T ,il ilil,1

il

(n,*Cfr WA

fi

CjeM,

crt

lA_

O'r,t.,q.trrl''-t4-

1,,

fi
X,JF:; \{{

1'

t&rrr.,e6$-.*,

:i

Two tasks remain: first, to examine

ics of an
expectations about outcomes associated with ur,u..hi. ."{g,

and the

to
examine the ways in which expectations vary as the structure of an anarchic system changes through changes in the distribution of capabilities across nations.
The second task, undertaken in Chapters 7,8, and 9, requires comparing different international systems. The first, which I now turn to, is best accomplished by
drawing some comparisons between behavior and outcomes in anarchic and hierarchic realms.

I
1.

VIOLENCE AT HOME AND ABROAD

' The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding
shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time--use-fgrgg, all states

mustbepreparedtodoso_ortl,,"uffimorevigorous

. _neighbors. Aqrong"slat-es. Ssjlelg jf nalqrqjg_g.sl#sfxar. This is meant not in

the sense that war constantly occurs but in the sense that, with each state deciding
, for itself whether or not to use force, war7pil'a])t any time break out. Whether in

'

[he family, the community, or the woif,at large, coiltlcffiiihout at least

occasional conflict is inconceivable; and the hope that in the absehce of an agent
to manage or to manipulate conflicting parties the use of force will always be
'avoided cannot be realistically entertained. .fugg**pg"n...q"s-..gryopg stqtes,
qbsence of goygrnment, is associated with the o..,r..".,.e of,

1) fhe threat

D M*o[#,naffi",,t*,,ffi f

"l"P-6fiu As?,il

Ancrrchic Orders clnd

Balcnrces of Power

ni
'., t-_,/

,I [

of violence and the recurrent use of force are said to distinguish

international from national affairs. But in the history of the world surely most
rulers have had to bear in mind that their subjects might use force to resist or

overthrow them. If the absence of government is associated with the threat of

violence, so also is its presence. A haphazard list of national tragedies illustrates
the point all too well. The most destructive wars of the hundred years following
the defeat of Napoleon took place not among states but toithin them. Estimates of
deaths in China's Taiping Rebellion, which began in 1851 and lasted 13 years,
range as high as 20 million. In the American Civil War some 600 thousand people
lost their lives. In more recent history, forced collectivization and Stalin's purges
eliminated five million Russians, and Hitler exterminated six million Jews. In
some latin American countries, coups d'rltats and rebellions have been normal
features of national life. Between 1948 and 1957, for example, 200 thousand
Colombians were lilled in civil strife. In the middle 1970s most inhabitants of Idi
Amin's Uganda rnust have felt their lives becoming nasty, brutish, and short,
quite as in Thomals Hobbes's state of nature. If such cases constitute aberrations,
they are uncomfortably common ones. We easily lose sight of the fact that
struggles to achieve and maintain power, to establish order, and to contrive a
kind of justice within states, may be bloodier than wars among them.
If anarchy is identified with chaos, destruction, and death, then the distinction between anarchy and government does not tell us much. Which is more precarious: ghe life of a state among states, or of a government in relation to its subjects? Tffi answerlvaries with time and place. Among some states at some times,
the actual or expected occurrence of violence is low. Within some states at some
times, the actual or expected occurrence of violence is high. T*,e_ggg_gLlg$e, o-r
the constant fear,ol it_s Use.g$__nql strfflelgt*sra$l&Jgljj*$ggt$inC.j$s6le and ih" u.trui,rie of force mark
;
both national and international orders, then no durable distinction between the
lwo lealm-s can be drawn in terms of the use or the nonuse of force.. No human
order is proof against violence.
To discoverlqualitative differencedtrbetween internal and external affairs one
must look for a criterion other than the occurrence of violence. The distincti
nonuqe .oJ {grce .!..ql..in ,{rei_r ,differgnt structures.. But if the dangers of being
violently attacked are greater, say, in taking an evening stroll through downtown
Detroit than they are in picnicking along the French and German border, what

of structure make? Nationally as

internationally, contact generates conflict and at times issues in violence. The difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but
in the different modes of organization for doing something about it. A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the right to use
force-that is, to apply a variety of sanctions to control the use of force by its
subjects. If some use private force, others may appeal to the government. A
government has t'ro monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effecpractical difference does the difference

G &

G 704
Gc I&B
'hapter 6

Ifu

Gr G

D Ia G

I*

Ifu,

r- ot,o,*,ou*",",*,

tive government,',however, has a Lnolrqpqly- Lr-r- \lt9 le-gitimpfe uqs*pf for-ce' and
legitimate here means that public agents are organized to prevent and to counter
the private use of force. Citi-zens nged 1o!

, is slight in comdiviEi.on

of labor within them. Integration

tg"*
2. INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRATION
realm
The political significance of interdependence varies depending on whether a
remains
or
is organized,. *itf, relations of authority specified and established,
fo.^""tty unorganized. Insqf-ar as a feq]m is fo-E3lly .gl83nizsl, ilt-glt53relEs"
me
tg-spe_cbuae, to pursue their own interests without concern tor cleveloplng
presence
the
in
.."r*-rf maintaining their identity and preserving their security
u..].u" to speciaiize because they have ng reas91j9.f9ar. l.the
iaiizatioq.'li those *ho tp"clulire
in ipecilliiaiion ensues. Goods are manu"'lo."p"iiiio"
grain is produced, law and order are maintained, commerce is confactured.

ducted, und fi.rrrr.irl services are provided by people who ever- more narrowly
specialize. ln simple economic terms, the cobbler depends on !!e tailor for his
the tailor on the cobbler for his shoes, and each would be ill-clad withpants
".,d
tut the services of the other. In simple political terms, Kansas depends on
Washington for protection and regulation and Washington depends on Kansas
for beef and wheat. In saying that in such situations interdependence is close, one
maintain that t(e o"ne part could not learn to live without the other' One
nu"a
"ot
need only say that the cost of bieaking the interdependent relation would be high.
Persons and institutions depend heavily on one another because of the different
tasks they perform and the different goods they produce and exchange. Ih"g,p"e*S*
(cf' Durkheim 1893'
of ,.poli;y--hlnd*tJa"*s

p.272).

are reflected in the

landi
ways the units of eacl
ing them. [n a115hic

interact.

ne therr

tend to

:**sh.ic. rea.Lll, "._!ltg,uLlt9.,ers*g!Jl9-:

remain to. Lik" r'r.tits work to maintain a measure of in
are urrrEtsrrlrarEu, arrs !rrL,
ullrl"b dlE
the units
realm, fne
hierarchic fealm,
autarchy. In a nlefafcnlc
for aUtafchy.
StfiVg tOf
ll"nd ,o increase the extent of their specialization. Differentiated units become
sog_rcep,ts. So as to follow the logi^^^'- I:disthroughout one's
fo.a'gir"n term .L-^--^L^..r

nations are two distinct

i#*';a-""itionio
.^r course,

"interdgpe4{ence" to

keep a single meani.rg

ation" to

defense.Whydoes,theirintegrationnottakepIace?@
politics limit-s

poltion of.itq.effort, not in

forwarding its own good, but in providing the meals qf plole-cllq& itpp.].[3".g?,l.ast
others. Specialization in a system of divided labor works to everyone's
#
iEvaniage, though not equally so. Inequality in the expected distribution of the
increased product works strongly against extension of the division of labor t" / I
'r' r i.
g41n, u\"'" 'rr
muqqaL 841n,
coope141j.ng to-!
fo1 muqqSt
internationally. W]1"^e;Lfu-q"e...{}yith."ihe,p,ossibility
internatronalty.
,of coopefel.r.n&
ryIg:_tASt-*L1y1,g5."lhgpossrbjlrty ,q!
i'lr't:1,:r,".',"
the gain will be dividedn th"y u.u comirfecure must ask how the
that feel
f";l i"E^il;;.."i1"rk
states
;ffitp9
a;il
pelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected ,, , ,l
gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other.
Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their
cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increqged capabilitls:.
Notice that the impediments to collaboration.may not lie in the gharacter and the
,

immediateintentionofeitherparty.Instead,[Wtthe
least, th
works against their cooperation.
In any self-help system,

Mr.oligopolistic-T-ar_ketslimitthecooperationoffirmsin
muifr-tte *ii ttat internatibridl-politiAfTiuctures limit the cooperation

of

states. Within rules laid down by governments, whether firms survive and
prosper depends on their own efforts. Firms need not protect themselves

tlg

eil;;;;;";;;"s

about, it seldom ;takes place. Nations could mutually enrich themselves by

further dividing not just the labor that goes into the production of goods but also
some of the other tasks they perform, such as political management and military

physically against assaults from other firms. They are free to concentrate on their
economic interests. As economic entities, however, they live in a self-help world.
All want to increase profits. If they run undue risks in the effort to do so, they
must expect to suffer the consequences. As William Fellner says, it is "impossible
to maximize foint gains without the collusive handling of all relevant variables."
And this can be apcomplished only by "complete disarmament of the firms in
relation to each o&,"r." But firms cannot ,".rribly disarm even to increase their
profits. This statefrnent qualifies, rather than contradicts, the assumption that
firms aim at maxirhum profits. To maximize profits tomorrow as well as today,
firms first have to survive. Pooling all resources implies, again as Fellner puts it,
I

'trr
I
106

ChaPter 6

Dr

Iii

--ij

-i

,,discounting the future possibilities of all participating firms" {J19a9, p,35). But
the future cinnot be discounted. The relative strength of firms changes over time
in ways that cannot be foreseen. Firms are constrained to strike a compromise
betweln maximizing their profits and minimizing the danger of their own demise.
the
Each of two firms may be better off if one of them accepts compensation from
that
firm
But
a
market.
part
the
of
some
from
withdrawing
other in return for
accepts smaller markets in exchange for larger profits will be gravely disadvantaged if, for example, a price war should break out as Part of a renewed
strugglelor markets. If possible, one must resist accepting smaller markets in

,"triiforlargerprofits (pp.L3z,z:r7-1.9)."ltip:' Fellnerinsists,"notadvisableto

disarminreIationtoone.,srivals,,(p.199)'ffiynot?Ee_.ass,s-JL":mf

"ffib.177).FeIlner,sreasoningismuchlikethe
;;";Giil;t l"d L;il1o U"li*" that capitalist countries would never be able to

.oop".uti for their mutual enrichment in one vast imperialist enterprise. Like
nati,ons, gligopolistic firms must be more concerned with relative strength than
with absolute advantage.

\\

A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favor others more
than itself . That is the first way in rvhich the structure of international politics
lirnits the cooperation of states. A state also worries lest it become dependent on
others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services' That
is the second way in which the structure of international politics limits the
cooperation of stares. Ibq-rprsa-9-k.19.!-pgf-}3l399lfu -mgl-e. it rglies on otlr.919 !-o

ng. The larger a state's

i^poit, i"a .*p".tr..tt. *o-r" it depends'o4 others. The world's well-beingI
rmport5dIrue^IfU.lt5/.tIl.cllt9!grlqEPlrluJ
would be increased if in ever more elaborate division of labor were developed,
but states would thereby place themselves in situations of ever closer interdependence. Some states -.y not resist that. For small and ill-endowed states the
coit, of doing so are excessively high. But states that can resist becoming ever
more enmeshed with others ordinarily do so in either or both of two ways. States
that are heavily dependent, or closely interdependent, worry about securing that
ln
of states means that ll1q
which they depend on.
. !

IFtr

Ilr/

Ii,

,-\'

Anarchi, Orders and Balances of Potoer

107

-[,

-/

able to

domestic imperative rs speclatlze

i.,
others in
. -,a system of divided labor- Thestates
;-_:..::--.,.
spend unproductively for their
lnternationatty, manyii-irnt"in" resources
welfare of their peoenhance
;;;;;ilr; uia ,n" opportunities they miss to yet thew1vs,3f
the
And
ple through cooperation with other states.
I

"""":lT9:

each unit's incentive is to put itgeJf --i11 a..p9,9i!i9nlo

little. In an u
r Lc
c-an.-99.--c"99"1"1"!e.s,-q"J'"-t"e. -suiu The
b"- ghls !"o,, lg-Lg-SarS"9.f..i-qe.*slt-s-in*qp-B-o^-a.a,s"-e"ls-e..
mav
nations
of
leaders
"tuk"
Some
yourself"l
care of
i"i;;;;lbdi-'ffie.ati". it
their parunderstand that the well-being of all of them would increase through
act on a
be
to
would
idea
the
on
act
to
ii.ipuri"" in a fuller division of labor. But
one
what
internationally.
run
not
does
domestic imperative, an imperative that
what
from
is
different
constraints
*igti*"", io do ln the absence of structural
presence' States do not willinely place themselve-s;,
^- ^ :^
their nrpqence
do in lhpir
^-^^rr--^^,1 r^
to ,l^
is encouraged
one

fx4\

subordinate
securitv
t'--Wi\lit"uihstite

gai! tp Political,in.tg4gs! '

i;"ri"i'iir"ii ir,-,'r,r.h like what all of the others are doing'

gc-on.or4i-q"

rheyaredeniedtheadvantae_"_:****Ig*i::g*eJkh"kP:l$::"**q:..1k:,
economic, would Provide
and unavoidable for most. Ratlcr-!
their
of thg*e-*effi' S#; io*pete' but not bv contributing
Here
o[ soods f or their mutual benefit
and economic systems'
international-political
between
is a second big difference
chapter'
next
the
of
4,
part
I,
section
one which is discussed in

;il;;;;;";;n."
i;af;iaU*li;;i;'i;ffiffi;i6luctio"

'.

ientails. Like other organizations, s!glg9- le-elj.9;9.n-t1-ol--W"h3j-l}gy

on or to lessen the gxtent of the!1 d-epen-dency. This simple thought
thrusts to widen lhe
*-flr'i.r q"ii" a bit of the behavior of states: their i
of their control and their a
ii""ttrose who do not
Structures encourage certain behaviors and
respond to the encouragement. Nationally, many lament the extreme develop*"nt of the division of labor, a development that results in the allocation of ever
narrower tasks to individuals. And yet specialization proceeds, and its extent is a
measure of the development of societies. ln a formally organized realm a

g-cope

3.

STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES

seen'
That motives and outcomes may well be disjoined should now be easily
intended to have'
not
were
they
haveconsequencei
to
iir*tuiua.uur" [.tior,s
to
u.torr will notice that, and at least some of them will be able
il;;;r;oiitg
how structures
fi*"tl .", *hv. th"y may develop a Pretty good sense of iustoriginal
ends bv
their
achieve
to
te_able
tiren
not
tfty
;il tili, "iil.r{. WiU
cannot' To
appropriately adjusting their strategies? Unfortunately' they often
,io* *6y this ls bo I stall give onlyl few examples; once the point is made, the
reader will easily think of others.
if they \
lf shortage of a commodity is expected, all are collectively better off

equito modeiate price increases and to distribute shortages

all
quickly,
tably. But because some will be better off if they lay in extra supplies
bank,
make a run on a
have a strong incentive to do so. If one expects others to

UuV

f"* oiiiinord".

i' ,L *i i"r*. than tirevdo even while Y::iY:i1'-'T:"I

ffi;-k';ill ,"","r" ,.r"ent, and if many run, it will fail. rn such

;;;;;;:.-.G"
;iil.";;;';;

that

IIil
708 Chapter 6

Il

ru

I;

themselves without alterSi3Lgoyet individuals by behaving differently will hurt

itg-outcomes. These two much used examples establish the main point. Some
courses of action I cannot sensibly follow unless you do too, and you and I cannot sensibly follow them unless we are pretty sure that many others will as well.
Let us go more deeply into the problem by considering two further examples in
some detail.
Each of many persons may choose to drive a private car rather than take a
train. Cars offer flexibility in scheduling and in choice of destination; yet at times,
in bad weather for example, railway passenger service is a much wanted convenience. Each of many persons may shop in supermarkets rather than at corner
grocery stords. The stocks of supermarkets are larger, and their prices lower; yet
at times the corner grocery store, offering, say, credit and delivery service, is a
much wanted convenience. The result of. most peo..ple"usually-"dlt-vrng"th"eif,.-o-wn
celp-.gldj_h-9p_pil-&qt sup.ermarkets iq to re{uce.papse.ngs.{.s-e-.rYice

tffi.1*fn[ir*"-f--qp"*l-"*1gJgCgry*Stgrcq. These results may not be what most people

*a"i. thev may be willing to pay to prevent services from disappearing. And yet
individuals can do nothing to affect the outcomes. Increased patronage would do
it, but not increased patronage by me and the few others I might Persuade to folIow my example.
We may well notice that our behavior produces unwanted otrtcomes, but we
are also likely to see that such instances as these are examples of what Alfred E.

Kahn describes as "large".change*haLarc!rcugblabg_gJly_*LgSSgglg f

"small" decisions. In such situations people are victims of the "tyranny of small
and this causes the market to make decision X (where
consumers woulct have

that large decision had ever,..bee1p;ire""#f[5, giieireipiic.lispniidsiation" (Kahn

T966, p.523). If the market does not present the large question for decision, then
individuals are doomed to making decisions that are sensible within their narrow

Either that or they

ts of the market by changing its structure-for example, by bringing consumer units roughly up to the size of the units
that are making producers'decisions. This nicely makes the point: So long as one
leaves the structure unaffected

it ip.n"o*t'ngpsihlelgr-shaneesjnjhe-iet.entipg*aed

of
may be changed, as just mentioned, by
across units. Structures may also be
previously people had to decide for themselves. If
dffi;H;iamnii-self on Sunday, others may have to do so in order to remain
competitive even though most prefer a six-day week. Most are able to do as they

I{

Iw

please only

I,

if all are required to keep

Ii

709

A.\

comparable hours. The-o-dy remedielfor

ri'

wished away, although many fail to understand this. In every age and place, the units of self-help systems-nations, corporations, or whaiever-are told that the greater good, along with their own,
iequires them to act for the sake of the system and not for their own narrowly
defined advantage. In the 1950s, as fear of the world's destruction in nuclear war
grew, some .on.lrldud that the alternative to world destruction was world dis-

irmament. In the L97Os, with the rapid growth of population, poverty, and
pollution, some cdncluded, as one political scientist put it, that "states must meet

ihe ,,"ed, of the political ecosystem in its global dimensions or court annihilation"
(Sterling 1974, p.i 336). The international interest must be served; and if that
means inything-ai all, it means that national interests are subordinate to it. The
problems are found at the global level.-solutions to the problems continue to

i"p"nd on nationhl policies.

are qo-o-!t91-lg!4-ol1!y,ryt?
so often laid on them? How
injunctions that qre
tlie-iniunctions
obgy the
willirrg to obev
or less r,villifns
more
-^ro ^"
for
acting {9r
pursuing
interests and aclfng
own
their
pursglng
;-".-if."',.o..1."
th-"
tension
between
b"!*""n
;;'Orf,;r-o;-sltte.thste.1t-io*.,
their 9w1 !1!91e9-19

of the systery? No one his shownho* that can be done, although manywring theii hu.,i, h.J plead for rational behavior. The very problem, however, is

tli;"[

k-r

, no one can

country

A stro.,g sense of peril and doom may lead to a clear definition of ends that
must be ach[ved, Their achievement is not thereby made possible. The possibility of effective aption depends on the ability to provide necessary means. It
depend, Even more so on the existence of conditions that permit nations and
other organizations to follow appropriate policies and strategies' World-shaking
problems cry for global solutions, but there is no global agency to provide them'
Wishins that final causes were ef f icient

Ng9gltlqg{g-lqtggA3-i9pfbil*iee.
Jnes doii not make them so.

That

onl

is 'i)'-

*nf

rtut"r, and especially the rnaior ones, are called on to do what is necessary
for the world's survival. But states have to do whatever they think necessary for
their own preservation, since no one can be relied on to do it for them. Why, thil
advice to place the international interest above national interests is meaningless f
.;" U;;6i"in"a pr".ii"iy in terms of the distinction between micro- and macro'Put differently,

st4tes face a

worse
examinat

If each of two parties follows his own

achiere ioint interests. For thorough

lnJOi"ri"g

gestive international applications, see Jervis, January 1978'

7977; tor brief and sug-

m
,

-t
gt *-1tC4!',''10

IIJIIIi
710 Chapter 6

Ir

Is

I
I

't d'-'.'
.., ,i ':.o . . r A , 1t , ', .' ."'"
trr.,ntrl 8..
t"

Ifl

J'

UnlE:

Amongpahrliggl
thgg.,ef Among economists- the distinction is well understood.
scii.,tists it is no1. As I have

"*ptui""a,

a microeconomic the:Iry*is q

tBtry.9f
t

the
l he theory
the market

I;InII'-+rr
Bolon"t of Poruer 111

tit-,i i, OiGand

,,tyranny of small hecisions.,, states, like consumers, can get out of the trap only
bears repeating:
Iffiffin*sins tf," r$rr.i"t"* their field of activity' The message
structural.n"l:?'
is
a
.;i";"r;;;;;dy f". strons structural effect

"

and how the market in turn affects them. A m

lncome

ffiggregates

are interconnected and

and the performance
others
affect
of
them
or
some
one
in
iffi."t", how changes
deal with large
macrotheories
and
microboth
of the economy. ln economics,
the obiects of
of
the
size
not
in
is
found
them
between
realms. The difference
8ates.

study, but in the way the objects of study are approached and the theory to
them is constructed. {nggfg!-bgqry of internqtio.rlal pelitiqs Wo$ibgy
"*plrin
how the international systeri-lJ*mo"ea U;-:rrr,"r"-wide aggregates;. One can
r, amount of world
ffi"efi";nut some of them might be-amount of wor
ndine, and of
imports a"4SIpoIll, of dealhs in war, of everybody's
macroeconomic
a
like
look
something
would
theory
The
exa*ple.
mffio[i,f6r
tffi*in the style of John Maynard Keynes, although it is hard to see how the
international aggregates would make much sense and how changes in one or
some of them would produce changes in others. I am not saying that such a
point, anlrway, is that a macrotheorv of inlgfthelry^^t;ri"Ll*^i,ld lacL the nractical imolications of macioeconomic

that_"1rlight b.e.g-sefql-. The decisive

;;;'^^j

\cis-s.-,w*hJo.,gP-3:3-bk"i3Pq-b.!Ii.!*"1."-elslEleJnll'snauv'
'

u;;fit

who wouro act on

tne

iffiT;m;ffifr i6&-5f i " t"rn a t i onal politics migh t

p oiiiffi l6';f-;a j
reveal? Even were such a theory available, we would still be stuck with nations as
the only agents capable of acting to solve global problems. We would still have to
revert to a micropolitical approach in order to examine the conditions that make
benign and effective action by states separately and collectively more or less
likely.
some have hoped that changes in the awareness and purpose, in the organization and ideology, of states would change the quality of international life.
Over the centuries states have changed in many ways, but the quality of international life has remained much the same. States may seek reasonable and worthy
ends, but they cannot figure out how to reach them. The problem is not in their
stupidity or ill will, although one does not want to claim that those qualities are
Iaciing. The depth of the difficulty is not understood until one realizes that
intelligence and toodwill cannot discover and act on adequate Programs. Early in
this century Winston Churchill observed that the British-German naval race
promised disaster and that Britain had no realistic choice other than to run it'
3tates facing- -e.!-s-ba! p-r*lgn' e$ Ji!.g-'"{iyigl"l--9-919}S9ry trapp--"d*by*!t'u

;";r;;;;i*

of
Ioi".,*es and m"i,Ttrtheir securitv, units in a condition
on the

or whatever-must rely
anarchy-be they people, corporations' states'
they can make for themselves'
means they can g".t.,"t" andlhe arrangements
A self-help
Self-help i, neessariLv-itr:r,lstpl9-9*Ggrr-g14a-anar'c-hk ,,n'Tq.u{' oT war
ind
the conomiciealni

l,ffiffitcy"in

"*..rJ"rr.""ffi@L

in-

an economy or within an international order

subordination,
*r"i"g rr"* a situation of coordinate action to one of super- and

and extending a system of

that is, by erecting ug"".iu, with effective authority
where the functions of regulation and management
rules. Government ;;;;;
maintaining a hier-

tasks. The costs of

themselves become d;,i;'.;;; specialized
who deplore its absence' -Q-'rsgllz'3-those
by
archic order are f."q";;t ig"o."a
ion" u.,a to mqlnfail thgm-s-elv-el qs
something
tions have at least ,*_""ai*e,i;get

jf

;;;;=tr"fli,=n;5***-"Ltheiraclivrtie-s-aredir"itg{t-owa4dthesecondpurpqsq
TKdleadersoforganizati.*,""apoliticalleaderspreeminently,arenotmasters
have becom" 1"19"rc,,Y^br,,,,',u',
of the matters tt"i. o-ie*u;r;tio-ns'a"l with. They
arts-' r' , .
excelling in the organizational
being experts on one thing or another but by

inmaintainingcontrolofagroup,smembers,inelicitingpredictableandsatisfac-i.
political decisions,
in holding a sroup together. tn making

;;;;;;;;;h;*,

of an
concern is not tJ achieve the aims the members
health of the organization
.rg""irrii.. ,nuyittu','. but to secure the continuityppand262-70)
1967
'
Downs
'
itself (cf . Diesing \962, pp ' 198-204;
'

if,Jft.ri""J*ortiirnpo.tant

Alongwiththeud^,uotug",ofhierarchico,d."''gothecosts.lnhierarchic
substantive

o.a"r, *Ir"over;

the means

;r"* ffi;;;{;t;J;th

If .o,t.ol become an object of struggle.

The
efforts to influence or control the controllers'

hierarchicorderihgofpoliticsaddsonetothealreadynumerousobjectsof
the liiect uaa"a is at a new order of magnitude'
"'^-?iit
""a
"*rri", ti't' of *u' ute un[$5ab-lv*bls]t-l3l they bs:gds't-ed b-v-erg-aJllzjlg.lg

*Uffi
i#trdryffi.A"tffi;*

fiil'*"r",

management requires controlling

iiihe dirposal of states. within nations, organizations

nations, in working to
have to work to *uirr,uin themselvls. As organizations,
against dissident elements and
maintain themselves, sometimes have to ur" io..u
nationally or globally are disrupted
areas. As hierarchical systems, governments

with little coherence'

by the defectionloi *u;ot parls' h-a society of states- of an emerging ceninability
the
on
*.rid gor"rr,*"nt would founder
"ir"*o,r-",

4lf'cnoil!|i'

-i

rr1 c

-i

tral authority to mobilize the resources needed to create and maintain the unity of

llq gtggge*ql qt.Yvilld3gygg,gtgnt$suld-be*aunutallo-uto prepsre.for world ciyiljtal. This calls to mind

Milovan Djilas's reminiscence of World War II. Accoiding to him, he and many
Russian soldiers in their wartime discussions came to believe that human
struggles would acquire their ultimate bitterness if all men were subject to the
same social system, "for the system would be untenable as such and various sects
would undertake the reckless destruction of the human race for the sake of its
greater trappiness' " (7962, p. 50). S-t"a!gc S"3ll_ol-9"!t.{qq-t-Eq"nage;ial. psw*eJs^J.gg
the system by regulating and managing its parts.

,lt:$

'

!""t."1 1s.g.tqy-.er$9.:-s- !hg,t qcs.n.y- is a![q,1r.-plplgs-! i!.:-"qlisr-t.:!s.tsr'*T-9*:Igre

glre mor.e-lhg pgryer of qa9_h
J pofiiffi.the clients in!9_f.!hg4.lppears as a threat to
in
the-CCnt6i
*riri 6". rnS gi:g,1ei-.F
greate.
ih;
otherr,
the
Iihe
for
siites
to eiigis; i" iilriigeielb
the
incentive
po*".
the
stronger
of
the
ceriter,
fi

;";;;dg"*a

i,'control it.

States, like people,_ar,e rnlg9gle-U-p-rp2grltiaglo-Lh-e e$qlt of their freedom.

freeclom is wanted,!n99-iu1-t1y'must-be accepted. Organiiations that esta6iish
."turio.r-9 of u.itInri,
, d-68-If might does iidFffir[e;At, whether among people or states, then soile
iilstitution or agency has intervened to lift them out of nature's realm. The more
influential the agency, the stronger the desire to control it becomes. In contrast,
units in an anarchic order act for their own sakes and not for the sake of preserving an organization and furthering their fortunes within it. Force is used for one's

If

own interest

t@lz?li-9;11

p*g9p-lg_-.-_l-:!?.tq311fi_eg !9.-le?_v--e*o-I-e*,-.

not do so, they aie beiieiable, in the absence

politics
of the
of the organization, to concentrate on the politics of the problem
and to aim for a_Ainr_**qn_?Ft9_9l*S*l*!h?l*Wjll-pS-rl"-tL.tki; .p.9pgl".t.e-,9[i9f.9nse
lqth"rt{,.5.affi;*a&dm"ert*6;ffik;-ef-mernter*i*g*9njtv.If mightdeildJJ,-the" bloody struggles over right can more easily be-ivoiiffi'*-

3l"p,l"hg-r"-glq+e.. Even when they do

Nationally, the force of a government is exercised in the name of right and

justice. Internationally, the force of a state is employed for the sake of its own
protection and advantage. Rebels challenge a government's claim to authority;
they question the rightfulness of its rule.
jio-ns of authority an{-gsl,1; $_e-y*."911 glrly d_9te;miry-gh--e-e[o*c.e$9[-glsgm*aasl
Iosggs--111ong gqn!,g1dere and.-settle"fo,r,a tirn-e*tbs-.Cg._e-tti9j.-oJ ,y_tl_oJs*lh5k*gef .
Nationally, lre'lations gtggth"{Mare established. Internationally, onlyfiSlgtjg1s._d*f"le$ffiiilETfationally, private force used against a government threatens
the political system. Force used by a state-a public body-is, from the international perspective, the private use of force; but there is no government to overthrow and no governmental apparatus to capture. Short of a drive toward world
hegemony, the private use of force does not threaten the system of international
politics, only some of its members. War pits some states against others in a

-l

#^ror;8E*o#**#,4#

deter
struggle among similarly constituted entities. The power of the strong may
of
kind
a
recognize
weak
the
because
not
the weak from assertini their claims,
sensible
not
it
is
because
simply
but
strong,
part
of
the
rightfulness of rule on tl'ru
tJtangle with them. Conversely, the weak may enioy considerable freedom of
lataction if they are so far removed in their capabilities from the strong that the
marginal
by
concerned
much
or
actions
their
by
ter are not much bothered
increases in their capabilities.

National. p.9"lltics,i:the realm of eglLgli!J-,-p-f*edrplsls-trat-i.p-R..?$d.9f l3y

Interfifti6nal p.fiti.t it tn" realm gfp"-tYgr. of stry-ggle-, qnd.q-f qccommodation'
-i'

it'" "" i i onui i"ul*

p
t i."r
""".
"ti
"'vertical,
heterogeneous,
centralized,
hierarchic,
being
as
variouslv describbd
horizontal,
anarchic,
being
as
realm,
the
international
directed, u"a 4ffiihl
more cen- 1
Theadaptive.
mutually
and
undirected,
decentralized, h;fiffieous,
Internaascends'
of
decisions
locus
the
top
to
the
nearer
the
tralized the orderl
il
tttl;fr
g
celv
scar
bein
there
t, e4ellL- de giq
nel*te*-ls/Sl,
" "{ "f"ig*e-*-f
prone
the
assume
structures
international
ffia*r;
position. Adiustments are made internation-4!1v...-h*lkxj*g:l**gWjkglglgL
*ut o, u" ti'otTallffiTiiiIffiii ^ A?icqEgelt--ad accomqodati on proceed bv

tilt imru5";ffi4iil'i; ;.1;;i;;';iiv

"

*;k;i#;#

Action and reaction, and reaction to the reaction, proceed by a piecemeal pro."g.-ifr" parties feei each other out, so to speak, and define a situation simuliu""o"rfy *ith itsidevelopment. Among coordinate units, adiustment is achieved
;;J;.;;r"*odations urrir"d at by the exchange of "considerations," in a condito
tion, as chester Bprnard put it, "in which the duty of command and the desire
consideraoU"U ur" essentiaily absmt" (pp. 150-51). Where the contest is over
by
maneuvering,
by
positions
their
improve
or
parti",
maintain
to
io"r,in"
{""t
deteris
Uu.gui"i"g, or bylfighti.,g. The manner and intensity of the competition
*irl"d bvih" d"rif"r-und the abilities of parties that are at once separate and inter-

*@l@dl

actins.

fuhether o. ,iot by force, each state plots the course it thinks will best serve
of
its interests. If force is used by one state or its use is expected, the recourse
No
other states is to use force or be prepared to use it singly or in combination'

that force will be used

(quoted in Johnson 1966, p. 13).

as a threat in

r_- Ir
ll
114 Lhapter

tchic Gti orFtkirn,Q;i,n, Jli::

social types according to the

4nV not, then, define additional
mixture of o.guhirir,g principles they embody? One might conceive of some
I

settlement of disputes. One who knows that pressing too hard may lead to war

lesser degre".

ffinsiderwhetherpossible8ainsareworththerisksentailed'

the purelv hier;;;ili; upp.Judhir,e-the purely unurihi., of others approaching

organizational
two
the
of
mixes
;;;il;. ;;:f of s,till [tn"rr reflLcting specified
of relations

The threat of force internationally is comparable to the role of the strike in labor
and management bargaining. "The few strikes that take place are in a sense," as
Livernash has said, "the cost of the strike option which produces settlements in
the large mass of negotiations" (1963, p. a30). Even if workers seldom strike,
their dJing so is always a possibility. The possibility of industrial disputes leading
to long and costly strikes encourages labor and management to face difficult
issues, to try to understand each other's problems, and to work hard to find
accommodaiions. The possibility that conflicts among nations may lead to long
and costly wars has similarly sobering effects.

5.

ANARCHY AND HIERARCHY

I have described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were of
one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of
,t.uci,.r.es allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types.
Anarchy is seen as one end of a continuum whose other end is marked by the
p."run." of a legitimate and competent government. International politics is then
iescrlbed as being ilecked with particles of government and alloyed with ele-

ments of community-supranational organizations whether universal or regional, alliances, multinational corporations, networks of trade, and what not.
systems are thought of as being more or less anarchic.
I international-political
-' Those who view the world as a modified anarchy do so, it seems, for two
reasons. First, anarchy is taken to mean not just the absence of government but
also the presence of disorder and chaos. Since world politics, although not
reliably peaceful. falls short of unrelieved chaos, students are inclined to see a
lesseping of anarchy in each oulbleak of peace. Si.tce @

on s an d rdet
t
14g aml_eg.tEalJ lvllbqta
Emgifl
Brg$3t+l"r,
itudents are inclinef6ffi; l#";i"s ;fffi.hr;fr6h*IfiiffiE6; form, when
i

I !

'\

s t

itu ti

transactions across national borders increase, and when international agencies

multiply. f,Sulh_-_views confuse strqclure w!th process[ and I have drawn attention
to that er6i6ften enough.
- Second, the two simple categories of anarchy and hierarchy do not seem to
accommodate the infinite social variety our senses record. Why insist on reducing
the types of structure to two instead of allowing for a greater variety? Anarcl$
are ordered by the juxtaposition of similar units, but those similar units are not
identical. Some specialization by function develops among them. Hierarchies are
ordered by the social divisi-on of labor among units specializing in different tasks,
but the ."r"f,EiliI7iili*[r does not vanish. Much duplication of effort continues. All societies are organized segmentally or hierarchically in greater or

i"""r.'fi

ur,"..hl", the exact likeness of units and the determination

U'"'.."uUitirr d[n" would describe a realm wholly of politics and power with
and conditioned by
;;;;i the intJraction of units guided by administration
parts
and the full specof
differentiation
ln hidrarchies the complete
""in.rirr.
o[ authority and
wholly
realm
a
produce
ifi.urion" of theip functions *orld
by politics and
parts
affected
of
interaction
the
.d*inirt."tion iuitt none of
realms by their
to
distinguish
exist,
not
do
fo*".. Although such pure orders

treanizins principles is nevertheless Proper and important'

" 1.r.."-uri.,g tiie number of catego-ries would bring the classification of societi-es-.1' )i
V\o't;'l,
closer to."ulitt. But that would be to mo-yg-31y?y-lrg-!g3^th99-ry-.claiming '.i
,o,jr". to ?*1.:si tli""rltieei*gvrje*-pro*iring greater desciiptiye

";;1";".*One who wishHilo*effi5-r

moving

1411[gf!bgr]lgl sgihe should resist

Is it? What does one gain by insisting
still be to simplify boldly? one
would
four
or
three
on two types when admitting
should be introduced only
concept
A
new
oiconcepts.
gains claiity and economy
If
some societies are neither
reach.
not
do
concepts
io .or". *itt"r, that existing
by some third ordering
defined
are
structures
their
if
anarchic nor hierarchic,
.{ll societies are mixed'
system'.
third
a
define
to
have
principle, then we would
prinSip"lss'
o1{g|ng
qf.-1h9
Th+!--dgg!-!9!- n
ilu*".tt, in them represent -b.gth.
one can
that liiri*e iocieties are ordered aiiordlng_lg_a_lhg$*nfitrSin-le. Usually
frftfr;t*ieit is ordered' The appearance of
ur,u..hi. sectors within hierarchies does not alter and should not obscure the
within
oiauring principle of the larger system, for those sectors are anarchic only
within
those
sectors
populating
units
the
of
behavior
and
limits. ihe attiibutes
they
how
be
and
would
they
what
from
moreover,
differ,
,t* trrg"r system
perfect
examare
again
markets
oligopolistic
in
it.
Firms
of
outside
would f,uhur.
prepare
ples of this. They struggle against one another, but because they need not
io defend themselves physically, they can afford to specialize and to participate
states
more fully in the division of economic labor than states can. Nor do the
to
another.
one
with
to
work
impossible
it
find
world
that populate aq anarchic
limiting their arms, and to cooPerate in establishing organiza,n"k"
the
"iruu*enits
tions. liierarchilc elemenls within international structures limit and restrain

"..,rru.y.
in iiiit<lirectioniif

resistance iffii6iuUl".

ffilidaryandmechanicalsocietiesstillprovidesthebest
to
pii""ipl"s, and his logic in limiting.the tvpes of societv(see
.;;i;;f,"";i;iittu";;;;i"i
it
overthrow
to
criiics
,;};'[[;;iffii;;p;i"ih; efforts of iis many
;#;ft;
;; il;31.i;i;i1fuil;;ii. pioblui" at some length in a future work'

r-'

Tlf,Chafrie7

I trrc

rr=

MlorT,rrc

ffiandVilfrrc* olQdf,", ll7*

i
I
I

of
exercise of sovereignty but only in ways strongly conditioned by the anarchy
the larger system. The anarchy of that order strongly affects the likelihood of
.oop".Itior,, the extent of arms agreements, and the iurisdiction of international
organizations.
r- But what about borderline cases, societies that are neither clearly anarchic
' nor clearly hierarchic? Do they not represent a. third type? To say that there are
borderline cases is not to say that at the border a third type of system appears' All
categories have borders, and if we have any categories at all, we have borderline
,.ur"l. Clarity of concepts does not eliminate difficulties of classification. Was
J-Chi.r" f.om the 1920s to the 1940s a hierarchic or an anarchic realm? Nominally a
nation, China looked more like a number of separate states existing alongside one
another. Mao Tse-tung in 1930, like Bolshevik leaders earlier, thought that strik-

ing a revolutionary spark would "start a prairie fire." Revolutionary flames

wJuld spread across thinu, if not throughout the world. Because the interdependence of China's provinces, like the interdependence of nations, was
insufficiently close, the hu*u, failed to spread. So nearly autonomous wbre
China's p.ori.r.u, that the effects of war in one part of the country were only
weakly registered in other parts. Battles in the Hunan hills, far from sparking a
national revolution, were hardly noticed in neighboring provinces. The interaction of largely self-sufficient provinces was slight and sporadic. Dependent
neither o., orr" another economiially nor on the nation's center politically, they
were not subiect to the close interdependence characteristic of organized and
integrated polities.

As a jractical matter, observers may disagree in their answrs to such questions as lust when did China break down into anarchy, or whether the countries
of Western Europe are slowly becoming one state or stubbornly remaining nine.
The point of theoretical imiortance is that our expectations about the fate of
those areas differ widely depending on which Lnswer to the structural question
becomes the right one- Structures defined according to two distinct ordering
principles help t explain important aspects of social and political behavior. That
i, iho*.r in various ways in the following pages. T\!s seqtlgn hap qxplained why
and only two, types of structure are needed to cover societies of all sorts.

lwo,

II -"-.,trwau *.{'}ifl:rr'\q*,fu,; ,l, " ;i!'i;:

How can a theory of international politics be constructed? Iust as any theory

must be. As Chapters 1 and 4 explain, first, one must conceive of !!.lernational
some,[w{ire
,"ri"* "r;ua;i"a i""l- did#ai6 siiond, onc mu-st-C.,xg""t exnlaini$1!!
a-*ai
develop
must
igularities wirhin it; and third, oni
"f
ob"served regularities. The first of these was accomplisliedi'irchapter 5. ChtpteiS
so far hab showii how political structures account for some recurrent aspects of

patterns. Wherever
the behavior of sfates and for certain repeated and enduring

are coupled by iorce and competition rather than by

are
"e"ri.i",
f"[, we expect to find such behaviors and outcomes. They
""a
rubric'
the
bv
"iii.r.r,,
suggested
.f"r"i, fa""tifiet'with tire ap-p-1gg!--p Rolitics

;;;;i

iealpotitik. Theielementr of [ifid?mff exhaustively listed, are these:

The
the spring of action;-the necessities

i"6.""lffi"ides
"n
-will -rtltes;,c4{Yliil}r{f,"i"a
""."r"f.i;ii"*r",ieimrof
6est servE]TtIiiflS interests;
these necessities can discover the policies that

.ulei,s, and later the state's,

of policy arise from ,i"

is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as p.t-gigryl$gind

strengthenins the state. Ever since M"chiI"elii, iSfgt*el,-11d necessity--and
;;;'.1";;';;i] ,-i; rilte that comprehends them-f,ave remained-iEa ry:-*lthe
cepts of ReaiJpolitik. From Machiavelli through MeineikeTridMoigeirthau
stands
Machiavelli
constant.
remain
reasoning
the
affiAf;i-ih"aiifi.ou.h and
thinking that he
so clearly as the expon ent of Realpolitlk that one easily slips into
Although he
well.
as
power
of
balance
of
idea
developed the closely associated
established
terms
its
own
in
be
explained
can
politics
did not, his conviction that
success

in the persons and..states who use them'

to explail. the restilt that such methods
purports
nulr.,."-of-power theory
th"o'v
ihu
is-what
;it-gg9" Rather,ithat
'h:ul9 -'l lll:,'^':1"d,':t'l:Y:Y
theory is it. And vet
qi r"i"^"r"nal politics, balance-of-power
,i"",,
X;liftaj
'""".u""", find i statement of the theory that is generallyaccepted' Carefully

repeatedly used idespite differences

balance-of-power iiterature, Ernstrkl@s discovered eight

term, and Martinffifiht found:ri'n{(rsss' rsoo)' Hans
the
air,i"., i"uringi of
alalvtic tid;tmen1, tT
in ps pioround
1ri.::1":1
-historn"l
Balance of power is seen !v t3m"
defloitigp
Os73).
aiiruru"t
ro.,[
'ndmfr;
it as
view
tot'.L-.*'of
.ra" to
'6ii-o-ttters, as simply an outrage' Some
u"i"* akin
as being

;;;;;;i;;;h" *[rr"r

@;tm",;"=d;;t*

1*

p:li:t:t:
"t
a guide to states{nen; others as a cloak that disguises their imperialist
il;;"i;;;,i"i-" u"r"".e of power is the best guarantee of the security of states

of the
,f," peace of the world; others, that it has ruined states by causing most
wars they have fqught.*
I
To Leteve tfral one can cut through such confusion may seem quixotic.
propositions about
shall nevertheless try. It will help to hark back to several basic
Such assumpassumption.
theoretical
one
(1)
least
ai
A theory contains
rheorv.
are true, but
they
if
ask
legitimately
cannot
therefore
one
;;;;;;;;"t factui.

*J

*Along with the

the
<plication of balance-of-power theory in the pages that follow'

rtuayof balance-of-power politics in practice. The

reader may wish t J."r"f ,
"'f,ir,ori.ui
t (1973).
best brief work is'

IJ

I;

!I;cl,Eu

I-i

Lil

Ij

Ij

I,

I-

L*p1g11,

reatig-1193! Ie" g1ll_e-g1hlge .o1 m9J9--pl-4y9rs..and-!1 is usually said that balance-ofpower systems require at least that number. The statement is false, foltn*e!fgp.*
power system the politics of_lqlan-c-g c-o.ntinue, but the rt?yl-9-gg-Itpqlra-tglglg!
inStgigll external disequilibrium is prima.,ty._b.y- iUte-nsrfyjng-.-one-s*-inte,rnal
efforts. To th-e dssumijtions of-the theoiy we then add the condition for its operatlon, tn"t two or more states coexist in a self-help system, one with no superior
agent to come to the aid of states that may be weakening or to deny to any of
them the use of whatever instruments they think will serve their purposes. The
theory, then, is built up from the assumed motivations of states and the actions
that correspond to them. It describes the constraints that arise from the system
that those actions produce, and it indicates the expected outcome: namely, the

formation

of

balances

of power. Balance-of-power theorv is

microtheorv

The
actions
assumptions
r
.
A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who
do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to
dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to
behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power. Notice that
ires no assumptions of
says simply that if some do relatively well,
others will emulate
or fall by the wayside. Obviously, the system won't
work if all states lose interest in preserving themselves. It will, however, continue
to work if some states do, while others do not, choose to lose their political
identities, say, through amalgamation. Nor need it be assumed that all of the
competing states are striving relentlessly to increase their power. The possibility

I;

IJ

Iil

I;,r

fl;

E:]

Anarchic Orders and Balances of Potoer

119

that force may be used by some states to weaken or destroy others does, however, make it difficult for them to break out of the competitive system.

only if they are useful. (2) Theories must be evaluated in terms of what they claim

Balance-of-powa;*ihaory-tffi;;' fo-?i6liin'1ht"iaCril6"df lditJs'

1o
lctioni, under given conditions, and those results may not be foreshadowed in
any of the actors' motives or be contained as objectives in their policies.
(3) Theory, a-q a.ggleral glphn_?t9ry.:yjteln, c$.ngt
particularities.
3ccount for
*Most
of the confusions in balance-of-power theory, and criticisms of it,
4, derive from misunderstanding these three points. A balance-of-power theory,
properly stated, begins with asupliqn:jhggl:lalgs: They ge unitary actors
rnaiifrffi;dfiv?Tor
who, at a minimum, teek theii-to@-a
those
who
act
for
try in more oi"iiss"or
thiem,
States,
universal" dq11,imyq
sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view.
Those means fall into two categories: intemal efforts (moves to increase
economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies)
and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to
weaken and shrink an opposing one). The external gamq pf.-aligfqm.-en!, en-C-

I,

I-

II

Ii

t!
o[.

lllportance of the theory are made clear by examining

rof it. Recall our first proposition about theory. A
ih"o.y c"rGifr'{iffiffions that are theoretical, not factual. One of the most
common misunderstandings of balance-of-power theory centers on this point.
The theory is ciiticized because its assumptions are erroneous. The following
prevalent

statement can stqnd for a host of others:

1

If nations w{re in fact unchanging units with no permanent ties to each other,
and if all we{e motivated primarily by a drive to maximize their power, except
for a single blalancer whose aim was to prevent any nation from achieving preponderant p{wer, a balance of power might in fact result. But we have seen that
these assumfltions are not correct, and since the assumptions of the theory are
wrong, the clnclusions are also in error (Organski 1968, p. 292).
I

The author's incldental error is that he has compounded a sentence some parts of
which are loosely stated assumptions of the theory, and other parts not. His basic
error lies in misunderstanding what an assumption is. From previous discussion,
fi
we know that as$umptionsglgEejthertrueaoLfalre and that they are essential for P
the construction lof theory. We can freely admit that states are in fact not unitary,
purposive actors,. States pursue many goals, which are often vaguely formulated
and inconsistentl They fluctuate with the changing currents of domestic politics,
are prey to the vagaries of a shifting cast of political leaders, and are influenced
by the outcomes;of bureaucratib struggles. But all of this has always been known,
and it tells us noqhing about the merits of balance-of-power theory.
A further conrfusion relates to our second proposition about theory. Ealance.of-p_--orryer t.hg".V.:qlginl.!g-SryIain ? te.gult (the recurrenq form3lion of balanc"es.of '
the unrls
units lyh.qqe
of tne
inlenti.ons or
of any ot
with tne
the lnlenllQns
power),
wnlcn may not iicord
accoro wltn
lyll.qle
ii"*er),"*filch-rliiy-not
actions combine to produce that result. To contrive and maintain a balance may
be the aim of ond or more states, but then again it may not be. According to the
theorv.
L.
-/abalances of power tend to form whether some or all states consciously L.'\
!

"i;t;;'

et many,

:l

nce
the separate states as a

power t
attribute the maintenance of a balance to
motive. David Hume, in his classic essay "Of the Balance of Power," offers "the
maxim of preserving the balance of power" as a constant rule of prudent politics
(tZ+2, pp.742-44). So it may be, but it has proved to be an unfortunately short
"Looking at states pver a wide span o[ time and space, Dowty concludes that in no case
were shifts in allidnces produced 'ty considerations of an overall balance of power"
(1e69, p. es).

Ir8

I
I
120 Chapter 6

-J

IS

-E'

WW
d.7

ltrji

r,1l

It

I.rl
121

i
"an orderliness abstracted from behaviour cannot guide behaviour" (Nadel 1957,
p . 148; cf . Durklrleim 1893, pp . 366, 418; Shubik 1"959, pp ' 17, 32) '
Analytic redsoning apltied where a systems approach is needed leads to the
laying down of dl s"rts oi ionditions as prerequisites to balances of power form-

toward equilibrium and as general preconditions of world

stiUility and pelce. Some require that the number of great powers exceed two;
others thut u maior power be willing to play the role of balancer' Some require
that military tecirnology not change radically or rapidly; others that the maior
states abide by arbitr;;ily specified rules. But balances of power form in the
absence of the "r.iecessary' conditions, and since 1945 the world has been stable,

i"i J"a tendin!

*o.td o* .na1or powers remarkably peaceful, even though international

conditions hur"l .,oi conformed to theorists' stipuiations. B-glgn,=,-qf*BUl9i

;tih;

-7 4, 202-207).

Reiiication is often merely the loose use of language or the employment of

metaphor to make one's prose more pleasing. In this case, however, the theory
has been &astically distorted, and not only by introducing the notion that if a
balance is to be formed, somebody must want it and must work for it. The
further distortion of the theory arises when rules are derived from the results of

:..[ d.t

I-:

Anarchic Orders and Balances of Pouer

power is to be maintained. This is apparent in the first "f &igg@t..-fi=qt

iefinitions of the term: namely, "a policv-aim-eg;1lg55,1e1g1"it"Atp.--"J"3f.&Ugi Th"
"easilfl56c6meJtl'ffiioEiiii. if"a bilance of power is to be mainieaiioiring-ftieif
tained, tie policies of states must aim to uphold it' If a balance of power is in fact
maintained, we can conclude that their aim was accurate. If a balance of power is
not produced, we can say that the theory's assumption is erroneous. Finally, and
this completes the drift toward the reification of a concept, if the purpose of states
is to uphold a balance, the purpose of the balance is "to maintain the stability of
the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it."
Reifiiation has obviously occurred where one reads, for example, of the balance
operating "successfully" and of the difficulty that nations have in applying it
1.67

IiiI

step from the belief that a high regard for preserving a balance is at the heart of
wise statesmanship to the belief that states must follow the maxiq;ifia{q[ance of

(1973, pp.

IA

IB

states' actions and then illogically prescribed to the actors as duties. A possible
effect is turned into a necessary cause in the form of a stipulated rule. Thus, it is
said, "the balance of power" can "impose its restraints upon the power aspirations of nations" only if they first "restrain themselves by accepting the system of
the balance of power as the common framework of their endeavors." Only if
states recognize "the same rules of the game" and play "for the same limited
stakes" .an the balance of power fulfill "its functions for international stability
and national independence" (Morgenthau L973, pp. 279-20)'
The closely related errors that fall under our second proposition about
theory are, as we have seen, twin traits of the field of international politics:
-^-^i-,
^^---.-^-,{--.o ^f mn}irrp r.d rp<rrlt and to infer
namely, to assume a
What has gone
rules for
thJeconomic analogy (Chapter 5, part III,
1). In a purely competitive economy, everyone's striving to make a profit drives
the profit rate downward. Let the competition continue long enough under static
.o.,ditior,r, and everyone's profit will be zeio. To infer from that result that
everyone, or anyone, is seeking to minimize profit, and that the competitors must
adopt that goal as a rule in order for the system to work, would be absurd. And

one, must want it and must work for it, it follows that explanation turns
ultimately on what the separate states are tike. If that is true, then theories at the

national ierel, o, lower, will sufficiently explain international politics. If, for
example, the equilibrium of a balance is maintained through states abiding by
rules, then or,e need, an explanation of how agreement on the rules is achieved
and maintained. One does not need a balance-of-power theory, for balances
would result from a certain kind of behavior explained perhaps by a'theory about
national psychology or bureaucratic politics. A balance-of-power theory could
not be consiructed because it would have nothing to explain. If the good or bad
motives of states result in their maintaining balances or disrupting them, then the
notion of a balance of power becomes merely a framework organizing one's
account of what;happened, and that is indeed its customary use. A construction
that starts out tb be a theory ends up as a set of categories. Categories then
multiply rapidlyito cover events that the embryo theory had not contemplated'
The quest for ei$lanatory power turns into a search for descriptive adequacy.
Finally, an& relatei to our third proposition about theory in general,

$,

balance-of

tffiffi#"T;T;;t.

*-E
g**

Tr"u, th" theory does not tell us why state X made a cerTo expect it to do so would be like expecting the theory

of universal gravitation to explain the wayward path of a falling leaf . A-Lhrqf*{

about matters at a different level
one level
is one error on
to notice

yet in international politics one frequently finds that rules inferred from the
results of the interactions of states are prescribed to the actors and are said to be a
condition of the system's maintenance. Such errors, often made, are also often
pointed out, though seemingly to no avail. S. F. Nadel has put the matter simply:

.1
{FZ

theory is rooted in the uncertainty of the distinction drawn

and international politics or in the denials that the distinction

<9

s\'et

?,.*J
't

Iil

"T'
722

IB

I&

mi

Ih

Ih

Ier

rh

EHr l rbr

rid]

Esil

Iblr

Shrt,

uBl

Pouer
Anarchic Orders and Balances of

-EI

723

ChaPter 6

should be made. For those who deny the distinction, for those who devise
explanations that are entirely in terms of interacting units, explanations of
international politics are explanations of foreign policy, and explanations of
foreign policy are explanations of international politics. Others mix their
explanatory claims and confuse the problem of understanding international
politics with the problem of understanding foreign policy. Morgenthau, for
example, believes that problems of predicting foreign policy and of developing
theories about it make international-political theories difficult, if not impossible,
to contrive (1970b, pp. 253-53). But the difficulties of explaining foreign policy
work against contriving theories of international politics only if the latter reduces
to the former. Graham Allison betrays a similar confusion. His three "models"
purport to offer alternative approaches to the study of international politics.
Only model I, however, is an approach to the study of international politics.
Models II and III are approaches to the study of foreign policy. Offering the
bureaucratic-politics approach as an alternative to the state-as-an-actor approach
is like saying that a theory of the firm is an alternative to a theory of the market, a
mistake no competent economist would make (1971; cf. Allison and Halperin
:1972). lf Morgenthau and Allison were economists and their thinking continued
to follow the same pattern, they would have to argue that the uncertainties of
corporate policy work against the development of rnarket theory. They have confused and merged two quite different matters.*
Any theory covers some matters and leave3 other matters aside. Balance-ofpower theory is a theqrv.abo_gj:he resultEp-rqduced bv the uneo-ordinatedagtign"
tl,$at-* The theory mites assumptions about the interests and motives of
states, rather than explaining them.
confine all states. The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the

HffffiTTAIffins of

states,

but by itself the theory cannot explain

those

reactions. They depend not only on international constraints but also on the
characteristics of states. How will a particular state react? To answer that question we need not only a theory of the market, so to speak, but also a theory about
the firms that compose it. What will a state have to react to? Balance-of-power
theory can give general and useful answers to that question. The theory explains
why a certain similarity of behavior is expected from similarly situated states.
The expected behavior is similar, not identical.

the detailed content

o-f

exPectations aauvu! :"-ieni'" expectdlrurt>

to dilterent
J; tt"
r:vers a.r:,
-Hfi;u;a the naiional and'-'the internattonal
.,t.i"uii-.nii-G""ii
*;"'
;Xifl;;
countries
ypes, if they are anv good',te" ":

t:Ttll':1:':l?:llffi*:

*ffiand5).

ilI-- &iruo t$it:'':t'

politics'

theory of international
ln the previous chapter, I constructed a-systemstheory as a further development
ln this chapter, r r,"r"'r,"t"J b"lance-of-power
I shall refine the theory by showing
of that theory' 'n tne t'"*t tht"" chapters'
At
structure of international systems'

in, the
wil ;;;
it* gooJth" theorv so far developed is'
whetherihe theory it-L'lgng1J
"Jfta theory to tests'
Before subi'ecting
";;t
we.would not know
it tells us some things of interest that
."#;;;';;"J;;"in"e.
mean that it can
.Iihat
il; ;i;;;, meets those..""q,rire*".rtr.d..":l:t
Tffiffisence.
falsify a theory' some

how expectatio$s "ary

this point I pausp *.

tir.tl ir flunked,
Ch;;;"t t)' i"'i't that

tests
survive tests. $any people prefer

theories are tested

among
Confirmations do not count because'
only by attempting'tli"frfirin""r.
or not
*'v be offered as proof while consciouslv
is
other reason,, 4""fi;;;;ii"l
later'
I
suggest
th"ory u." u'*roiJ"d. Tiris dlfficulty,
cases likely to (pnfound lhe
have
parties
which
for example' in

people, followifrg

#iP;;;t

(1e34'

lessened bv .h4o'iiJ;;;J;;'"'jsitua.tions'
Confirmato the fredictions oJ one's theory'
strong reasons [o beiu'e contrary
theory are
a
tests that appear to confirm
tions are also rdiecteJ because numerous

in Chap-

rr'"'o"'"ption oi theory presented a theorv

Hil::*, ;{'f"lsi;;;rl"'i'"'"'
If
pos'iUilitv of a"'iti"g tests'that confirm'
ter 1, howev"',

;;'';f,"

the connections among its

and displays its organization and
oil'"*ua domain with the picture the
behaviors and
,s7o). we can ask whether expected

;;;;:.tJ"!:t'.:itr'"
i:Hnlni'il
t.i.'ii"r.r,
lim{red
theory
has

outcomesarerepeatedlyfoundwheretheconditionscontemplatedbythetheory

obtain.

-i

plausibility if similarities of behavior are

IJ;;;;;:;;'*,u'
I;"*::'iffi:[*:,x;n::.:x;"?:r,
substance but
in "'""ure'
observed -tr"r"-*A*s are similar
i"

and

I if diff"r".,.", of U"fu"i;;;;;
is won: International^r-t^t5:' ? I
ILff#;.a,
different in structure. This special "d;;;,#
in economrcs' n',
of
;d;ii*y ;; t'he confirmation certain theories
*The confusion is widespread and runs both ways. Thus Herbert Simon thinks the goal of
classical economic theorists is unattainable because he wrongly believes that they were trying "to predict the behavior of rational man without making an empirical investigation of
his psychological properties" (L957, p. 19).

otn"t such nonpolitical fields'

expectations' or
""th,";;i;;l"na
tn"J'it',"'"f course' always means inferring
Testing
is a diffitheories
i"r,i"g tt oru-l*p".tations' Testing theory' bv the
hypotheses, fr.;ii.,;
""a
#rd"p;;;;n* of factind
cult and subtle task, made so by the

sociology,

IJ

1-24 Chapter
--

-i

tices

elusive relation between reality and theory as an instrument for its apprehension.
questions of useQuestions of truth and falsity are somehow involved, but so are
!.vith
Fqgt/
onejti*9
In
the
end,
t\e-qbegv-tbtrFvgalgfulness and uselessness.
and
reiection
the
acceptance
about
I
shallffiGe
is
suspect.
validity
even if its

only enough to make the relevance of a few

can then easily be thought of . Many are
Others
clear.
testing
theory
examples of
and in all parts of the next three,
part
this
chapter
of
first
the
in
provided
or put them in testable form.
as
tests
labeled
them
not
always
I
have
although
Tests are easy to think up, once one has a theory to test, but they are hard to
carry through. Given the difficulty of testing any theory, and the added difficulty
of testing theories in such Ci6'htx-Feiffi6fii4b fieldq ?:-,il-Lqr-nqtiolgl-g9"lilt!? we

shouldexpIoitalIofthewaF-offined-bytryingtofalsify,

f
_tio"11e-.ie .dif

,,:

cleavages.

Ins(ead,

-o"bgfyeliet*9f5!rt$-.glt
for exanple. lsq! r"til.:J"-lSgs--9{-9t31e9"a-flvi3e, ,J'-aq.plCelce
with"the expectations the theory gives iGe to, _eve.qtl-rgr:.gh they have strong rear""J""t io co$feratri with bne ;notl{if :Tfieliii;il;";f Fi;"ie ana i{tiisia, mide
Iorhi,f in 1s'94[is o;; ffifr;fr;A?sJe Chupte.8, part I). One should, for example, look for instances of states making internal efforts to strengthen themselves,
however distasteful or difficult such efforts might be. The United States and the
Soviet Union following World War II provide such instances: the United States
by rearming dqspite having demonstrated a strong wish not to by dismantling the
most powerfull military machine the world had ever known; the Soviet Union by
maintaining a[out three million men under arms while striving to acquire a costly
new military technology despite the terrible destruction she had suffered in war.
These examples tend to confirm the theory. Wg {lld pQleq f-or4ing b4lancq-spower
whether or not they wish to. They alsoihow the difficulties of testing.
of
*t.'-.-**-=-

Cermfry*ffiTffimed

iqul!

.def ined and inconstant

balances to form, and the failure of some slates to conform to the successful prac-

effects

SiS::Of:-&1d,.

Two problems are paramount. First, though balance-of-power theory offers

some predictions, the*predictions are indeterminate. Because only a loosely

iondition of balance is prbdicted, it is difficult to say that

any given distribution of power falsifies the theory. The theory, moreover, does
not lead one to expect that emulation among states will proceed to the point
where competitors become identical. What will be imitated, and how quickly and
closely? Because the theory does not give precise answers, falsification again is
difficult. Second, although states may be disposed to react to international constraints and incentives in accordance with the theory's expectations, theggrli-cies.
and actions of states are also shaped by their internal conditions. The failure of

of other states, can too easily be explained away by pointing to

one should not look mainly to the eighteenth-century heyday

of the balance,of power when great powers in convenient numbers interacted and
were presumaply able to adiust to a shifting distribution of power by changing
partners withia grace made possible by the absence of ideological and other

by devising hard confirmatory tests, by comparing features of the real and the
theoretical worlds, by comparing behaviors in realms of similar and of different
structure. Any good theory raises many expectations. Multiplying hypotheses
and varying tests are all the more important because the results of testing theories
are necessarily problematic. That a single hypothesis appears to hold true may
not be very impressive. A theory becomes plausible if many hypotheses inferred
from it are successfully subjected to tests.
Knowing a little bit more about testinS, we can now ask whether expectations drawn from our theory can survive subjection to tests. What will some of
the expectations be? Two that are closely related arise in the above discussion'
According to the theory, balances of power recurrently form, and states tend to
emulate the successful policies of others. Can these expectations be subjected to
tests? In principle, the inswer is "yes." Within a given arena and over a number
of years, we should find the military power of weaker and smaller states or
groupings of states growing more rapidly, or shrinking more slowly, than that of
stronger and larger ones. And we should find widespread imitation among competing states. ln practice, to

125

produced by fgrces that lie outside of the theory's purview.

In the absence of theoretical refinements that fix expectations with certainty
and in detail, what can we do? As I have just suggested, and as the sixth rule for
testing theori{s set forth in Chapter 1 urges, we should make tests ever more
difficult. If wd observe outcomes t
leads us to

trffiay

'lr'.

I:ri

lI,j

-U

-E!

,.

IJ

Anarchic Orders and Balances of Pou:er

their Dual Alliance in 1879.

Since

detailed inferences cannot be drawn from the theory, we cannot say just when
other states are expected to counter this move. France and Russia waited until
1894. Does this show the theory false by suggesting that states may or may not be
brought into balance? We should neither quickly conclude that it does nor lightly
chalk the delayed response off to "friction." Instead, we should examine diplomacy and policy in the 15-year interval to see whether the theory serves to
explain and broadly predict the actions and reactions of states and to see whether
the delay is out of accord with the theory. Careful judgment is needed. For this,
historians'accounts serve better than the historical summary I might provide.
The theory leads us to expect states to behave in ways that result in balances
forming. To infer that expectation from the theory is not impressive if balancing
is a universal pattern of political behavior, as is sometimes claimed. It is not.
Whether political actors balance each other or climb on the bandwagon depends

'tial

iAI*pa;G,

whEn"rhffi|sffis. theii

"]iiesitrEn--

candidates, dramatically illustrate both points. When nomination time

rEl.

126

b)
j'. ),'

fl

y''.:f

lq?.".,,
;

inyone

-;j

-si!

lIEtr

Pouer

127

r.o* *1""1ry ilii:.pft{df.f,pwfl B;na'ffi;ffiin[', n"[6iTiii.iig,''u"to.i"!

the characteristic behavior.

---

Band*agoning ,na-balancing behavior are in sharp contrast. Internally,

losing candidates throw in their lots with the winner. Everyone wants someone to
win; the merhbers of a party want a leader established even while they disagree
on who it shouid be. In a competition for the position of leader, bandwagoning is
sensible behavior where gains are possible even for the losers and where losing
does not place their security in jeopardy. Externally, states work harder to
increase their own strength. or they combine with others, if they are falling
behind. In a competition for the position of leader, balancing is sensible behavior
where the victory of one coalition over another leaves weaker members of the
winning coalition at the mercy of the stronger ones. Nobody wants anyone else to
win; none of the great powers wants one of their number to emerge as the leader.
If two coalitions form and one of them weakens, perhaps because of the
political disorder of a member, we expect the extent of the other coalition's military preparation to slacken or its unity to lessen. The classic example of the latter
effect is the breaking apart of a war-winning coalition in or just after the moment

of victory. W"S_-d_g*ryj;Xp_e_clJhffIlo*tlq-g9g_U99;yit}-Ltue*qt6snc-luprd"S-r.-tS
increase the -e*ent*b( ifreir power 9vglg,!hg"ir-*bll!,1e.!hSr;g."s*q.qa-r,e.sff.and*loqk.
for allies who might help them. In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if
profit,
tranquility, proflt,
is assured can states safely seek such other goals
survival rs
survlval
Soals as tranqultlty,
and power. Because-pbwer is a means and not an end,:'states prefer to ioin the
t t
'ti
't'':-*---i
'
means,
power, a possibly
useful
weaker of two
cc,aliiffi]They
cannot' let
become the end they pursue. The goal the
jgg*Iy Increased power may di"may not serve that end. Given two coalitions,
Tor eiample, the greater success of one in drawing members to it may tempt the
other to risk preventive war, hoping for victory through surprise before disparities widen. If states wished to maximize power, they would foin the stronger
side, and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This
does not happen because balancing, n9t b3qdw-agoning, is the behavior induced
by the system. The first concern of states rs not to maximize power but to main-tain

-EJ

rer

Anarchic Orders and Balances of

no ohe is established as the party's strong favorite, a number of

"pproache&a.,d contend. Some of them form coalitions to check the progress of
would-be leaders
others. The maneuvering and balancing of would-be leaders when the party lacks
one is like the external behavior of states. But this is the pattern only during the
leaderless period. As soon as someone looks like thg-wi1119L- n-e35ly.d-!"igryp-o*
the bandwagon ratfi6r tErn c6;iinuirig-1ii-bliia coalitions inil"aia t.i prevent

IEs

*li:l

!rc1
Chapter 6

their positions in the system.

'Stephen Van Evera suggested using 'tandwagoning"

'talancing."

to

serve as the opposite of

Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is
the stronger sidq that threatens them. On the weaker side, they"ge-b"Slb.-mers
appreciated andisafer, provided, of course,'t-hat the coalition they ioin achieves
inough difensivt! oi-ifeterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking.
Thus Thucydides records that in the Peloponnesian War the lesser city states of
Athens as the tyrant and the weaker Sparta as their
Greece cast the

'stronger

liberator (circa 400 B.C., Book v, Chapter 17). According to Wemer Jaeger,
Thurydides thought this "perfectly natural in the circumstances," but saw "that
the parts of tyrant and liberator did not correspond with any permanent moral
quality in these istates but were simply masks which would one day be interchanged to the hstonishment of the beholder when the balance of power was
altered" (1939,L,397). This shows a nice sense of how the placement of states
affects their behavior and even colors their characters. It also supports the
proposition that state-s balq"l:g_-pg.ygr 1q.!h91 th.an.maximize i! **gl-:**H,fun
g;fudfe m*S.-q11rH-Tg39y*",*b*"ggd. International politics is too serious a
business for that.
The theory depicts international politics as a competitive -lealm. Do states
develop the characteristics that competitors are expected to display? The question
poses another test for the theory. The fate of each state depends on its responses
to what other states do. The possibility that conflict will be conducted by force

leads

to competition in the arts and the instruments of fo..". Cg[Pg[*,gS

oroduces a tendencv toward the sameness of

iffi

-t

th_e

caollpelilorq. Thus Bismarck's

&-;i;ioiffis i,6-Aiiii.il iii 16oo i"d """i F.fri'Jl"' idzo quickly led the
major continental powers (and Japan) to imitate the Prussian military staff system, and the failure of Britain and the United States to follow the pattern simply
indicated that thdy were outside the immediate arena of competition. Contending
states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest
capability and ingenuity. And so the weapons of major contenders, and even
their strategies, [egin to look much the same all over the world. Thus at the turn
of the century Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz argued successfully for building a
battleship fleet d1n the grounds that Germany could challenge Britian at sea only
with a naval docirine and weapons similar to hers (Art1973, p. 16).
The effects fif competition are not confined narrowly to the military realm.
Socialization to fthe system should also occur. Does it? Again, because we can
almost always fifid confirming examples if we look hard, we try to find cases that
are unlikely to {end credence to the theory. One should look for instances of
states conformirlg to common international practices even though for internal
reasons they would prefer not to. The behavior of the Soviet Union in its early
years is ottu trr(!-, instance. The Bolsheviks in the early years of their power
preached intern{tional revolution and flouted the conventions of diplomacy.
They were sayinf, in effect, "we will not be socia]ized to this system." The atti-

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128

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In

I"

ChaPter 6

do as
who' when asked what he would
tude was well expressed by Trotsky'
the
to
proclamations
"i will issue some revolutionary
foreign minister, replied'
coma
ln
23s)'
p'
1963'
fquoted in Von Laue
peoples and then .to." 'ii ;";;;*i;
to
n""J the assistance of tthers' Refusal
t"uy
party
one
petitive arena, ho*e'et'
.*" aestruction. The pressures o[ competiplay the political ,u*.'*"r'.tlt .i".
Lenin'
in the Soviet union's diplomacy. Thus
him
tion were rapidly f"l, ";;;"fl;;ted
bade
7922'
of
Conference
the Genoa
t"
*iti""t"Cttiti"t*
foreign
p'
204)'
sending
"Avoid big wotd;; (quoted in -{o9re 1950'
farewell with this tuJot"
tailo.ei iraditional diplomat rather than
chicherin, *no p.rro.,ii*a ,i-,"'**fuiiy to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric
was
the simply uniformed revolutionary'
other
h" ,uc.ersfrrlly completed with that
These
deals.
for the sake of working
enemy' Germanv'
ol.t"il ;;;". and ideologicalof states promo[s'their sameness through the disa4The close iuxtapositiln
.o;forr" to successful practices' lt is this
vantages that arise f;;;;'e"r"t.o
"sameness,"aneffectofthesystem'thatis'oofttttattributedtotheacceptanceof
come to power' ln
Chiliastic *1"r, o..urionally
so_called rules of ,t"t" t.i.,u"i.r.
and
th"it *uv'' They-can refuse to do so'
power, most of thtttt*-niir-thanqe
ti,tt" affected by the competition
yet hope to survive, oif, iiif,.V rulle countrie,
is set.
states proceeds at a pace that
of states. The sociuliza;i;; "i^;".o-nformist
testable
tt'"'iv'it*' And that is another
by the extent of

Sttrrcturql Ccruses and

Economic Effects

behavnational and international systems and showed how

compare
9
and
7,8,
Chapters
ior and outcomes vary from one system to another.
and outcomes varv in
itif"r""ii"i"r""ir.["1 ,frtu*, and show how behaviorstructures
vary through
whose
but
whose or{ering pri".ipr* endure
posed in this
question
The
states.
across
chanses in the distrlbuti"on of capabilities
powers'
great
of
numbers
smaller
or
.ir;;;;;i, *r.."ir.'"ri,'*e should prefer larger
practice'*
to
theorv
from
zurthei' Part II moves

Chapter 6

;;;,

irJi....t"t,n" ii+..v

rt"t"Tilln"ory 'hr;it';i;";"'ttin

behaviors and outcomes. From

leads to many expectations about
whether or

will eng# in balancing behavior'

the theory, o.," p..aiti' tnut
predicts a strong
"ut"t
acts. Fiom the theory, one
not balanced power is the end of their
iq
svs tem' 1t'-q- glnes latt-oq
I
t en dency t ow ard
di
^1n"
once
balance'
tliil
oncs -49hie-ve..d- *ill;;';uineio*d' "'-b-gJ
Sinc" the'
restored in-o-ne-"By*g*ngghel' Balances';
more
predicts
competitive system' one
iheo.y depicts inter;;i;;ffii:;oiiiit' as a
common to competitors:
specifically that st;;; Jil'airptuy characteristics socialized to their system'
become
and.
namely, that they *iti i*itut" uu.h tth",
these propositions more specific
;;[;s
*uv,
h";;;;;;*a
r
rn this chapter,
"f
;hipters, as tire theory is elaborated
.u*ul"i"e
and concrete ,o u, ioi".i,iem. ln
appear.
will
,"fi.,"a, additional testable propositions

!+;;

"nJ

"ql,lt}tftl*ffi";
i
ffi;;""""trv fli^'

.o*p"r"h

rl

1. COUNTING PO+ES AND

MEASURING POWER

power? These questions

How should we cJ,lunt poles, and how can we measure
;;";;;*ered order to identify variations of structure. Almost everyone

;;;

4n
was bipolar. Few seem to believe
agrees that at somei time since the wai the world
the bipolar world as being
that it remains so. for years walter Lippmann wrote of

1e63)' Manv

of rapidly passing away (e.g., r-e50 and

il;;;i;*;'i;;i; i;"ss
he so firmly esiablished. To reach the conclutradition
dn the

others now carry

odd counting. The inclinasion that bipolarity is passing, or past, requirls some
at a particular answer'
tion to count in f,r.rr,y iuy, if rooted in the desire to arrive
world of Metternich and
scholars feel a strong affection for the balance-of-power
rest, That was a world in
Bismarck, on which many of their theoretical noiions
maneuvered for
which five o*o gruui-;o*ers manipulated their neighbors.and
to their capabilities' Stuadvantage. Great powers were o"ce defined according
conditions' The ability
dents of internationaf p.liti.. now seem to look at other
rankings' The
to'rotlre problems is said to raise or lower their
;;];tltt;iriut",

f;;ii;

n as a studY of interdePendence
mine'
from
differ
mav
views
whose
State,
of
b;p;.tment