhvnews.com/en/news/53957baryanisrole-in-Israels-presence-in-iraqs-kurdistan, accesat la 04.08.2013.
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acorduri de cooperare n domeniul securitii, toate semnate n anul 1996 24 .

Analistul politico- militar Senussi Bsaikri arat c acordurile militare convenite
vizau modernizarea armamentului armatei turce i cooperarea n domeniile
trupelor terestre, aviaiei, aprrii antiaeriene i marinei, precum i n sectorul
informaiilor. Aciunile n comun aveau n vedere vizite militare reciproce,
antrenamente i exerciii, trimiterea de observatori pentru supravegherea
exerciiilor militare, schimburi de experien i de expertiz. Pentru
ameliorarea performanelor armamentului armatei turce, Israelul urma s
modernizeze flota de avioane F-4 Phantom i tancurile M60A1 ale Turciei.
Urmare acordului de liber schimb convenit ntre cele dou ri, singurul de acest
fel semnat de Israel cu un stat cu populaie majoritar musulman, volumul
schimburilor comerciale a crescut (de cca. 7 ori) de la 446 milioane dolari SUA
n 1996, la 3,38 miliarde dolari SUA n 200825 .
Pn la venirea la putere n Turcia a Partidului Justiiei i Dezvoltrii
(AKP), raporturile dintre Israel i Turcia au fost foarte bune. Ulterior, relaiile
dintre cele dou state au cunoscut momente de intensiti diferite, pn la
blocajul total intervenit n relaiile bilaterale n perioada 2010-2013. n martie
2013, liderii israelieni i turci au ajuns la concluzia c aspectele care unesc cele
dou state sunt mult mai importante dect cele care le despart.
n mediul regional volatil i marcat de incertitudine creat n Orientul
Mijlociu de revoltele cunoscute sub numele de Primvara Arab, Turcia
rmne pentru Israel un punct important de sprijin, suficient de puternic i de
credibil, pe care ar putea conta n situaii neprevzute. La refacerea acestei
aliane au avut o contribuie foarte important i SUA, care erau interesate s-i
revad unii pe cei mai importani parteneri ai si din Orientul Mijlociu.
n urma acestei treceri n revist a raporturilor Israelului cu statele
regiunii, putem trage concluziile urmtoare:
poziia Israelului n structura sistemului de relaii al Orientului Mijlociu
este marginal, prin frecvena, amploarea i intensitatea contactelor cu
statele arabe, dar central, prin reaciile pe care le determin n cadrul
elementelor sistemului nu numai aciunile sale, ci i simpla sa existen;
metoda adoptat de Israel pentru a-i asigura securitatea are unele
asemnri cu cea adoptat de Turcia (omnibalancing, combinaia dintre
preocuparea pentru asigurarea securitii interne i necesitatea
descurajrii ameninrilor externe venite din toate prile), dar i cteva
24
25
Meliha ALTUNISIK, The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era,

Middle East Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, Aprilie 2000, pp. 172-191, http://www.jstor.org/st
able/4284076, accesat la 19.02.2014.
Senussi BSAIKRI, Turkish-Israeli Relations Frozen, Can the Arabs Turn this to their
Favor?, Middle East Monitor, 23 iunie 2010, http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/art
icles/europe/1197-turkish-israeli-relations-frozen-can-the-arabs-turn-this-to-thier-favor,
accesat la 04.08.2013.
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deosebiri; astfel, Israelul aplic doar politica de aliniere (aliana

strategic cu SUA), dar nu face parte dintr-o alian, deci nu poate fi
ncadrat n metoda de echilibrare; dac n relaiile cu statele arabe
Turcia este interesat de realizarea echilibrului de interese, pentru Israel
funcioneaz n principal balana ameninrii; Turcia este interesat de
maximizarea profitului, demersurile sale de politic extern n lumea
arab avnd un caracter voluntar, n timp ce, pentru Israel, aceste
aciuni au rolul de a-i asigura supravieuirea;
asemnarea dintre metodele utilizate de Turcia pentru a-i asigura
securitatea i cele avute n vedere de Israel const n relaia special pe
care guvernul israelian o ntreine cu Administraia american i rolul
important al lobby-ului israelian din SUA n meninerea unor raporturi
strnse ntre Washington i Tel Aviv; cooperarea transguvernamental
si transnaional, vzut ca un instrument al teoriei neoliberale a
relaiilor internaionale, este pus n valoare n cazul Israelului, poate
mai mult dect n privina Turciei, ntr-un mod care confirm validitatea
principiilor instituionaliste ale lui Robert Koehane i Joseph Nye;
dezavantajul neparticiprii Israelului la o alian este compensat de
potenialul nuclear de care dispune i care i asigur o mare capacitate
de descurajare;
dei guvernul israelian este criticat uneori de SUA i de statele
europene pentru politica promovat n Teritoriile Palestiniene, n
momentele n care supravieuirea sa este ameninat, Israelul
beneficiaz de sprijinul politic, economic i militar al Occidentului.
Evoluii n orientrile politice i de securitate

ale Republicii Islamice Iran
Ca i celelalte dou republici non-arabe, Iranul este un actor regional
obligat s conteze n primul rnd pe propriile capaciti pentru a-i asigura
securitatea. Dup nfiinarea Republicii Islamice Iran, n 1979, acest stat a fost
supus n mod constant unui regim sever de sanciuni din partea SUA i a
aliailor si occidentali. Raporturile Iranului cu statele arabe au fost i au rmas
marcate de litigii teritoriale (Emiratele Arabe Unite) i acuzaii la adresa
regimului de la Teheran de interferen n afacerile interne ale statelor arabe,
prin stimularea comunitilor iite din Kuweit, Bahrein, Arabia Saudit, Liban
i Irak. Dei Qatarul, Omanul i Emiratele Arabe Unite au dezvoltat relaii de
cooperare economic cu Iranul, tabloul general al raporturilor Iranului cu
vecinii si arabi, dup 1990, este caracterizat de suspiciuni reciproce, mai ales
n contextul dezvoltrii de ctre regimul de la Teheran a unui program nuclear.
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Arabia Saudit consider Iranul drept principalul su adversar n regiune,

singurul care are interesul i suficiente capaciti economice, militare i
ideologice pentru a-i face concuren. Conducerea de la Teheran nu poate uita
c Arabia Saudit i majoritatea statelor arabe au sprijinit Irakul n rzboiul
mpotriva Iranului (1980-1988) i este convins c un scenariul asemntor s-ar
putea repeta oricnd.
n acest context regional i internaional n mare parte ostil, amplificat la
nceputul anilor 1990 de confirmarea rolului SUA de hegemon de necontestat
al regiunii i al lumii, Iranul i-a dezvoltat capaciti defensive pentru a putea
rspunde ameninrilor interne i externe i pentru a-i apra interesele, direct
sau indirect, n diferite zone din regiunea Orientului Mijlociu. Strategia
Teheranului pe plan extern mbrac trsturile politicii de beleaguering,
enunat de Chong Ja Ian, fiind axat pe realizarea a cel puin dou obiective
majore: meninerea sub o continu ameninare a Statului Israel, n cadrul unei
variante persane a politicii de ngrdire promovat de SUA n raporturile cu
URSS n timpul Rzboiului Rece i, respectiv, amplificarea influenei iraniene
n cadrul comunitilor iite din statele arabe (Arabia Saudit, Irak, Siria, Liban,
Bahrein, Kuweit, Emiratele Arabe Unite etc.), inclusiv prin incitarea acestora la
manifestri provocatoare n raport cu autoritile din statele respective.
Conducerea iranian a preluat, ntr-un fel, modelul Assad din perioada
1970-1990, cnd Siria nu rata niciun prilej de a crea focare de tensiune n
regiune (ex.: Liban, Teritoriile Palestiniene, Irak, Iordania), pentru a-i asigura
stabilitatea intern i securitatea pe plan regional. n plus, Iranul conteaz pe un
anumit nivel de sprijin politico-diplomatic pe plan internaional din partea
Federaiei Ruse i a Chinei, dei nu se poate afirma c raporturile Teheranului
cu aceste state intr n categoria alinierii, deoarece nu exist acorduri formale
sau informale de garantare a securitii.
Decesul ayatollahului Khomeini (1989), nlocuirea acestuia n poziia de
Ghid Suprem cu ayatollahul Khamenei i accederea la funcia de preedinte a
lui Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani au marcat intrarea Iranului ntr-o perioad de
tranziie, de la etapa ideologic-revoluionar, care a urmat nfiinrii Republicii
Islamice Iran, la o epoc pragmatic, caracterizat prin raionalism.
Noua conducere iranian, ntrit prin desfiinarea funciei de primministru i prin prerogativele extinse dobndite prin revizuirea Constituiei, a
renunat la obiectivul exportului valorilor revoluiei iraniene, care a preocupat
conducerea iranian ntre 1979 i 1989, n favoarea a ceea ce preedintele
Rafsanjani numea o politic de bun-vecintate26. n perioada care a urmat,
Iranul a nceput s-i fac simit contribuia la asigurarea stabilitii Golfului
26
Christopher C. JOYNER, The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy
(Contributions in Military Studies), Grennwood Press, Inc., Westport, 1990, pp. 3-25.
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Persic, i-a multiplicat conexiunile cu economia global i a jucat un rol eficient

n cadrul unor organizaii regionale i globale27.
Destrmarea URSS a modificat complet arhitectura sistemului geopolitic
din Orientul Mjlociu i a obligat noua conducere iranian s se adapteze rapid
acestei lumi unipolare. ntre teritoriul Iranului i cel al Federaiei Ruse au aprut
noi entiti statale, precum Armenia, Azerbaidjan i Georgia. Pn la
cristalizarea raporturilor de putere n aceast zon, Iranul a fost preocupat de
identificarea prghiilor de influen i a tendinelor care se manifest n cadrul
noilor republici, pentru a se asigura c acestea nu vor constitui o ameninare,
direct sau indirect, la adresa regimului de la Teheran. Resursele importante
energetice ale Mrii Caspice au constituit o atracie pentru marile companii
petroliere ale lumii i au determinat concentrarea preocuprilor actorilor
internaionali (SUA, China, Rusia, statele europene occidentale etc.) n spaiul
dintre Marea Caspic i Marea Neagr, pe care George Friedman l denumete
inter-marium 28 . Aceast competiie, desfurat n vecintatea imediat a
Iranului, a contribuit la amplificarea ngrijorrii conducerii iraniene fa de
securitatea frontierei de nord a rii. Prin proximitate geografic, Iranul era
obligat s ia parte la lupta pentru mprirea sferelor de influen ntr-o zon de
mare interes economic.
Controlul zonelor petroliere din aceast regiune i a reelelor energetice
de transport dinspre Asia Central spre restul lumii a constituit sursa competiiei
dintre Iran i SUA29. Pentru a echilibra presiunile politico-economice intense
ale SUA asupra Iranului, viznd limitarea controlului acestuia asupra surselor
energetice din regiune i ocolirea teritoriului iranian de ctre reelele regionale
de transport al petrolului i al gazelor naturale, conducerea de la Teheran a
recurs la intensificarea relaiilor sale cu India i cu China, n cadrul unor politici
pe care Chong Ja Ian le denumete bonding30 iar Paul Schroeder specializare31
(oferirea unor spaii de interes altor actori regionali, pentru a descuraja
ameninrile venite din partea unui potenial adversar).
27
28
29
30
31
Eva Patricia RAKEL, Iranian Foreign Policy since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 19792006, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, (PGDT), nr. 6 din
28.06.2007, pp. 159-187, http://semihlee.files.wordpress.com/2009/03/26210546-ir_fore
ign_policy_1997-2006.pdf, accesat la 06.08.2013.
George FRIEDMAN, The Next Decade, Empire and Republic in a Changing World,
Anchor Books, A division of Random House, Inc, New York, 2012, p. 139.
Roy ALLISON, Lena JONSON, Central Asian Security: the New International
Context, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Brooking Institution Press, London,
UK, 2001, pp. 1-23.
Chong JA IAN, Revisiting Responses to Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The
Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Singapore, noiembrie 2003, http:// www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP
54.pdf, accesat la 15.02.2014.
Paul SCHROEDER, Historical Reality versus Neo-Realist Theory, International
Security, vol. 19, no. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 108-148.
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n pofida semnalelor cooperante trimise de noua conducere iranian ctre

SUA, preedintele Bill Clinton a impus Teheranului un nou regim de sanciuni.
n 1992, dei Iranul s-a meninut neutru n timpul Rzboiului din Golf,
Congresul SUA a adoptat Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, pentru
interzicerea transferului ctre cele dou state a oricror materiale sau tehnologii,
inclusiv cu dubl utilizare, care permiteau realizarea de arme chimice, biologice
sau nucleare sau de arme convenionale avansate32. Clinton inaugura astfel o
doctrin cunoscut sub numele de dual containment, care promova o politic de
ngrdire a Iranului i Irakului, state considerate o ameninare pentru interesele
americane n regiune. n 1995, un nou set de sanciuni economice a fost impus
Iranului. n 1996, Congresul SUA a votat Iran-Libya Sanction Act (ILSA), care
sanciona orice companie cu investiii mai mari de 40 milioane USD n proiecte
petroliere sau de gaz n Libia i Iran33.
n urma atacurilor teroriste de la 11 septembrie 2001 din SUA,
preedintele Khatami i-a exprimat profundul regret i simpatia fa de
victimele 34 acestui eveniment dramatic i a afirmat c lupta mpotriva
terorismului constituie o responsabilitate internaional. Era continuarea unei
politici de diminuare a ostilitii dintre cele dou state, iniiat de preedintele
Khatami nc din noiembrie 1998, cnd lansase ideea unui Dialog ntre
civilizaii, n contrapondere la teza lui Samuel Huntington privind Ciocnirea
Civilizaiilor35. n pofida acestor gesturi de deschidere spre Occident, Iranul a
continuat s constituie obiectul unor sanciuni i critici severe din partea SUA,
care au influenat n mod negativ raporturile dintre cele dou state. Tendina de
apropiere dintre Iran i SUA s-a ncheiat n mod oficial n timpul Administraiei
George W. Bush. La 29 ianuarie 2001, n discursul su despre Starea Uniunii,
preedintele american a descris statele Iran, R.P.D. Coreean i Irak drept
elemente ale Axei Rului (Axis of Evil), datorit eforturilor acestora de a
produce arme de distrugere n mas i aciunilor de sprijinire a terorismului. Era
de fapt o reluare adaptat a conceputului de Imperiu al Rului (Empire of
Evil), lansat n martie 1983 de preedintele Ronald Reagan, referindu-se la
Uniunea Sovietic.
32
33
34
35
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993, H.R. 5006, Public Law:102-484 (10/23/92), http://.www.iraqwatch.or
g/government/US/Legislation/iran-iraq-nonprolif.htm, accesat la 06.08.2013.
Saeid NAJY, Jayum A. JAWAN, US-Iran Relations in the Post-Cold War Geopolitical
Order, Asian Social Sceince, vol. 7, no. 9. September 2011, p. 96.
CNN.com, Workd Shock over US Attacks, Available: http:/edition.cnn.com/2001/World
/europe/09/11/trade.center.reaction/ May 21, 2010, accesat la 15.02.2014.
Alan K. HENRIKSON, Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach,
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, ma021555,
http//ips.sagepub.com/content/23/4/437.short, accesat la 06.08.2013.
vol. XIV
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A urmat o perioad n care Iranul a fost, din punct de vedere geostrategic,

nconjurat de state ocupate sau controlate de SUA36. Invadarea Irakului de
ctre coaliia internaional condus de SUA, n martie-aprilie 2003, prezena
israelian i american n Azerbaidjan, rzboiul din Afganistan nceput n
octombrie 2001 i prezena militar a SUA n statele din Golf au oferit
regimului de la Teheran percepia c se afl sub ameninarea direct a SUA.
Relaiile Iranului cu statele europene occidentale au cunoscut perioade de
intensificare i de stagnare. Frana, Marea Britanie i Germania au fost primele
state europene care au recunoscut Republica Islamic Iran. Pentru a evita att
alinierea cu SUA ct i cu URSS (Neither East nor West Policy37), noua conducere
de la Teheran i-a orientat politica extern ctre Europa. Tendinele pozitive
manifestate la un moment dat n acest domeniu au fost afectate ns de trei
evenimente majore, cu impact global: luarea de ostateci din cadrul Ambasadei
SUA la Teheran (1979-1980), rzboiul dintre Irak i Iran (1980-1989) i cazul
Salman Rushdie38.
Federaia Rus este unul dintre actorii internaionali relevani care au
continuat s coopereze cu Iranul pe plan economic, militar i nuclear, n pofida
presiunii exercitate de Occident asupra regimului de la Teheran. Interesele
Moscovei n relaia cu Iranul au n vedere limitarea extinderii NATO spre Est,
obstrucionarea eforturilor Occidentului de a obine accesul la resursele
energetice ale regiunii, monitorizarea activitilor Turciei i Israelului n Asia
Central i n zona Caucazului, prevenirea hegemoniei globale a SUA i
ocuparea de ctre Rusia a unui rol major n deciziile globale39.
Din partea Rusiei, Iranul are nevoie de armament modern i de susinere
politic pe plan internaional. Relaia dintre Moscova i Teheran, dei mbrac
n unele aspecte caracteristicile unui raport de aliniere, nu semnific o
dependen total a Iranului de Federaia Rus, deoarece conducerea iranian
profit de interesele ruse n zon i exploateaz la maximum competiia
Moscovei cu Occidentul, dar i menine o marj important de independen n
deciziile majore de interes naional, mai ales n aspectele legate de programul
36
37
38
39
Enayatollah YAZDANI, Rizvan HUSSEIN, Unites States's Policy towards Iran After the
Islamic Revolution: An Iranian Perspective, International Studies, vol. 43, no. 3, Aprilie 2006,
pp. 267-289. http://dx.doi.org/101177/002088170604300302, accesat la 15.02.2014.
Fred HALLIDAY, An Elusive Normalization:Western Europe and the Iranian
Revolution, Middle East Journal, vol. 48, no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 309-326.
Salman Rushdie este un scriitor britanic de origine indian care n septembrie 1988 a
publicat o lucrare extrem de contestat n lumea islamic, denumit Versetele Satanice.
Ca urmare, Ayatollahul Khomeiny a pronunat o fatwa (sentin islamic) la adresa
autorului, cernd executarea acestuia. Marea Britanie a ntrerupt relaiile diplomatice cu
Iranul, n martie 1989, n semn de protest fa de incitarea la asasinarea lui Salman
Rushdie i a condiionat reluarea acestora, n septembrie 1998, de renunarea de ctre
regimul de la Teheran la orice atitudine ostil fa de S. Rushdie.
Saeid NAJY, Jayum A. JAWAN, US-Iran Relations...cit., p. 99.
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su nuclear. De asemenea, Iranul nu conteaz, n probleme de asigurare a

propriei securiti, pe sprijinul necondiionat al Rusiei. Regimul de la Teheran
este convins c Rusia nu ar risca un conflict cu SUA sau cu NATO, n cazul n
care teritoriul iranian sau capacitile sale nucleare ar fi atacate de o coaliie de
state occidentale.
China este un alt actor internaional important cu care Iranul coopereaz,
avnd n vedere nevoile tot mai mari de energie ale economiei chineze. Potrivit
Bncii Mondiale, China este cel mai important partener comercial al Iranului i
cel mai important importator de petrol. n 2011, cca. 10% din importurile de
petrol ale Chinei proveneau din Iran, iar volumul schimburilor comerciale dintre
cele dou ri ajunsese n 2007 la cca. 15 miliarde dolari SUA, fa de 3,3
miliarde dolari n 2001 i 9,2 miliarde n 200540. China a livrat Iranului cantiti
importante de armament n perioada Rzboiului Rece, dar embargoul impus
dup 1990 de Consiliul de Securitate al ONU a condus la diminuarea acestor livrri.
China, Rusia i Iran i-au extins cooperarea n cadrul Organizaiei de
Cooperare Shanghai (Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO). n cadrul
acestui grup de ase state (Rusia, China, Kazahstan, Kirghistan, Tadjikistan i
Uzbekistan), Federaia Rus i China ocup poziii privilegiate, iar Iran,
Pakistan, India i Mongolia au statut de observatori. Creat n 2001, aceast
organizaie euroasiatic i-a propus s ofere un cadru de cooperare care s
diminueze riscurile de securitate la adresa statelor membre. Combaterea
terorismului, a extremismului i a separatismului se numr printre obiectivele
principale ale acestei structuri politico-militare, dar cooperarea n domeniile
dezvoltrii sociale, economiei, energiei, transporturilor, turismului, culturii i
proteciei mediului dobndete un rol tot mai vizibil de la creare pn n prezent.
n ultimii ani, SCO i-a intensificat activitatea n sectoarele cooperrii militare,
schimbului de informaii (intelligence sharing) i combaterii terorismului.
ncepnd din 2003, mai multe exerciii militare comune au fost efectuate de
trupe aparinnd armatelor statelor membre.
Prin structur, componen i anvergur demografic (populaiile reunite
ale statelor membre reprezint o jumtate din populaia lumii), economic
(Rusia i China sunt reprezentate n G20, ceilali membri dispun de resurse
energetice foarte importante), politico-militar (China i Rusia sunt membri ai
Consiliului de Securitate al ONU i dispun de capaciti militare importante,
inclusiv nucleare, iar dou dintre statele cu statut de observator, India i
Pakistan, dein capaciti nucleare) i cuprindere teritorial (teritoriile reunite
ale statelor membre reprezint cca. 60 % din Eurasia), SCO se dorete o
contrapondere la influena NATO i a SUA n Asia Central i are anse s
40
US Energy Information Administration, Countries: Iran, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab

.cfm?fips=IR, accesat la 06.08.2013.
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devin al doilea pol politic al lumii 41 . Analistul politic rus Andrei Areshev,
evalund perspectivele Iranului n cadrul organizaiei, apreciaz c obinerea de
ctre aceast ar a statutului de membru va face aproape imposibil un atac
asupra sa din partea SUA i va pune capt planurilor Americii de a retrasa
frontierele n Orientul Mijlociu i n Asia Central42.
Jurnalistul american Rick Rozoff consider c acordarea statutului de
observator Iranului n 2005 i participarea fostului preedinte iranian Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad la trei summit-uri succesive ale SCO au constituit evenimente
care au descurajat Israelul i SUA s recurg la lovirea obiectivelor i
instalaiilor nucleare de pe teritoriul iranian. Aa cum sesizeaz Rozoff, dei
liderii statelor membre ale SCO au negat c aceast organizaie este o alian
militar, nu este foarte sigur c acest obiectiv nu va fi realizat n scurt timp43.
Iranul a solicitat deja s devin membru cu drepturi depline al SCO,
oferind o poziie strategic care ar permite accesul membrilor organizaiei la
Golful Persic, la Strmtoarea Hormuz i la Oceanul Indian. Prin includerea
Iranului, membrii organizaiei ar deveni deintorii a dou treimi din resursele
energetice ale planetei, ceea ce le-ar conferi prghii de influen strategic i
capaciti economico-financiare impresionante. Din punctul de vedere al
Iranului, alinierea la aceast organizaie ar constitui unica ans de a evita
presiunile SUA i ale UE i de a depi situaia dificil creat de regimul de
sanciuni economice i militare.
Cu toate acestea, pentru a fi acceptat n organizaie, Iranul ar trebui s-i
clarifice raporturile cu comunitatea internaional, n primul rnd cu ONU, SUA
i UE. Din raiuni practice, este clar c Rusia, China i ceilali membri ai SCO
nu ar risca s-i deterioreze relaiile cu aceste organizaii i cu statele
occidentale, acceptnd n cadrul grupului un stat cu probleme, considerat de
SUA printre statele proscrise (rogue states) ale lumii.
Din acest punct de vedere, ansele Iranului de a aplica politica de
echilibrare (balancing), prin intrarea ntr-o alian regional care s-i asigure
protecia n faa ameninrilor SUA i ale Israelului, sunt relativ sczute n acest
moment. Pe termen mediu i lung, lansarea unui proces de reapropiere de SUA,
n a doua parte a anului 2013, prin acceptarea de ctre conducerea de la Teheran
a desfurrii de negocieri privind punerea sub control internaional a
41
42
43
Hamid GOLPIRA, Iraq Smoke Screen, Tehran Times, 20 noiembrie 2008.

Andrei ARESHEV, RosBusinessConsulting, 30 august 2008, citat de Rick Rozoff n The
Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Prospect for a Multipolar World, Global Research,
mai 22, 2009, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-shanghai-cooperation-propect-for-a-multip
olar-world/13707, accesat la 07.08.2013.
Pye IAN, The Global Tug-of-War Over Iran, Huffington Post, 29 iunie 2009,
http://www.hufingtonpost.com/pye-ian/the-global-tug-of-war-ove-b-222092.html, accesat
la 07.08.2013.
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programului nuclear iranian, ar putea conduce la modificarea poziiei Iranului

pe plan internaional i facilita accederea sa n SCO.
Deocamdat, codul geopolitic al Iranului, aa cum se contureaz n prima
jumtate a anului 2014, conine adversari poteniali puternici (SUA, NATO,
UE), inclusiv n proximitatea sa geografic (Israel, Turcia, Arabia Saudit, alte
state din Golf), aliai preocupai de propriile probleme (Siria, Hezbollah, Hamas)
sau parteneri insuficient de ataai relaiei cu Teheranul (Rusia, China, SCO),
pentru a sprijini Iranul pe plan politic, militar sau economic n caz de nevoie.
Nu este exclus ca necesitatea ameliorrii raporturilor Iranului cu celelalte state
ale lumii s fi determinat flexibilizarea poziiei pe plan intern a Ghidului
Suprem al rii, ayatollahul Ali Khameney, care a sprijinit alegerea n funcia de
preedinte a moderatului Hassan Rouhani. De altfel, n discursul de
investitur a noului preedinte (Teheran, 4 august 2013), ayatollahul Khameney
a ndemnat la moderaie, artnd c aceasta este i calea islamului. Avnd n
vedere influena determinant pe care o are poziia Ghidului Suprem al
Revoluiei Islamice asupra politicii interne i externe a Iranului, analitii politici
regionali au tras concluzia c moderaia va caracteriza politica regional i
internaional a Iranului n mandatul preedintelui Rohani44.
CONCLUZIE
Literatura de specialitate prezint opinii diferite referitoare la locul ocupat
de republicile non-arabe n arhitectura geopolitic a Orientului Mijlociu. De la
Carl Brown, care include Turcia i Israelul n acest sistem, dar exclude Iranul45,
pn la Jamil Mattar i Ali Al-Din Hilal, politologi arabi care exclud toate cele
trei republici non-arabe din conceptul de Orient Mijlociu46, cadrul de analiz cu
care opereaz specialitii n domeniul relaiilor internaionale depinde att de
premisa de la care acetia pornesc n efortul de identificare a tendinelor
manifestate n interiorul sistemului, ct i de obiectivul final al acestor
demersuri. Indiferent de orientrile academice i, uneori, politice ale
cercettorilor preocupai de evoluiile regiunii, apreciem c evenimentele care
au avut loc n ultimele decenii n zona Orientului Mijliociu, raporturile interarabe sau ale statelor arabe cu ceilali actori ai comunitii internaionale nu pot
44
45
46
Mustafa AL-LABBAD, Rouhani, Khamenei Agree: Iran To Follow a Moderate

Discourse, Al Monitor, The Pulse of the Middle East, 5 august 2013, articol publicat n
limba arab n cotidianul libanez As Safir i tradus n limba englez de Rani Geha.
Carl BROWN, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game,
Princeton University Press, London, 1984, pp. 2-31.
Jamil MATAR, Ali Al-Din HILAL, The Arab Regional System...cit., p. 30.
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fi disociate de relaiile lor cu Israelul, Turcia i Iranul. Mai mult, o investigare

complet a evoluiilor zonei impune luarea n calcul a rolului SUA i al URSS
(Federaiei Ruse, dup 1991) n cadrul acestui sistem, dei statele respective nu
fac parte, din punct de vedere geografic, din regiunea Orientului Mijlociu.
Transformrile geopolitice produse n sudul Mediteranei de micrile
revoluionare declanate la sfritul anului 2010 i nceputul anului 2011 au
scos n eviden rolul important jucat n acest sistem de Turcia i Iran. Ambele
state aspir la statutul de lider regional, dispun de argumente politice,
economice, militare i demografice pentru a pretinde un rol important n
evoluiile zonei i au la dispozitie prghii de influen pe care le pot utiliza n
raporturile cu statele arabe.
Dei Statul Israel a pstrat pn acum un profil sczut n raport cu aceste
evenimente, este de ateptat ca atitudinea conducerii de la Tel Aviv s se
modifice n perioada urmtoare, ndeosebi dup stabilizarea evoluiilor din
Egipt i din Siria i clarificarea orientrilor de politic extern ale autoritilor
de la Cairo i Damasc. Luarea n considerare a opiniei maselor populare n
adoptarea unor strategii naionale pe termen mediu i lung va restrnge marja de
manevr a conducerilor sirian i egiptean i va diminua capacitatea marilor
puteri i a organismelor internaionale de a impune o anumit conduit n
raporturile acestor state cu Israelul.
Spre deosebire de perioada anterioar anului 2011, deciziile importante
privind politica intern i orientrile de politic extern nu vor mai putea fi
impuse din afar i i vor avea originea n cadrul statelor arabe. Refuzul
autoritilor de la Cairo de a accepta planul de redresare economic propus de
FMI indic deja intenia acestora de a-i pstra independena total n raport cu
organismele internaionale. Modul cum vor evolua raporturile statelor arabe cu
Israelul i cu celelalte dou republici non-arabe, Turcia i Iranul, constituie un
subiect interesant de urmrit ntr-o perioad pe care o putem caracteriza, fr
teama de a grei, drept o faz de tranziie spre un nou sistem, multipolar, n
cadrul cruia autoritile naionale, comunitile etnico-religioase i actorii nonstatali vor dispune de o pondere fr precedent n procesele de decizie legate de
furirea propriului destin.
vol. XIV
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Libert, ordre et gouvernement,

entre Anciens et Modernes
Du modle politique roumain
(1821-1830)
RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU
Toutes les nouvelles gnrations politiques ont

besoin de structurer leur identit en tablissant des
ruptures, relles ou imaginaires. 1
INTRODUCTION
Le texte se propose d'interroger, dans la perspective des indicateurs
conceptuels de la modernit plus particulirement dans la perspective du
binme libert-ordre, tel qu'il rentre dans la pense politique librale du XIXe
sicle la manire dont se reflte l'acquisition de la modernit a travers la
science du gouvernement dans la pense politique roumaine. La priode qui
nous intresse plus particulirement, dans le cas prsent, est marque par deux
moments significatifs dans l'histoire du Nouveau Rgime des Principauts
Roumaines: il s'agit des premires annes aprs l'abolition des rgimes
phanariotes en Moldavie et en Valachie et l'adoption des Rglements
organiques (1821-1831/32).
L'poque en question est traverse par des tourments historiques, des
changements importants dans la structure institutionnelle des deux pays et dans
la perspective politique des lites locales. Dune part, les Princes rgnants
introduisent un discours politique diffrent et se proccupent plus
systmatiquement de lintroduction dun certain mouvement rformateur,
dmarche place sur une verticale politique qui suscite le regroupement
conceptuel et philosophique des principaux producteurs de discours et de
rflexion politique. La perturbation du rythme consacr jusqu'alors dans la
pratique politique et discursive des pays roumains, dans l'investissement
symbolique des rles et des paroles va de pair avec une perturbation
1
Pierre ROSANVALLON, Le Moment Guizot, Gallimard, Paris, 1985, p. 143.
RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU
112
conceptuelle dans le sillage des changements qui s'entament ou, peut-tre, dans
la prvisions des autres, venir2. L'expression langagire des transformations
du rgime politique dans une mouvance qui se propose de se situer dans la
logique rformatrice se retrouve illustre activement dans cette priode par
l'apparition des projets de rforme3 et d'autres types de textes, parfois littraires,
parfois philosophiques, qui ont comme dnominateur commun l'introduction
d'un univers de rfrence politique et institutionnel diffrent, dans l'air du temps.
C'est une intention de plus en plus souvent dclare par les auteurs de cette
poque de se relier aux rfrences qui rapprochent l'chafaudage institutionnel
mettre en place des acquis similaires d'inspiration occidentale. Ceci, par le
truchement d'un double processus d'assainissement politique et social accompli
travers la tranquillit, la piti, le pardon 4. Les changements des pratiques
politiques et de la mise en place de la gouvernance se retrouvent dans les
occurrences plus frquentes des termes tels libert , ordre , accompagns
par un concept lui aussi plus frquent partir de cette poque, savoir la
dmocratie . Nanmoins, la cohabitation des mots en tant qu'expressions
langagires autonomes et des concepts en tant que porteurs de contexte
attachs aux mots n'est pas toujours l'vidence 5 dans les textes de cette
priode. Ce phnomne, prsent assez frquemment dans le contexte de
l'poque, n'est pas lui-mme dpourvu de signification: l'intentionnalit
implicite retrouve dans l'usage des mots peut devenir le vhicule d'une
modification conceptuelle sur la longue dure 6 . Par exemple, Constituia
C'est Reinhart Koselleck qui avance la thorie de l'imbrication structurelle de l'histoire

sociale et politique et des concepts: Le primat anthropologique du langage dans la
reprsentation de l'histoire passe acquiert ainsi un statut pistmologique. Car c'est par le
langage qu'il faut dterminer ce qui, dans l'histoire passe, a t conditionn par le
langage et ce qui ne l'a pas t . In L'exprience de l'histoire, dit et prfac par Michael
Werner, trad. de l'allemand par Alexandre Escudier avec la collaboration de Diane Meur,
Marie-Claire Hoock et Jochen Hoock, Gallimard, Seuil, 1997, p. 108.
V., pour le contexte et les transformations idologiques de l'poque, Vlad GEORGESCU,
Ideile politice i iluminismul n Principatele Romne, 1750-1831, Editura Academiei
RSR, Bucureti, 1972, ou, pour le renouveau littraire et philosophique de l'poque, Paul
CORNEA, Originile romantismului romnesc: spiritul public, micarea ideilor i
literatura ntre 1780-1840, Cartea Romneasc, Bucureti, 2008.
Iordache GOLESCU, Scrieri alese, dition et commentaires de Mihai Moraru,
biobibliographie et repres critiques de Coman Lupu, prface et coordination de Al.
Rosetti, Cartea Romneasc, Bucureti, 1990, p. 19.
En parlant de l'cart entre action et discours, Koselleck observe que mme si les actes
langagiers et les actes effectifs restent entrelacs dans la synchronie qui est elle-mme
une abstraction l'volution diachronique qui reste elle-mme une construction
thorique ne suit pas les mmes rythmes ni la mme chronologie dans l'histoire relle
que dans l'histoire des concepts . (L'exprience de l'histoire, cit., p. 117).
J'ai tent une dmonstration plus tendue de cette hypothse, en Raluca
ALEXANDRESCU, La rvolution mlancolique. Sur la construction et l'volution du
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Libert, ordre et gouvernement, entre Anciens et Modernes
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crvunarilor (La Constitution des carbonari ), texte paru en 1822 et crit sous
linspiration du mouvement italien homonyme va prcisment dans ce sens. Le
projet utilise des sources qui sont dailleurs une base pour le dveloppement du
discours dmocratique libral, en tenant compte des circonstances
institutionnelles spcifiques des Principauts roumaines. Mais les
interprtations particulires et les contextes intellectuels diffrents du transfert
des ides font ainsi que le texte ne reflte pas ncessairement le dbat
dmocratique libral dans les termes de lEurope de 1822.
Ordre patriarcal et mobilit librale

dans les dynamiques de la premire modernit
Les perturbations d'ordre politique influent dans cette priode, dans un
certain sens, sur la dynamique des structures sociales. Ce dernier phnomne
connat effectivement une volution dans les annes qui suivent l'installation
des Princes rgnants roumains la tte des deux pays, dans un point prcis qui
nous intresse dans la perspective de la progression vers la modernit. Plus
prcisment, le nouveau rgime politique entrane des changements au niveau
de la slection et du recrutement des fonctionnaires publiques, qui proviennent
soit de la haute noblesse locale, pour les fonctions les plus importantes, soit
d'une classe intermdiaire, compose de deux catgories diffrentes: les
trangers ayant servi les Princes rgnants roumains, grecs dans leur majorit et
qui avaient accumul une comptence administrative parfois plus importante
que les Roumains, et les petits nobles autochtones, moins duqus, moins riches
mais ayant une disponibilit et un apptence accrues pour amliorer leur
condition7. La transition qui s'opre dans ce contexte permet en fait l'accession
aux positions plus importantes d'un groupe distinct et nouveau, composs par
les boyards de la deuxime et troisime catgorie. Le contexte leur est favorable,
car le rgime politique qui se met en place a besoin d'un rafrachissement
symbolique et pratique de ses lites. Les critres de noblesses eux-mmes
commencent changer8, et la place privilgie que la fortune personnelle ou
une bonne naissance dtenaient jusqu'alors en quasi exclusivit sont parfois
remplacs par une qualification par la fonction. Le va et vient de la petite
noblesse, qui volue du rural vers l'urbain, en rejoignant les diffrentes
fonctions dans l'administration devient non seulement une source de progrs
concept de dmocratie dans la pense politique roumaine moderne, Editura Universitii

din Bucureti, Bucureti, 2011.
Cf. Alexandru-Florin PLATON, Geneza burgheziei n Principatele romne, Editura
Universitii Alexandru-Ioan Cuza , Iai, 1997, pp. 273-274.
Ibidem.
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RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU
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pour la fragile classe moyenne de la seconde moiti du XIXe sicle, mais aussi
un petit bassin de recrutement d'une nouvelle lite politique qui frle
l'establishement constitu par la haute noblesse de sang, souvent critique pour
sa collaboration coupable avec les princes phanariotes et toujours suspecte de
corruption, de mauvaises intentions et de manque du savoir-faire politique. La
petite noblesse formule les critiques et les dnonces les plus virulentes de la
corruption endmique des anciens gouvernants.
Un modeste boyard moldave de campagne devient le secrtaire personnel
du fils du premier Prince rgnant roumain de Moldavie (il s'agit de Ionic
Tutu); ailleurs, en Valachie, un reprsentant de marque de la haute noblesse de
sang (Iordache Golescu) crit des pices de thtre dont les personnages
ngatifs sont toujours de hauts nobles corrompus. Ces permutations n'adoptent
pas ncessairement le ton ou l'allure d'une critique sociale; il s'agit plutt d'une
raction face aux changements politiques.
Le phnomne n'est pas nouveau dans son expression europenne; l'explosion
d'une entire classe de fonctionnaires utiliss dans la haute administration par
les tats europens en voie de bureaucratisation au dbut du XIXe sicle offre le
spectacle d'une rinvention des catgories sociales, des hirarchies administratives
et des prsances de l'Ancien Rgime9. La vague contestataire rvolutionnaire
imprime dans l'imaginaire europen un nouveau type d'interaction entre les
gouvernants et les gouverns, qui passe dornavant travers la mdiation d'un
pallier dont on parle d'une manire de plus en plus insistante
L'interrogation de notre texte porte principalement sur les raisons sousjacentes, les concepts apparents et les techniques discursives qui soutiennent le
concept de libert rapport celui de l'ordre des textes de cette priode. En
d'autres termes, comment se rvle un des indicateurs fondamentaux de cette
timide ouverture vers la modernit du XIXe sicle, travers la contorsion du
temps historique, confront aux bouleversements de paradigme introduits par la
Rvolution franaise?
L'analyse de la modernit dans le champ mthodologique de l'histoire
intellectuelle sur le territoire de la pense politique roumaine la diffrence
de l'histoire sociale o les sources sont encore enfouilles dans les archives et
pas suffisamment exploites, a lire les dernires valuations sur ce thme10 se
retrouve face un dfi diffrent, celui de relecture et rvaluation des sources
qui sont souvent publies, sans tre pour autant exploites, pour diffrentes
raisons. L'impasse idologique de la Roumanie pour plus de 40 ans en est une
explication, mais elle n'est pas la seule. Ce qui s'est ensuivi, c'tait une
concentration des nergies des chercheurs vers un domaine tout aussi lgitime
9
10
Pierre ROSANVALLON, Le modle politique franais. La socit civile contre le

jacobinisme de 1789 jusqu' nos jours, Seuil, Paris, 2004, pp. 29-37.
Cf. Constana VINTIL-GHIULESCU, Evghenii, ciocoi, mojici. Despre obrazele
primei moderniti romneti, 1750-1860, Humanitas, Bucureti, 2013, pp. 11 et suiv.
vol. XIV
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115
que vaste, celui de l'histoire du communisme et de son systme rpressif.

D'autre part, l'tude de la premire moiti du XIXe sicle a cd la place aux
recherches concernant surtout l'poque post 1848, gnralement identifie
comme porteuse de la premire grande vague de modernisation dans la culture
politique roumaine.
l'intrieur de cette priode, la production intellectuelle commence
gagner une certaine impulsion dynamique, avant la Grande Qute de l'Occident.
Le nouveau thme de l'europanisation est dj pressenti, mais il se partage,
dans un dchirement culturel visible, entre la puissante influence de la langue et
de la culture no-grecques, d'une part, de l'influence politique et institutionnelle
croissante de la Russie, d'autre part et finalement de l'entre, mme indirecte,
dans le concert intellectuel occidental.
Cette priode concide dans l'histoire de la pense politique roumaine
avec la pntration tardive du modle illuministe, surtout dans les pratiques
culturelles de l'poque 11 . C'est l'poque des princes philanthropes, qui se
plaisent jouer le rle de Mcne dans le frle systme d'ducation des
Principauts ou bien dans la promotion des arts ou de la littrature. Cet effort se
conjugue une croissante volont d'introduire dans la discussion concernant
l'identit politique des Roumains des notions nouvelles lies la roumanit,
attaches sans aucun doute l'innovation du rgime politique survenue en 1821.
La modernit romantique est lie aussi une notion nouvelle qui est celle
de synchronisation12; elle relie l'expression de la nature humaine universelle,
exprime en diffrentes manires par la rflexion politique de l'poque, mais
aussi, certainement, par la littrature. Ce phnomne de synchronisation comme
indicateur de la modernit devient l'argument majeur du travail des penseurs
roumains. Le regard vers l'Occident se traduit alors par l'attitude ambivalente
dominante qui marie la critique de l'tat actuel des institutions avec les
propositions d'un dplacement cohrent vers le modle occidental 13 . Pour le
monde europen dans les annes vingt, le support mthodologique de ce besoin
de synchronisation a t, entre autres, soit le fondement scientifique de la
science politique moderne (Franois Guizot, Saint-Simon etc.), soit paralllement,
l'invention de la nouvelle histoire, envisage comme une succession de priodes
critiques et de priodes organiques 14 qui donne un sens la modernit.
11
12
13
14
Cf. Paul CORNEA, Cuvnt nainte , dans Paul CORNEA, Mihai ZAMFIR, Gndirea
romneasc n epoca paoptist (1830-1860), Editura pentru literatur, Bucureti, 1969, p. 11.
Le terme est utilis par Hartmut Rosa pour dcrire un phnomne similaire dans le
contexte contemporain de la modernit tardive. Cf. Acclration. Une critique sociale du
temps, trad. de l'allemand par Didier Renault, La Dcouverte, Paris, 2010, p. 34.
Cf. Elena SIUPIUR, Intelectuali, elite, clase politice moderne n Sud-estul european,
Secolul XIX, Editura DominoR, Bucureti, 2004, pp. 21-24.
V. Pierre ROSANVALLON, Le moment Guizot, cit, p. 83.
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C'est peut-tre ce caractre statique imprim au monde roumain plus

particulirement dans les annes trente du XIXe sicle qui constitue, dans ce
sens, un signe du travail de la prmire modernit. Il se peut trouver ensuite que
la sortie mme de ce sens giratoire dans lequel le temps s'coule indique un
dplacement de la modernit vers l'espace sud europen. Il s'agit d'une
modification du rgime d'historicit, dans le sens de l'acclration. Le
dynamisme de la modernit et ses tensions correspondantes se dplacent vers le
sud-est europen, engendrant des structures parallles dans l'espace propre de la
pense politique et des carts de plus en plus significatifs entre le champ
d'exprience et l'horizon d'attente15. C'est prcisment ce renversement qualitatif
du rapport entre l'individuel et le collectif qui traduit le passage entre les
diffrents paradigmes de la modernit16. Les notions lies au citoyen participatif,
aux techniques dmocratiques apparaissent peu dans la littrature politique
roumaine, mme si les textes dits rformateurs connaissent dj une certaine
vogue parmi les auteurs de l'poque17.
De ces tensions et modifications prolixes sort une premire hypothse de
cette tude, engendre par l'attitude gnrale envers le temps et ses rythmes,
dans une perception collective, d'une part, visible dans les textes de la
gnration des frres Golescu, Iordache et Constantin (Dinicu) et d'autre part
d'une perception individuelle, engendre par le mme ethos de la modernit, o
le rle rserv au citoyen en tant qu'acteur individualis d'une masse sociale
prend de plus en plus de contour. Nous partons dans le questionnement de cette
hypothse avec les instruments conceptuels fournis par la thorie critique et qui
montrent en effet que l'exprience de la modernit est une exprience de
l'acclration [...] l'acclration est la caractristique centrale de la
transformation des structures temporelles et est ainsi une force majeure de la
culture de la modernit 18. Dans ce contexte, le pendant logique de
l'acclration serait la dclration, qui est un partenaire ingal dans le
dveloppement des structures de la modernit. La relation avec le temps et
l'imaginaire dmocratique comme projection de ce nouveau parcours subjectif
se rvle travers les diffrents moyens d'expression employs par cette
15
16
17
18
Reinhart KOSELLECK, Champ dexprience et horizon dattente: deux catgories

historiques , en IDEM, Le futur pass. Contribution la smantique des temps
historiques, trad. de lallemand par Jochen Hoock et Marie-Claire Hoock, ditions de
lcole dtudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1990, pp. 307-331.
V. pour la discussion concernant les mutations culturelles dans les modernits, Hartmut
ROSA, Acclrationcit., pp. 35 et suiv., et pp. 416-417.
Le dynamisme de la vie politique, traduite essentiellement par le vote comme indicateur
de la modernit dmocratique est pris en compte pour cette priode pr-rglementaire
par Cristian Preda, qui montre le caractre plus ou moins fodal des Rassemblements
jusqu' l'adoption des Rglements Organiques (Rumnii fericii. Vot i putere de la 1831
pn n prezent, Polirom, Iai, 2011, pp. 27-29).
Ibidem, p. 36.
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117
gnration. Dinicu Golescu publie ses notes de voyage au milieu des annes '20
du XIXe sicle, en fournissant non seulement un rcit colori et attentif aux
murs et aux paysages, mais en proposant aussi implicitement un rcit sur
l'altrit, sur la diffrence fondatrice qui spare, ses yeux, la civilisation
roumaine des espaces occidentaux. C'est le repli typique et lgrement dpressif
d'une entire gnration, qui marie la description et le voyage une valorisation
symbolique et historique19 de la diffrence.
En fin de comptes, il est vident, pour ce premier acte de la modernit
roumaine, qu'elle rentre petit petit dans un moule temporel traduit dans un
conflit naissant entre diffrents types de horizons d'attente. Il y a, d'une part, le
temps biographique 20, et d'autre part, celui d'une collectivit qui partage des
tches et des rles.
Une deuxime hypothse, issue partiellement de ce premier constat, vise
la modification du rapport entre le champ d'exprience et l'horizon
d'attente 21 des projets politiques des annes trente du XIXe sicle. Cette
modification est peut-tre paradoxalement moins visible dans les textes
considrs d'habitude rformateurs . Ce n'est pas par hasard qu'un auteur tel
Simion Marcovici, qui publie ses textes la fin des annes '20, est inclus
d'habitude dans la longue liste refltant les prmices de la pense de la
gnration de 48 22 . Mme si Marcovici partage peu l'apptence pour
l'acclration rformiste ou rvolutionnaire de ses continuateurs, en se limitant
finalement les reprendre, d'une manire beaucoup plus systmatique que
d'autres collgues de gnration, il reste fidle aux catgories classiques de la
science politique aristotlicienne, dans une cohabitation paradoxale avec la
philosophie du contrat, le tout mis dans un langage politique l'apparence
librale. La modification progressive du rapport entre le champ d'exprience et
l'attente temporelle se traduit sur le plan de la politique relle dans l'volution,
lente, au dbut, de plus en plus acclre au fur et mesure de son volution, de
la nature du rgime politique. Dans un texte plus ancien, cit souvent23 comme
un des premiers projets de rforme, l'hsitation continuelle entre le paradigme
scolastique prolong par les Acadmies Princires et les nouveaux concepts de
19
20
21
22
23
V. Alex DRACE-FRANCIS, At Ten Minutes Past Two I Gazed Ecstatically upon Both
Lighthouses: Self, Time and Object in Early Romanian Travel Texts , en Andi
MIHALACHE, Alexandru ISTRATE (coords), Romantism i modernitate. Atitudini,
reevaluri, polemici, Editura Universitii Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Iai, 2009, p. 43.
Hartmut ROSA, Acclrationcit., pp. 32-33.
Cf. la dfinition formule Reinhart Kosseleck en Le futur passcit., pp. 19-35 et
reprise par Hartmut Rosa en Acclrationcit., pp. 53-83.
Par exemple, dans l'anthologie sur la pense des quarante-huitards, runie par Paul
CORNEA, Mihai ZAMFIR, Gndirea romneasc n epoca paoptistcit.
partir de sa publication initiale par Emil Vrtosu, dans Napolon Bonaparte i
proiectul unei Republici aristo/dimocraticeti n Moldova la 1802 , Viaa Romneasc,
nr. 6-7, 1946, pp. 26-32 (extrait).
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la modernit europenne se retrouve d'une manire encore plus manifeste24.

cela s'ajoute, selon d'autres auteurs25, une influence russe de type autocratique,
indirectement exerce bien avant le moment officiel d'inauguration de la
rforme constitutionnelle opre sous le Protectorat russe la suite de la paix
d'Adrianople en 1829 qui ouvre la priode rglementaire.
C'est toujours dans ce laboratoire mal outill, mais muni de praticiens
tenaces et entts, que va se dfinir, petit petit, la dmocratie26 comme vhicule
pour lindividu27, conue dans ses rapports non seulement avec une verticale des
hirarchies et des institutions, mais aussi dans une horizontale communautaire28.
Cette ralit politique est surplombe par le discours philosophique ou
littraire; ici se jouent les destins futurs des Principauts, marqus par des
dcennies de mauvaise gouvernance, de corruption et de faiblesse de l'tat,
comme on peut lire, par exemple, dans les Mmoires du prince Nicolas Suu,
publies la fin du XIXe sicle:
Dans le cours de leur pouvoir phmre, les princes tchaient, comme de raison,
de se ddommager de leur sacrifices et de se munir, quand ils le pouvaient, de quoi parer
leur dtresse future. Telle tait la triste exprience des Grecs de Constantinople, ncessite
par l'astuce, la barbarie, la rapacit et la faiblesse des Turcs. Princes, ils taient dpouills
avant leur investiture et aprs leur dchance 29.
C'est ainsi que le prince Suu, influent personnage, par lui-mme et par
sa famille, de l'histoire des Principauts Roumains des trois premiers quarts du
XIXe sicle, dresse le portrait du modle politique sur lequel repose le
discours contemporain.
24
25
26
27
28
29
Cf. Raluca ALEXANDRESCU, L'individu et la dmocratie au XIXe sicle roumain ,

Analele Universitii Bucureti. Seria tiinte Politice, anul XV, nr. 1, 2013, pp. 51-67.
Cristian PLOSCARU, Proiectul Republicii aristo-dimocraticeti: Consideraii n jurul
unei controverse istoriografice , en Andi MIHALACHE, Alexandru ISTRATE (coords),
Romantism i modernitate...cit., pp. 115-141.
Pour ltude des significations et des occurrences du terme de dmocratie en roumain
jusquau dbut du XIXe sicle, v. Daniel BARBU, Democraia n romnete. Istoria
veche a cuvntului , Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. II, no. 4,
2002, pp. 969-978.
Ce laboratoire, beaucoup plus performant philosophiquement et culturellement et avec un
recul chronologique beaucoup plus important, se retrouve dans l'analyse de R.A. Dahl, qui
identifie quatre grandes sources de lamalgame dmocratique moderne: la Grce antique,
la tradition rpublicaine no romaine des cits italiennes de la Renaissance, lide de
reprsentation et les institutions qui en dcoulent, ainsi que la logique de lgalit politique.
En Democracy and its critics, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1989, p. 13.
V. Giovanni SARTORI, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Chatam House Publishers,
Chatam, NJ, 1987, pp. 278-279.
Prince Nicolas SUU, Mmoires, publies par Panaoti Rizos, Gerold et Cie, Vienne,
1899, p. 4.
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Les thmes de prdilection des auteurs de cette priode sont justement la

mauvaise gouvernance, la corruption, la personnalisation de l'tat, mais le terme
de rforme, propre la thorie politique librale postrvolutionnaire, est
pratiquement absent des textes. Nanmoins, il ne serait gure exact de voir dans
cette diagnose la complaisance envers les mfaits de la barbarie : il s'agit,
tout simplement, d'un phase dans le long processus de stratification des
diffrentes expriences politiques et discursives de cette poque, des modles et
des horizons temporels30.
Ce processus fait partie d'un ensemble de mutations progressives du
rgime politique, le champ d'exprience crant invitablement des mutations
respectives dans les projections politiques de cette priode, autrement dit
l'horizon d'attente des acteurs politiques de l'poque.
Les champs aux revenants de Iordache Golescu

Les auteurs de cette troisime dcennie du XIXe sicle n'ont pas la
discipline et la cohrence relative de la gnration suivante, qui va dj dans
les universits de Paris ou de Berlin. Nanmoins, il y a une propension certaine
vers l'analyse politique, sur l'introduction des structures lexicale novatrices qui
soient mieux en mesure de traduire et de prparer les ralits institutionnelles du
nouveau rgime politique roumain. On crit beaucoup plus que dans les annes
prcdant le moment 1821, les essais versificateurs sont l'ordre du jour. La
qualit souvent douteuse de la performance littraire se trouve souvent excuse
par l'intention patriotique retrouvable derrire les rimes maladroites, les vers
boiteux ou les phrases naves. Un pome publi en 1939 par le philologue Emil
Vrtosu, qui aurait t rdig en 1821 par un certain Peacov pour glorifier la
personnalit de Tudor Vladimirescu, fournit un bon exemple de ces lancements
qui sacrifient la qualit littraire sur l'autel de l'intrt patriotique31. C'est ce que
va d'ailleurs provoquer, vingt ans plus tard, la tristesse indigne de Ion HeliadeRdulescu qui constate dans un texte devenu manifeste pour une partie de sa
gnration, la dchance de la littrature roumaine , la mdiocrit des
productions littraires et le vide d'inspiration d'une culture qui ne s'lve pas la
hauteur des dfis de l'poque32.
Le versificateur Peacov se dclare l'apprenti du pote Iancu Vcrescu,
mais la qualit de ses productions laisse dsirer. Le pome en question est
30
31
32
Cf. Hartmut ROSA, Acclrationcit., p. 39.

Emil VRTOSU, Versuri inedite despre 1821 , Revista Arhivelor, III, no. 8, 1939,
pp. 3-10 (extrait).
Ion HELIADE-RDULESCU, Despre decderea literaturii romne , en Opere, vol. I,
dition, prface, notes et bibliographie de Mircea Anghelescu, Univers Enciclopedic,
Bucureti, 2002, p. 540.
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favorable au mouvement de Vladimirescu et dcrit sans trop de talent, mais

avec beaucoup d'admiration les gestes de son hros: i, vrnd ca s
izbveasc,/Acum, eara Romneasc,/Din jugul ei cel cumplit,/Viaa sa n-o
socotete,/Dragii patrii o jrtfete/De nimenea nesilit! 33 . Le versificateur
voque le patriotisme du hros: Bravo, Tudore viteze/Dumnezeu sa te'nzileze,/
Carele te-a nsuflat/A te arta n fapt/Cu ajutorin dreapt,/Patriot adevrat! 34.
Et finit par dplorer le funbre dnouement de l'histoire, la trahison des boyards
mchants et voleurs et des trangers opportunistes et vnaux (les Grecs):
i Grecii, la pit gat,/Nvlind flmnzi, ndat/A mnca-o au poftit,/i cui o
avea gtit,/n loc s-i dea mulumit,/ La moarte l-au osndit! 35.
Il y a certes des efforts qui arrivent dpasser, au moins partiellement, les
essais malencontreux. Iordache Golescu, un des auteurs de poids dans
l'avnement culturel et politique de la Valachie, est non seulement un patron des
arts, mais aussi un crivain et linguiste remarquable de son temps. Il crit des
pamphlets et des pices de thtre qui sont en mme temps les allgories
politiques, mais il veut aussi mettre au point un dictionnaire de la langue
roumaine, Condica limbii rumneti, majoritairement encore en manuscrit la
Bibliothque de l'Acadmie Roumaine. L'auteur lui-mme va publier en 1840
des petits fragments, sous le titre Bgri de seam asupra gramaticii
romneti 36 . Une partie est reste non publie, l'exception de quelques
fragments dans une dition d'uvres choisies qui rassemble les morceaux
littraires les plus importants37, au dbut des annes 1990.
Iordache Golescu ne se propose pas d'crire un trait de science politique,
comme son jeune contemporain Ionic Tutu, ou un projet constitutionnel,
comme Costache Conachi. Sa vocation traduit plutt la veine pamphltaire, la
tentation du sarcasme, en touchant les questions politiques l'ordre du jour. La
libert, relie au patriotisme qui signifie aussi, dans cette priode, bonne
gouvernance sont des concepts prsents dans les textes de cette poque,
comme on peut lire dans une lettre de Iordachi Roset Roznovanul adresse au
mtropolite Veniamin Costachi, o le destinataire reoit des assurances quant
l'amour pour la Patrie , rvl par ses efforts de bien travailler pour le
gouvernement du pays38.
Le bon travail, la mritocratie, la bonne slection des fonctionnaires sont
en fait les thmes chers Iordache Golescu, qui choisit de les mettre dans la
33
34
35
36
37
38
Emil VRTOSU, Versuri cit. , p. 5.

Ibidem, p. 6.
Ibidem, p. 10.
Cf. Vlad GEORGESCU, Istoria ideilor politice romneti (1369-1878), Ion DumitruVerlag, Mnchen, 1987, p. 374.
Iordache GOLESCU, Scrieri alese, cit.
Lettre de Iordachi Roset Rosnovanul, 1821, publie par Nicolae Iorga, en Scrisori de
boieri. Scrisori de domni, 3e dition, Datina Romneasc, Vlenii de Munte, 1932, p. 118.
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bouche de ses personnages vivants (mme si parfois revenants), frappant par la

libert des mots et par le registre lexical qui descend parfois dessous du
colloquial, dans des propos parsems de licences.
Sa propension vidente pour la dramaturgie ne sert pas la clart de ses
formules politiques, mais elle joue sur le pallier de la spontanit dramatique
expressive, qui offre son auteur une plus grande libert d'expression, car son
caractre direct, dpourvu du prjug romantique sur l'art comme exception 39,
parle finalement d'une voix distincte de la tension dramatique qui se joue
l'intrieur des dbuts de la modernit roumaine.
Paradoxalement, l'lment cl d'une rationalisation de la tension implicite
entre les diffrents concepts est le silence: le silence de l'crivain en rapport
avec les techniques littraires et les supports philosophiques frquents, c'est un
dtail qui veille l'attention. l'poque du romantisme europen, o
l'affirmation de la subjectivit et l'esprit libre qui souffle sur les lites
enflamment le dbat public40, l'auteur, nourri d'une solide ducation classique,
dveloppe une propension assidue pour les grands auteurs classiques, dont il est
parfois le traducteur: il s'essaie, par exemple, une version de l'Iliade ou bien,
en s'avanant vers le sicle des Lumires, s'exerce dans la traduction de l'Esprit
des lois de Montesquieu. Nanmoins, Iordache, fils de Radu Golescu, haut
dignitaire de l'administration valaque, n en 1768, qui tudie la maison avec
des prcepteurs et de professeurs privs et L'Acadmie princire de Bucarest41,
manifeste une discipline assez relche quand il s'agit de dfinir et d'identifier
ses sources. La discipline de l'intellectuel scientifique est manifestement un
concept encore vague pour l'lite locale42, ce qui soulve d'emble une question
discute par diffrents spcialistes de l'poque, qu'il s'agisse des historiens ou
des critique littraires. Car pour retracer le parcours de ces auteurs, il faut se
poser la question de la gnalogie intellectuelle, des influences philosophiques
ou politiques subies par ceux-ci dans la formation des concepts politiques mis
en dbat. Or, la question des sources dans l'histoire intellectuelle a toujours t
une question pineuse, surtout quand elle a faire aux auteurs eux-mmes
indcis ou manquant de discipline scientifique43. Dans le cas de Golescu, par
39
40
41
42
43
Mircea ANGHELESCU, Iordache Golescu , en Mircea ZACIU, Marian PAPAHAGI,

Aurel SASU (coords.), Dicionarul scriitorilor romni, D-L, Editura Fundaiei Culturale,
Bucureti, 1998, pp. 424-425.
V., pour le contexte politico-symbolique europen, Jacques JUILLARD, Les gauches
franaises. 1762-2012: histoire, politique et imaginaire, Flammarion, Paris, 2012, pp. 211-307.
Mircea ANGHELESCU, Iordache Golescu , cit., p. 423.
V., au sujet du dveloppement de la conscience auctoriale des intellectuels roumains de
l'poque, les contributions d'Elena Siupiur, qui relie l'avnement de l'intellectuel
professionnel avec sa formation acadmique accomplie dornavant dans les universits
occidentales (en Intelectuali, elite...cit., pp. 14-17).
Sur le problme de la rentabilit des influences et sur les difficults survenues dans
une enqute de cette nature dans l'histoire de la littrature roumaine (et, dans ce qui nous
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exemple, il y a peu d'indices concernant le rle des influences, sachant si peu,

en vrit, sur ses sources.
Les intentions dclares ou suggres des nobles clairs dans la
direction d'une insertion progressive dans le concert de la modernit, en
expression, mcanismes, ressorts symboliques se refltent indirectement dans
un phnomne propre cette poque qui concide chronologiquement la
Restauration, phnomne souvent remarqu par les historiens de la bourgeoisie
et de la noblesse dans cette priode44. Conformment aux analyses faites pour
ces annes-l, les premiers Princes rgnants roumains, Ioni Sandu Sturdza en
Moldavie et Grigore Ghica en Valachie, procdent une trs rapide srie
d'ennoblissements qui donnent naissance une croissance rapide du nombre des
nobles dans l'espace urbain mais surtout des hobereaux, dans les deux
Principauts. Pour la Valachie, les documents attestent officiellement l'existence
des 31 hauts nobles et dignitaires en 1806, tandis que en 1829 leur nombre
s'tait lev 70, ce qui signifie plus que le double, en une vingtaine d'annes,
mme moins si l'on tient compte de la stagnation relative de ce processus
jusqu'en 1821.
Pour la Moldavie, les chiffres sont encore plus spectaculaires, la hausse
de 460 de grands nobles officiellement enregistrs en 1810 902 pendant le
rgne de Ioni Sandu Sturdza45. Pour les autres catgories de boyards moyens
et petits les statistiques indiquent des phnomnes similaires46. Il s'agit du
dbut d'un processus de formation d'une catgorie nouvelle et fragile, la
bourgeoisie, qui provient, la diffrence des tendances occidentales, de la petite
noblesse conomiquement prospre plutt que d'une classe moyenne renforant
petit petit son bien-tre conomique. L'absence d'un bassin usuel de
recrutement selon les habitudes de l'Occident europen imposerait l'ide d'une
classe moyenne en herbes, suffisamment reprsente du point de vue
numrique, mais cache sous les blasons de la noblesse 47. Les observateurs
trangers du phnomne remarquent eux aussi l'poque les consquences
d'une certaine typologie des structures conomiques et politiques dans les
44
45
46
47
concerne, de la pense politique roumaine), v. Paul CORNEA, Regula jocului, Ed. Eminescu,
Bucureti, 1980, pp. 102-119.
Nous pensons particulirement l'analyse d'Alexandru-Florin Platon sur la constitution de
la bourgeoisie des Principauts dans les premires dcennies du XIXe sicle, en Geneza
burgheziei n Principatele romne, Editura Universitii Alexandru Ioan Cuza , Iai,
1997, pp. 264-328.
Ibidem, p. 276.
Selon les mmes sources, pour les deuxime et troisime rang, il y a en Moldavie, vers la
fin de l'anne 1827, 902 hobereaux, mme si le chiffre est encore disput, et en Valachie
626 hobereaux environ (ibidem).
Gheorghe PLATON, Alexandru-Florin PLATON, Boierimea din Moldova n secolul al
XIX-lea: context european, evoluie social i politic (date statistice i observaii
istorice), Editura Academiei Romne, Bucureti, 1995, p. 143.
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principauts, qui engendre la prosprit de quelques-uns, sans que la nation

en profite: Si l'agriculture et le commerce ont repris de nouvelles forces, au
moins est-il vrai que cette revivification n'a eu qu'un effet partiel et ne s'est pas
porte sur la partie de la nation sur laquelle ont port les pertes fait
remarquer le comte d'Hauterive48 au Prince rgnant Alexandru Ipsilanti en 1787,
et la situation ne change pas radicalement vingt ans aprs. Les boyards taient
devenus plus pauvres et ils sont devenus plus riches, voil l'effet de la paix 49.
L'impacte prvisible de la croissance d'une catgorie sociale munie
d'accs l'instruction, possdant les moyens financiers pour l'acqurir et
pouvant participer directement au processus de dcision politique peut tre suivi
dans l'introduction progressive des thmes de rflexion politique et dans l'veil
d'une importante conscience culturelle. Pour les nobles tels Iordache Golescu,
cette proccupation devient manifeste non seulement en crit, mais aussi dans
les actions concrtes: il participe en 1817 l'laboration et la rdaction des
Rglements des coles de Bucarest, il est membre pratiquement sans
interruption de l'Ephorie des coles de Bucarest de 1818 jusqu'en 1830, et il est
l'avocat enthousiaste de Gheorghe Lazr, qu'il soutien ardument pour occuper la
position de professeur au nouveau collge Saint Sava 50 . Son frre, Dinicu
Golescu, fondateur de l'Acadmie Princire de Bucarest, trs soucieux du rle
de l'ducation dans le processus de modernisation des Principauts, est un
remarquable et avis bibliophile.
Les frres Golescu constatent et dplorent l'incapacit lexicale de la
langue roumaine. Les notations pleines d'humour des rcits de voyage de Dinicu
Cltorii 51 indiquent un certain tat d'esprit li la ncessit de la
construction d'un langage utile pour le renouveau scientifique et littraire.
Iordache dploie des efforts concrets dans ce sens, en s'impliquant, comme l'on
vient de voir, dans l'administration des coles52. Ses actions constituent un bon
indice pour les efforts conjugus d'assimilation des concepts politiques lus
travers une interprtation moderne.
Iordache Golescu est un auteur d'autant plus intressant par le fait de ses
proccupations doublement philologiques et philosophiques, pour la
configuration d'une identit roumaine traversant la modernit politique. Mme
si l'on ne peut pas parler de ce que le monde occidental appelle dj une
technologie dmocratique (des mcanismes institutionnels, l'tat de droit, le
citoyen et la relation avec les droits et les liberts), on peut nanmoins tracer les
48
49
50
51
52
Comte Alexandre d'HAUTERIVE, L'Etat actuel et ancien de la Moldavie, Institut d'arts

graphiques Carol Gbl, Bucureti, 1902, p. 120.
Ibidem, pp. 120-122.
Cf. Iordache GOLESCU, Scrieri alese, cit., p. 11.
C. GOLESCU, Cltorii, publi par Petre V. Hane, Editura Tipografiile Romne Unite,
Bucarest, s. a.
V. Coman Lupu, en Iordache GOLESCU, Scrieri alese, cit., p. 11.
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lments d'une construction lente, mais progressive du langage politique.

L'avnement d'un discours li la cration d'un modle politique national, d'une
socit base sur la Loi (modle conu dj en l'Europe depuis Grotius et
rflchi comme une manire de structurer le pouvoir partir de la grande
secousse rvolutionnaire de 1789 53 ) se retrouvent implicitement, dans cette
volont toujours prsente de l'auteur de mettre en question l'tat des choses:
corruption, personnalisation du pouvoir etc.
Le mot justice se retrouve dans la dramaturgie de Iordache Golescu
dans des textes labors mme avant le moment 1821. On le dcouvre dans un
pamphlet dramatique, Starea rii Rumneti p vremea asidosiei, crit, selon
toute les probabilits, en 1818, aprs la fuite du Prince rgnant Caragea54. Les
personnages dbattent la question d'une possible exemption de taxes, en liant
cette discussion de nature fiscale l'quilibre politique garanti par la paix
sociale (ou par l'ordre): Linite d mil, linite d blndee, linite d ndurare,
d iertare i d toate celelalte fapte bune, mbiliugare mare 55.
Les quatre personnages mis en scne discutent, dans un langage
colloquial, une pratique institutionnelle typique pour la priode phanariote. Le
dialogue parle de la rsistance au changement et de l'incapacit de
l'administration d'imposer de nouvelles rglementations. Il s'agit d'un tat
inexistant, o l'autorit politique moderne se retrouve toujours subordonne un
prince arbitraire ou remplace par la participation complaisante de quelques
collaborateurs corrompus56.
La conversation volue rapidement vers le thme de la corruption,
stimule par le rgime phanariote qui dpense des sommes irrflchies du
budget de l'tat, dans une complicit vidente de la clientle qui forme le
Conseil des ministres (le Divan). Le rgime politique ainsi dcrit devient
d'autant plus intolrable que l'ide de justice est remplace par l'arbitraire lev
au rang de loi. Toutes les fonctionnalits de l'tat sont par consquent mises
sous le signe du doute.
Dans un autre dialogue, qui met en scne le nouveau Prince rgnant
roumain Grigore Ghica et Barbu Vcrescu (son opposant au premier mandat),
Golescu traite explicitement d'un autre cas de corruption, suggrant de facto
l'existence d'un mcanisme de la corruption institutionnalise. Aprs avoir
53
54
55
56
Le lien entre l'tat puissant, lgislateur et rgulateur et l'avnement de la socit des

individus est expos par Tocqueville dans sa Dmocratie en Amrique et discut dans le
contexte de l'laboration du modle politique franais par Pierre Rosanvallon, en Le
modle politique franais cit., p. 113.
Cf. Mihai Moraru, en Iordache GOLESCU, Scrieri alese, cit., p. 428.
La tranquillit engendre la charit, le calme, la douceur, la tranquillit engendre le
pardon, et toutes les autres bonnes choses et une grande prosprit (la traduction nous
appartient), en Starea rii Rumneti p vremea asidosiei , en Iordache GOLESCU,
Scrieri alese, cit., p. 19.
Ibidem, p. 25.
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dcrit, dans le dialogue antrieur, les techniques propres la corruption, dans le

dialogue ci-prsent, Barbu Vcrescu, tratre du pays, Golescu discute le
contexte du dbarquement du Prince rgnant Grigore Ghica envisag comme
une consquence directe de la corruption du systme.
L'ide de justice et d'ordre, concepts fondamentaux utiliss par la
modernit pour la dfinition de l'tat de droit fond sur le rgne de la loi et sur
le principe de la sparation des pouvoirs dans l'tat se confrontent avec la
survie d'un univers parallle, o le chaos, le manque d'autorit et l'absence de
toute dmarcation institutionnelle deviennent le substitut universel de la
fondation de l'tat. La vision suggre par l'auteur est celle d'un tat prpolitique, trs loin situ par rapport aux sens mme des passions politiques
modernes, et qui est orient vers une sorte de subversion du progrs. Or, le
thme du progrs est, comme on le sait, fondateur pour l'univers politique
moderne la fin du XVIIIe et au dbut du XIXe sicle. L'identit du modle
politique dmocratique est redevable en grande partie cette mcanique
politique hrite du XVIIe sicle, laquelle se rejoigne une dynamique
irrpressible des temps historiques postrvolutionnaires 57 . L'irrsistibilit
dmocratique observe sur le vif, plus tard, par Tocqueville en Amrique et
dont l'Europe commence dj subir les consquences provoque des frissons
dans les milieux conservateurs des Principauts roumaines, mme s'il s'agit
souvent plutt d'un simple prsage que de sa prsence relle, comme l'on peut
constater dans ce mmoire rdig par Mihail Sturdza en 1823:
La marche progressive du dsordre, qui rsulte de lesprit inquiet et turbulent de
la classe infrieure, est le sinistre prsage dun fcheux avenir ; La principale cause de
ces dispositions malveillantes est la tendance des esprits au principe dgalit qui se
nourrit par la multiplicit des promotions immrites 58.
La pense politique de Golescu laisse entendre, elle aussi, ce prsage de

la dynamique dmocratique moderne par la mobilit des rcits et par la
succession rapide des vnements prsents: la fuite de Caragea, l'installation de
Princes rgnants roumains, ensuite au dpart forc de Grigore Ghica. Mais dans
cette succession dramatique et parfois anecdotique des faits et des dtails
historiques, une suggestion paradoxale plane sur les tableau gnral dress par sa
pense: car la toile de fond est anhistorique, atemporelle et unidimensionnelle. Elle
renvoie plutt au mouvement cyclique des sophistes ou de Platon qu' la
mobilit historiques des temps modernes59. Il s'agit d'un cart assez commun
57
58
59
V. Pierre MANENT, Enqute sur la dmocratie, Gallimard, Paris, 2007, pp. 370-372.
Ibidem.
Le dtour philosophique de la modernit passe souvent travers la redcouverte des
Anciens travers l'ide de cit et de citoyen, c'est la thse de Pierre Manent dveloppe
dans Les Mtamorphoses de la cit. Essai sur la dynamique de l'Occident, Flammarion,
Paris, 2010.
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pour les auteurs roumains de cette poque: dans les strates plus profonds de leur
mouvance philosophique, le sens du Temps, de la rythmicit et du rapport
d'extriorit restent en attente. Qu'il s'agisse d'un projet de rforme crit vers
1820 ou d'une pice de thtre, d'un mmoire ou d'un pome, la pense
politique de cette priode oscille entre un aristotlisme dgrad et un certain
type de libralisme moderne de surface, o les mots ne sont que leurs propres
vhicules, laissant encore en attente les concepts correspondants60.
L'ide d'un ordre traditionnel, ritualis et obissant aux anciennes
fonctions dont l'ordre institutionnel tire sa lgitimit est un thme rcurent dans
la pense politique de cette priode et dans sa prsence socialement accepte61.
Les artifices littraires mobiliss renvoient cette mme impression de
cohabitation docte et atemporelle avec les Anciens. Dans un des textes, Golescu
utilise une mise en scne dramatique, dans un champs aux revenants .
L'image et la symbolique qui y est attache pourraient tre une influence de
Lucien de Samosate62. Les revenants de Golescu deviennent paradoxalement
l'ancrage dans le prsent d'un Ancien Rgime toujours dominant dans la pense
politique de l'poque.
Les autres productions littraires de Golescu vont dans la mme direction:
Mavrodinada sau Divanul nevinovat defimat sau Copiii srmani nevrstnici
npstuii63, Starea rii Rumneti pe vremea pmntenilor64. Le lecteur est
averti sur le caractre pamphltaire des textes, il s'agit d'une comdie o l'on
retrouve, parmi d'autres personnages, le Peuple ( Norodul ), comme
personnage collectif toujours prsent dans l'absence chronique du Citoyen (c'est
seulement Nicolae Blcescu qui va faire parler un tel personnage65, un quart
sicle plus tard), quelques fonctionnaires de l'tat, les faux patriotes, les
60
61
62
63
64
65
Dans un texte ddi au pamphlet politique de l'poque, Mihai Cojocaru et Cristian

Ploscaru arrivent, en utilisant des outils diffrents, la mme conclusion: en dpit des
innovations lexicales et de certaines ides nouvelles nonces plutt par complaisance
et par la pression de la mode, la gnration de Ionic Tutu, Conachi ou des frres
Golescu reste ancre dans l'Ancien Rgime. C'est seulement dans la priode rglementaire
que la force des mots et la rhtorique politique ont dpass le cadre rituel traditionnel,
pour devenir l'horizon principal d'affirmation, reproduction et lgitimation du pouvoir
politique (Mihai COJOCARU, Cristian PLOSCARU, Preliminarii la o istorie a
pamfletului politic , en Andi MIHALACHE, Alexandru ISTRATE (coords), Romantism
i modernitate...cit., pp. 624-625).
V. aussi ce sujet Radu PUN, Scen i simbol: reprezentaii ale puterii n Vechiul
Regim romnesc , en Constana VINTIL-GHIULESCU, Maria PAKUCS WILLCOCKS,
Spectacolul public ntre tradiie i modernitate, Editura Institutului Cultural Romn,
Bucureti, 2007, pp. 79-121 (apud Mihai COJOCARU, Cristian PLOSCARU, Preliminarii
la o istoriecit. ).
Cf. M. Moraru, en Iordache GOLESCU, Scrieri alese, cit., p. 430.
Ibidem, p. 95.
Iordache GOLESCU, Scrieri alese, cit., p. 91.
Nicolae BLCESCU, Manualul bunului romn, introduction de Petru V. Hane,
Tipografia Munca, Bucureti, 1903.
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patriotes sincres et le bouffon (utilis dans la tradition shakespearienne du

raisonneur). Le prambule voque les changements de rgime politique et le
passage aux rgnes roumains, des patriotes: S-au cufundat patrihoii, hoii,
hoii, hoii/S bem i s nchinm, pentru patrioi s ne rugm 66. La scne
change tout de suite et prsente une proclamation qui suscite l'enthousiasme du
peuple, personnage collectif prsent dans la plupart des pices de Golescu. Un
fonctionnaire prsente un expos de motifs de la proclamation, en invoquant le
dsir de changement manifest par les nobles patriotes en rponse la politique
fiscale touffante et injuste mene par les princes phanariotes:
Ne pouvant plus souffrir les exils, la malhonntet et les injures profrs par les
princes trangers leur adresse, les nobles [...] l'ont pri (le nouveau prince, n.n.) de
rdiger des lois nouvelles, plus justes et plus adaptes aux capacits du pays 67.
Avec la lecture, on peut supposer que les lois nouvelles font partie de la
prparation des Rglements Organiques, car dans la troisime scne, elles se
transforment en rglements . L'auteur fait introduire, vers la fin de cette
courte pice, l'ide d'un Assemble lue par tout le peuple, responsable
ensuite de l'lection du Prince rgnant68.
La libert tolre et le monarque bienveillant:

quelques discontinuits conceptuelles chez Simeon Marcovici
Dans cette transition opre durant la troisime dcennie du XIXe sicle,
il y a nanmoins deux tapes distinctes. Tous les penseurs n'voluent pas sur une
trajectoire identique, tant donne l'appartenance biographique et intellectuelle
diffrente. Ionic Tutu ou Simion Marcovici sont srement encore trs
tributaires l'ducation et la formation intellectuelle de l'Ancien Rgime, mais
leur expression politique mots et concepts est sensiblement diffrente. Chez
eux, les accents se modifient, l'action politique accompagne souvent l'uvre, les
vnements historiques sont surpris dans une perspective qualitative diffrente.
D'autre part, des lments les rapprochant de la logique traditionnelle de
l'Ancien Rgime sont encore dtectables, ce qui complte l'image de cette tape
de la pense politique quand le processus de modernisation n'tait et ne
pouvait tre le rsultat dlibr d'une stratgie globale, bien articule 69.
66
67
68
69
Iordache GOLESCU, Scrieri alese, cit., p. 91. Les faux patriotes sont tombs l'eau, les voleurs,
les voleurs/Buvons et trinquons, prions la sant des patriotes! , la traduction nous appartient.
Ibidem, p. 92. La traduction nous appartient.
Ibidem, p. 94.
Gheorghe PLATON, Romnii n veacul construciei naionale, Editura Enciclopedic,
Bucureti, 2005, p. 17.
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L'absence d'une articulation systmatique des projets de rforme politique

se traduit, comme on l'a dj montr, par les hsitations des textes gnralement
traits de libraux , ou parfois illuministes . Les textes de cette priode
sont souvent htroclites70 et la dmarche interprtative se heurte souvent aux
difficults lies au retracement des sources utilises. Le texte assez connu et
souvent cit de Simeon Marcovici, Idee pe scurt asupra tuturor formelor de
oblduire, 1829, offre des ressources supplmentaires dans la logique
interprtative propose dans cet article.
L'auteur distingue deux types de rgime politique, en fonction du critre
de l'intrt commun, dans la bonne tradition aristotlicienne enseigne dans les
manuels de Vamvas ou autres: Il faut distinguer deux types de gouvernements,
ceux qui sont fonds sur l'intrt commun, et ceux qui ne sont nullement fond
sur le bien commun 71. La classification continue dans les termes bien connus:
la monarchie, l'aristocratie et rpublique, dans la classe des rgimes purs et la
tyrannie, l'oligarchie et l'ochlocratie, dans la catgorie des rgimes dvis72.
Marcovici continue son exposition sur les rgimes politiques en faisant
appel, cette fois-ci, la thorie de la souverainet et de la monarchie dcrite au
XVIIe sicle par Grotius: Le monarque tient dans ses mains tout le pouvoir de
gouverner et veille sur les actions des corps lgislatifs et excutifs ( prile
legiuitoare i svritoare ), ainsi que sur la tranquillit de ltat 73 . Les
marques de la souverainet selon le modle invoqu apparaissent ainsi
partiellement: la marque lgislative, excutive, judiciaire et le maintien de
l'ordre public, avec le respect des lois sans discrimination, y compris par le
monarque, ce qui met la pense politique de Marcovici dans une logique
librale: Le monarque est oblig de suivre le contenu des lois 74 . Le
souverain a des attributions fiscales, il tablit les taxes et les impts, selon le
principe de la contribution proportionnelle aux revenus.
Le monarque veille sur les dpenses publiques et sur le bien-tre de ses
sujets: Les revenus de l'tat sont utiliss pour les ncessits du pays ; il ne
70
71
72
73
74
V. Raluca ALEXANDRESCU, Drumul politicii romneti spre modernizare: despre

democraie i regim politic la nceput de secol XIX , en Liviu BRTESCU, tefania
CIUBOTARU (coords.), Monarhia n Romnia, o evaluare: politic, memorie i
patrimoniu, Editura Universitii Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Iai, 2012, pp. 271-285.
In Paul CORNEA, Mihai ZAMFIR, Gndirea... cit., p. 230. Trebuie s osebim dou
feluri de oblduiri, adec acelea care sunt aszate numai pe folosul de obte, i iari
acelea n care acest folos obtesc s socotete ntru nimic .
Ibidem. Clasul inti coprinde monarhia mrginit, aristocraia i republica; n clasul al
doilea s coprinde tirania, oligarhia i ohlocraia .
Ibidem, p. 231. Monarhul are toat puterea crmuitoare n minile sale i privegheaz
asupra lucrrilor tuturora prilor legiuitoare i svritore, precum i asupra linitirii statului .
Ibidem.
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pratique point la diffamation et ne se rjouit pas de la pauvret des sujets 75. La

justice est, d'autre part, dfinie en troite liaison avec une vision plutt
platonicienne, car elle se traduit par la conformit des rles dans la cit, marie
l'amour pour la vrit et la haute instruction:
L'clat dont il est entour imprime respect, et non pas peur, l'honntet est le
moteur de tous ses actions et l'amour de ses sujets en est la rcompense; il reoit les bras
ouverts et respect le mrite et l'instruction, en sachant fort bien que, si les hommes sages
et pris de la vrit le quittent, la justice n'aura plus de renfort... 76.
Le final de cette prsentation du rgime politique optimal, qui ressemble,

mais qui ne s'identifie pas, une monarchie constitutionnelle car les images
traditionnelles d'un monarque pre sont encore trop prsentes comprend aussi
un Snat, qui a des comptences lgislatives places sous la rserve de
l'entrinement du monarque.
Les changements de rgime politique et des institutions de produisent,
comme on l'a vu, d'une manire lente et progressive avant 1830. Les
intellectuels participent de plus en plus ce renouveau, Marcovici en tant un
exemple. Cette influence est ressentie travers les progrs dans la
professionnalisation, mais aussi dans l'activit politique des intellectuels, qui
remplacent, par leur implication, une classe politique de professionnels qui
mettra du temps se former77. La cration d'un espace public de dbat et de
prise de dcision politique est due cette action des nouvelles lites locales,
travers notamment la presse et l'urbanisation78. Ce que Marcovici saisit tout de
suite: dans un nouveau rgime politique libral, il faut assurer,
constitutionnellement, la libert de la presse, condition prsente dans son projet:
la presse est libre pour rpandre les ides de chacun sur le gouvernement
politique, sur le pouvoir. Marcovici introduit ici un dtail fondamental de la
pense librale, mis au fondement du rgime politique de la monarchie
constitutionnelle par Benjamin Constant. Le pouvoir de l'opinion, comme il
l'appelle dans ses Principes de politique79, est un signe de la dmocratisation et
une garantie pour la libert politique, condition qu'elle soit mise dans le
contexte d'un pouvoir politique limit. Dans le cas de Marcovici, les conditions
75
76
77
78
79
Ibidem: Veniturile statului le cheltuiete la trebuinele Patriei; nu defaim, nici s

bucur de srcia supuilor .
Ibidem, pp. 231-232: Strlucirea carea l nconjoar nsufl smerenie iar nu spaim,
cinstea este vecinicul mictor al tuturora lucrrilor sale, i dragostea supuilor rspltirea;
priimete cu braele deschise i cinstete meritul i nvtura, tiind bine c, de se vor deprta
de scaun brbaii cei nvai i iubitori de adevr, dreptatea nu se va mai rezema... .
V. ce sujet les explications dtailles d'Elena Siupiur, dans Intelectuali, elite... cit., p. 42.
V. Cristian PREDA, Rumnii fericii cit., p. 29.
Benjamin CONSTANT, Principes de politique , en crits politiques, Folio Gallimard,
Paris, 1997, pp. 305-588.
vol. XIV
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RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU
130
n'en sont pas runies, car le pouvoir ragit d'une manire paternelle et non
constitutionnelle, ce qui renvoie le petit projet libral dans la sage case du
savoir politique traditionnel80.
Le dilemme devient plus pais encore, puisqu'on se retrouve devant un
tlescopage de deux visions concurrentes dans la pense moderne, source de
polmiques clbres dans l'espace anglo-saxon du XVIIe sicle: le modle
patriarcal et le modle contractuel du pouvoir politique. Marcovici tait
thoriquement familiaris avec au moins un des deux auteurs impliqus dans la
polmique entre John Locke, avec ses Deux Traits du gouvernement civil, et
Sir Robert Filmer, avec son De Patriarcha81.
Tandis que, pour la thorie de la dmocratie moderne, la presse devient
elle-mme un contre-pouvoir 82 , comme partie intgrante des nouvelles
expressions de la socit civile, pour Simeon Marcovici, la libert de la presse
et de la parole, plus gnralement devient plutt l'expression d'une complicit
du monarque pre, une soupape pour la pression croissante du patriotisme
l'intrieur d'une socit patriarcale.
Ce paradoxe conceptuel illustre fort bien la problmatique gnrale de
cette priode, et le parcours de Marcovici est en soi un exemple: tudiant
l'Universit de Pise pour quatre ans, entre 1823 et 1827, et Paris, entre 1827-1830,
il est parmi les premiers boursiers roumains en Occident, devenant ensuite un
professionnel de l'administration: secrtaire d'tat dans le Ministre des
Affaires trangres, directeur gnral des coles (1850), mais en occupant aussi
des postes lus: maire de Bucarest (1855), et, plus tard, dput. Idee pe scurt...,
texte crit en 1829, est donc le rsultat d'une rencontre entre le paradigme de la
perception traditionnelle du pouvoir politique et de ses agencements83 , d'une
part, et de la confrontation au paradigme culturel occidental, d'autre part.
Le projet politique de Marcovici se retrouve aussi dans les positions
adoptes par les princes roumains, en Valachie mais aussi en Moldavie, partir
de 1821. En effet, comme l'ide d'une rforme constitutionnelle est de plus en
plus prsente et passe travers les rapports de domination exercs par La Porte,
d'une part, et par la Russie, d'autre part, la solution adopte par les deux
monarques est de s'appuyer sur les petits et les moyens boyards, plus cooprants,
plus intresses dans les changements et beaucoup plus mobiles que les grands
80
81
82
83
Iordache GOLESCU, Scrieri alese, cit., pp. 231-232. Tiparul este slobod ca s-i dea
fietecare patriot ideile sale n scris asupra strii patriei, asupra nnoirilor ce snt s se fac
i chiar asupra micrilor oblduirii, careia, fiind printeasc, nu s teme de fiii si .
On notera ici le remarquable livre de Franck LESSAY, Le dbat Locke-Filmer, PUF,
Paris, 1998.
L'avnement des contre-pouvoirs dans les rgimes politiques modernes se distingue
comme un concept propre de la Restauration et traduit cette conviction selon laquelle il
faut stimuler les corps intermdiaires pour maintenir la libert politique. V. Pierre
ROSANVALLON, Le modle politique franais cit., pp. 179-189.
V. aussi, ce sujet, Traian SANDU, Histoire de la Roumanie, Perrin, Paris, 2008, pp. 127.
vol. XIV
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131
boyards84. Marcovici parle dans ce contexte du but ultime du gouvernement, qui

est la dfense contre la tyrannie, envisage comme une destruction du contrat
social 85 , de la libert, de l'ordre bien-sant. Le tyran est l'ennemi de
l'instruction notamment de la philosophie et de la science politique, prcise-til et du patriotisme poursuite du bien commun86.
Le tableau de la tyrannie voque aussi la question de la servitude
volontaire, dont l'arbitre ultime en est l'Histoire, cette mre de la Vrit 87.
La discussion sur la nature des rgimes politiques volue ensuite vers la
thorie de leur transformation cyclique, car le renversement d'un rgime
despotique prfigure les potentialits du bon rgime88.
CONCLUSIONS
La pense politique des premires annes des rgnes autochtones met les
fondements d'un chantier qui va crer progressivement les conditions pour
l'entre fragmente, partielle dans le circuit intellectuel des Principauts des
concepts de la modernit europenne. L'interrogation prsente un potentiel pour
complter, par ailleurs, les modifications significatives qui ont lieu dans cette
priode dans les mouvements du Temps Historique, telles qu'elles se produisent
un peu partout en Europe de sud-est l'poque, avec l'incontestable concours de
l'Europe des plus forts. La Rvolution Franaise change le rgime politique non
seulement en France, mais elle permute aussi la dynamique de la modernit
dans son ensemble, rapporte la perspective romantique, au biologisme du
XIXe sicle ou aux technologies politiques en pleine acclration. S'ensuit
lgitimement le problme des rpercussions dtectables dans la pense politique
roumaine dans les annes 1820.
La position des auteurs roumains se forge dans une troite cohabitation
avec un paradigme culturel o les distances entre le champ d'exprience et
l'horizon d'attente restent encore loin de cette acclration propre la modernit
occidentale. Il ne s'agit pas ici d'une valuation qualitative de la progression
historique de l'Occident, mais tout simplement d'apprhender, si possible, le
rapport de l'imaginaire politique roumain en rapport avec son domaine de
rfrence plac de plus en plus souvent dans la culture politique occidentale. Par
ailleurs, les diffrences de projection, visibles dans le champ symbolique du
84
85
86
87
88
Ibidem, p. 128.
Paul CORNEA, Mihai ZAMFIR, Gndirea... cit., p. 233.
Ibidem, p. 234.
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
vol. XIV
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RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU
132
Temps historique, ensemble avec ses catgories conceptuelles (la libert, l'ordre
politique etc.) constituent des indicateurs fixs par les thoriciens de la
dmocratie l'ge des premiers exercices du parlementarisme monarchique
constitutionnel 89 et sont lis aux techniques dmocratiques mobilises dans
l'architecture du rgime politique libral. Plus tard, ces dichotomies vont se
coaguler dans une nouvelle tension: celle des grandes visions et fantaisies
romantiques s'teignant dans l'ennui sarcastique et mlancolique de la
gnration post Napolon III90.
89
90
Cf. Jacques JUILLARD, Les gauches franaisescit. p. 213.

Virgil NEMOIANU, mblnzirea romantismului. Literatura european i epoca Biedermaier,
trad. par Alina Florea et Sanda Aronescu, Curtea Veche, Bucureti, 2004, p. 11.
vol. XIV
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MAURO CALISE
Fuorigioco. La sinistra contro i suoi leader
Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2013, 156 pp.
Furigioco. La sinistra contro i suoi leader appartient ce type de livres
concis, condenss, qui, poursuivant une tradition ditoriale bien consolide en
Italie, construisent leur fil argumentatif la frontire entre lanalyse scientifique
et la critique politique. Le spcialiste en science politique quest Mauro Calise
explique, pour un public largi mais sans pour autant sacrifier la rigueur
conceptuelle de largumentation, une ralit politique italienne qui na plus de
principe dintelligibilit vident ni pour ses citoyens, ni pour les chercheurs. Ce
faisant, le texte participe un double contexte. Il est dabord un livre sur lItalie,
destin au lecteur italien, tous ceux qui sintressent la vie politique de la
pninsule dont les volutions rcentes sont pour le moins fascinantes, voir ce
propos le vif dbat autour des rformes institutionnelles et constitutionnelles
venir. Mais Fuorigioco nest pas pour autant un livre contextuel. Il prolonge
une rflexion que lauteur mne depuis longtemps dont les origines remontent
la publication en 2000 du texte Il Partito Personale1 sur ce quil considre
tre le phnomne dfinitoire de la politique dmocratique des dernires
dcennies dans la pninsule et au-del: la personnalisation du pouvoir. Aussi,
slve-t-il un niveau de gnralit suprieur et sadresse-t-il un public
international avis.
La structure du livre correspond bien cette logique duale. Une premire
partie est consacre la personnalisation du pouvoir; la deuxime traite des
mthodes et instruments (e.g. les lections primaires) qui ont renforc la
tendance actuelle la personnalisation; la troisime, enfin, est focalise sur
plusieurs personnalits politiques de la gauche italienne (le maire de Naples
Antonio Bassolino; le Premier ministre Massimo DAlema; le chef Secrtaire
du Pd Walter Veltroni; le prsident Giorgio Napolitano) dont la succession
scanda la politique italienne rcente, afin de montrer que la figure du leader fort
nest pas lapanage exclusif de la droite et den retracer les parcours. Le livre
peut donc se lire de deux faons: comme une rationalisation de lhistoire
italienne rcente, considre sous langle de la personnalisation et comme une
analyse de la personnalisation politique, illustre dans diffrentes formes,
modes et vicissitudes politiques.
1
Mauro CALISE, Il Partito Personale. I due corpi del leader, 2e d., Laterza, Roma-Bari,
2010 (2001).
RECENSIONES
136
Comme telle, la personnalisation du pouvoir nest pas un phnomne

nouveau ou rcent. Lauteur le rappelait dj ailleurs 2 : le pouvoir est
personnel avant de devenir impersonnel. Ce qui est en revanche dfinitoire et
la fois troublant pour la politique contemporaine, cest la combinatoire du
pouvoir personnel et du rgime dmocratique. Or, cet amalgame, notait
Mauro Calise3, nous le considrons toujours dun il inquiet travers les
lentilles dont nous a munies ce Max Weber a diffus dans le monde de laprs
guerre dans sa version amricaine par les travaux de Talcott Parsons et
Reinhard Bendix 4 : au sein de ce quest devenu un vritable paradigme, la
validit de lordre politique disons-le, dans lItalie postfasciste et dans
lAllemagne post-nazie, plus que dans la France du Gnral de Gaulle repose
sur la lgalit dmocratique et la rationalit bureaucratique dune autorit
impersonnelle dont la force et lefficacit ne dpend pas du caractre de ceux
qui lactualisent et dont la valeur se juge laune de sa capacit rduire
limprvisible quintroduit fatalement le facteur humain. Dans ce monde, toute
intrusion significative du facteur personnel dans sa concrtude physique sonne
lalarme soit du chavirage vers lautoritarisme dun leader fort, soit de
lenlisement dans la vase (no-)patrimoniale dune autorit dcompose. Il
serait en fait temps, exhorte Mauro Calise, de sortir de cette perspective
normative et de raviver les vertus explicatives de linstrumentaire weberien au
demeurant riche et disponible afin dexaminer ouvertement et de grer
efficacement la ralit de cette cohabitation entre le pouvoir personnel et le
rgime dmocratique dont on ne peut plus ignorer lvidence.
De nos jours, la combinatoire du pouvoir personnel et du rgime
dmocratique se manifeste plusieurs niveaux et sous plusieurs formes. Les
deux constituent des couples durables, officiels et prouvs dans ce que
Theodore J. Lowi appelle la Seconde Rpublique amricaine5 cest--dire
les Etats-Unis daprs le New Deal et dans la France de la Ve Rpublique6. Ils
pratiquent en revanche un concubinage coupable et/ou avou demi-mot dans
2
3
4
IDEM, The Personalization of Power , Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science

Review, vol. X, no. 4, 2010, pp. 617-622.
V. la conclusion, LAltra facia di Weber , de Il Partito Personale... cit., pp. 147-155.
V., pour un aperu la fois synthtique et critique de la rception de Weber, Guenther
ROTH, Introduction to the New Edition , in Reinhard BENDIX, Max Weber. An
Intellectual Portrait, University of California Press, Berkely & Los Angeles, 1977 (1960),
pp. xiii-xxxvii.
Theodore L. LOWI, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States,
W.W. Norton & Company, 1979; IDEM, The Personal President. Power Invested,
Promise Unfulfilled, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1985.
V. lexamen quen fait Ben CLIFT, Dyarchic Presidentialization in a Presidentialized
Polity: The French Fifth Republic , in Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB (eds.), The
Presidentialization of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, Oxford
University Press, Oxford & New York, 2007, pp. 221-245.
vol. XIV
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RECENSIONES
137
lItalie berlusconienne et post-berlusconienne. LItalie contemporaine illustre

les pathologies de la personnalisation du pouvoir et rvle les ressorts
structurels et les facteurs contextuels (institutionnels, culturels, technologiques)
favorisants. lavis de Mauro Calise, les dboires de la politique italienne
actuelles sont largement dues lincapacit manifeste surtout par les partis de
gauche prendre conscience du fait que la personnalisation du pouvoir n'est
pas un dmon antidmocratique qui ressuscite les fantmes du pass [mais] la
forme de gouvernement dominant dans toutes les dmocraties atlantiques
(p. 4). Au lieu de sy opposer ou de lignorer, il conviendrait donc de lapprivoiser
en la rationnalisant au moyen du renforcement des fonctions institutionnelles
monocratiques, Premier ministre et/ou prsident (p. vii). Le refus ou
lincapacit de traiter au plein jour ce phnomne et de le ramener lintrieur
de lespace institutionnel du rgime fit quil se manifestt dans lunivers
extraconstitutionnel des pratiques partisanes pour y engendrer ces formes
pathologiques que sont le parti personnel dune part, expression de la macropersonnalisation , et la prolifration des micro-leaders de parti, dautre part (pp. 6-7).
Explore dans le livre homonyme7, la premire pathologie nourrit cette
arme organisationnelle 8 (p. vii) mise sur pied par Silvio Berlusconi,
structure pyramidale et hyper-centralise, rsultant de la fusion entre la
personnalisation du pouvoir et la privatisation9 de lorganisation partisane, dans
un contexte dfini simultanment par la fragmentation de lespace politique
national et local et par le renforcement du gouvernement10. Si la fragmentation
du centre est due leffondrement des partis traditionnels dont les causes sont
la fois pninsulaires (lopration Mani Pulite) et globales (fin de la Guerre
Froide, chute du lURSS), le morcellement politique du territoire sest nourri du
direttismo install aprs la rforme lectorale des municipalits (llection
directe des maires ds 1993). Lautre palier, le renforcement du gouvernement,
correspond cette tendance manifeste en Italie comme ailleurs et quon a
baptise du non de prsidentialisation de la politique11. Soulignons-le, le
parti personnel nest pas une faction un ralliement plus ou moins phmre
autour dune personne mme sil peut en raviver le souvenir: il est pleinement
parti, mais dun type nouveau, ni idologique, ni programmatique, ni de notables, ni
de masse. Le parti personnel fait reposer son identit et son organisation sur la
volont et limage de son leader. Il reprend et exploite dans un monde politique
7
8
10
11
Mauro CALISE, Il Partito personale... cit.

Rfrence tant faite au classique de Philip SELZNIK, The Organizaional Weapon: A
Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1952.
Dans un sens similaire aux processus de privatisation des conomies planifies dans
les pays de lEst ayant engendr les conomies postcommunistes de march.
Pour lanalyse de lvolution politique italienne des dernires dcennies, v. les articles
runis dans le no. spcial de Studia Politica, vol. XIII, no. 4, 2013.
Mauro CALISE, Presidentialization, Italian Style , in Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul
WEBB (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics cit., pp. 88-106.
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RECENSIONES
138
de plus en plus marktis le modle organisationnel et lethos des ces

entreprises qui se sont dveloppes dans le monde de la spculation boursire
lpoque du no-libralisme. Le parti personnel (Forza Italia) arrive proposer
un style de reprsentation et de gouvernement, qui, exploitant outrance les
mdia privs, visuels avant tout, a lair de fournir un principe (personnalis) de
cohrence un univers politique qui en manque ostensiblement.
Si, du ct droit de la politique italienne, lon a su tirer profit de cette
tendance la personnalisation lge de la communication tlvisuelle (capable
de couvrir de grands nombres) et de lInternet ( mme de cibler finement le
message), la gauche italienne agit comme si rien ntait et resta hors-jeu .
Elle faillit constamment rpondre aux exigences de cette nouvelle dmocratie
daudience qui sinstalla en Italie la place de lancienne dmocratie des
partis 12. Les checs que lui infligea Berlusconi dabord, Beppe Grillo ensuite,
en fournissent pleinement la preuve (p. 24 sq.). Cette incapacit avre de la
gauche italienne sexplique, en partie, par son ancrage durable dans cet
environnement idologique et organisationnel de la Premire Rpublique
italienne caractris par la mmoire du fascisme (et lhostilit consquente la
macro-personnalisation du pouvoir), par lattachement la collgialit comme
principe politique et organisationnel (et lhostilit consquente au principe
monocratique) (pp. 11-12). Cest dire que la gauche reprsente actuellement
par le Partito democratico, produit tardif des scissions et fusions ayant suivi
lexplosion du PCI et de la DC, et en hritant des deux sacharna rester
attache au modle du parti corporation oligarchique ayant grandi avec ltat
dmocratique et instituteur du social 13 de laprs-guerre et, ce titre,
appartenant un passe tout aussi glorieux que rvolu. Toutefois, le rejet du
principe monocratique nalla pas de pair avec la prservation de la rigueur du
principe collgial. Car ce nest pas dire que cette gauche ne fut pas touche par
le phnomne de la personnalisation. Son refus de jouer la carte de la macropersonnalisation nempcha pas la dilution de lorganisation partisane dans
une foule de micro-notables, qui ne forment plus une oligarchie cohsive (pp. 5-7).
Cette dilution de lancienne oligarchie nationale de la gauche italienne dans un
tissu de micro-leaders est nourrie par les rformes institutionnelles successives
(rformes lectorales des annes 1990 et 2000), aggrave par les
instrumentalisations politiques des technologies de communication anciennes
(tlvision) et nouvelles (web 2.0) et renforce par les techniques de
renouvellement politique et de construction (de la lgitimit) de la direction
partisane (les primaires et les lections internes).
12
13
Cf. la typologie des formes historiques du gouvernement reprsentatif propose de Bernard

MANIN, Principes du gouvernement reprsentatif, Flammarion, Paris, 1995, pp. 247-304.
Cf. Pierre ROSANVALLON, LEtat en France de 1789 nos jours, Seuil, Paris, 1990.
vol. XIV
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RECENSIONES
139
Dans une certaine mesure, la dsagrgation politique de la gauche

italienne ou, tout le moins, son incapacit se reconstituer dans une
organisation cohsive, est la revanche du mode de production du personnel
politique de la Premire Rpublique qui, grce au systme lectoral (vote
prfrentiel au niveau local, prfrences multiples pour les lections
nationales), reposait dune part sur la production territoriale du consensus
autour des micro-leaders et, dautre part, sur leur agencement dans des courants
transversaux en comptition au sein des partis. Le systme permettait donc un
commerce politique stable entre le local et le national, gr magistralement par
la DC, capable de la sorte de concilier en son sein la multitude des
particularismes locaux, et par le PCI, mme de faire valoir les vertus du
centralisme dmocratique. Or, les rformes lectorales des annes 1990 et 2000
ont dtruit ce systme et, ce faisant, ses produits politiques, en premier lieu le
PCI sans y substituer un nouveau mcanisme centre-territoire fonctionnel. Ds
que le systme majoritaire fut consacr au niveau national, le microvote
personnel, conserv au niveau local, ne fut plus compens, mais renforc par le
dcoupage des collges uninominaux. la place dune politique qui construisait
son consensus sur lhorizontalit territoriale et sa cohsion sur la verticale
partisane sinstallait une politique dsagrge dans une multitude de
comptitions localises, parfois fratricides, alors que les anciens partis
noffraient plus de principe de cohrence (p. 31 sq.). Ensuite, la Loi lectorale
de 2005 baptise Porcellum, scrutin proportionnel avec des listes bloques,
avec une prime majoritaire calcule diffremment pour la Chambre et le Snat
remit entre les mains de la direction partisane un pouvoir (et une responsabilit)
dans la confection des listes et la construction des majorits parlementaires
quelle narriva pas ou plus grer (p. 75 sq.) dans le contexte de rapports
dautorit intra-partisane changs.
Car en parallle, et sur la toile de fond de leffritement manifeste de
lidologie comme facteur de cohsion organisationnelle, la gauche italienne
renouvela ses mcanismes de production de la lgitimit interne en faisant appel
des mthodes dans lair du temps, mais effet ambivalent: les primaires pour
la dsignation des candidats aux lections locales et rgionales et llection
interne de la direction partisane des mcanismes qui combinent par ailleurs les
qualits personnelles des leaders et les ressources organisationnelles (intra-)
partisanes dont ils disposent. Ainsi, au niveau local, lexercice confirma
lemprise territoriale des leaders locaux et, en rgle gnrale, consacra la
victoire du candidat plus radical sur les voix plus modres. Au niveau national
en revanche, llection interne de la direction ne produisit pas un leadership
unifi et incontest, mais, tout au contraire, une prolifration sans prcdent des
courants internes prsident la reconstruction mme de la gauche (p. 68 sq.).
Qui plus est, si le combat national de la gauche contre le principe
monocratique fut perdu dans les annes 1990 lge de la tlvision, manie
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RECENSIONES
140
avec astuce et vigueur politique par cet animal tlvisuel qutait Berlusconi
(p. 41), la dsagrgation territoriale dont le Pd est en proie est renforce et
aggrave par cette innovation technologique des annes 2000 quest le Web 2.0,
nouveau eldorado de la construction du consensus (p. 43). Lartisan de cet
exploit est cette fois-ci le Movimento 5 Stele de Beppe Grillo. Effectivement, en
refusant la mdiation tlvisuelle (en termes technologiques, mais surtout
institutionnels et politico-conomiques), ce dernier arriva agencer la parit des
rapports sur Internet avec une pratique du leadership empruntant la fois aux
figures du comdien que Grillo est par profession (et par vocation), et du
prophte qui accumule les disciples ou, sur le web, les followers, pratique
actualise la fois dans lespace virtuel et dans lespace trs concret des places
publiques. Si lInternet a pu nourrir ses dbuts la promesse dune dmocratie
dlibrative grande chelle, les blogs principe d'agrgation des opinions
quasi-publiques exprimes au moyen de lInternet (p. 46) et les rseaux
sociaux support de communication, change, rassemblement, mobilisation
dmontrent pleinement, en Italie et ailleurs, cette qualit tant clbre de
lInternet, la versatilit . Ils servent tout aussi bien la dlibration citoyenne,
que lentreprise populiste de Beppe Grillo
Avec Furigioco, Mauro Calise nous invite reconstituer lhistoire
politique italienne les deux dernires dcennies laune de la confrontation
entre le principe monocratique et le principe collgial (au niveau national, au
niveau territorial, au sein des partis) et constater la dfaite du second. Certes,
cette confrontation est italienne et son rsultat lest tout autant. Il nempche
quelle dmontre que les remdes du renouveau dmocratique dont on vante les
mrites depuis vingt ans (e.g. lections primaires, participation via lInternet) ne
sont pas la panace quon croyait. En tout cas ils ne sont pas des substituts des
partis politiques robustes. En fin de compte, sans ces derniers, la politique
dmocratique en son ensemble risque parfois de se jouer hors jeu.
ALEXANDRA IONESCU
vol. XIV
no. 1
2014
FABIO BORDIGNON
Il partito del capo. Da Berlusconi a Renzi
Maggioli Editore, Santarcangelo di Romagna, 2013, 280 pp.
Le livre de Fabio Bordignon, chercheur du centre La Polis auprs
lUniversit dUrbino et du centre Demos, propose au lecteur une interprtation
systmatique de la politique italienne. Le volume vient dtre publi dans un
contexte politique particulirement turbulent: la chute du gouvernement
dEnrico Letta et larrive du leader rottamatore1 la direction du gouvernement en
fvrier 2014 fournissent une confirmation empirique immdiate aux interprtations
de Bordignon. Les mandres de la vie politique italienne deviennent effectivement
plus lisibles si lon adopte une cl de lecture selon laquelle les partis et les
stratgies politiques sont fortement dpendants des leaders en place. Partis
personnels ou partis des personnes, les partis politiques italiens sont dcrits
comme les prcurseurs dune transformation dj en acte dans plusieurs pays;
selon lauteur, nous identifions un assujettissement symbolique ou pragmatique
(voire surtout conomique) des partis au(x) leader(s) et, dans certain cas, une
fusion complte entre les deux. Ds lors, si lItalie des dernires dcennies est
souvent lie aux avatars de Silvio Berlusconi, le volume ajoute une nouvelle
dimension: le rapport entretenu avec son parti est devenu une rfrence, presque
oblige, pour tout parti ou formation avec des ambitions politiques. Chercher le
leader afin de gagner les lections semble tre alors la devise implicite de la
Seconde Rpublique italienne, mais aussi des dmocraties contemporaines.
Dans un mouvement argumentatif tendu sur presque trois cent pages,
Bordignon propose non seulement une riche reconstruction vnementielle de la
vie politique italienne, mais aussi une perspective compare largie. Cest
dailleurs travers une analyse dtaille de la littrature compare que lauteur
se propose dinterprter le passage de la dmocratie des partis la dmocratie
de laudience2 en Italie. Afin de mieux encadrer ce passage sinueux, lauteur
construit son schma analytique sur la toile de fond de la personnalisation de la
vie politique et la diffusion de partis personnels en gnral, avec un
Mtaphore utilise par Matteo Renzi partir du verbe rottamare, littralement mettre
la casse utilise normalement en association avec la destruction des vieilles voitures
dsormais dsuets. Lactuel secrtaire gnral du Parti Dmocratique et Premier ministre
italien en a fait le slogan de sa lutte symbolique pour un renouveau du systme politique.
partir du schma interprtatif propos par Bernard MANIN, Principes du gouvernement
reprsentatif, Calmann-Lvy, Paris, 1995.
RECENSIONES
142
approfondissement au niveau du cas italien 3 . Le style de lauteur ainsi que

lquilibre entre laffinement thorique et lapprofondissement empirique
expliquent pourquoi le volume russit sadresser la fois aux spcialistes en
politique compare et un public moins attach une approche conceptuelle.
Largumentation est btie sur une hypothse qui reconsidre et largit en fait
lancienne prvision de Duverger 4 . Dans les annes 1950, le politologue
franais annonait un phnomne de contagion par la gauche: les partis de la
gauche allaient devenir des modles organisationnels imiter avec plus ou
moins de succs et de cohrence. Or, Fabio Bordignon renverse le circuit pour
affirmer que lon assiste maintenant la propagation dun modle
organisationnel (et nous ajouterions fonctionnel aussi) de parti implant sur le
versant de la droite. Il sagit dune organisation qui gravite autour du leader du
parti tel point que les frontires institutionnelles seffilochent et que sa
prennit pose problme. Cette forte dpendance du leader (qui va au-del du
systme de partis italien) sexplique la fois par des stimuli environnementaux
( savoir les nouvelles stratgies de communication, les transformations sociales
et conomiques qui entranent le dmantlement des solidarits traditionnelles
de groupe ou communautaires en faveur de la personne et de lindividu, etc.) et
des conjonctures (dont notamment lascension politique de S. Berlusconi). Cette
tendance touche la fois les partis de la Seconde Rpublique et les nouveaux
arrivs (e.g. le Mouvement Cinq toiles, M5S). Elle quivaut galement
ladoption dune rhtorique partage qui puise dans lantipolitique et le
populisme la plupart de ses lments constitutifs.
En termes chronologiques, Fabio Bordignon examine un intervalle qui va
de la chute du Mur de Berlin (qui concide avec les derniers jours de la Premire
Rpublique italienne et de son pluralisme polaris) aux dernires lections de
fvrier 2013 en passant par les diffrentes tapes (avec leurs acteurs) qui ont
cisel le fonctionnement de cette Seconde Rpublique accouche sous le signe
de la rupture (aprs Tangentopoli), avec une vie politique marque par le
bipolarisme, par son caractre spectaculaire et fortement mdiatique5 et par la
recrudescence des partis personnels.
Le volume est divis en trois grandes parties. La premire est consacre
lencadrement mthodologique. Lauteur passe en revue les principaux auteurs
qui se sont intresss lvolution des partis politiques partir du modle
sminal de Duverger jusquaux interprtations plus rcentes. Lauteur adopte
une approche constructiviste. Lauteur se focalise sur limpact de diffrents
stimuli environnementaux et de la circulation des modles (notamment par
rapport au processus dimitation organisationnelle et des styles de
3
4
5
Concept lanc par Mauro CALISE, Il partito personale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2000.
Maurice DUVERGER, Les partis politiques, Armand Colin, Paris, 1951.
Gianpietro MAZZOLENI, Anna SFARDINI, Politica pop. Da Porta a Porta a
L'isola dei famosi , Il Mulino, Bologna, 2009.
vol. XIV
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RECENSIONES
143
communication) afin de mieux cerner les dynamiques qui bouleversent les

quilibres traditionnels au niveau du systme politique. Cest notamment
travers la centralit de la personnalit des leaders dans la comptition politique
que les partis entament une reconstruction de leurs organisations. Ils
deviennent alors des vritables alter ego de leurs leaders et de leurs expriences.
Prenant appui sur la littrature, dsormais classique, construite autour des
concepts de prsidentialisation6 et de personnalisation7, lauteur souligne le rle
de plus en plus central des acteurs individuels en parallle avec un
redimensionnement des acteurs collectifs, dont notamment les partis politiques
(niveau macro). En mme temps, le citoyen sadapte ces stimuli et exige un
rapport politique bas sur la reconnaissance de ses propres spcificits
individuelles et, tout simplement, la reconnaissance de lunicit de sa personne
(niveau micro). un niveau intermdiaire, la personnalisation du leadership
politique quivaut une concentration de plus en plus forte des ressources
(politiques, conomiques ou symboliques) entre les mains dune seule personne
le nouveau Prince ou le prince dmocratique pour reprendre lexpression de
Sergio Fabbrini 8 (Ch. 1.1). La superposition complte, nous dirions mme
lassujettissement du parti au Prince/leader, engendre un parti personnel ou,
selon les repres de Calise, un parti qui nat de linitiative mme du leader au
point que sa survie semble en dpendre compltement car pour llecteur le
leader est le parti. Ce rapport fusionnel alimente un espace de manouvre sans
limites pour le leader.
Au-del de ces repres conceptuels, lauteur se penche avec minutie sur
lanalyse des diffrents stimuli qui ont accompagn ces transformations
entrecroises (ch. 1.2). Ce cheminement argumentatif dbouche sur un point qui
mrite une attention particulire: la question de lantipolitique. Cest dans cet
chafaudage multidimensionnel que rside, selon nous, la valeur ajoute de
louvrage de Bordignon. Le populisme et lantipolitique (utilis la fois dans le
sens dantilitisme et de lanti-establishment) enrichissent la panoplie des
concepts mis au service de lanalyse. Ils ont en commun un discours critique
lgard de la dmocratie reprsentative qui serait atteinte de nombreux vices.
Ds lors, le rapport direct entre le leader et le peuple offre lchappatoire,
vitant les effets pervers gnrs par les corps intermdiaires (ch. 1.4).
Cest ainsi que largumentaire dbouche sur un dbat sur la dmocratie
des leaders ou la dmocratie de laudience pour utiliser le concept de Bernard
6
Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics. A

Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005.
Ian McALLISTER, The Personalization of Politics , in Russell J. DALTON, HansDieter KLINGEMANN (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, pp. 571-88.
Sergio FABBRINI, Il principe democratico. Le leadership nelle democrazie contemporanee,
Laterza, Roma, Bari, 1999.
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2014
RECENSIONES
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Manin. La crise des dmocraties contemporaines, sensible travers la baisse de

la participation et de la prolifration de nouveaux partis-tribuns, est avant tout
une crise de la dmocratie des partis. Qui plus est, une crise des partis de masse
perus de plus en plus comme des corps spars, cest--dire isols des enjeux
rels de la socit, et dirigs par des lites autorfrentielles (ch. 1.5). Par une
sorte de retour aux origines mme de la dmocratie fonde sur le rapport de
confiance entre les citoyens et leurs reprsentants politiques, Bordignon observe
une rsurgence des notables qui rappelle (surtout dans la forme) les dynamiques
caractristiques du XIXe sicle. De nombreuses diffrences sont pourtant
visibles, dont notamment labsence dune connaissance directe (possible au
niveau local, ingrable au niveau central). Le lien personnel est cette fois-ci
consolid par lexploitation de la tlvision dans les comptitions lectorales et
dans la politique en gnral, avec des consquences notables sur la passivit de
llectorat-audience9. Plus proche de nous, linternet fournit un contexte encore
plus propice pour lexaltation de lautonomie individuelle au-del des
mdiations proposes par les partis (ch. 6). De nouveau, lon retrouve
limportance du rapport direct entre le citoyen et les leaders politiques. Le
rapport one-to-many typique des media traditionnels devient de plus en plus un
rapport many-to-many10. Que ce soient les opportunits ou les limites fournies
par linternet, Bordignon met en vidence limportance du consensus personnel
tiss par les leaders; un consensus qui va au-del des frontires de la dmocratie
reprsentative, avec ce bmol-ci: le peuple-internaute continue prouver le
besoin du visage et de la voix du leader.
La premire partie sachve avec un portrait analytique du leader
postmoderne: il sagit dun leader attrape-tout, qui valorise un discours
antipolitique au nom dun rapport direct avec les citoyens en sadressant ceuxci en tant que personnes et non plus en tant quexpressions dune entit
collective. Afin de pouvoir rendre crdible cette nouvelle tribune, les leaders se
prsentent souvent en tant quoutsiders maniant avec savoir-faire lintelligence
motive, la capacit de vision et de communication.
Fabio Bordignon nous amne ainsi avec un fil analytique clair et un style
trs communicatif sa thse centrale: la contagion par la droite, avec un accent
particulier sur lamricanisation de la politique (ch. 2). Les caractristiques des
leaders postmodernes dcrites la fin de la premire partie trouvent ainsi un
terrain dapplication dans le cas amricain. Lauteur conclut toutefois en
observant quil faudrait faire rfrence plutt des points similaires dans une
volution qui enregistre des rythmes et intensits nettement plus accentus aux
9
10
Un point de support ce propos pourrait tre la vision pessimiste de Sartori (Homo

videns. Televisione e post-pensiero, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2007) qui oppose la complexit
de la parole limage, la connaissance la simple information.
Manuel CASTELLS, Democracy in the Age of Internet , Journal of Contemporary
Culture, no. 6, 2011, pp. 96103.
vol. XIV
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2014
RECENSIONES
145
tats-Unis par rapport aux cas europens. Ces mises en garde rangent le cas
italien ct dautres dmocraties europennes innerves par un rseau
capillaire de personnalisation (notamment le cas britannique et franais).
On touche ainsi au noyau dur: le processus dimitation par les partis de la
gauche du rle jou par le leader dans les partis de droite et ce malgr les
rticences historiques des premiers lgard la personnalisation ( savoir mme
la centralisation) du pouvoir. Le Csarisme sans Csar de Gramsci en est
lincarnation, mme si Bordignon met en vidence cette tension que Bobbio
mettait en exergue lorsquil observait que lavant-garde (le parti des proltaires)
avait ncessairement besoin dune retro-garde (le leader). Limitation du modle
de la personnalisation (lanc initialement droite) oblige des contorsions
intellectuelles multiples au sein de la gauche, notamment pour ces formations
qui rclament une hrdit marxiste et/ou communiste (ch. 2.4). Dans ce
contexte, les volutions typiques au postcommunisme semblent renforcer la
solidit de sa thse. Lauteur y retrouve la diffusion de lantipolitique et limage
des partis en tant que mal-aims de la politique 11 ; lhypothse de la
personnalisation est nanmoins moins dtaille dans ce cas. Mme si le chantier
postcommuniste nest pas explor en dtail, il est propos comme une piste de
recherche intressante.
La deuxime partie dbute avec une analyse des caractristiques de la
Premire Rpublique qui ont facilit la diffusion dune personnalisation de taille.
La dernire dcennie de la Premire Rpublique permettait dj dobserver un
affaiblissement des points de rfrence traditionnels et une rosion des bases
sociales des partis, in primis la Dmocratie Chrtienne (DC) e le Parti
communiste (PCI). Cest dans ce contexte que le devant de la scne est occup
par un parti muni dune longue tradition mais qui, sous la direction de Bettino
Craxi, devient un pivot de la vie politique italienne: les socialistes (PSI).
Poursuivant une rforme institutionnelle longuement dbattue, Craxi, rappelle
Bordignon, combine une gestion centralisatrice du pouvoir avec un langage
inspir par les mdia: il devient, en bref, un des premiers prophtes de
lantipolitique en Italie12. Lapparition et le succs de la Lega Nord (LN) sont
galement interprts sous langle de la figure de Umberto Bossi, chantre dune
tradition la communaut padane quil nhsite de confectionner de toute
pice. Au-del de ces deux expriences avec des volutions divergentes, le
parlementarisme italien en tant que tel, notamment partir de la Prsidence
Cossiga et de llection directe des maires, subit une prsidentialisation progressive.
La Seconde Rpublique dbute ainsi par une personnalisation multi-niveaux.
Ladoption dun systme lectoral vocation majoritaire renforce la tendance
11
12
Daniel-Louis SEILER, Les partis politiques en Occident, Ellipses, Paris, 2003.

Alfio MASTROPAOLO, Antipolitica. Allorigine della crisi italiana, lAncora del
Mediterraneo, Napoli, 2000.
vol. XIV
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RECENSIONES
146
la personnalisation. Surtout, la mdiatisation de la politique fixe dcisivement

les rflecteurs plus sur les leaders et passe les organisations partisanes et les
institutions en ombre. Cest prcisment dans ce contexte quest propuls
lacteur politique central de la personnalisation de la vie politique italienne: iI
Cavaliere Silvio Berlusconi fait irruption dans la politique non pas au nom dun
parti mais en son propre nom, il amne dans la comptition politique son
histoire et son succs conomique, sa victoire contre la maladie et sa proximit
avec les gens ordinaires. Volens nolens, la naissance de Forza Italia (FI) et la
promotion de Silvio Berlusconi en tant quentrepreneur politique de succs les
transforment en modles imiter afin de mieux les combattre. La gauche
italienne, issue de lexplosion de lancien systme de partis, nat sous le signe
de Silvio Berlusconi, entrane dans une qute incessante et puisante dun
leader capable de mesurer ses forces avec le leader de FI. Bordignon retrace
dans le ch. 3.4 le parcours de cette qute de leaders jusquaux lections
primaires de 2007 et 2009. Ce modle inspire aussi les autres partis qui
gravitent au centre et centre-gauche avec une attention particulire accorde
Antonio Di Pietro (ancien magistrat et leader de lItalie des valeurs, IdV) et le
M5S de Beppe Grillo, le comique devenu politicien.
Devenu un vritable laboratoire pour tudier la personnalisation, lItalie
de la Seconde Rpublique permet Bordignon dapprofondir lanalyse afin
dtudier de prs le rle (et les caractristiques) de linformation tlvise ainsi
que linfluence de limage du leader au niveau du comportement lectoral (ch. 4).
ce stade, lanalyse savre particulirement minutieuse. Tout dabord lauteur
utilise la variable de la visibilit des principaux partis dans le journal tlvis de
la chaine publique (Rai 1) partir de deux indicateurs: (1) le temps total ou les
secondes ddi un sujet politique et (2) le temps de prsence ou la
participation directe de celui-ci. La tendance constate confirme la thse
dfendue par Bordignon: si, au dbut, la visibilit mdiatique du leader tait
plutt une caractristique de la droite, elle devient ensuite un lment cl pour
tous les partis. En mme temps, les donnes semblent indiquer une gestion
stratgique de limage dans le cas de Berlusconi, notamment pendant les
diffrents scandales qui ont parsem sa carrire politique. Mais au-del des
nuances, tous les partis italiens sont la recherche dune personne qui puisse
incarner leur image. Pour reprendre la terminologie de Mauro Calise, les partis
cherchent des leaders dont ils puissent devenir les reflets. Dans le contexte
apparent de la dynamique des choix lectoraux, les modles multi-variables
confirment limpact que limage des leaders a sur le comportement lectoral,
mme si leffet leader semble plus limit dans le cas de la LN et du Parti
Dmocratique (PD). Une position intermdiaire est occupe par le M5S (ch. 4.3).
La troisime partie du volume se concentre sur la reconstruction de six
leaders politiques de haut calibre: A. Di Pietro (IdV), trois leaders du PD V.
Veltroni, P. Bersani e M. Renzi, le leader de la gauche plus traditionnelle
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RECENSIONES
147
Nichi Vendola (Gauche et liberts SeL) et, enfin, le leader du M5S B. Grillo.
Le chapitre analyse les carrires politiques et dvoile les ressources discursives
qui sont utilises. Dans trois des six cas analyss (Di Pietro, Renzi et Grillo),
Bordignon retrouve le discours contre et la position doutsider (lgitim par
les attaques constantes ladresse de lestablishment et les propositions de
rforme du systme lectoral italien et du rgime politique en vue dune
proximit renforce entre le leader et la base). Le cas de Pier Luigi Bersani
prsente des particularits: son leadership dmontre une continuation avec la
tradition du PD et ses structures de masse. Ce sont dailleurs ces continuits et
les carences au niveau de la communication qui vont acclrer la faillite du
projet Bersani et favoriser l'mergence d'un leader-communicateur en rupture
avec la tradition du parti, Matteo Renzi. Cette partie descriptive sert tayer la
construction dun chafaudage conceptuel qui ramne ensemble la communication
politique (et en particulier le storytelling) et la construction du leader (6. 4)
ayant parfois comme consquences une nouvelle apprhension de la dmocratie
et, surtout, des partis (ch. 6.5). Au sortir de cette analyse riche de rfrences
empiriques et thoriques, nous pourrions dire que la thse de Bordignon
pourrait tre ainsi rsume: Craxi engendre Berlusconi, Berlusconi engendre
Renzi avec les diffrents points de passages intermdiaires. Le dfi quidentifie
Bordignon concerne le passage du parti personnel au parti des personnalits,
une fine dmarcation qui est en soi un sujet pour des recherches ultrieures.
Revenons en conclusion lchafaudage mthodologique trs solide de
largumentation propose par Bordignon. Cest grce la formation statistique
dorigine et ses recherches doctorales en sociologie des phnomnes culturels
que Fabio Bordignon manie aisment un instrumentaire conceptuel et
mthodologique complexe, quil sagisse de lopinion publique et du
comportement lectoral, de la participation politique ou du fonctionnement
dmocratique en gnral. Son schma interprtatif sadapte fort bien au cas
postcommunistes: cest dans la personne et non dans le parti que la vie politique
roumaine par exemple trouva ses repres depuis un quart de sicle. Rappelons-le,
comme Bordignon le fait constamment, le phnomne nest pas circonscrit
lItalie. La pninsule en fournit en revanche une image dEpinal: cest l quune
transmission tlvise de la chaine publique (Rai 1) Porta a porta puisse tre
parfois considre une vritable troisime Chambre du Parlement.
SORINA SOARE
vol. XIV
no. 1
2014
ABSTRACTS
RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY, A Critical Assessment of the Concept of

Europeanization in Light of the State of the Union.
This article engages with a reflexive and critical assessment of
Europeanization and addresses conceptual, methodological and empirical
issues related to the ways of knowledge in explaining and understanding
the impact of the EU. It argues that, although it has generated an
important amount of very valuable empirical research, its relevance as a
specific concept is limited in two respects. The argument of this article is
twofold. First, the conceptual debates in the Europeanization literature
lead to the conclusion that Europeanization describes a general
phenomenon of transformation and modernization, i.e a general
explanandum rather than a specific explanans. Second, methodological
biases have led many scholars to overestimate the impact of EU
integration. Whereas short-term institutional adjustment can be easily
demonstrated, the structural impact of EU integration on its Member
States deserves more attention. We address the democratization of
Central and Eastern Europe and the debt crisis in Southern Europe as two
empirical examples for discussing the shortcomings of the central
hypotheses and methodologies of the Europeanization literature.
Keywords: europeanization, methodology,
democratization, macro-economic policy.
mechanisms,
impact,
FLORIN N. FENIC, OANA I. ARMEANU, Does Education Make Voters More

Leftist or More Rightist? A West vs. East Cross-Regional Analysis.
Education is one of the most important determinants of political
preferences and voting behavior. However, the direction of this impact is
not universal. In a less developed, post-Communist polity like Romania,
education is negatively correlated with support for the left. In a postindustrial democracy like France, increased education translates into
more support for the moderate left (i.e., the post-materialist left,
Socialists and Ecologists). We explain these differences as the joint effect
ABSTRACTS
150
of recent historical experiences and the current level of economic, social

and political development of the two polities.
Keywords: voting, old politics, new politics, Romania, France.
IONU APAHIDEANU, Unicameralism versus Bicameralism Revisited. The Case

of Romania.
In the midst of a public debate over the governing majoritys project of a
Constitution revision, the present paper revisits the unicameralism versus
bicameralism debate, a classic one within the disciplinary fields of
Constitutional Law and Political Science, and explores its relevance and
applicability to Romanias current bicameral legislature. The research
starts with an empirical approach, focused on the European area, of some
theses more or less shared by field scholars regarding certain correlations
between Parliament structure and other state-related variables, while also
exploring worldwide trends, in an attempt to later on contextualize the
Romanian case in both descriptive and explicative terms. Necessarily
preconditioned by the employment of a conceptual framework meant to
capture the considerable variety of contemporary bicameral legislatures,
the subsequent debate is structured along nine major comparative analysis
criteria ideally usable as legislative performance indicators. The final part
addresses Romanias Parliament accordingly, from the historical
background of its bicameral structure, to a detailed evaluation of its
strength and weaknesses.
Keywords: unicameralism, bicameralism, Romania, Constitutional revision.
DNU-FLORIN SANDOVICI, Republicile non-arabe din Orientul Mijlociu.

Orientri geopolitice i de securitate n perioada post-Rzboiul Rece
(The Geopolitical and Security Orientations of the Non-Arab Republics
of the Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era).
Within the geopolitical system of the Middle East, the non-Arab
republics (Israel, Turkey and Iran) are a special category of regional
actors occupying an increasingly important role in the dynamics of the
area. Recent history, starting with 1991, has shown that a lot of
developments in the region were either the result of disputes of these
states with their Arab neighbors, or of events in the relations between
Arab states in which Israel, Turkey and Iran have been drawn or played a
specific role. The uprisings in the Arab world, known as the Arab
vol. XIV
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ABSTRACTS
151
Spring, that started in early 2011 have already led to an increased role of
Turkey and Iran in the geopolitical equation of the region. In this context,
already influenced by the growing visibility of Islamist nuclei, Israel has
reasonable grounds for concern, being forced to adapt its security
architecture to the possible developments in the Arab states.
Keywords: non-arab, republic, alignement, balancing, omnibalancing.
RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU, Libert, ordre et gouvernement, entre Anciens et

Modernes. Du modle politique roumain (1821-1830) (Liberty, Order
and Government between Ancient and Modern. On the Romanian
Political Model [1821-1830]).
The article examines the way Romanian political thought in the early 19th
century connected with the major trends of Western political thought.
Romanian political thought was often reluctant to adopt the mainstream
liberal ideas, forged in reaction to the French Revolution, as well as to
synchronize with the pace of political change it set. Hence, concepts like
constitutional regime, rule of law, liberty and order are to be read as
indicators of the Romanian definition of political modernity as shown by
several texts of that time. Their authors combined several themes and
concepts as sovereignty or political legitimacy in a hesitating
philosophical context, drawing a thin line between Ancient and Modern.
Keywords: political regime, democracy, modernity, ancient and
modern, liberty.
vol. XIV
no. 1
2014
AUTORES
RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU
Assistant Professor of Political Science with the University pf Bucharest
specialized in the analysis of Romanian and European 19th century
political thought. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the
University of Bucharest with a dissertation devoted to the construction
and the development of the concept of democracy in modern Romanian
political thought. She is the author of Le concept de dmocratie dans la
pense politique roumaine moderne, Editura Universitii din Bucureti,
Bucureti, 2011. (raluca.alexan@gmail.com)
IONU APAHIDEANU
PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Bucharest and
research assistant at the Centre for Political Analysis within the BabeBolyai University in Cluj-Napoca; BA (Babe-Bolyai University, 2004)
and MA (National School of Political Science and Public Administration,
Bucharest, 2006) in Political Science; managing editor of the Romanian
Journal of Society and Politics. (apahideanu@gmail.com)
OANA I. ARMEANU
Associate professor of political science in the Department of Political
Science, University of Southern Indiana, where she teaches comparative
politics, international relations, international organizations, and European,
post-communist, and Middle Eastern politics. She received her PhD. in
Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in
2005, and has an MA in Political Science from the Central European
University in Budapest, Hungary (1998). Her publications include The
Politics of Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Political
Parties, Coalitions, and Policies, Palgrave, 2010. (oiarmeanu@usi.edu)
AUTORES
154
RAMONA COMAN
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Universit libre de
Bruxelles (ULB). She is a research fellow of the Centre dtude de la vie
politique (CEVIPOL) and Deputy Director of the Centre. She received
her BA in political science from the University of Bucharest, her MA in
European politics form the Institute of European Studies-Brussels and her
MA and PhD in political science from the Universit libre de Bruxelles
(May 2008). She co-edited with Jean-Michel De Waele Judicial Reforms
in Central and Eastern Europe, Vanden Broele, 2007; with Justine
Lacroix Les resistances lEurope. Cultures nationales, idologies et
strategies dacteurs, ditions de lUniversit de Bruxelles, Bruxelles,
2007. She recently published Rformer la justice dans un pays post
communiste. Le cas de la Roumanie, ditions de lUniversit de
Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2009. (ramona.coman@ulb.ac.be)
AMANDINE CRESPY
Assistant Professor of Political Science and EU Studies at the Universit
libre de Bruxelles (ULB). She is a research fellow at the Centre dtude
de la vie politique (CEVIPOL) and at the ULB Institute for European
Studies. Over the past few years, she conducted research as a visiting
fellow at the Freie Universitt Berlin, Science Po in Paris and Harvard
University. Her research interests relate to conflicts over European
integration, especially in connection with socio-economic policies. She
has published articles in a number of French-speaking and international
journals, she is the co-editor (with M. Petithomme) of L'Europe sous
tensions, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2010, and the author of Qui a peur de
Bolkestein? Rsistances, conflit et dmocratie dans l'Union europenne,
Economica, Paris, 2012. (amandine.crespy@ulb.ac.be)
FLORIN N. FENIC
Researcher at the Center for the Study of Democracy in the Department
of Political Science, Babes-Bolyai University Cluj, Romania. His
research interests include democratization, party politics, voting behavior,
institutional design, development, and civic education. He received his
PhD from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2008, and
has an MA in Political Science from the Central European University in
Budapest, Hungary (1998). His publications include The PD-L as a
Catch-All Party, in Ronald F. King, Paul E. Sum (eds.), Romania under
Bsescu, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2011. (fesnic@democracycenter.ro)
vol. XIV
no. 1
2014
AUTORES
155
Graduated Faculty of Economic Sciences, University Alexandru Ioan
Cuza Iai and International Brevet for Public Administration at the
National Administration School, Paris, France. He is currently a PhD
Candidate at the Carol I National Defense University in Bucharest,
having as research topic the geopolitical and security of the Middle East
between the Cold War and the Arab Spring. His areas of interest are
Middle Eastern Studies, International Security and International Relations.
He published a couple of articles, in Studias Securitatis, Lucian Blaga
University of Sibiu, on the formation of the Arab states and the policies
of USA and USSR in the Middle East during the Cold War era.
(dfsandy@yahoo.com)
vol. XIV
no. 1
2014
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Romanian Political Science Review

vol. XIV, no. 1

vol. XIV, no. 1

Romanian Political Science Review

International Advisory Board

Facultatea de tiine Politice, Universitatea din Bucureti

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY, A Critical Assessment of the Concept of

IONU APAHIDEANU, Unicameralism versus Bicameralism Revisited. The Case of

DNU-FLORIN SANDOVICI, Republicile non-arabe din Orientul Mijlociu. Orientri

RALUCA ALEXANDRESCU, Libert, ordre et gouvernement, entre Anciens et Modernes.

MAURO CALISE, Fuorigioco. La sinistra contro i suoi leader, Laterza, Roma-Bari,

FABIO BORDIGNON, Il partito del capo. Da Berlusconi a Renzi, Maggioli Editore,

A Critical Assessment of the Concept

Claudio M. RADAELLI, Whiter Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

While it has brought an impressive sum of knowledge about political

Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Claudio RADAELLI, The Politics of Europeanization,

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

IN SEARCH OF A CONCEPT: UROPEANIZATION

Trine FLOCKHART, Europeanization and Eu-ization? The transfer of European Norms

Inward and Outward Looking

This outward dimension of Europeanization corresponds to the Enlightenment

Even if the recent understanding of Europeanization is no longer limited

Ulrike VON HIRSCHHAUSEN, Kiran K. PATEL, Europeanization in History: An Introduction,

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

If the previous definition refers to a diffuse source of change, the third

Transdisciplinary and Common Ontological Grounds

Claudio M. RADAELLI, Whiter Europeanization?...cit., p. 4.

IN SEARCH OF A CAUSE: RESEARCH DESIGNS

Fit or Misfit: Does it Really Matter?

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

empirical grounds27. Considering a larger number of variables, Brzel and Risse

Markus HAVERLAND, National Adaptation to European Integration: the Importance of

How to Measure to Impact of the EU?

Robert LADRECH, Europeanization cit., p. 39.

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

The Interactive Model:

Bastien IRONDELLE, Europeanization without the European Union? French Military

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

IN SEARCH OF EFFECTS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe

of EU rules implied the most massive international rule transfer in recent

We witnessed a surge of promising scholarship covering a wide area of

Frank SCHIMMELFENNIG, Ulrich SEDELMEIER, Governance by Conditionality: EU

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

the modernization/adaptation process at the domestic level. As in any functional

Heather GRABBE, European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire,

model in these fields is a reflection of the strength of national traditions across

In these cases, the EU could be an intervening variable but, according to

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

Europeanization and Socio-economic Reform

Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Georgios A. KAZAMIAS, Europeanization and the Southern

mechanisms lead to deep transformation. In this perspective, a lot of research

Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Georgios A. KAZAMIAS, Europeanization and the Southern

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

In contrast, in the Italian case, Europeanization is often depicted as a

Ibidem, pp. 200-201.

endogenous capacity of firms), time (date of entry, path dependencies) and

RAMONA COMAN, AMANDINE CRESPY

transformation was at stake but could not be attributable to the EU, or

Romanian Political Science Review

Does Education Make Voters

Fifty years ago, Lipset observed general phenomenon of democratic

FLORIN N. FENIC, OANA I. ARMEANU