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Executive Summary
Strong world GDP growth from 2002 to 2007 led to a steady rise in global oil demand. Coupled with more
modest increases in oil output and capacity levels, and the impact of a gradually weakening US dollar, this
led to an accelerating rise in oil prices. World demand for oil peaked in the first quarter of 2008, prior to the
onset of the global financial crisis and subsequent recession that saw oil demand decline in both 2008 and
2009, despite a pick-up in the latter part of last year and in Q1 2010.
As a result of the sharp swings in demand, oil prices have been volatile. The price of Brent crude peaked at
US$149pb in July 2008, the culmination of a 10-year rise from lows of under US$10pb in 1998, but then
subsided to under US$40pb at the end of 2008, a slide of almost 75% in less than six months. Greater
stability in the world economy and OPEC quota cuts led to a steady recovery in oil prices through 2009,
ending the year at around US$75pb but averaging US$62pb, a 36% fall from the 2008 average. And the
price has risen further in early 2010, to over US$80pb at April but then slipping to US$70pb in May.
The price of oil in real terms set a new record high in mid 2008, surpassing the level in 1980 that resulted
from the Iranian revolution and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. Despite the sharp slide in the latter part of
2008, the real oil price remains comfortably above the levels that prevailed during the 20-year period from
1985 to 2005 and that resulted in low oil industry investment over the period.
The key influence on oil prices over the next year will be the pace of world growth. Oxford Economics
forecasts a modest pick-up in world growth, with global GDP seen growing close to 4% on a PPP basis this
year after falling by about 1% in 2009. The fastest growth will be in the emerging markets, led China and
India in particular, while OECD countries will experience a sluggish recovery. As a result, although oil
demand in non-OECD countries is forecast to grow quite strongly, OECD oil demand is expected to be
broadly unchanged in 2010, held down by weak growth and further gains in energy efficiency and use of
alternative energy sources. In addition, OECD inventories are currently also at relatively high levels.
This demand scenario suggests that oil prices are unlikely to climb significantly further this year, with rising
oil output also likely to act as a restraint. The improving global economy and the higher oil price have
meant that OPEC countries are now raising production, with output currently running at around 29 mb/d,
the highest for over a year, and with the prospect of further increases. Non-OPEC output remains broadly
stable, with higher output in FSU countries offset by lower production in Norway, the UK and Mexico.
Beyond 2010, demand for oil will still be largely driven by the pace of the world economic recovery but with
other factors beginning to play an increasingly important role, including efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, the growing importance of gas and increasing use of alternative energy sources such as
nuclear and biofuels. As a result, the level of global oil intensity will continue to fall steadily in the coming
years, as will the share of oil in global GDP.
June 2010
With global GDP growth seen accelerating to almost 5% in 2012 and 2013 but then dropping back to some
4-4.5% pa in the second half of the decade, Oxford Economics expects world oil demand to grow by 1.2%
pa over the period to 2020, with much of the increase coming from the emerging markets, led by China and
the rest of emerging Asia.
Despite the failure of the December 2009 Copenhagen summit to deliver global commitments to cut carbon
emissions, growing pressure to combat global warming will see many countries trying to curb demand for
hydrocarbons, including the growing use of carbon taxes, energy efficiency gains and use of renewable
energy sources. But the absence of coordinated global action to stem the rise in carbon emissions means
that oil demand will continue to rise in many emerging markets.
This demand profile is likely to see the call on OPEC rising in the years ahead, especially as non-OPEC oil
output is likely to remain broadly static as a result of the lack of investment in recent years and ageing
oilfields. Moreover, new oil resources are expected to be in more remote and less accessible areas,
thereby involving greater exploitation and transportation costs and longer lead times. As a result, OPEC
capacity is expected to rise steadily, with some countries such as Nigeria and Iraq hoping to raise output
significantly and other smaller members, seeking to accelerate economic development, also likely to press
for higher quotas.
The medium-term supply and demand trends are expected to result in world oil prices rising by about 2%
pa in real terms over the period to 2020, to US$100pb in 2008 prices, with nominal Brent crude forecast to
climb to around US$100pb in 2015 and to about US$130pb in 2020.
Over the longer term, the pace of oil demand growth is expect to ease slightly, to 1% pa during 2020-2030
from 1.2% pa in 2010-2020. Again, much of this demand growth will be led by the emerging markets, with
Chinas role in the world economy overtaking the US in terms of GDP on a PPP basis after 2020 and
becoming the second largest oil consumer by 2030 meaning that demand for primary fuel sources will
continue to climb.
As a result, we forecast the price of Brent crude in nominal terms will climb to around US$180pb in 2030,
slightly below the projections of both the IEA and the EIA. In constant 2008 US$ terms, we expect Brent
crude to be nearly US$110pb, continuing the steady trend increase since the lows of the 1990s.
There are many risks to the central forecast. In the short term, the most important risk is that the world
economy grows more slowly than expected, which in turn would probably keep oil demand and prices
lower than expected in the next few years. Moreover, OECD inventories are also relatively high currently,
which could further undermine any recovery in demand.
But a stronger than expected recovery in the world economy this year, coupled with continued OPEC quota
discipline, could see prices spike even higher in the short term, perhaps hitting US$100pb later in 2010.
Medium-term upside risks include further tensions in the Middle East, which currently appear most likely to
be linked to the situation in Iran, or in other major OPEC producers, such as Nigeria or Venezuela.
Currency movements are also a significant risk, with any extended period of US$ weakness likely to exert
greater than expected upward pressure on prices, as was the case during 2003-2008.
June 2010
Great
Recession
Iran/Iraq
war
Iran revolution
Gulf war
100
Oil embargo
Asian crisis
80
60
9/11
40
Series of
OPEC cuts
20
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
June 2010
1990
1995
2000
2005
for oil in emerging markets is greater than 1 . As the emerging markets grew at over 6% pa on a PPP
basis for much of this period, this meant that their demand for oil was growing exceptionally rapidly.
The slowdown in world growth to 3% in 2008 and then the move into recession in 2009, with world GDP
(in PPP terms) falling 1%, saw world oil demand falling continuously for five consecutive quarters.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global oil demand in 2009Q2 was down to 84.1
million barrels per day (mb/d), almost 4% lower than in 2008Q1. The weakness was particularly marked
in the Americas and Europe, where demand was down 5.2% and 6.8% respectively over the period,
while demand in Asia/Pacific was down just 2.6% and in the Middle East it actually rose 9%. Data for
the second half of 2009 show demand picking up slowly in all regions, with world demand up to 85.9
mb/d in the final quarter of the year and then to 86.3 mb/d in Q1 2010. But for 2009 overall global
demand averaged 84.9 mb/d, a drop of 1.5% from 2008 and the second successive annual decline.
Non-OECD demand is estimated by the IEA to have risen 2% from the 2008 level, but OECD demand
fell again, down 4.4% from 2008.
World oil consumption
Oil consumption
mbd
mbd
90
50
45
85
OECD
40
80
35
75
30
Non-OECD
25
70
65
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
20
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Source : Oxford Economics/BP/IEA
The income elasticity of demand for oil measures the % change in demand associated with a given % change in GDP. So an
elasticity greater than 1 implies that a 1% rise/fall in GDP will lead to a rise/fall in oil demand (other things being equal) of greater
than 1%.
June 2010
EIA
IEA
Oxford
Economics
OPEC
OECD
2008 actual
2009 actual
2010 forecast
mb/d
47.6
45.4
45.3
growth
-3.2
-4.7
0.0
mb/d
47.6
45.5
45.4
growth
-3.3
-4.5
-0.1
mb/d
47.6
45.5
45.3
growth
-3.3
-4.4
-0.4
mb/d
47.6
45.5
45.5
growth
-3.5
-4.4
0.0
Non-OECD
2008 actual
2009 actual
2010 forecast
38.2
38.7
40.2
3.9
1.2
4.1
38.4
39.3
40.9
3.2
2.3
4.1
38.3
38.9
40.1
3.5
1.6
3.1
38.6
39.3
40.8
3.5
1.8
3.8
Total
2008 actual
2009 actual
2010 forecast
85.8
84.0
85.6
-0.1
-2.1
1.9
86.0
84.8
86.4
-0.5
-1.4
1.9
85.9
84.4
85.4
-0.3
-1.7
1.2
86.2
84.8
86.3
-0.2
-1.6
1.8
June 2010
mtoe
7500
mtoe
9500
7000
9000
6500
6000
8500
5500
5000
8000
4500
4000
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
7500
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
But the rise in oil prices since the low point at the end of 2008 has led to renewed production rises from
OPEC members, whose collective compliance rate with quota cuts was close to 60% in December 2009
and then slipped further to 55% in March 2010. Total OPEC production at end-2009 and in Q1 2010
was running around 29 mb/d, close to its highest in over a year, with Nigerias output recovering strongly
from its lowest level in two decades in August as its ceasefire with rebel forces operating in oilproducing areas proved durable. In addition, Iraq and Angola are still looking to raise output. As a result,
OPEC oil production in 2010 is seen remaining at relatively high levels, with member countries recent
statements suggesting that they are comfortable with current production levels and prices. Non-OPEC
production is seen rising only very modestly, with higher output in FSU countries being broadly offset by
further falls in OECD countries, notably Norway, the UK and Mexico.
EIA
IEA
OPEC
mb/d
mb/d
mb/d
85.8
85.6
87.2
86.0
84.8
86.4
86.0
84.8
86.3
Non-OPEC
2008 actual
2009 actual
2010 forecast
49.7
50.4
51.0
50.8
51.5
52.2
50.8
51.5
52.0
OPEC NGLs
2008 actual
2009 actual
2010 forecast
4.5
4.8
5.4
4.4
4.7
5.4
4.4
4.7
5.4
OPEC call
2008 actual
2009 actual
2010 forecast
31.7
28.9
29.2
30.8
28.6
28.8
30.8
28.6
28.9
Total supply
2008 actual
2009 actual
2010 forecast
Source: EIA/IEA/OPEC
June 2010
2010
2011
2012
2013
4.0
4.8
7.7
3.3
0.9
3.8
3.4
3.9
5.3
5.3
7.3
4.5
1.7
4.7
3.8
4.4
5.5
5.5
7.9
5.5
2.3
4.9
3.6
4.9
5.2
5.6
7.7
5.8
2.6
4.4
3.0
4.8
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
5.1
5.4
7.4
5.0
2.5
3.9
2.5
4.5
4.8
5.1
7.2
4.7
2.5
3.6
2.2
4.3
4.8
5.0
7.1
4.6
2.3
3.4
2.5
4.3
4.8
5.0
7.0
4.6
2.2
3.4
2.8
4.3
4.8
5.1
6.9
4.6
2.1
3.4
2.9
4.3
4.8
5.2
7.0
4.5
2.0
3.3
2.9
4.4
4.8
5.2
7.0
4.5
2.0
3.2
3.0
4.4
Based on this growth profile, Oxford Economics expects world oil demand to increase by 1.2% pa over
the next ten years, rising from some 86 mb/d in 2010 to 97.5 mb/d in 2020, somewhat lower than
projected prior to the onset of the global downturn. As indicated by the GDP growth assumptions noted
above, much of the increase in demand will be in the emerging markets, led by China and the rest of
emerging Asia, although the assumed recovery in growth in the US to around 3% pa over the period will
June 2010
World GDP
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
World oil
demand
(RHS)
-6
1975 1979 1983 1987
Source: Oxford Economics
F'cast
1991
1995
1999
2003
2007
2011
June 2010
June 2010
On the other hand, the level of global oil intensity, the amount of oil needed per unit of GDP, will
continue to fall as governments in developed countries implement carbon tax policies and other
measures to discourage the demand for hydrocarbons. But the emerging economies are more energy
intensive than developed economies, with China and India particularly energy intensive, so the
continued faster growth in the developing world will partly offset the gains elsewhere.
Over the next ten years, the use of nuclear power and other alternative energy sources will become an
increasingly important factor in the demand for, and hence the price of, oil. Despite the failure of the
June 2010
Oil price
$/barrel
140
120
120
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
Forecast
Forecast
0
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
0
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
June 2010
- 11 -
2020
World
2010
2020
2030
Growth % pa
2010-2030
2010-2020
2020-2030
EIA
mb/d
IEA
mb/d
OPEC
OE
mb/d
85.2
95.9
106.6
86.3
105.2
85.1
95.4
105.6
86.3
97.5
107.2
1.1
1.2
1.1
1.0
-
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.0
The Oxford Economics forecast of long-term oil demand is similar to the IEAs, showing a rise of 1.1% pa
over the period 2010-30 to 107.2 mb/d. The US Energy Information Administration and OPEC also
forecast oil demand to grow by 1.1% pa over the period 2010-30.
On the basis of the long-term oil demand profile noted above and the projected growth of the world
economy, Oxford Economics expects oil prices (Brent, nominal terms) to rise to US$180pb in 2030, a little
below both the IEA projection of US$190pb in 2030 and the EIAs forecast of US$186pb. But with
increasing efforts in the developed world to reduce the use of hydrocarbon fuels and develop alternative
energy sources, the pace of increase in real oil prices is forecast to slow to about 1% pa in the period
2020-30 from 2% pa in 2010-20. We forecast the price of oil in constant 2008 US$ terms at US$110pb.
June 2010
- 12 -
Oil price
$/barrel
200
120
180
100
160
140
80
120
100
60
80
40
60
40
20
20
Forecast
0
2000
2005
2010
Forecast
2015
2020
2025
2030
0
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
June 2010
2030
June 2010