Scots Philosophical Association

University of St. Andrews

Liberal Justice: Political and Metaphysical

Author(s): Richard Bellamy and Martin Hollis
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 178 (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-19
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the
University of St. Andrews

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The PhilosophicalQuarterlyVol.45 No. 178

ISSN o03 -8094

Januaryi995

The PhilosophicalQuarterly
LIBERAL JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL
BY RICHARD

BELLAMY

AND MARTIN

HOLLIS

The God of the Old Testamentis proclaimed as a just God but is assuredly no liberal. A societywhose idea ofjustice accords withpatriarchal
principlesof political authorityis an unjust societyby the testof liberal
ideas about freedom,autonomyand the equalityof persons. Such a dispute between conceptions ofjustice sounds squarelymetaphysical,turning on the true character of a just society,of human nature and, perneutral:if patriarchywere to
haps, of ajust God. Nor is it meta-ethically
a
would
citizens
to lead a particularformof
prevail, just society
oblige
and
to
the
familiar
liberal tenet that quesgood
uprightlife,contrary
tions of what is rightcan be settled withoutprejudice to questions of
what is good. Yet this liberal tenet is not disputed only by patriarchs
and other opponents of liberalism.There are competingconceptions of
justice withinthe liberal camp, and some of them include a specific,if
carefullyincomplete,account of a citizen's moral commitments.
Liberals who agree withJ.S. Mill that the onlyfreedomworthyof the
name is thatof pursuingour own good in our own waymayseem bound
to leave each of us to define our own good for ourselves.This familiar
conclusion does not followsimply,however.A liberal could stress'our
own way', rather than 'our own good', when designing a constitution
whose primaryidea of religious tolerationwas to allow a varietyof ways
to a Christiangood (e.g., Locke). A more agnosticliberal could tolerate
wider experimentsin living,provided that theyembody a prescribed,if
secular, notion of human flourishing(e.g., Mill). A liberal with communitariantendenciescould let us choose ourown good withoutletting
each of us choose his or her own good (e.g., Rousseau). This maybe to
approach the limitsof liberalism,but thereare liberal disciplesof Rous?The Editorsof The PhilosophicalQuarterly,
1995. Publishedby BlackwellPublishers,108 CowleyRoad, OxfordOX4 IJF,UK
and 238 Main Street,Cambridge,MA 02142, USA.

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RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

seau and, in general, the line between the rightand the good has never
been perspicuous.
Contemporary liberals usually contend that modern democratic
societies are so deeply plural that liberalismmust do withoutany comliberal kind. Pluralism
prehensive moral frameworkof a distinctively
forcesthe issue. But it does so neitherbecause it is a contingenthistorical factwhicha democraticliberalshould recognize,nor because liberalism implies moral relativismor some such meta-ethicalcommitment.
The point is, rather,thata liberal societywhich permitsfree discussion
and action has to leave radicallyconflictingethical viewpointsin play.
To restrictthis diversityby the use of state power would be oppressive
(Rawls 1993 p. 37). Hence, it is argued, liberalismcannot defend itself
by appealing to the inherent superiorityof the liberal ideal without
becoming illiberal. The only way to avoid this paradox is to provide
principles of justice which are neutral in the 'political' sense that all
involvedaccept them as offeringfairtermsof social co-operationwhen
viewedfromwithintheirrespectivecomprehensivedoctrines.Pluralism
involves a compromise between liberal and illiberal views, which,
although reached in the name ofjustice, allows illiberal practices. (We
shall testthe coherence of thisline later.)
Can one constructa conception ofjustice that eschews metaphysical
claims to universaltruth,for instance about the nature of persons, and
instead seeks simplyto provide a fairand stable basis forpeaceful political co-existence?The attempt has been made most explicitlyin the
recentwritingsofJohnRawls (notablyin PPA 1985 [JF],revisedin Political Liberalism[PL] as Lecture 1). His idea of a just societyas 'a fair
systemof co-operationbetween free and equal persons' is finelypoised
(JFp. 238; PL pp. 9, 26). Fairnessis a procedural notion,fallinga hair'sbreadth short of implyinga thickconception of the good. Co-operation
involvesa notion of proper conduct Kantian enough to preventfreeenvisriding,yetwithoutrequiringa shared moral purpose. The freedom
of
leaves
room
for
Locke
between
(the
aged
dispute
disciples
'moderns') and disciples of Rousseau (the 'ancients'). Equalityconstrains the distributionof power and resources withoutconceding to
egalitarians.Personsare essentiallyparticipantsin social life, equipped
witha capacityfora sense ofjustice and of the good; yetthisconception
does not call for a metaphysicaldoctrine of the nature of the self.The
whole idea is framed to apply not universallyor eternallybut to the
basic structureof a modern political democracy.It 'startsfromwithina
particularpolitical tradition',roughlythe one which emerged in Western Europe fromthe wars of religion and has given us an 'overlapping
consensus' about the virtuesrequired of citizens to base the construct
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LIBERAL TUSTICE: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL

on (JFp. 225; PL pp. 14-15).

The revised theory of justice is thus as

promised by the titleof JF, 'political, not metaphysical'(JFp. 230; PL

p. 10).
In thispaper, we address tworelated doubts about tryingto turnmetaphysicalwaterinto political wine. First,there are rivalnon-metaphysical
theoriesofjustice on offer,and in weakeninghis conception of the self,
freedom and equality,Rawls may have let himselfbe fatallysqueezed
betweenlibertarianwriterslike F.A. Hayek and left-of-centre
liberalslike
Ronald Dworkin. Second, his theory,in common with those of other
philosophical liberals,is curiouslyunpolitical.He deliberatelyexcludes
the haggling and tradingof interestsand the contingenciesof power,
characteristicof political agreements,from the rational deliberations
thathe believes ought to motivatethe partiesin a democraticsocietyto
arriveat his two principles of justice. He contrastsan articulatedand
normative'overlapping consensus' on principlesofjustice witha mere
modusvivendiachieved througha contingentbalance of power; and he
sees his two principles as removingfrom the political agenda certain
contentiousissues, such as who has the vote or what sortsof viewscan
be expressed. This exclusion of politics threatensto render the principles ofjustice too abstractand farremovedfrompeople's real circumstances to yield any practical guidance to free and equal persons trying
to workout what counts as fairco-operationin particularpolitical conditions.
To focus these doubts we shall begin by asking whethera Rawlsian
type of constructcan be defended against libertarianswithoutfalling
preyto communitarians.This enquirywillbe conducted in the next two
sections under the headings of 'Clubs' and 'Communities'. We shall
then step back to consider whetherthe 'political' can be kept clear of
'metaphysics'.We explore this question in the thirdsection under the
heading of 'Commonwealths', understood as fair systemsof co-operation between free and equal persons, conceived in a republican tradition updated by drawing on our earlier comments on each of the
other headings. This discussionwill bring us to the conclusion thatcitizenship does indeed involvea political idea ofjustice, where political
obligationsare prior to pre-politicalrights,but one which is, as our title
suggests,metaphysicalfor all that. In the final section we testout this
thesisby applyingit to questions about the position of women and the
distributionof welfarein an illiberalculture.

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1995.

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RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

I. CLUBS
By 'clubs' we mean free associations formed to mutual advantage in
pursuing limited aims. Members observe the rules for instrumental
reasons. The rules embody a systemof co-operationrelated to the purpose of the club. But not all clubs treattheirmembers equally or even
fairly.Women, for instance,may be banned fromthe libraryin a London club, expected to make the tea in a cricketclub or admittedat halfprice to a datingclub. Rich and powerfulmembersmayfarebetterthan
others,as in clubs for landowners,yachtingenthusiastsand oil barons.
Since nothing in the basic idea of a club itselfrules out all manner of
discrimination,we need a particularsortof club to serveas a model for
the liberal state.
So let us specifythat the members be equal and the systemof cooperation fair.Also, since theycannot easilyleave, we need to construe
theirfreedom in some broader sense, which may involveresources for
pursuingtheirown good and not merelyan absence of formalobstacles.
Here liberal opinion startsto divide,withlibertariansthinkingin terms
of a mail-orderclub, so to speak, and social liberals in terms of a
Christmasclub. In the mail-orderstate, all are equally free to trade,
human relations are severelyinstrumental,everyone's penny is worth
the same as everyoneelse's penny and it is no one's concern that all
have at least a basic number of pennies. Each widow's mite is worththe
same as each of the millionaire'smillion.In the Christmasclub state,all
insure themselvesagainstsome futurepersonal calamitybycontributing
according to theirmeans to some formof collectivewelfareand social
securityprovision,drawing on the common fund according to need
ratherthan contribution.On thisview,whichwould appear to be Rawls',
mutual advantage is secured by a relationshipof reciprocity.
For both versionsa crucial question is whetherthe self-interested
participants will rationallyaccept that theyhave an obligation to abide by
the spiritof the rules. If theydo, then theywillplay faireven when able
to avoid it. If not, then free-ridingwill destroythe systemof co-operation, as Hobbes insistedwhen arguingfor 'a power to keep all in awe'.
All participantsdo betterifall play fairthan if the systemfails;but each
seems to do betterstillby undetected cheating,not only if otherscheat
but also iftheyplayfair.Where thischoice is trulydominantforrational,
self-interested
individuals,the club is doomed. The problem is more
obvious forthe mail-orderversion,where human relationsare explicitly
instrumental,but also besets the Christmasclub, which has difficulty
explainingwhythe betteroffshould join in the firstplace.
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LIBERAL JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL

if those takingpart
The liberal club would be safe fromfree-riders,
were Kantians. The problem vanishes among rational agents, if obedience to the categorical imperativeis a requirementof rationality.Yet,
although the Good Samaritan may have no reason to regretsaving the
life of a strangerwho then pinches his wallet,it is hard to believe that
one should rationallybe as high-mindedabout failuresof mutual trust
by mail-orderor even in the course of a mutual insurance scheme.
Whereas moral obligations may be unconditional, obligations of prudence seem to be rendered void by reasonable suspicion of non-compliance, as Hobbes suggests.Yet Hobbes' own remedyis not as dour as
appears fromremarkslike 'covenantswithoutthe swordare but words,
and of no strengthto secure a man at all' (ch. xvii). In his replyto the
'fool' who 'questionnethwhetherinjustice ... may not sometimesstand
withthatreason,whichdictatethto everymanhis own good', he declares
that'it is not againstreason' to honour covenantsof mutual trust,unless
one has reasonable suspicion that the other partywill not (ch. xv). But
this conclusion is not easy to extractwithas littleapparatus as Hobbes
provides,and even his liberal admirersusuallygive themselvesmore to
workwith.
The snag, as diagnosed by Rawls (PL pp. 16-17, 147-8), is that a
of rational agents
societybuilt on nothing but the mutual self-interest
issues at best in a mere modusvivendi.Such a societyneed be neither
fair,depending as it does on a contingentdistributionof power, nor
durable, since it will collapse as soon as it suits one or more of the
parties to defect.Accordinglyhe now advocates a solution witha moral
element,injected by basing a just societyon an 'overlappingconsensus'
among 'reasonable' agents who recognize ties of 'reciprocity'.Since
reciprocityinvolvesdischargingone's obligationseven when one could
defect, we are being offereda version of the Christmasclub model
which looks safe fromfree-riders.
with the role of the 'veil of
This manoeuvre compares interestingly
in
A
Behind
the
veil the demands of selfTheoryofJustice.
ignorance'
interestgenerated an extensivemutual insurance scheme by reasoning
uncannilyclose to Kantian. It looked as if prudence pursued in ignorance was congruentwiththe Kantian moral point of view.Even so, that
leftit unclear whya rationalagent,as standardlydefined,would comply
withthe social contract,if,once the veil was lifted,defectionturnedout
to be dominant. By making more of a distinctionbetween rational
agents and reasonable agents and relyingheavilyon an 'overlapping
consensus', Rawls makes compliance less problematic.
Nevertheless,reciprocityis something of a mysteryingredient. Its
effectis to populate thejust societywithreasonable agents of a neigh?The Editorsof The PhilosophicalQuarterly,
1995.

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RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

bourly sort. Yet this would be a sleight of hand if it only worked by

doctoringthe passions so as to make human beings more sociable, sympatheticto one another,or prone to the pangs of a bad conscience than
originallyenvisaged.So presumablyits role is to make reasonable agents
reflective and hence able to over-ride their own preferences as
expressed in their currentutilityrankingsof outcomes: when rational
choice theorybids rational agents to defect, reasonable agents sometimes refuse. But why?The obvious answer might seem to be that we
are being offereda robust 'philosophical psychologyor a metaphysical
doctrine of the self, which includes a Kantian power of reason to override inclination,renders agents less individualisticand more sociable,
and thus grounds a distinctionbetween reciprocityand even superenlightenedself-interest.
Yet Rawls squarely refuses to elaborate any such moral ontology or
metaphysics,insistingthat'no politicalviewthatdepends on these deep
and unresolvedmatterscan serve as a public conception ofjustice in a
constitutionaldemocraticstate', and remarkingthat 'we mustapply the
principle of toleration to philosophy itself (JFpp. 231, 223; PL pp. 13-

14, 9-1o). In thatcase, however,the puzzle remainshow to undermine

when thatis a dominant choice, withina procedural theory
free-riding,
of rationalityand justice thatstillkeeps the liberalityin liberalism.Reciprocitymay indeed hold the key,but not as an ad hocdevice.
The generic problem is that,ifprudence is construedalong the lines
of standardrationalchoice theory,then it threatensto be self-defeating.
The putativesolution is to set the hypotheticalin pursuitof the categorical by equipping rational agents with a reflectivenesswhich leads
them to overcome thisfeatureof prudence to theirmutual advantage.
Yet, while (expected) utilitiesremain a given element in the stock of
common knowledgewhich rationalagents have of one another and are
an automatic link between preference and choice, there is simplyno
wayforreflectivenessto make a difference.Hence we need a device for
distancingrational agents from their preferences,while leaving them
in the pursuitof theirown good.
'self-interested'
Rawlsfailsto solve thisdifficulty.
The imperativeto co-operate,in his
view,remainshypothetical,in thatco-operationproceeds on 'termsthat
each participantmayreasonablyaccept, provided thateveryoneelse likewise accepts them' (JFp. 232; PL p. 16). However,there is bound to be
a problem of compliance among rational maximizers,once theyhave a
shrewd idea of their power to avoid doing theirbit. This is explicit in
David Gauthier'sversionof the club, forexample, where rationalagents
know their historicaland social positions and yet choose to be 'constrained maximizers'who play fairwith other constrained maximizers
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LIBERAL JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL

even when able to avoid it. That may sound promising.If it pays the
weak and the strongalike to adopt a disposition to play fair,then the
Hobbesian problem is solved withoutthe troubleand expense of a fraud
squad. But the burden of this solution falls veryheavilyon the idea
thatone can choose a dispositionto be a Kantian among Kantiansand,
presumably,a rat among rats.Since the choice is promptedbyself-interest, and the disposition,being conditional, can be suspended when it
suits,we fail to see whya rational villain will not smile and smile and
stillbe a villain. In Rawls and Gauthier alike, the social contractneeds
to bringabout whatRousseau called (I 8) a 'remarkablechange in man',
putting'justice in the place of instinct'and leading him 'to consult his
reason ratherthan studyhis inclinations'.Gauthier'sdispositiontowards
is not to be trustedany more than Rawlsian
enlightened self-interest
is transmutedin acquiring it.
unless
the
self
reciprocity,
That will disappoint those who hope that Kant can furnish the
element of trustwhich even a mail-ordermarketneeds. But the Kantian
is not a club, even though it seems to keep the liberalityin
Rechtsstaat
liberalism withoutblending the right and the good. Despite its contractarianair, the Rechtsstaat
firmlypresupposes a theoryof morality
which is not contractarianand rational agents who are categorically
moral in all their practical dealings with one another. In undertaking
to respectone another's autonomy,these agents are not enteringa contractbut simplyrecognizingwhat their own autonomy implies. It may
look as if autonomy is too schematic a notion to have moral content.
But there is no mistakingKant's view that someone who consults only
is not a fitcitizen of the Rechtsstaat.
however reflectively,
self-interest,
Autonomous agents keep promises because theyhave made them,and
regardlessof theirexpected utilitieswhen the time comes. Pace Rawls,
the Rechtsstaat
embodies a universalconception ofjustice,a metaphysical
doctrine of the selfand a refusalto apply the principle of tolerationto
philosophyitself.
In denying that the Rechtsstaat
is a contract,we do not deny that it
a
be
a
construct.
Such
construct
would need to be the work of
may
not their incentive to become
autonomous
however,
agents,
already
autonomous. That is to build a specificprinciple of limited toleration
into the constructand hence a refusalto compromise between liberal
and illiberal views.The grounds of this refusalcan only be moral and
connected witha metaphysicaldoctrine of the self,even if the morality
involvedis carefullyschematic ratherthan detailed. The Kantian selfis
not prior to all the ends which constituteit. That much is clear. But a
new difficulty
arises, when we ask exactlywhich ends are integralto a
That is the cue forcommunitarians.
citizen of the Rechtsstaat.
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RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

II. COMMUNITIES
Communitiesdifferfromclubs in that,ratherthan individualsconstituting societyfordistinctpurposes of theirown,social membershipsupposedly constitutesindividual identity.Communitarians regard the club
model of societyas an impossible attemptto pull societyup by its own
bootstraps,since it assumeswhatit seeks to create: unless thereis already
a social settingwhich providesindividualswithroles and standards,the
notion of individualchoice has no meaning. The self-interested
agents
of much liberal theorizingare ridiculed as compulsiveshoppers in the
supermarketof ends. Lacking either a sense of purpose or a shared
moral framework,
such disencumberedindividualsas the participantsin
Rawls' original position or Gauthier's contractorscould not establisha
settledorder of preferencesor reach stable agreementswithothers.
Communitarians contend, therefore, that the Kantian Rechtsstaat
makes sense only withinthe context of the Hegelian ethical state. The
rightcannot be separated from the good, since rules ofjustice reflect
common understandingsof ends, ratherthan means, whichexplain why
certain goods are importantand how theyfitinto a particularpattern
of social relationshipsof which the individualis a part. Despite an established traditionof neo-Hegelian liberal communitarianism,however,
many liberals have been uneasy with thisway of thinking,regardingit
as eitherconservative,witha small 'c', or downrightauthoritarian.
Contemporaryattemptsat communitarian liberalism cannot easily
escape these criticisms.Communitarian liberals can be divided into
relativistsand rationalists,withMichael Walzer's SpheresofJustice
providing an example of the firstand Joseph Raz's Moralityof Freedoman
instance of the second. Walzer's argumentis communitarianin so far
as he argues (p. 7) that 'distributionsare patternedin accordance with
shared conceptions of what the goods are and what theyare for'. His
theoryis liberal, however,in contending that we ought to show equal
concern and respect both for the differentunderstandingsof justice
found in differentsocieties and for the distributionalcriteriaappropriate to differentgoods withinsocieties.The problem withWalzer's thesis
is that the relativismneed not generate the liberalism.His contention
(p. 313) that 'a given societyis just if its substantivelife is lived ... in a
way faithfulto the shared understandingsof the members' can legitimizeextremelycoercive regimes.Public opinion maybe misguided or
unreliable. People are often misinformed,prejudiced or self-deluded,
theirviews as much the product of socialization and various formsof
indoctrinationas of reasoned argument.Oppression is often accepted
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LIBERAL JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL

by the oppressed as a result of their acquiescence in the ideology

inflictedon them. Thus a shared understanding that we are all, for
instance,miserable sinnerscan underpin a 'substantivelife' quite contraryto a liberal idea ofjustice.
Moreover, the relativistargument provides no basis for toleratinga
pluralityof viewseitherwithinor between societies - somethingWalzer
desires. Complete agnosticismabout any foundationsfor truthor moralityleads not to tolerance but to strugglesbetween opposed ideologies
in which might is right.If X seeks to impose a lifestyleon Y, on the
then Y can restrain
grounds that Ys life will otherwiselack fulfilment,
their
to
some
respectivesubprincipletranscending
Xonly byappealing
Walzer
of
The
desired
ideals.
mightemerge
by
equality respect
jective
naturallywhere there is an equitable balance of power. Outside this
purely contingentsituation,however,he needs a warrantfor it in an
objectiveclaim about whatmakes all human livesworthyof our concern.
Rationalistcommunitariansseek to provide such a justificationby arguing that the central human good thata liberal societyshould uphold is
the capacityforautonomy.A communitarianliberalismmust,therefore,
be committed to maintaining an autonomy-supportingenvironment
that secures those conditions necessary to make meaningful choices
possible. This entails not merelyprotectingeach individual's negative
libertyfromdeliberate coercion by others,but also providinga range of
worthwhileoptions. The danger withthis thesisfroma liberal point of
view arises from the classic objection to all positive theories of liberty:
namely,thattheylead to the paternalisticimpositionof a particulartype
of behaviour on individuals,on the grounds thatfreedom requires the
pursuitof certain goals necessaryto realize their 'true' selves. The difficultyarises fromtryingto reconcile the requirementsof the conditions
for autonomy,which only flourishesin a certain kind of social set-up,
with the capacity for autonomy,seen as our abilityto create our own
moral world. Once our capacity for autonomy becomes itselfa conditioned product, then one can no longer appeal to it as an independent standard to preventpaternalisticinterferenceswithindividual
liberty(see Mendus). As Raz himselfobserves (p. 391), 'for those who
environmentthere is no choice but to
live in an autonomy-supporting
be autonomous'.
This criticismmay seem unfair.Raz does afterall contend that autonomy presupposes what he calls 'competitivepluralism', and we ourselves believe thatliberalismcannot divorce itselffromall metaphysical
and moral considerations.In our view, however,Raz goes too far. He
attemptsto make the metaphysicsdo all the workin producing a wellordered society.As a result,the pluralismwhich he allows turnsout to
1995.
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10

RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

be narrowerthan at firstappears, consistingonly in putatively'worthwhile options'. Crucial to his thesis is a distinctionhe makes between
'self-interest'and 'personal well-being' analogous to Mill's famous
division between the lower and the higher pleasures. The firstrelates
primarilyto our biological requirementsand arouses 'pleasure' which,
on Raz's definition,is both insatiableand non-diminishing.The second
is orientated towardsgoals or pursuitsof independent value and produces 'happiness', which Raz regardsas a satiable and diminishingemotion. He argues that,whilstthe pursuitof self-interest
produces conflict,
after
does
not.
striving
personal well-being
Consequently,if the opportunitiesavailable withinsocietyonly 'enshrine sound moral conceptions'
then people will naturally'choose for themselvesgoals which lead to a
rough coincidence in theirown lives of moral and personal concerns'.
Social harmony will follow, in which 'by being teachers, production
workers,drivers,public servants,loyal friendsand familypeople, loyal
to theircommunities,nature-lovingand so on, [people] willbe pursuing
theirown goals, enhancing theirown well-being,and also servingtheir
communities,and generallylivingin a morallyworthyway' (p. 215).
This ethical liberal utopia, in which (only slightlyto amend a famous
phrase) the autonomyof each is the condition forthe autonomyforall,
is wildlyoptimistic.Not only does it underestimatethe potential for
moral conflictbetween differentfeaturesof people's lives even withina
single ethical code, it greatlyoverestimatesthe degree of moral agreement that a liberal societywhich encourages diversityand experimentation is likelyto be able to sustain.As we shall argue in the following
sections,it is thejob of politics,albeit informedby liberal morality,to
conciliate and resolve such disputes.
To avoid the sort of difficulties
we have raised concerning Raz's theory,Rawls proposes a non-metaphysicalpolitical liberalism that avoids
comprehensivemeta-ethicalclaims.Yet,we submit,Raz is correctto the
extent that such a conception cannot in itself be entirely neutral
betweenconceptions of the good. At the veryleast,it requiresan attachment to a specific set of political virtueswhich force us to exchange
viewsratherthan bullets and agree on equitable solutionsand compromises. How deep such citizenlyethics need bite into our personal moralityformsthe subject of the next section.
III. COMMONWEALTHS
The members of clubs and communes lack the qualities required of a
citizen of a liberal polity.The formerare too detached and the latter
too involved. The club model cannot show why it is instrumentally
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LIBERAL JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL

11

rational foratomisticindividualsto adopt the impartialstandpointprescribedwithinthe liberal frameworkand thusregulatetheirsocial interaction in ajust manner. In anycase, such an abstractand general framework is only part of what is needed. By itself,it cannot motivate a
common concern for the qualityof lifeor guide it towardsa set of policies. Yet, as we shall argue below, it is the abilityto formulateand motivatecommon concern and to translateit into policythatrepresentsthe
truetaskof politicsand hence of citizenship.Clubs are inherentlyapolitical.
Communities,by contrast,are unmistakablypolitical. Communitarians are generally neo-Aristotelians,and to accuse them of lacking a
conception of citizenship may seem perverse. However, their civic
humanistversion of citizenshipexcludes politics,in the modern sense
of negotiation and bargaining in (until recently) smoke-filledrooms.
For communitarians,politicssimplyinvolvesparticipationin the public
life of the community.It presupposes a pre-existingcommunal good, a
'tradition'which participantsare to accept as a going concern. It does
not startfromdebating a varietyof different
viewpointsabout what that
be
as
to
so
secure
the
good might
emergence of a workablecompromise.
Indeed, the communitarianposition denies both the pluralismof ends,
at least within a community,and the public/privatedivide necessary
to make sense of such a conception. Yet both, we would contend, are
inescapable featuresof modern lifewithwhich a viable formof liberalism must come to terms.A liberalism posited upon a homogeneous
moral communitymay have been possible in the eighteenthcentury,
but not in the twenty-first.
The form of citizenship we associate with 'commonwealths' stems
from the civic republican tradition.Deriving from Machiavelli rather
than Aristotle,it treatspolitical participationmerelyas the condition
for retainingour liberty,ratherthan as essential to our self-realization.
Accordingto thisline of thinking,since the rightsand libertiesavailable
to us depend upon the laws, norms and prioritiesof our particular
society,we shall be free only to the extentthatwe share in determining
theircharacter.As Rawlsnotes (PL pp. 205-6), since thisconception of
citizenshipinvolvesno advance commitmentto any specific
conception
of the good, civic republicanism is compatible with a pluralistdemocraticliberalism.Yet the schema implies an unspecific
conception of the
good, since it is underpinned by obligations.For, if these arrangements
are to respect fairlythe values and demands of all members of society,
ratherthanjust those of elites,then we have an obligation not only to
participatepersonallyin collective decision-makingbut also to ensure
thatothersdo too.
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12

RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

Our conception of citizenshiprestson the acceptance of dutieswhose

discharge is a preconditionfor the political life of the commonwealth.
They enjoin equal basic respect and concern for all others in thiscommonwealth of free and equal persons. The idea of respect looks to
Kant's notion of autonomy,togetherwithhis thesis that to claim autonomyfor oneself is to recognize that others have the same claim to be
treatedas ends in themselves.Free citizensof the kingdom of ends are
separate and equal persons,in a sense which respectsboth theiraccess
to public life and their right to a private one. The idea of concern
implies an equal minimum of resources, enough to make autonomy
real. A degree of materialindependence is needed for public and private life alike, to give citizens the time and means to play their public
part and literallyto close the door on othersfor the sake of privacy.
These duties provide a substantiveaccount of the preconditionsfor
open-minded discussion among free and equal persons,including consideration of the social resources necessary for freedom of thought,
expressionand action. As preconditions,theyneed to be metaphysically
grounded and defended as reflectinga priorinotions of what is due to
individuals,so that no citizen is treated as less than a person. Then,
within this frameworkof enablements and constraints,there will be
room for politics of a practical kind to deliberate and settlemattersof
collectiveconcern.
By puttingduties beforerightsand makingthempreconditionsof the
life of a commonwealth,we hope to overcome two familiarproblems
forliberal attemptsto accommodate pluralism.The firstarises fromthe
charge that liberals concede too much if theythin down theirconception of justice so as to appeal to all points of view. There is a danger
that a theoryof justice thin enough to appeal to a pluralityof groups
will entail toleratingthe intolerable. Moreover, it could be decidedly
inegalitarian,prone to entrenchingand legitimatingrather than challenging the prevailingdisparitiesof power and wealth. Pluralismcombined witha thintheoryofjustice maymean capitulationto the existing
distributionof power in society and an implicit endorsement of the
belief that might is right. The second problem arises because metaphysicsprovidesno substitutefor politics. Our moral obligationsprove
too narrowto determine to whom our dutyis owed or how it is to be
by
discharged.Rights-basedpolitical moralitiesexacerbate thisdifficulty
of
non-interference
so
firmly
perfect
obligations
upholding negative
that they cannot set about explaining why we should (as opposed to
merelycould) participatewithinformsof collectivedecision-makingand
co-operation.We shall returnto this point in the discussion of welfare
in the next section.
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LIBERAL JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL

13

in recent criticismsof liberThe firstproblem has surfacedforcefully

alism byfeministswho have remarkedhow the discourse ofjustice needs
to be supplemented by an awarenessof the sources of oppression (e.g.,
Young). It has also been central to criticismsof the Rawlsian project
since its inception. On the one hand, Rawls' firstprinciple of justice,
which prescribesmaximal equal libertiesfor all, has been criticizedfor
being too formal.It fails to appreciate thatjudgements about maximal
equal liberty,being necessarilyqualitative rather than quantitativein
nature, cannot yield definiteresolutionsof conflictsbetween liberties
(O'Neill 1979/80). On the other hand, his second principle, which
allows inequalities, provided that theybenefit the worstoff,has been
attackedforfailingto capture the importanceof people's relativestanding for theirevaluation of theirsense of worth.Moreover, the division
between stateand civilsociety,privateand public, implied by givingthe
firstprinciple lexical priority,underestimatesthe extent to which the
equal libertiesrequire a substantialsocial and economic empowerment.
These criticismscan be related to Rawls' attemptto drawa distinction
to matbetween the rightand the good so as to confine the Rechtsstaat
tersof proceduraljustice, while leavingitsmembersautonomyto pursue
their own good in their own way. This classic distinctionis a liberal
hallmark;but it has never come out cleanly. The snag is that there is
no purelyprocedural objection to treatingdifferentpeople or groups
Any objection has to take the form of complaining that a
differently.
is irrelevantand such questions of relevance are
difference
particular
moralquestions, even if they do not therebycease to be questions of
justice. For example, fairnessbetween 'freeand equal persons' rules out
formsof the subjection of women forwhich some religionsclaim moral
authority,even though the religion deals fairlybetween women (and
fairlybetween men). The liberal retortis that no moral authoritycan
infringeanyone's autonomy - a moralclaim that women are free and
equal persons.The liberaldivisionbetweenpublic and privateis not one
betweenjustice and moralitybut one distinguishingmoral commitments
which the commonwealthmakes fromthose where it stands aside.
Rawls' retreatfroma metaphysicalto a political theoryofjustice is a
partialrecognitionof the point. 'Political' is meant to avoid metaphysics,
thuslettingargumentabout the meritsof public policyproceed without
having to settle questions of objectivityin ethics. But it is not meant
to abolish all moral engagement. In a societymarked by a 'reasonable
pluralism',there are overlappingconceptions of the good withenough
of a liberal consensus in the overlap to allow the emergence of reasonable policies like those implied by the Differenceprinciple.The consensus is morallycommittal,even if the warrantis only consensus itself.
1995.
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14

RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

Can a 'political' theoryofjustice relyon its own bootstraps?Rawls is

ambivalent. Sometimes he presents the liberal overlap in communitarian guise as the historicalproduct of the Western democratic tradition. We find this profoundlyunsatisfactory,
granted that traditions
are not rigid. To continue the example, are there ways of treating
women in contemporaryBritainwhich are establishedpractices,and so
acceptable to an evolving tradition,but, by the test of a reasonable
pluralism, unreasonable? For instance, sexual harassment and the
exclusion of women from all-male clubs are well-establishedpractices,
and Britain has lately incorporated new traditionswhich, it has been
argued in a local governmentcouncil chamber, include an established
practice of female circumcision.By what testdoes a liberal deem these
practices'unreasonable'? Someone mightperhaps replythatthe crux is
not what is in fact accepted but whethera liberal view can be got to
prevailin a power-gamewhere winnersare alwaysreasonable and losers
alwaysunreasonable. But thatwould be a desperate move. It would offer
a wayof makingjustice 'political' which recalls Thrasymachos'sardonic
viewthatjustice is whatsuitsthe strong.The testof a 'reasonable' pluralism, therefore,stillneeds a metaphysicalbacking.
Accordingly,Rawls now argues thatan attemptto arriveat a political
conception by strikinga merelypragmaticbalance between the various
moral viewsfound withinsocietywould be 'political in the wrongway'
(PL p. 40). Instead, he presentshis theoryofjustice as a free-standing
view derived from 'the fundamentalidea of societyas a fair systemof
co-operation',in the hope that'thisidea, withitsindex of primarygoods
arrived at fromwithin,can be the focus of a reasonable overlapping
consensus'. Yet withoutsome transcendentalreason whya liberal convergence should occur, this must surelyremain a pious hope - particularlyas he rejects as 'oppressive' any state action througheducation
or legislationto uphold a political morality.
In arguing for some metaphysicalfoundationsfor liberalismwe do
not wish to run foul of the second familiarproblem associated with
liberal theory,namely that it is anti-political.Here we agree withRawls
that metaphysicsmust not swallowup the whole of morality.The political realm needs a metaphysicalbasis to define fairnessfor decisionmaking procedures, while settingonly partial conditions on what may
emerge from them. Thus who gets what, when and how, remains an
issue wherespecificpolicies are to be settledby the pushingand shoving
of differentinterestsand points of view within the basic constraints.
Whateverpolicyemergesfroma due process of decision is to be deemed
reasonable. Yet, to make it a 'due process', we require not only due
about the procedure but also substantiveconditions forpolitformality
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LIBERAL JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL

15

ical debate between free and equal persons. These conditions could be
said to enable the emergence of a General Will,while also constraining
its scope. From this perspective,the General Will is a matter not of
discoveringthe objective,antecedent truthabout the best policies but
of constructingpolicies which are 'reasonable' by the test of whether
withoutbreach of the conditions
theyemerged bypoliticalhorse-trading
of communicativeaction.
Here lies the basis for a conception of liberaljustice and citizenship
that is both political and metaphysical.It is metaphysicalin its connection witha formof Kantian universalism.However,unlike rights-based
theories,which attach to certain putative'natural' or 'basic' properties
of the individual,our duty-basedargumentdoes not idealize any particular formof agency,but is concerned solelywithhow one should act
towardsothers (see O'Neill 1989 for this reading of Kant). Moreover,
unlike Raz's ethical liberalism,it is directed to the preconditions of
political communication rather than to the detailed conduct of social
life at large. It is political in leaving the choice of specificpolicies for
what is owed to whom to be determined by the deliberativeprocess
itself.
IV. THE POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE DISTANCE
To illustrate the merits of this approach, we offer two concrete
examples. That such an exercise is possible in itselfsignalsan advantage
over rivalconceptions of politicaljustice, which so oftenfail to engage
criticallywiththe real world.
The firstexample, by way of comment on Rawls' Libertyprinciple,
continues our remarksabout what a 'reasonable pluralism' is to make
of the position of women in a societymarked by illiberal practices. In
so far as the question is whether to tolerate the intolerant,we echo
Milton's Areopagitica:
and unbreathed,
unexercised
I cannotpraisea fugitive
and cloistered
virtue,
butslinksoutoftherace,where
thatneversalliesoutand seesheradversary,
dustand heat.
thatimmortal
garlandis to be runfor,notwithout
In insistingon a metaphysicalgrounding for a principle of equal liberties for all, we bypass the subversive thought that unsexed, riskinclined individuals behind a veil of ignorance might assign some
women to drudgeryand gamble on not turningout to be among them.
We also deny thatthe Libertyprinciplecan be classed as a matterwhere
a liberal can agree to disagree with the intolerant,by deploring the
subjection of women while recognizing the rightof the oppressors to
get on withit.
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16

RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

But this does not dispose of two more awkwardaspects of the principle. What if there are women who are contentwithsubservientroles
and regard a liberal rescue as illegitimatepaternalism?Since this can
indeed be the case in a plural society,male authorscannot merelysulk,
like knightsexpostulating that the infuriateddamsel cannot possibly
preferthe dragon theyhave slain to them. The point at issue concerns
the statusof preferencesin a liberal theory.In marketversionsof the
club, where the customer is alwaysright,there is no scope for arguing
that preferencesmay be contraryto real interestsbecause shaped by
the existingdistributionof power. We see no need for a metaphysical
liberalismto let itselfbe cloistered by this line. Nor, we mightadd, do
liberal women feminists.Once the preconditions of reasonable discourse include considerationsof social empowerment,however,preferences cease to be simply'given'. Those formedafterthe dust and heat
have subsided are to be respected and theycan stillbe for a woman's
role of a sort to disappoint a feminist.The liberal metaphysicinsistson
equal libertiesfor all, withoutsupposing thatno one could then reflectivelychoose to forgo some of them. But such a choice threatensthe
liberal trustin the spread of enlightenmentand it maybe thatit has to
be an option which only a few are allowed. In the last resort liberals
cannot let the Rechtsstaat
fade out unexercised and unbreathed.
is
there
an
awkward
Relatedly,
question about the line between public
and privatefor a theorywhich denies thatjustice can be purelya procedural notion. In homes, as in markets,acquiescence is not alwaysto
be read as consent. Here we endorse the propositionthat the personal
is the political. But that does not give the plural, yet liberal, commonwealth the rightor dutyto regulatepervasively.
We envisagea three-fold
of
into
where
the
those
issues,
Liberty principle must be
grouping
those
where
it
forbids
and those in
intervention
upheld,
definitely
between,where the outcome is a matterfor political debate. Examples
are domesticviolence,adult homosexualityand varietiesof pornography
respectively.But the topic is too complex for the presentpaper and we
leave it with the remark that a distinctionbetween public and private
remains as crucial for a liberalismwhose notion ofjustice has a moral
foundationas it is difficultto determine.
The second example is bywayof commenton Rawls' Differenceprinciple. The issue of welfaredistributionhas been at the heart of recent
debates about liberal justice. On the one hand, contractarianshave
sought to generate abstract rules of justice, ranging from Rawls' two
principles to Nozick's historical theoryof just transfer.On the other
hand, communitarianshave attemptedto viewwelfareas a social good
thatshould be distributedin accord eitherwiththe norms of a specific
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LIBERAL JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL

17

culturalcontextor withsome viewof human flourishing.Contractarian

theories fail for the two reasons explored in ?I. They cannot explain
why the well-favouredwill be moved to comply with a general welfare
principle,once theyknow themselvesto be among those who would do
better by self-help.Moreover, they disagree so much about even the
abstractcharacterof an impartialtheoryofjustice thatnot even an overlapping consensus on the matteris in sight.In short,theystand too far
back fromthe problem.Yet, ifcontractariantheoriesare under-determined, communitarianones stand too close to prevailingpractices and
If the debate about how resourcesare to be distributed
are over-specific.
could be resolvedby appealing to communal values, it could never have
arisen in the firstplace.
Our approach bringstogethermetaphysicaland political,individualistic and communitarianconsiderations.Libertariansargue that there
can be no human rightto welfare,on the grounds thatthere can be no
correlativeuniversalduties on anyone to help everyonein need. This
argumentstems fromthe individualismat the root of the club model,
and can be countered onlyifdutiesinclude imperfectobligations,which
are wider than correlativeindividual rightsand prior to them. Rawls'
enthusiasmin PL for reciprocity,as distinctfrom mutual self-interest,
mightdo the trick.But his theoryremainstoo grounded in an individualism of intereststo generate a general social duty.Communitarianscan
do this,but in a formtoo specificto particularcommunities.Moreover,
we see no intrinsicreason why the communitarianargument should
relate one to other members of one's state rather than just to one's
familyor ethnic group, unless stateshave (or ought to have) a greater
degree of homogeneitythan theycurrentlymanifest.
From our perspective,in contrast,the denial of a universalobligation
to help othersfallsfoul of the centralmoral commitmentsof a political
theoryofjustice.The denial drawsitsplausibilityfroman implicitappeal
to a model of idealized independent agents. These paragons of selfsufficiencyapparently suffernone of the usual human frailtiesand
requirements,such as the propensityto fall sick and the need forfood,
that lead ordinarymen and women to call on the help and support of
othersat various timesin theirlives- particularlyin childhood and old
age. According to our duty-basedview,however,a principleof universal
indifferencecould never be adopted among ordinarilyneedy and vulnerable human beings. If we are only to adopt principlesall can act on,
then we must necessarilyreject those that undermine or threatenthe
capacityforagency of others.
Nevertheless,the dutyso establishedremainsan imperfectobligation.
This does not implythat we have no dutyto do anything.Rather, the
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18

RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

argumentcreates a requirementto create welfarearrangementsand to

allocate recipientsof welfareto agents and agencies capable of supplying these needs. Institutionalrightsto welfare can be tailored to the
characterand conditionsof particularsocieties. Such rightscapture the
more special obligations to help others which most of us feel we have
or which,so far as the greatersocietyis concerned, have been created
throughpolitical commitmentsof a piecemeal nature. In other words,
a metaphysicswhich makes sense of our moral obligationsneeds to be
supplementedbymore specificpolitical obligations.I need to know,for
example, why my general moral obligation to help others should be
fulfilledby givingto the National Health Service ratherthan to Oxfam
for reliefin the Third World. This seems to us to be the only way to
understand the growthof the welfarestate.
V. CONCLUSION
Metaphysicsis necessaryto determinethose minimumstandardsofjust
condutctwhich liberalsinsistare owed to all human beings. Politicsboth
enables us to appreciate these basic obligationsbybringingus into communicationwithour fellow-citizens,
and makes possible practicalagreements that go beyond this bare minimum by providing the extensive
public servicesnecessaryto the functioningof a well-orderedmodern
state. Liberaljustice needs to be both metaphysicaland political.
University
ofEast Anglia
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