PORTUGEZ V GSIS

FACTS:

Petitioner Portugez
o a utility clerk, who eventually became a branch manager then
appointed as Business Devt and PR Officer of GSIS. Moreover, he
was also a member of the Procurement BAC, OCIC.
o In 1997, he was temporarily assigned as caretaker of GSIS.
o In 1998, he was designated as Acting Assistant VP and OIC.

Respondent bank (RB)

o originally known as Royal Savings Bank.
o In 1983 and the early part of 1984, it underwent serious liquidity
problems and was placed by the CB under receivership.
o Failure to maintain a state of liquidity, CB ordered its closure in 1984
o 2 months after, it reopened under Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM)
and was renamed as Comsavings Bank.

1987 GSIS acquired interest of CBM in RB and CB and PDIC.

o GSIS put a substantial amount of capital to RB for rehabilitation and
controlled and managed RB which was renamed as GSIS Family
savings bank.
In 1998, MACALINO was appointed as President of the RB. Pursuant to such
appointment, the designation of petitioner as OIC and caretaker of RB was recalled but
his appointment as Acting Assistant VP was retained. To attain financial stability,
overhead expenses were cut down through streamlining. Thus, RB implemented an
early voluntary retirement program. In 2001, petitioner availed himself of the retirement
package and received 1.3M as retirement pay. In 2002, he filed a complaint against the
RB and Macalino for constructive dismissal and underpayment of wages, 13th month
pay and retirement benefits before the Labor Arbiter and invoked forced retirement due
to discrimination, unfair treatment, and intense pressure he received from Macalino. LA
declared RB guilty of illegal dismissal. RB appealed to NLRC which confirmed the
decision of LA, dismissed the appeal and MFR. RB appealed to CA through Certiorari
R65 and applied for TRO and/or WPI. Pending the resolution of the petition, LA issued
a writ of execution pursuant to the decision of NLRC and served a notice of
garnishment on the manager/cashier of RB. However, CA enjoined such
implementation. CA reversed the judgment of LA and NLRC and ruled out constructive
dismissal invoking voluntary separation from service when petitioner availed the early
retirement program and received the retirement pay. Petitioner filed MFR but was
denied by CA. Thus, the present PFRC.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was constructively dismissed from employment
HELD: NO.
When the findings of LA and NLRC are inconsistent with CAs, there is a need to review
the records to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to
evidentiary facts. In the case at bar, there is a divergence between the findings of the
LA (affirmed by NLRC) and CA.

Petitioner alleged the ff:

Macalino harassed him that forced him to resign

Deprivation of salary, benefits and privilieges as AA VP

RB granted much higher salary to the newly hired bank officers compared to
what he received
RB alleged:

He was not coerced to resign but he voluntarily did so as he availed of the

early retirement program and was duly paid his retirement benefits.

He was only holding an acting position (AA-VP) which was subject to

ratification of BOD. Since there was no ratification, RB cannot grant him the
salary and benefits accorded to such position.
CA found there was no constructive dismissal as there was no showing that:

the separation was due to involuntary resignation or forced severance

decrease in salary and privileges or downgrading of petitioner's rank

What was clear was until his voluntary retirement, petitioner was AAVP and he received
the salary and benefits accorded to such position.
After examination of the decisions of LA, NLRC, and CA, the court found the records of
the case bereft of evidence to substantiate the conclusions reached by LA and NLRC
that petitioner was constructively dismissed from employment.

Constructive dismissal or constructive discharge quitting because continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer
involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.
In the case at bar, a demotion in rank or diminution in pay was never raised as an
issue. Thus, petitioner suffered netither of the two cases that could give rise to cause of
action for constructive dismissal under the said definition.
Petitioner argued this:
However, the definition constructive dismissal is not conclusive as discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer may become so unbearable on the part of the
employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such
employment.

He argued that while the newly hired bank officers were given higher salaries
and fat allowances, he was merely paid the amount of 15K basic pay and 4K
allowance for the position of AAVP (according to him was way below what the
newly hired bank officers were enjoying)

In short, he claims DISCRIMINATION in terms of payment of salary and grant

of benefits and allowances.
NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE DISCRIMINATION.

Discrimination failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable

distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.
Reqts for claim of discrimination to prosper
1. No reasonable distinction or classification that can be obtained between
persons belonging to the same class
2. Persons belonging to the same class have not been treated alike.
The bank records showing newly hired officers were being paid the basic
salaries in the range of P25-30K could not be given any evidentiary weright as
such were never presented as evidence.
The evidence presented by petitioner was not substantial.

Petitioner also asserts that in cases of constructive dismissal, the burden of proof rests
on the employer to show that the employee was dismissed on a valid and just cause
and failing to discharge such presumption, as in the case at bar, RB should be
adjudged guilty of illegal dismissal = NOPE

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon

Global Forum on Migration and Development
Brussels, July 10, 2007 1
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph
of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, 2 to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. . . . In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

No rule in illegal dismissal cases that the employer has the burden of proof to
show that the separation is not motivated by discrimination and etc. However,
this principle presupposes that there is indeed an involuntary separation from
employment and the facts attendant to such forced separation was clearly
established.
BUT: THIS PRINCIPAL DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE (because Petitioner
failed to prove discrimination)

does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national
development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their
entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired
portion of their employment contract "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last
clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their
contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.

Indeed, we must be vigilant in striking down any attempt of the management to exploit
or oppress the working class, but it does not mean that we are but bound to uphold the
working class in every labor dispute. While our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and on the protection of labor, it does not mean
that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes
that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play. Under the Consti, while protection of the working class from
exploitation and unfair treatment is protected, social justice is upheld so as to strike a
balance between the worker and employer.

By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the
December 8, 2004 Decision 3 and April 1, 2005 Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which applied the subject clause, entreating this Court to declare the subject
clause unconstitutional.

DENIED PETITION.
SERRANO V GALLANT
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire families and communities
out of poverty. Their earnings have built houses, provided health care, equipped
schools and planted the seeds of businesses. They have woven together the world by
transmitting ideas and knowledge from country to country. They have provided the
dynamic human link between cultures, societies and economies. Yet, only recently have
we begun to understand not only how much international migration impacts
development, but how smart public policies can magnify this effect. TacESD

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month 5
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. 6

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. 7 Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines
on May 26, 1998. 8 DHAcET
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998
up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had
served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired
portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

complainant's claim for a salary differential. In addition, the respondents are hereby
ordered to pay the complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, the complainant's (petitioner's) claim
for attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount awarded to the
aforesaid employee under this Decision.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint 9 against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73, broken down as follows:

All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.

May 27/31, 1998 (5 days) incl. Leave pay US$413.90

June 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
July 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
August 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
Sept. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
Oct. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
Nov. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
Dec. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
Jan. 01/31, 1999 2,590.00
Feb. 01/28, 1999 2,590.00
Mar. 1/19, 1999 (19 days) incl. leave pay 1,640.00

25,382.23
Amount adjusted to chief mate's salary
(March 19/31, 1998 to April 1/30, 1998) + 1,060.50 10

TOTAL CLAIM US$26,442.73 11

=============
as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. SIDTCa

In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his

computation on the salary period of three months only rather than the entire
unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract
applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00,
consisting of petitioner's "[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed
overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation
per month." 14

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner
illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the
dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case
was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner],
jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at
the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY
U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant's salary for three (3)
months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and
severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of
payment, the amount of FORTY FIVE U.S. DOLLARS (US$ 45.00), 12 representing the

SO ORDERED. 13 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents appealed 15 to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to

question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed. ESacHC
Petitioner also appealed 16 to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission 17 that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their
salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. 18
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED. Respondents are
hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine currency, at the
prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment the following:
1. Three (3) months salary
$1,400 x 3 US$4,200.00
2. Salary differential 45.00
US$4,245.00
3. 10% Attorney's fees 424.50

TOTAL US$4,669.50
==========
The other findings are affirmed.
SO ORDERED. 19

The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner
by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A.
No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to
have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay." 20
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. 21 The NLRC denied the motion. 22
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari 23 with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. 24 After initially dismissing the petition on a
technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its
Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which granted the petition for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 151833, filed by petitioner.
In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the
reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner. 25
His Motion for Reconsideration 26 having been denied by the CA, 27 petitioner brings
his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
I The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in
accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting
unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of
employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months.
II In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were merely
applying their interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, it is submitted that
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to
decide questions of substance not theretofore determined by the Honorable Supreme
Court, particularly, the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the
constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment
of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months. HETDAa
III Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner's award
the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract
they form part of his salary. 28
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as he is
already old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary award for his
medical treatment and medication. 29 Required to comment, counsel for petitioner filed
a motion, urging the court to allow partial execution of the undisputed monetary award
and, at the same time, praying that the constitutional question be resolved. 30

Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the Court now
takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the
constitutional question raised therein.
On the first and second issues
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was
illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00
awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains disputed is only the computation of
the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of
petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of
the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total
of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in
addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire
nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate
of US$2,590.00. 31 AcTHCE
The Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs
the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment
contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package. 32 It also
impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino
workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which
OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same
monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the
disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between the
two groups; 33 and that it defeats Section 18, 34 Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers, whether
deployed locally or overseas. 35
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor tribunals are not
in line with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed
OFWs. Though there are conflicting rulings on this, petitioner urges the Court to sort
them out for the guidance of affected OFWs. 36
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No. 8042
serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement agencies. He marks the
statement made by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum, viz.:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money
claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the

court or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies
that are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for
the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful
contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money claims was
reduced under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. 37 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the
subject clause sacrifices the well-being of OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes
foreign employers better off than local employers because in cases involving the illegal
dismissal of employees, foreign employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum
of only three months of the unexpired employment contract while local employers are
liable for the full lump-sum salaries of their employees. As petitioner puts it:
In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the amount of
backwages they have to give their employees they have illegally dismissed, following
well-entrenched and unequivocal jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand,
foreign employers will only be limited to giving the illegally dismissed migrant workers
the maximum of three (3) months unpaid salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of
the contract that can be more than three (3) months. 38
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause, for it
deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to under his fixedperiod employment contract. 39
The Arguments of Respondents
In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the constitutional issue
should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal
before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal
before the NLRC. 40 cTACIa

employees who can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers who
are or can become regular employees. Hence, the OSG posits that there are rights and
privileges exclusive to local workers, but not available to OFWs; that these peculiarities
make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under the subject
clause of the money claims of OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision
does not violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of the Constitution.
45
Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police power
measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement agencies for this
"redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to
promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government
that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and
humane conditions." 46
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its
co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that
there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination; 47 (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party 48 and
at the earliest opportunity; 49 and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota
of the case, 50 otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some
other ground. 51 DICcTa
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving
petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his
monetary award based on the salary period of three months only as provided under the
subject clause.

The Arguments of the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General (OSG) 41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15,
1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998 employment contract.
Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's contract, the provisions thereof are
deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner's employment, especially on the matter
of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties. 42
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of the
nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary benefits must necessarily
be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the essential elements that distinguish
OFWs from local workers: first, while local workers perform their jobs within Philippine
territory, OFWs perform their jobs for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our
courts to acquire jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce
judgment; and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission 43
and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, 44 OFWs are contractual

The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the
requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the
interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the
issue is not raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be considered
at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. 52
Records disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first
raised, not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration with said labor tribunal, 53 and reiterated in his Petition for Certiorari
before the CA. 54 Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is
not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue.
The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function its
function in the present case is limited to determining questions of fact to which the
legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself; 55 thus, its foremost function
is to administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its

provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the
power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject
clause. 56 Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA was
undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in
its decision.
The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the case
likewise obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to his lump-sum salary for the
entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period
of three months, strikes at the very core of the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject
clause.
Does the subject clause violate Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts?

with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs
wherever they may be employed. 61 Police power legislations adopted by the State to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare
of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those
already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate
measures taken by the State to promote public welfare. 62
Does the subject clause violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor
as a protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

The answer is in the negative.

Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his
contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive 57
is not tenable. ETAICc
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation, 58 and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; 59
however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and
deemed a part thereof. 60 Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II
is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate
from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the
execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998.
Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired
the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998
employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions
of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be
declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for
the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a
business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,

Section 18, 63 Article II and Section 3, 64 Article XIII accord all members of the labor
sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally
enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne
by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is
enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances. 65 AECacT
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to
incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be
valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on
substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to
existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class. 66
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest; 67 b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the
government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state
interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest; 68 and c) strict judicial scrutiny 69 in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right 70 or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class 71 is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest. 72

Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect

classifications 73 based on race 74 or gender 75 but not when the classification is
drawn along income categories. 76
It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 77 the constitutionality of a
provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), a government
financial institution (GFI), was challenged for maintaining its rank-and-file employees
under the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file employees of
other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL by their respective charters. Finding that
the disputed provision contained a suspect classification based on salary grade, the
Court deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review of the
constitutionality of said provision. More significantly, it was in this case that the Court
revealed the broad outlines of its judicial philosophy, to wit: aHDTAI
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as
the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se
controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to
support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon
them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come
to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a
different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests
and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with
our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the
intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of
each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly,
they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the endall of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and
different from others.
xxx xxx xxx
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal
protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution.
The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing

inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II,
Section 10, in "all phases of national development", further explicitated in Article XIII,
are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater
equality. . . . [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for
a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic
rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social
justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working
class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more
in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into
a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. TDcHCa
xxx xxx xxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis"
test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or
the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view
would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law
repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor
committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of
its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or
nature of the actor.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or
officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status,
with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower
grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are
competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the
rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in
rank possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career
advancement are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people
whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job

marketability, it is they and not the officers who have the real economic and
financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to
free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent
standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs
counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it
can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)
Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor", the Court in the
present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the
subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment; cITCAa
OFWs with employment contracts of
less than one year vis--vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or
more
As pointed out by petitioner, 78 it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission 79 (Second Division, 1999) that the Court laid down the
following rules on the application of the periods prescribed under Section 10 (5) of R.A.
No. 804, to wit:
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an
illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or three (3) months' salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract
concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words
"for every year of the unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries . . . for three
months". To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3)
months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard
and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is
contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute,
care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the lawmaking body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statute
and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 80 (Emphasis
supplied)

In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his 10-month
contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months and 6 days of his
contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made conflicting
rulings on Section 10 (5). One was Asian Center for Career and Employment System
and Services v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division, October 1998),
81 which involved an OFW who was awarded a two-year employment contract, but was
dismissed after working for one year and two months. The LA declared his dismissal
illegal and awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months, the
unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the award to
SR3,600.00 equivalent to his three months' salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:
Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion
of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less. SATDEI
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent's employment contract is
eight (8) months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary
corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600. 82
Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission (Third Division, December 1998), 83 which involved an OFW (therein
respondent Erlinda Osdana) who was originally granted a 12-month contract, which
was deemed renewed for another 12 months. After serving for one year and sevenand-a-half months, respondent Osdana was illegally dismissed, and the Court awarded
her salaries for the entire unexpired portion of four and one-half months of her contract.
The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10 (5) has since been adopted in the following
cases:
Case Title Contract Period of Unexpired Period Applied
Period Service Period in the Computation
of the Monetary
Award
Skippers v. 6 months 2 months 4 months 4 months
Maguad 84
Bahia 9 months 8 months 4 months 4 months
Shipping v.
Reynaldo
Chua 85
Centennial 9 months 4 months 5 months 5 months
Transmarine v.

dela Cruz l 86
Talidano v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
Falcon 87
Univan v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
CA 88
Oriental v. 12 months more than 2 10 months 3 months
CA 89 months
PCL v. 12 months more than 2 more or less 9 3 months
NLRC 90 months months
Olarte v. 12 months 21 days 11 months and 3 months
Nayona 91 9 days
JSS v. 12 months 16 days 11 months and 3 months
Ferrer 92 24 days
Pentagon v. 12 months 9 months and 2 months and 2 months and
Adelantar 93 7 days 23 days 23 days

awarded his salaries for the remaining 4 months. In contrast, the respondent OFWs in
Oriental and PCL who had also worked for about 2 months out of their 12-month
contracts were awarded their salaries for only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their
contracts. Even the OFWs involved in Talidano and Univan who had worked for a
longer period of 3 months out of their 12-month contracts before being illegally
dismissed were awarded their salaries for only 3 months.
To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A
with an employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00 and
a hypothetical OFW-B with an employment contract of 15 months with the same
monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the same day and
under the same employer, and were illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under
the subject clause, OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for
the remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only
US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion of his
contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14 months of his
contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.
The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account
jurisprudence that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July 14, 1995, 97 illegally
dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. The matrix
below speaks for itself:

Phil. Employ 12 months 10 months 2 months Unexpired

v. Paramio, portion
et al. 94 ECDHIc
Flourish 2 years 26 days 23 months and 6 months or
Maritime v. 4 days 3 months for
Almanzor 95 each year of
contract
Athenna 1 year, 10 1 month 1 year, 9 6 months or
Manpower v. months months and 3 months for
Villanos 96 and 28 days 28 days each year of
contract
As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two
categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of
less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second category consists of OFWs with
fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal,
they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired
portion of their contracts. IaSCTE
The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted. In Skippers,
the respondent OFW worked for only 2 months out of his 6-month contract, but was

Case Title Contract Period of Unexpired Period Applied in

Period Service Period the Computation
of the Monetary
Award
ATCI v. 2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
CA, et al. 98
Phil. 2 years 7 days 23 months and 23 months and
Integrated v. 23 days 23 days
NLRC 99
JGB v. 2 years 9 months 15 months 15 months
NLC 100
Agoy v. 2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
NLRC 101
EDI v. 2 years 5 months 19 months 19 months
NLRC,
et al. 102

Barros v. 12 months 4 months 8 months 8 months

NLRC,
et al. 103
Philippine 12 months 6 months and 5 months and 5 months and
Transmarine v. 22 days 18 days 18 days
Carilla 104
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the
unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform
rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of
their employment contracts. TaDSHC
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their
employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an
unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage
of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the
unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category
from such prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one
year.
Among OFWs With Employment
Contracts of More Than One Year
Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause, the Court
now has misgivings on the accuracy of the Marsaman interpretation.
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying phrases "every year" and
"unexpired term". By its ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a limited or definite
extent of time. 105 Corollarily, that "every year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is
significant in many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it
were any shorter, there would be no occasion for such unexpired term to be measured
by every year; and second, the original term must be more than one year, for otherwise,
whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently,
the more decisive factor in the determination of when the subject clause "for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the
length of the original contract period as held in Marsaman, 106 but the length of the
unexpired portion of the contract period the subject clause applies in cases when the
unexpired portion of the contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically
requires that the original contract period be more than one year. EDCIcH
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among
OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally

dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries
for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one
year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and
their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.
To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject
clause, the Court assumes hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24month contract at a salary rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C is illegally dismissed
on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on the 13th month. Considering that there is at least
12 months remaining in the contract period of OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the
computation of the latter's monetary benefits. Thus, OFW-C will be entitled, not to
US$12,000.00 or the latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired portion of the
contract, but to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries for 3 months
out of the 12-month unexpired term of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is
spared from the effects of the subject clause, for there are only 11 months left in the
latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be entitled to US$11,000.00, which is
equivalent to his/her total salaries for the entire 11-month unexpired portion.
OFWs vis--vis Local Workers
With Fixed-Period Employment
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was
applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment. 107
The earliest rule prescribing a uniform system of computation was actually Article 299
of the Code of Commerce (1888), 108 to wit:
Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their shop clerks and
employees should have been made of a fixed period, none of the contracting parties,
without the consent of the other, may withdraw from the fulfillment of said contract until
the termination of the period agreed upon.
Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the loss and damage
suffered, with the exception of the provisions contained in the following articles.
In Reyes v. The Compaia Maritima, 109 the Court applied the foregoing provision to
determine the liability of a shipping company for the illegal discharge of its managers
prior to the expiration of their fixed-term employment. The Court therein held the
shipping company liable for the salaries of its managers for the remainder of their fixedterm employment. cAEaSC
There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605 of the Code
of Commerce which provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent
should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment

of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery,

theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice
or manifest or proven negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, 110 in which the
Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its
illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, 111 Article 299 of the Code
of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain
time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause,
before the fulfillment of the contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan 112 read the disjunctive "or" in Article
1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local workers who are
employed for a time certain although for no particular skill. This interpretation of Article
1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel de France Company. 113 And in both
Lemoine and Palomar, the Court adopted the general principle that in actions for
wrongful discharge founded on Article 1586, local workers are entitled to recover
damages to the extent of the amount stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their
contract. On the computation of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v. Gay
114 held: ITDHcA
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and nothing has been
brought to our attention to the contrary under Spanish jurisprudence, that when an
employee is wrongfully discharged it is his duty to seek other employment of the same
kind in the same community, for the purpose of reducing the damages resulting from
such wrongful discharge. However, while this is the general rule, the burden of showing
that he failed to make an effort to secure other employment of a like nature, and that
other employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the defendant. When an
employee is wrongfully discharged under a contract of employment his prima facie
damage is the amount which he would be entitled to had he continued in such
employment until the termination of the period. (Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen
vs. Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich., 43.) 115
(Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on fixed-term
employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3, Title I, and Sections 2
(Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of Work), Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV.
116 Much like Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, the new provisions of the Civil
Code do not expressly provide for the remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is
illegally discharged. However, it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v.
Rich, 117 the Court carried over the principles on the payment of damages underlying
Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a case involving the

illegal discharge of a local worker whose fixed-period employment contract was entered
into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was already in effect. 118
More significantly, the same principles were applied to cases involving overseas Filipino
workers whose fixed-term employment contracts were illegally terminated, such as in
First Asian Trans & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 119 involving seafarers who were
illegally discharged. In Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 120 an OFW who was illegally dismissed prior to the expiration
of her fixed-period employment contract as a baby sitter, was awarded salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract. The Court arrived at the same
ruling in Anderson v. National Labor Relations Commission, 121 which involved a
foreman hired in 1988 in Saudi Arabia for a fixed term of two years, but who was
illegally dismissed after only nine months on the job the Court awarded him salaries
corresponding to 15 months, the unexpired portion of his contract. In Asia World
Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 122 a Filipino working as a
security officer in 1989 in Angola was awarded his salaries for the remaining period of
his 12-month contract after he was wrongfully discharged. Finally, in Vinta Maritime Co.,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 123 an OFW whose 12-month contract
was illegally cut short in the second month was declared entitled to his salaries for the
remaining 10 months of his contract.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment
who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in
that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment. DEAaIS
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion
of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification
of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the
Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and
determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive
means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 124 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state 125 for which some individual liberties must give way,

such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards,

126 or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern. 127

The liability of the principal and the recruitment/placement agency or any and all claims
under this Section shall be joint and several.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state
interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.

Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on any money claims

exclusive of damages under this Section shall not be less than fifty percent (50%) of
such money claims: Provided, That any installment payments, if applicable, to satisfy
any such compromise or voluntary settlement shall not be more than two (2) months.
Any compromise/voluntary agreement in violation of this paragraph shall be null and
void. TaDAHE

The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to protect
the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas . . . . By limiting the liability to three
months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign
employers." The limitation also protects the interest of local placement agencies, which
otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of pesos in "termination pay". 128

Non-compliance with the mandatory period for resolutions of cases provided under this
Section shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:

The OSG explained further:

Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money
claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the
court or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies
that are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for
the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful
contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money are reduced under
Section 10 of RA 8042. IaHDcT
This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the
government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps
[assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed
under decent and humane conditions. 129 (Emphasis supplied)
However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the source of
its perception of the state interest sought to be served by the subject clause.
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep. Bonifacio Gallego
in sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from which the law originated; 130
but the speech makes no reference to the underlying reason for the adoption of the
subject clause. That is only natural for none of the 29 provisions in HB 14314
resembles the subject clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on money
claims, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of the complaint, the claim arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within
the prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies
therewith;
(2) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office
for five (5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any
liability which any such official may have incurred under other existing laws or rules and
regulations as a consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph.
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the
computation of money claims.
A rule on the computation of money claims containing the subject clause was inserted
and eventually adopted as the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The Court
examined the rationale of the subject clause in the transcripts of the "Bicameral
Conference Committee (Conference Committee) Meetings on the Magna Carta on
OCWs (Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 2077 and House Bill No. 14314)."
However, the Court finds no discernible state interest, let alone a compelling one, that
is sought to be protected or advanced by the adoption of the subject clause.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against
OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect
the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies,
such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a
justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector,
but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is
composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged

sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution

commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a
compelling state interest is odious. EScIAa
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of
placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in
place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the
constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of
Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative
disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual
obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary
measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA
Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers,
dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against
erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of
aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign
principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative
of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the clause
directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3, 131 Article XIII of the
Constitution.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, 132 there
are some which this Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being
one, 133 particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 134 has described to be not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be
deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and
observed without need for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the
constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights
embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical,
if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being
overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and "security of
tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest
interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of
removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right
to continued employment a utopian notion, doubtless but still hardly within the
contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the

parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not only
the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as well. Without specific and
pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to
approximate at least the aims of the Constitution. cSCTEH
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a
positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing
to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the
1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for
their enforceability. 135 (Emphasis added)
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct
enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be declared
unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every
worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice
for labor.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working
class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for
whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative action and
judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the
executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the
welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional
agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge
to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the
Constitution with special protection such as the working class or a section thereof
the Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same
to strict judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny
formulated inCentral Bank Employee Association exaggerate the significance of
Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII in
conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the
application of the equal protection clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated in
Agabon. aCTHDA
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause
violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property,
consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. 136
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject clause of
limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in case of illegal dismissal,
is to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign employers. This is plain
speculation. As earlier discussed, there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of
the deliberations leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would

indicate that there is an existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even
just a pretext of one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it
is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, 137 Article III
of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the
December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days
computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the
entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract,
pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

SKIPPER V DOZA
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the 5 July 2006 Decision 1 and 7
November 2006 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88148. 3

On the Third Issue

This arose from consolidated labor case 4 filed by seafarers Napoleon De Gracia (De
Gracia), Isidro L. Lata (Lata), Charlie Aprosta (Aprosta), and Nathaniel Doza (Doza)
against local manning agency Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and its foreign principal,
Skippers Maritime Services, Inc., Ltd. (Skippers) for unremitted home allotment for the
month of December 1998, salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Skippers, on the
other hand, answered with a claim for reimbursement of De Gracia, Aprosta and Lata's
repatriation expenses, as well as award of moral damages and attorney's fees.

Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis
in the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have
been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10 (5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a
Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic
wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is
compensation for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday
pay is compensation for any work "performed" on designated rest days and holidays.
SAcCIH
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of
overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award, unless
there is evidence that he performed work during those periods. As the Court held in
Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 138
However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be disallowed in light of
our ruling in Cagampan v. National Labor Relations Commission, to wit:
The rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said was
actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to
overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly
salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the
entitlement to such benefit must first be established.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired portion of the
contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the
seamen.

De Gracia, Lata, Aprosta and Doza's (De Gracia, et al.) claims were dismissed by the
Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. 5 The Labor Arbiter also dismissed Skippers' claims. 6
De Gracia, et al. appealed 7 the Labor Arbiter's decision with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), but the First Division of the NLRC dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit. 8 Doza, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the
NLRC, 9 so they filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). 10
The CA granted the petition, reversed the Labor Arbiter and NLRC Decisions, and
awarded to De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta their unremitted home allotment, three months
salary each representing the unexpired portion of their employment contracts and
attorney's fees. 11 No award was given to Doza for lack of factual basis. 12 The CA
denied Skippers' Motion for Partial Reconsideration. 13 Hence, this Petition.
The Facts
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. deployed, in behalf of Skippers, De Gracia, Lata, and
Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom Star, under the following terms and
conditions:
Name: Napoleon O. De Gracia
Position: 3rd Engineer
Contract Duration: 10 months
Basic Monthly Salary: US$800.00
Contract Date: 17 July 1998 14
Name: Isidro L. Lata ETCcSa
Position: 4th Engineer

Contract Duration: 12 months

Basic Monthly Salary: US$600.00
Contract Date: 17 April 1998 15
Name: Charlie A. Aprosta
Position: Third Officer
Contract Duration: 12 months
Basic Monthly Salary: US$600.00
Contract Date: 17 April 1998 16

Skippers also claims that, due to the disembarkation of De Gracia, et al., 17 other
seafarers disembarked under abnormal circumstances. 29 For this reason, it was
suggested that Polish seafarers be utilized instead of Filipino seamen. 30 This is again
evidenced by a fax of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to Skippers, which bears conflicting
dates of 24 January 1998 and 24 January 1999. 31
Skippers, in its Position Paper, admitted non-payment of home allotment for the month
of December 1998, but prayed for the offsetting of such amount with the repatriation
expenses in the following manner: 32

Paragraph 2 of all the employment contracts stated that: "The terms and conditions of
the Revised Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Seafarers
approved per Department Order No. 33 and Memorandum Circular No. 55, both series
of 1996 shall be strictly and faithfully observed." 17 No employment contract was
submitted for Nathaniel Doza.

SeafarerRepatriation ExpenseHome AllotmentBalance

De Gracia, et al., claimed that Skippers failed to remit their respective allotments for
almost five months, compelling them to air their grievances with the Romanian
Seafarers Free Union. 18 On 16 December 1998, ITF Inspector Adrian Mihalcioiu of the
Romanian Seafarers Union sent Captain Savvas of Cosmos Shipping a fax letter,
relaying the complaints of his crew, namely: home allotment delay, unpaid salaries (only
advances), late provisions, lack of laundry services (only one washing machine), and
lack of maintenance of the vessel (perforated and unrepaired deck). 19 To date,
however, Skippers only failed to remit the home allotment for the month of December
1998. 20 On 28 January 1999, De Gracia, et al. were unceremoniously discharged from
MV Wisdom Stars and immediately repatriated. 21 Upon arrival in the Philippines, De
Gracia, et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter on 4 April 1999
and prayed for payment of their home allotment for the month of December 1998,
salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. 22

Since De Gracia, et al., pre-terminated their contracts, Skippers claims they are liable
for their repatriation expenses 33 in accordance with Section 19 (G) of Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of
1996 which states:

Skippers, on the other hand, claims that at around 2:00 a.m. on 3 December 1998, De
Gracia, smelling strongly of alcohol, went to the cabin of Gabriel Oleszek, Master of MV
Wisdom Stars, and was rude, shouting noisily to the master. 23 De Gracia left the
master's cabin after a few minutes and was heard shouting very loudly somewhere
down the corridors. 24 This incident was evidenced by the Captain's Report sent via
telex to Skippers on said date. 25

De GraciaUS$1,340.00US$900.00US$440.00
AprostaUS$1,340.00US$600.00US$740.00
LataUS$1,340.00US$600.00US$740.00

G.A seaman who requests for early termination of his contract shall be liable for his
repatriation cost as well as the transportation cost of his replacement. The employer
may, in case of compassionate grounds, assume the transportation cost of the
seafarer's replacement.
Skippers also prayed for payment of moral damages and attorney's fees. 34
The Decision of the Labor Arbiter
The Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on 18 February 2002, with its dispositive
portion declaring: cDCEHa
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing herein action for lack of merit.
Respondents' claim for reimbursement of the expenses they incurred in the repatriation
of complainant Nathaniel Doza is likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 35

Skippers also claims that at 12:00 noon on 22 January 1999, four Filipino seafarers,
namely Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and Doza, arrived in the master's cabin and
demanded immediate repatriation because they were not satisfied with the ship. 26 De
Gracia, et al. threatened that they may become crazy any moment and demanded for
all outstanding payments due to them. 27 This is evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship
MV Wisdom to Skippers, which however bears conflicting dates of 22 January 1998
and 22 January 1999. 28

The Labor Arbiter dismissed De Gracia, et al.'s complaint for illegal dismissal because
the seafarers voluntarily pre-terminated their employment contracts by demanding for
immediate repatriation due to dissatisfaction with the ship. 36 The Labor Arbiter held
that such voluntary pre-termination of employment contract is akin to resignation, 37 a
form of termination by employee of his employment contract under Article 285 of the
Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter gave weight and credibility to the telex of the master of
the vessel to Skippers, claiming that De Gracia, et al. demanded for immediate
repatriation. 38 Due to the absence of illegal dismissal, De Gracia, et al.'s claim for

salaries representing the unexpired portion of their employment contracts was

dismissed. 39

c.Aprosta = US$1,800.00
3.Attorney's fees and litigation expenses equivalent to 10% of the total claims.

The Labor Arbiter also dismissed De Gracia et al.'s claim for home allotment for
December 1998. 40 The Labor Arbiter explained that payment for home allotment is "in
the nature of extraordinary money where the burden of proof is shifted to the worker
who must prove he is entitled to such monetary benefit." 41 Since De Gracia, et al.,
were not able to prove their entitlement to home allotment, such claim was dismissed.
42

SO ORDERED. 47

Lastly, Skippers' claim for reimbursement of repatriation expenses was likewise denied,
since Article 19 (G) of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996 allows the
employer, in case the seafarer voluntarily pre-terminates his contract, to assume the
repatriation cost of the seafarer on compassionate grounds. 43
The Decision of the NLRC
The NLRC, on 28 October 2002, dismissed De Gracia, et al.'s appeal for lack of merit
and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. 44 The NLRC considered De Gracia, et al.'s
claim for home allotment for December 1998 unsubstantiated, since home allotment is
a benefit which De Gracia, et al., must prove their entitlement to. 45 The NLRC also
denied the claim for illegal dismissal because De Gracia, et al., were not able to refute
the telex received by Skippers from the vessel's master that De Gracia, et al.,
voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts and demanded immediate repatriation due to
their dissatisfaction with the ship's operations. 46

The CA declared the Labor Arbiter and NLRC to have committed grave abuse of
discretion when they relied upon the telex message of the captain of the vessel stating
that De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts and demanded
immediate repatriation. 48 The telex message was "a self-serving document that does
not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion that
petitioners indeed voluntarily demanded their immediate repatriation." 49 For this
reason, the repatriation of De Gracia, et al., prior to the expiration of their contracts
showed they were illegally dismissed from employment. 50 DaIACS
In addition, the failure to remit home allotment pay was effectively admitted by
Skippers, and prayed to be offset from the repatriation expenses. 51 Since there is no
proof that De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts, the repatriation
expenses are for the account of Skippers, and cannot be offset with the home allotment
pay for December 1998. 52
No relief was granted to Doza due to lack of factual basis to support his petition. 53
Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total claims was granted since it involved an
action for recovery of wages or where the employee was forced to litigate and incur
expenses to protect his rights and interest. 54

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The Issues

The CA, on 5 July 2006, granted De Gracia, et al.'s petition and reversed the decisions
of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, its dispositive portion reading as follows:

Skippers, in its Petition for Review on Certiorari, assigned the following errors in the CA
Decision:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolution dated
October 28, 2002 and the Order dated August 31, 2004 rendered by the public
respondent NLRC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Let another judgment be entered
holding private respondents jointly and severally liable to petitioners for the payment of:

a)The Court of Appeals seriously erred in not giving due credence to the master's telex
message showing that the respondents voluntarily requested to be repatriated.

1.Unremitted home allotment pay for the month of December, 1998 or the equivalent
thereof in Philippine pesos:
a.De Gracia = US$900.00
b.Lata = US$600.00
c.Aprosta = US$600.00
2.Salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for 3 months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, or the equivalent thereof in Philippine
pesos:
a.De Gracia = US$2,400.00
b.Lata = US$1,800.00

b)The Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding petitioners liable to pay backwages
and the alleged unremitted home allotment pay despite the finding of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC that the claims are baseless.
c)The Court of Appeals seriously erred in awarding attorney's fees in favor of
respondents despite its findings that the facts attending in this case do not support the
claim for moral and exemplary damages. 55
The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition and affirm the CA Decision, but modify the award.

For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural
and substantive due process. The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes
procedural due process, while the legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive
due process. 56
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice
and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before
the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2)
the second notice informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be
complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that
an actual hearing be conducted. 57
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be
made under a just or authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.
In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al., regarding the
cause of their dismissal. Cosmoship furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the
local manning agency, claiming that De Gracia, et al., were repatriated because the
latter voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given credibility and
weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pre-termination of the
employment contract "akin to resignation" and no illegal dismissal. However, as
correctly ruled by the CA, the telex message is "a biased and self-serving document
that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence." If, indeed, De Gracia, et
al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts, then De Gracia, et al., should have
submitted their written resignations.
Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the
employment contract by "serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month
in advance." Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written
notice of resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that
the employer terminated the seafarers. In addition, the telex message relied upon by
the Labor Arbiter and NLRC bore conflicting dates of 22 January 1998 and 22 January
1999, giving doubt to the veracity and authenticity of the document. In 22 January
1998, De Gracia, et al., were not even employed yet by the foreign principal. For these
reasons, the dismissal of De Gracia, et al., was illegal.
On the issue of home allotment pay, Skippers effectively admitted non-remittance of
home allotment pay for the month of December 1998 in its Position Paper. Skippers
sought the repatriation expenses to be offset with the home allotment pay. However,
since De Gracia, et al.'s dismissal was illegal, their repatriation expenses were for the
account of Skippers and could not be offset with the home allotment pay.
Contrary to the claim of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC that the home allotment pay is in
"the nature of extraordinary money where the burden of proof is shifted to the worker
who must prove he is entitled to such monetary benefit," Section 8 of POEA

Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996, states that the allotment actually
constitutes at least eighty percent (80%) of the seafarer's salary: ScCDET
The seafarer is required to make an allotment which is payable once a month to his
designated allottee in the Philippines through any authorized Philippine bank. The
master/employer/agency shall provide the seafarer with facilities to do so at no expense
to the seafarer. The allotment shall be at least eighty percent (80%) of the seafarer's
monthly basic salary including backwages, if any. (Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 2 of the employment contracts of De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta incorporated
the provisions of above Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996, in the
employment contracts. Since said memorandum states that home allotment of
seafarers actually constitutes at least eighty percent (80%) of their salary, home
allotment pay is not in the nature of an extraordinary money or benefit, but should
actually be considered as salary which should be paid for services rendered. For this
reason, such non-remittance of home allotment pay should be considered as unpaid
salaries, and Skippers shall be liable to pay the home allotment pay of De Gracia, et al.,
for the month of December 1998.
Damages
As admitted by Skippers in its Position Paper, the home allotment pay for December
1998 due to De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta is:
SeafarerHome Allotment Pay
De GraciaUS$900.00
AprostaUS$600.00
LataUS$600.00
The monthly salary of De Gracia, according to his employment contract, is only
US$800.00. However, since Skippers admitted in its Position Paper a higher home
allotment pay for De Gracia, we award the higher amount of home allotment pay for De
Gracia in the amount of US$900.00. Since the home allotment pay can be considered
as unpaid salaries, the peso equivalent of the dollar amount should be computed using
the prevailing rate at the time of termination since it was due and demandable to De
Gracia, et al., on 28 January 1999.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) provides for money claims
in cases of unjust termination of employment contracts:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause
as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of
his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

The Migrant Workers Act provides that salaries for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract or three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less, shall be awarded to the overseas Filipino worker, in cases of illegal
dismissal. However, in 24 March 2009, Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., 58 the Court, in an En Banc Decision, declared
unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" and awarded the entire unexpired portion of the employment contract
to the overseas Filipino worker.
On 8 March 2010, however, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 (RA 10022) amended
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers Act, and once again reiterated the provision of
awarding the unexpired portion of the employment contract or three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Nevertheless, since the termination occurred on January 1999 before the passage of
the amendatory RA 10022, we shall apply RA 8042, as unamended, without touching
on the constitutionality of Section 7 of RA 10022.

(1)A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2)Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3)Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4)Adultery or concubinage;
(5)Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6)Illegal search;
(7)Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8)Malicious prosecution;
(9)Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10)Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of
this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

The declaration in March 2009 of the unconstitutionality of the clause "or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in RA 8042 shall be
given retroactive effect to the termination that occurred in January 1999 because an
unconstitutional clause in the law confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no
protection. The unconstitutional provision is inoperative, as if it was not passed into law
at all. 59

Article 2229 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, provides for recovery of exemplary
damages:

As such, we compute the claims as follows:

In this case, we agree with the CA in not awarding moral and exemplary damages for
lack of factual basis.

Seafarer Contract Contract Repatriation Unexpired Monthly Total

TermDateDateTermSalaryClaims
De Gracia10 months17 Jul. 199828 Jan. 19993 months & US$800US$2933.34
20 days
Lata12 months17 Apr. 199828 Jan. 19992 months & US$600US$1600
20 days
Aprosta12 months17 Apr. 199828 Jan. 19992 months & US$600US$1600
20 days
Given the above computation, we modify the CA's imposition of award, and grant to De
Gracia, et al., salaries representing the unexpired portion of their contracts, instead of
salaries for three (3) months.
Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides for recovery of moral damages
in certain cases: HTDAac
Art. 2219.Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

Art. 2229.Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.

Lastly, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides for recovery of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation:
Art. 2208.In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other
than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1)When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2)When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3)In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4)In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5)Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6)In actions for legal support;
(7)In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
(8)In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9)In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10)When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11)In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
Article 111 of the Labor Code provides for a maximum award of attorney's fees in cases
of recovery of wages:
Art. 111.Attorney's fees.
a.In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed
attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered. cHaDIA
b.It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or
administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages, attorney's fees which exceed ten
percent of the amount of wages recovered.
Since De Gracia, et al., had to secure the services of the lawyer to recover their unpaid
salaries and protect their interest, we agree with the CA's imposition of attorney's fees
in the amount of ten percent (10%) of the total claims.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 5 July 2006 with
MODIFICATION. Petitioners Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and Skippers Maritime
Services, Inc., Ltd. are jointly and severally liable for payment of the following:
1)Unremitted home allotment pay for the month of December 1998 in its equivalent rate
in Philippine Pesos at the time of termination on 28 January 1999:
a.De Gracia = US$900.00
b.Lata = US$600.00
c.Aprosta = US$600.00
2)Salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or its current equivalent
in Philippine Pesos:
a.De Gracia = US$2,933.34
b.Lata = US$1,600.00
c.Aprosta = US$1,600.00
3)Attorney's fees and litigation expenses equivalent to 10% of the total claims.
SAMEER V BAJARO
Assailed in this Petition for Review is the August 22, 2005 Decision 1 and October 11,
2005 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87672 which
nullified and set aside the March 31, 2004 Decision 3 and September 22, 2004
Resolution 4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated in toto
the July 12, 2002 Decision 5 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC OFW CASE No. (M) 01-071366-00.
It is undisputed that sometime in 1999, 6 petitioner company Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency, Inc. deployed respondents Maricel N. Bajaro (Bajaro), Pamela P.
Morilla (Morilla), Daisy L. Magdaong, Leah J. Tabujara, Lea M. Cancino, Michiel D.

Meliang, Raquel Sumigcay (Sumigcay), Rose R. Saria, Leona L. Angulo and Melody B.
Ingal to Taiwan to work as operators for its foreign principal, Mabuchi Motors Company,
Ltd. under individual two-year employment contracts, 7 with a monthly salary of Taiwan
Dollars (NT$) 15,840.00 each. Prior to their deployment, each respondent paid
petitioner company the amount of P47,900.00 as placement fee. cAISTC
However, after working for only a period of eleven (11) months and before the
expiration of the two-year period, respondents' employment contracts were terminated
and they were repatriated to the Philippines. This prompted the filing of a complaint for
illegal dismissal against petitioner company and its President and General Manager,
individual petitioner Rizalina Lamson, 8 with prayer for the payment of salaries and
wages covering the unexpired portion of their employment contracts in lieu of
reinstatement, and with allegations of illegal deductions and illegal collection of
placement fees. Respondents Bajaro, Morilla and Sumigcay likewise sought
reimbursement of the amount they personally expended for their plane tickets for their
return flight, alleging that their employment contracts provided for free transportation
expenses in going to and from Taiwan. Collectively, respondents prayed for the award
of damages as well as attorney's fees.
In defense, petitioners claimed that respondents were validly retrenched due to severe
business losses suffered by their foreign principal. They denied the alleged deductions
amounting to NT$7,500.00 from petitioners' monthly salaries and that, consequently,
petitioners are not entitled to damages and attorney's fees.
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In its July 12, 2002 Decision, 9 the Labor Arbiter found respondents to have been
illegally dismissed for petitioners' failure to substantiate their defense of a valid
retrenchment. Hence, the Labor Arbiter granted respondents' money claims, citing
Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 10 as then applicable, 11 which provides:
Section 10.Money claims. . . .
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and
all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case
may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. SEIDAC
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment
contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made
locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.

Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims

inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the
approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause
as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of
his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, petitioners were directed to pay each respondent, jointly and solidarily, the
amount of P47,900.00 as full reimbursement of their individual placement fees, with an
interest of 12% per annum; the amount of NT$47,520.00 each, representing three (3)
months' worth of their salary amounting to NT$15,840.00; the amount of NT$7,500.00
which had been illegally deducted from respondents' monthly salaries; the amount of
NT$6,000.00 each as reimbursement for the transportation expenses of respondents
Bajaro, Sumigcay and Morilla in going home to the Philippines; and attorney's fees of
10% of the total monetary award.
The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, respondents SAMEER
OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INCORPORATED and RIZALINA LAMZON, are
hereby ordered jointly and severally to: AEaSTC
(a)pay each complainant an amount equivalent to three (3) months salary which is
NT$47,520 or a total of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED TAIWAN DOLLARS (NT$475,200) or its Philippine currency equivalent at
the time of payment;
(b)pay each complainant NT$82,500.00 representing the amount that has been illegally
deducted from their salaries for a period of eleven (11) months or a total of EIGHT
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND TAIWAN DOLLARS (NT$825,000) or its
Philippine currency equivalent at the time of payment;
(c)pay each complainant, Php47,900.00 by way of reimbursement of placement fees or
a total of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS (Php479,000.00)
plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum;
(d)pay complainants MARICEL BAJARO, RAQUEL SUMIGCAY and PAMELA
MORILLA NT$6,000.00 as and by way of reimbursement to their transportation
expenses in going home to the Philippines, or its Philippine currency at the time of
payment;
(e)pay attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
SO ORDERED.
The NLRC's Ruling: On appeal, the NLRC vacated and set aside 12 the Labor Arbiter's
Decision upon a finding that all the requirements for a valid retrenchment have been

established, thus, the respondents were not illegally dismissed. Therefore, it found that
the awards of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contracts and the
refund of placement fees to be bereft of any basis in fact and in law. The award for the
payment of the salary deductions was also not considered for respondents' failure to
substantiate it, and the claim for reimbursement of expenses for the return flight of
respondents Bajaro, Sumigcay and Morilla was similarly disallowed, not having been
raised as a cause of action in their complaint. ESTDcC
Lastly, the NLRC absolved petitioner Lamson of any personal liability for dearth of
evidence showing that she acted in bad faith, following the oft-repeated principle that
corporate officers cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of a
corporation arising from employment-related claims.
Respondents sought reconsideration 13 of the NLRC's Decision, which was
subsequently denied in the Resolution 14 dated September 22, 2004.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case via petition for certiorari before the CA
which, in its assailed August 22, 2005 Decision, 15 nullified and set aside the previous
issuances of the NLRC and reinstated in toto the July 12, 2002 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter. The CA concurred with the findings of the Labor Arbiter that petitioners failed to
comply with the substantive and procedural requirements to effect a valid retrenchment.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the Resolution 16 dated
October 11, 2005.
Issues Before the Court
In this petition for review, petitioners impute reversible error on the part of the CA in
nullifying the NLRC issuances and in reinstating in toto the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, as the latter failed to take into consideration the principles of private
international law, which form part of the law of the land, as well as the labor standards
laws of the Republic of China, in resolving the complaint filed before it. Petitioners also
contend that the Labor Arbiter misconstrued and misapplied Section 10 of R.A. 8042.
The Court's Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. aDACcH
At the outset, the Court notes that petitioners are raising before the Court for the first
time, the applicability of the principles of private international law and the labor
standards laws of the Republic of China in the proper interpretation of respondents'
employment contracts. Records show that petitioners never advanced this issue at the
first opportunity before the Labor Arbiter, and even in the subsequent proceedings
before the NLRC and the CA. Instead, petitioners' arguments consistently centered on
the existence of a valid retrenchment and compliance with the requirements to legally
effect the same. It bears stressing that issues not raised in the proceedings below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 17 Specifically, points of law, theories and
arguments not raised before the appellate court will not be considered by the Court. 18

The Court, therefore, shall limit the resolution of this case on the sole question of
whether the Labor Arbiter's Decision, as reinstated in toto by the CA, properly applied
and interpreted Section 10 of R.A. 8042, the pertinent portions of which state:
Sec. 10.Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause
as defined by law or contract, . . . (Emphasis supplied) SCIAaT
Indisputably, respondents' illegal dismissal complaint with money claims is anchored on
the overseas employment contracts with petitioners and the allegations that they were
dismissed without just, valid or authorized cause. With these allegations, Section 10
afore-quoted clearly applies in this case. 19 As petitioners failed to establish a valid
retrenchment, respondents were clearly dismissed without just, valid or authorized
cause.
Consequently, petitioner Lamzon is jointly and severally liable with petitioner company.
To reiterate, Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provides that "[i]f the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors . . . shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation . . ." for any claims and damages that
may be due to the overseas workers.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court finds that a modification of the
monetary award in the amount of NT$47,520.00 per respondent corresponding to
three (3) months' worth of salaries granted by the Labor Arbiter is in order,
conformably with the pronouncement in the case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc. 20 (Serrano case) where the Court En Banc
declared unconstitutional, for being violative of the Constitutionally-guaranteed rights to
equal protection and due process of the overseas workers, the clause "or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" found in Section 10 of
R.A. 8042, which originally reads:

outset, confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. Hence, even if
respondents' illegal dismissal occurred sometime in August 2000, 22 the declaration of
unconstitutionality found in the Serrano case promulgated in March 2009 shall
retroactively apply.
Since the unexpired portion of respondents' individual two-year contracts is still for 13
months, as they worked in Taiwan for a period of only 11 months, each respondent is
therefore entitled to a total amount of NT$205,920.00 23 or its current equivalent in
Philippine Peso, by way of unpaid salaries, in addition to the other monetary awards
granted by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals reinstating in toto the July 12, 2002 Decision of the Labor Arbiter is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION awarding the amount of NT$205,920.00 or its
current equivalent in Philippine Peso to each of the respondents by way of unpaid
salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. The rest of the
Decision stands.
CREWLINK V TERINGTING
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Decision 1 dated July 8, 2004 and Resolution 2 dated January 17,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, setting aside the
Resolutions dated February 20, 2003 3 and July 31, 2003 4 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed in toto the Decision 5 dated February
12, 2002 of the Labor Arbiter.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent Editha Teringtering (Teringtering), spouse of deceased Jacinto Teringtering
(Jacinto), and in behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against petitioner Crewlink,
Inc. (Crewlink), and its foreign principal Gulf Marine Services for the payment of death
benefits, benefit for minor child, burial assistance, damages and attorney's fees.
Respondent alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas employment
contract with Crewlink, Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign principal Gulf Marine
Services, the details of which are as follows:
Duration of Contract :12 months

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause

as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of
his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less. EIAHcC

Position:Oiler
Basic Monthly Salary:US$385.00
Hours of Work:48 hrs./wk.

In Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Services, Inc. Ltd. v. Doza, 21
the Court declared that an unconstitutional clause in the law, being inoperative at the

Overtime:US$115.50

Vacation Leave with pay:1 mo. leave after 12 months

Point of Hire:Manila, Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
Teringtering claimed that before her husband was employed, he was subjected to a
pre-employment medical examination wherein he was pronounced as "fit to work."
Thus, her husband joined his vessel of assignment and performed his duties as Oiler.
On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued by the Ministry of Health of
the United Arab Emirates wherein it was stated that Jacinto died on April 9, 2001 due to
asphyxia of drowning. Later on, an embalming and sealing certificate was issued after
which the remains of Jacinto was brought back to the Philippines. IECAaD
After learning of the death of Jacinto, respondent claimed from petitioners the payment
of death compensation in the amount of US$50,000.00 and burial expenses in the
amount of US$1,000.00, as well as additional death compensation in the amount of
US$7,000.00, for the minor Eimaereach Rose de Gracia Teringtering but was refused
without any valid cause. Hence, a complaint was filed against the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be compensable it is
enough that he died during the term of his contract and while still on board. Respondent
asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or Mood Disorder Bipolar
Type, which resulted to his jumping into the sea and his eventual death. Respondent
further asserted that her husband's death was not deliberate and not of his own will, but
was a result of a mental disorder, thus, compensable.
For its part, petitioner Crewlink alleged that sometime on April 9, 2001, around 8:20
p.m. while at Nasr Oilfield, the late Jacinto Teringtering suddenly jumped into the sea,
but the second engineer was able to recover him. Because of said incident, one
personnel was directed to watch Jacinto. However, around 10:30 p.m., while the boat
dropped anchor south of Nasr Oilfield and went on standby, Jacinto jumped off the boat
again. Around 11:00 p.m., the A/B watchman reported that Jacinto was recovered but
despite efforts to revive him, he was already dead from drowning.
Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits being claimed,
because Jacinto committed suicide. Despite the non-entitlement, however, Teringtering
was even given burial assistance in the amount of P35,800.00 and P13,273.00 on May
21, 2001. She likewise received the amount of US$792.51 representing donations from
the GMS staff and crew. Petitioner likewise argued that Teringtering is not entitled to
moral and exemplary damages, because petitioner had nothing to do with her late
husband's untimely demise as the same was due to his own doing.
As part of the record, respondent submitted Ship Captain Oscar C. Morado's report on
the incident, which we quote: *

At arround 2000 hrs. M/V Raja 3404 still underway to Nasr Complex w/ 1 passenger.
2018 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding to drop 1 passenger At 2020 hrs. Mr.
Jacinto Tering Tering suddenly jump to the sea, while the boat cast off from Nasr
Complex boatlanding. And the second Engr. Mr. Sudarto jump and recover Mr. Jacinto
Tering Tering the oiler.
2040 hrs. Dropped anchor south of Nasr oilfield and standby. And that time informed to
GMS personnel about the accident, And we informed to A/B on duty to watch Mr.
Jacinto Tering Tering. 2230 hrs. The A/B watch man informed that Mr. Jacinto Tering
Tering jump again to the sea. And that time the wind NW 10-14 kts. and strong current.
And the second Engr. jump to the sea with life ring to recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering.
2300 hrs. We recovered Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering onboard the vessel and apply
Respiration Kiss of life Mouth to Mouth, And proceed to Nasr Complex to take doctor.
2320 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding and the doctor on-board to check the
patient. 2330 hrs. As per Nasr Complex Doctor the patient was already dead. Then
informed to GMS personnel about the accident. HTCIcE
I Captain Oscar C. Morado certify this report true and correct with the best of my
knowledge and reserve the right, modify, ratify and/or enlarge this statement at any time
and place, According to the law. 6
In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing, dismissed the
case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that, while it is true that Jacinto
Teringtering died during the effectivity of his contract of employment and that he died of
asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was the result of his deliberate or intentional
jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was directly attributable to him.
Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter.
Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals and sought the nullification of the NLRC Resolution, dated February 20, 2003,
which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated February 12, 2002.
On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of the NLRC,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February 20, 2003 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Crewlink, Inc. and Gulf Marine
Services are hereby DECLARED jointly and severally liable and, accordingly, are
directed to pay deceased Jacinto Teringtering's beneficiaries, namely respondent
Editha Teringtering and her daughter Eimaereach Rose de Gracia, the Philippine
Currency equivalent to US$50,000.00, and an additional amount of US$7,000, both at
the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment.

SO ORDERED. 7

discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter
disregard of the evidence on record. This case is no different.

Thus, before this Court, Crewlink, Inc. and/or Gulf Marine Services, as petitioner, raised
the following issues:
I
WHETHER A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI INCLUDES CORRECTION
OF THE NLRC'S EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS
BASED THEREON OR CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF FACTS IN THE JUDGMENT
OF THE NLRC;
II
WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF SUPPOSEDLY FAILING TO TAKE SUCH
MEASURES FOR THE COMFORT AND SAFETY OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER,
AMONG OTHERS, WHICH WERE ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED IN THE ASSAILED CA
DECISION AND WHICH ACTUALLY REFERRED TO ACTS COMMITTED BY THE
SHIPMATES OF THE DECEASED, BUT POSITIVELY ATTRIBUTED TO
PETITIONERS AND FOR WHICH THE LATTER ARE NOW BEING HELD LIABLE
ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SOURCE OF OBLIGATION
THAT IS PREDICATED ON QUASI-DELICT OR TORT AS PROVIDED UNDER OUR
CIVIL LAWS AND, THUS, HAS NO REFERENCE TO OUR LABOR CODE; ITAaHc
III
WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS A RESULT OF A
DELIBERATE/WILLFUL ACT ON HIS OWN LIFE, AN ACT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE
TO THE DECEASED, AND NO OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO RULED BY THE LABOR
ARBITER AND NLRC, AS TO RENDER HIS DEATH NOT COMPENSABLE.
Petitioner claimed that Jacinto's death is not compensable, considering that the latter's
death resulted from his willful act. It argued that the rule that the employer becomes
liable once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his
employment contract is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if he
can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act, as in this case.
We find merit in the petition.
In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law
in the absence of any showing that the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support in the records or are glaringly erroneous. We are not a trier of facts, and this
applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and
quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even
finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of

As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an accident but
was deliberately done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into the sea and it was on his
second attempt that caused his death. The accident report of Captain Oscar Morado
narrated in detail the circumstances that led to Jacinto's death. The circumstances of
Jacinto's actions before and at the time of his death were likewise entered in the Chief
Officer's Log Book and were attested to by Captain Morado before the Philippine
Embassy. Even the A/B personnel, Ronald Arroga, who was tasked to watch over
Jacinto after his first attempt of committing suicide, testified that despite his efforts to
prevent Jacinto from jumping again overboard, Jacinto was determined and even
shoved him and jumped anew which eventually caused his death.
Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the evidence
presented as well as the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Settled is the rule that factual
findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within
their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts
when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. More so, when there
is no showing that said findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence on record.
Likewise, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are certainly inapplicable in this
case. For precisely, the issue for resolution here is the obligation of the employer to its
employee should the latter die during the term of his employment. The relationship
between the petitioner and Jacinto is one based on contract of employment and not
one of contract of carriage. HTIEaS
Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract Governing
the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC),
it is provided that:
xxx xxx xxx
6.No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or
death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that
the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly
attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur
during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the
term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation
benefits. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability
if it can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act.

In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was
attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile,
respondent, other than her bare allegation that her husband was suffering from a
mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical report was given to support her
claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does not even show when the alleged insanity of
Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but
the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a
question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state
or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given
by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who
has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness' own
perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 8 No
such evidence was presented to support respondent's claim.
The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial evidence from
which reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court is
left with no choice but to deny her petition, lest an injustice be caused to the employer.
Otherwise stated, while it is true that labor contracts are impressed with public interest
and the provisions of the POEA-SEC must be construed logically and liberally in favor
of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels,
still the rule is that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the
light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79966, dated July 8, 2004, and its January 17, 2005 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 20,
2003 and July 31, 2003 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in
NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 01-06-1144-00, affirming the February 12, 2002
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
PEO V COMILA
On April 5, 1999, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, an Information 1 for
Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, as defined and penalized
under Article 13(6) in relation to Articles 38 (b), 34 and 39 of Presidential Decree No.
442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code, as amended, was filed against Charlie
Comila, Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of September, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously offer, recruit, and promise employment as contract workers in Italy, to
the herein complainants, namely: MARLYN ARO y PADCAYAN, ANNIE FELIX y
BAKISAN, ELEONOR DONGGA-AS y ANGHEL, ESPERANZA BACKIAN y LAD-EY,
ZALDY DUMPILES y MALIKDAN, JOEL EDIONG y CALDERON, RICKY WALDO y

NICKEY, JEROME MONTAEZ y OSBEN, DOVAL DUMPILES y SAP-AY, JONATHAN

NGAOSI y DUMPILES, EDMUND DIEGO y SUBIANGAN and MARLON PETTOCO y
SUGOT, without said accused having first secured the necessary license or authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Information was docketed in the RTC as Crim. Case No. 16427-R and raffled to
Branch 60 thereof.
On the same date April 5, 1999 and in the same court, twelve (12) separate
Informations 2 for Estafa were filed against the same accused at the instance of the
same complainants. Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 16428-R to 16439-R and likewise
raffled to the same branch of the court, the twelve (12) Informations for Estafa, varying
only as regards the names of the offended parties and the respective amounts involved,
uniformly recite:
That on or about the 10th day of November, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one ZALDY DUMPILES Y MALIKDAN by way of
false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully well that he/she/they is/are not
AUTHORIZED job RECRUITERS for persons intending to secure work abroad
convinced said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdanand pretended that he/she/they could secure
a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P25,000.00 and
representing the placement and medical fees when in truth and in fact could not; the
said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan deceived and convinced by the false pretenses
employed by the accused parted away the total sum of P25,000.00 in favor of the
accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan in the
aforementioned amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00),
Philippine currency. EICSTa
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Of the three accused named in all the aforementioned two sets of Informations, only
accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila were brought under the jurisdiction of the trial
court, the third, Indira Ram Singh Lastra, being then and still is at large.
Arraigned with assistance of counsel, accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila entered
a plea of "NOT GUILTY" not only to the Information for Illegal Recruitment (Crim. Case
No. 16427-R) but also to the twelve (12) Informations for Estafa (Crim. Case Nos.
16428-R to 16439-R).
Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.

Of the twelve (12) complainants in both the illegal recruitment and estafa charges, the
prosecution was able to present only seven (7) of them, namely: Annie Felix y Bakisan;
Ricky Waldo y Nickey; Jonathan Ngaosi y Dumpiles; Marilyn Aro y Padcayan; Edmund
Diego y Subiangan; Jerome Montaez y Osben; and Eleonor Dongga-as y Anghel. A
certain Jose Matias of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was
supposed to testify for the prosecution but his testimony was dispensed after the
defense agreed that he will merely testify to the effect that as per POEA records,
accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila were not duly licensed or authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment.
In a consolidated decision 3 dated October 3, 2000, the trial court found both accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment committed in
large scale by a syndicate, as charged in Crim. Case No. 16427-R, and of estafa, as
charged in Crim. Case Nos. 16430-R; 16431-R, 16432-R, 16434-R, 16436-R, 16438-R,
and 16439-R. The other informations for estafa in Crim. Case Nos. 16428-R, 16429-R,
16433-R, 16435-R and 16437-R were, however, dismissed for lack of evidence. We
quote the fallo of the trial court's decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the accused, Aida Comila
and Charlie Comila:
1. In Criminal Case No. 16427-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale Committed by a Syndicate. They are hereby
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 16430-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to each
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Marilyn Aro, the sum of P25,500.00 plus
interest from the date this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
3. In Criminal Case No. 16431-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to each
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Annie Felix, the sum of P50,000.00 plus
interest from the date this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
4. In Criminal Case No. 16432-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to each
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall

also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Eleanor Dongga-as, the sum of
P50,000.00 plus interest from the date this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
5. In Criminal Case No. 16434-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the
provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to each suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall also jointly and
severally pay the complainant, Edmund Diego, the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest
from the date this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
6. In Criminal Case No. 16436-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to each
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Jonathan Ngaosi, the sum of P25,000.00
plus interest from the date this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
7. In Criminal Case No. 16438-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to each
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Ricky Waldo, the sum of P25,000.00
plus interest from the date this Information was filed until it is fully paid;
8. In Criminal Case No. 16439-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to each
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Jerome Montaez, the sum of
P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this Information was filed; and
9. Criminal Cases Nos. 16428-R; 16429-R; 16433-R; 16435-R and 16437-R are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
In the service of the various prison terms herein imposed upon the accused Aida
Comila and Charlie Comila, the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall
be observed.
As to the accused, Indira Sighn Lastra, let all these cases be archived in the meantime
until the said accused is arrested.
SO ORDERED.

Pursuant to a Notice of Appeal 4 filed by the two accused, the trial court forwarded the
records of the cases to this Court in view of the penalty of life imprisonment meted in
Crim. Case No. 16427-R (Illegal Recruitment in large scale). In its Resolution 5 of
October 3, 2001, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and the subsequent
respective briefs for the appellants 6 and the appellee 7 as well as the appellants' reply
brief. 8

Appellant introduced them to a certain Erlinda Ramos, one of the agents of Mrs. Indira
Lastra, a representative of the Far East Trading Corporation (p. 4, 11, ibid.).
Accordingly, Erlinda Ramos would be responsible for the processing of the applicants'
visas (ibid.). Erlinda Ramos even showed them the copy of the job order from Italy
(ibid.). Like Ramos, appellant likewise introduced herself to Annie and the other
applicants as an agent of Lastra (pp. 3-4, ibid.).

Thereafter, and consistent with its pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 9 the Court, via
its Resolution 10 of September 22, 2004, transferred the cases to the Court of Appeals
(CA) "for appropriate action and disposition." In the CA, the cases were assigned one
docket number and thereat docketed as CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01615.

Annie submitted all her requirements to appellant, along with the amount of two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) as processing fee (p. 6, tsn, ibid.). She also paid a total of
twenty three thousand (P23,000.00) as partial payment of her placement fee of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) on or about September 6 or 7, 1998. Appellant issued a
common receipt detailing the amounts she received not only from Annie Felix
(23,000.00) but also for her fellow applicants, Zaldy Dumpiles (P23,000.00), Joel
Ediong (P25,000.00), and Ricky Baldo (P25,000.00) (p. 8, tsn, ibid.).

In a decision 11 promulgated on December 29, 2005, the appellate court affirmed that
of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated October 3, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, in Criminal Cases Nos. 16427-R to
16439-R finding accused-appellants guilty of (1) illegal recruitment committed in large
scale; and (2) seven (7) counts of estafa is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD. AICDSa
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
The cases are again with this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal 12 interposed by the
herein accused-appellants from the aforementioned affirmatory CA decision.
Acting thereon, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire.
In their respective manifestations, 13 the parties opted not to file any supplemental brief
and instead merely reiterated what they have said in their earlier appellants' and
appellee's briefs.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in the brief 14 it filed for appellee People,
summarizes the facts of the case in the following manner:
Annie Felix was introduced by her sister-in-law, Ella Bakisan, to appellant Aida Comila
in August 1998 (pp. 3, 24, tsn, September 14, 1999). Ella Bakisan told her that
appellant Aida Comila could help her find work abroad as she was recruiting workers
for a factory in Palermo, Italy (ibid.). Annie Felix then went to meet appellant Aida
Comila at the Jollibee outlet along Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City in August, 1998 to
inquire about the supposed work in Italy (pp. 3-4, tsn, ibid.). There were other
applicants, aside from Annie at the Jollibee outlet at the time, similarly inquiring about
the prospective jobs abroad (ibid.).
Annie met appellant again at the St. Theresa's College on or about September 6 or 7,
1998 (p. 11, ibid.). there were around fifty (50) to sixty (60) applicants at that time (ibid.).

Annie went to Manila several times to complete her medical examination as required
(pp. 14-16, tsn, ibid.). Considering appellant Aida Comila's pregnancy at that time, her
husband Charlie Comila, also an agent of Lastra, accompanied Annie and the other
applicants during their medical check-up (pp. 22-24, ibid.).
On the last week of October, 1998, Annie again paid appellant the total amount of
twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to complete her placement fee of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Annie was told that her flight to Italy was scheduled on
September 14, 1998 (p. 20, ibid.). Later on, Erlinda Ramos told Annie that her flight to
Italy was re-scheduled to October, 1998 due to a typhoon (p. 20, ibid.).
There were others like Annie Felix who were similarly enticed to apply for the promised
job in Italy (pp. 4-5, tsn, September 22, 1999). Among them were Ricky Waldo, Edmund
Diego, Eleanor Donga-as, Jonathan Ngaosi, Marilyn Aro and Jerome Montaez (pp. 45; 19-28, tsn, September 22, 1999, afternoon session). AIDTSE
In the briefing at St. Theresa's College, Navy Road, Pacdal, Baguio City, (p. 7, tsn,
September 22, 1999; pp. 29-30, tsn, September 14, 1999) appellant briefed Ricky
Waldo and the rest of the applicants on their application requirements (pp. 7-8, tsn,
Sept. 22, 1999). The briefing was conducted by appellants Aida Comila, Charlie Comila,
and Erlinda Ramos who alternately talked about the documents to be submitted for the
processing of their applications and the processing fee of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) they have to pay (p. 8, tsn, September 22, 1999). In the same briefing,
they were also told that Erlinda Ramos was scheduled to go to Italy on September 14,
1998 and that whoever would pay P25,000.00 first, or half of the P50,000.00
processing fee would be able to go with her to Italy (p. 8. tsn, September 22, 1999). Per
the job order shown to Jonathan Ngaosi, for instance, male workers were to receive a
salary of two thousand three hundred dollars ($2,300.00) plus an additional eight
dollars ($8.00) for overtime work (p. 8, tsn, September 21, 1999, afternoon session).

After undergoing the required medical examination in Manila, applicants Ricky Waldo
and company paid the following amounts for their respective processing fees, which
were duly receipted by appellant Aida Comila in three separate documents, thus:

(ibid.). At this point, appellant Charlie Comila assured them that they should not worry
and that everything will be alright (ibid ). Appellant Charlie Comila then brought them to
Indira Lastra (p. 26, ibid.).

"8-23-98, received the amount of P14,000.00 from Ella Bakisan. Signed, Aida Comila.
The second document again is a piece of paper of which the following is written: 9-798. Received the amount of the following: Philip Waldo, P20,000.00; Doval Dumpiles,
P23,000.00 Edmund Diego, P25,000.00; Jerome Montaez, P25,000.00 Total
P93,000.00. Received by A. Comila. The 3rd document is 1/2 page of a yellow pad and
it reads 9-7-98, received the following amounts from Zaldy Dumpiles P23,000.00;
Joel Ediong P25,000.00; Ricky Waldo P25,000.00; Annie Felix P23,000.00;
Marlon Tedoco P23,000.00. Total P119,000.00. Received by Aida Comila;
witnesses Ella Bakisan. (p. 14, tsn, of witness Edmund Diego, September 22, 1999,
morning session).

Marilyn Aro, Annie Felix, and the rest were all shocked to find out that Indira Lastra was
actually an inmate of Manila (Quiapo) city jail. (p. 26, ibid.; p. 13, tsn, September 14,
1999). They felt at once that they were, indeed, victims of illegal recruitment
(ibid.).When they demanded the return of their money from Indira Lastra, the latter told
them to withdraw their money from appellant Aida Comila (p. 26. ibid.).

Considering the payments they made, Ricky Waldo's flight to Italy was scheduled on
September 14, 1999 while those of Marilyn Aro, Edmund Diego, Jerome Montanez,
Jonathan Ngaosi, and Eleanor Donga-as were scheduled on October 27, 1999 (pp. 8-9,
tsn, September 22, 1999; pp. 32-33, tsn, September 14, 1999; pp. 2-4, tsn, September
15, 1999; p. 24, September 21, 1999; p. 10, tsn, September 22, 1999, morning session;
p. 27, tsn, September 22, 1999, afternoon session).
Like Annie Felix, Ricky Waldo's flight did not push through as scheduled on September
14, 1999 (pp. 32-34, tsn, September 14, 1999; pp. 2-4, tsn, September 15, 1999).
Appellant Aida Comila explained that the re-scheduling was due to typhoon (ibid.).
Ricky's flight was then re-scheduled to October 7, 1999 but was again moved to
October 27, 1999 as, according to appellant Aida Comila, there were some problems in
his papers and that of the other applicants (pp. 2-3, ibid.).
On October 25, 1998, appellant Aida Comila called the applicants for a briefing at the
St. Therese Building at the Navy Base, Baguio City (p. 24, tsn, September 21, 1999). In
the same briefing, Erlinda Ramos, as representative of the supposed principal, Indira
Lastra, explained to the applicants that their flight on October 27, 1999 was cancelled
but will be re-scheduled (ibid.). Appellant Aida Comila told them that they have to wait
for the notice from the Italian Embassy (ibid.).
On the first week of November, 1998, appellant Charlie Comila told Marilyn Aro and
several other applicants that their visas would be released (p. 25, September, 21,
1999). Appellant Charlie Comila accompanied them and the others to the Elco Building
at Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City purportedly to see Erlinda Ramos (p. 25, tsn, September
21, 1999). When Erlinda Ramos arrived, she told Marilyn and the other applicants to
wait for the release of their visas, the following day (p. 25, ibid.). Marilyn and the rest
came back each day for one whole week but the promised visas were not released to
them (ibid.). AaHcIT
Marilyn and the other applicants complained to appellant Charlie Comila about the
delay and told him of their doubts about their application and the promised job in Italy

Upon their return to Baguio, Marilyn's group proceeded to appellant Aida Comila's
residence at Km. 6, La Trinidad, Benguet to demand the return of their money (p. 27,
tsn, ibid.). Appellant Aida Comila, however, told them to wait as Indira Lastra will soon
be out of jail and will personally process their papers at the Italian Embassy (ibid.).
Marilyn and the other applicants followed-up several times with appellant Aida Comila
the return of the amounts of money they paid for their supposed placement fee, but
were simply told to wait (ibid.). the last time complainants visited them, appellants Aida
Comila and Charlie Comila were already in a Bulacan jail (p. 27, ibid.).
In April, 1999, Marilyn Aro, Edmund Diego, Annie Felix, Eleanor Donga-as, Jerome
Montanez, Ricky Waldo and Jonathan Ngaosi filed their complaint against appellants
Aida Comila and Charlie Comila before the Criminal Investigation Group (CIG).
In the same month of April 1999, separate Informations for estafa and illegal
recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate or violation of Article 13 (b) in
relation to Article 38 (b) 34, and 39 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code
of the Philippines were filed against appellants Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and Indira
Lastra.
In their appellants' brief, accused-appellants would fault the two courts below in (1)
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and
estafa; and (2) totally disregarding the defense of denial "honestly advanced" by them.
It is not disputed that accused-appellants Charlie Comila and Aida Comila are husbandand-wife. Neither is it disputed that husband and wife knew and are well-acquainted
with their co-accused, Indira Ram Singh Lastra, and one Erlinda Ramos. It is their
posture, however, that from the very beginning, appellant Aida Comila never professed
that she had the authority to recruit and made it clear to the applicants for overseas
employment that it was Erlinda Ramos who had such authority and who issued the job
orders from Italy. Upon this premise, this appellant contends that the subsequent
transactions she had with the applicants negate the presence of deceit, an essential
element of estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. On
the charge of illegal recruitment, this appellant argues that "she was merely trying to
help the applicants to process their papers, believing that Indira Ram Sighn Lastra and
Erlinda Ramos would really send the applicants to Italy." With respect to co-appellant
Charlie Comila, the defense submits that the prosecution "miserably failed to prove his
participation in the illegal recruitment and estafa."

The appeal must fail.

After a careful and circumspect review of the records, we are fully convinced that both
the trial and appellate courts committed no error in finding both appellants guilty beyond
moral certainty of doubt of the crimes charged against them. Through the respective
testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that both
appellants were then engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The
combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses point to appellant Aida Comila as
the one who promised them foreign employment and assured them of placement
overseas through the help of their co-accused Indira Ram Singh Lastra. For sure, it was
Aida herself who informed them of the existence of job orders from Palermo, Italy, and
of the documents needed for the processing of their applications. Aida, in fact,
accompanied the applicants to undergo medical examinations in Manila. And relying
completely on Aida's representations, the applicants-complainants entrusted their
money to her only to discover later that their hopes for an overseas employment were
but vain. In the words of the trial court:
Aida Comila cannot escape culpability by the mere assertion that the recruitment
activities were done by Ella Bakisan, Erlinda Ramos and Indira Lastra as if she was just
a mere observer of the activities going on right under her nose, especially so that the
seven complainants who testified all pointed to her as their recruiter. She could not
adequately explain why: (1) she had to show and explain the job order and the work
and travel requirements to the complainants; (2) she had to meet the complainants at
Jollibee, Magsaysay Ave., Baguio City and in her residence; (3) she had to be present
at the briefings for the applicants; (4) she received the placement fees even if she
claims that she received them from Ella Bakisan; (5) she had to go down to Manila and
accompanied the complainants for their medical examination; and (6) she had to go out
of her way to do all these things even when she was pregnant and was about to give
birth. Certainly, she was not a social worker or a humanitarian who had all the time in
this world to go out of her way to render free services to other people whom she did not
know or just met. To be sure, Aida Comila had children to attend to and a husband who
was unemployed to be able to conduct such time-consuming charitable activities. 15
Running in parallel vein is what the CA wrote in its appealed decision: 16
As regards appellant Aida Comila's contention that she did not represent herself as a
licensed recruiter, and that she merely helped complainants avail of the job opportunity
on the belief that Indira Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would really send them to Italy, the
same hardly deserves merit. The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when, among
other things, a person who, without being duly authorized according to law represents
or gives the distinct impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide
work abroad convincing those to whom the representation is made or to whom the
impression is given to thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of that
employment. EaSCAH

In fact, even if there is no consideration involved, appellant will still be deemed as

having engaged in recruitment activities, since it was sufficiently demonstrated that she
promised overseas employment to private complainants. To be engaged in the practice
and placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an
employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.
As regards appellant Charlie Comila, it is inconceivable for him to feign ignorance of the
illegal recruitment activities of his wife Aida, and of his lack of participation therein.
Again, we quote with approval what the trial court has said in its decision: 17
Charlie Comila could not, likewise, feign ignorance of the illegal transactions. It is
contrary to human experience, hence, highly incredible for a husband not to have
known the activities of his wife who was living with him under the same roof. In fact, he
admitted that when Aida gave birth, he had to accompany the complainants to Manila
for their medical examination and again, on another trip, to bring them to the office of
Erlinda Ramos to follow-up their visas. The fact that he knew the ins and outs of Manila
was a desperate excuse or reason why he accompanied the complainants to Manila
considering that, as he and his wife claimed, they have nothing to do with the
recruitment activities. Furthermore, if he and his wife had nothing to do with the
recruitment of the complainants, why did he have to sign the letter and accommodate
the request of Myra Daluca whom they have not really known. But damning was his
statement that he signed the letter because Aida was not there to sign it. Such a
statement would only show that they were indeed parties to these illegal transactions.
Charlie Comila would even claim that he was just an elementary graduate and so he
did not understand what he was asked to sign. But his booking sheet showed that he
was a high school graduate. He was a conductor of a bus company who should know
and understand how to read and write. Furthermore, he was already a grown up man in
his thirties who knew what was right and wrong and what he should or should not do.
It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for
both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is
imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business
or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud. 18 Here, it has been sufficiently proven
that both appellants represented themselves to the complaining witnesses to have the
capacity to send them to Italy for employment, even as they do not have the authority
or license for the purpose. Doubtless, it is this misrepresentation that induced the
complainants to part with their hard-earned money for placement and medical fees.
Such act on the part of the appellants clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (2), of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellants next bewail the alleged total disregard by the two courts below their defense
of denial which, had it been duly considered and appreciated, could have merited their
acquittal.
The Court disagrees. The two courts below did consider their defense of denial.
However, given the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants who were
one in pointing to appellants, in cahoots with their co-accused Indira Ram Singh Lastra,
as having recruited and promised them with overseas employment, appellants' defense
of denial must inevitably collapse. IAcDET
All told, we rule and so hold that the two courts below committed no error in adjudging
both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate in large scale and of estafa in seven (7) counts. We also rule
that the penalties imposed by the court of origin, as affirmed by the CA, accord with law
and jurisprudence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision of
the CA, affirmatory of that the trial court, is AFFIRMED in toto.
PEO V JAMILOSA
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
in Criminal Case No. Q-97-72769 convicting appellant Joseph Jamilosa of large scale
illegal recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, and
sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
The Information charging appellant with large scale illegal recruitment was filed by the
Senior State Prosecutor on August 29, 1997. The inculpatory portion of the Information
reads:
That sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, or thereabout in the City of
Quezon, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
representing to have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or
transport workers for overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally recruit, contract and promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants,
namely, Haide R. Ruallo, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh,
for work or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care
Center without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Contrary to law. 2
On arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The case for the prosecution, as synthesized by the Court of Appeals (CA), is as
follows:

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: private complainants Imelda D.
Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh.
Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that on January 17, 1996, she met the appellant in
Cubao, Quezon City on board an aircon bus. She was on her way to Shoemart (SM),
North EDSA, Quezon City where she was working as a company nurse. The appellant
was seated beside her and introduced himself as a recruiter of workers for employment
abroad. The appellant told her that his sister is a head nurse in a nursing home in Los
Angeles, California, USA and he could help her get employed as a nurse at a monthly
salary of Two Thousand US Dollars ($2,000.00) and that she could leave in two (2)
weeks time. He further averred that he has connections with the US Embassy, being a
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent on official mission in the Philippines for
one month. According to the appellant, she has to pay the amount of US$300.00
intended for the US consul. The appellant gave his pager number and instructed her to
contact him if she is interested to apply for a nursing job abroad.
On January 21, 1996, the appellant fetched her at her office. They then went to her
house where she gave him the photocopies of her transcript of records, diploma,
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) license and other credentials. On January
28 or 29, 1996, she handed to the appellant the amount of US$300.00 at the
McDonalds outlet in North EDSA, Quezon City, and the latter showed to her a
photocopy of her supposed US visa. The appellant likewise got several pieces of
jewelry which she was then selling and assured her that he would sell the same at the
US embassy. However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money and
jewelry. Thereafter, the appellant told her to resign from her work at SM because she
was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for Los Angeles, California, USA on
February 25, 1996.
The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits before their
scheduled departure to hand to them their visas and passports; however, the appellant
who was supposed to be with them in the flight failed to show up. Instead, the appellant
called and informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because he had
to go to the province because his wife died. She and her companions were not able to
leave for the United States. They went to the supposed residence of the appellant to
verify, but nobody knew him or his whereabouts. They tried to contact him at the hotel
where he temporarily resided, but to no avail. They also inquired from the US embassy
and found out that there was no such person connected with the said office. Thus, she
decided to file a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Prosecution witness Geraldine Lagman, for her part, testified that she is a registered
nurse by profession. In the morning of January 22, 1996, she went to SM North EDSA,
Quezon City to visit her cousin Imelda Bamba. At that time, Bamba informed her that
she was going to meet the appellant who is an FBI agent and was willing to help nurses
find a job abroad. Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. On the same date at about
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she and Bamba met the appellant at the SM Fast-Food
Center, Basement, North EDSA, Quezon City. The appellant convinced them of his
ability to send them abroad and told them that he has a sister in the United States.

Lagman told the appellant that she had no working experience in any hospital but the
appellant assured her that it is not necessary to have one. The appellant asked for
US$300.00 as payment to secure an American visa and an additional amount of Three
Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00) as processing fee for other documents.
On January 24, 1996, she and the appellant met again at SM North EDSA, Quezon
City wherein she handed to the latter her passport and transcript of records. The
appellant promised to file the said documents with the US embassy. After one (1) week,
they met again at the same place and the appellant showed to her a photocopy of her
US visa. This prompted her to give the amount of US$300.00 and two (2) bottles of
Black Label to the appellant. She gave the said money and liquor to the appellant
without any receipt out of trust and after the appellant promised her that he would issue
the necessary receipt later. The appellant even went to her house, met her mother and
uncle and showed to them a computer printout from Northwest Airlines showing that
she was booked to leave for Los Angeles, California, USA on February 25, 1996.
cTDaEH

that they will meet again the following day for her to give P10,000.00 covering the half
price of her plane ticket. Singh did not meet the appellant as agreed upon. Instead, she
went to Bamba to inquire if the latter gave the appellant the same amount and found
out that Bamba has not yet given the said amount. They then paged the appellant
through his beeper and told him that they wanted to see him. However, the appellant
avoided them and reasoned out that he could not meet them as he had many things to
do. When the appellant did not show up, they decided to file a complaint for illegal
recruitment with the NBI.
The prosecution likewise presented the following documentary evidence:
Exh. "A" Certification dated February 23, 1998 issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo,
Director II, Licensing Branch, POEA.
Exh. "B" Affidavit of Alma E. Singh dated February 23, 1996. 3
On the other hand, the case for the appellant, as culled from his Brief, is as follows:

Four days after their last meeting, Extelcom, a telephone company, called her because
her number was appearing in the appellant's cellphone documents. The caller asked if
she knew him because they were trying to locate him, as he was a swindler who failed
to pay his telephone bills in the amount of P100,000.00. She became suspicious and
told Bamba about the matter. One (1) week before her scheduled flight on February 25,
1996, they called up the appellant but he said he could not meet them because his
mother passed away. The appellant never showed up, prompting her to file a complaint
with the NBI for illegal recruitment.
Lastly, witness Alma Singh who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first met
the appellant on February 13, 1996 at SM North EDSA, Quezon City when Imelda
Bamba introduced the latter to her. The appellant told her that he is an undercover
agent of the FBI and he could fix her US visa as he has a contact in the US embassy.
The appellant told her that he could help her and her companions Haidee Raullo,
Geraldine Lagman and Imelda Bamba find jobs in the US as staff nurses in home care
centers.
On February 14, 1996 at about 6:30 in the evening, the appellant got her passport and
picture. The following day or on February 15, 1996, she gave the appellant the amount
of US$300.00 and a bottle of cognac as "grease money" to facilitate the processing of
her visa. When she asked for a receipt, the appellant assured her that there is no need
for one because she was being directly hired as a nurse in the United States.
She again met the appellant on February 19, 1996 at the Farmers Plaza and this time,
the appellant required her to submit photocopies of her college diploma, nursing board
certificate and PRC license. To show his sincerity, the appellant insisted on meeting her
father. They then proceeded to the office of her father in Barrio Ugong, Pasig City and
she introduced the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant asked permission from her
father to allow her to go with him to the Northwest Airlines office in Ermita, Manila to
reserve airline tickets. The appellant was able to get a ticket confirmation and told her

Accused JOSEPH JAMILOSA testified on direct examination that he got acquainted

with Imelda Bamba inside an aircon bus bound for Caloocan City when the latter
borrowed his cellular phone to call her office at Shoe Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon
City. He never told Bamba that he could get her a job in Los Angeles, California, USA,
the truth being that she wanted to leave SM as company nurse because she was
having a problem thereat. Bamba called him up several times, seeking advice from him
if Los Angeles, California is a good place to work as a nurse. He started courting
Bamba and they went out dating until the latter became his girlfriend. He met Geraldine
Lagman and Alma Singh at the Shoe Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon City thru Imelda
Bamba. As complainants were all seeking advice on how they could apply for jobs
abroad, lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Imelda Bamba, Geraldine Lagman
and Alma Singh sign separate certifications on January 17, 1996 (Exh. "2"), January 22,
1996 (Exh. "4"), and February 19, 1996 (Exh. "3"), respectively, all to the effect that he
never recruited them and no money was involved. Bamba filed an Illegal Recruitment
case against him because they quarreled and separated. He came to know for the first
time that charges were filed against him in September 1996 when a preliminary
investigation was conducted by Fiscal Daosos of the Department of Justice. (TSN,
October 13, 1999, pp. 3-9 and TSN, December 8, 1999, pp. 2-9) 4
On November 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 5 The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Illegal Recruitment in large scale; accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), plus costs.
Accused is ordered to indemnify each of the complainants, Imelda Bamba, Geraldine
Lagman and Alma Singh the amount of Three Hundred US Dollars ($300.00).

SO ORDERED. 6
In rejecting the defenses of the appellant, the trial court declared:
To counter the version of the prosecution, accused claims that he did not recruit the
complainants for work abroad but that it was they who sought his advice relative to their
desire to apply for jobs in Los Angeles, California, USA and thinking that he might be
charged as a recruiter, he made them sign three certifications, Exh. "2," "3" and "4,"
which in essence state that accused never recruited them and that there was no money
involved.
Accused's contention simply does not hold water. Admittedly, he executed and
submitted a counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation at the Department of
Justice, and that he never mentioned the aforesaid certifications, Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 in
said counter-affidavit. These certifications were allegedly executed before charges were
filed against him. Knowing that he was already being charged for prohibited
recruitment, why did he not bring out these certifications which were definitely favorable
to him, if the same were authentic. It is so contrary to human nature that one would
suppress evidence which would belie the charge against him.
Denials of the accused can not stand against the positive and categorical narration of
each complainant as to how they were recruited by accused who had received some
amounts from them for the processing of their papers. Want of receipts is not fatal to
the prosecution's case, for as long as it has been shown, as in this case, that accused
had engaged in prohibited recruitment. (People v. Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574).
That accused is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment, is shown in the Certification issued by POEA, Exh. "A."
In fine, the offense committed by the accused is Illegal Recruitment in large scale, it
having been committed against three (3) persons, individually. 7
Appellant appealed the decision to this Court on the following assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE LATTER'S GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY THE
PROSECUTION. 8
According to appellant, the criminal Information charging him with illegal recruitment
specifically mentioned the phrase "for a fee," and as such, receipts to show proof of
payment are indispensable. He pointed out that the three (3) complaining witnesses did
not present even one receipt to prove the alleged payment of any fee. In its eagerness
to cure this "patent flaw," the prosecution resorted to presenting the oral testimonies of
complainants which were "contrary to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary habits
of life [under Section 3 (y), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence] and defied credulity."

Appellant also pointed out that complainants' testimony that they paid him but no
receipts were issued runs counter to the presumption under Section [3] (d), Rule 131 of
the Rules on Evidence that persons take ordinary care of their concern. The fact that
complainants were not able to present receipts lends credence to his allegation that it
was they who sought advice regarding their desire to apply for jobs in Los Angeles,
California, USA. Thus, thinking that he might be charged as a recruiter, he made them
sign three (3) certifications stating that he never recruited them and there was no
money involved. On the fact that the trial court disregarded the certifications due to his
failure to mention them during the preliminary investigation at the Department of Justice
(DOJ), appellant pointed out that there is no provision in the Rules of Court which bars
the presentation of evidence during the hearing of the case in court. He also pointed
out that the counter-affidavit was prepared while he was in jail "and probably not
assisted by a lawyer." 9
Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that the absence
of receipts signed by appellant acknowledging receipt of the money and liquor from the
complaining witnesses cannot defeat the prosecution and conviction for illegal
recruitment. The OSG insisted that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt via the collective testimonies of the complaining
witnesses, which the trial court found credible and deserving of full probative weight. It
pointed out that appellant failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the complaining
witnesses to falsely charge him of illegal recruitment. cASEDC
On appellant's claim that the complaining witness Imelda Bamba was his girlfriend, the
OSG averred:
Appellant's self-serving declaration that Imelda is his girlfriend and that she filed a
complaint for illegal recruitment after they quarreled and separated is simply
preposterous. No love letters or other documentary evidence was presented by
appellant to substantiate such claim which could be made with facility. Imelda has no
reason to incriminate appellant except to seek justice. The evidence shows that Alma
and Geraldine have no previous quarrel with appellant. Prior to their being recruited by
appellant, Alma and Geraldine have never met appellant. It is against human nature
and experience for private complainants to conspire and accuse a stranger of a most
serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings. (People v. Coral, 230 SCRA 499, 510
[1994]) 10
The OSG posited that the appellant's reliance on the certifications 11 purportedly
signed by the complaining witnesses is misplaced, considering that the certifications
are barren of probative weight.
On February 23, 2005, the Court resolved to transfer the case to the CA. 12 On June
22, 2005, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC. 13
The OSG filed a Supplemental Brief, while the appellant found no need to file one.
The appeal has no merit.

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement
as follows:

It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code that the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers
for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. 17 As the Court held
in People v. Sagaydo: 18

(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.

Such is the case before us. The complainants parted with their money upon the
prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on the false pretense that she had the
capacity to deploy them for employment abroad. In the end, complainants were neither
able to leave for work abroad nor get their money back.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:

SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such nonlicensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. . . .
Any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts
shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 14 Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. 15
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three
(3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity
under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers; and (3) accused committed the same against three or more
persons individually or as a group. 16 As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the
complaining witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court found to be credible
and deserving of full probative weight, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum
of evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged. Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are
conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals ignored, misunderstood, or
misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by
appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him
from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as
consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is considered as being engaged
in recruitment activities.

The fact that private complainants Rogelio Tibeb and Jessie Bolinao failed to produce
receipts as proof of their payment to accused-appellant does not free the latter from
liability. The absence of receipts cannot defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal
recruitment. As long as the witnesses can positively show through their respective
testimonies that the accused is the one involved in prohibited recruitment, he may be
convicted of the offense despite the absence of receipts. 19
Appellant's reliance on the certifications purportedly signed by the complaining
witnesses Imelda Bamba, Alma Singh and Geraldine Lagman 20 is misplaced. Indeed,
the trial court and the appellate court found the certifications barren of credence and
probative weight. We agree with the following pronouncement of the appellate court:
Anent the claim of the appellant that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the
certifications (Exhs. "2," "3" & "4") allegedly executed by the complainants to the effect
that he did not recruit them and that no money was involved, the same deserves scant
consideration.
The appellant testified that he was in possession of the said certifications at the time
the same were executed by the complainants and the same were always in his
possession; however, when he filed his counter-affidavit during the preliminary
investigation before the Department of Justice, he did not mention the said certifications
nor attach them to his counter-affidavit.
We find it unbelievable that the appellant, a college graduate, would not divulge the
said certifications which would prove that, indeed, he is not an illegal recruiter. By failing
to present the said certifications prior to the trial, the appellant risks the adverse
inference and legal presumption that, indeed, such certifications were not genuine.
When a party has it in his possession or power to produce the best evidence of which
the case in its nature is susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the
evidence is withheld for some sinister motive and that its production would thwart his
evil or fraudulent purpose. As aptly pointed out by the trial court:
". . . These certifications were allegedly executed before charges were filed against
him. Knowing that he was already being charged for prohibited recruitment, why did he
not bring out these certifications which were definitely favorable to him, if the same

were authentic. It is so contrary to human nature that one would suppress evidence
which would belie the charge against him." (Emphasis Ours) 21
At the preliminary investigation, appellant was furnished with copies of the affidavits of
the complaining witnesses and was required to submit his counter-affidavit. The
complaining witnesses identified him as the culprit who "recruited" them. At no time did
appellant present the certifications purportedly signed by the complaining witnesses to
belie the complaint against him. He likewise did not indicate in his counter-affidavit that
the complaining witnesses had executed certifications stating that they were not
recruited by him and that he did not receive any money from any of them. He has not
come forward with any valid excuse for his inaction. It was only when he testified in his
defense that he revealed the certifications for the first time. Even then, appellant lied
when he claimed that he did not submit the certifications because the State Prosecutor
did not require him to submit any counter-affidavit, and that he was told that the criminal
complaint would be dismissed on account of the failure of the complaining witnesses to
appear during the preliminary investigation. The prevarications of appellant were
exposed by Public Prosecutor Pedro Catral on cross-examination, thus:

Q I will show you the Counter-Affidavit dated June 16, 1997 filed by one Joseph J.
Jamilosa, will you please go over this and tell if this is the same Counter-Affidavit you
said you prepared and you are going to file with the investigating state prosecutor?
A Yes, Sir. This the same Counter-Affidavit.
Q There is a signature over the typewritten name Joseph J. Jamilosa, will you please
go over this and tell this Honorable Court if this is your signature, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir. This is my signature.
Q During the direct examination you were asked to identify [the] Certification as Exh.
"2" dated January 17, 1996, allegedly issued by Bamba, one of the complainants in this
case, when did you receive this Certification issued by Imelda Bamba, Mr. Witness?
A That is the date, Sir.
Q You mean the date appearing in the Certification.

Q Mr. Witness, you said that a preliminary investigation [was] conducted by the
Department of Justice through State Prosecutor Daosos. Right?

A Yes, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where was this handed to you by Imelda Bamba, Mr. Witness?

Q Were you requested to file your Counter-Affidavit?

A At SM North Edsa, Sir.

A Yes, Sir. I was required.

Q During the direct examination you were also asked to identify a Certification Exh. "3"
for the defense dated February 19, 1996, allegedly issued by Alma Singh, one of the
complainants in this case, will you please go over this and tell us when did Alma Singh
allegedly issue to you this Certification?

Q Did you file your Counter-Affidavit?

A Yes, Sir, but he did not accept it.

A On February 19, 1996, Sir.

Q Why?
A Because he said "never mind" because the witness is not appearing so he dismissed
the case.

Q And also during the direct examination, you were asked to identify a Certification
which was already marked as Exh. "4" for the defense dated January 22, 1996
allegedly issued by Geraldine M. Lagman, one of the complainants in this case, will you
please tell the court when did Geraldine Lagman give you this Certification?

Q Are you sure that he did not accept your Counter-Affidavit, Mr. Witness?
A January 22, 1996, Sir.
A I don't know of that, Sir.
Q If I show you that Counter-Affidavit you said you prepared, will you be able to identify
the same, Mr. Witness?

Q During that time, January 22, 1996, January 17, 1996 and February 19, 1996, you
were in possession of all these Certification. Correct, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.
Q These were always in your possession. Right?
A Yes, Sir, with my papers.

Q Do you know when did the complainants file cases against you?

A No, Sir. I did not receive anything.

A I don't know, Sir.

Q Did you receive a resolution from the Department of Justice?

Q Alright. I will read to you this Counter-Affidavit of yours, and I quote "I, Joseph
Jamilosa, of legal age, married and resident of Manila City Jail, after having duly sworn
to in accordance with law hereby depose and states that: 1) the complainants sworn
under oath to the National Bureau of Investigation that I recruited them and paid me
certain sums of money assuming that there is truth in those allegation of this (sic)
complainants. The charge filed by them should be immediately dismissed for certain
lack of merit in their Sworn Statement to the NBI Investigator; 2) likewise, the
complainants' allegation is not true and I never recruited them to work abroad and that
they did not give me money, they asked me for some help so I [helped] them in
assisting and processing the necessary documents, copies for getting US Visa; 3) the
complainant said under oath that they can show a receipt to prove that they can give
me sums or amount of money. That is a lie. They sworn (sic), under oath, that they can
show a receipt that I gave to them to prove that I got the money from them. I asked the
kindness of the state prosecutor to ask the complainants to show and produce the
receipts that I gave to them that was stated in the sworn statement of the NBI; 4) the
allegation of the complainants that the charges filed by them should be dismissed
because I never [received] any amount from them and they can not show any receipt
that I gave them," Manila City Jail, Philippines, June 16, 1997. So, Mr. Witness, June
16, 1997 is the date when you prepared this. Correct?

A No, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.

FISCAL CATRAL

Q Now, my question to you, Mr. Witness, you said that you have with you all the time
the Certification issued by [the] three (3) complainants in this case, did you allege in
your Counter-Affidavit that this Certification you said you claimed they issued to you?

Q What did you receive?

A I did not say that, Sir.

Q You said you learned here in court, did you read the resolution filed against you, Mr.
Witness?

Q Did you go over the said resolution you said you received here?
A I just learned about it now, Sir.
Q Did you read the content of the resolution?
A Not yet, Sir. It's only now that I am going to read.
COURT
Q You said it was dismissed. Correct?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you receive a resolution of this dismissal?
A No, Your Honor.

A I did not receive any resolution, Sir. It's just now that I learned about the finding.

Q So, it is not here in your Counter-Affidavit?

A I did not read it, Sir.
A None, Sir.
Q What is your educational attainment, Mr. Witness?

Q Did you read by yourself the resolution made by State Prosecutor Daosos, Mr.
Witness?

A I am a graduate of AB Course Associate Arts in 1963 at the University of the East.

A Not yet, Sir.

Q You said that the State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice did not accept your
Counter-Affidavit, are you sure of that, Mr. Witness?

Q What did you take, if any, when you received the subpoena from this court?
A I was in court already when I asked Atty. Usita to investigate this case.

A Yes, Sir.
Q Did you receive a copy of the dismissal which you said it was dismissed?

Q You said a while ago that your Affidavit was not accepted by State Prosecutor
Daosos. Is that correct?

A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please read to us paragraph four (4), page two (2) of this resolution of State
Prosecutor Daosos.
(witness reading par. 4 of the resolution)

MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby ordered to refund to each of the complaining

witnesses the peso equivalent of US$300.00. Costs against appellant.
SANTOSA DATUMAN
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated August
7, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 59825, setting aside the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). HCSEIT

Alright. What did you understand of this paragraph 4, Mr. Witness?

The facts are as follows:
A Probably, guilty to the offense charge. 22
Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services,
Inc. recruited petitioner Santosa B. Datuman to work abroad under the following terms
and conditions:
It turned out that appellant requested the complaining witnesses to sign the
certifications merely to prove that he was settling the cases:
COURT
Q These complainants, why did you make them sign in the certifications?

Site of employment - Bahrain

Employees Classification/Position/Grade - Saleslady
Basic Monthly Salary - US$370.00
Duration of Contract - One (1) year
Foreign Employer - Mohammed Sharif
Abbas Ghulam Hussain 2

A Because one of the complainants told me to sign and they are planning to sue me.
Q You mean they told you that they are filing charges against you and yet you [made]
them sign certifications in your favor, what is the reason why you made them sign?
A To prove that I'm settling this case.
Q Despite the fact that they are filing cases against you and yet you were able to make
them sign certifications?
A Only one person, Your Honor, who told me and he is not around.
Q But they all signed these three (3) certifications and yet they filed charges against
you and yet you made them sign certifications in your favor, so what is the reason why
you made them sign?
(witness can not answer) 23
The Court notes that the trial court ordered appellant to refund US$300.00 to each of
the complaining witnesses. The ruling of the appellate court must be modified.
Appellant must pay only the peso equivalent of US$300.00 to each of the complaining
witnesses.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of Joseph Jamilosa for large scale illegal
recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 is AFFIRMED WITH

On April 17, 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying the required
placement fee. However, her employer Mohammed Hussain took her passport when
she arrived there; and instead of working as a saleslady, she was forced to work as a
domestic helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00), equivalent only to One
Hundred US Dollars (US$100.00). This was contrary to the agreed salary of US$370.00
indicated in her Contract of Employment signed in the Philippines and approved by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). 3
On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to sign another contract,
transferring her to another employer as housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for the
duration of two (2) years. 4 She pleaded with him to give her a release paper and to
return her passport but her pleas were unheeded. Left with no choice, she continued
working against her will. Worse, she even worked without compensation from
September 1991 to April 1993 because of her employer's continued failure and refusal
to pay her salary despite demand. In May 1993, she was able to finally return to the
Philippines through the help of the Bahrain Passport and Immigration Department. 5
In May 1995, petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office against
respondent for underpayment and nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay and refund
of her plane fare, docketed as Case No. POEA ADJ. (L) 95-05-1586. 6 While the case
was pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC for underpayment of salary for
a period of one year and six months, nonpayment of vacation pay and reimbursement
of return airfare. EHSITc

When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement before the Labor Arbiter,
they were required to file their respective position papers, subsequent pleadings and
documentary exhibits.
In its Position Paper, 7 respondent countered that petitioner actually agreed to work in
Bahrain as a housemaid for one (1) year because it was the only position available
then. However, since such position was not yet allowed by the POEA at that time, they
mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating petitioner's position as
saleslady. Respondent added that it was actually petitioner herself who violated the
terms of their contract when she allegedly transferred to another employer without
respondent's knowledge and approval. Lastly, respondent raised the defense of
prescription of cause of action since the claim was filed beyond the three (3)-year
period from the time the right accrued, reckoned from either 1990 or 1991. 8
On April 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision finding
respondent liable for violating the terms of the Employment Contract and ordering it to
pay petitioner: (a) the amount of US$4,050.00, or its equivalent rate prevailing at the
time of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15) months; and, (b)
the amount of BD180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment,
representing the refund of plane ticket, thus: DAaEIc
From the foregoing factual backdrop, the only crucial issue for us to resolve in this case
is whether or not complainant is entitled to her monetary claims. AacDHE
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, from the facts and circumstances laid down, it is thus self-evident
that the relationship of the complainant and respondent agency is governed by the
Contract of Employment, the basic terms a covenants of which provided for the position
of saleslady, monthly compensation of US$370.00 and duration of contract for one (1)
year. As it is, when the parties complainant and respondent Agency signed and
executed the POEA approved Contract of Employment, this agreement is the law
that governs them. Thus, when respondent agency deviated from the terms of the
contract by assigning the position of a housemaid to complainant instead of a saleslady
as agreed upon in the POEA-approved Contract of Employment, respondent Agency
committed a breach of said Employment Contract. Worthy of mention is the fact that
respondent agency in their Position Paper paragraph 2, Brief Statement of the Facts
and of the Case admitted that it had entered into an illegal contract with complainant
by proposing the position of a housemaid which said position was then not allowed by
the POEA, by making it appear in the Employment Contract that the position being
applied for is the position of a saleslady. As it is, we find indubitably clear that the
foreign employer had took advantage to the herein hopeless complainant and because
of this ordeal, the same obviously rendered complainant's continuous employment
unreasonable if not downright impossible. The facts and surrounding circumstances of
her ordeal was convincingly laid down by the complainant in her Position Paper, from
which we find no flaws material enough to disregard the same. Complainant had clearly
made out her case and no amount of persuasion can convince us to tilt the scales of
justice in favor of respondents whose defense was anchored solely on the flimsy

allegations that for a period of more than five (5) years from 1989 until 1995
nothing was heard from her or from her relatives, presuming then that complainant had
no problem with her employment abroad. We also find that the pleadings and the
annexes filed by the parties reveal a total lapse on the part of respondent First
Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotions their failure to support with substantial
evidence their contention that complainant transferred from one employer to another
without knowledge and approval of respondent agency in contravention of the terms of
the POEA approved Employment Contract. Obviously, respondent Agency anchored its
disquisition on the alleged "contracts" signed by the complainant that she agreed with
the terms of said contracts one (1) year duration only and as a housemaid to
support its contention that complainant violated the contract agreement by transferring
from one employer to another on her own volition without the knowledge and consent of
respondent agency. To us, this posture of respondent agency is unavailing. These
"documents" are self-serving. We could not but rule that the same were fabricated to
tailor-fit their defense that complainant was guilty of violating the terms of the
Employment Contract. Consequently, we could not avoid the inference of a more logical
conclusion that complainant was forced against her will to continue with her
employment notwithstanding the fact that it was in violation of the original Employment
Contract including the illegal withholding of her passport.
With the foregoing, we find and so rule that respondent Agency failed to discharge the
burden of proving with substantial evidence that complainant violated the terms of the
Employment Contract, thus negating respondent Agency's liability for complainant's
money claims. All the more, the record is bereft of any evidence to show that
complainant Datuman is either not entitled to her wage differentials or have already
received the same from respondent. As such, we are perforce constrained to grant
complainant's prayer for payment of salary differentials computed as follows:
January 1992 April 1993 (15 months)
US$370.00 agreed salary
US$100.00 actual paid salary
US$270.00 balance
US$270.00 x 15 months = US$4050.00
We are also inclined to grant complainant's entitlement to a refund of her plane ticket in
the amount of BD180 Bahrain Dinar or the equivalent in Philippine Currency at the rate
of exchange prevailing at the time of payment. SHCaDA
Anent complainant's claim for vacation leave pay and overtime pay, we cannot,
however, grant the same for failure on the part of complainant to prove with particularity
the months that she was not granted vacation leave and the day wherein she did
render overtime work.
Also, we could not grant complainant's prayer for award of damages and attorney's
fees for lack of factual and legal basis.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding respondent

Agency liable for violating the term of Employment Contract and respondent First
Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotions is hereby ordered:
To pay complainant the amount of US$ FOUR THOUSAND AND FIFTY (US$4,050.00),
or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing her salary
differentials for fifteen (15) months;
To pay complainant the amount of BD180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time
of payment, representing the refund of plane ticket;
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 9 (emphasis supplied)
On appeal, the NLRC, Second Division, issued a Decision 10 affirming with
modification the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr., by reducing the award of salary
differentials from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00 ratiocinating as follows:
Accordingly, we find that the claims for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of
1993 had indeed prescribed. This is so as complainant had filed her complaint on May
31, 1995 when she arrived from the jobsite in April 1993. Since the cause of action for
salary differential accrues at the time when it falls due, it is clear that only the claims for
the months of May 1993 to April 1994 have not yet prescribed. With an approved salary
rate of US$370.00 vis--vis the amount of salary received which was $100.00,
complainant is entitled to the salary differential for the said period in the amount of
$2,970.00. IHcTDA
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the
assailed Decision by reducing the award of salary differentials to $2,970.00 to the
complainant.
The rest of the disposition is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 11
On July 21, 2000, respondent elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
On August 2, 2000, 12 the CA dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

On August 7, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision 15 granting the petition and
reversing the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, thus:
Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations, the local
agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and
liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract,
including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and
repatriation.
Respondent Commission was correct in declaring that claims of private respondent "for
salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed." It must be
noted that petitioner company is privy only to the first contract. Granting arguendo that
its liability extends to the acts of its foreign principal, the Towering Recruiting Services,
which appears to have a hand in the execution of the second contract, it is Our
considered opinion that the same would, at the most, extend only up to the expiration of
the second contract or until 01 September 1991. Clearly, the money claims subject of
the complaint filed in 1995 had prescribed. STIcEA
However, this Court declares respondent Commission as not only having abused its
discretion, but as being without jurisdiction at all, in declaring private respondent
entitled to salary differentials. After decreeing the money claims accruing before April
1993 as having prescribed, it has no more jurisdiction to hold petitioner company for
salary differentials after that period. To reiterate, the local agency shall assume joint
and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the contract. Which contract? Upon a judicious
consideration, we so hold that it is only in connection with the first contract. The
provisions in number 2, Section 10 (a), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules
and Regulations were not made to make the local agency a perpetual insurer against
all untoward acts that may be done by the foreign principal or the direct employer
abroad. It is only as regards the principal contract to which it is privy shall its liability
extend. In Catan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 160 SCRA 691 (1988), it was
held that the responsibilities of the local agent and the foreign principal towards the
contracted employees under the recruitment agreement extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
Foregoing considered, the assailed Decision dated 24 February 2000 and the
Resolution dated 23 June 2000 of respondent Commission in NLRC NCR CA 01635498 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 16

On October 20, 2000, 13 however, the CA reinstated the petition upon respondent's
motion for reconsideration. 14

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 17 thereon was denied in the assailed

Resolution 18 dated November 14, 2002.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT ABANDONED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AS
AFFIRMED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. IADaSE
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE RESPONDENT AGENCY IS ONLY A [sic] PRIVY AND LIABLE TO THE
PRINCIPAL CONTRACT.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE PETITIONER ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
The respondent counters in its Comment that the CA is correct in ruling that it is not
liable for the monetary claims of petitioner as the claim had already prescribed and had
no factual basis.
Simply put, the issues boil down to whether the CA erred in not holding respondent
liable for petitioner's money claims pursuant to their Contract of Employment.
We grant the petition.
On whether respondent is solidarily liable
for petitioner's monetary claims
Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:
Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. Every applicant for license to
operate a private employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written
application together with the following requirements:
xxx xxx xxx
f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:

private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based
employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. 20
This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign
employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient
payment of what is due him. 21 This is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class.
In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision of the law and the
policy of the state when it reversed the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. As
the agency which recruited petitioner, respondent is jointly and solidarily liable with the
latter's principal employer abroad for her (petitioner's) money claims. Respondent
cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all the claims and liabilities arising from the
implementation of their POEA-approved Contract of Employment.
We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent extends
only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which had a term of
until April 1990). The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign
employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any
continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year term, against the
will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved contract. To
accept the CA's reasoning will open the floodgates to even more abuse of our overseas
workers at the hands of their foreign employers and local recruiters, since the
recruitment agency could easily escape its mandated solidary liability for breaches of
the POEA-approved contract by colluding with their foreign principals in substituting the
approved contract with another upon the worker's arrival in the country of employment.
Such outcome is certainly contrary to the State's policy of extending protection and
support to our overseas workers. To be sure, Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits
the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts
already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
the expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE. 22 ECTHIA
Respondent's contention that it was petitioner herself who violated their Contract of
Employment when she signed another contract in Bahrain deserves scant
consideration. It is the finding of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which,
significantly, the CA did not disturb that petitioner was forced to work long after the
term of her original POEA-approved contract, through the illegal acts of the foreign
employer.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities
which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract; including but not
limited to payment of wages, death and disability compensation and repatriation.
(emphasis supplied) ADECcI
The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume joint
and solidary liability with the employer. 19 This Court has, time and again, ruled that

In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, 23 we held that the

subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign
employer which reduced his salary below the amount approved by the POEA is void
because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. The said side
agreement cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment contract approved
by the POEA.

Hence, in the present case, the diminution in the salary of petitioner from US$370.00 to
US$100 (BD40.00) per month is void for violating the POEA-approved contract which
set the minimum standards, terms, and conditions of her employment. Consequently,
the solidary liability of respondent with petitioner's foreign employer for petitioner's
money claims continues although she was forced to sign another contract in Bahrain. It
is the terms of the original POEA-approved employment contract that shall govern the
relationship of petitioner with the respondent recruitment agency and the foreign
employer. We agree with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the precepts of justice
and fairness dictate that petitioner must be compensated for all months worked
regardless of the supposed termination of the original contract in April 1990. It is
undisputed that petitioner was compelled to render service until April 1993 and for the
entire period that she worked for the foreign employer or his unilaterally appointed
successor, she should have been paid US$370/month for every month worked in
accordance with her original contract. HTSIEa
Respondent cannot disclaim liability for the acts of the foreign employer which forced
petitioner to remain employed in violation of our laws and under the most oppressive
conditions on the allegation that it purportedly had no knowledge of, or participation in,
the contract unwillingly signed by petitioner abroad. We cannot give credence to this
claim considering that respondent by its own allegations knew from the outset that the
contract submitted to the POEA for approval was not to be the "real" contract.
Respondent blithely admitted to submitting to the POEA a contract stating that the
position to be filled by petitioner is that of "Saleslady" although she was to be employed
as a domestic helper since the latter position was not approved for deployment by the
POEA at that time. Respondent's evident bad faith and admitted circumvention of the
laws and regulations on migrant workers belie its protestations of innocence and put
petitioner in a position where she could be exploited and taken advantage of overseas,
as what indeed happened to her in this case.
We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of innocence or
ignorance on the part of local recruitment agencies of acts of their foreign principals, as
if the agencies' responsibility ends with the deployment of the worker. In the light of the
recruitment agency's legally mandated joint and several liability with the foreign
employer for all claims in connection with the implementation of the contract, it is the
recruitment agency's responsibility to ensure that the terms and conditions of the
employment contract, as approved by the POEA, are faithfully complied with and
implemented properly by its foreign client/principal. Indeed, it is in its best interest to do
so to avoid being haled to the courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for
acts of its foreign principal. IaEACT
On whether petitioner's claims for
underpaid salaries have prescribed
It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly found that petitioner
is entitled to underpaid salaries, albeit they differed in the number of months for which
salary differentials should be paid. The CA, on the other hand, held that all of
petitioner's monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code
which provides that:

Art. 291. Money Claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from the time
that cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. (emphasis
supplied)
We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of petitioner had
already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from
September 1, 1989 when petitioner was forced to sign another contract against her will.
As stated in the complaint, one of petitioner's causes of action was for underpayment of
salaries. The NLRC correctly ruled the right to claim unpaid salaries (or in this case,
unpaid salary differentials) accrue as they fall due. 24 Thus, petitioner's cause of action
to claim salary differential for October 1989 only accrued after she had rendered
service for that month (or at the end of October 1989). Her right to claim salary
differential for November 1989 only accrued at the end of November 1989, and so on
and so forth.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner was forced to work until April
1993. Interestingly, the CA did not disturb this finding but held only that the extent of
respondent's liability was limited to the term under the original contract or, at most, to
the term of the subsequent contract entered into with the participation of respondent's
foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have discussed previously the reasons why (a) the CA's
theory of limited liability on the part of respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner
has a right to be compensated for all months she, in fact, was forced to work. To
determine for which months petitioner's right to claim salary differentials has not
prescribed, we must count three years prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31,
1995. Thus, only claims accruing prior to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the
complaint was filed on May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary
differentials for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11)
months. 25
We find that the NLRC correctly computed the salary differential due to petitioner at
US$2,970.00 (US$370.00 as approved salary rate - US$100.00 as salary received =
US$290 as underpaid salary per month x 11 months). However, it should be for the
period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994 as erroneously
stated in the NLRC's Decision.
A final note
This Court reminds local recruitment agencies that it is their bounden duty to guarantee
our overseas workers that they are being recruited for bona fide jobs with bona fide
employers. Local agencies should never allow themselves to be instruments of
exploitation or oppression of their compatriots at the hands of foreign employers.
Indeed, being the ones who profit most from the exodus of Filipino workers to find
greener pastures abroad, recruiters should be first to ensure the welfare of the very
people that keep their industry alive. CAaSHI

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated August 7, 2002 and Resolution dated November 14, 2002 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59825 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated February 24, 2000 is REINSTATED with a qualification
with respect to the award of salary differentials, which should be granted for the period
May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994.
PEO V HU
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu (Hu)
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 9
October 2007 in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02243, affirming with modification the Decision
2 dated 4 January 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, in
Criminal Case No. 03-356. The RTC in its Decision found Hu guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized under
Section 7 (b) of Republic Act No. 8042, 3 and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, to pay the fine of P500,000.00, and to indemnify private
complainants Paul Abril (Abril), Joel Panguelo (Panguelo) and Evangeline Garcia
(Garcia) in the amounts of P44,000.00, P50,000 and P50,000, respectively. The
decretal part of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision reads: ACEIac
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 03-856, finding appellant Nenita
B. Hu, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
As modified, the award of actual damages in the amount of P50,000 in favor of
Evangeline Garcia, is DELETED. 4

thus in large scale amounting to economic sabotage without any license or authorized
by the POEA of the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit workers for an
overseas employment.
Upon arraignment, Hu assisted by counsel entered a plea of not guilty while Genoves
remained at large. 7 Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued. While the Information for
illegal recruitment named several persons as having been promised jobs by Hu and
Genoves, only four of them Panguelo, Garcia, Abril and Orillano testified.
CHcETA
Hu was the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc. (Brighturn), a land-based
recruitment agency duly licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) to engage in the business of recruitment and placement of workers abroad,
with principal address at No. 1916 San Marcelino St., Malate, Manila. Brighturn was
authorized by the POEA to recruit, process and deploy land-based workers for the
period 18 December 1999 to 17 December 2001. 8
Genoves worked as a consultant and marketing officer of Brighturn. Aside from her stint
at Brighturn, Genoves was also connected with Riverland Consultancy Service
(Riverland), another recruitment agency located at Room No. 210, LPL Building, Sen.
Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
Private complainants Orillano, Panguelo, Abril and Garcia sought employment at
Brighturn for the positions of factory worker and electronic operator in Taiwan. 9
Notwithstanding private complainants' compliance with all of the pre-employment
requirements, including the payment of placement fees, they were not able to leave the
country to work abroad.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

An Information 5 for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale was filed against Hu and Ethel
V. Genoves (Genoves) which reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses Ethel V. Genoves a.k.a. Merry Ann Genoves and
Nenita B. Hu, of the crime of Violation of Section 6 penalized under Section 7(b) of RA
8042 6 (Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale) committed as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of October 2001, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and both of them helping and aiding one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit, promise employment/job
placement abroad for an overseas employment and collect fees from the following
persons to wit:
NOEL P. DELAYUN JOEY F. SILAO
JOEL U. PANGUELO PAUL C. ABRIL
EVANGELINE E. GARCIA ERIC V. ORILLANO

Sometime in June 2001, Panguelo was informed by a friend that Brighturn was hiring
factory workers for Taiwan. When Panguelo went to Brighturn, he was promised
employment abroad by Hu for P50,000.00. Upon Hu's instruction, Panguelo paid in full
the placement fee in the amount of P50,000.00 to Genoves. The payment was
evidenced by an Official Receipt dated 16 October 2001 bearing Genoves' signature.
Panguelo waited for three years to be deployed to Taiwan. His waiting was all for
naught. Thus, Panguelo decided to abort his application and demanded from Hu the
return of the amount he paid for the placement fee, but Hu could no longer return the
money. 10
Also sometime in September 2001, Abril went to Brighturn to apply as a factory worker
in Taiwan. At Brighturn, Abril was entertained by Hu who oriented him on the necessary
requirements for application which included a valid passport, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Clearance and ID pictures. After complying with the documentary
requirements, Abril was required by Hu to pay the placement fee to Genoves in the
amount of P44,000.00. As shown in Official Receipts dated 9 October 2001 and 26
October 2000, which were signed by Genoves, Abril paid the whole amount of
P44,000.00 as placement fee. Abril was assured by Hu that he would be deployed to

Taiwan by December 2001 which was subsequently reset to April 2002. Despite several
postponements, Abril was not able to leave the country. 11 cTSDAH
For his part, Orillano came to know of Brighturn thru Genoves. Orillano was interviewed
at Brighturn by a Taiwanese principal in October 2001. After the interview, Hu informed
Orillano to submit a medical certificate, NBI clearance and passport; and to pay the
requisite placement fee in the amount of P50,000.00. Believing that Hu could send him
abroad, Orillano faithfully complied with these requirements including the placement
fee, the payment of which was made to Genoves at Brighturn's office. Despite such
payment, however, Orillano was not able to leave the country. 12
Garcia suffered the same fate as her co-applicants. In April 2002, Garcia applied as
Electronic Operator at Brighturn wherein she was entertained by Hu who informed her
that Brighturn's license was suspended. Garcia was then referred by Hu to Best One
International (Best One), another recruitment agency likewise located in Malate, Manila.
While Garcia was told by Hu that the processing of her documents would be done at
Best One, the placement fee, however, should be paid at Brighturn. Accordingly, the
amount of P60,000.00 was paid by Garcia to Hu and Genoves as placement fee upon
Hu's instruction. Almost predictably, the promise of an employment abroad never came
to pass. 13
When Hu was not able to refund the amounts paid as placement fees upon demand,
private complainants went to NBI to file a complaint for illegal recruitment against Hu
and Genoves.
For her defense, Hu claimed that she was the President of Brighturn, a duly authorized
land-based recruitment agency. Brighturn had foreign principals in Taiwan who were
looking for skilled individuals willing to work in a foreign country. Hu alleged that
Brighturn had an established recruitment procedure wherein applicants were only
required to pay the corresponding placement fees after the POEA had already
approved their employment contracts. According to Hu, announcements were posted all
over Brighturn's premises warning job applicants to pay placement fees only to the
cashier. After the expiration of its license issued by the POEA on 18 December 1999,
Brighturn failed to pursue its application for renewal due its inability to post the required
cash bond. Brighturn was thus constrained to refer all pending applications to Best
One. 14 IEcaHS
Hu admitted knowing the private complainants because these individuals went to her
office demanding the return of their placement fees by showing their official receipts. Hu
averred that when she examined such receipts, she found that private complainants
paid their placement fees to Riverland and not to Brighturn as shown in the heading of
the said receipts which bore the name and address of Riverland and its proprietress,
Genoves. Hu denied knowing Genoves. 15
On 4 January 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision 16 finding Hu guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Nenita Hu guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6 and 7(b) of Republic
Act No. 8042, and, accordingly, sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, pay the fine of P500,000.00 and to indemnify private complainants Paul
Abril in the amount of P44,000.00, Joel Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00 and
Evangeline Garcia in the amount of P50,000.00.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision 17 dated 9 October 2007, confirmed the presence
of all the elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, and thereby affirmed the
conviction of Hu with the modification that the amount of actual damages awarded to
Garcia in the amount of P50,000.00 be deleted.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING HU GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE.
Hu was charged with and convicted by the trial court of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale, which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court found that Hu made enticing, albeit empty promises, which moved private
complainants to part with their money and pay the placement fee. ADCTac
For its part, the Solicitor General joined the lower courts in finding that Hu was indeed
guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. According to the Solicitor General, all the
elements of illegal recruitment in large scale had been established beyond reasonable
doubt. 18
We cannot sustain the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.
19 Recruitment and placement is "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contact
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement." 20
The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the foregoing two
elements concur, with the addition of a third element the recruiter committed the
same against three or more persons, individually or as group. 21
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case
of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. While

it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial,
nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense
was committed against three or more persons. 22
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the prosecution
has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for the offense with
which he is charged. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non qui negat; i.e., "he who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove". The conviction of appellant must rest not on the
weakness of his defense, but on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. 23 SDIACc
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that
illegal recruitment was committed against three or more persons. What we have
uncovered upon careful scrutiny of the records was the fact that illegal recruitment was
committed against only one person; that is, against Garcia alone. Illegal recruitment
cannot successfully attach to the allegations of Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, since they
testified that they accomplished their pre-employment requirements through Brighturn
from June 2001 up to October of the same year, 24 a period wherein Brighturn's license
to engage in recruitment and placement was still in full force and effect. 25
While there were six private complainants in this case, four of whom were presented
during the trial, the prosecution, nonetheless, failed to establish that Hu engaged in
illegal recruitment acts against at least three of these complainants. In offenses in
which the number of victims is essential, such as in the present petition, failure of the
prosecution to prove by convincing evidence that the offense is committed against the
minimum number of persons required by law is fatal to its cause of action.
Underscoring the significance of the number of victims was the disquisition of Justice
Florenz Regalado in People v. Ortiz-Miyake: 26
It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons victimized is
determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed against a lone victim, the
accused may be convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is punishable with a lower
penalty under Article 39(c) 27 of the Labor Code. Corollarily, where the offense is
committed against three or more persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large
scale which provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) 28 of the same Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Regrettably, we cannot affirm the conviction of Hu for the offense of illegal recruitment
in large scale. While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job
recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment
abroad, nevertheless, we find the pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of Hu
beyond reasonable doubt. It is unfortunate that the prosecution evidence did not pass
the test of reasonable doubt, since the testimonies of its witnesses unveil a
contradicting inference that the recruitment of Panguelo, Abril and Orillano was
undertaken by Hu with the required authority from the POEA. cASTED
Failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of Hu beyond reasonable doubt does not
absolve her of her civil obligation to return the money she collected from private

complaints Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, plus legal interest in accordance with our
ruling in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals. 29 There, the prosecution failed to sufficiently
establish a case to warrant a conviction, but clearly proved a just debt owed to the
private complainant. Thus, the accused was ordered to pay the face value of the check
with 12% legal interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the information until the
finality of the judgment. It is well settled that acquittal based on reasonable doubt does
not preclude an award for civil damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, civil liability is not extinguished where the
acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance
of evidence is required in civil cases. There appears to be no sound reason to require
that a separate action be still filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil
case have already been established in the criminal proceedings. 30 In the present
case, the prosecution explicitly proved that private complainants parted with substantial
amounts of money upon the prodding and enticement of Hu on the false pretense that
she had the capacity to deploy them for employment abroad. In the end, private
complainants were not able to leave for work abroad or get their money back.
Neither does her acquittal herein exempt Hu from subsequent criminal prosecution for
estafa 31 provided that deceit, which is an essential element of estafa, be proven by
the prosecution. 32 Apparently, Hu deluded private complainants into believing that she
had the capacity to send them abroad for employment. Through this hoax, she was
able to convince private complainants to surrender their money to her in the vain hope,
as it turned out, of securing employment abroad.
This leaves us a case of simple illegal recruitment committed against Garcia.
Garcia testified that she applied for employment in Taiwan for the position of Electronic
Operator thru Brighturn in April 2002. Due to the alleged suspension of Brighturn's
license, Hu referred her to a neighboring agency (Best One), but Hu continued
collecting placement fees from her. IaHSCc
The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant
after an initial interview to a selected employer, placement or bureau, is included in
recruitment. 33 Undoubtedly, the act of Hu in referring Garcia to another recruitment
agency squarely fell within the purview of recruitment that was undertaken by Hu after
her authority to recruit and place workers already expired on 17 December 2001.
Failure of Garcia to present proof of payment is irrelevant. The absence of receipts in
the case of illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is not
fatal to the prosecution's case. As long as the prosecution is able to establish through
credible and testimonial evidence, as in the case at bar, that the appellant had engaged
in illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can be very well justified. 34
Irrefragably, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Hu of the
charge of illegal recruitment against Garcia when the former referred the latter to
another agency without the license or authority to do so. The trial court gave full

credence to the testimony of Garcia, which unmistakably demonstrated how Hu

successfully enticed her to part with a considerable amount of money in exchange for
an employment abroad which was never realized. This finding was adopted by the
appellate court, considering that that the trial court was in the best position to ascertain
credibility issues, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during trial.
Aptly, the bare denials of Hu have no probative value when ranged against the
affirmative declarations of Garcia, even if the latter failed to present receipts for the
payments she had made. In People v. Villas, 35 this Court affirmed the conviction of the
appellant for illegal recruitment even if private complaints were not able to present any
receipt that they paid appellant anything, thus: ETHIDa
Neither is there merit in the contention of the defense that appellant should be
exonerated for failure of the prosecution to present any receipt proving that private
complainants paid her anything. The defense argues that a receipt is the best evidence
to prove delivery of money and the absence thereof shows that no payment was made.
This argument is not novel. The Court has previously ruled that the absence of receipts
evidencing payment does not defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment. In
People vs. Pabalan [262 SCRA 574, 30 September 1996], this Court ruled:
". . . the absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant
the acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as
the witnesses had positively shown through their respective testimonies that the
accused is the one involved in the prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the
offense despite the want of receipts.
"The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not require the presentation of
receipts in order to prove the existence of recruitment agreement and the procurement
of fees in illegal recruitment cases. The amounts may consequently be proved by the
testimony of witnesses."
The private complainants have convincingly testified that the accused enticed them to
apply and, in actual fact, received payments from them. And to these testimonies, the
trial court accorded credence. On the other hand, appellant has not shown any reason
to justify a modification or reversal of the trial court's finding.
Our ruling in People v. Villas 36 that the absence of receipts in illegal recruitment case
does not warrant the acquittal of the accused has been reiterated in several cases. 37
We are not unaware of the proliferation of these scheming illegal recruiters who
cunningly rob Filipino workers, desperate to work abroad, of their money in exchange of
empty promises. This Court cannot be drawn to the ingenious ploy of these illegal
recruiters in withholding receipts from their victims in their vain attempt to evade liability.
In fine, the Court will have to discard the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale
meted out by the RTC, since only one applicant abroad was recruited by Hu without

license and authority from the POEA. Accordingly, Hu should be held responsible for
simple illegal recruitment only. Hu's unsuccessful indictment for illegal recruitment in
large scale, however, does not discharge her from her civil obligation to return the
placement fees paid by private complainants. DHcEAa
Under Section 7 (a) of Republic Act No. 8042, 38 simple illegal recruitment is
punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more
than twelve years and a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if the offense is punishable
by a special law, as in this case, the court shall impose on the accused an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by the said law and the minimum of which shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same. Accordingly, a penalty of eight (8) to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment should be meted out to Hu. In addition, a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00; and indemnity to private complainants Abril in the amount of
P44,000.00, Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00, Garcia in the amount of
P60,000.00 and Orillano in the amount of P50,000.00, with 12% legal interest per
annum, reckoned from the filing of the information until the finality of the judgment is
imposed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CR.-H.C. No. 02243 affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu for
the offense of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and sentencing her to life
imprisonment is hereby VACATED. A new Decision is hereby entered convicting the
accused-appellant of the offense of Simple Illegal Recruitment committed against
private complainant Evangeline Garcia. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. She is ordered to pay a
fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to indemnify private complainant Evangeline
Garcia in the amount of P60,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, reckoned from the
filing of the information until the finality of the judgment.
Accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu is likewise ordered to indemnify private complainants
Paul Abril in the amount of P44,000.00, Joel Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00,
and Eric Orillano in the amount of P50,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, as
reckoned above. aTADCE
NASI VILLAR V PEO
This is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Rosario Nasi-Villar assailing the Decision 2 dated 27 June 2005 and Resolution 3 dated
28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals. This case originated from an Information 4
for Illegal Recruitment as defined under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8042 5 filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur on 5 October
1998 for acts committed by petitioner and one Dolores Placa in or about January 1993.
The Information reads: cDCSTA

That on [sic] or about the month of [January 1993], in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another through fraudulent representation and deceitful machination, did
then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for employment
abroad[,] demand and receive the amount of P6,500.00 Philippine Currency [sic] as
placement fee[,] the said accused being a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to
engage in the recruitment of workers abroad to the damage and prejudice of the herein
offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
On 3 July 2002, after due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 18, Digos City,
Davao del Sur found the evidence presented by the prosecution to be more credible
than that presented by the defense and thus held petitioner liable for the offense of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, as amended. 7 The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused ROSARIO NASIVILLAR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Recruitment and, in
accordance with the penalty set forth under the Labor Code, as amended, said accused
is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR YEARS as
minimum to FIVE YEARS as maximum.
On the civil aspect of the case, there being no substantial proof presented to justify a
grant of civil damages, this Court makes no pronouncement thereon.
With respect to accused Ma. Dolores Placa, who is still at large, the records of this case
are hereby sent to the archives to be retrieved in the event that said accused would be
apprehended. Issue an alias warrant of arrest for the apprehension of said accused.

Art. 39 of the Labor Code. The appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of
the RTC, decreeing in the dispositive portion, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, 11th Judicial Region, Br. 18, City of Digos, Province of Davao del Sur, finding
Rosario Nasi-Villar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Rosario Nasi-Villar is ORDERED to pay Nila
Panilag the sum of P10,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED. 10
On 28 November 2006, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 11
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that R.A. No.
8042 cannot be given retroactive effect and that the decision of the RTC constitutes a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law. Since R.A. No. 8042
did not yet exist in January 1993 when the crime was allegedly committed, petitioner
argues that law cannot be used as the basis of filing a criminal action for illegal
recruitment. What was applicable in 1993 is the Labor Code, where under Art. 38, in
relation to Art. 39, the violation of the Code is penalized with imprisonment of not less
than four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00
and not more than P100,000.00 or both. On the other hand, Sec. 7 (c) of R.A. No. 8042
penalizes illegal recruitment with a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than
P200,000.00 nor more than P500,000.00. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment provided
in the Labor Code was raised or increased by R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner concludes that
the charge and conviction of an offense carrying a penalty higher than that provided by
the law at the time of its commission constitutes a violation of the prohibition against ex
post facto law and the retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042. aCTHDA

SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as sole issue the alleged error by
the trial court in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis of the trial court's
appreciation of the evidence presented by the prosecution. aDcETC
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 June 2005, 9 following the principle that
an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, noted that the
criminal acts alleged to have been committed happened sometime in 1993. However,
R.A. No. 8042, under which petitioner was charged, was approved only on 7 June 1995
and took effect on 15 July 1995. Thus, the Court of Appeals declared that petitioner
should have been charged under the Labor Code, in particular Art. 13 (b) thereof, and
not under R.A. No. 8042. Accordingly, it made its findings on the basis of the provisions
of the Labor Code and found petitioner liable under Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13 (b), and

In its Comment 12 dated 7 September 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argues that the Court of Appeals' conviction of petitioner under the Labor Code is
correct. While conceding that there was an erroneous designation of the law violated by
petitioner, the OSG stresses that the designation of the offense in the Information is not
determinative of the nature and character of the crime charged against her but the acts
alleged in the Information. The allegations in the Information clearly charge petitioner
with illegal recruitment as defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code,
and penalized under Art. 39 (c) of the same Code. The evidence on record
substantiates the charge to a moral certainty. Thus, while there was an erroneous
specification of the law violated by petitioner in the Information, the CA was correct in
affirming the RTC's imposition of the penalty for simple illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code, the OSG concludes.

The petition is denied. We find no reversible error in the decision arrived at by the Court
of Appeals.
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 13 we held that the real nature of the crime charged is
determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the law alleged to have been violated these being conclusions of law
but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. What controls is not
the designation but the description of the offense charged. From a legal point of view,
and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what the technical name of
the crime of which he stands charged is. If the accused performed the acts alleged in
the body of the information, in the manner stated, then he ought to be punished and
punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts
constitute. 14
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
had performed the acts constituting the offense defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13
(b) and punished by Art. 39 of the Labor Code, as alleged in the body of the
Information. To prove illegal recruitment, two elements must be shown, namely: (1) the
person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities, or any of
the activities enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) said
person does not have a license or authority to do so. 15 Art. 13 (b) defines "recruitment
and placement" as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising, or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided that
any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons, is considered engaged in recruitment and placement." The trial
court found these two elements had been proven in the case at bar. Petitioner has not
offered any argument or proof that countervails such findings. HCITDc
The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at the time of its
commission. Thus, petitioner can only be charged and found guilty under the Labor
Code which was in force in 1993 when the acts attributed to her were committed.
Petitioner was charged in 1998 under an Information that erroneously designated the
offense as covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in its body acts which are punishable
under the Labor Code. As it was proven that petitioner had committed the acts she was
charged with, she was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not under R.A.
No. 8042.
There is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law nor a retroactive
application of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by petitioner. An ex post facto law is one which,
among others, aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed or
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed. 16 Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature,
nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their
violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except
when they are favorable to the accused. 17

R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and gave a new
definition of the crime of illegal recruitment and provided for its higher penalty. There is
no indication in R.A. No. 8042 that said law, including the penalties provided therein,
would take effect retroactively. A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it
operates prospectively since its strictures would cover only offenses committed after
and not before its enactment. 18 Neither did the trial court nor the appellate court give
R.A. No. 8042 a retroactive application since both courts passed upon petitioner's case
only under the aegis of the Labor Code. The proceedings before the trial court and the
appellate court did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto law nor involved a
retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042 in any way.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 27 June 2005 and
Resolution dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. DTAcIa
BECMEN V CUARESMA
These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding
White Falcon Services, Inc. and Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.
solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of
US$4,686.73 in actual damages with interest. HTAEIS
On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service
Exporter and Promotion, Inc. 2 (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a
corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was
found dead by a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her
mouth foaming and smelling of poison. 3
Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the AlBirk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmin's body, the likely cause of her death
was poisoning. Thus:
According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al-Birk Police Station, for
examining the corpse of Jasmin Cuaresma, 12.20 P.M. 27.2.1419H, Sunday, at Al-Birk
Hospital.
1.The Police Report on the Death
2.The Medical Diagnosis
Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian

The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of the hospital; time 12.20 P.M.
and she was unconscious, blue, no pulse, no respiration and the first aid esd
undertaken but without success.
3.Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation respiratory system and brain damage
due to an apparent poisoning which is under investigation. 4
Name: Jasmin Cuaresma
Sex: Female
Marital Status: SingleNationality: Philipino (sic)
Religion: ChristianProfession: Nurse
Address: Al-Birk Genrl. HospitalBirth Place: The Philippines
On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki Komar, both have examined the
dead body of Jasmin Cuaresma, at 12.20 P.M., Sunday, 22.2.14189H, and the result
was:
1.Report of the Police on the death
2.Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the Extrimes (sic), total halt to blood
circulation and respiratory system and brain damage. There were no external injuries.
Likely poisoning by taking poisonous substance, yet not determined. There was a bad
smell in the mouth and unknown to us. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Jasmin's body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the
City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical
report indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as
originally found by the KSA examining physician. The City Health Officer found that
Jasmin had abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on
her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows;
abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the
anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the
vaginal area. 6
On March 11, 1999, Jasmin's remains were exhumed and examined by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested
negative for non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides. 7
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmin's parents and her surviving
heirs, received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the
following amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life;
P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its
principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance
benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmin's death. 8 acAIES

In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmin's death was work-related, having
occurred at the employer's premises; 9 that under Jasmin's contract with Becmen, she
is entitled to "iqama insurance" coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory
damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary
of US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the
remaining years of her productive life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming
that she lived and would have retired at age 60).
The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmin's death under mysterious
circumstances, they suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they
claim, was aggravated by findings in the autopsy and exhumation reports which
evidently show that a grave injustice has been committed against them and their
daughter, for which those responsible should likewise be made to pay moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a
prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the
medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny
liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits totaling
P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to
"iqama insurance" because this refers to the "issuance" not insurance of iqama,
or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary
damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they
have not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmin's case.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution
alleging that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White
Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines.
Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and
reiterated Becmen's arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 10 dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital
finding that Jasmin died of poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded that Jasmin
committed suicide. In any case, Jasmin's death was not service-connected, nor was it
shown that it occurred while she was on duty; besides, her parents have received all
corresponding benefits they were entitled to under the law. In regard to damages, the
Labor Arbiter found no legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of
Cabanatuan City and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report,
respectively, the Commission, via its November 22, 2002 Resolution 11 declared that,
based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of compensable workconnected criminal aggression. It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending physician's
report as well as the KSA police report, finding the same to be inconclusive. It declared
that Jasmin's death was the result of an "accident" occurring within the employer's

premises that is attributable to her employment, or to the conditions under which she
lived, and thus arose out of and in the course of her employment as nurse. Thus, the
Cuaresmas are entitled to actual damages in the form of Jasmin's lost earnings,
including future earnings, in the total amount of US$113,000.00. The Commission,
however, dismissed all other claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the
Commission issued its October 9, 2003 Resolution 12 reducing the award of
US$113,000.00 as actual damages to US$80,000.00. 13 The NLRC likewise declared
Becmen and White Falcon as solidarily liable for payment of the award.
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals. 14 On June 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision, 15 the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the execution of the decision, it
should first be enforced against White Falcon Services and then against Becmen
Services when it is already impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White
Falcon).
SO ORDERED. 16
The appellate court affirmed the NLRC's findings that Jasmin's death was
compensable, the same having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually
provided by the employer. Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within
the employer's premises, arising out of and in the course of her employment.
Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May 14, 2008, the appellate
court rendered the assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads,
as follows: HAcaCS
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. Accordingly, the award
of US$80,000.00 in actual damages is hereby reduced to US$4,686.73 plus interest at
the legal rate computed from the time it became due until fully paid. Petitioners are
hereby adjudged jointly and solidarily liable with the employer for the monetary awards
with Becmen Service Exporter and Promotions, Inc. having a right of reimbursement
from White Falcon Services, Inc.

Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-79). The
Cuaresmas, on the other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended decision,
but it was denied. They are now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99 with G.R.
Nos. 182978-79.
In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues for our resolution:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GAVE MORE CREDENCE
AND WEIGHT TO THE AUTOPSY REPORT CONDUCTED BY THE CABANATUAN
CITY HEALTH OFFICE THAN THE MEDICAL AND POLICE REPORTS ISSUED BY
THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND AL-BIRK
HOSPITAL.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON THE BASIS OF THE
POSITION PAPERS AND ANNEXES THERETO INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY
REPORT, IT CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS
CAUSED BY CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DEATH
OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS COMPENSABLE PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN TALLER VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO. 35741, DECEMBER
20, 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE STILL GOOD LAW.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ADMISSIONS
THAT "IQAMA INSURANCE" WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SINCE "IQAMA" IS
NOT AN INSURANCE.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE
DEATH OF JASMIN WAS WORK RELATED.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO
JASMIN'S BENEFICIARIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF HER 36-MONTH CONTRACT
COMPUTED IN THIS MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF US$246.67 MULTIPLIED BY
19 MONTHS, THE REMAINDER OF THE TERM OF JASMIN'S EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT, IS EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.

SO ORDERED. 17
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmin's death was
compensable, however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual
damages in the amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected, because
the same may be charged only against the perpetrator of the crime or quasi-delict.
Instead, the appellate court held that Jasmin's beneficiaries should be entitled only to
the sum equivalent of the remainder of her 36-month employment contract, or her
monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied by nineteen (19) months, with legal interest.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO

PAY INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM THE TIME IT WAS DUE UNTIL FULLY
PAID.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN AND
WHITE FALCON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE EMPLOYER
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY EXECUTED BY WHITE
FALCON IN FAVOR OF BECMEN.

8.Eight days public holidays per year;

On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas raise the following issues:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF
THE CIVIL CODE CONSIDERED GENERAL LAW DESPITE THE CASE BEING
COVERED BY E.O. 247, R.A. 8042 AND LABOR CODE CONSIDERED AS SPECIAL
LAWS. DCIEac
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE
DECEASED'S FUTURE EARNINGS WHICH IS (AN) INHERENT FACTOR IN THE
COMPUTATION OF DEATH BENEFITS OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO CONTRACT
WORKERS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH
BENEFITS AWARDED BY NLRC CONSIDERED FINDINGS OF FACT THAT CANNOT
BE DISTURBED THROUGH CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.
The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by
way of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
The terms and conditions of Jasmin's 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her
employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule,
stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public
order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties. 18 An
examination of said employment agreement shows that it provides for no other
monetary or other benefits/privileges than the following:
1.1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
2.Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the Philippines at the end
thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;

9.The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated as per labor
laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or
other benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and
appellate court granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.
However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does not
make Jasmin's employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is not
obliged to provide her these benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum wage
unless of course the KSA labor laws have been amended to the opposite effect, or
that a bilateral wage agreement has been entered into.
Our next inquiry is, should Jasmin's death be considered as work-connected and thus
compensable? The evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was
not on duty, or else evidence to the contrary would have been adduced. Neither was
she within hospital premises at the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on
personal time when she died. Neither has it been shown, nor does the evidence
suggest, that at the time she died, Jasmin was performing an act reasonably necessary
or incidental to her employment as nurse, because she was at her dormitory room. It is
reasonable to suppose that all her work is performed at the Al-Birk Hospital, and not at
her dormitory room.
We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even while she is
not on duty. It is not fair to require employers to answer even for their employees'
personal time away from work, which the latter are free to spend of their own choosing.
Whether they choose to spend their free time in the pursuit of safe or perilous
undertakings, in the company of friends or strangers, lovers or enemies, this is not one
area which their employers should be made accountable for. While we have
emphasized the need to observe official work time strictly, 19 what an employee does
on free time is beyond the employer's sphere of inquiry. aHcDEC

3.Transportation to and from work;

4.Free living accommodations;
5.Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations, plastic surgery
charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;
6.Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but the exit/reentry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport renewal,
sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;
7.Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after twenty fourmonths of continuous service;

While the "employer's premises" may be defined very broadly not only to include
premises owned by it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses, 20 we are
not prepared to rule that the dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute
employer's premises as would allow a finding that death or injury therein is considered
to have been incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her employment.
There are certainly exceptions, 21 but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a
complete determination would have to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining
and the overall factual environment of the case, which are here lacking.
But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently insist
that she did; thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal
aggression. On the other hand, the Cuaresmas do not believe so.

The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway
into her employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year-old
Filipina, in the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent
living with a high-paying job which she could not find in her own country, would simply
commit suicide for no compelling reason.

unaware that cruelties and inhumanities are inflicted on OFWs who are unfortunate to
be employed by vicious employers, or upon those who work in communities or
environments where they are liable to become victims of crime. By now they should
know that our women OFWs do not readily succumb to the temptation of killing
themselves even when assaulted, abused, starved, debased and, worst, raped.

The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that Jasmin is a likely/or apparent
victim of poisoning are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as evidence.

Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmen's revolting scheme of conveniently
avoiding responsibility by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own life.
Abandoning their legal, moral and social obligation (as employer and recruiter) to assist
Jasmin's family in obtaining justice for her death, they immediately gave up on Jasmin's
case, which has remained under investigation as the autopsy and police reports
themselves indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin, who had no relative or
representative in the KSA who would naturally demand and seek an investigation of her
case, Rajab and Becmen chose to take the most convenient route to avoiding and
denying liability, by casting Jasmin's fate to oblivion. It appears from the record that to
this date, no follow up of Jasmin's case was ever made at all by them, and they seem
to have expediently treated Jasmin's death as a closed case. Despite being given the
lead via the autopsy and toxicology reports of the Philippine authorities, they failed and
refused to act and pursue justice for Jasmin's sake and to restore honor to her name.
IcEACH

On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the
exhumation report of the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin
sustained external and internal injuries, specifically abrasions at her inner lip and gums;
lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and
hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs;
intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured rib; puncture wounds; and
abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area. The NBI toxicology report came up
negative on the presence of poison.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to her
death.
Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate Jasmin
was poisoned to death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was
poisoned, the assailants who beat her up and possibly raped her are certainly
responsible therefor.
We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of the world
blind to the realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of some
foreign employers. It is inconceivable that our Filipina women would seek employment
abroad and face uncertainty in a foreign land, only to commit suicide for unexplained
reasons. Deciding to leave their family, loved ones, and the comfort and safety of home,
to work in a strange land requires unrivaled strength and courage. Indeed, many of our
women OFWs who are unfortunate to end up with undesirable employers have been
there more times than they care to, beaten up and broken in body yet they have
remained strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to live. Raped, burned with
cigarettes, kicked in the chest with sharp high-heeled shoes, starved for days or even
weeks, stabbed, slaved with incessant work, locked in their rooms, forced to serve their
masters naked, grossly debased, dehumanized and insulted, their spirits fought on and
they lived for the day that they would once again be reunited with their families and
loved ones. Their bodies surrendered, but their will to survive remained strong.

It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on
suicide, without even lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmin's death. Being
in the business of sending OFWs to work abroad, Becmen and White Falcon should
know what happens to some of our OFWs. It is impossible for them to be completely

Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmin's remains
were repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to
make personal representations with Jasmin's parents, if only to extend their
condolences or sympathies; instead, a mere colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was
designated to accompany Jasmin's body home.
Of all life's tragedies, the death of one's own child must be the most painful for a parent.
Not knowing why or how Jasmin's life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly
unbearable for Jasmin's parents, and further aggravated by Rajab, Becmen, and White
Falcon's baseless insistence and accusation that it was a self-inflicted death, a mortal
sin by any religious standard.
Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of our
OFWs; and the resilient and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest
desecration of her physical self, that Jasmin did not commit suicide but a victim of
murderous aggression.
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcon's indifference to Jasmin's case has caused
unfathomable pain and suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their
moral obligation, as employer and recruiter and as entities laden with social and civic
obligations in society, to pursue justice for and in behalf of Jasmin, her parents and
those she left behind. Possessed with the resources to determine the truth and to
pursue justice, they chose to stand idly for the sake of convenience and in order that
they may avoid pecuniary liability, turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities'
autopsy and toxicology reports instead of taking action upon them as leads in pursuing
justice for Jasmin's death. They have placed their own financial and corporate interests

above their moral and social obligations, and chose to secure and insulate themselves
from the perceived responsibility of having to answer for and indemnify Jasmin's heirs
for her death.
Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, 22 the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens
whether in country or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular.
23 The State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to
Filipino migrant workers. 24 The rights and interest of distressed 25 overseas Filipinos,
in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented,
are adequately protected and safeguarded. 26
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to
abide by the provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend
assistance to their deployed OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they
abandoned Jasmin's case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests
and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact
from them. They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the deceased
Jasmin, treating her case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth wasting
their time and resources on. The evidence does not even show that Becmen and Rajab
lifted a finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmin's
case. Worst of all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin
by standing pat on the argument that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave
accusation given its un-Christian nature.
We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmin's parents should be the ones to actively
pursue a just resolution of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the
finances to undertake this herculean task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend any
assistance at all in this respect. The most Jasmin's parents can do is to coordinate with
Philippine authorities as mandated under R.A. 8042, obtain free legal assistance and
secure the aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Labor and
Employment, the POEA and the OWWA in trying to solve the case or obtain relief, in
accordance with Section 23 27 of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the Cuaresmas did all that
was within their power, short of actually flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas went
even further. To the best of their abilities and capacities, they ventured to investigate
Jasmin's case on their own: they caused another autopsy on Jasmin's remains as soon
as it arrived to inquire into the true cause of her death. Beyond that, they subjected
themselves to the painful and distressful experience of exhuming Jasmin's remains in
order to obtain another autopsy for the sole purpose of determining whether or not their
daughter was poisoned. Their quest for the truth and justice is equally to be expected of
all loving parents. All this time, Rajab and Becmen instead of extending their full
cooperation to the Cuaresma family merely sat on their laurels in seeming
unconcern.
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, 28 a seaman who was being
repatriated after his employment contract expired, failed to make his Bangkok to Manila
connecting flight as he began to wander the streets of Bangkok aimlessly. He was shot

to death by Thai police four days after, on account of running amuck with a knife in
hand and threatening to harm anybody within sight. The employer, sued for death and
other benefits as well as damages, interposed as defense the provision in the seafarer
agreement which provides that "no compensation shall be payable in respect of any
injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the
seaman." The Court rejected the defense on the view, among others, that the
recruitment agency should have observed some precautionary measures and should
not have allowed the seaman, who was later on found to be mentally ill, to travel home
alone, and its failure to do so rendered it liable for the seaman's death. We ruled therein
that HCEcAa
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by
its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed
by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some
mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say
the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically
owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise
lost their usefulness. 29 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals,
recruitment agencies have equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where
OFWs are likely to encounter uneven if not discriminatory treatment from the foreign
government, and certainly a delayed access to language interpretation, legal aid, and
the Philippine consulate, the recruitment agencies should be the first to come to the
rescue of our distressed OFWs since they know the employers and the addresses
where they are deployed or stationed. Upon them lies the primary obligation to protect
the rights and ensure the welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed or not. Who else is
in a better position, if not these recruitment agencies, to render immediate aid to their
deployed OFWs abroad?
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly, Article
24 requires that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is
at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon's acts and omissions are against public
policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our
OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful
example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with
respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous
treatment of Jasmin's case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to
assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death,

and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed
suicide just so they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own
corporate interests above of the welfare of their employee's all these are contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor
employee and her family's ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and
resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one.

White Falcon's assumption of Becmen's liability does not automatically result in

Becmen's freedom or release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas
Manpower Corporation v. NLRC. 39 Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should be
held liable solidarily, without prejudice to each having the right to be reimbursed under
the provision of the Civil Code that whoever pays for another may demand from the
debtor what he has paid. 40

Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting on
it just to protect Rajab and Becmen's material interest despite evidence to the
contrary is against the moral law and runs contrary to the good custom of not
denouncing one's fellowmen for alleged grave wrongdoings that undermine their good
name and honor. 30

WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah
Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.,
and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and
ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila
Cuaresma, the following amounts:

Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle
of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the
State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the
Civil Code which states that laws which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 31
The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest, 32 and
neither shall act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of
the public. 33 In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. 34
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of
the employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10) 35 of the Civil Code, which allows
recovery of such damages in actions referred to in Article 21. 36
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral
damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay,
together with exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of
example for the public good.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based
employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This
joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign
employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient
payment of what is due him. 37 If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being,
the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves
be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages. 38 DAEcIS

1)TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral

damages;
2)TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
3)Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and,
4)Costs of suit.