abi Global Governance

23.10.12

Dawid Friedrich EU after Lisbon The crisis and

democracy in the EU
-

Empty chair crisis 1966, De Gaulle ne hodinasestankeSveta

EU crisis as normality of European integration
o There is a EU-is-collapsing-literature throughout the whole integration
process
o Unsuccessful political integration in the 50s, only economic integration
Understanding of EU
o As a peace project that fosters freedom and democracy
o Or as an economic project, guaranteeing wealth and growth
o Or as a stronghold against neo-liberal globalization
o Or as a neo-liberal project killing welfare
o Or as the only chance of the EU countries not to lose any power and influence
in an emerging multi-power world
o Or as a threat to democracy
Transfer of decision-making away from countries
Contradictory normative expectations signify the special character of the EU
Questions arising from the current crisis
o Future of the modern nation-state
o The primacy of political vis--vis the market
o The future of modern democracy in Europe

Conceptual issues
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What is national democracy

o Collective decision-making practices and collective policy integration
Policy integration often overlooked, democracy is more than merely
voting, it is about policy integration different policies have different
goals economic policies or social policies, different goals, a multitude
of goals there needs to be a space to integrate these policies
What is Global Governance(!)
o Deficit of democracy
o Some problems cant be solved within a nation state
o The decision-making power of a national executive is functionally limited
o Decisions going to a supranational actor

o It can have positive or negative aspects for democracy

Strengthening and weakening democracy
The idea of post-democracy
o Colin Crouch
o When a system is not about the input but when it is merely about the output
legitimacy
o System doesnt loose democratic institutions, they still stay, but we are only
simulating democracy, the substance of democracy is decreasing
o The competencies of elected official move to experts, MNC, technocrats
o The people are not the main sovereign, but it would be the task of politics to
make people accustomed to market needs
o IMF, WTO, etc signs of entering a post-democratic state, with all the
democratic institutions
o Democracy as a subsystem of the market system, the primacy of the market

Methodological issues
-

How to measure democracy?

Plea for modesty in research
o Normative (democratic) legitimacy
o Not democracy
o Democracy is more than normatively valuable fragments
There is no one concept of democracy
Core values of democracy
o Political autonomy, political equality, public control, freedom

Legitimacy check
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Chain of democratic legitimacy

o We are authorizing our representatives
o Representatives are accountable
Participation of citizens
o The longer the chain of legitimacy is, the thinner it gets
o Participation should be stronger so not to loose legitimacy
The primacy of political
o The politics does not succeed in keeping its own temporality against other
societal subsystems
o In such case democracy is impossible to uphold
o Tensions between the temporality of politics and temporality of others
(markets)
Contribution of the Lisbon treaty to these aspects of legitimacy check
o Classical chain of legitimacy
o Aim was to keep most of the substance of the failed constitutional treaty
o One of the key aim was to put democracy of the EU on a stronger basis
Two meta-standards: representation and political equality
o Institutional developments
Fosters representation in a multi-level perspective
Stronger role of the EU Parliament

A stronger role of the national parliaments with the early-warning

mechanism
But no pan-European intermediary system (parties) European
elections have national lists of candidates, no parties that would be
represented everywhere
The chain of legitimacy is not yet fully developed
The EP does still not have all competencies of a national parliament
The EP cant decide on the executive cant withdraw its power
It also does not have main competencies on the budget
Chain of legitimacy weak on these issues
Two meta-standards the Treaty doesnt clarify what does it mean by that or
who shall be represented a citizen (individual) or a country
Countries or citizens equal between each other
The state is included and often in contradiction to the equal representation of
the individuals
Nr of seats for each country in EP as an example
The role of the citizen is weakened on a national level and not addressed on the
EU level
The crisis is increasing the deficit towards the rule of the few
Lisbon Treaty strengthens consultation of functional interests as a means for
creating legitimacy
European citizens initiative an innovation
If the ECI is successful, the Commission must think about that
issue
Is rather a means of consultation
Political equality not given, public control if existent, than only nontransparent
EP is heavily marginalized
Crisis citizens just spectators
Discursive figure of crisis as a chance to win lost ground back
G20 didnt achieve a strong agreement on strengthening regulation of financial
capitalism
EU attempts to strengthen the political increases post-democratic
exclusiveness of informal decision-making groups (Euro-group, Frankfurt
group)
These groups sign of fear vis--vis the markets, rather than streghtening

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Conclusions
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Lisbon fail to tackle problem of policy integration

30.10.12 -gostujoi Nina Pfifer

3 weaknesses/3 strenghts
o S1 flexibility or adaptability

o S2 curious
o S3 razgledanost
o W1 not specialized, yet still special
o W2 no experience
o W3 da ne znamo poiskat weakness-ov, premalo samozavestni
Where blab la 5 years
o NGO v Afriki, reevalisvet
What are you goals
o Najtidelo, ki bi teizpolnjevalo, imelo added value
If youd be an animal, which one?
o Zooplankton
Why should I hire you?
o Willing to work hard, not a union member,
o
How much vacation in the first year?
o Kolkorzakonskopripada

8.11.12

What are networks

Advocacy networks
NGO imajonek status, HQ, nekoagendo to jihrazlikuje od networks
o Network set the agenda or influence the agenda
Kerk, Sinkink
o Introduction to the role of networks
o Model how to research networks
F. neki Anti-tobacco lanek
o Contributes to the conceptual debate
Scientist networks
o Can be source of ideas
o Specially social scientists meet often on conferences there various ideas are
being exchanged and are put on offer to states to pick and choose
o Chicago school, Kissinger itd, they are influential
Slaughter New world order
o Stop imagining a world of states
o Disaggregated states
o Globalization paradox
Need for more government on a global scale but we dont want the
centralization of decision-making power
Global networks are a subject worth analyzing on formal and informal level
o Both contribute to global governance as they contribute to the accumulation of
rules and practices that are eventually accepted by the international community

Global public policy networks

BIERSTEKER PON 19.11., 9-12

Global governance and the development of global international organizations

Most institutions created 60 years ago strong period of institutionalization 1944-49

UN is profoundly state-centric in its design
o But they also constantly adapted
o Rates of reform in different institutions vary

Global governance
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Defining
o Often in negative what is it not
Its not global government
Its not chaos and anarchy
o Rosenau an order that lacks centralized authority with a capacity to enforce
decisions on a global scale
o Oxford English dictionary
Governance as steering, somebody that is directing
Originally from latin gubernator a person who steers and as a selfacting contrivance (like an engine that keeps itself from overheating,
self-regulating)
Idea of controlling, directing influence as being controlled
Power of governing
Manner in which something is governed
General conduct of life, behavior normative aspect of governance
Biersteker definition: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
o Patterned regularity
Recurring basis, order at global level
Regular pattern of behavior
Its a necessary but not defining aspect
o Purposive
There must be some purpose of the governance
Achievement of some goals
GG is order + intentionality at a global level
o System of rules
Formal, embodied in treaties
Could be informal, a recognition or acknowledgment
It resides intersubjectively
There is some entity that governs and other entities that are being
governed
Defines expectations at a global level
o Authoritative
There is a relationship between authority claims by some body and
acceptance of this claims of those subject to that authority
Relation between the governed and some governing authority

Dependent on intersubjective meaning

Governance is not the same as government, but it embodies functions
of government (Rosenau) governance associated with functions of
government and not existence of government
o Steering
To steer, regulate the process but with the possibility to self-regulate
o Self-regulating
A market or a market-like mechanism can be set to govern
Example global bonds markets constitute a part of global governance,
regulating and self-controlling
GG is intersubjectively recognized, system of authoritative rules, functioning on a
global level
Defining global level
o Doesnt mean its universal
o It simply requires that the rules and practices are widely shared on at least 3
continents
Multilateral governance
o Coordination
Go beyond 3 or more actors that coordinate
It is coordination between 3 or more states in accordance with certain
principles
o There must be a social basis of meaning, some general principles
Contemporary global governance
o There is no single dominant form of governance today
o Different issues differently governed
o Governance is not a single unitary system, there are multiple government
arrangements that coexist in different issue areas
o These arrangements can even conflict between each other
o There is a density of governance arrangements does it help or hurt?
Overlapping institutions
o Governance is not necessarily a good thing or normatively desirable
An issue domain can be governed poorly
Criteria for evaluating governance
o Inclusiveness
o Representativeness
Difference from being included and being actively represented
Question of legitimacy
Do you have some influence on the core agenda
o Adaptability
Can it accommodate changes in global power distribution
o Efficiency
o Fairness
Potential trade offs:
Inclusiveness versus short-term efficiency and long-term effectiveness
Adaptability versus assountability
Others?
Not all governance is good governance

Forms of governance and the place of IOs

o Governance is not equal to IOs, although they can have a strong or leading role
o Inis Claude book Power and IR continuum
Differentiated 3 heuristic ways to manage power in IR
There is a continuum
On one side you have balance of power
On the other side you have global government
In between you have collective security arrangements
From the least institutionalized (balance) to most formalized (global g.)
In the middle of the continuum the collective security arr.
Representation of forms of governance in security
Each is a system of authoritative rules, intersubjectively recognized etc

o Adam Watson Typology of systems

Spectrum of international systems
On one end absolute independence of states
On the other the absolute empire
He argued that order promotes peace, but it does it on the expense of
independence
The more order, the less freedom
Independence brings insecurity military, economy so it seeks
alliances
Different degrees of institutionalization
o Kenneth Waltz States as analogous to firms interacting in a market
Its self-regulating, you are like an individual firm operating on a
market
States pursue survival in the system as firms on the market
o Different period of times associated with different forms of governance
Balance of power as a system of governance
o It is a system of governance but it is less institutionalized
o Late 19th century, were a system of governance
o Schroeder: two 19th century systems
Argument that 1815 was the introduction of the concert system

Powers met on periodical conferences, dealing with various issues

Concert system started to hinder in around 1850
The second half of 19th century competitive balance of powers,
competitive imperialisms
The concert was more institutionalized than the competitive system at
the end of the century
There were informal rules
Purposes
Preserve the independence of the units
Preserve the concert system itself
Block preponderance of power of any single member
Mechanisms
Vigilance
Concert and communication
Alliance formation
Intervention in foreign territory
Mediation by a 3rd party
Military preparedness
Compensation territorial compensation
Preservation of members
Periodically you maintain balance by going to WAR
Critiques of the balance of powers
Alliance politics
The system of balance of power was responsible for WWI
Alliances themselves foster fear, mistrust, arms races, spread
and spiral of military escalation
Arms races
Alliances are symptoms of insecurity
They dont provide security to states
They bring new commitments and dangers
Its out of date, fallacious
Metaphor itself is misleading
The Wilsonian Critique
Low standards of political morality
Anti-liberal, involved in selfish rivalry among cliques, it encouraged
devious maneuvering
Sacrificing interest of peoples to the ambitions of militaristic tyrants
It should be open diplomacy, self-determination, open economic system
A morally-based system that would stress the basic harmony of interest
between like-minded states
Therefore you needed to have a more predictive system of collective
security
Collective security operates the same as balance of power but
there is pooling of military capabilities in one entity
Against preponderance of power
Security for all for weaker powers, states

Concept of collective security

o Security for all, by collective action of all against all challenges of status quo
o Types of collective action
Engage in making moral argument, critique
Issue a formal diplomatic statement condemnation
Economic measures
Collective military action a wide range of actions
o Deterrent threat of preponderance of force
o Peace is indivisible
o Advantages for the small and weak
o Status quo implications
Collective security is fundamentally status quo oriented
o Embodied in the League of Nations failure of LN
Critical states never joined USSR, Germany, USA
Collective decision-making on use of force was never institutionalized
Major powers never took it seriously
Unable to act in crises
o UN designed to address deficiencies of the League
Universal membership
UN doesnt expel its members
Universal membership one of the core values
Veto
Outlaws inter-state war
Limited collective security
Broad agenda: Development and HR

Purposes and functions of IO

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Is the density of IO creating forum shopping?

o US cant bomb Serbia through UN so they chose another international forum
like NATO need for legitimization of their actions
o US shopped around if we cant make it through UN, we might do it through
some other IO
o The density of IO increased to such an extent that it creates opportunities for
forum shopping finding another forum to make something happen
Why do states join IO, why do they participate?
o Constrain great powers
o Promote rule of law
o Achieve equal standing
o Solve collective action problems
Potential disadvantages
o Costs of compliance
o Limitations on sovereignty
o IOs can be used to extend Great Power hegemony
Differences in postwar settlements
o Treatment of defeated powers

After WWII defeated powers changed their political system

consequence of total war
Firstly they changed the polity and then reconstructed its economy
From punishment of WWI
o UN as universal membership organization
o Security council veto
o Liberal basis for economic order
o More institutionalized and constitutionalized
o More global
o More issues
Options available to US after WWII
o Domination
o Abandonment
o Self-restraining engagement
Competing conceptions in the US different strategic arguments in the US on the
post-war order
o Global governance
o Open trading system
o Alliance of North Atlantic democracies
o Maintain access to markets and raw material
o Idea of a third force in EU to counter Soviet Union / meaning European
cooperation, eventually it became the EU
o Bipolar balancing of the Soviet Union
How institutions constrain great powers
o They evolve and develop
o Governing language can be applied in different contexts
o Cost of leaving exceeds cost of restraint
Ruggie: Embedded Liberalism
What is a regime: principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures
o Affect state behavior indirectly
o Alter interests and preferences of key actors directly
o Vehicles for international learning
o What do regimes do
Lower cost of cooperation
Provide forum for bargaining
Increase information
Affect the reputation of states
Provide linkages that enable trade-offs
o Why is Keohane optimistic about regimes
Adaptable to a post-hegemonic era
Cooperation dependes on expectations, transaction costs and
uncertainty
Institutions can change and mold interests
Institutional legacy is significant
Regimes are fragile but of great value
o Factor conducive to regime formation
Shared interests

Previous regimes
Self-interest
Small number of actors

Building a CFT regime after 9/11

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Counter-financing-terrorism
UNSCR 1373
o Every state on the globe must criminalize terrorism
o Countries need to report on the compliance
Expansion of 1267 mandate
o The Al Qaeda Committee
o Anyone associated with terrorism
FATF 8 special recommendations on CFT
IMF and IBRD
UNODC
All institutions start to adhere to CFT
Egmont Group financial intelligence units
Private banks voluntarily
A fairly robust regime created in a short period of time
o Expansion of mandates + IOs
Core principles
o Widely shared belief about the importance of following the money
Following transactions to reconstruct a network of financing
Norms
o Obligations from implementation of formal UN resolutions
o General consensus on best practices
Rules
o Specific rules to comply
o For example to inform financial institutions in a country about these
obligations
Decision-making procedures
o Periodic meetings, group of 8 meetings
o Global, regional organizations
o Private firms, banks, are at the end individual enforcers
Internalization by financial institutions it became routine
Phases of regime development
o Roughly 4 phases
o 1. Construction
2001-02
Bush administration provided leadership
Falls under realist arguments
UNSCR 1373 and the CTC process
Counter-terrorism-committee: calling ambassadors in to report
on country actions against terrorism
Expanding the 1267 sanction scope
From a few to more than 500 people
FATFs 8 special recommendations

Al Qaeda continues to attack facilitates the creation of the regime

High levels of compliance
High political will behind it
Other institutional developments
2. Institutionalization
2003-04
1267 for the first time de-lists some people
CTED was created Counter-terrorism executive director
institutionalized CTC providing training to countries how to comply
with the regime
UNSCR 1540 on proliferation sensitive material
Calls upon the criminalization of proliferation of nuclear
material to non-state actors
Subject of nuclear+terrorism
Every country must monitor and report on the implementation
Its global legislation (chapter 7)
CTAG count. Ter. Action group established
FATF 9th special recommendation mustnt have more than 10.000 on
flights
Institutional overlap & coordination problems
3. Fatigue
2003-07
Fall-out from US-led invasion of Iraq
There is much less sympathy, more dissent
Legal challenges from individuals posing a fundamental challenge to
the regime what is the criteria of the sanctions list, what about
notifications, there is no due process, no appeal
Reporting fatigue
A lot of reports and so on
CTED stalls
Al Qaeda changes strategy regime was successful
They stopped using the formal sector
Private sector doubts about efficacy
Institutional innovations
4. Maintenance challenges
2006-12
Reporting fatigue
Legitimacy challenge is it overreaching?
Legal cases Qadi at ECJ, Nada at ECHR
Parliamentary queries in CH, UK, NL
Public criticism big brother critiques
UNSCR reforms
Conclusion
UN provided the legal basis for the global regime
Growing democratic deficit threatens entire UN targeted sanctions
regime

Limited capacity for intelligence gathering

UN knows only what national intelligence services tells them
IOs have limited enforcement power
Regime successes, but requires moral authority

Biersteker 20.11.12
Institutional and organizational behavior of IOs
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Different theories of institutional and organizational behavior

Mearsheimer The false promise of international institutions (article)
o Realist
o Institutions as a reflection of the distribution of power
Reflect global power distribution
o Dismissive comment on UN
IOs operate at the margins of IR
They are not really important, dont really affect states behavior
Voluntary principle states chose to obey IOs or they dont
o All states posses military capabilities
o States can never be sure about the intentions of other states
o Primary goal is survival for states
o States cant rely on others for their security
o Principle aim of states to maximize their relative power
o Relative gains
But states dont always worry about relative gains, absolute also matter
o IOs are created by powerful states
IOs are vehicles for pursuit of national interest
o IOs have limited agency
Limited independence, states control them, states are principal
Liberal institutionalist view
o States are self-interested, but states rationally choose IOs to achieve goals
Like create regimes
IOs can harmonize policies that can maximize absolute gains for all
states
o IOs lower costs, provide forums, increase information and decrease
uncertainty, provide legal framework
The rational design of institutions
o States design institutions to further their goals
o 5 dimensions of design institutions between each other vary in these 5
Membership
Scope of issues
Centralization of tasks
Rules for controlling the institution
Flexibility
o Membership is highly contested
Who is allowed to join and who isnt
How many are involved

How large can it be

Will it be limited or not
The more members you have the more heterogeneous the group is and
the more issues will come to the agenda
Scope increases with number of members
o Size has implications for decision-making rule
More members, less individual states can control the process
This is why many UN bodies work with a consensus effective veto
o States are risk averse prefer veto
To protect themselves from unpredictable consequences
Can lead to institutional paralysis
o Some states are more equal than others
Some states are still more important, if not because of else, some have a
bigger government and are active on all fields
Role and influence proportional to contribution financial or
operational
o Institutional flexibility will decrease with the increase in number of members
Larger number increase costs of flexibility more than its benefits
Public choice perspectives
o IOs are bureaucracies
o IOs contain unelected, over-paid civil servants
o Subject to interest group pressure collusion
o Interested in maximizing their power
o National governments assign IOs unpleasant tasks
o Like all organizations, IOs interested in survival
Why are IOs self-interested
o Personal: keep the job, or get promotion
Personal advancement
o Institutional pride
o Incentives to expand mandate
o Just like elected officials want to stay in the office, IOs want to keep going
o Increase budgets, staff, space, flexibility
You can expand by taking on new mandates
Increase freedom of action
o More pronounced in IOs less accountable
o National quotas worsen these tendencies
o Interests in protecting turf mandates
o Success defined as growth in all of the above
How IOs ensure their survival and expansion
o Constant adaption mission creep
Mission always evolving from the starting point
Unforeseen circumstances
To maintain survival
New institutions encounter suspicion, institutional sabotage,
o Challenge any encroachments
New institutions are challenged
Oppose being coordinated

o Protect institutional turf mandate

Organizational theories
o Decision-makers do not optimize, but satisfice from existing policy repertoire
o Individuals in IOs are analytically parsimonious
o Dealing with complexity requires reduction2
o Complexity requires short-cuts
o Short-cuts = existing policy repertoire
o To simplify, agree on broad definitions
Example peace-building
o Organizations are broken down into departments, issue areas, projects
o Range of policy responses is constrained
Attention is limited by time and resources
As a result, policy alternatives are limited
o Lack of institutional capacity to determine whether a policy is optimal
Constructivist approaches

BIERSTEKER 22.11.12
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Constructivist approaches to IO behavior

o Emphasize how over time IOs develop agency of their own
o They exercise power autonomously
o Independent agency!
o Legal authority of IO gives them certain amount of power independent from
states
o IOs over time become more than reflection of state preferences
o IOs can create actors, specify responsibilities, define what actors do, and give
it meaning
o Take a sociological approach
o Explore the content of institutions, their legitimacy concerns, norms that guide
their behavior and shape interests
o IOs become autonomous because
Legitimacy of their rational-legal authority
Control over technical expertise and information
Develop rules and routines appear apolitical
o Three types of IOs power
Power of classification
It can classify problems, situations, which gives them power
Fix meanings
Articulate and diffuse norms
o Pathologies of IOS
Institutions are sticky
Dysfunctional
Internal cultures dominate
Means can become ends
Like efforts to create democratic institutions having an
election becomes equated with democracy, but can also loose
site of the goal

Existing data drives definition and judgement

Data sources, data itself confines and drives definitions and
measurements of certain goals
Bureaucratic universalism
Disproportionate influence of recent experience
Normalization of deviance
Insulation
Cultural contestation
o Other institutional issues
Forms of representation
Voting rules
Institutional learning
Cycles of institutional development
Design
Adaptation
Independence
Institutional cultures
Institutional leadership

UN peacebuilding commission
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Peace is more than just cessation of war, it must be sustainable, is something that is
built
This entity is a product of GA and SC together
o It was founded so to address the democratic deficit cooperation of the GA
Tasked with complex challenges
o Broad mandate
It faces all predictable institutional challenges
o About membership
o Scope of authority
o Coordination
o How will it organize and staff itself
At time of establishing the expectations of the UNPBC were extremely high
o It came in the time of disappointing performance of the UNHRC and other
institutions
Realist view of the UNPBC
o UNPBC reflects underlying tensions between SC and GA both claim
jurisdictional authority
o The compromise is: consensus-based, advisory body that is subsidiary entity of
both GA and SC
o Membership
Of course the P5
The ones that are paying the most and providing the most (so money
and troops)
Japan, Germany, Brazil, India all this countries were not included
permanently in the permanent seat of SC as the reforms failed
o Debates over procedures

How is it going to manage its activities

Procedure means bureaucracy
o It is easier to create new institutions than change existing ones
o Bureaucratic specializations likely to remain strong
Liberal institutionalist view of the UNPBC
o It was created to solve specific problems fill the institutional gap, peacebuilding
o Membership would be contested therefore large 31 members
Membership it includes states that themselves went through the process
of peace-building after civil wars first chairs Angola and El Salvador
Donor countries more important to the institution will dominate
committee chairs more wealthy countries
o Institutional flexibility will suffer because of a bigger membership
Public choice on UNPBC
o UNPBC predictably eager to take on dirty business of peace-building
o It will encounter suspicion and resistance
o Geneva-based UN institutions fear political NY UN institutions
Closer to security and politics
o Everyone is in favor of coordination
But no one wants to be coordinated
Organization theory & UNPBC
o UNPBC was a way to muddle through
Means to generate greater coordination
o Complexity requires reduction and simplification
o Means-driven policy
o Everybody agree that something had to be done so UNPBC
Constructivist view UNPBC
o Stem from growing unease over the lack of coordination
In any conflict zone you will have simultaneously a few organizations
or agencies deployed by the UN
o Big problem + lack of coordination = new entity
o Classification common cause = peace-building
o Fixing the meaning of peacebuilding as immediate aftermath of conflict
Diffuse this norm in the first 2 years after the conflict
o Normalization of deviance
First recipients of UNPBC assistance were no longer in immediate
aftermath of conflict
First one was Sierra Leone where conflict already ended and
more than 2 years ago
o UN introduced a terminology peacebuilding not employed by most
member states
No counterpart departments or agencies on national levels
o Blueprints for one size fits all are officially shunned
But Working groups on lessons learned searching for just that
dysfunctionally
Conclusions

o Theories identify predictable constraints faced by new institutions

o UNPBC likely to remain large and confront challenges of scope and limited
flexibility
o Leadership can make a difference look to institutional entrepreneurs
o Use working group on lessons learned to generate new ideas
Private Authority in Contemporary Global Governance and the Revival of the UN
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Global public domain

States remain central
Joined by NGOs
Begin to play authoritative role
Transnational advocacy networks
o Networks of activists motivated by a cause principled ideas and values
o Networks = voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal forms of organization
How do TANs work
o Information politics
o Symbolic politics
o Leverage politics on IGOs and states
Put pressure on powerful actors
o Accountability politics
When do TANs have influence?
o Issue formation and agenda setting
o Discursive change
o Influence on international procedures
o Influence on policy change in targets states, firms, IOs
o Influence on state behavior
Issue characteristics
o Bodily harm
Appealing to universal empathy
o Indiscriminate nature of effects
o Legal equality of opportunity
o Recognizable responsibility
Specific responsibility, who is to blame

Trans-governmental networks
-

Types of TGN
o Regulators
o Judges
o Parliamentarians
o Others
Networks of governmental officials working on the same issue
o Across different states and IOs

Relationships between TANs, TGNs, & IOs

-

Who takes the lead?

How independent are NGOs?

Emergence of private authority

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IPE increasingly governed by private sector

Why does private authority emerge?
o States abandon
o Technology is complex
o States lack effective capacity
Why do states abandon some areas?
o Globalization
o Liberal ideology
o Private actors more capable
o Costs savings
Definition of private authority
o Independent of state
o Not public
o NGOs
How private sector becomes authoritative?
o By virtue of expertise in a virtue domain
o Historical practice
o Delegation

Biersteker 23.11.12
-

Revival of the UN after the Cold War

o Rapid increase in sanctions by UN, increase in peace-keeping
o Security Council Report dobervirza SC
Whats in blue whats happening in the SC day by day
o Ideas the Agenda for Peace
o Expanding conception of what constitutes threat to international peace and
security
Principal challenges facing the UN today
o Performance deficits
A lot of examples where you can point to UN failures Rwanda,
scandals with peace-keeping forces
o Democratic deficit
o Incorporating the emerging powers
o Global transnational challenges
Stalemate on environment, Doha round trade, disarmament
o Failure of post-colonial state-building
UN reform
o UNSC membership add new members, veto
o Operational reform good management
Financial accounting
Hiring redundancies, SG staffing
Grievance procedures
To better efficiency
o Procedural reform
United for peace

Reform how SC committees work

Subsidiary bodies of the council
Calls for transparency
Idea that if you use the veto you have to explain why you used it
And why you used it in terms of the Charter
Idea that current P5 couldnt veto in cases of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes

Conclusion
o Challenges facing UN are daunting
o Concern for over-extension of peace-keeping, proliferation regime in crisis,
climate change
o Crisis of legitimacy can it live up to the expectations
o Demoralization of the staff due to financial cutbacks
Most agencies and secretariat are firing
o Leadership question Ban Ki Moon is not the most dynamic
o But if we wouldnt have the UN we would have to invent it
Its easy to blame UN
Given the most difficult tasks

Designing UN targeted sanctions

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Increasingly utilized by UNSC

There are diamond sanctions, timber, cocoa sanctions
Can be against a region of a country
o DRC sanctions only against the eastern provinces
No comprehensive sanctions since 1994
Applied to a broad range of threats to IPnS
Defined intended to be different from comprehensive sanctions
Targeted sanctions began and took off during comprehensive sanctions against Iraq
o High humanitarian consequences of such sanctions
o Why does a farmer in Basra suffer for Saddams actions
o Such sanctions are unfair, penalize the whole population
o Oil for food because of the humanitarian crisis
o At the end of 90s constant krenje sanctions
Targeted sanctions are more adaptable and can be calibrated
o Comprehensive more blunt
o You can impose sanctions on only one part, deterrent for another
Scholarly and popular debate largely unchanged
o All sanctions since 1994 were targeted in some way
o Arguments that sanctions dont work
o 20+ years of experience with targeted sanctions the first were imposed
against Yugoslavia
o Yet, no comprehensive, systematic analysis of their impacts or effectiveness
Targeted sanctions consortium
o Biersteker + Watson institute + graduate institute Geneva
o Scholars, academics, plus policy actors
o First comprehensive, systematic and comparative assessment of UN targeted
sanctions

o Conceptual innovation
o Case episodes within broader country cases
Case episode is every time the council changes the mix of measures,
increases the number of targets substantial change in the nature of
sanctions
Or if the target changes behavior
o Unit of analysis not country case but case episode
o Purposes of the sanctions
Not always to coerce, often also to constrain
Iran sanctions are clearly constraining the targets are individuals,
corporations, scientists involved in the program, banks that provide
support
UN sanctions on Iran arent coercive, but constraining
The other purpose is to send a signal
Sanctions are useful for looking at norms the SC with passing
of a resolution is involved in sending the signal
Other regimes in the region can be the target of the signal when
for example Gadafi was sanctioned
Signaling is always part of a sanction
o Project team
40+ scholars and policy practitioners from around the world
16 different research teams located in Africa, Asia, EU, N. Am.
o Scope of project
16 UN targeted sanctions regime
56 case episodes identified
Produced a quantitative database of 286 variables coded for each case
episode
More than 16.000 cells
Principal findings
o Targeted sanctions are effective about 1/3 of the time
o Sanctions are more effective in constraining and signaling than coercing a
change in target behavior
Measuring effectiveness
o Policy outcome + sanctions contribution to that outcome
o Policy outcome on a 5 point scale
Coercive
1 = intransigence
5 = full compliance with UNSCR
Constrain
1 = none observable
5 = significant, increase in costs to target
Signal
1 = unclear and no stigma
5 = norms clear and full stigma
o Sanctions contribution on 6 point scale
Negative = 0 target increases activity

None = 1 no sanction contribution

Minor = 2 other measures most significant
Modest = 3 sanctions reinforced
Major = 4 necessary, but not sufficient
Significant = 5 single most important factor
General findings
o Targeted sanctions are never applied alone
Always combined with other measures and never applied in isolation
Methodological problem
o Targeted sanctions consist of a variety of types and differences in degree of
discrimination
Discrimination as to what extent do the targets discriminate between
innocents and targets of sanctions
From individual to diplomatic to arms embargo to commodity sanctions
to oil and financial sector sanction comprehensive sanctions nondiscriminatory
o Commodity sanctions are highly effective
Like diamond or timber sanctions
o UN sanctions are enhanced by regional groups (EU)
UN is usually following in the sanctions regimes, not leading
UN follows regional initiatives
o Most sanctions of the UN remain largely targeted
With the exception of Libya II
Additional findings
o Targeting is important, and the list of targets should reflect the purposes of the
sanctions
Too many, to few, or the wrong list undermines credibility
o Secondary sanctions, although applied relatively infrequently, appear to be
highly effective
Its better to put secondary sanctions on those that violate sanctions
than to expand the existing set
Like for Iran, sanction Dubai rather than cripple even more its
population
o Sometimes its better to hit the re-start button
Start over with a new UNSCR rather than continue to add new
requirements to an existing sanctions regime
Retain focus
Renews political will

Predstavitev GG and underdevelopment of Africa

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Deconstruct myths on Africa

Single story on Africa presented and seen only as poverty and wars
Nelson Mandela kot success story of African leadership
Global competitiveness report
o Published by World Economic Forum
o 144 countries

Neoliberal order put pressure on leaders to reform into liberal democracies?

Ubuntu philosophy in Africa individualism and collectivism at the same time;
o Western cultures imply only individualism
o Ubuntu: individuals exist only through interactions and living with others
New partnership for Africas development NEPAD now integrated into African
Union
o Goals sustainable development, poverty reduction, stop marginalization of
Africa in the globalization process
o African peer review mechanism
Periodic reviews of the policies and practices of participating countries
Common African market beneficial to all African countries?
EU conditionality effects on Africa

Marua& co Environment, NGO

Tomi& co Whose GG
Cyber warfare primer stuxnet
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Cyberterrorism napad ki gre iz virtualnega na pravo infrastrukturo, proti non-combatants,
clandestine agents