SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

RULE 72
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174975

January 20, 2009

LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR
MONTAER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN
LILING S. MONTAER, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District,
Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21, 2006.2
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception
Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3 Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan
are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.5
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a
"Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District Court.6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling
S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K.
Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7 In the
said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the
decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties
comprising the estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among others, the
following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.9
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction
over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the
correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation
between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.10
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint. The district court held that Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased
Muslims.11
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.12 On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.13 On January
17, 2006, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners opposition.14 Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration "lacked
notice of hearing," the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of the existence of the pleading,"
and it took cognizance of the said motion.15 The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.16
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November 22,
2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence.18 In its second assailed order dated September
21, 2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial
conference.19
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:
I.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN
CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND
PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH
CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.

IV.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A
"NOTICE OF HEARING."

V.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT
RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE
OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia District Court must be given the
opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.20
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether the late
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already been a determination resolving
such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The
assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that
the Sharia District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters
of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought in the
complaint or petition.21 The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it
according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive
averments of the pleadings."22
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of
properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,23 such as the fact of Alejandro
Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very
properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private
respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent.24 These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of
the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case because of an
allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the
action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer25 or a motion to dismiss.26 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant27 or result in having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings
unduly delayed by simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not
render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction."29
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not deprived of
jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court
has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that
the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the
district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil
action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the
confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs
or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are
for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding.
Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the
applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs, which
would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.32 Here, the
respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling
S. Montaer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action33 applies to
a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite
adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding,
respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong"34 necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.35
On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,"36 has one definite
party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it
bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the
settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,37 pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute the
residual to those entitled to the same.39
Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to
private respondents petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate
as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially
involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the
correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court.41 In such a
case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts
insufficient assessment of the docket fees.42 As "every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law
with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be penalized with
the clerk of courts insufficient assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.44
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include
this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of
courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration before the Sharia District Court is defective for
lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The

Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties
concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service
thereof."46 However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction
specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its
face or from the recitals contained therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested
right in technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities.49
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction
over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to
control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the
notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners
were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the
adverse party were not affected.50 The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,51 for the court to
determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or
opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof
and lack of opportunity to be heard."53 In the case at bar, as evident from the Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006,
petitioners counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an
opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District Court reset
the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said
motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process,
was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle
the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions
regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding.54
The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.55 In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Sharia District Court has
jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006
respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO

HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA
GABATAN and JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN,
Petitioners,
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 150206
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,**
CARPIO,***
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION,**** JJ.

Promulgated:
March 13, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated April 28, 2000, and
Resolution[2] dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an
action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against
petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang,
Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent
alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero
(Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana
Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo),
and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return
of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous
demands to surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondents demands for them to vacate the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and
that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and
without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest),
Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical,
open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and
enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that
Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while
the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilos wife, Rita Vda.
de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest.
Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed
and/or has been barred by laches.
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo
Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed land was already covered by OCT No. P3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos daughter).
On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot
No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan

Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance;
ordering the defendants to pay P10,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as Attorneys fees; and P2,000.00 for litigation
expenses.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October 20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With
costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared that respondents claim of filiation
with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of
the trial court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not
supported by evidence.
The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale[5] executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs
of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines,
as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest
relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
Applying Section 38, Rule 130[6] of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could not deny
that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed
on to respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners possession of the disputed property could not ripen into acquisitive
prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an owner.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending that the CA committed the following
reversible errors:
FIRST ERROR:

The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and without issue;

SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan,
the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN;
THIRD ERROR:
Gabatan;

The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN is the child and sole heir of Juan

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants
(petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan
Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;
FIFTH ERROR:
The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been
barred by laches and/or prescription.[7]
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of
fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.[8] It is not our function to examine
and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its impugned decision or
resolution is based.[9]
However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact by the lower courts, such as (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[10]
Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors
and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as
errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case
or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal
but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters
not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. [11]
In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the case.
The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is undisputed
that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.[12] Before us are two
contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence
over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in
a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.[13]
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,[14] this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding,
and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals[15] where the Court held:
xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam,
the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased
to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa
Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in
question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we
ruled that such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being
within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,[16] the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of
filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,[17] this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed
to be an heir to a decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.
However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[18] where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the
trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to
still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case,
could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners
(Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court
should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their
inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of
the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding.
Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
We GRANT the petition.
After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon
respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her claim entirely on her alleged status
as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of
status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates[19] of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony,
presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mothers maiden
name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondents handwritten
birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was respondents mothers full maiden
name which was indicated as Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten birth certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff herein,
Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit A for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and
which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that Exhibit A for the
plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and bears the as is and where is rule. It has the impression of the original
certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950s. Her mothers maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito
Gabatan. While Exhibit 1, the entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used
is of latest vintage. The entry on the space for mothers maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent

attempt to thwart plaintiffs mother filiation with the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the
Court is inclined to believe that Exhibit A for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of live birth.[20]
Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the above-quoted findings of the trial court.
To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a
form of 1950s vintage[21] but this Court is unable to concur in the trial courts finding that Exhibit 1[22] was of a later vintage than
Exhibit A which was one of the trial courts bases for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on
the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January 1945) which makes it an older form than
Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the
evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar
of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy
of respondents birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950
were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.) also merely typewritten beside their names. The words A certified true copy: July 6,
1977 above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same typewriter as the very entries in
Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly,
Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein
were identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious
credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly
authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City
Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa,
Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of birth records in their respective offices,
[23] and (b) the certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth
certificate registered in their respective offices.[24] Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten
birth certificate before the trial court and respondents counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually marked
as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the original.[25] Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of
respondents birth certificate exists in their records except the handwritten birth certificate.[26] Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the
original of respondents handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied)
was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.[27] Both Ms. Vidal and Ms.
Cacho testified and brought their respective offices copies of respondents birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by
the trial court and there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between
respondents Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document,
the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had
been credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondents mother was a certain Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It does
not prove that same Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates
of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.[28]
It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To
reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial
tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these,
respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only
in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court
of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of Hermogenas
relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or
final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified
that they personally knew Hermogena (respondents mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had personal
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet
born or were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of
them were present at Juan and Laureanas wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had
been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents witnesses testimonies. The records would show that they
cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than
Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.[29] His testimony regarding the relationships within the
Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,
[30] this Court is wary of according probative weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination
that her (respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.[31] In other words, although these witnesses are indeed
blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of respondents husband. They cannot be said to be entirely
disinterested in the outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute
Sale[32] (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan
Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan
Gabatan was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo
Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.[33] The CA considered the
same statement as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.[34]
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence was
vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.[35]
After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself.[36] Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the
presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for
the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,
[37] we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary
evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original
instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed
of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether
it was recorded in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this, respondent relied on the stamped
notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez,
Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessors office. Regarding the authentication of public documents,
the Rules of Court[38] provide that the record of public documents, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.[39] The attestation of the
certifying officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be.[40]
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was registered or exists in the records
of the local assessors office. Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H
since Velezs certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez was not presented as a
witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an
attestation since the assessors office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the
legal custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his notarial register and to forward
the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could have
produced the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana
who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had
no personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who
secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessors office.[41] To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of
Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status
of Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still nonetheless would
have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of
respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that respondent produced to
demonstrate her filiation to Hermogena Gabatan (respondents Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence
presented by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to respondents own testimony,[42] Juan
Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedents property from
third parties or to quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were truly
the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to
recover the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan.[43] However, that
case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.[44] Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of action,
i.e. the present case.[45] She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita
was then already old.[46]
We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her contemporaries (who might have
personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have
exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic of the Philippines v.
Agunoy: Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights[O]ne
may not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity.[47]
All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof,
her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness
of her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if
not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of
action. If the Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,

G.R. No. 157912
Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,
REYES, JJ.
VICTORIA S. MEDINA-

Administratrix,
Promulgated:

Respondent.

December 13, 2007

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file
their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's
commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on
the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2)
petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the
money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds
advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such
claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the
time of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on the
service and filing by registered mail?[2]
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that
Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a
suppletory manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.[3]

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in
special proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be,
as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as
far as practicable.
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.[4]
This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as
possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say
that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are
applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against
respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a
contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding
was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to
file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to
certain exceptions.[5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken
into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of
the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and
dependent upon the principal remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is
contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a
money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her
duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable
time.[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, nonpayment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point.
Therein, the Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a
court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading,
motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who,
wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2)
upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party
may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in
the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever
practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place.
The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause
whenever practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service
and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when
personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a
court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit
of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied
Section 11 of Rule 13:

As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable.
The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of
Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed
considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In
any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion
whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonias counsels is Lucena City.
Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a
written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous.
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where, among other
cases, the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which
rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between
said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court
of Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered
as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of
petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid.[13] The ultimate
purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of
Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator
of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against
the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15]
(Emphasis supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal
service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003
and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED
to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ
G.R. No. 164108
SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING
Present:
CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
Promulgated:
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila,
May 8, 2009
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent
Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time of his death,
there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The
second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation
and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.[2]
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21,
presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million,
net of liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate
of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent submitted an
Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.[5] In the List of
Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims
then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two
cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC
required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.[8]
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they
be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before
the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for
the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other pleadings or
motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not
interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC
had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in
the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision[12] dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila
RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or

disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of
Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still
pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in
the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their
argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be
henceforth furnished copies of all processes and orders issued by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix
Benedicto with the said court.[14] Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix
Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax
appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.[15] Third, petitioners
moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon
submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties
interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.[16]
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily
agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x While the language of
Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held
that the legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant.[17]
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation
in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to
creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as
intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not
necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those
reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons or any persons interested in the
estate to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely:
(1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of any person interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file
a petition for administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of
administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76,
which allows a person interested in the estate to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an
individual interested in the estate of the deceased to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of
any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice
of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrators account to persons interested; (6) Section 7(b) of
Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice to the persons interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows any person interested in the
estate to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied
or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have
filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting
letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it appears
that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and
Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors
required under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced
against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case[21] was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and
not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce
the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it does provide us with guidance on how to
proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against
respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to
whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the
estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a
co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the
civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case,
the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the
Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests
it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of
administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that
whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and

distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case
but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as
having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of
the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until
after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the
Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil
case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of
the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be
closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of
Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan,
stated: [t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for
a decision on their action.[24]
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are
mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any person interested or persons interested in the
estate various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a
pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor,
the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the
right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such
persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules,
if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by
which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate
proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for
the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the
estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as
the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate
in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have
the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would
mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would
unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly
disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners
herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge
Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be
allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135
came to fore, the provision stating that the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that petitioners were interested persons entitled to access the court
records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation
and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the
Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto
Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under
Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x[26]
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable
precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in
seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging
their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to
their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing
a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all interested parties the petitioners
as interested parties will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in:
(1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2)
Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the
estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases
filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix
Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court
set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for
her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation
and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an
account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that
there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context
of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those
with contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of
the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the
interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general
competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners
should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of
Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of
Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 122646 March 14, 1997

ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratix of the Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO B. MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGELITO C. TEH, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC, Rosario, Batangas, SPS. HERMINIO & CLARITA TAYAG @ SPS. GEORGE T.
TIGLAO & CLARIZZA T. TIGLAO and/or @ TEOFILO M. ESGUERRA, LEONOR M. ESGUERRA. LETICIA M. ESGUERRA, JOEL M. ESGUERRA,
RICARDO M. ESGUERRA, VOLTAIRE E. TAYAG, BENITO I. TAYAG, MERLIE MALIG, ALBERTO T. TAYAG, ROSEMARIE T. TAYAG, LETICIA E.
LULU and the REGISTER OF DEED for the Province of Batangas, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner "for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate" of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for "reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and
damages with petition for preliminary injunction" docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009. 1 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of said complaint states:
2.
That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto B. Mendoza in her
capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on December 29, 1993;
3.
That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of her co-plaintiff for
purposes of this case; 2
Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995 3 their "answer with motion to dismiss" 4 alleging among others that the complaint
states no cause of action and that petitioner's demand had already been paid. 5 On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed
another pleading entitled "motion to dismiss" invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and
prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to the

motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as administratrix is only an incidental matter
which is not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioner's husband
resided in Quezon City at the time of his death, the appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in
accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction
over the case.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh "dismissed without prejudice" the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction "on the ground that the rules governing an ordinary civil action and a special proceeding are different."
Accordingly, the lower court found it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss. 6 Upon denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he filed this petition under Rule 45 on pure questions of law. The Court thereafter gave due
course to the petition.
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate, would
oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?
We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1)

In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2)
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). . .
xxx
(4)

xxx

xxx

In all matters of probate, both testate and intestat . . . .

Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:

Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
(1)

Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate . . . (emphasis ours).

The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of
this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions "incapable of pecuniary estimation," such as the
appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73 7) impliedly
recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings
for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that
the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents
confuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95 8 provides that actions involving title to property shall
be tried in the province where the property is located, in this case, Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's deceased husband
resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court. 9
Second, the cases cited 10 by private respondents are not at point as they involve settlement of estate where the probate court was
asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain properties.In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an
allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have
invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which must be
stated in an action for reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the reconveyance suit rather than
dismiss the entire case.
Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership or title to property 11 is not
applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. 12 Moreover, the instant action for
reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. 13 Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it
be on the reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was improper for respondent judge to dismiss the whole
complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or petitions filed before them, just so they can comply with their
administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days at the expense of their judicial responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14, 1995 of the RTC of Batangas are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
trial court is ordered to immediately proceed with the disposition of the case in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED.
RULE 73
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159507

April 19, 2006

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1
dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in
Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case, except to dismiss
the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's
Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T.
Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House
of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent
AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied
services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein
respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other court processes at
their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the
supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary
credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo
used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the
Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending
petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having
received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000.
Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and
besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith,
and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally,
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack
of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that
venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of
Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as
evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner
Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on
Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of
Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering
that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take
judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution
including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte
Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because
he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is
not determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It found the
allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied
respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone
District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual
residence. As a high-ranking government official of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his
personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for
purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home, the place to which,
whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they
disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any
time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715
[1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then
filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding
judge of the court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the
appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that
venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2,
2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried
where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election
of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the parties was a resident of
Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for
purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals5 where the Court distinguished the terms "residence"
and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is [an] established principle
in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary
stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must
necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have
a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have

numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since
no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court referred to his community tax
certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City.
Similarly, it referred to the same community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against respondents
Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located.8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law
office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances were considered by the
appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer required proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, judicial
notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo
was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his
complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the
possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner
Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of
the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.9 Further, fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for
bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking
into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts
of justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents' affirmative defense of improper
venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and
unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and
influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in
Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the court in Pagadian City "was
a specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an influential person in the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the
respondent judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case,
except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the
posting this time by petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the amount of Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the
issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so
minded, may refile his case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial
Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution dated August 14, 2003,
denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for review with the Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and Resolution, has decided a question
of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein petitioner is the incumbent congressman
of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence (sic) of said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to the alleged judicial admission of
herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this Honorable Court; and1avvphil.net
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and even speculated that herein
petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to vex the respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that
venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as
plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may
be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is
regulated by the Rules of Court.14 The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding.15 The option of plaintiff in
personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff
resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern
Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern
Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax
certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law
office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.

The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of
the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co.,
Inc. v. Sarmiento,17 the Court had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the
courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished
from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil
actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the
maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in
legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively
more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is
very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases
involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61
Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that 'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have
a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since
no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the
words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of
domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from
government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no
moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the
action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v.
Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v.
Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Pao, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976.
Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as
distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the
time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that
private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower house."19
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the
requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district which he was representing, i.e., Southern
Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the
term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the term "residence"
requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as
"the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile)
therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for
purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also
his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the facts of the present case are
not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff

who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that
he manifested the intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident therein
at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because although he manifested the
intent to go back there after retirement, the element of personal presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or
residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the
court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including that he
was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only
had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be
considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in
Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without
actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for
vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have
residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s
legal residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with
intention to stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or doing business and also a
house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays
physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to
acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo
that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of
venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his
complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's
residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted
for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so
commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable
among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country,
it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact
of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by
the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is
bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of
Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or
capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by petitioner Saludo deserves scant
consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information
and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the contents thereof [referring to the
petition] and the same are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The
same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution dated August 14, 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA,
Petitioner,
Present:

G.R. No. 154322

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versusAZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

CORONA,

CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,*

ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA,*
HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA
FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN
FIGURACION and
MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ,
Respondents. Promulgated:
August 22, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla challenges the decision[2] and resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 49, which
dismissed her complaint for partition. The properties involved are two parcels of land which belonged to her late father, Leandro
Figuracion.
The facts of the case follow.[4]
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six children: petitioner and respondents Elena
Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased), Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez.
On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six children. When he died in
1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta consisting of 7,547 square meters with
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P in the name of Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento and (2) Lot 705 of the
Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an area of 2,900 sq. m. with TCT No. 4220-P also in the name of Leandro Figuracion, married to
Carolina Adviento. Leandro had inherited both lots from his deceased parents,[5] as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
Nos. 16731 and 16610, respectively, issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan.

Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento, as a result of which TCT No. 4221-P was cancelled and TCT No. 101331 was
issued to Lazaro Adviento, married to Rosenda Sagueped as owner of the 162 sq. m. and Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina
Adviento as owner of 7,385 sq. m. This lot continued to be in the name of Leandro in Tax Declaration No. 616 for the year 1985.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner and her sister, respondent Mary, over the
eastern half of Lot 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an area of 3,164 sq. m.
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento, as evidenced by OCT No. 15867 issued on February 9, 1916. When Adviento died, his two
daughters, Agripina Adviento (his daughter by his first wife) and respondent Carolina (his daughter by his second wife), succeeded
him to it. On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707.
Agripina died on July 28, 1963, single and without any issue. Before her half-sisters death, however, respondent Carolina adjudicated
unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa and
Hilaria. The latter two immediately had OCT No. 15867 cancelled, on December 11, 1962. A new title, TCT No. 42244, was then
issued in the names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot 707.
In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten years. Returning in 1981,[6] she built
a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707. She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon.
It was sometime later that this dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common by her
and respondents. On May 23, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City, Branch 49, for partition, annulment of
documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against respondents, praying, among others, for: (1) the partition of Lots
2299 and 705; (2) the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244; (3) a declaration that petitioner was the owner of onehalf of Lot 707 and (4) damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-5826.
On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandros estate should first undergo settlement proceedings before partition
among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such
settlement.
On June 26, 1997,[7] the RTC[8] rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot
707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate. The RTC,
however, dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground that it could not grant the reliefs prayed
for by petitioner without any (prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties should first be effected.

On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being premature. The CA reversed the decision,
however, with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale. Upholding the validity of the affidavit of selfadjudication and deed of sale as to Carolinas one-half pro-indiviso share, it instead partitioned Lot 707. Dissatisfied, respondents
elevated the CA decision to this Court in G.R. No. 151334, entitled Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla.[9]
The issue for our consideration is whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate (that is, an
accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legal
requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed.
Respondents claim that: (1) the properties constituting Leandros estate cannot be partitioned before his estate is settled and
(2) there should be an accounting before anything else, considering that they (respondents) had to spend for the maintenance of the
deceased Leandro Figuracion and his wife in their final years, which support was supposed to come from the income of the properties.
Among other things, respondents apparently wanted petitioner to share in the expenses incurred for the care of their parents during
the ten years she stayed in the United States, before she could get her part of the estate while petitioner apparently wanted her
gross share, without first contributing to the expenses.
In any event, there appears to be a complication with respect to the partition of Lot 705. The records refer to a case entitled
Figuracion, et al. v. Alejo currently pending in the CA. The records, however, give no clue or information regarding what exactly this
case is all about. Whatever the issues may be, suffice it to say that partition is premature when ownership of the lot is still in dispute.
[10]
Petitioner faces a different problem with respect to Lot 2299. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do
so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real
estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment of death of the decedent.
There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner has a legal interest in Lot 2299. But can she compel
partition at this stage?
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2[11] and through commissioners
when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.[12]
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69
provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition,
[13] there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable,
such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner
points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracions only legal heirs, she does
not dispute the finding of the CA that certain expenses including those related to her fathers final illness and burial have not been
properly settled.[14] Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because the
determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate must answer. If
it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the
settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations.[15]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision and resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290 are AFFIRMED in
so far as the issue of the partition of Lots 2299 and 705 is concerned.
But with respect to Lot 707, we make no ruling on the validity of Carolina vda. de Figuracions affidavit of self-adjudication and deed
of sale in favor of Felipa and Hilaria Figuracion in view of the fact that Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
(G.R. No. 151334) is still pending in this Division.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November
2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated
March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who
are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom
Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957,
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with
one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real
properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent
the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the
issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken
by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator,
let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise
Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village,
Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos
estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE,
THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO
QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in
the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed
by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for
the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a
resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered
proofs of a decedents residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to
the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of
properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20
That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners position
that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners
submission that the lower courts findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab
initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the
Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to
Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly
by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does
not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the
decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish
of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a
record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently,
in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters
of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling,
or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to

request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person,
thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on
good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November
2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128314

May 29, 2002

RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989,
respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any
accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not
reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they
stayed in Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns,
voters affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1wphi1.nt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their
deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61
Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother,
Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents residence on the death certificates in good
faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late
years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same
way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The
death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents residence in light of the other documents
showing otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court
ordered that the petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8 After the parties submitted the names of their respective
nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea
Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that
Quezon City was the last place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V.
Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own
representation by taking an inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit movants motion to dismiss.

SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996,
the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence,
this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY
CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100
PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF
DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN
ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE
PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE
DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE
DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE
PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their
permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in
the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement
proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining
residence at the time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that
the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never
adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.1wphi1.nt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the
process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was
advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house
in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and
hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his
physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioners Quezon City residence. Petitioner
failed to sufficiently refute respondents assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before
they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their
demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mothers death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows
that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to
contest the entry in Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.

The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by
the court a quo. We agree with the appellate courts observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even before
petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their
parents death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary
evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death,
as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of their
deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the
challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents physical
presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence
of any substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence
presented, the same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73,
Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to
actual physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in
Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile
because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of the decedents properties are located.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither
can it be presumed that a persons properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he
has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business
interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain properties is
entirely dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special
proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.21 All
told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was
properly laid in the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95574

August 16, 1991

HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and BASSER MUSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, Cotabato City and HADJI
JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.
Randolph C. Parcasio for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an intestate proceeding are herein raised.
Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who passed away on 31 December 1987. He had six (6) wives, three
(3) of whom he later divorced, and twenty three (23) children. He had extensive real and personal properties located in the provinces
of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa, are among those he
divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL Musa and BASSER Musa
are two (2) of his sons.
On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the Administration and Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late
Jamiri Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership," before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato
City (SDC Spec. Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate Case). That Court embraces the province of Maguindanao within its jurisdiction
but not the provinces of Davao del Sur and Oriental.
The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, left various properties located in the
provinces of Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61 hectares), and Davao Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement
of the vast estate, also prayed for was the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and ABDURAHIM and the
segregation and turn-over to the latter of her one-half (1/2) share.

Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the divorced wives, who also claim to be widows of the deceased:
RIZAL, Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the decedent; and BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was
improperly said and that the properties of the decedent located outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District.
Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent Judge issued the Order of Publication on 1 July 1989 and
initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.
All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said date where petitioners, through counsel, manifested their
desire to have the case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the interest of peace and harmony among the heirs of the deceased
Jamiri Musa," appointed the following as Special Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL. for all
properties situated in Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties situated in Davao del Sul.
However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and Motion to Cite for Contempt," accused BASSER, among others, of
having allegedly fired upon the house of her son in-law in Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.
Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for Administration and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership" was filed by
Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally married to the decedent and, as such, there was "nothing to support her
claim" of having had a conjugal partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly laid. Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be
issued Letters of Administration instead.
In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage to the decedent was admitted by the latter in various
Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were presented as documentary evidence. Since there was no amicable settlement reached,
hearings on the Joint Petition were conducted, commencing on 27 December 1989.
On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix upon the finding that she was
legally married to the decedent. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.
In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June 1990, incorporating the testimonies of the two (2) other
witnesses presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order, dated 16 May 1990. Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM
as Regular Administratrix was maintained.
On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Motion to Dismiss," raising once again, mainly the questions
of venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del
Sur and Davao Oriental.
Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22 August 1990. Hence, the elevation of
the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a
District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, from further taking action on the "Joint Petition ."
Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have dismissed the Intestate Case for lack of jurisdiction and for improper
venue. Private respondent maintains the contrary.
We rule against Petitioners.
Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, explicitly provides that exclusive
original jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, belong to Shari'a District Courts. Thus:
Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b)
All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of
letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the
property. (Chapter 1, Title I, Book IV, par. (b), (Emphasis supplied).
Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim is, in fact, involved herein, the Joint Petition was
correctly filed before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to the Rules of Court mandating that:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73). (Emphasis supplied).
It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the time of his death was actually in Davao City, not Maguindanao, as
averred by ABDUHARIM, the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, and that venue is
more properly laid in Davao City before the Regional Trial Court since there are no Shari'a District Courts therein.
At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the deceased in an estate proceeding is not an element of jurisdiction over
the subject matter but merely of venue. The law of jurisdiction confers upon Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts)
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of the intestate estate of
Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).
To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, and Davao City. In fact, in various Deeds of Sale
presented as evidence by the parties, the decedent alternately stated his place of residence as either Linao, Upi,Maguindanao which
is the residence of ABDURAHIM, or Davao City, where Petitioners reside. As this Court held in Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890
(1954), "a man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence." Venue, therefore, ordinarily could be at either place of the decedent's residence, i.e., Maguindanao or Davao City, but for
the provisions of the Muslim Code vesting exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and settlement of estates of
deceased Muslims, in Shari'a District Courts (supra).
But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, presided over by respondent Judge, has no territorial
jurisdiction over properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, citing as statutory
authority therefor the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, which provides:
Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.Five special judicial districts, each to have one Shari'a District Court presided over by one judge,
are constituted as follows:

xxx
(e)

xxx

xxx

The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the City of Cotabato.

Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the Fifth Shari'a District. In fact, those provinces are outside the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created by Republic Act No. 6734, its Organic Act. But as stated in that law, "the Shari'a
District Court and the Shari'a Circuit Courts created under existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein." (Art. IX, Sec.
13).
Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;
(4)
Except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire jurisdiction over controversies involving real property
outside the area of autonomy. (Art. IX, Section 17[4]). (Emphasis supplied)
Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled with the fact that the decedent was also a resident of
Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in that province, venue has been properly laid with the Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Shari'a District, winch is vested with territorial jurisdiction over Maguindanao, notwithstanding the location in different
provinces of the other real proper- ties of the decedent.
A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the detriment of the expeditious settlement of estate proceedings (See
Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 237 [1988]). Besides, the judgment that may be rendered by the Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Shari'a District, may be executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.
When an action covers various parcels of land situated in different provinces, venue may be laid in the Court of First Instance of any
of said provinces, and the judgment rendered therein may be executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated
(National Bank v. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310 [1931]; El Hogar Filipino v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57 Phil. 712 [1932]).
The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts(Rule 73, sec. 1). There should be no impediment to the application of said Rules as
they apply suppletorily to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, there being nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the latter statute
(Article 187 of said Code).
And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record," we have taken cognizance of this Petition for Prohibition considering that the
jurisdiction of a Shari'a District Court, a relatively new Court in our judicial system, has been challenged.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case hereby REMANDED to the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District,
for continuation of the intestate proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Rule 74
THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO
G.R. No. 161220
and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO

substituted by their heirs, namely:

Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and

Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and

SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and

Present:
ROSIE M. BENATIRO,

Respondents,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus -

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS,
namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian,
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,
represented by their attorney-in-fact,
Salud Cuyos,
CHICO-NAZARIO
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
Respondents.
July 30, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Decision[1]
dated July 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution[2] dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.[3]
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope,
Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon,
Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name of
Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten),
filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition[4] for Letters of Administration,
docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian,
petitioner. The petition was opposed by Glorias brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested
that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued an Order[5] appointing Gloria as
administratrix of the estate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the undivided half accruing to his spouse
Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after
posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00.[6]
Subsequently, in the Order[7] dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing was called on that
date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco, together with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray,
Franciscos counsel, manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested
that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the
parties and to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and
approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report[8] dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all
the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located,
for a conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos
failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their respective given addresses; that since
some of the heirs present resided outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1.
Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was
administering the properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as having been properly and duly accounted for.
2.
Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly
appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs as having been properly and duly accounted for.
3.
Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos
Talian, as having been withdrawn.
4.
Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 subject to
the condition that should any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will
just receive only Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) each.
5.

Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their respective share of P4,000.00.[9]

The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all those present in the conference of
her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to which everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo
explained that the delay in the submission of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time
to make some consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976 that the
letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been
agreed upon, provided she be given the sum of P5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of the estate was
mortgaged to her in order to defray their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioners Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order[10] dated December 16, 1976, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same being not contrary to law,
said compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the
Administratrix to execute the deed of sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the
payment to her of the sum of P36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and
administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided
equally among the heirs. [11]
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly disregarded by the
heirs present during the conference.
In an Order[12] dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate, purportedly on
the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence
was detrimental to the early termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[13] over the six parcels of land constituting the intestate
estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of P36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and
Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725,
000728, 000729, 000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled
and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columbas
name; and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba; that
some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son
and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer certificates of title were subsequently
issued; that they subsequently discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.[14]
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.[15]
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation[16] of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia,
Numeriano,[17] and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu,
Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null
and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that such report
practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an
affidavit, as well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to
dispose of the estate of their parents and that they never received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the
inheritance; that the report was done in close confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the
Commissioner's recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a falsity, any order
proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and
irregularity, since the CFI which issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale;
that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the remainder of
the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the administration expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had
not yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that
they never received their corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with
administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic
fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in
February 1998 was preposterous, as respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to
counsel was notice to client; that this was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the
statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the same was
sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed
order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988;
that respondents were estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba CuyosBenatiro and the subsequent transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be continued.[18]
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and truthfulness of the Commissioners
Report, which was used by the trial court as its basis for issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there
was a need for all the concerned parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario since in their separate
sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever happened among
them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of
an official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioners
Report never mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in the alleged conference but only the names of those who were
absent, when the names of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more important, than the names of those who
were absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the attendees, such as letting them

sign the report to signify their consent as regards the agreed mechanisms for the estates settlement; (3) there was lack or absence
of physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled
conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise
agreement did not stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria
and Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyers authority
to compromise cannot be simply presumed, since what was required was the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client;
that a compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legal effect,
citing Quiban v. Butalid;[19] that being a void compromise agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of
the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since
the compromise agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of P36,000.00 to the administrator as consideration for the
sale, except for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the
exact amount that he received; that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial courts
order for the administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after
the payment to the administratrix of the sum of P36,000.00; that said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the
claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be
divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor was said money placed under
custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the
case had not yet been terminated and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new
administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners,
were tainted with fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers
made by petitioners through fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in
enriching them at the expense of the respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one of
extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by
petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the aggrieved party had other
appropriate remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk
of Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of regularity - based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the
performance of said official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to
annul the lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. [20]
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in possession of affidavits of waiver and
desistance executed by the heirs of Lope Cuyos[21] and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares[22] on February 17, 2004 and
December 17, 2004, respectively. In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more interest in prosecuting/defending the
case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and
they had already received their share of the purchase price. Another heir, respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an
Affidavit[23] dated December 13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she had already received her
share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In addition, Numeriano had issued a certification[24] dated May 18, 1988, which was
not refuted by any of the parties, that he had already received P4,000.00 in payment of his share, which could be the reason why he
refused to sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, which
approved the Commissioners Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and
Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character[25] and will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by
parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in
civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based
"only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground
therefor.[26]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.[27] Extrinsic
fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.[28]
Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration
when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
[29]

While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground
that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and to prepare the project of partition
for submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the
heirs. In his Commissioners Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona
Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by sending them subpoenae supplemented
by telegrams for them to attend the conference scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs,
only six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but
only those heirs who failed to attend the conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report,
based on the return of service, could not be located in their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs
to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs,
who was presumably present in the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an affidavit[30]
dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any
meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance[31] regarding
this case, it was only for the reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she had
already received her corresponding share of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her previous
statement that she was not called to a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement[32] that there was no
meeting held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneos holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the
estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the
Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to
show their consent and conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise agreement over the estate of
Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them the
opportunity to protect their interests. Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs
embodying their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the
heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section
3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection with the performance of an official
act in the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances
mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs
in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that respondents were notified of the conference, to be
competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held accordingly and in annulling the
assailed order of the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification[33] dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC,
Branch 11, to show that copies of the Commissioners Report were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys.
Lepiten and Yray as enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the accompanying registry receipts.[34]
In Cua v. Vargas,[35] in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial
settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and
partition has been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out
or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the
said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in
the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it
because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and
was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the
present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only
shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the
partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise
agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying
the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted
and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the
Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other
heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a
void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in the trial court were duly
represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the
heirs agreed to settle the case amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January
30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person need not hire his own lawyer, because his interest in the
estate is represented by the judicial administrator who retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal
representative not only of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents; that when the trial
court issued the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties lawyers were duly
served said copies of the Order on December 21, 1976 as shown by the Certification[37] dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk
of Court; that notices to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of
notices of orders and pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the

respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a petition for
relief under Rule 38 at the proper time, but they failed to do so without giving any cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioners Report was received by Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of
Gloria and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate
court, Atty. Lepiten was Glorias counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was Franciscos
lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of administration and his Motion to Order administrarix Gloria to render
an accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus, the other heirs who were not represented by counsel were not given any
notice of the judgment approving the compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax
declarations covering the parcels of land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled; and new
Tax Declarations were issued in Columbas name, and Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor of Columba.
Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source
of any right or of any obligation.[38]
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,[39] we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the
aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In
contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from.
In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared
inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid
adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is
not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void
judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same
as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to
it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is
void: "x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.[40] (Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final
order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[41] Consequently, the compromise agreement and
the Order approving it must be declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its
finality on ground of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed
within four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
[42]
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances.[43] The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable
doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.
It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result.[44]
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of
judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed
order. It bears stressing that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.[45]
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void
judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error
was thus committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP
Proceedings Case No. 24-BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115181

March 31, 2000

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and
MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents.
RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No.
31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed
the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the
issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private
respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory
heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma.
Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as
SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died
intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an
action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:
Acting on the "Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition", considering that the petitioner is the only heir not
amenable to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate
of the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to
submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on
APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all the parties and their counsel of this assignment.
SO ORDERED.1
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to
convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574.
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE
COURSE" and accordingly dismissed. 2
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE
DECEDENT'S ESTATE.3
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is whether respondent appellate court committed
an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has yet been made of the
character and extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we
held that when the existence of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are
the proper mode of resolving the same.4 In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an
administrator to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be
struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses
the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and
the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78.5 The exceptions to this
rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 746 which provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. . .
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he
died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor
more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the
court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to
grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate
and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and
such persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and
qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to
them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and
judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it
involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office.1awp++i1
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death.7 Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated.

When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration,
nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.8
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age."9 With
this finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and
character of the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be done during the
partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it
ruled that the lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters of administration to one for
judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial
settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more
expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings. 10 The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for
judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found
the trial court's action procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 112260 June 30, 1997

JOVITA YAP ANCOG, and GREGORIO YAP, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO DIEZ, and CARIDAD YAP, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-CR. No. CV-19650, affirming the dismissal by the Regional
Trial Court 2 of Bohol of an action for partition of a parcel of land which petitioners had filed.
The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of the spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez. In 1946,
Gregorio Yap died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario Diez, and children, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr.,
and private respondent Caridad Yap as his heirs.
In 1954 and again 1958, Rosario Diez obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on the disputed land, which
was annotated on its Original Certificate of Title No. 622. When Rosario Diez applied again for a loan to the bank, offering the land in
question as security, the bank's lawyer, Atty. Narciso de la Serna, suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement covering the
disputed land as a means of facilitating the approval of her application. The suggestion was accepted and on April 4, 1961, Atty. de la
Serna prepared an extrajudicial settlement, which the heirs, with the exception of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., then only 15 years old,
signed. The document was notarized by Atty. de la Serna on April 12, 1961. As a result, OCT No. 622 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3447 (T-2411) was issued on April 13, 1961. On April 14, 1961, upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on
the land, the loan was approved by the bank.
Rosario Diez exercised rights of ownership over the land. In 1985, she brought an ejectment suit against petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's
husband and son to evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure to pay rent. Shortly thereafter,
petitioner Jovita Ancog learned that private respondent Rosario Diez had offered the land for sale.
Petitioner Ancog immediately informed her younger brother, petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., who was living in Davao, of their mother's
plan to sell the land. On June 6, 1985, they filed this action for partition in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 3094. As private respondent Caridad Yap was unwilling to join in the action against their mother, Caridad was
impleaded as a defendant.
Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and therefore void. They claimed that in signing the instrument
they did not really intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable her to obtain a loan on the
security of the land to cover expenses for Caridad's school fees and for household repairs.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated:
1.
Yap;

That the parcel of land in question originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez

2.

That Gregorio Yap, Jr. is the legitimate child of spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez Yap;

3.

That Gregorio Yap is not a party in the execution of the Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate dated April 4, 1961;

4.
That all the encumbrances found in TCT No. (3447) T-2411 which is now marked as Exh. C for the plaintiffs and Exh. 2 for the
defendants as Entry No. 6719, 6720, 11561 and 11562 are admitted by the plaintiffs subject to the condition that the Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate dated April 4, 1961, was made by the parties that the same was only for the purpose of securing a loan with the
Philippine National Bank. 3
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners' action. It dismissed petitioners' claim that the extrajudicial settlement was
simulated and held it was voluntarily signed by the parties. Observing that even without the need of having title in her name Rosario
Diez was able to obtain a loan using the land in question as collateral, the court held that the extrajudicial settlement could not have
been simulated for the purpose of enabling her to obtain another loan. Petitioners failed to overcome the presumptive validity of the
extrajudicial settlement as a public instrument.
The court instead found that petitioner Ancog had waived her right to the land, as shown by the fact that on February 28, 1975, 4
petitioner's husband, Ildefonso Ancog, leased the property from private respondent Diez. Furthermore, when the spouses Ancog

applied for a loan to the Development Bank of the Philippines using the land in question as collateral, they accepted an appointment
from Rosario Diez as the latter's attorney-in-fact. 5
The court also found that the action for partition had already prescribed. The registration of the land under private respondent
Rosario Diez's name amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership. Therefore, petitioners had ten (10) years from April 13, 1961
within which to bring an action to recover their share in the property. While it is true that petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor at
the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, his claim, according to the court, was barred by laches.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the extrajudicial settlement and sustained the trial court's dismissal of the
case. The appellate court emphasized that the extrajudicial settlement could not have been simulated in order to obtain a loan, as
the new loan was merely "in addition to" a previous one which private respondent Diez had been able to obtain even without an
extrajudicial settlement. Neither did petitioners adduce evidence to prove that an extrajudicial settlement was indeed required in
order to obtain the additional loan. The appellate court held that considering petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's educational attainment
(Master of Arts and Bachelor of Laws), it was improbable that she would sign the settlement if she did not mean it to be such. Hence,
this petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT RULING THAT THE CONTESTED EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT (EXHIBIT "B") IS NOT A
SIMULATED ONE;
II.
IN BLOATING THE EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF PETITIONER JOVITA YAP ANCOG AND USING THE SAME AS ARGUMENT
AGAINST HER CLAIM THAT SAID EXHIBIT "B" WAS INDEED A SIMULATED DOCUMENT;
III.

IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR PARTITION HAS PRESCRIBED;

IV.
IN RULING THAT PETITIONER GREGORIO YAP, JR., ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS OF THE LITIGATED PROPERTY, HAD LOST HIS
RIGHTS TO THE PROPERTY THROUGH PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.
We hold that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly acted in upholding the extrajudicial settlement but erred in ruling
that petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was barred by laches from recovering his share in the property in question.
To begin with, it is settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the parties and are not reviewable by
this Court when they are an affirmation of the findings of the trial court. 6 In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found
no evidence to show that the extrajudicial settlement was required to enable private respondent Rosario Diez to obtain a loan from
the Bank of Calape. Petitioners merely claimed that the extrajudicial settlement was demanded by the bank.
To the contrary, that the heirs (Jovita Yap Ancog and Caridad Yap) meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective is shown by
the fact that Rosario Diez performed acts of dominion over the entire Land, beginning with its registration, without any objection from
them. Instead, petitioner Jovita Ancog agreed to lease the land from her mother, private respondent Rosario Diez, and accepted from
her a special power of attorney to use the land in question as collateral for a loan she was applying from the DBP. Indeed it was
private respondent Diez who paid the loan of the Ancogs in order to secure the release of the property from mortgage.
Petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog contends that she could not have waived her share in the land because she is landless. For that matter,
private respondent Caridad Yap is also landless, but she signed the agreement. 7 She testified that she did so out of filial devotion to
her mother.
Thus, what the record of this case reveals is the intention of Jovita Ancog and Caridad Yap to cede their interest in the land to their
mother Rosario Diez. It is immaterial that they had been initially motivated by a desire to acquire a loan. Under Art. 1082 of the Civil
Code, 8 every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition even though it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.
We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was barred by laches. In
accordance with Rule 74, 1 9 of the Rules of Court, as he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. 10 It is
uncontroverted that, at the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor. For this reason, he was not
included or even informed of the partition.
Instead, the registration of the land in Rosario Diez's name created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by
implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.
In the case of O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, 11 Art. 1451 was held as creating a resulting trust, which is founded on the presumed intention
of the parties. As a general rule, it arises where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined
from the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out of which it is sought to be established. 12 In this case,
the records disclose that the intention of the parties to the extrajudicial settlement was to establish a trust in favor of petitioner Yap,
Jr. to the extent of his share. Rosario Diez testified that she did not claim the entire property, 13 while Atty. de la Serna added that the
partition only involved the shares of the three participants. 14
A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years from the time the trust is repudiated. 15 Although the
registration of the land in private respondent Diez's name operated as a constructive notice of her claim of ownership, it cannot be
taken as an act of repudiation adverse to petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim, whose share in the property was precisely not included
by the parties in the partition. Indeed, it has not been shown whether he had been informed of her exclusive claim over the entire
property before 1985 when he was notified by petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog of their mother's plan to sell the property. 16
This Court has ruled that for prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated by unequivocal acts made known
to the cestui que trust and proved by clear and conclusive evidence. Furthermore, the rule that the prescriptive period should be
counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of reconveyance under the Property
Registration Decree. 17 Since the action brought by petitioner Yap to claim his share was brought shortly after he was informed by
Jovita Ancog of their mother's effort to sell the property, Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim cannot be considered barred either by prescription or
by laches.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that this case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court for the determination of the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118680

March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG
FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO,
PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for
the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared
petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's
estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with
petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed
said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina
for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters.
These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The
heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9,
respectively.1 The total land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.2
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents Chuan Lung Fai,3 but
not included in the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered under
TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A,
560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall4 and was
subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square
meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla5 and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registered it
under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT
No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The
remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and was
registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.6
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss.
On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused
saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was
later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the
plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."7
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its ruling was premised on the
following grounds:8
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is already
estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the
partition would have been alright had she been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period
provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code;9
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 20, 1994.10
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals in I. FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID
TRANSACTION
II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF
THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE
DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN
ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I"

V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER
OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE
FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE
DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION11
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since the prescriptive period
which should be applied is four years following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74
which provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been
given notice, and two, the party assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not
present in her case,12 since she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." She cites Villaluz vs.
Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.13
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise the necessary due diligence
required before purchasing the lots in question.14 In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of
respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.15
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She asks for the rescission of the said partitioning
under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.16
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they argue that petitioner, Maria
Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered
into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the
extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that
the shares of Miguel's heirs were adequately protected in the said partition.17
Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of
the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 119 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that
all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.20
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is
not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery
of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.21
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned
extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud
has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof.22
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be
binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or
Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson,
since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground
of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the
same, is fraudulent and vicious.23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone
descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article
1003 of the Civil Code.24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since
they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of
Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption
was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from
inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private
respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been deprived of his lawful participation in the
estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or summary
settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as
the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were
concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs
who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its
execution in 1941.25

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a
minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased
Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not
include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is
not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the
name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only
be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.26
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence was presented to justify such
claim for damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply
rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.27 The same is true for moral damages.
These cannot be awarded in the absence of any factual basis.28 The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay
and has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.29
Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate her claims for damages does not mean that she will be totally deprived of
any damages. Under the law, nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by
defendants may be vindicated and recognized.30
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, (2)
petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3)
respondents had transferred portions of the properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a
decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.31
The amount to be awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the
concept and purpose of said damages.32 Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons
extant in this case.33 Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view
of the technical injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of
P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 138971. June 6, 2001]
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), petitioner, vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City
(Branch 54); and the Heirs of the Deceased Spouses JUAN CUIZON and FLORENTINA RAPAYA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An action for reconveyance of land, an equitable remedy recognized under our land registration laws, is subject to the applicable
rules on prescription. Moreover, the right to pursue such reivindicatory action may be defeated when the property sought to be
recovered has been conveyed to an innocent purchaser for value.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the June 8, 1999
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 47575. In the said Decision, the CA sustained the January 12, 1998[2] and
the March 31, 1998[3] Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54) in Civil Case No. 4534-L, which denied
petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, [there being] no abuse of discretion committed by respondent court, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Facts
The subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 4673 of the Opon Cadastre situated in Lapu-Lapu City, covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2537 (May 19, 1982) and registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon, Isidro
Cuizon, Ursula Cuizon, Benito Lozano, Isabel Lozano, Pelagia Lozano, Augusto Lozano, Valeriano Ybaez, Jesus Ybaez, Numeriano
Ybaez, Martino Ybaez, Eutiquio Patalinghug, Celedonio Patalinghug, Santiago Patalinghug and Silvino Patalinghug. The lot has an
area of 11,345 square meters, more or less.
On May 15, 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in which they declared
themselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered owners of the aforesaid lot. Consequently, they were issued TCT No. 12467
on July 8, 1982.
Considering that the said lot was among the objects of expropriation proceedings docketed as Civil Case No 510-L and pending before
it, Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City rendered a partial Decision on August 11, 1982. In that Decision, the
RTC approved the Compromise Agreement entered into between the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the new registered
owners of Lot No. 4673; namely, Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon. In accordance with the approved Compromise
Agreement, EPZA would pay P68,070 as just compensation for the expropriation of the subject property, which was to be used for an
export processing zone to be established in Lapu-Lapu City.
As a consequence of the RTC Decision, petitioner acquired title over Lot No. 4673 and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 12788 issued by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on October 13, 1982.
On July 29, 1996, private respondents filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a Complaint for Nullity of Documents, Redemption and
Damages against petitioner and Jorgea-Igot Soroo et al. Docketed as Civil Case No. 4534-L, the Complaint alleged that herein
private respondents had been excluded from the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. It likewise sought the nullification of several
documents, including TCT No. 12788 dated October 13, 1992, issued in the name of herein petitioner.
On February 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of prescription. This Motion was denied by
respondent judge in the Order dated January 12, 1998. A Motion for Reconsideration thereof was likewise denied in the Order dated
March 31, 1998.
On April 30, 1998, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari. As earlier noted, the CA
dismissed the Petition.
Hence, this recourse.[4]

The CA Ruling
In denying the Petition, the CA ratiocinated as follows:
Civil Case No. 4534-L although instituted in the guise of a complaint for Nullity of Documents, Redemption and Damages is in effect
an action for reconveyance of the property to plaintiffs of a portion which rightfully belong to them. It would be against good reason
and conscience not to hold that defendants, Francisca Frisca Booc, heirs of deceased Jorg[e]a Igot-Soronio and heirs of Felix Cuizon
committed a breach of trust which enabled them to execute a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition[,] Special Power of Attorney and Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of EPZA to the prejudice of the plaintiffs as their co-heirs. Therefore, in an action like this case, the private
respondents may be ordered to make reconveyance of the property to the person rightfully entitled to it.
It is undeniable that defendants defrauded plaintiffs by falsely representing that they were the only heirs of deceased Juan Cuizon
and Florentina Rapaya, succeeded in having the original title cancelled and enabling them to appropriate the land in favor of EPZA
and a new one issued in the name of the latter (EPZA). This way of acquiring title create[s] what is called constructive trust in favor
of the defrauded party and grants the latter the right to vindicate [itself] x x x regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, it has been held
that if a person obtain(s) a legal title to the property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so called
trust in favor of the defrauded party. In fact, it has long been held that a co-heir who through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a
certificate of title in his name to the prejudice of his co-heirs, is deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter. The excluded heirs
action is imprescriptible.
And if the action involve(s) the declaration of the nullity or inexistence of a void or inexistent contract which became the basis for
the fraudulent registration of the subject property, then the action is imprescriptible. This finds codal support in Article 1410 of the
Civil Code, which declares that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe.
As to the constructive notice rule alleged by the petitioner, (the) Supreme Court in the case of Juan vs. Zuniga, citing Sevilla vs.
Angeles, has this to say:
'While this ruling is correct as applied to ordinary actions by recovery of real property which is covered by a torrens title upon the
theory that its registration under our registration system has the effect of constructive notice to the whole world, the same cannot be
applied x x x when the purpose of the action is to compel a trustee to convey the property registered in his name for the benefit of
the cestui que trust. In other words, the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action whose purpose is to recover property
held by a person for the benefit of another.
The Issues
Petitioner interposes the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that private respondents claim against expropriated property had prescribed.
II
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that reconveyance does not lie against the expropriated property.[5]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Prescription
Petitioner avers that private respondents claim against the subject property has already prescribed, because the two-year period
within which an unduly excluded heir may seek a new settlement of the estate had already lapsed by the time private respondents
filed their action with the trial court. Petitioner further argues that private respondents received constructive notice in view of the
registration of the extrajudicial partition with the Registry of Deeds. According to petitioner, the two-year period commenced from
July 8, 1982, the date of inscription of the extrajudicial settlement on OCT No. 2537.
The pertinent provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, are reproduced for easy reference, as follows:
Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. - If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and
distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person
has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the
estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same
time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or
other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may,
by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what
manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond
provided in the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall
remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution,
notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made. (Emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the foregoing provision will show that persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement may assert
their claim only within the two-year period after the settlement and distribution of the estate. This prescription period does not apply,
however, to those who had no part in or had no notice of the settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is not meant to be
a statute of limitations. Moreover, by no reason or logic can one contend that an extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parte
proceeding, would affect third persons who had no knowledge thereof.[6] Be that as it may, it cannot be denied, either, that by its
registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be known actually or constructively.
In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have been constructively notified of the extrajudicial settlement by reason of
its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot. From the time of registration, private respondents had
two (2) years or until July 8, 1984, within which to file their objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.
On the matter of constructive notice vis--vis prescription of an action to contest an extrajudicial partition, a leading authority on land
registration elucidates as follows:
While it may be true that an extrajudicial partition is an ex parte proceeding, yet after its registration under the Torrens system and
the annotation on the new certificate of title of the contingent liability of the estate for a period of two years as prescribed in Rule 74,
Section 4, of the Rules of Court, by operation of law a constructive notice is deemed made to all the world, so that upon the expiration
of said period all third persons should be barred [from going] after the particular property, except where title thereto still remains in
the names of the alleged heirs who executed the partition tainted with fraud, or their transferees who may not qualify as innocent
purchasers for value. If the liability of the registered property should extend indefinitely beyond that period, then such constructive
notice which binds the whole world by virtue of registration would be meaningless and illusory. x x x.[7] (Emphasis supplied)

The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the title remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently
caused the partition of the subject property or in those of their transferees who cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
In this regard, title to the property in the present case was no longer in the name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that
of an innocent purchaser for value the government. Moreover, the government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the
acquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto was obtained through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in proper
expropriation proceedings.
Even assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part of the other heirs, private respondents may proceed only against the
defrauding heirs, not against petitioner which had no participation in or knowledge of the alleged fraud. The fact that the co-heirs
title to the property was fraudulently secured cannot prejudice the rights of petitioner which, absent any showing that it had
knowledge or participation in the irregularity, is considered a purchaser in good faith and for value.[8]
The remedy of an owner alleged to have been prejudiced or fraudulently deprived of property that was subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the person or persons who perpetrated the fraud.[9]
Second Issue: Limitations on Reconveyance
The law recognizes the right of a person, who, by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, is deprived of an
estate or an interest therein.[10] Although a review of the decree of registration is no longer possible after the one-year period from
its entry expires, still available is an equitable remedy to compel the reconveyance of property to those who may have been
wrongfully deprived of it.[11] This equitable remedy afforded by law is not without limitations, however.
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the discovery of the fraud; such discovery is deemed to
have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Registration of real property is considered a
constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom.[12] Clearly then, private respondents
action for reconveyance based on fraud has already prescribed, considering that title to said property had been issued way back on
August 11, 1982, while the reivindicatory suit was instituted only on July 29, 1996.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive trust would have already prescribed just the same, because
such action prescribes ten (10) years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.[13] The imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff
or the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the
property title, which does not prescribe.[14] Undisputedly, private respondents are not in possession of the disputed property. In fact,
they do not even claim to be in possession of it, even if to do so would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action.
Accordingly, the CA Decisions reliance on Juan v. Zuiga,[15] as regards the imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust, is utterly misplaced in the light of the foregoing rulings of the Court declaring a ten-year period of
prescription for such action. Moreover, the principle enunciated therein has no application to the instant case, considering that the
supposed trustee herein has effectively repudiated the so-called trust by directly performing an act of ownership; that is, by
conveying the property to the government through expropriation. An action to compel, for the benefit of the cestui que trust, the
conveyance of property registered in the trustees name does not prescribe unless the trustee repudiates the trust.[16] Thus, private
respondents cannot invoke the imprescriptibility of their action for reconveyance, irrespective of their basis for it.
Finally, it must be remembered that reconveyance is a remedy of those whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in the name of another. Such recourse, however, cannot be availed of once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for
value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value.[17]
Indubitably, we find that the property has already been conveyed to the government in appropriate expropriation proceedings, the
regularity or validity of which has not been questioned. Petitioner should, therefore, enjoy the security afforded to innocent third
persons under our registration laws. Equally important, its title to the property must be rightfully preserved.
Hence, private respondents action to recover the subject property from the government cannot be maintained, not only because of
the prescription of the action, but on account of the protection given to innocent purchasers for value granted under our land
registration laws. Indeed, the inevitable consequences of the Torrens system of land registration must be upheld in order to give
stability to it and provide finality to land disputes.
This ruling notwithstanding, private respondents are not without recourse. They may sue for damages their co-heirs who have
allegedly perpetrated fraud in Civil Case No. 4534-L pending before the RTC. The right and the extent of damages to be awarded to
private respondents shall be determined by the trial court, subject to the evidence duly established during the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54) in Civil Case No. 4534-L, dated January 12, 1998 and March 31, 1998, are SET
ASIDE and the said Civil Case, as against petitioner, is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

DELFIN TAN,
Petitioner,

- versus

ERLINDA C. BENOLIRAO,
ANDREW C. BENOLIRAO,
ROMANO C. BENOLIRAO,
DION C. BENOLIRAO,

SPS. REYNALDO TANINGCO

and NORMA D. BENOLIRAO,
EVELYN T. MONREAL, and
ANN KARINA TANINGCO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 153820
Present:
*QUISUMBING, J.,
CARPIO-MORALES,
**NACHURA,
BRION, and
ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 16, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

Is an annotation made pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (Rules) on a certificate of title covering real property
considered an encumbrance on the property? We resolve this question in the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by Delfin Tan
(Tan) to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52033[2] and the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
[3] that commonly declared the forfeiture of his P200,000.00 down payment as proper, pursuant to the terms of his contract with the
respondents.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The facts are not disputed. Spouses Lamberto and Erlinda Benolirao and the Spouses Reynaldo and Norma Taningco were the
co-owners of a 689-square meter parcel of land (property) located in Tagaytay City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 26423. On October 6, 1992, the co-owners executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the property in favor of Tan for the price of
P1,378,000.00. The deed stated:
a)
An initial down-payment of TWO HUNDRED (P200,000.00) THOUSAND PESOS, Philippine Currency, upon signing of this contract;
then the remaining balance of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND (P1,178,000.00) PESOS, shall be payable
within a period of one hundred fifty (150) days from date hereof without interest;
b)
That for any reason, BUYER fails to pay the remaining balance within above mentioned period, the BUYER shall have a grace
period of sixty (60) days within which to make the payment, provided that there shall be an interest of 15% per annum on the
balance amount due from the SELLERS;
c)
That should in case (sic) the BUYER fails to comply with the terms and conditions within the above stated grace period, then the
SELLERS shall have the right to forfeit the down payment, and to rescind this conditional sale without need of judicial action;
d)
That in case, BUYER have complied with the terms and conditions of this contract, then the SELLERS shall execute and deliver to
the BUYER the appropriate Deed of Absolute Sale;

Pursuant to the Deed of Conditional Sale, Tan issued and delivered to the co-owners/vendors Metrobank Check No. 904407 for
P200,000.00 as down payment for the property, for which the vendors issued a corresponding receipt.
On November 6, 1992, Lamberto Benolirao died intestate. Erlinda Benolirao (his widow and one of the vendors of the property) and
her children, as heirs of the deceased, executed an extrajudicial settlement of Lambertos estate on January 20, 1993. On the basis
of the extrajudicial settlement, a new certificate of title over the property, TCT No. 27335, was issued on March 26, 1993 in the names
of the Spouses Reynaldo and Norma Taningco and Erlinda Benolirao and her children. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, the
following annotation was made on TCT No. 27335:
x x x any liability to credirots (sic), excluded heirs and other persons having right to the property, for a period of two (2) years, with
respect only to the share of Erlinda, Andrew, Romano and Dion, all surnamed Benolirao

As stated in the Deed of Conditional Sale, Tan had until March 15, 1993 to pay the balance of the purchase price. By agreement of
the parties, this period was extended by two months, so Tan had until May 15, 1993 to pay the balance. Tan failed to pay and asked
for another extension, which the vendors again granted. Notwithstanding this second extension, Tan still failed to pay the remaining
balance due on May 21, 1993. The vendors thus wrote him a letter demanding payment of the balance of the purchase price within

five (5) days from notice; otherwise, they would declare the rescission of the conditional sale and the forfeiture of his down payment
based on the terms of the contract.
Tan refused to comply with the vendors demand and instead wrote them a letter (dated May 28, 1993) claiming that the annotation
on the title, made pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, constituted an encumbrance on the property that would prevent the
vendors from delivering a clean title to him. Thus, he alleged that he could no longer be required to pay the balance of the purchase
price and demanded the return of his down payment.
When the vendors refused to refund the down payment, Tan, through counsel, sent another demand letter to the vendors on June 18,
1993. The vendors still refused to heed Tans demand, prompting Tan to file on June 19, 1993 a complaint with the RTC of Pasay City
for specific performance against the vendors, including Andrew Benolirao, Romano Benolirao, Dion Benolirao as heirs of Lamberto
Benolirao, together with Evelyn Monreal and Ann Karina Taningco (collectively, the respondents). In his complaint, Tan alleged that
there was a novation of the Deed of Conditional Sale done without his consent since the annotation on the title created an
encumbrance over the property. Tan prayed for the refund of the down payment and the rescission of the contract.
On August 9, 1993, Tan amended his Complaint, contending that if the respondents insist on forfeiting the down payment, he would
be willing to pay the balance of the purchase price provided there is reformation of the Deed of Conditional Sale. In the meantime,
Tan caused the annotation on the title of a notice of lis pendens.
On August 21, 1993, the respondents executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Hector de Guzman (de Guzman)
for the price of P689,000.00.
Thereafter, the respondents moved for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the ground that it was inappropriate since the
case that Tan filed was a personal action which did not involve either title to, or possession of, real property. The RTC issued an order
dated October 22, 1993 granting the respondents motion to cancel the lis pendens annotation on the title.
Meanwhile, based on the Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor, de Guzman registered the property and TCT No. 28104 was issued in his
name. Tan then filed a motion to carry over the lis pendens annotation to TCT No. 28104 registered in de Guzmans name, but the RTC
denied the motion.
On September 8, 1995, after due proceedings, the RTC rendered judgment ruling that the respondents forfeiture of Tans down
payment was proper in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties.[4] The RTC ordered Tan to pay
the respondents the amount of P30,000.00, plus P1,000.00 per court appearance, as attorneys fees, and to pay the cost of suit.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court in toto. Hence, the present petition.
THE ISSUES
Tan argues that the CA erred in affirming the RTCs ruling to cancel the lis pendens annotation on TCT No. 27335. Due to the
unauthorized novation of the agreement, Tan presented before the trial court two alternative remedies in his complaint either the
rescission of the contract and the return of the down payment, or the reformation of the contract to adjust the payment period, so
that Tan will pay the remaining balance of the purchase price only after the lapse of the required two-year encumbrance on the title.
Tan posits that the CA erroneously disregarded the alternative remedy of reformation of contract when it affirmed the removal of the
lis pendens annotation on the title.
Tan further contends that the CA erred when it recognized the validity of the forfeiture of the down payment in favor of the vendors.
While admitting that the Deed of Conditional Sale contained a forfeiture clause, he insists that this clause applies only if the failure to
pay the balance of the purchase price was through his own fault or negligence. In the present case, Tan claims that he was justified
in refusing to pay the balance price since the vendors would not have been able to comply with their obligation to deliver a clean
title covering the property.
Lastly, Tan maintains that the CA erred in ordering him to pay the respondents P30,000.00, plus P1,000.00 per court appearance as
attorneys fees, since he filed the foregoing action in good faith, believing that he is in the right.
The respondents, on the other hand, assert that the petition should be dismissed for raising pure questions of fact, in
contravention of the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules which provides that only questions of law can be raised in petitions for review
on certiorari.
THE COURTS RULING
The petition is granted.
No new issues can be raised in the Memorandum

At the onset, we note that Tan raised the following additional assignment of errors in his Memorandum: (a) the CA erred in holding
that the petitioner could seek reformation of the Deed of Conditional Sale only if he paid the balance of the purchase price and if the
vendors refused to execute the deed of absolute sale; and (b) the CA erred in holding that the petitioner was estopped from asking
for the reformation of the contract or for specific performance.
The Courts September 27, 2004 Resolution expressly stated that No new issues may be raised by a party in his/its Memorandum.
Explaining the reason for this rule, we said that:
The raising of additional issues in a memorandum before the Supreme Court is irregular, because said memorandum is supposed to
be in support merely of the position taken by the party concerned in his petition, and the raising of new issues amounts to the filing of
a petition beyond the reglementary period. The purpose of this rule is to provide all parties to a case a fair opportunity to be heard.
No new points of law, theories, issues or arguments may be raised by a party in the Memorandum for the reason that to permit these
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[5]

Tan contravened the Courts explicit instructions by raising these additional errors. Hence, we disregard them and focus
instead on the issues previously raised in the petition and properly included in the Memorandum.

Petition raises a question of law

Contrary to the respondents claim, the issue raised in the present petition defined in the opening paragraph of this Decision
is a pure question of law. Hence, the petition and the issue it presents are properly cognizable by this Court.
Lis pendens annotation not proper in personal actions
Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules enumerates the instances when a notice of lis pendens can be validly annotated on the title to real
property:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens.
In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is
claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the
pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of
the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer
of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency
against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice
is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded.
The litigation subject of the notice of lis pendens must directly involve a specific property which is necessarily affected by the
judgment.[6]
Tans complaint prayed for either the rescission or the reformation of the Deed of Conditional Sale. While the Deed does have real
property for its object, we find that Tans complaint is an in personam action, as Tan asked the court to compel the respondents to do
something either to rescind the contract and return the down payment, or to reform the contract by extending the period given to
pay the remaining balance of the purchase price. Either way, Tan wants to enforce his personal rights against the respondents, not
against the property subject of the Deed. As we explained in Domagas v. Jensen:[7]
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or
quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to
enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may
involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically
perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.

Furthermore, as will be explained in detail below, the contract between the parties was merely a contract to sell where the
vendors retained title and ownership to the property until Tan had fully paid the purchase price. Since Tan had no claim of ownership
or title to the property yet, he obviously had no right to ask for the annotation of a lis pendens notice on the title of the property.
Contract is a mere contract to sell
A contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into consideration its essential elements, and not what the contracting parties call
it.[8] Article 1485 of the Civil Code defines a contract of sale as follows:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
The very essence of a contract of sale is the transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised.[9]
In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to the
prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed, i.e., full payment of the purchase price.[10] A contract to sell may not
even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale
until the fulfillment of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present,
although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur.[11]
In the present case, the true nature of the contract is revealed by paragraph D thereof, which states:
x
x
x
d)
That in case, BUYER has complied with the terms and conditions of this contract, then the SELLERS shall execute and deliver to
the BUYER the appropriate Deed of Absolute Sale;
x

Jurisprudence has established that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of
the payment of the price, the contract is only a contract to sell.[12] Thus, while the contract is denominated as a Deed of Conditional
Sale, the presence of the above-quoted provision identifies the contract as being a mere contract to sell.
A Section 4, Rule 74 annotation is an encumbrance on the property
While Tan admits that he refused to pay the balance of the purchase price, he claims that he had valid reason to do so the sudden
appearance of an annotation on the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, which Tan considered an encumbrance on the
property.
We find Tans argument meritorious.

The annotation placed on TCT No. 27335, the new title issued to reflect the extrajudicial partition of Lamberto Benoliraos estate
among his heirs, states:
x x x any liability to credirots (sic), excluded heirs and other persons having right to the property, for a period of two (2) years, with
respect only to the share of Erlinda, Andrew, Romano and Dion, all surnamed Benolirao [Emphasis supplied.]
This annotation was placed on the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, which reads:
Sec. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. - If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of
an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts
in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2)
years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person
has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for
that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what manner each
distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in
the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain
charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding
any transfers of real estate that may have been made. [Emphasis supplied.]

Senator Vicente Francisco discusses this provision in his book The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,[13] where he states:
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 prescribes the procedure to be followed if within two years after an extrajudicial partition or
summary distribution is made, an heir or other person appears to have been deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, or
some outstanding debts which have not been paid are discovered. When the lawful participation of the heir is not payable in money,
because, for instance, he is entitled to a part of the real property that has been partitioned, there can be no other procedure than to
cancel the partition so made and make a new division, unless, of course, the heir agrees to be paid the value of his participation with
interest. But in case the lawful participation of the heir consists in his share in personal property of money left by the decedent, or in
case unpaid debts are discovered within the said period of two years, the procedure is not to cancel the partition, nor to appoint an
administrator to re-assemble the assets, as was allowed under the old Code, but the court, after hearing, shall fix the amount of such
debts or lawful participation in proportion to or to the extent of the assets they have respectively received and, if circumstances
require, it may issue execution against the real estate belonging to the decedent, or both. The present procedure is more expedient
and less expensive in that it dispenses with the appointment of an administrator and does not disturb the possession enjoyed by the
distributees.[14] [Emphasis supplied.]

An annotation is placed on new certificates of title issued pursuant to the distribution and partition of a decedents real properties to
warn third persons on the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid creditors in these properties. The annotation, therefore,
creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the real property in favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the real
property despite the annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that the title could be subject to the rights of excluded parties.
The cancellation of the sale would be the logical consequence where: (a) the annotation clearly appears on the title, warning all
would-be buyers; (b) the sale unlawfully interferes with the rights of heirs; and (c) the rightful heirs bring an action to question the
transfer within the two-year period provided by law.
As we held in Vda. de Francisco v. Carreon:[15]
And Section 4, Rule 74 xxx expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful participation in the real estate
notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate and to issue execution thereon. All this implies that, when within the
amendatory period the realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it among the heirs has the authority to direct cancellation of
such alienation in the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to do so. To require the institution of a separate
action for such annulment would run counter to the letter of the above rule and the spirit of these summary settlements. [Emphasis
supplied.]

Similarly, in Sps. Domingo v. Roces,[16] we said:

The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights
within two years from the date of the settlement and distribution of estate. Contrary to petitioners contention, the effects of this
provision are not limited to the heirs or original distributees of the estate properties, but shall affect any transferee of the properties.
[Emphasis supplied.]

Indeed, in David v. Malay,[17] although the title of the property had already been registered in the name of the third party buyers, we
cancelled the sale and ordered the reconveyance of the property to the estate of the deceased for proper disposal among his rightful
heirs.
By the time Tans obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price arose on May 21, 1993 (on account of the extensions granted by
the respondents), a new certificate of title covering the property had already been issued on March 26, 1993, which contained the
encumbrance on the property; the encumbrance would remain so attached until the expiration of the two-year period. Clearly, at this
time, the vendors could no longer compel Tan to pay the balance of the purchase since considering they themselves could not fulfill
their obligation to transfer a clean title over the property to Tan.
Contract to sell is not rescinded but terminated
What then happens to the contract?
We have held in numerous cases[18] that the remedy of rescission under Article 1191 cannot apply to mere contracts to sell. We
explained the reason for this in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[19] where we said:
[I]n a contract to sell, title remains with the vendor and does not pass on to the vendee until the purchase price is paid in full. Thus, in
a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. Failure to pay the price agreed upon is not a
mere breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory
force. This is entirely different from the situation in a contract of sale, where non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory
condition. The effects in law are not identical. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost ownership of the thing sold and cannot recover

it, unless the contract of sale is rescinded and set aside. In a contract to sell, however, the vendor remains the owner for as long as
the vendee has not complied fully with the condition of paying the purchase price. If the vendor should eject the vendee for failure to
meet the condition precedent, he is enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. x x x Article 1592 speaks of non-payment of the
purchase price as a resolutory condition. It does not apply to a contract to sell. As to Article 1191, it is subordinated to the provisions
of Article 1592 when applied to sales of immovable property. Neither provision is applicable [to a contract to sell]. [Emphasis
supplied.]

We, therefore, hold that the contract to sell was terminated when the vendors could no longer legally compel Tan to pay the balance
of the purchase price as a result of the legal encumbrance which attached to the title of the property. Since Tans refusal to pay was
due to the supervening event of a legal encumbrance on the property and not through his own fault or negligence, we find and so
hold that the forfeiture of Tans down payment was clearly unwarranted.
Award of Attorneys fees

As evident from our previous discussion, Tan had a valid reason for refusing to pay the balance of the purchase price for the property.
Consequently, there is no basis for the award of attorneys fees in favor of the respondents.
On the other hand, we award attorneys fees in favor of Tan, since he was compelled to litigate due to the respondents refusal to
return his down payment despite the fact that they could no longer comply with their obligation under the contract to sell, i.e., to
convey a clean title. Given the facts of this case, we find the award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees proper.
Monetary award is subject to legal interest
Undoubtedly, Tan made a clear and unequivocal demand on the vendors to return his down payment as early as May 28, 1993.
Pursuant to
our definitive ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[20] we hold that the vendors should return the P200,000.00
down payment to Tan, subject to the legal interest of 6% per annum computed from May 28, 1993, the date of the first demand letter.

Furthermore, after a judgment has become final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the obligation was in the
form of a loan or forbearance of money or otherwise, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction. Accordingly, the
principal obligation of P200,000.00 shall bear 6% interest from the date of first demand or from May 28, 1993. From the date the
liability for the principal obligation and attorneys fees has become final and executory, an annual interest of 12% shall be imposed on
these obligations until their final satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and, accordingly, ANNUL and SET ASIDE the May 30, 2002 decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52033. Another judgment is rendered declaring the Deed of Conditional Sale terminated
and ordering the respondents to return the P200,000.00 down payment to petitioner Delfin Tan, subject to legal interest of 6% per
annum, computed from May 28, 1993. The respondents are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, petitioner Delfin Tan the
amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. Once this decision becomes final and executory, respondents are ordered to
pay interest at 12% per annum on the principal obligation as well as the attorneys fees, until full payment of these amounts. Costs
against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.