Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
OP THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.
NEW
SERIES.
VOL.
VIII.
PUBLISHED BT
WILLIAMS
14,
HENRIETTA STREET,
AND NORGATE,
COVENT GARDEN, LONDON, W.C.
1908.
v\
Afi.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
I.
II.
BY
R.
LATTA
17
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
Ay
Br
G. E. MOORE....
VIII.
33
INDUCTIVE ENQUIRY.
78
BY SHADWORTH H. HODGSON
THE PROBLEM OF
95
IDEALISM.
BY H. WILDON CARR
VII.
115
LEVELS.
BY
139
160
ACTIVITY. A SYMPOSIUM BY
ALEXANDER, JAMES WARD, CARVSTH READ, AND
G. F. STOUT....
215
OF
MINUTES OF
TwENTr-NiNTH SESSION
ABSTRACT
THE
PROCEEDINGS
FOR
THE
258
FINANCIAL STATEMENT
261
KULJIS
262
1908-1909
SESSION,
265
CONCEPTION OF INFINITY.
By
R. B. HALDANE.
in
reality
realities.
and
to see to
My
method, and
more
to criticise their
it
only valuable
would do well
what are
purpose in this
is
paper
same
to pursue the
rule,
all,
or, if defined,
employed in a
special sense which excludes what the word means when used
in other connections.
An infinite series suggests, or ought to
an
infinite
God.
The former
series,
is finite,
and
this
whole
R.
HALDANK
B.
that law.
Finite,
the
in the sense
of ended, is in this
But there
nothing
final
and
is itself
It
is
is
one
included in an
be capable of
their
is
limit.
sought in vain.
true
entirely
this
is
of Quantity.
not a concrete thing.
It is a relation
Even in mathematics the category of quantity is
of
Quantity as such
or category.
And
is
and
and
to
speech
Quantity
itself
Quantity
is
little
more
closely.
increased or decreased.
This definition
The
is
tautologous, but
it
is
notwithstanding that
quantity possesses a discrete as well as a continuous aspect.
Quantitative magnitudes are not of two kinds, but inherently
qualitatively
identical.
This
is
so
and that
On
whichever side
we
take quantity
INFINITY.
we
indefinite extension.
extension to infinity.
true infinite.
It simply signifies that something greater or less
can be set up beyond any given stage. But this something beyond
is
and
of,
It
is
in contrast
therefore a
to,
the phase
The true
finite.
infinite
first
thing else
true
infinite
must be
may have an
the sum
such a sum
that
aspect
has
2
the
is
But although
limit.
whole
series, in its
aspect as a
numbers outside
that
representative of
series
it is
the
sum
number
such a summation
is
itself.
what
definite
of
or limit
one
self-
of an
members has no
of
it
contains the
number
has an
it
modo
this
self-contained
resemblance
infinity of
it is
which
inherent
From
The number
containedness.
its
qualitative relations.
aspect in
for instance, as
badge of finitude.
that no
It follows
self-contained.
self-contained, and
for the
From
relationship in
the failure of
"
is
inherent.
"
word
infinite
am
on that which
to
if
carefully
outsider enters on an
infinitesimal calculus he
confusion.
But
I will
is
A 2
R. B.
HALDANE.
both Americans
outsiders,
Dr. A. T. Bledsoe's
"The student
"
I will
begin with
"
Philosophy of Mathematics
from the lower
:
of mathematics, in passing
analysis, finds
of scientific truth.
On
the contrary, he
is
He
finds himself
surrounded by enigmas
Commenting on
this
passage, Professor
The
"
Buckingham, of
Differential and Integral
student," he declares,
"
the principles and axioms that have hitherto guided his studies
his convictions, and to receive in their stead a set
and sustained
ideas of truth.
When
and
another
infinitely
smaller
still,
and
so
on
an
infinite
but
it is
disheartened.
and made
INFINITY.
them beneath,
It is
It can be
of the calculus as a
the great names that first adopted them, and the indisposition
of mathematicians to depart from the simple ideas of the
ancients in reference to the attributes of quantity. They regard
it merely as inert, either fixed in value or subject only to such
changes as
may
in
efforts
to escape
Many
tencies,
there
is
no need
for
me
to
In 1684 Leibnitz
Buckingham.
full
the method
confine
first
of Infinitesimals.
First
"
:
We
demand
that
we may
myself
to
Professor
with an
infinite
number
which
R.
B.
HALDANE.
determine by the angles which they make with each other, the
curvature of the lines."
That these
infini-
presents
its
He goes on
plain from the next step which Leibnitz takes.
to treat the infinitesimals of his system as themselves composed
is
of
an
infinite
number
still,
and so on.
polygon of
an
infinite
number
made up
calculus by
quantities.
is
explanation would,
if
But,
true, completely
it
to a
As another
of the calculus.
and that
it
Infinitesimal Calculus
is
an exact
To
you
The
The
in
increase
and
or decrease of finite
INFINITY.
since
and he
into
fell
and dogmatic
Newton, whose
uncritical
results
of
the
have endeavoured
A Differential
(1)
of a function
work
with respect to
its
when
is
The
independent variable.
given.
function
is
given.
there
(2) If
hoof.
Nevertheless
is
that
we
equally
it
negligible
difference
mark
is
of the cloven
present
in
it.
which
with
concerned.
is
the discrete
It suggests
aspect
that
with which
we may
arithmetic
is
and
its
peculiar subject
it
is
of
HALDANE.
R. B.
continuous change.
Eate
is
elements are time and change, but where one uniform rate is
compared with another, without regard to absolute values, as
in dyjdx, the symbol of the differential coefficient, the idea of
time
may
be made
themselves
rates
so
the
that
the
of
ratio
simultaneous
which
will
characteristic,
of
course
the
be
rates
constant.
which
at
Just
the
because
of
this
may
quantities
be
quantities
of
or
increase,
their
of
and
increments,
therefore,
when
but also of
applied
to
their
the
rates
so-called
they pass through the zero point of their value, dyjdx is thus
a symbol which represents, not actual or separable minute
quantities in their relation to each other, but simultaneous
x and a function
cf x.
Apart from their
and
dx
are
non-existent
dy
they have
reality only as moments in a relationship which belongs to the
continuous aspect of quantity. Thus it is only as symbolising
rates of change in
may
of
curves
the differential
to its differential,
must be regarded
as
no difference by so much,
finite
relation
INFINITY.
What
is
present
is
in
we
beyond
taken as discrete.
we
"
"
It is
rid ourselves of
quantity,
assumed
Thus
to
is
instrument of
written
we
that
true
as
:*
are
it is
'
reject
stating
16
l&t
because
it
is
small,'
or
'
let
dt
be
an
an engineer."
I have dwelt thus long on the
illustration
from mathe-
with
it.
The controversy
as
to the
"
"
Encyclopaedia
deemed
to be the
* The CcUculm
is
10
R.
B.
HALDANE.
and
bound up with
on the
"
that time
Philosophy of Law."
After
It
is
the
I
his lectures
much
of the truth
American mathematicians
have quoted.
that there
is
whom
its
the province of
survey, and
modern
to set
logic to
up warning
embrace
posts for
men
of science
and
of metaphysicians alike.
One
make
here.
It is a
common
This
is
is
due
to the circum-
stance that the latter have, as a general rule, failed to take the
trouble to study the criticisms of the former.
The method
is
the same in both cases, the testing and modification of hypotheses by facts.
It is not the necessity for experiment, or the
results attained
The claim
is
It
is,
under scrutiny.
If,
then,
we must
mere endlessness
quantity on its discrete side, it follows that space and time must
be rejected as a field of study. For they can yield us no picture
INFINITY.
Nor do
11
these
is
implying the
"
which are
of relationships
"
Beyond
free
What
is
true
infinite
But
cannot be abstract.
It has, therefore,
something outside
and
it,
is
which
into
and
in
it.
When
real
Hume
David
followed
men began
to
this
mind
reconsider
itself as
their
position.
Kant's
doctrine
mind
itself.
Over the
significance
of
this doctrine a
great
On
it
12
When
that I do
object world
is
different quality.
and
HALDANE.
R. B.
still
measure
do not make
The moment
thought and
reflect
I perceive.
consists in large
but- these
the
me it is plain
What is my
depends on,
of sense or feeling
is
if
and
to be that thought
tions
is
isolation in
objects,
which
is
within
the
It is only
Much
what
is
13
thus that
it is
seems to be constituted.
The
which
it
arise,
of
distinguishes from
it
itself,
and
yet,
turning
upon
containing itself as a part of the whole.
It is as belonging to the object world that it constructs the
conception of itself, and of necessity constructs it, as that of
itself,
regards as
knowledge of
and the
itself
In
this it is
never object.
It is the condition of
consequently,
in
of apperception.
which
individual,
But
is
independently of the
through the
finite.
finite,
The
is
its
but realises
finite,
through
which
The true
finite
more than
no aspect existing
itself only in and
man.
universal side,
infinite is
on
individual.
The
this
yet,
man
is
is
thus an
infinite-finite.
as indispensible to
God
as
In
God
never realised
entire process.
as
statically
14
HALDANK.
R. B.
These investigations
as
the possibility of
real world
by a continuous
in
their
concrete
when we
reason.
As Mr. Bosauquet
were any
necessity,
i.e.,
If there
ment
it
of knowledge.
as
it
including
The
universe,
subordinate
including
more
relation to
than
it.
Strictly
power
talking of
it is,
falls
its
a reality which
we have no
within
it.
of
is
therefore,
explanation
than
it
speaking,
it is."
We
this entirety
reality
we must assume,
is
15
INFINITY.
It is of
we know,
know-
its
remain incomplete.
Yet, such finite selfledge should
consciousness presupposes the infinite which becomes real in it.
The two are separable, not as concrete individuals of reality,
The one
is
reducible to
its logical
and foundation.
Yet
this
is its
complement.
key
the
is
The
note, presupposi-
completion
unending
character and of which it is the summation.
incapable of
is
process to
which
it
gives
itself in
finite
It is
no
moments.
(4)
To ask
completed perception,
rest,
and
The category
of
self-consciousness
is
the
it
be
highest
16
category
we know.
If a completely
it
itself,
requires for
its
INFINITY.
purposive development,
This
object.
is
universe
is
The system of
systems which progressively realise them.
nature is the logical antithesis which reflection sets up between
the universality of abstract reflection, and the particulars which
are
the
essential
limit
confronting abstract
hand, nature
through
These
reflection.
as
is
On
are
could
the other
distinctions.
its
is
not ultimate.
and
not prior to
is
(7)
difficult
made and
The metaphysical
they
may
falls
within consciousness,
it.
however
application,
ment
and
of infinity,
if
confusion
even
in
is to
mathematical science.
17
PURPOSE.
II
By
IN
recent
R. LATTA.
epistemological
conception of purpose is
are frequently derived from
our intelligence"
is
"
it.
emphasised
as
principle
of
of
being transferred to
mental
life.
The methods
side of our
and
My
interpretation.
is
to
make an
and
viz.,
In the
same
volume
a project is defined by
Professor Baldwin as "a possible course of action conceived
Combining the two statements
simply, but not decided upon."
executed."
it is
of
said to differ
18
R.
LATTA.
This
description
of much
may
"
"
and
purpose
"
intention
"
mere
From
of meaning.
is
may
action, that
it is
In
logic,
it is
for
instance,
we may
quite
fairly
speak
of
the
remote end.
its
end may
be a merely
be immediate. Nor is it
It
than a vague,
realised
partly subconscious
present to his
may
It
disposition,
it is.
It
is
be no more
imperfectly
would be absurd
man makes
may
it
purposeless.
he has some
may
fairly
be
Indeed, one
a purpose.
9, 10.
19
PURPOSE.
by
"
this purpose
it is
And
defeat."
"
again,
when
'
'
'
teleological,'
All that I
matter of
mean
is
life
are as a
to maintain
or,
by
"
"
agency
in purpose.
spectator than
This external
conception of agency an unmeaning mystery.
way of conceiving agency from the standpoint of a bystander
.
trick, the
somewhat
difficult
to understand
Mr.
* Elementt
of Metaphysics,
t Studies in
Humanism,
I find
Schiller's objection to
p. 55, note.
p. 230.
B 2
20
LATTA.
R.
endeavour
is
his action.
And
in order to understand he
may
act or regulate
must be a spectator
To " enter into the
"
to understand
contention, then,
of them.
Mr.
Schiller's
essential
"
far as I understand
that
it,
Hume,
take
that
it)
Hume
then,
"
For
refused
this external
it
"
of conceiving
"
"
or a
conception of agency,"
spectator
we must
(I
way
point of a bystander
of a cause.
If,
either give
up the
scientific
unmeaning mystery."
But, assuming that a spectator
other beings to be
what
me
agents,
may
we may
"
"
agent
sense,
is
activities in
purposeless
or aimless,
We
do speak of some
when we mean
that
activities
their ends
as purposeless
are
vague or
21
PURPOSE.
But vagueness or
indefinite.
activity
is
the agent
is
On
tained that such activities are purely mechanical, and are, therefore,
i.e.,
name
is
this.
For
if
there
is
no
activity,
justified,
how
it
means
is
must mean,
sum
to
ultimately
in which
unintelligible.
an agent
But
in
the
second
sense,
that
regarded as
22
if
R.
not the
sole,
LATTA.
activity.
is
It
purposes.
may
agency
the whole universe, as
it is
for us
(i.e.,
is
we can
agents.
conscious agents
relative
to
It
is
degree of truth
this
sense,
is
is
no need
absolute
[That
"
practically,
be
may
point of
from the
view
the
case
"
"
pragmatist
from an
ultimately,
suffice.]
point of view,
We
much
cannot, however, in
less
my
must be
context
is
which cannot be
possible to
comprehend and
uninterpretable or inscrutable,
fully
and
if it is
meaning and
and the statement
it
must be
arbitrary,
* Studies in
Humanism,
a purpose
p. 86.
23
PURPOSE.
must
be unintelligible.
Now,
the context
if
is
we must
further ask,
appears to himself or
is
is it
it is
it
under-
stood by others
own
purpose.
supposition of an assertor or theorist that his purpose
pure, unprejudiced
investigation of truth,
when
is
the
in reality,
and
of the truth of
besets
us
We
all.
are
often
which
It is a snare
self-deceived,
and we cannot
own
our statements.
meaning
of
of a conscious agent,
may,
in certain circumstances, be a
many
less
important part
but they are not necessarily
cases they are a negligible element
more or
in the context.
do
about colour,
if
documents makes
bound
scientific
or historical
statements,
we
are
statements.
Similarly,
if
man
is
known
to be
of the
endeavouring
we must
24
R.
LATTA.
Every statement
meaning and value
rests
its
be fully expressed, the statement would be completely determined, both as to its meaning and its truth. And thus an
absolutely true statement is not a statement which is true
whole
made
explicit.
of the
scientific
may
we
"
use the term purpose."
sense
ends
of aspect.
and in general
there are ends.
it
may
Now
and unconscious,
is
is
function
the
mutual
fitting or the
a chemical combination
25
PURPOSE.
so as to maintain the unity of the whole.
are thus present in
every system,
in everything
Wherever there
wherever there
As
is
system there
a matter of
is
end.
is
purpose
a mere
possible.
Can we say
that
we
determination of
riot
is
fact,
We
organic beings.
many
system, there
is
which has
And
nature.
its
again we
a guide to the
is
attribute purpose
machines as wholes.
It
purposes or that
it
human
to
is
The parts
of the machine,
human
There
The
purpose, although
is,
however, an
we do regard them
obvious
rejoinder
to
as
my
purposive.
contention.
is
to
self-
We
conscious beings.
read purpose into unconscious things,
just as we call the sea cruel or the wind biting.
Now, language
is
undoubtedly
we
full of
metaphorical.
Every
on some analogy between the primary and
the metaphorical use of the term, and the analogy may have
metaphor
rests
may have a
It
may
be exceedingly fanciful
it
26
R.
LATTA.
Now
almost negligible.
is
if
the attribu-
purpose to organic and inorganic systems is metaphorical, the analogy on which the metaphor rests does not
tion
of
include consciousness as
common
We
characteristic.
do
We
Prestonpans,
"
wee
who thought
that
Our point
beastie."
view
of
is
"
"
it
can be made
On
meaning
and
explicit,
it
seems to
me
of purpose.
The
find
scientific
point
not expressly
exclude the possibility of regarding the universe as a system
in which every element has its function or its purpose in
of view excludes
it.
The
leave the
everything, not by
but by showing
and
making
But
to the whole.
It
it
does
endeavours to explain
its relations
to
other parts.
is
related to
B,
to C,
to
interrelated
is
conceived
an endless
effects
of
is,
as
series of
hypo-
of course,
27
PURPOSE.
if
they had
regards them
no real systematic
as without purpose.
relation, and,
consequently,
we
find
find in
separate
an isolated
Actual
part.
vary indefinitely in
exhibiting purpose.
I
think, be
The degree
of unity of
regarded as equivalent
to
is
This
is
end as the
and most,
if
not
all,
who
thinkers
this idea.
is
process
The process
in
its-
various stages, the successive unfolding of the means, is practically treated as a series or combination of particulars which
The end
regarded aa
You
relatively, if not entirely, independent of the means.
can, it is said, attain the same end by a variety of means.
ultimately culminates
in
the
end.
is
Now,
in proportion as
28
R.
from the
LATTA.
teleological standpoint.
standpoint
-an
at
system
tention
is
that
in
the case
of
is
only one means to any end. In all our desires and purposes
the end is present from the beginning. In so far as the means
are realised the end is realised we do not have to wait for the
:
means
is
The
means, is
often an element in the end
numerous instances
in
is
at
of
an object
itself.
is
the
desired
To take the
means
for the
attainment of the
to choose
between such
alternatives.
it
but I do
and
in all their
complex
relations.
Indeed,
when
we
say that
When
is
29
PURPOSE.
indefinite.
end.
alternative
of
means impels us
We
our end.
real,
to a
more
full
and exact
definition
we had
possible means.
be unmotived; we should be
Buridan's
ass.
say,
e.g.,
in the impossible
that
my
end
is
to
last resort
position of
arrive
at
general end
the town,
my
end
of arrival, say, in
if possible,
venient station, to
is
some town.
My end
is
to reach
make
enough comfort
to enable
me
may
sacrifice
some
But when
my
is
The unity
complex and
same extent identical with
ends are
less
its
is less
is
the special
complete.
Its
its ends.
The organs, as means, are
on
on
the
the
ends,
dependent
organic system as a whole ;
but the fact that there are separate organs, having more or less
still
(i.e.,
30
R.
LATTA.
conditions
it
as a distinguishable unity of
adaptation of
still
greater,
and
in
relative independence
is
inorganic
as great as
wherever there
is
is
a certain degree of
is
present in the
We
in language the
various
in
the
degrees
unity
recognise
various systems by using the term "purpose" mainly with
reference to systems of the highest unity, such as self-conscious
"
"
systems, and by substituting for it the term function as we
descend in the
"
unity
it
scale,
"
function
Although
of
purpose, I do not
mean
The
typical system
is
to suggest that
purpose in its
a self-conscious
systems,
of the universe
is
is
a self-conscious purpose.
But
it
seems
to
me
which are
and contin-
31
PURPOSE.
is
laid
attention
is
upon
selection as
we tend
to
relatively to
any ultimate
of scientific
it is
which system
is
dependent on
principles,
Similarly, all
human
selection
in the nature of
And
principles, inexplicable
of chaos.
The
it is
should have to suppose chaos selecting out of chaos, an unthinkLet us suppose, then, a systematic purposive
able hypothesis.
Even if its selection
self-consciousness confronting a chaos.
depends on
its
own
purposes,
it
must
32
PURPOSE.
selects.
They must be adapted to
say that their nature must be in
systematic relation to the nature of the selecting agent. And
if that is so, the supposed chaos is not a chaos, but a system
its
purposes, which
is
it
to
but rational
is,
by
33
By
MY object
Professor
"
PEOFESSOE JAMES'
III.
MOORE.
E.
Gr.
PEAGMATISM."
of the things
which
which
some
In Lecture
he has given the above name.*
to give an account of a theory, which he calls
VI he
"
professes
the pragmatist
"
In
truth.
all
me
to
to
make statements
and
my main
object
In the
first place,
he
is
"
verification
"
"
verified," or are
"
"
or
"
utility."
is
"
something
static
"
"
or
useful."
"
To what he
asserts
to
me
"
to
"
man-made products
view that
anxious to
an unascertain(p. 242).
what seem
is
mutable."
He
immutable."
some sense
Our
truth
some
to be
and
now propose
to point out
separately.
(I) Professor
James
is
plainly anxious
to
assert
some
Lectures on Philosophy.
34
MOORE.
G. E.
"
"
verification
or
"
And
utility."
there
admit.
is
them can be
reality."
reality
And
he
"
"
by the words
agreement
first briefly
and
"
"
And
do
But he
this.
in this proposition.
reality
is
that they
"
"
copy
some
what truth
all
that all of
is
And
many
certainly this
of
them are
would be worth
The very
so.
discussing.
But even
we
cannot."
words
all.
which
Professor
(p.
and
And what
four
not
this, I think, is
first
the following.
we can
is
word
James
verify.
does this
"
"
verify
uses,
as
False ideas
mean
Let
he
himself
"
PROFESSOR JAMES'
'
PRAGMATISM.
35
this
by
of his
words
is
that all
we can verify are true. No one would use them who did not
mean this. Apparently, therefore, Professor James means to
assert not merely that we can verify all our true ideas but
And so,
also that all the ideas, which we can verify, are true.
He seems to mean not merely
too, with utility or usefulness.
;
that
all
but that
all
and
"
"
usefulness
as
if
all
expedient thinking
so long as to believe
is to say,
every idea,
it is
"
is
is
the expedient
"
Or again
is true.
"
:
which
is
An
'
idea
is
"
(p. 75).
is,
that
'
true
That
while
it
is so, true.
James means
to assert
not
merely that all true ideas are useful, but also that all useful
ideas are true.
wishes to assert
wishes to assert,
all
it
He
would seem
That we can verify all those of our ideas, which are true.
(2) That all those among our ideas, which we can verify,
(1)
are true.
(3)
That
(4) That
all
all
mean
propose
first to
Very
consider.
He
likely he wishes to
C 2
36
G. E.
MOORE.
assert
"
true ") which belong to
(beside that of being properly called
our true ideas and to none but true ideas. But this obviously
cannot be true, unless all these four propositions are true. And
all
therefore
we may
as well consider
them
first.
find out
which idea
is
Very
often, indeed, I
may
For instance,
may
and some-
may believe
may have
it.
But
have verified
my
correspondent's idea.
suppose there
is
no copy
nor any
suppose there is no
of
it,
is
nearly always.
possible
means
I think
is
we may
Certainly
of verification,
a time at
it
At
a suit.
among
37
they had or had not the seven of diamonds, or the five of spades.
And, after the cards have been shuffled, a dispute will sometimes
arise as to
or not.
may
memory
of both,
untrustworthy.
on such a point,
And,
may
it
known
to be
may
be well
This
much
is
certain.
This also
is
certain.
And
it
is
certain that
one
two ideas
But can they always
Sometimes, no doubt, they can, even
verify either of them ?
after the cards have been shuffled. There may have been a fifth
or other of these
is true.
Or the
players
may
And,
in such a case, is
always possible to verify the true idea ? Perhaps, theoretiTheoretically, I suppose, the
cally, it may be still possible.
it
investigation.
may
remain even
same card has been repeatedly used in many subsequent games. But suppose the same question arises again, a
week after the original game was played. Did you, or did you
after the
not, last
of
38
G.
hand
The question
Is
it
still
suppose,
it
be
may
any man
to verify
man
am
thesis I
But even
it is
plain that,
this, I
think, is
humanly and
practi-
all
is
we can not
verify
that
is
of
an
this
idea,
considering
Theoretically, I
No
particular occasion.
which some
idea
possible.
surely
In
been destroyed.
will often
it
cally speaking,
pack
of cards has
verify either
still
And
very doubtful.
original
to
possible
lias
MOORE.
E.
we never have a
to say, which we
cannot verify after the idea has occurred. And with regard to
this hypothesis, it seems to me quite plain that very often
we have two
indeed
true
and yet
ideas,
it
is
is
certainly
no longer possible
and never
It
no
seems
man
to
And,
But
so far, I
have given
only comparatively
plain that, in
the same sense, historians are very frequently occupied with
true ideas, which it is doubtful whether they can verify. One
trivial instances.
it
is
that
it
did not
their idea.
and another
happen
Is
it
But
certain
is
it
case of an
which
to be settled
by
immense number
of events,
39
Yet it may be
verify either the one hypothesis or the other.
certain that either the events in question did happen or did
not.
we have a
large
number
of
to
cases
which
it is
them
where
it
men
will
it
surely
to verify every
But
one of them.
And
will.
the theory
has
all
probability against
And
it.
far
With
we can
verify
own
lives
many
of
we have
both the idea that the event did happen arid also the idea that
did not, when it is certain that one or other of these ideas is
it
true.
And
many
my
certain that
If,
is
we can
which
to
many
it
is
verify,
it.
But
it
is,
I think, certainly
not only in the case of ideas, with regard to the past, that
doubtful whether we can verify all the true ideas we have.
the case of
by
as seems certain,
it
purpose.
it is
In
40
G.
we
it is,
E.
MOORE.
be able to verify
shall ever
most
But
we
is
men have
those
all
is
it
either
that,
Euclidean or
is
that
verified
observations.
by
will be.
And
is
though
it
would be rash
to say that
we
too,
that the
hypothesis
it
it
actual space,"
been held,
It has
is not.
and where
meant by "our
whatever be
it is
no
man
ever
we
positively that
hypothesis.
shall
that
we
Many men
are immortal.
And
here
we have
cases
where
it
is
And
seems to
me
able
to
verify
that
it is true.
day be able
the
is
a view, which
true
hypothesis.
a false one
we
shall.
are not.
And
But
it
we
we
Is
we
it
do not say
shall
some
are immortal or
seems to
me
doubtful
seems to
is
whether we
it
never shall be
me
But
there
we
PROFESSOR JAMES'
When,
are those
we can
tells
us that
assimilate, validate,
verify.
41
PRAGMATISM."
James
therefore, Professor
that
"
we
"
True ideas
corroborate and
They imply,
it.
that whenever a
therefore,
man wonders
verify
it.
number
But
it
this,
and an immense
two ideas
is
true.
If
But
On
the contrary,
large
number
either of the
it
of such cases
two
any obvious
ideas.
no man ever
There
is,
do not know.
objection to
what he
says,
whether
to
what he means or
not.
There
is
we can verify.
But to another part
"
serious objection.
ideas which
we can
Here, I think,
verify are true.
true, I see
no
42
G. E.
MOORE.
we have
verified
case that
we may
is
But
not true.
it
This
is all
propositions,
(1)
namely
first
two
That no ideas
which we
can verify.
(2)
The
That
first
all
seems to
certainly untrue
me
we can
extremely doubtful
in fact, almost
in
its
if
to say that
we can
verify an idea
came
to the
talks about
that
think, really
is,
verification
"
thinks
"
PKOFESSOR JAMES
truth
is
what
"
works,"
is
"
useful," is
is this
That
(3)
all
then
is it
"
"
to
expedient,"
pays."
We
consider.
It
have to
43
PRAGMATISM.
which are
true,
except those
wish to introduce
"
have an unconLecture VI, he attacks the view that truths
And
is it
he says,
constantly be repeating the truth
because of its eternal claim on recognition ?
or
"
Must
'
in
'
sometimes irrelevant
and day on
have them ?
my
or
apology
"
It is quite evident,"
acknowledge
truth,
so
tremendously conditional.
What
"
is
Professor
expedient
(pp.
James says
231
232).
in this passage
seems to
me
so
is
It is clear, that
is
is,
that,
useful, there
44
G.
E.
MOORE.
This
quite
all,
is
It
it
would not be
useful,
all, if
but
not
is
many
more.
With regard
most
It
of
is,
would not be
useful, are
would.
sense in which
it is
most
at
useful
it
it
is
Is this so
Are
all
our
Professor James,
ever so
as 2
it
so clear that
times,
all
we
see,
would be
positively
in
the way.
And
this
seems
to
be
times
when they
way
me
It seems
to be perfectly clear that this does sometimes
and not sometimes only, but very commonly.
The
occur
to
cases in
are,
number.
Is
it
occur, at times
when
make up
men
45
their
and,
if
this is so, then, in one sense of the words, it is plainly not true
that
all,
or nearly
For
the words.
if
all,
In one
2= 4
sense of
on one day,
on the next
it
another.
= 4,
and
one only.
And
in asking
whether
all
plainly not true that all our true ideas are useful.
is,
It is
useful, whenever it
is
occurs.
sense in which
it
is
But there
occurs.
it
But
is
this,
It
seems to
me
many
many
immense number
person,
of true ideas,
no doubt,
to be an
to
him or
number
to
of dots
to
one
46
G.
and arrive
MOORE.
E.
number
and
yet, perhaps,
me
Just as clear as
it
is
that
Plainly
it
employment may
men
true that
is
sometimes useful to be
idle,
and one
idle
But surely it is
when their time would
which
as
it is
blemishes
I cannot see
my way
once,
to
me
deny that
this is so
and
my way
seems
to
much
many
as on one occasion.
It
occur.
And
if
this be so, then it is plainly not true that all our true ideas are
These seem to
me
all.
to be the
saw
all
It is
times.
And
it
to the
clear,
we
useful,
seemed almost
every time
when they
which
it is
actually occur.
But
useful,
47
when they
are not, it
ideas,
some
If
an
to
man
of
sometimes occur
useful, does
and
irrelevant
the way,
in
the
way
when
It
when
it
is
why
at a time
it
to
is
irrelevant and in
doubt that
this does
not true that none of our ideas are true, except those
is
which are
useful.
the proposition that all those among our ideas, which are
That we never have a useful idea, which is
useful, are true ?
not true
me
assertion should
useful, is true
And
mean
it
It
false.
is,
is
is
not true,
doubt that
to
The
at
is
any time
ever useful.
this assertion is
commonly held
that
it is
some-
instance,
Such a
false idea is
clear that
may
it is
sometimes
given
it,
And
the question
whether
it
is
who
actually believe in
useful on
the whole
it.
will
hat
such a
false idea is
48
G.
MOORE.
E.
idea, not
false
not very
is
ever
difficult to
and
plainly useful
is
produced by deception,
useful, not merely on the whole, but to the person who has
man often thinks that his watch is right, when,
it as well.
in fact,
his
is
it
slow,
And
train.
and his
false idea
him
cause
may
to miss
in
is
Do
train.
it
And
when
right
which
is
wrong.
show that
sufficient to
ours,
it
is
it
ever useful,
is
an
is
And
at
times.
many
It
man
to catch his
me
perfectly
to think his
watch
idea,
men
is
seems to
It
him
for
seems to
me
very
difficult to
be sure
that the belief in an eternal hell has not been often useful to
still,
and
we
beliefs,
But there
true, have,
to
is,
I think, very
beliefs, of
and
And I do not
others, again, that they are neither.
are justified in giving them as certain instances of
useful.
seems
These
Some men
troversy.
think
it
is
death,
difficult to
not
happy
God
life after
is
nevertheless,
me
though not
and this view
beliefs,
we have
some
false
beliefs,
Are we
useful.
Is
it
in
justified
may
many men,
sometimes
it
been useful to
Is
49
it
is
not, nevertheless, be
untrue
useful
many men ?
to
at least
useful.
all
and almost certainly false that all our useful ideas are true.
But I have only urged what seem to me to be the most
obvious objections to these two statements I have not tried
;
objections by
arguments, and
have omitted elaborate argument, partly because of a reason
which I now wish to state. The fact is, I am not at all sure
to
these
sustain
elaborate
that Professor
are,
either to assert or to
some
of the critics of
He
complains that
to read
any
meanings
Pragmatists and, perhaps, he would say that this is the case
I certainly hope he
I certainly hope that he would.
here.
would say that these statements, to which I have objected,
but the
silliest
of possible
are
silly.
we can
For
verify
it
all
does seem to
me
silly,
for if
50
G.
a view to be
silly,
when
MOORE.
E.
it
is
him, he
that he
is
not angry
he
may
he
is not,
and
yet we may be
that he really
that he never
is
angry.
He may
meant anything
to our discredit
by what he
said
and yet
is
it
may
put before him in other words than his own, that he never
meant or implied any such thing, and yet it may be
either
possible
to judge,
from what he
very view,
and
important.
Certainly he
may
quite
were possible
very
will
And
for a philosopher to
do
this,
often
Unless
there would be
all
is
so,
and
all
our
do not mean
merely that his words imply them. A man's words may often
imply a thing, when he himself is in no way, however vaguely,
"
PROFESSOR JAMES'
PRAGMATISM."
51
and
all
Professor James.
to
him and
he
is
so with
seem interesting
is
some reasons
James
Professor
to
certainly wishes
which
mind
this
is
And
them.
wish now
to
And
utility.
is
the connec-
not mean
he mean
And,
first of all,
and even
occur.
that most of
them are
useful,
moreover, that
by
And
number
them
to us,
that true
were
of
we consider the
we shall find that
if
us,
may
insist
upon
this
admitted commonplace ?
this,
D 2
and
52
G. E.
MOORE.
me
He must
meant.
mind.
But,
if so,
what more
that he does
way
"
of our thinking
"
(p.
222).
of course
for
we have something
What is expedient in
And what exactly does
this
mean
else that
he might mean.
he means to
It
seems
to
say, is true.
mean
that an
which
not true,
is
But
will
(Professor
James seems
when it
come a time,
to prophesy)
if it is
If it
occurs again and again over a long enough period, there will at
last, if it is not true, come a time when it will (for once
at least)
fail to
be useful
that Professor
to
mean
that,
be expedient.
positively to
And
this is all
mean.
He
seems-
some day
"
PROFESSOR JAMBS'
cease to be expedient.
this is not true ; since
And
it is
it is
very
very
am
be sure that
difficult to
difficult to
53
PRAGMATISM."
prophesy as to what
may happen
But in the meantime (Professor
prophesy will coine true.
James seems to admit) ideas, which are not true, may, for an
And is it
indefinitely long time, again and again be expedient.
conceivable that a theory, which admits this, is all that he has
meant
to assert
Is
it
merely the
belief that,
"
of course" he says, as if
But I think it is quite plain that this is not all that he has
meant. This may be one thing which he is anxious to assert, but
it certainly does not explain the whole of his interest in his
theory of truth.
in fact, there is quite a different theory
And,
plainly to
"
James
says,
places.
which he seems
When
Professor
which are expedient only for a short run, are very often not true.
But in what he says elsewhere he asserts the very opposite of
He
this.
believe
it is
be true, so long as
This
useful in the long run
belief will
it
theory
it
is
is
true
"
(p. 75).
is
useful,
"
so long as to
That
even
certainly quite
is to say,
if it
is
a different
not
But perhaps
is
this is
to
one
man
is
if
they are
some
54
G.
E.
MOORE.
false
ideas
and
but
it is difficult
it is
to prove
if it
and,
be important. And it
which show, with certainty, that
I think,
it is false.
it,
were
true, it
would,
instances
to find
difficult
is
I believe that
it is
some
not true.
eternal hell
belief
is
an instance.
long time, useful, and that yet it is false. But it is, perhaps,
arguable that it never has been useful and many people, on
;
still
It cannot,
an instance
of a belief,
which
useful.
is
But whether
this
expedient for
true,
be true or false
to assert
Can
it
can
it
be
all
constitu te the
He
following reason.
to tell
true
to tell us, that is to say, not merely of some property
which belongs to all our true ideas nor yet merely of some
property which belongs to none but true ideas but of some
;
and he adds
"
as falsity
their disagreement."
And he explains that he is going to tell
"
us what property it is that is meant by these words agreement
with reality." So again in the next passage which I quoted
:
"
True
ideas,"
he says
"
are
those
we
cannot."
that
we can
assimilate,
possibly speak
way, who
this
had not in
55
his
head the
all
Our account
truth
of
"
he says
"
218)
(p.
is
an account of
this quality in
common
this
in
this quality
be
so,
intending to
not true.
tell
that of
at
And
But now
paying."
let
all,
not shared
James
"
"
is
common
least
Only
all
he says,
us suppose that he means
this property,
"
paying," not
by
paying once at least," but, according to the
"
"
"
alternations he suggests, paying in the long run or paying
1
whether the
opposite.
latter does
But even
it
but
still
it
is
difficult to
prove the
if
we granted
is
Can
"
or repeatedly for
some time
Surely
it is
plain
short,
December
21st,
1907
and
me
well and
56
MOORE.
G. K.
me
helps
to find
But the
it.
book
is
there at
therefore,
we supposed
in
"
period
"
or
Professor
James
mean
to
that
"
paying
"
To sum up then
I
think there
is
"
"
"
true.
But Professor
"
that
is
interpretation of this
least
And
all
ideas which
"
pay
And
here
it
"
"
"
paying
"
if
it
some time,
"
pay
is
if
all ideas
which pay
for
some time
at least once."
This, I think,
Professor
James'
is
"
PROFESSOR JAMBS'
that truth
what
is
"
mind
mainly
ideas
property
that
is
false
and
ones,
He
to
be
And
the
objection
that,
is,
"
paying in the long run," or paying for some
seems certain that none of these properties will
at least once,"
it
As
regards the
first,
is
from
of "paying."
it
"
least once," or
it
He seems
useful."
to
57
whatever we
time,"
and
ideas
"
is
true
all
it
pays,"
mind the
PRAGMATISM."
"
works,"
interested in
"
all
that of
it satisfies
"
pay at
"
paying
neither
least once,"
nor yet that every idea which pays at least once, is true. On
the contrary, many true ideas never pay at all
and many
;
ideas,
And
do pay on at
true,
least
one occasion.
"
"
and
paying in the long run
for
some
even
if
none
but
these
do
to
time,"
paying
belong
true ideas (and even this seems very doubtful), they certainly
as regards
the others,
"
them
neither of
to att
belong
them
them
neither of
may
as
we have
cannot, therefore, pay either in the long run or for some time.
me
in
of the ideas
true.
pay
This seems to
what he
meant
says.
But
is it
tell
ones
and, moreover,
it
us of no property
to none but true
and
58
G.
MOORE.
E.
have worn, had he merely asserted this this quite clearly, and
nothing but this, while admitting openly that many true ideas
do not pay, and that many, which do pay, are not true
And,
mean two
is
only
him
left for
to
all
And
There
the
is
as to the
first, it
may
be true
but
it
may
also be doubted,
for
is
it
not
may
That, in short, even though they are not true, they nevertheless
will be useful, not only for a time, but in the long
run
And
as for the assertion that all ideas, which pay for a considerable
is
Whether
still.
certain religious ideas will or will not be useful in the long run,
seems
it
for
doubt that
difficult to
a considerable time.
by
far the
James
to
that this
is
and
to
me
points, in
notice.
seem
to
this
head, that
wish
to
59
whether
first place,
we have
is
it
true ideas are useful, and those which are not true,
never.
a matter of fact,
it is
property of utility
And
true ideas.
if,
not
so.
more than
asserts something
the
is
do possess
it,
or
seen, he also
we have
But, as
this
many
as I have urged,
if,
The
many
which
ideas,
objections already
considered are, then, sufficient to overthrow this further asserIf there are
tion also.
which are
or if any,
any true
ideas,
that utility
common.
which
is
common
what property it is
none but true ones,
is
still
The empirical
to seek.
another and
to
more
objections,
this further
There
it.
is sufficient to
useful.
refute
it.
But
it
also
idea,
which was
properties
it
useful,
would be
as
if
this
true,
There can, I
and there
is
an independent and
still
60
MOORE.
G. E.
more
Even
true (as
it is
if
were
it
not) that all our true ideas and none but true ideas
are, as a
exists,
of
diamonds
in
hand
my
And we
my
is
hand.
With regard
to
some kinds
"
"
Professor
ideas
James
exists
to
were to
owing
done without
it,
"
what he seems
it
to hold about
the
He
And
have.
all events, it
seems
plain that they cannot be true, unless they have the property
that
to
exist,
really
even
if
I alone existed
would not be
And
.says
in
might be useful
to
me,
true.
there
upon which
I wish to remark.
We
61
some length
of
But
true.
is
time,
this
is
not
that
all
it
by
He
profitable for
when they
He
belief,
at
some
of the
a time
different times,
times at which
may
be true
I think there is
others.
finally occur at
it
occurs,
useful at
period
its
some time, or
utility
comes and
It
goes.
times at times
idea
those
is
when
it is
not
when
it
is
not.
when
but
when
And
go, as
it
it
it is useful,
and some-
and not
true, at
James
truth and
is the useful
naturally seems
not to be overlooking this obvious fact, but to be suggesting
that truth is a property which comes and goes in the same
"
"
It is, in this way, I think, that the
instrumental
way.
view of truth is connected with the view that truth is
"mutable."
Professor
James
does, I think,
62
is
G.
MOORE.
E.
this sense
namely, that one and the same
be true at some of the times at which it occurs, and
mutable in just
idea
may
is
consider.
(II) Professor
is
James seems
And by
mutable.
idea which,
when
this
may
is
He
truth
"
it
"
true,
seems
may, when
it
to hold that
another.
That
least, will
be, for I
it
means
to
all
he seems to
none
if
He
them,
speaks,
of
all of
in this respect.
"
209),
(p.
"
Relations
among
beliefs are
When
absolute or unconditional.
make
3,
and
so
on
and
make
2,
that 2 and 1
when the
that
'
The
'
'
mental
objects.
'
eternal
'
character.
If
63
you can
'
white
'
a concrete
find
'
'
or
'
or an
grey
everlastingly apply to
it."
'
that
thing anywhere
is
one
'
or
hold that there are true ideas, which once true, are always
true.
Perhaps, then, he does not hold that all true ideas are
mutable.
least that
many
me
proposition seems to
that there
idea that,
if
to be disputable.
a sense in which
is
it
it
which
sense in which
tained that
to
me
to
this is
mean
me
me
it
is
if
truths are
all
to
deny
even in
it,
constantly to speak as
truths are immutable.
seems to
seems to
does occur.
it
in
sense
It
this
is
which
is
even
once true,
at
And
this sense.
He
seems to
me
if
And
to be the plainest
such language.
first of all,
And,
there
is
"
which
He
with him.
mutable
that
it is
it
now.
And
this
seems to
me
to
in the future
now
better.
many
There
is
much misery
in the world
now
and
I think
64
G.
it is
E.
MOORE.
is
much
less.
some things have properties at one time which they do not have
at other times, seems to
me
And
certainly true.
so far, there-
fact, I
him.
But
merely
this,
choose this
think
it
when he
way
is
quite
us, is
ideas,
Universe.
No
mean
one would
And
does not
mutable.
is
of expressing himself
he
that
plain
those of our
Other
change, even
if
perty.
And
some
respects.
my mind
in
exist in it at another.
at one
At one moment
moment
it is
in
my mind
else's
am
in another.
sometimes think of
in connection with
it
set.
some
respects.
They
and at one time they stand in a given relation to
other things or ideas, to which at another time they do not
stand in that relation. In this sense, any given idea may
come and go
another time.
and
is
it
all this
mutable
that some
But obviously
things change.
it
65
It
does not seem to follow that because ideas, and other things,
change some of their properties, they necessarily change that
one which
we
"
truth."
It does not
namely,
follow that a given idea, which has the property of truth at one
time, ever exists at any other time without having that pro-
are considering
And
is so.
And
this is
it
still
is
what
want now
to consider.
is
Is it
true then,,
Is
?
it
the
That
it
In order to answer
it
exists
this
We
a given
and
constantly speak as
think
it
cannot be denied
true.
It is true
now,
might
say, that I
true.
It
if
is
am
true
in
a perfectly
is
undeniably
room but
in this
now
that
men
are
expression,
be
We
con-
66
G.
MOOUE.
E.
one time
is
And
to use them.
hence, I
sense, it is
think,
may
it
is
what
it
certainly legitimate
that, in
which we
is
use
that these
is,
true at
is
we must admit
And
these expressions.
and
am
in this room,
We
true.
is
true
say this
might
any ordinary book
we
the
now
but to-morrow
it
will not be
In
indeed, in
are
at
subject
expressly discussed such expressions do, I think, constantly
And we should pass them, without any objection.
occur.
We
We
an idea
sense,
The question
sense
What
is
expressions stand
seems to
It
be true
may
is
In what
me
we
are not
"
"
idea
merely talking of facts, but of true ideas, that the
which we truly say to be true at one time and false at another,
is
And we
"
would not
be
The words
"
"
time,
and
words
same
"
false
at another
of certain of our
"
ideas
ideas
"
:
of
true at another.
But
is it
another
truth
mutable
one, I
is
same words
false at
67
to
and
Can
this
could
ideas,
And
false.
this is
am
is
another.
And
mere
same
and
false at
may
idea that
and
if I
were
to use the
same words
my
my
use of
E 2
68
MOOKE.
G. E.
And
we
its
primary
we do mean something
We always mean (among
plain that
use
it.
by
it
is
by
each time
it,
me
we
on one occasion
of it
"
different
whenever
seems to
different fact
in general,
sense, it
we
is always a
on another, we express
it
use
it.
And
similarly with
Napoleon
words something different
use them now. He would have meant that Napoleon's death
occurred at a time previous to his use of those words and this
;
true.
But
is
nothing to
if he had meant
by them what I mean now, his idea
would not have been as true then as mine is now. And so, if
show that
I say
"
to-morrow.
"
if
to-morrow
used them
"
is
obviously
a different day,
them,
is it
occasion
so certain that
ever changes
from true to
me to-morrow the
words " I am in
the
by
to occur to
express
this idea would not be
as
which
is true.
Part of
If
were
there
I
now
true
false
then as
what
It
is
a phrase
room
in that
then, as
it is
should
last night."
And
now.
is
69
"
And
this part
was
would be as true
if
were to
it
true at another
when
it
occurs,
And
glance
know
"
as having an
character
and needing
as
"
"
"
eternal,"
"
absolute,"
"
being
perceptually
no sense-verification."
uncon-
obvious
Just
at
as
we
if
if
is
we mean by an
idea, not
same
mere
words, but the kind of idea which words express, any idea,
which is true at one time when it occurs, would be true at any
time when
it
is
an
it
idea,
to occur
and that this is so, even though
which refers to facts which are mutable. My
were
a truth now, would not have expressed one if I had used them
But if we
yesterday, and will not, if I use them to-morrow.
This seems
70
G.
me
to
which
to
110
be
E.
MOORE.
James means
to false.
And
in.
1 think
to
and
And
false at another..
it
if
at one time
true
false
and at another
how
far does he
mean
same
But he
false.
certainly
him
idea,
And
Does he
hold that the idea that Julius Caesar was murdered in the
tries to tell
point I want to
man-made
make about
this
view
"
made
"
existence.
ways
In
many
ways
in
an unascertain-
And
the only
may
are instances of
to
products."
gives of the
"
how
"our truths
which our
of these ways, it
beliefs
would seem,
come
"
are
into
false beliefs
;
and I take
it
Professor
beliefs, I
"
PROFESSOR JAMES'
PRAGMATISM."
the
be
illustrated
71
by
these
all
of a true belief
or other
way
which we may truly say This man would not have had just
that belief, had not some man previously had such and such
in
instances of
ways
in
in
all.
his
But
interests or volitions.
James seems
Professor
belief
seem
or
to be the case in
that one man's beliefs often depend upon the previous experi-
And, as
I say, the
is
is sufficient to illustrate
And
as regards this
beliefs, true
far as I
that almost
general thesis
in
all
It is a
our
it will,
commonplace, which, so
is
to be
it
really are
And
man-made.
this
is
all
all, if
not quite
all,
But
is
means
to insist
commonplace
upon
It
man-made
Is
it
this undeniable,
seems
to
me
is
not
all
that he means.
follows.
And
think
it
72
G. E.
that
we not
them
true.
only
At
MOORE.
least as
we make
our true
unless he meant
beliefs,
ditions.
beliefs,
but also that their truth, depended upon human conThis, it seems to me, is one consequence which
Professor
James means us
to
human
But does
place
our true
conditions.
our true
beliefs,
does
it
follow that
In one
(as
sense,
we may
it follows that, in
upon human
had never
must
its
If the
truth.
must, in a sense,
same degree
is
existence depends.
its
in
which
But
obvious.
is
would be suggested
its
and therefore
its
truth
upon them.
existence depends
to us
belief
meant?
by telling us that we
This
make our
beliefs
true?
It
it
is
It
this belief.
may
it is not.
And
may
may have
have
"
it,
and
my
my
it,
volitions.
It
may
my
interests
existed.
true, unless
And
upon any
this belief
may
It will be true,
be true.
if it
73
But,
it is
had made
true, I
it
true
Would anyone
say that
Plainly no one
making
would. We should say that I had a hand in making it true, if
and only if I had a hand in making the rainfall. In every case
I had had any
in
we
hand
at all in
it
true
and only
if
which, in
Surely this
to-morrow.
belief
is
plain.
And
certainly
may
it
its
"
"
makiug
existence
this
upon what
which contributed
to
making
they
may
be)
rise.
"
by making a belief true," we mean
something quite different from what Professor James means by
"
"
that belief.
Conditions which have a hand in
making
making
it
tainly this
the
belief,
belief.
may
(it
have no hand at
may
how we use
we had made a belief
making
that
true
it
all in
making
hand
it.
in
Cer-
We
is
the words.
James mean ? Does he mean merely the accepted commonplace that we make our true beliefs, in the sense that almost
all of them depend for their existence on what has been preOr does he mean also that we
viously in some human mind ?
make t)iem true that their truth also depends on what has
been previously in some
human mind
74
G. E.
MOORE.
I cannot help thinking that he has the latter, and not only
the former, in his mind. But, then, what does this involve ?
it
purpose,
causing one
hand
in
fall,
truth-making
mean
own
beliefs,
my
should
of
it
making
whenever I cause
should
mean
true.
actually
it
"
"
If his instances of
rise,
my
more,
about
the past, I must have had a hand in making this true. And if
so, then certainly I must have had a hand in causing the
James write
my
this book.
father's birth, in
making
who made
Alps rise,
and others
seem
And
to be involved.
it
these
is
me
We
certainly do
indeed, a great
make some
many
power
But
which are
can see no
"
make
true
"
any
And certainly
nearly all those of their beliefs which are true.
to give for
James
seems
the only reason which Professor
namely, that the existence of almost all their
depends on them seems to be no reason for it
believing this
beliefs
"
"
make true
For unquestionably a man does not
and,
nearly every belief whose existence depends on him
at
all.
the
so,
question which of
men do "make
true,"
their
must he
75
beliefs
settled
siderations.
me
in
to be
pragmatist theory of
seems to
It
me
that,
his
false;
and
wish to
false.
That most
of
and that
at
another
and a falsehood
that they
may
at another.
of most,
if
not
all, of
our
beliefs, true as
we do
it
was.
That the truth, and not merely the existence, of some of our
That we really do make some
beliefs, does depend upon us.
true
"
all
of these alterations.
To
And
all
they seem
A certain
to
me
to be generally
no objection
to offer.
admitted commonplaces.
76
G. E.
And
reality of time.
is
object
MOORE.
meant
But
to assert.
do not
think
that
anyone, fairly
what he has in
it
his
me we may
seems to
mind, wrapped
distinguish that
in
up
more or
less
That
utility is
which
are useful,
"
"
and
"
all
beliefs,
are
true
useful, are
by
"
utility
utility on at least one
being sometimes meant
"
occasion," sometimes
utility in the long run," sometimes
utility for
That
all beliefs
for
some length
of
time
have
are true.
That
in
common
property which
that, therefore, if
it
were useful to
that, if
it
were
me
would be
to believe
true,
not useful to
if
even
if
me
to
he did.
which we
That the
beliefs,
there
may
be some exceptions.
extent on us, then also the truth of that belief depends to some
in the sense in
the existence of
me, then,
if
my
which
belief that a
this belief is
77
when
shower will
true, I
making the shower fall that, therefore, men must have had
a hand in making to exist almost every fact which they ever
:
believe to exist.
78
IV.
ENQUIEY.
By
I.
Preliminary.
Elements.
of
Joy
A. CALDECOTT.
III.
Conclusion.
THIS
corroboration of
sets
the value
quantity in
At
its
of
the
data.f
London, 1846.
other
t The distribution of the cases is as follows
Yorkshire, ten
northern counties, four ; London and neighbourhood, three
Midlands,
four ; South-west, three Cornwall, three Wales, two Scotland, three
Ireland, two. As to station* in life, thirteen belonged to the employer
class, all in a small way of business
amongst the others were a printer,
three weavers, a china factory worker, a mason, a carpenter, a baker, a
:
campaigns).
AN INDUCTIVE ENQUIRY.
79
be there,
if
men
in the
On
"
circa
1750,
reports
Passions are
animal
and
"
spirits are
equivalent to
"
ment
"
more
violent,
own command
use
then
to
be that the
"
:
the
custom
sentiment
common
less in its
general
the
lies in its
undoubted tendency
of every intensity,
it
to suggest refine-
as sentiments
may
be
to prefix
an
it
comes.
sentiment,
we
80
CALDECOTT.
A.
whom
Being before
reference to
Newman
ledge,"
"
knowledge
"
has said,
is
the root of
as fact of
is
core, the
is
new
must seek
religious
this
"
Self-know-
real
all
of self-knowledge.
quality
"
specific feature.
its
is
(relief) till
it,
consolation
I find
it
is
"
no
exquisite,"
unattainable
says one.
Fear
frequently
misery
a constituent
of self-reproach here
More prominent
"
is
the
I found
holiness,
old,
had
it
been in
my
is
neither repining
woe
of defiance
the depth of
the
lies
soul,
be
it
so,
he
is
It
should be added
that the group contains a few cases in which the emotion above
is
God and go
experience was
"
The emotion
to
effective desire
first
Heaven";
81
a Somersetshire
was
"
Yorkshire
to
do the will
h'rst
printer's
delight in God."
of
self-distress is recorded as
awakening, as
distress
They
escape.
all
find
it
indispensable
to
make a
great
transfer:
is
they assign
replace
This decision
is
when
arrived at
it
judgment of condemnation as to
and become the dominant attitude towards them.
so countervail the
at
least,
by
all
its
"
"
My
(This
is
in
striking contrast
my
with
the
mode
assertion of
by
whole
Me
of
Carlyle's
himself as a
stood up in native
82
A.
CALDECOTT.
and defiance
"
its
indignation
of opposing forces.)
The evidence
not in
responding to a love
had entered
of love
to
their experience.
life it
sufficient of the
advance of their
Nearly
all of
religious life to
them record
We
emotion.
then we watch
"
see the
it
as
it
dominance
and
on their character in
indulgence in
profanity,
this respect
and the
like,
are specified.
ance of
evil, so far
it
namely,
and inner selves as judged
83
by the exalted standard which had come into their minds. Fear
quite overcome, and Anxiety Anger and Pride are subdued in
is
"
when
self-will,
which, like dry tinder, were formerly ready to catch Hre at any
provocation, I found them not but, on the contrary, I found
;
were
will
ill
there;
peace
had
some
for
time
left
our
when
but
harmony and
And
show
sincere Humility
and Trust
Awe.
and a permanent
"
The other
connexion
sentiments
"
are
brought
find
them again
The
won
over:
it is,
Moral virtues
comparatively indifleient.
servience to that
and knowledge,
them only
is
in the con-
and
into articulate
trutli
But
in relation to that,
of
and
these
in sub-
men had
The
life.
84
CALDECOTT.
A.
system.
sentiments of the
of the poetical
and
rhetorical
an
ability to see
and
people to
illiterate
to
whom
To the
they ministered.
attractions
of the repre-
enjoyment
The
into
those
harmony;
come under the domination
how
for
them
their
great leader
unbroken attachments
itself
for
after they
was brought
had
sex-affection
who married
to
whole-hearted and
they secured
But
life.
record
almost con-
comitant with the attainment of peace for self arose the desire
the newly-awakened
to lead others into the same happiness
;
love extended
itself
in
welfare
of
others.
totally indifferent to
me when
"
opposition
afterwards,
"
immediately,
my
they stood
views and
parents,
brothers and
sisters,
85
at
work.
we
Hindu attainment
of victory.
And
men were
These
social situation of
indifferent
to
for forwarding
of
that
reformations
kind.
Their emotion
progress by
interested them in a reformation of society by a reconstitution
their time,
human
of
it
the
natures of
all
outside
To work
it.
for
lie
in
and in such a
society
Under
its
life.
have spoken of
intel-
was
so,
range of the
education which
them
record
considerable
wrestlings
with
fundamental
editor of the
86
CALDECOTT.
A.
whom
of the towns
and
tile
villages of
England at that
time.
of their character
a vivid impression in
"
of
one
speaks
memory
being constrained to acquiesce,"
i.e.,
though there was constraint he experiences something
conational which he designates acquiescence, and that he then
their
"
if
but to hold
confidence."
said,
my
he will
we
left
"
Another,
"
another,
my
fast
I can."
the generalisation of
is
"
ventured
and
to believe,
its decisions
brought into complete consilience
in
more
and
more
accord
with
the requirements
have become
obedience becomes habitual. And the
of the religious desire
see will
influence
is
highly sthenic.
of
but
it
seems as
if
new
intensity
is
III.
victory
is
the
cases
a series of
vicissitudes
force, in
is
the
after
won.*
Old
detachment or in opposition
* The most frequent ages for the first clear experience of relief and
in only three of them
is between twenty and twenty-five
satisfaction
in only four
when
87
And sometimes
emotion
itself
is
reduced, even
the
central
to
temporary disappearance
in a few cases even
satisfaction fails, and only desire remains
that fades away and periods of emptiness have to be lived
Sometimes this is taken in callousness, but more
through.
:
frequently there
is
an undercurrent
the
five, six,
five years
of poignant regret,
aching void
"
of
which
Cowper
seven years
;
is
"
after
rest of life
come
These vicissitudes
change in
he was nearly thirty years old.
take to have been due principally to the
till
In
emotions themselves.
all
vention
of
intellectual
in
no
in the Object
of
doubtings,
assign
inter-
considerable
grapple
it
to itself
it
floats
has faded.
Removed
to
memory
of past joy
of darkness wretched.
There
is
"
no comfort
88
A.
in anything."
change
CALDECOTT.
them,
who know
is
shining
the coldness of quenched emotion.
still,
These
men
con-
"
comfortable hope for seven years says the Dorset soldier. In the
extinction of the once victorious emotion, the old miserable
sense of unworth and just condemnation revived with increased
near
to despair,
and
distress
as
in
approaching
to
contemplate suicide.
This inability of the religious sentiment to maintain its hold
of the field, even after a very striking and impressive victory, is
If in the sentiment, complex as
a fact of great significance.
we
see
it
to be, the
of
anything
from the
field
of
victory
so
The obvious
we may
by
Hoffding,*
89
is
is single,
fixity of tenure is
secured only
me
that
it
would be reasonable
to expect that
what
till
a later stage of
their experience.
full
sentiment as
is
master-sentiment.
enable
me
to see
or paralleled
in the case
but I
* Outlinet
of Ptychology, VI, E.
t Mind, October, 1907.
90
A.
CALDECOTT.
IV.
Of the emotions
taken
up and organised
men
sentiment of these
in
the
full
invariably included
it.
The
religious
It
was not
degrees,
some speak
of
"
ecstacies
"
of joyfulness
but
of joy which
of joy is confirmed
by the
effects
of
suspended peace of
is
men
of
tions,
warm
tone.
as one of
"
solid
says, not only occasional ecstacy, but a fund of
And
be
this is what would
appropriate to men
happiness."
them
who
and mental
health.
91
to be gleaned which
theory of emotionality,
after
viz.,
including
sensori-motor
course, no
new
has
influence
reflective
brought
organic
into
sensations,
arise
consciousness.
my
is
an
if
Of
contention be
inner emotion
till
sensations,
and the
anxiety, hope,
like.
at the full
on a distressing
failure
"
"
(to
here
pray)
we
illness.
felt
clearly find
as
if
an organic sensation
had suffered, and
his health
And here,
organic
mental
it is
state.
But
is
so written that
have been
astonished to
primary and
hear that
these
sensations were
upon
their
memory.
far.
Of
effect of
there seem to
them
92
CALDECOTT.
A.
"
have
Revivals
frequently attended
are
experiences
conspicuously absent.
"
and pseudo-Mystic
What
changes of this
kind there were did not catch the attention of these men, and
was
as their emotionality
and considerable
of high intensity
who were
selected
roll of those
it is of
these
men
value to learn
Acquired after
Still,
helpers in the cause.
the sentiment can become.
by a more or
course of vicissitudes in
many
less severe
Under
its
fifty years, in
disappointments.
And
after
strenuous labours
their
fifty -five
life
of
in
at the goodness of
"
I stand
amazed
men who
"
The
93
was single
it
seems
to
recurrence or constancy.
ably satiated in his Happy Valley. These were not the floating
"
"
emotions of such religious Revivals as gave serious concern
in New England about that time, and drew from Jonathan
Edwards
the
and
profound
though
beautiful,
is
somewhat
"
on
falls
will,
subject
"
to
the
law
of
decline,
"
incapable
of
which
he required
in the experiences which he could welcome and approve.
attaining that
With
fixedness
these men, as
life
of
strength
to the
original objects,
and invested
all
"
sistent Character
parts
... a character
or elements
are
in
and Emotion,
which
all
the constituent
* The
Religiout A/ectiont, Part
t Fact, Idea,
in
1,
3,
and Part V,
1.
It
94
Yorkshire stonemason
to
who
is
abilities
in
developed.
Yet we
its
see
in
and
vicissitude
life.
95
V.
By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON.
I
SHOULD
for
will, I hope,
to
my
methods gives
hearers, as,
which the
rise.
It is the affinity of
matters which
its
tether,
to go, nor
There
many
are, or at
own
own
What
pursuit
In
attain,
place
my
its
special,
compose
the
widely they
intellectual
may
characteristic,
differ
all
world,
when
its
votaries,
however
SHAD WORTH
96
HODGSON.
H.
points:
that
its
is
purpose
understand so far as
to
is to
we have
examines our
say,
of it
also
its
totality,
without
experience, that
which we seem
is,
to be
aware
it
may
should be so taken.
taken until
it
is
taken
strictly
as
of.
say
that
and
assumptions,
accepted.
merely an individual's
Well, I am quite content
is
then, there
it
must be
are
so
as
many
many as
made by
philosophy at all;
organised
ideas
and terms
a preliminary of philosophy
necessary by the
history and
development
of
the various
divergent philosophies, and particular departments of philosophical thought, wherever such have existed, down to the
to be
if
instituted
97
all,
And
this
to attain, far
science,
because
immediate
it
in the consciousness
not
sciousness
individual's
is
of
difficult
specially
of individuals, while
at
the
an individual's consciousness
shared by, or
any other
is
difficult
consensus
philosophical
more
communicable
making
part of
An
consciousness.
immediately objective
to
to,
is
any other
the immediacy of
individual's con-
itself,
consciousness
consciousness.
behind
When,
cloud,
for
instance, the
this,
my
an
light,
immediate experience,
is
The two
same
tions,
sensa-
cable
of
same
in kind.
Now
the experiences,
as
well as
our belief in
common
o
real
SHADWORTH
98
HODGSON.
H.
Objects of them (such as the sun and its light in the above
instance), the truth of all mediate knowledge being inferential,
its
proof solely upon self-evident, that is,
of
evident
data
it follows that a consensus
immediately
individuals, in analysing each his own immediate, unshared,
for
depending
and in
its
of attainment.
And
this is
And
one not
it is
all
drawn and
its
Immediacy in application
a Knowing means the self-evidence of any
necessity perceived.
to consciousness as
{e.g.,
if
is
required
solid
(e.g.,
object).
the perception
Immediacy here
But
expresses the self-objectifying character of consciousness.
the same term, immediacy, in application to consciousness as
an Existent, means that incommunicable vivacity or awareness
which is the essential characteristic of consciousness itself,
whatever
its
contents as a
Knowing may
be,
and expresses
is
Eeal Condition.
It is
99
is plain,
immediacy
its
proximate
two senses
A
real
the term
of
in consciousness (as a
diacy by no
Mediate
of the other.
knowing may be actual presentations in the existent consciousness of an individual conscious being, and in that sense be
incommunicable
to
And
again, contents
of
an
individual's experience,
as
it
and
sciousness as an existent.
in that state
memory
become
into the
meaning
of this
recall
due
And
the immediate
by further analysis
and
their
different as
the
are,
the
individual,
SHADWORTH
100
H.
HODGSON.
common
lish
object of
them
by comparing the
he seeks to estab-
theirs regarding
own
all.
ideas or representations
which he has of
own
con-
common
concerned, as objects
to
all,
or as
actions passing
recall,
by
association,
his
own
which in
It is thus those
detached or detachable from the current of an individual's consciousness as an existent, but also as capable of recall into
it
immediacy
of his
own
by repeated
so to distinguish, analyse,
and describe
them
light of their
The seeking
philosophy;
human
it
beings.
the same in
as he does,
own
presentative consciousness.
for a
is
by bringing them
and
consensus
is
no peculiar characteristic of
all cases.
The mother
teaching,
names
to things, to
common
of the establishing
of
a consensus
101
establishing a consensus
agreement sought
for
an
is
in
philosophy
is,
that here
the
ideas,
analyses of ideas, perceived or inferred relations of the components of ideas, which make part of the experience of one
individual on the one hand, and on the other hand the ideas,
analyses, components,
and
relations,
ponent of an
common by
idea,
or relation between
all individuals,
either,
perceived as
criterion of the
ideas
perceived in
common and
thinking,
make
default
by philosophy.
Now,
And
in philosophy
in pre-philosophic
is
in the case of
some sensations
at
any
rate
but the
SHADWORTH
102
or
what idea
or thought
we
H.
HODGSON.
it.
cerning
II.
In
the
fact
when applied to
the idea of the Universe
itself,
which
is
that which
gives
it
is
be appreciated.
of
of
to
content.
The
usual
course
is
to
consider
consciousness,
how much
of the
knowledge which
it
seems
So
much
it
is
is
of philosophising.
103
mean
this is
more
what
may
its
be.
that
it,
is,
irrespective of
Strict Experientialists,
basing themselves upon analysis, maintain that purely perceptual data are necessary as a prior conditio cognoscendi
strict Idealists, basing themselves upon the
that
assumption
thought is an agency, maintain that conceptions
are necessary as a prior conditio cognoscendi of purely perceptual
of conceptions
data.
which consciousness
is
the property,
it
assumes an Agency in
contents thought
perceptual data.
of,
are alike,
and in
my
opinion alike fallacious, in this, that they both lay at the basis
of
philosophy
consciousness,
the
of
its
hypothesis (that of an
SHADWORTH
104
H.
HODGSON.
whether being or
The consequence
Idealists
is,
that
it
action,
of
the assumption
compels them
made by the
to treat concepts,
strict
which are
it is
that
is
and
And
directly
assumption
from
is
of experience;
its
original
an assumption
may
by means
of concepts, conceiving
being a necessary part of the
The
specific
occurrence in consciousness,
its
existence, genesis,
of
or
datum
is
of experience,
inseparable
it is
105-
of
aa
And Thought
itself as
into
necessity analysable
producible by itself, or by the logical forms which belong to it
as a conscious process dealing with those contents or their
elements.
Strict
Experientialists
must
therefore
conceive
aiming at what
is
commonly
called
understanding, that
is,
bringing into more and more consistent order, data of consciousness which as data are purely perceptual. So far from creating
percepts, the function of thought is to understand and interpret,
them.
III.
Now
way.
The purely
completeness, limitation,
and
The
it,
relative to the
Whole
ift
at
is,
taken as
SHADWORTH
106
H.
HODGSON.
and
of the idea of
which
applied.
The confusion
in philosophy results
when we apply
term Whole
is
therefore
is
great,
that
inapplicable,
the
Universe, or in speaking
When we
try to conceive
it
of
is
the
implied in thinking of
Universe as a Whole.
implied
by the
finitude
of
its
object.
We
them
them
as
;
we
that
perception
we have
and
one of which
is
to think of
of
in
as given elements
which we
107
thinking of them, to be
find, in
and name, in consequence of that contrast, incomplete, unI speak of what are called the formal
limited, and infinite.
elements of perception, Time-duration and Spatial -ex tension.
These are given as continua, into which all difference and
therefore all limitation
is
infinite.
The Universe,
of
we
which
find
ourselves a finite part, is to us a Whole in virtue of its continuity with our actual experience, but a Whole which no
We
finite.
grasp, that
is,
have to think of
it,
as
we
perceive
it,
from
that
is
to say, as perceived
infinite.
But
known
are
as
the
formal elements
others, as already
of
perceptual data,
there
data,
mean
the
of emotion,
taken by
in
consciousness, has to be
of the
besides those
of
existence
of
specific
qualities
of
feeling,
108
SHADWORTH
experience
qualities
H.
HODGSON.
by us in their
which we as human
entirely unimaginable
and existing
can
beings
assign no limit.
specific nature,
in
numbers
to
And
And
just
same perceptual
their specific
nature,
may
be
the
co-elements
of
specific
have
By
this, of course, I
tions,
known
positively as realities.
My
possibilities,
meaning
is,
should be
that a world or
human comprehension.
know,
either
the modes of
pretend to
109
its
ultimate
which we
we
followed, in
Universe.
is
futility
of
supposing
he can frame a
that
its
theory of the
cannot represent
He
origin.
And
Infinity
as a
is
knowing, which
his
is
only evidence
of
Being or of
Existence.
IV.
We
two
first
and the
Section
objective,
of this
paper.
of
it
may
modes
of consciousness
Things-in-themselves ?
hidden parts of the Universe are not thought of, nor can they
be thought of, as out of relation to human modes of consciousness, seeing that these latter
for
all.
SHAD WORTH
110
HODGSON.
H.
was
also
to
therefore,
man, inexplicable
Man
nature.
and
but
cannot
whether
ness,
his
own
Being and
of
infinite
that
we
idea
Eealities
perceiving them
adequate
We
transcend
we cannot frame
but
which
be
to
their
consequently of
would be perceived by an
to
supposed
It is only through
apprehension.
and
another's,
of Existence, as they
consciousness,
the
or
and
of
powers
sole
as in its
it
non-existent.
It is at this point in our thinking of the
Universe that
my
modes of our consciousness are our only evidence either for its
The evidence is one thing, the
existence or for its nature.
existent
knowing
made evident
is
existent, that
itself.
But
think of
it
is,
Our consciousness
all that we think
as
of as
then, as itself
aspects, as a
a double relation
knowing,
another.
it is its
an
which, as an existent,
two
is
to
it is
opposite and to us
its
it
reveals;
as
agency.
The Ego
of knowledge,
"
itself
"
We
order of existence
Now,
for
depending
ditionate,
"
we
In the order
are subjects
we
con-
efficient
its
upon
genesis
is its
it
We "
we apply
if
as an existent,
own
its
Ill
in the
are objects.
found within
ditioning
that
the existence of
of
knowledge
it,
a knowable or
what we
consciousness which
find is this.
known
is
the
as-
object
ipso facto distinguished from
our consciousness which is a knowledge of it, and that in both
aspects of the latter distinguished from its knowing aspect as
is
from
existent
object,
end
its
of our tether,
philosophy,
as before
to
acknow-
what we are
facts, therefore,
fain to call a
Power
we
Power
Being in
my
paper
justified.
(Svvajjus) as the
its fullest
sense (TO
of last Session
It
is
characteristic of
justified,
OJ/TGX? elvai),
Fact, Idea,
as
Reality or Real
which
and Emotion*
quoted in
is thus
Many
* Proc. Aritt.
SHAD WORTH
112
H.
HODGSON.
of which
I
seemed
it
to
hang
it
contains,
ness,
when
is
it
Section
The
I,
senses
that
This
is,
in
truth in strict
is
of
is
the only
not-conscious-
immediacy, distinguished
such an inference
own
is
truth, namely,
some
for
first
above in
is,
own
is
it is
that
fact
two
the
of
is,
is
since
unlearning it.
truth I think
though,
But ever
as a real curtain.
which
is
of its
not-consciousness.
my
opinion,
Now
is
real
Knowing furnishes
means of positive
Being beyond
its
and actual apprehension, though it can render that idea intelligible, and indeed non-contradictory, only by thinking of the real
and transcendent Being (transcendent, be it understood, to
human modes of positively knowing, not to consciousness generally) as the Object of a Consciousness as infinite
and eternal
is
Consciousness, gene-
as itself.
which
is its object,
not,
But
Eeality
is
not then,
By no
it
may
means.
It
must
still
be thought of as an
Terms
consciousness.
113
terms
And
events occur.
of consciousness.
content,
it
is
and
objective
it
process, and
possible content
least
its
its
is
what we
an
we
call
what
It is
what
human
consciousness contains,
own awareness of
involved alike (as
distinction) in Being
in Subjectivity.
in itself or per
extension,
is
per
is
se,
knowledge, that
events occur,
is,
what
Except so
se.
held to be equivalent
or
far as
we cannot
alternative, or
explanatory names.
114
features.
experience begins
and owing
analysing experience,
aspects,
and secondly
of
to
the
fact,
the inseparability,
discovered
first
of
its
by
two
it
end.
concrete
or
empirical whole
it
will
now
be evident,
is
115
VI.
THE PKOBLEM OF
IDEALISM.
By H. WILDON
BY
CAIIR.
Hume.
It is
it
based.
is
He
on which
did
dilemma demanding
philosophers to
is sufficient
resulting scepticism
not
overcome.
He
accepted
to them,
as the
title of this
paper.
consists of impressions
and
Hume
they arise
or the cause or causes of them being unknown, while the
fact,
why
ideas are in every case derived, being more or less faint, more
or less persistent, survivals or copies of impressions. Nihil
est
Impressions and
Hume
of
mind
H 2
116
WILUON CARR.
H.
different impression
to be derived from,
round square
may
vacuum
is
is
Hume's instance
of the latter.
He
denies that
we
is
The whole
points or surfaces.
of
up
impressions
of experience is simply
made
them.
of
is
the association
of
ideas.
Hume
human
nature.
His method
of
the meaning of good and evil, the meaning of vice and virtue,
was to discover the impressions which gave rise to the ideas
and the nature of the association of those ideas.
of
easy to criticise any system
to
one.
and
difficult
construct
This
exceedingly
philosophy,
fact is so obvious and commonplace that I think it does not
often occur to anyone to seek a reason for it, and least of all
It
is
comparatively
not
so,
criticism
there
is
is
should
easier
than
systematic
construction.
Scepticism
may
117
of
knowledge and
There
that
if
is
withstand
so,
and,
it
destructive
criticism.
Is
there
anything
con-
tradictory in
satisfied
not
common
possible to give
it
at all
Is
it
Time
is
attempt
able
of paradoxes.
questions,
unanswerable
us,
not
in
the
sense
that
the
scepticism
is
it
118
H.
WILDON CARR.
me
is
him.
in
Hume
Scepticism was
not his attitude toward the problems of philosophy, but a
Little attention has been
definite philosophical doctrine.
represents to
and
Impressions
ideas,
nothing
all as
a systematic
perceptions
independent
with
no
perceived,
make up
succession
experience,
So far
out of the path of philosophy, and rendering the task of construction easy.
The far greater portion of the Treatise and
of the
analysis of the
It is not
first part.
to
Hume
them
from writing a
constructive philosophy.
The scepticism
of
Hume
is
119
"
The
words
"
"
and
impressions
ideas are taken from common usage without any reference
to their etymological significance or any attempt to
give them
or
scientific
"
"
scientific
terminology.
definition,
his
yet
doubt
if
so unmistakably.
has
anyone
ever
his
If
expressed
meaning
philosophy
leaves a dilemma it is not due to confusion of language.
Surprising and startling as the analysis of experience into
impressions and ideas
plain man,
of
acquaintance to the
does, nevertheless, satisfy the requirements both
it
common
sense
and
appear at
of
reality,
and
psychology.
also
we
it
is
usually thought of
mere subjective
if
impossible to
is
a perception,
by us as not real at
all,
but as a
qualification of reality,
gives knowledge
or deceptive
is
Yet an impression
an impression.
and nothing
if it
is
Eeality
satisfy us, is
hand,
first
ordinary
nothing but a perception.
we ask whether a statement is true, whether an event
common-sense
When
may
it
of
refers to nothing
beyond
itself.
Yet
it
is
deny
The impression is the answer
to
actual reality.
We may
we can
because
we do not
120
and
WILDON CARK.
H.
this
we
final reality
which
distinguish as an
is
impression
impression.
An
not an impression, nor is it a necessary connection with any other impression, nor can it in
any way
else
is
Experience
is
a succession, time
process
its
"
What
"
causes
in
is,
fact,
if
it
On
as substance.
Hume
of association.
It
is
as unjustifiable
idea, for
it
it
by a theory
originated in
there
is
nothing to discover
by
is
experience.
make
it
is
into content
and
it
does not
and
fall
apart
ance and reality, nor even into reality and awareness of reality.
do not reason about matters of fact, they are final. We
reason about ideas.
Impressions succeed one another in
We
knowledge
be real
of that existence.
when
it
is
their
An
existence,
and
is
our
ceases to be present.
Impressions
may
pass
121
The
of the Alps,
for
ception that I
liy that remembrance.
The
of the
reality
assassination of
Julius Caesar
as
are
known
to
me by
of
ideas,
and
for the
people's impressions
formation of these ideas
am
of reasoning,
and reasoning
is
an association of
name
cause and
is
ideas.
Seasoning
the association
we
effect.
are satisfied
We
because
it is
if
It
is
inde-
and
pendent
succeeded by other impressions, which have no power to affect
it, and independent also in the sense that it is incommunicable.
in the sense that
My
impression
not
my
is
it is
this
arise
even as mistaken
It
is
ideas.
There
is
is
it
no impression of them.
an internal impression,
be consciousness of
self,
122
H.
of power, or of will, is
sion
WILDON CARR.
They
arise
my room
with the
burning in the
grate, I return an hour or two later and find the fire burnt
out.
No impressions, my own or anyone else's, connect those
experience.
fire
room
I think of the
in
my
absence and
there
is
no
reality.
independent reality
To
justify
and
call
my
is
I wish
to
to express
its
power
belief I
when
substance
it
wish to
produce impressions.
if
to justify
when
It
is
them I must
to
How
ideas.
experience.
Hume
association of ideas.
principles.
Our
practical beliefs
Eeality
am
analysis of
itself,
123
and ideas
is
not the
and
is
This
is
is
It
meaningless.
it,
and an idea
is
must
formed
experience
and raison
is
reality
"
for us
is
its
the basis of
The
d'etre.
experience,
men
"
an unknowable
The
ideas,
The recognition
or
"
this principle
conclusion unconvincing.
want
it
This
Hume
me
it is
by distinguishing
ground
of idealism.
and
to be undeniable,
me
sophical position.
either in
that reality is
so I
of
what
expound Hume,
am
trying to explain
to me.
I hope I
have
The
difficulty I
am
trying to express
is
one that
find in
124
H.
some form
in
WILDON CARR.
To put
every philosophy.
Hume's
I think
my
view
briefly,
and
two
analysis
ideas drives us into idealism, or
alternatives, idealism
am now speaking
that term
is
that reality
process
It is
employed.
sometimes restricted
is
reality is
is
reality,
to the
and that
view
logical
is
which
is
as well as
feelings
sometimes
all
reality is
Also
thought.
it
agency
is
to
mean
is
the theory
nothing but
impressions and ideas, that impressions and ideas are not only
It is the argument
#11 that we know, but all that there is.
that you cannot infer a reality independent of experience or
consciousness, for the very inference contradicts the inde-
pendence, and
How,
is
with
then, shall
its
we express
what that
and
is
known
The attempt
or difference seems to
physics.
The
me
distinctions,
by various systems
to
solve
cover the
They
reality.
125
distinction.
ticular only,
may be described as
represented by
the endeavour to explain how reality can be thought of and
practically regarded as outside and independent of experience
known
while
to be within
it.
of this
The
difficulty is the Kantian theory of the thing-in-itself.
matter of experience, the manifold of sense, is nothing until
clothed with the form it receives from the categories of the
understanding, but absolute nothing it cannot be thought to
be, so the formless matter is thought to exist, but is unknow-
This
able.
solution
unsatisfactory
I have never
not
solipsism.
It
illogical.
If
may be
we hold
incredible, it
that experience
what way we
that
we
there
may
as a theory of knowledge.
it
impressions and
will,
is
is
be absurd, but
in
we know everything
What we know at the
and
that
also
moment
of knowing
same time
which
is
we know
nothing.
it is for
no
reality
126
H.
WILDON CARR.
an attempt
without examination.
it
"
postulate
reality
cannot contradict
"
itself
may
be a reason for
To suppose
that
it is
it,
is
my
to fail to appreciate
difficulty,
it
if
what
it
impossible to believe.
is
this
it,
far
as
the
content of
concerned.
its
The
declares
solipsist
that
absolute
this
know.
Now
a proposition
is
experience
is
one.
my
that
lies
it is
is
is
It
in
If
conclusion
in
its
my
immediate experience.
than myself
my
is
experience.
systems
of
my
but a content of
The
idealism
inference,
it
is
my
are
the various
127
Whether
psychical state.
my
immediate knowledge
The problem then
ness.
of consciousness
state?
my
If all
my
is
know an
an experience, a
how
state of conscious-
knowledge is a state
can be aware of anything outside that
knowledge is my presentation, must not
is,
if all
an
illusion
reality
to
call
it
behind it?
veil,
This
is
and vain
not
how an
Is it not
imagine a
idealist argues, he
to try
to
of reality is ideal,
what
know
is
all,
in relation to
somewhat
are
it.
cannot
the
know
The
knowledge.
not
how
am
simply ask
whatever be
the
we may be aware
of
affect their
idealism
is
gone.
independent
states of
reality.
If it is true that
knowledge consists in
is
128
H.
WILDON CARR.
the
slightest
All reality
own
is
consequence to
knowledge, and
existence
addressing the
or
or
idea
experience.
is
my own
whether
us,
I
am
argument are
my
exists
it
or
not.
You
perception.
whom
to
my
am
presentation or perception
my own
ness.
is
which
state of conscious-
apparent as soon
is
as stated.
is
However much
The conclusion
not true.
content me.
me from
prevents
this conclusion is
and
it
seems
to
resist
only scepticism
an
as
alternative.
seems
to
me
that there
two
are
difficulties,
The
quite
first is
the
states.
psychical
The second
is
practical
fact,
start fair,
comes
difficulty,
to
an inference, by the
to
made by every
human infant,
make the ordinary
I am not concerned in
mistake of developed consciousness.
this paper with any particular system of idealism, nor with
any particular theory, but I may illustrate the first of these
difficulties
course.
by referring
how
a world of independent
might
reality
arise
of
129
purely ideal
elements.
us say ten men, have each a perception of the sun, intersubjective intercourse is all that is needed to convert for
let
theory from the point of view which I am now taking lies in its
assumption that a subject may know an independent subject, or
subjective
state.
independence, so long as
it
is
that
object,
is
Idealism
is
the
solved
gene-
we
know
and
intercommunicate
may
holds
reality.
If
own
of his
state of
consciousness,
consciousness,
is
the reality
is
represented as outside
is
it
If
and
by that
is
to see
other.
any
The main
of idealism, is
idealists.
it is
fact
to
proved to be
to give
and
it
to
the reason
ideal,
may
not material, I
my mind
why
fail
all
mankind
are not
130
H.
WILDON CARU.
of the
that to
ness
and existence,
is ideal,
even
its
independence
Even
in philosophy.
I take it for
view
him
to his
pains,
states.
own
subjective state.
emotions,
He
passions,
also
He
desires,
recognises
that
volitions,
are
sensations,
difference
confines
perceptions,
But there
of
sense.
He
may know
independent
He
knowledge.
qualifies his
as limited to the
is
thinks that he
is
directly
of
an inde-
to the Senses.
another
131
And
yet a
fact,
is
knowledge.
moment's
ness.
common
If the
world
is
an
illusion, there
a problem more
is
and
does or
how
it
can
how
this is to explain
gist holds
even than
it
arise.
difficult
but clearly
it would be fatal to this whole standpoint to admit the possibility that experience could arise in a conscious individual
infant consciousness
is,
of
course, unattainable,
common
sense world
refer to or
The
imagine anything
simple identity of
first
outside
name
doubt or
or
itself,
its state of
the
At what
consciousness.
the
dispute
stage
of its experience
that
the
it
and
simple
exception
infant's first
difficulty
own
what
it
seems to
truth
that
conscious state
its
Why
there never an
arises,
and an
This
illusion.
me
am
am not
asking
must be at the
we allow no more
and
impressions
is
saying this I
idealism.
obvious
why
first,
a solipsist.
to understand
An
infant's first
moment
of
made, yet
it is
impossible to understand
why
or
how
it
I
should
132
W1LDON CARR.
H.
be made.
for
difficult to justify
impossible to
understand how
it
it
it is
appears
do,
experience
corrects,
experience itself.
I hope I have
an
is
it
made
my
the nature of
about
illusion
even
difficulty plain,
if,
as is
more
likely, I
now
refer briefly to
of criticising
some
of these, not
problem.
The philosophy
of Mr.
Shadworth Hodgson
me
empirical method of
Hume, and
philosophy as he presented
it.
is
to take
up the problem of
feel
in
reading
Hume.
certainly
owe more
to
philosophy rests on an analysis of experience without assumpThis analysis reveals an order of being which contions.
and
is not conditioned by the order of knowing.
The
ditions
a solution of
brought conviction to
my
problem.
me
It does take
should have in
up the
challenge-
Hume
to
rise
133
to the
appearance.
am
my
problem
is
it.
By
is
this I
for
my
mean
my
illustrate
of experience
gives
is
conclusion.
undeniable,
it
is
undeniable.
this
It
seems to me,
of
in the consciousness
analysed.
There
ia
134
H.
W1LDON CARH.
pragmatist to urge,
dilemma
The
to
"
After all," I
may imagine
the
all
ideal
knowledge
life
in pristine purity
and unapproachable
Truth
majesty.
postulates."
us an impossibility, and
must content ourselves with a much
we
it
is for
What is
it
The question,
professes to subordinate.
is
intellectual experience, it
The
latter.
solution,
is
idle
proffered solution
is
to
seek a solution in
the
The
difficulty.
non-intellectual
known
to us at
all.
The
an
idealist to the
experience.
intellectual
It
intellectualist, unless
seems to
meaning
he be a Hegelian,
me
to truth.
impossible
Truth
is
all reality is
appear
to
be simple nonsense.
To an
idealist,
whatever be
to
knowing and
is
135
being,
not merely to
endeavours
to
by
meet the particular
idealist contention,
I will try to
and
to refute it
show why
it fails to
and
if
an
and
ultimate
purely external
relation of awareness, making no difference to the facts, it
would end my scepticism. Very much of Mr. Moore's paper
in
of his paper,
of
modern
idealism, such as
which posit
meet a simple
it
tautology, or
percipi, or that
it
wherever there
declares
is
esse
there
is percipi,
and he
Mind,
New
Series,
136
WILDON CARR.
H.
analysis.
used
Hume
and as
it
away behind
used
of the proposition as
was
it
apparently exhaustive
this
declared
ultimate
the
universal
to
follow
trying
to
his
indicate
the
criticises
this
consciousness or
that,
Now how
am
fails
does
not proposing
I
criticism.
between
distinction
idealist
existence, the
it ?
it
Positively,
reality.
be
to
Berkeley
to
am
only
grip.
He
content
and
to
Consciousness
reality perceived.
is
their
The
difference.
different is not a
sense content, not a part of experience, not a state of consciousness at all, but the ultimate independent real entities
we
it
it,
has
it
are
is
itself
is
made aware
of in the sensation.
as it
it
is
not
tion, accept.
esse,
and
This view
is
something
else, percipi.
But
it is
also
self-evident
reality cannot be
him thereby
perceive
fore, clearly
it.
impossible.
137
What
is
is
more important
free
from that
is,
there-
is
to
difficulty
see
which
relation
is
easily separable
are denied
in
facts,
which
content, the
main
to
be
its
therefore, I suppose,
it might,
be qualified independently of the entity perceived
for instance, without logical contradiction, be a green or any
;
make
clear
somewhat
And on
perceived.
Hume named
What
perceptions
be,
following
and the
difficulty is the
In conclusion,
those to
whom
I will
138
and
act.
to defend nor
any
as to feel
me
formed
to think
and judge,
as well
my own
triumph
of
is
of experience,
it
may sound
all, it is
as I think
Hume
did, literally.
what the
be.
I accept it
139
VII.
By
T.
PERCY NUNN.
IT has become a commonplace remark that the rapid development of the positive science of psychology has profoundly
affected the course of recent philosophical studies.
This
influence seems, for example, to be transforming the logician
From
this point
Things exhibits
of
simultaneous
the
"
"
psychologising
of
parallel
controlled
by
which
its
is
author's general
merely a
series of incidents in
which these
method
made
of
It
these incidents
entities
were suc-
must be
140
tions
PERCY NUNN.
T.
that
"
"
in
persist
But these
it.
references
to
the
faculties of understanding
it
was necessary
to
the only
make
for
a normative doctrine.
psychological
possible,
"
"
mode
the
significance
contingent,
and
the
necessary
him the
for
either
atomically
or
as
existences which
modifi-
may
or
functioning
faculties, or as long as
it
it
that an account
to the logician to
assume
may
involved in that of
that,
is
even
if
it
is
its
true that
precise
nature of
these circumstances
to
.be determined.
141
It is not sufficient
indicated
falls
within the
it.
discipline
responsibilities
of
such an
inquiry.
It has
that logic
"
My
present point is
psychological conditions of thinking."*
that even if his contention is sound it does not inevitably lead
to the pragmatist position in philosophy
pragmatist
is
that position..
It is still possible
though, of course, a
to adopt the
"
pamphletf
"
is
in
which these
it
presents itself
my
argument
* Proc.
et teq.
142
T.
PERCY NUNN.
my
justify
the
way
is
entitled
to
It
the
may,
presumption in its favour as a metaphysic that would follow
from a demonstration of its efficiency as a scientific method.
I.
There can be
little
give an account of
his
theories of experience
must take
as his analytical
unit
the
conative process.*
we may
any
it
Conation
process
is
to
is
upwards move
It
this stage
by means that
are not, even conceivably, capable of reduction to the physiological terms that may have sufficed to describe them before.
When
the
human
level
is
means
reached, these
The
consist in the
and conceptual,
initiation of a conative
"
On
Soc.,
1906-7,
p. 80.
is
143
It
type
on
its
of
the
is
in
these
felt to reside,
cognitive
elements
of a certain process as
moment by
is
train
of
moment
to
or
and
mental advance
his
is
is
reached, his
mental contents will have consolidated for the greater part into
structural systems enjoying relatively complete
the empire
of the
entering into
still
mind
autonomy within
some arch-system.
This progressive systematisation of conative processes has
two aspects the development, on the one hand, of the mind's
But
cognitive elements, on the other of its affective elements.
though distinguishable as aspects, these are inseparable in fact.
Here we have a point
*
I use the
familiar,
means
utmost importance,
of the
"
and
"
affective
"
vital, it
seems
as convenient, because
^~N
f
144/
T.
PERCY NUNN.
make
it
same name
The
in both cases.
new game
child engaged in a
by a
"
it
though
delight,"
or by a philosopher following a
So when
and
vice versa.
But though this remains true, yet there is a great convenience in separating the two aspects of mental development
in regarding
them
as parallel
instead
of
interpenetrative.
And an
The
and
objects with
credit for
do,
an independence
of
object
It
may provoke
is
bad lead
of a player at cards
may
145
described
and
or repeated,
cognition to sympathetic
of
so
friends
becoming
an
object
of
while the
for
years after,
emotional aspects of the transaction were different in the case
of each individual and evanescent in all, makes it almost
cognition should be thought of
must
and not
follows
that even
boredom drove
if
of sight.
It
A and B
musical comedy, few people would admit that the two persons
"
"
were actuated by the " same emotion, using " same in the
sense given to it when it was said in the former example that
"
"
the same event was the cause of different emotions.
This
affective
is
the
aspects
difference
between
of experience
that
the cognitive
I
and the
spoke of as
making
it
the objects of
will, in
many
cases, be of
from
their
These
isolated
affective
is
the
clear that
we have
relate.
the typical
systems so complete as to be
self-supporting
is
yet,
really
well-founded), comparable
146
PERCY NUNN.
T.
On
dissected
the
tissues it supported
have
affective
away.
elements will in this case be also sufficiently rich and continuous to be thought of as constituting independent systems.
Such
affective systems
which will, like the single emotion,
be regarded as lying wholly within the limits of the individual
form the "passions" or "sentiments" whose nature has
examination of
to
disclose.
of
are
in
the
advanced stage of
golf, or
of the
"
"
be
the
may
pure
knowledge of the historian, of the literary critic, of the man
in each case we are dealing
of science or the mathematician
procedure of the
House
of
Commons,
or
it
and
up
these
As we have
line
elements,
of
seen, uninstructed
demarcation between
some (such as
referring
and other
feelings
we have spoken
elements
other states of
of as the affective
which
cognition, but
thoughts
know these
"
"
consciousness are
objects.
conception of states of
of consciousness,"
is
to
classic) of a
varied, be conceived as so
"stream
It is necessary
many
phenomena
particular cases
every
element
of
to be
however
me
of
consciousness, even
shall,
147
element
of
experience.
which
Since
represented some
of
mind
definite
the
which
in
without.
my
emotion of anger
is
the anger
objects.
ments
many
fictive
move-
"
phenomena
in terms of
"
states of consciousness
"
must assume
148
T.
PERCY NUNN.
mere
which
to be distinguished
is
easy.
It suffers, indeed,
its
from
notable methodological
of psychological exposition
mitted to the
task
of
going
it
is
into a
it
mere succession
"
knowing and including thus the Thoughtswhich went before," and so " appropriating them."*
of
Thoughts each
If 1
am
sciousness
"
right in
of the
my
modern psychologist
"
stream of con-
strictly speaking,
not the one datum, nor even one of the data which he must
is
is,
i,
p. 339.
demands that
all
149
many
as
of
As
values of experience,
as those concerning
voluntarist escapes
to be at least
it
may have
error)
an equally
which the
efficient
subjectivism of
scientific
the
it
appears
plane
instrument of psychological
Thus,
upon
the
realist
hypothesis,
the
methodological
postulate requires merely that the affective elements of experience shall be regarded, equally with the cognitive, as being
though
its
"
fundamentally from the concept of a succession of momentary
TV' adopted by Dr. Schiller from Professor James. Of this
account
it
may
be maintained that
it
is
quite as
"
"
economical
150
is
T.
PERCY NUNN.
indispensable by
in the
many
psychological terms.
is
also regarded as
psychologists of authority,
who
yet rely
1?hese circumstances
seem
to afford
good
Occam.*
objects,
the affective-coefficient.
cognitive-coefficient, others
that
is, it is
constituted
by
much
case,
that
is
connected.
Nevertheless, there
is
so
it is
example,
it is
paper seems to
* Plato and
Protagoras,
p. 15, footnote.
in every
"
subject
common programme
of instruction
may
151
be given
to the whole of the children in a class, or students in a lectureis based upon the fact that conative synthesis will in
follow substantially the same course.
case
Moreover,
every
room,
modern
It
facts
logical order.
It is
is
assimilation
difficulty,
is
from these views, which have both been operative in the near
past, it is held, with increasing frequency and increasing
The
that a systematic
is
of
sound
treatment based
between the elements of the subjectto be the terminus ad quern of instruction, not the
first
is
relations
terminus a quo
in other
must be
deter-
effort
is
an
objects
bearing
coefficients.
subject,
respectively
Thus,
the
however detailed
the
cognitive
curriculum
it
may
be, is
and
of instruction
affective
in
any
It represents only
152
PERCY NUNN.
T.
medium
These must, at every stage, be suppleaffective elements whose existence they imply
of language.
mented by the
III.
is
in the race
of the
knowledge
and
growth in
its
the individual.
form
of
maxim
it
is
rather
maxim
a generalisation from
is
an extension,
It can
justified
on a priori
of a
it
it is if it
man
may
mind, say, of a Homeric chieftain, his passions, his vices and his
virtues were never anything but those of a man.
But
"
mind
"
if
of
we
an individual
is
is
essentially a
commonly
mass
called the
of objects (dis-
Kff., Burriet,
153
of knowledge
such as one of the special sciences comes under
the formula which we have found to express its development in
"
the " mind of the individual.
processes
relatively
isolated
and
relatively
It
short-lived.
advances by a progressive systematising of these processes expressing itself in a gradual fusion of their cognitive contents
"
into a definite doctrine and a definite
method," and a parallel
fusion
of
the affective
At
of the
But
if
we accept
we
and unequivocally objective this difference ceases, as far as the epistemologist is concerned, to be
relevant.
Finally it should be noted that in general a conative
of elements everywhere
"
"
system at any stage constitutes only part of the mind in
which its development is proceeding, and that the degree of
is
relatively independent
was
mind
Thus
of a Plantagenet
it
was
which
in the
mind
of a
that characterises
at the
the
little, if
We
mind
mind
at
of a
child
as
of synthesis
whole, while
of synthesis represented
all,
by his
of Bismarck.
special
154
T.
PERCY NUNN,
by themselves
IV.
To exhibit
be convenient to illustrate
it
It
by a very
may, nevertheless,
allow
me
to
make
some
more or
of the sciences.
You
by
erection
character of
the
the impulse
primary
facts.
Thus
it
was possible
elaboration of
to
compare the
forms which
true
range.
They
represent, that
is,
science.
We
the
find
earliest
beginnings
of
these
child of wonder.
beautiful
and the
novel.
155
structures,
by intuition
Science
is
the
The
"
the straight
staff
the
curiosity
which
The
inquiry.
is
the
intellectual
of
germ
enterprises
scientific
systematic
to
immediately
be
scientific
in
made
to
divide
nomena
man
It
is
department
able
amount
of
For example, it
of exact methods
will in
of determination of
phenomena
the inven-
This
is
156
their
PERCY NUNN.
T.
own
special complexions.
is
But
problem.
systematisation, which
effort to
make
is
this
at first
practical control
become
the system to
process.
itself
organisation
the objective of the whole
in the
"
which aims at
complex system the disinterested
passion
and
extending
perfecting the theoretical sway of some system
it
claims to
rule.
V.
These, then, are, as I read them, the three characteristic
moments
in the
development
I
could be described in
processes,
"
"
pure
like
history,
or
have
157
by considering
which
have tried to
define.
It is exhibited, for
primitive races,
and in
example, in the
pre-scientific
"
"
magic
cosmological
of
inquiries
At every
same
"
"
Thus, at the wonder level
apprehension
of
the
moment
will be the
mere
as a
sequence
sequence, the
connexion between universal meanings;
will be little more than the expectation
striking
recognition of a definite
the deductive
of the
reappearance
"
moment
recurrence of later
utilitarian
"
of
earlier
members
members.
of the sequence
At
the
on the
intermediate
or
character which
Whewell
called
"
* This
truth, in some of its aspect*, has been well brought out by
Rey, L*Energetique et le Jf&anttme, Paris, 1908.
158
PERCY NUNN.
T.
to preceding inquiries.
It cannot be disputed, I think, that the traditional treat-
ment
of
induction
as definition
of
many
apparent contradic-
It
must
suffice
here to indicate
main contention
in a
new form
may
"
"
theory of objects
the
relations
between
and
as
other parts of
classes,
(such
it
its
but
cannot
achieve
special aim without
symbolic logic),
of
of
that
is,
without
acquirement
process
knowledge as it
takes place under definite psychological conditions. An examir
nation of these conditions shows that the cognitive process is
in every case only an aspect of the development of a conative
159
it
to be considered
The
true
developmental process.
160
VIII.
FROM THE
G.
By
MORE
DAWES
HICKS.
Psychology,
Adamson
clear
and
forcible
psychologist had to
special
grounds
of
difficulty
the
of
He
deal.
facts
pointed
in
taking
first
steps in
the exposition."
to be handled in limine
facts
whether, that
is
problems
of principle
and method
is
The plea
"
its
been reinforced.
criticism of
day as to
Mind, N.S.,
xvi, p. 27.
review to which I
am
Adamson
161
pressed in the
referring.
for con-
most
of
those
Can the
itself
are known ?
Such, I take it, is the problem that
Mr. Prichard desires to see faced, and, although I differ profoundly from what appears to be his view, that psychology as
it
in
in
to the front.
receive
me
appearance of
its
modes
to
confirmation.
Briefly,
There
stand thus.
is
of being as objects
"
in
the sense in
way
in
This peculiarity
to
distinctive
is
aware or
peculiarity
of
aspect,
an act
of apprehending, and,
apprehended.
These
two
distinguishable,
but
a content
inseparable,
162
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
an indissoluble unity
there is no having a
content apart from an act of apprehending, there is no occurrence of an act of apprehending apart from a content apprehended.
When, now, the attempt is made to look upon
aspects form
in
fact of
mind
it is
tacitly
assumed to be
nothing in
"mental states" so conceived which would enable them to
entities play their respective parts.
still
less
is
the observing subject to contemplate them as conIn other words, whatever else the mind
stituting his mind.
enable
may
It follows
mere aggregate
of objects.*
part
is
mental
of,
given.
special
life is
may
name philosophy
of
"
knowledge
is
"
any
not, for
"
* Mr. Prichard remarks
very truly that
upon no view can knowitself
an
in
in
be
the
same
sense
which
ledge
object
anything else can be
an object." In illustration of this, and of what I have said in the text,
Bickert's suggestive book (Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 2te Aufl.,
Rickert distinguishes three different
1904, p. 11 sqq.) may be cited.
(a) the external world of spacesignifications of the term object
extendedness outside my body, (6) the whole of what exists independently of my mental life, (c) the content of my consciousness as distinct
from the consciousness that is aware of such content. Objects in the
third sense (immanent objects, as he calls them) are " my ideas, perceptions, feelings, and volitions, over against which stands the subject, that
is believed to perceive the perceptions, feel the feelings, and will the
:
volitions."
163
"
"
or features
ordinary
life
make
work
it
in psychology."*
"
not in this respect on the same level as ordinary life and the
physical sciences. As regards it, the point in dispute is not
mere workability.
certain sense, work,
and
it
may
will,
in
F. Stout in
p. 238.
L 2
164
G.
materialism
is
DAWES
HICKS.
preferable to either.
But
it is futile
mind
contend
to
will not be
vitally affected
is
based.
"
manner
The
of
inde-
is
abstraction
which
pendent,
philosophical theory.
renders the latter possible, is precisely the abstraction which
every psychologist who writes a treatise begins by assuring
is,
with
science.
there
is
"
false in psychology,"
of the
dictum must at
if
it
means anything
at
all,
that
we ought
Let
ment.
ledge
it suffice
an
for
all
165
to refer to the
illustration
of
distinction
elements, ceases,
in the light of
it is
not too
much
The subject
by Mr. Prichard's
With
article.
his epistemological
With some,
false
in
epistemology.
But there we
which
When
he
the outcome
of
part.
proceeds to lay
down
his criticism
is to
the proposition
that
if
changing
characteristics.
consciousness gradually
and
Relinquishment
world
constructs the
it
apprehends
seems to me very far indeed from carrying with it the implication, which I imagine it is sometimes thought to carry, that
its
manifestations
it
166
G.
which
reality
known
be
i.e.,
"
is
and
is
not
DAWES
itself
HICKS.
the finding of
what already
"
is
is
is
to
"
essentially discovery,
is
realised in indi-
for
Mr. Prichard rightly insists that the latter problem takes its
start from the subject-object relation involved in
knowledge.
I propose, then, to support the thesis just
advanced by con-
how
the light which that development throws upon the nature and
significance of the relation itself. But before proceeding directly
to
my theme, I
want
I.
tried to
ciently
distinguishing
special
sciences,
at
its
the
territory
from
same time
that of
effectually
the other
excludes
the
possibility of
its
own, independent
familiar one
perhaps, clear
by
first
making
the ground
it
for
is
an old and
in view.
* Richard Herbertz
"
:
Die angeblich
falsche
Wissenstheorie der
167
occurrences in the
life of
series
conscious
of
states
or
real
an individual mind
processes taking
place at a definite time and connected in definite ways with
other
psychical
events
of
like
The business
nature.
of
psychology
study the relations of interconnection which
these psychical events exhibit, to ascertain the laws of coexistis
to
ence and sequence which they exemplify. In contrast therewith, it may be said to be the function of epistemology to
consider psychical events not as they are in themselves, but as
significant, as ideas of something, as
of a
world of
facts.
With what
symbolic or representative
justification do we pass beyond
"
reference
involves
of
Mental
fields of investi-
appears to be made or
reality that
is
is
made from
To a
psychology
it is
he
criticises,
so,
and
in
any case
precise
It
is, I
And
it
is
so,
because the
168
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
would,
if
strictly
adhered
to,
"
"
as
such
are not
or
what
is supposed to be left.
Considered as mere
ever
could
be
so
considered, psychical states
they
would be for us at least all on the same level
states of
describing
events,
if
perceiving,
imagining,
thinking,
desiring,
would exhibit no
by the
which
it
is
in
short,
we
of happenings,
difficult to see
"
qualification
psychical."
"
"
To talk of an association
by means of psychical states.
between psychical particulars is," in Mr. Bradley 's emphatic
"
to utter mere nonsense."
The consideration of
language,
content apart
so
no
less.
is
condemn
(a) Is
it
effected.
Then, in their case,
no open question as to whether our belief in
other than knowledge is or is not well founded their
at least, there
what
is
is
existence, at
any
should
But
if
we can know
realities,
mountain
a tree
is
Just as
little in
is
no more
knowledge of
you get rid of the antithesis between knowledge and the known, and if the antithesis creates an unique
may
may
likewise be
and
that
is
to say, elements of
?
Then,
knowledge
no doubt, the passage from knowledge to reality has yet to be
made, but we are assuming a severance between the two at the
start
170
DAWES
G.
But
what
known
HICKS.
end.
if
is
is
"
my
is,
tradiction.
For,
and everything
indeed, to speak
own knowledge
not
"
of
though
in that case, a very obvious and curious con-
knowledge,"
knowledge,
"
as
else,
I,
too,
in question, I do
Like everybody
a part of knowledge, and to
I can transcend myself is to be
am
is
just
what
it
seems to
me
"
accepted
as
any
literally,
are considering,
when
consequences which
to
we
are,
to
a science of
"
to
Understood
facts.
"
The
definition derives
whatever plausibility
possesses from
it
it
(see p.
my
127 of this
vol.),
moment
state is the
mind
part, that
is
an existent
ought
to
at a determinate
reality.
It
is
of time
it
mental
forms
life
as
it
"
171
"
is
meant a
is
world
"
my
it
is
to me," although it
"
is
"
assertion that
me
your mind
in
momentous
may
the formed
an event in
my
considers
"
are
presentations
at
once objects
it
and psychical
states.
example, a loud
tained that the
shrill
exse of
sound.
It
that sound
may
is
I hear, for
conceivably be main-
percipi.
But even
if
that
Cj).,
however, what
172
G.
psychical in
is
undoubtedly
DA WES HICKS.
apprehending, but
loud, shrill, or of
neither
it
the
is,
sense that
it
is
mode
of
it
neither
is,
nor
Beyond
apprehended,
But
of
act
is,
I should
have thought, no
self-conscious
Now,
it is
only
experience
when
similar
antithesis
holds.*
when
however,
of
we then
the mental
get
life,
is
title of
"
presentationism,"
* It
"
in someone's consciousness.
consciousness
"
existent,
or-
cognised by consciousness as a
173
concerned.*
is
seems apparent
line,
no
and
and conation,
To me the
all
along the
than
less surely
I venture to urge
it
assumption on which
to the
growth
of
all
it
been discarded.
By
knowledge
elements
instead of to discern
mind
is
there
supposed
what
to be to create
is
together out of
mental
work
of the
there, the
way
in which a conscious
The
act of cognising
so fused
witli
property of
"
surveying their
posited, implicitly
and underlying,
if
own
as
the
curious
Mind, N.S.,
ii,
mind and
p. 80.
as qualities of
174
G.
DA WES
HICKS.
Whichever alternative be
objects.
the
adopted,
situation
we
latter,
entity,
a discredited
own modes
its
metaphysical
of being.
II.
After
now
this
to the
preliminary preparing
main subject
of
my
the way,
of
And
paper.
pass
take, as
my
This object
subject knowing.
may
be of two kinds
It
may
cipient subject.
with
identical
conscious
ego,
it
but
"
still
as
projects,
subjective
adds,
may
or
it
In the former
In the latter
the
itself.
given as really
consciousness
it
were, this
at a distance,
it
in
or objectification, he
of Cognition."*
of
an
Cognition
object."
There
is
is
"
feature
of
and
object,
cognition,
* Lectures on
Metaphysics,
somewhat.]
ii,
which
is
p. 432.
is
[I
175
mode
of
consciousness
jectively subjective."
we may
to be exhaustive, but
neither of
1.
them
is
tenable.
compel us to answer
first
while,
in
accordance with
Hamilton, we understand by
the
"
object
is
an independent order of
distinguished therefrom as
fact,
The
is,
I
it
state
down
it
in
as an
an original synthesis."*
For
my
part,
am
aid
of
a variety
Ibid., vol.
i,
p. 292.
176
G.
DAWES
of such a function, by
doctrine of faculties
Even admitting
in,
way
HICKS.
of explanation, illustrates
calls, its
the
worst form.
position should
other
error.
is
and
is
apprehended in sense-perception,
to be the invariable con-
since these
But there
is
the
outside,
to be the
it.
The
so-called
itself,
however,
all
it
"
"
giveness
it
objectivity
is
no
fixed
177
The
Again, the contents of the various orders of sensepresentation differ enormously with respect to the clearness
in point.
and distinctness
of the so-called
"
objective reference."
Motor
smell
much
less
so,
all.
Once more,
in
sciousness
may
awareness of
not-self
be
self
almost,
banished
is
as
quite
if
field.
the
the
In
is
(a)
that
content apprehended as
same
time,
upon
"
"
psychical
definitely
process of apprehending.
separating
The main
it
from the
stress of their
"
object,"
which
is
by
"
object
is
meant
"
to
the
or
argument
term
act
Every care
is
178
G.
understood.
When
DAWES
the inquiry
HICKS.
is
further pressed as to
what
"
On
distinct heads.
may
"
"
"
them
of the subject's
apprehending
activity.
doubtless, at
by the subject
a very
the
in
first,
On
to himself.
fact.
hending
is
above
all,
their
activity.
Any
summary
criticism is
a hearing.
I can here, however, only
hardly
indicate some of the reasons that lead me to think the analysis
entitled
to
In the
first
place,
thing of which
it is
me
an unjustifiable separation.
effected,
position
Adamson's
words,
"a
quasi- substantive
it
and,
existence,"
"
istics
of
in
ii,
p. 173.
are simply
employed
"
terms
"
"
presentations
179
"
"
or
objects
Anyone who
tried con-
sistently to
difficulties.
intuitions,
notions")
"
mental
concepts,
facts,"
of
capable
being attended
"
"
impressions
be due to
to
that
"
depend
occur.
As
of being
"
said to
"
is
"
receive
held to
primordial factor in materiality
the projection of a subjectively determined reaction
;
the
of
is
not-self
on
and
action
"
to,
a matter of fact,
in
his
which
of
like
sense-impressions
import,
we know from
view much at
frequently
Professor Ward's
least
what
of
is
are
memories,
like
object
is
its
those of no other."
interests,
"
their respective
and
aims and
non-Ego's,
are non-existent,
non-L, non-M,
manner."f
Surely, then,
we
of the objection I
am
urging
is
that
the presentation is
no more than a fictitious existence conferred upon it as the
ascribed
does not
itself
t Naturalitm
and
to
much
p. 238.
Agnotticitm, vol.
ii,
p. 170, tqq.
less
180
DAWES
G.
HICKS.
already in
existence prior to the act of perceiving and upon which that act
ground
is
is
as independent
whether
that ever
question
way
of regarding them.
objects,
is,
although
it
is
another
By means
of reflection,
we no doubt
of apprehension,
existence of
its
But
own.
this
seems to
me
a complicated
and
inter-related things.
There
is
and
am
criticising
Now, apart
ception of trans-subjective realities as objects.
from the question as to whether presentations are, as a matter
of fact, objects,
my
contention here
in conscious experience
is,
is
We
"
of
"
"
object
distinct
and separate
entities.
In
181
nor attention
is
rightly
conceived as an inner eye, the objects of which are presentaIt is only by reflection, a
tions furnished to the mind.
process to which we attain, that we can make any so-called
In the
presentation for itself an object of contemplation.
third place, I note the special difficulties in which the theory is
involved with reference to the rudimentary stages of consciousness.
experience, but
"
to represent
to reproduce
psychologist would do
"
it."
The infant who
if
a spectator of
We
mind
is
To me
this
argument seems
to
For the
primitive mind, as
fully recognises, sense-qualities are not definite,
isolated, individualised features.
Definiteness, isolation, indisentations
as
Professor
Ward
objects arises.
what
is
"
"
and
so on,
is
inner
life
XX,
416.
182
G.
Ward
DAWES
HICKS.
one
is
says, has
at a loss to understand
to
briefly
another
way
withstanding the
of
not
distinction,
of
which
I shall myself
have
relation as a
relation.
and primitive.
less original
be sustained.
If all that be
meant
is
neverthe-
is
argument can
nor the nature of an object is constituted by its being recognised as an object, then not only do I concede the point, but
beg leave to describe this paper as a modest attempt to vindicate its truth.
If,
But
if
it
it
is
implies
it.
grounded in
"
it
relations
are not
cannot, therefore,
object
is
not
identical
is
in
character
with
factors, it
mind and
the
its
relation
its object,
even
183
two terms
relation between
the relation,
when
of the relation
a self-conscious subject.
is
self-consciousness
which
that
is
As Mr.
relation.
Russell,
specially
Then the
fact of
characterises
the
supports the
"
the peculiarity of the
is
any other;
seems to form
that
"
is
and awareness
relatedness
relation
2.
"
way
which
advisable
reserve
to
the
title
of
view
it is
"subject-object
does not start by intuitively appreexperiences as objects, much less does it start
If consciousness
hending what
it
as that
of
istically different,
in every
of features
mind
modes
Mind, N.S.
of its
own
being.f
From
experiences as
mere consciousness to
it
" we
writes,
may be quite sure that his faithful dog is as
I am
little of a solipsist as the noble savage whom he accompanies."
t Dr.
Ward
184
G.
self -consciousness is
makes
own
DAWES
a far cry
HICKS.
individuality,
is
and would
The former
apprehending, and the recognition by a subject of such transitory modes of apprehending as his is no more intuitive or
immediate than the recognition by him of objective qualities
Mental states as existences are doubtless in
as objective.
being, but
outer facts, the circumstance that the facts are inner lends no
In and through
the process of apprehending he can be no more protected from
error in regard to what forms part of his consciousness as an
It
is
what
be conscious in
them without
we may
them, the ways in which we are conscious are not at the same
time the facts of which we are conscious and when we do
;
"
"
in the same sense.
But it may,
using above the term
solipsist
I suppose, be argued that a solipsist need not be aware that he is a
On this point I shall have a word to say later, see p. 202solipsist.
185
AN!) OBJECT.
bring to bear upon what we observe (often, I think, detrimentally, so far as the accuracy of such observation is concerned),,
general notions and interpreting ideas which have been developed
in the process of observing external things.
There is, then,,
no stage
when
of conscious life
its
own
make
subjective modes
of
a consequence of that contrast, a contrast which itself presupposes a considerable amount of preceding mental evolution.
With the substance of what has just been said, most modern
I
psychologists would,
believe,
my way
no occasion
of saying it
of
quarrel,
opinions,
how-
when
ever, diverge,
questions
find
falls to
"
?
I am aware, of course, that those
"
take this view do not use the term " feeling as equivalent
the aspect of pleasure or pain.
"I take feeling," says
described as
feeling
who
to
Mr. Bradley,
"
psychical centre.
means
for
experiences of
largely
such
what
is
which
becomes evident^
it is
features
it
as
characterise
p. 459.
in
186
DAWES
G.
HICKS.
I quote again
if
you
supposed
to
consist
entirely
is
of
thought
and out
is felt,
of which,
through articu-
of
knowledge
intelligible
which I have vainly struggled to grasp it strikes me
rather as a conundrum than as the solution of a problem. Not
lation,
confess,
all that
reality
through
the limited
way
aperture of
we
find
it
and
it is less
when we come
to sense-contents is a
prominent in visual
less
very varying
and auditory
pleasure or pain.
It
is
no
we work downwards
Mind, N.S.,
means
and
187
But
pain.
it
by no
however
unique
consciousness
Feeling
gives
be.
may
subjective in a special
it
in
justified
indistinct they
in
its
is
it.
to
and
self-
Now,
if
and objective
assume
this
back, nevertheless, to
some
which
in
was developed.
So again, presentations,
even in their crudest form, have characteristics which we are not
the course of time
it
what comes
to be recognised as objective
must
still
even before
seem equally
life.
roughly and
in
more interdependent, than they appear to be when we consider their mature developments.
This does not mean that
approach one another so nearly as hardly to be
distinguishable, they become identical, or that if we descend
if
these
188
DAWES
G.
HICKS.
far
is that,
whilst
its
modes
would be
III.
Our
In the
first place,
the
experience,
has
main
positive results.
namely,
antithesis,
between
subject
and
a secondary characteristic,
say, which has been gradually
developed from an experience of a rudimentary type, in which
it was not contained.
And, in the second place, as regards the
object,
evinced
a characteristic,
as
itself
that
is
to
problem
mere
of the
"
feeling."
It becomes,
must be employed.
obtaining direct
experience,
knowledge
we can but
of the constituents of
resort to the
an elementary
180
Following this method, I proceed to consider the factors involved in our ordinary objective experience with a view to
determining how their presence there has conie about.
Let us start from what Avenarius calls the natural conception of the world (der natiirliche Weltbegriff), the point of
view
of so-called common-sense.
which
is
composed
fellow
men
belong,
who
talk
one another
To that environment
and act as
do
my
who answer my
like myself,
world
is
reality,
I also
Or, if
exhibiting features of an apparently identical character.
I take any specific part of it, say a tree in my neighbour's
garden, I apprehend the form of the tree with its trunk, and
autumn,
in
fact,
its
its
growth,
its
temporal relations.
of
my own
inner
life,
independent of that
life,
permanent
having existence beyond the moment of my
apprehension, identical, or retaining a certain unity of structure,
or
which
is
characterised
forming part of
enumeration of
"
"
immediately
additions
to
the
given
strictly
by sense
sensory
190
DAWES
G.
HICKS.
The
tree
is regarded
by
thus
imply by
assigning to
(a)
actuality
me
it
have in
Certainly I
What
as real or actual.
do
come
seek.
And
to regard as unreal.
that antithesis
not far to
is
my
present
environment, and, however distinct and clear that representation may be, it would, in contrast to the object before me, be
unhesitatingly described as unreal.
of apprehension
doubt about what I
be
may
alike,
the reality
call
In colour, in form, in
two
between
reality
and ideality
me no
opposition
the word real would have for me no
meaning.
how
tried to
in question
show
may
be
feeling
which in
normal
is largely,
absent
circumstances
when
i,
may
be
a content identical
p. 200.
sense-perception.
recognition,
and I
am
it
am
is to
If I
simple solution
This difference,
abundance.
191
majority of cases I
am
am
question.
life.
We
can offer
admission has
the
scarcely received
attention
it
deserves.
somehow
power
that must be assumed
retaining or reviving past experience,
to be a fundamental characteristic of conscious activity. Without
this power even the most rudimentary development in mind
would be altogether precluded.
But, although we cannot
certain continuity of being, a certain
of
regard to
the fact of
(if
What
is
we may employ
is a crucial
problem
which psychology cannot
there
far,
revival
am
we maintain, as
in sense-perception we are
directly
a real thing, how are we to interpret
discriminating features of
the content when no real thing
is
If
actually before us
In a
he means that
"
new way
the doctrine;
"
p.vj
yevotro.
"
I raise
If
that
of ideas
"
"
no voice in defence of
by "content" be intended a
intervenes between reality and
192
G.
the knower,"
if
DAWES
implies that
it
HICKS.
the things
Stout
is
is
we
perception,
But, as Professor
Even
in respect to sense-
is
"
the thing,"
This, then,
aufgefasst by our act of perceiving.
"
to use Professor Stout's own phraseology, in so far as it is
is
if
what
we
for convenience
resist converting it
that
it is
separated,
if
we think
of
it
as that
which
arises
"
content,"
memory.
Just as
little in
to
memory
to
Here, again,
it is
is
"
content
then, in
the
"
is
regard
we compelled
is first
known
193
however,
is
Hades
is,
as
which
in
we
"
reproduced."
say,
There
is
no psychical
shades of
purpose
making their appearance at irregular intervals
"
on the field of consciousness there are no " images stored
of
up
some sub-psychical
in
summoned
We
at will.
no mythology of that
case of
owing
what may be
the
to
fact
cellar,
Eather have we
sort.
"
called the
that
acts
to
do with a
of consciousness
economy
"
;
are
of
capable
apprehension
being revived, the work of discrimination, once accomplished, need not be constantly repeated in all its details
of
in an act of
memory,
discrimination
may
proceed on a
"
memory-image
construction
is,
made up
then,
just
as
as
little
of psychical material
The
basis,
so-called
percept a
not something
the
it is
content
its
is
way
is
mental
we
assign to
it
Were
* No doubt we do
ordinarily regard the "memory-image" as in a
sense subjective, but that is a sense of the term subjective, which in
no way
conflicts
my paper in ftoceedingt,
194
I in
doubt about
seek to allay
my
myself of
its
act of apprehending.
is
in the apprehension of
was unable
HICKS.
its reality,
my
tests to satisfy
of
DAWES
G.
what
apprehending as a transitory
momentary phase of his own inner life, which relatively to it
is permanent, it would be impossible to effect that distinction
independent.
conceived as strictly correlative, that recognition of the distinction on each side must pass through successive stages from
the relatively obscure to the relatively clear, from the
relatively confused
specially to
What
emphasise
is
that
we
want
is
inconceivable apart
Any
the same, the recognition of permanence depends upon characteristics of the mental life itself, and is essentially a mental
process.
permanence
become facts of experience.
of the object to
may
be called the
Sense-presentations fall
general order of sense experiences.
and
marked
contrasted
those that
groups,
readily into two well
are variable and those that are relatively uniform and constant.
The former
dependent on extra-organic
those which result from more or less
exclusively
195
bodily conditions.
Characteristic
presentations
The
the presentations which come about as their consequence.
of
reference
for
the
centre
the
also
is
peculiar experiences
body
which we group under the head of feeling. Sensuous feeling
is localised in the body, and the evidence of language justifies
us in saying that primitive peoples even localised emotions and
passions in the body. It is interesting to note that, in regard to
bodily experience, a marked change takes place in the course
In our mature mental life, we think of the
of development.
extra-organic world as the constant, as that over against which
For the primitive mind, on the
is variable.
our perceiving
self,
whilst experience
which breaks
in, so
presentations.
would
Too much
upon
"
intersubjective intercourse."
as the conception of
Beyond
been laid
question, so soon
common
of course, recognition of
their
and thereby,
But
certainly the
primitive
N 2
196
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
subject
What
outer or external.
in ascribing the
The key
mark
as, in
contrast to myself,
of externality to that
which
peculiarities
the
of
bodily experiences.
is
perceived
be found in the
The
characteristic
further,
when
it
call space.
No
other meaning
We
movement
extendedness
is
visual
The
presentations.
immediately apprehended.
is complex and derivative.
said to be, in
any
of
sense,
space
perceptive.
to perception,
apprehended
simultaneously
as
distinct
presentations
will
197
On
number
life
essentially
depends.
Here,
of
too,
them
is,
however,
there
movement
is
then, the
as external or outer
is
to
self.
be
For
extensity emerges.
and the
of psychical being,
must come
and
of extendedness,
and
of physical being,
Apprehension
of self as
is
parallel to apprehension of
characterised by space-extendedness.
The
space
is
We
198
G.
no support
DAWES
HICKS.
component
mind.
the finite
itself, at
absence
all,
is
to be
realised by
aware
of itself, or to be
its
it.
(d)
by me as possessing a certain unity
and identity amidst the variety of its modes of appearance.
Its qualities,
are
figure, position, solidity, colour and the rest,
The
tree is regarded
their apprehension,
meaning
sufficient
here to
made
in
an
the thing
is
way
in which that
its
ways
of appearing.
is
to be discerned a corresponding
subject had
come vaguely,
own
inner
life.
advance
Unless the
own
for it to
qualities.
As
before,
of
a unity and
on the other
is
I tend
to regard
199
Be it observed, however,
apprehension of it.
that in thus thinking of our perceptions as products of some
dition, of
my
we do not
external agency,
it
is
the
known
objects of
metaphysical
justification,
or
want
of justification,
of
this
inference on our part, and direct attention merely to the correlative conception respecting the inner life, in conjunction with
to
comes
and confused
at
be made.
to
first,
although in
Although
no sense
within that
life
as such or of
The animism
life.
of
what he
primitive
calls himself
reflection,
an
evidence were
prevalent amongst
of
of
the strictly correlative character
the conceptions
needed,
of force or power in nature and of effort or activity originating
us, is sufficient evidence, if
from ourselves.
(/) Finally,
an interdependent
ception of
my
and
it,
mode
of existence
perception,
it
is
independent
of
I assign
my
per-
although independent of
nevertheless connected with other things,
that,
liable
to
we form
development which
200
DAWES
G.
In the progress
world.
HICKS.
We
come
to
and
to recognise the
in
way
We
experience in our
Correlatively therewith,
sequent.
after
similar
we
as
and related
those relations
life
we
own
relation
we come
beyond
its
to
recognise a
present phase,
of a cause or
manner
moment
of the relations in
extends in
perception
up experienced
we never wholly
we never wholly come
it
may now
problem
am
very
far,
of course,
what can
mode
in which
be psychologically established in regard to the
knowing, as a process of mind, comes about, is, I submit, a
legitimate requirement.
It will scarcely be disputed that the results of the foregoing
step by step,
we
it
a universe which
actually
is,
known and
its
it.
is
existence or nature
we
are,
may
and
concerned,
the content
no doubt, psychologically
it
is
A contrast between
But the
real.
and the
201
and
a difference,
fullness,
it is
or conceptions
own
inner
new
to
be living
more or
less of
it
mind
to be
the nature
On
yielded
by our
psychological
is
inquiry.
So
far
from
objective, there
logically for
" is
* "The consciousness of
prior in time to
objects," says Dr. Caird,
I need not now point oat the modifications this
self-consciousness."
it
psychologically accurate.
202
it
DAWES
G.
HICKS.
idealism, as
truth of what
may
not
unfairly
his
be
directly,
Cartesian
the
called
immediately, aware of
own
my
Volkelt, in what
is
aware
of what
But why go further
knowledge
am
likewise
an absolutely self-evidencing
paper read to our Society this session, states the case with an
"
At what
explicitness which leaves nothing to be desired ?
stage of its experience and why," asks Mr. Carr, "does an
infant begin to think that
it
of
knowledge, and reject the simple and obvious truth that its
impressions and ideas are its own conscious state ? Why is
there
never an
illusion arises,
from any
exception
and an
In
has
infancy
early
About this
him " inherent
illusion."t
confesses seems to
enough
already been
said.
difficulty,
this
great
must be
free
in psychological idealism,"
It
is
sufficient
now
to
drawn of a psycho"
handicapped by no prejudices and undeceived
-about
its
"
own
states
of
consciousness,
itself
is
utterly
out of
not bound to
might argue,
it
may
is
no immediate,
p. 54.
is,
as a
fact, subjective.
The
"
great
illusion
"
203
that
we
are
as subjective,
we come
to
know
in
consciousness
together
virtue of making, at the same time, a gigantic mistake about the
former.
The subjective idealist who argued thus would
;
With
that,
however, I
am
not
now
concerned.*
The point
of
still
be in the negative.
come to be aware
IV.
We
we seem
an elementary condition
which there would be but obscure and
to arrive at length at
of consciousness in
Cf.
204
G.
inner
life.
The term
"
DAWES
HICKS.
immediate experience
"
sion,
absence
Gewissheit,
experience prior to
Wahrnehmung. At the stage in
of
comparison of
it
no relating
is
and
difference.
it
We
to
the
So
differ
"
"
conception of
led
to
over
for us,
the nature, namely, of the purely sensory
elements of an apprehended content I have two theses to
No valid reason can, I contend, be given for maintainsupport.
ing either (1) that the purely sensory elements of the earliest,
or,
any
later, stage of
"
there
immediate
is
experience
any generic
"
apprehension of
a sense quality and the apprehension of a sense quality when
"
"
that sense quality is interpreted or mediated by thought.
1. With reference to the first point, I can bring out what
distinction
I wish to urge
by
briefly noticing
an argument which
is
often
205
what
is
in
"
that
we could
It is quite incon-
receive an impression
from the world outside with the shaping of which our own
nature had nothing to do." And the ground on which Lotze
bases that contention
two
facts
which we
and
is
of
Wherever between
the following:
state, a,
separating
itself
and B, a
does happen is that, given a relation C between
becomes the cause of B evolving out of its own nature, and as
So that the form of the effect
part of itself, its new state yS.
$
is
as between
from
and
1
,
produce in
new
effect /8
1
,
quite
in
to
y9,
J3.
@ may
How is
contain in
it
it
possible to escape
elements of
representation of
I
which
an accurate
throughout we
is
206
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
when we
stances connected
I appeal here,
objects.
out that
enabled to distinguish in
(c)
of these
causal relation
is
which we are
the second
justified in designating a
No
(6).
No
discover any ground for the common belief that the impression
or nervous change produces the green which the subject is
apprehending. What, on the other hand, it does give rise to,
in some way we cannot yet explain, is a specific mode or state
of consciousness, in
in that
or
in
is
discriminated
is
fact,
but
207
some way, the former physical fact conditionsThe green, therefore, is neither an impression
process which, in
or calls forth.
mental
nor a
state
it
is
of the impression
"
by
and
figures
bulks,
their motions."
impression, and
and
If,
if,
to-
is
a veritable
or another,
into
much
And
current psychology.
certainly,
respect
is
would not be
and thought,
possible, in
to insist
upon
a.
Cf.
Mr. Pritchard's
to us,
article,
already alluded
to,
pp. 52-3.
208
G.
DAWES. HICKS.
occupy, as an isolated fact upon which thinking may be exercised, has only gradually come to be thus recognised, through
a long series of discriminative acts,
if
name
presentation
life force
upon
us.
When
sions
"
nigh
is
retained,
some form
inevitable.
rightly saw,
For
of psychological
"impressions,"
must be in themselves
"
isolated
well-
is
and
Kant
and disconnected
Hume
atomism
Hume
as
"distinct
"
ceptions
or
existence."
"
no way equivalent
known
object
sensations," or
are
to
of
in
mere impressions.
fashion
not
"Did our
writes Hume,
"either inhere in something
and
or
did
the mind perceive some real
individual,
simple
connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the
perceptions,"
case."
reflection along
Hume
himself
The
by
first
Kant.
is to
alternative
Synthesis,
combination
of
the
manifold,
the
feature
as impressions were
of the
mind
209
to
in
"
or relating, of conferring
of
what was in
Kant means
opposed
in
to the
might
be, then,
universal or
However
necessary aspect.
it
No
"
given
In
experience.
from the
really differ
was there
for
insuperable.
it
to
be tolerated
after
that,
"
objects,"
The conversion
Yet
closer
inspection
reasoning by which
reasoning assumes in
reveals
serious
flaw
in
was reached.
the premisses what is rejected
the
latter
position
the
The
in the
210
G.
DAWES
HICKS.
constitution of
synthetic
an
object.
But
and
the
form
of
had
knowledge
been
abandoned,
and,
pure
weary
"An
of insisting,
"
nature
is
certainly a precarious way of
of
a
the
truth
philosophical theory
Only on the
establishing
"
"
to relate, is the
impressions
assumption that there are
as
sheer
impossibilities,
an unique activity
of
thought
is
permissible.
That thinking
a matter of
must be contained.
is
As
a necessary
It
synthetic activity.
the synthetic procedure of
its
mass
of primitive perception
is
gradually broken up
what
is
211
more or
from their
less apart
same
is
perceive some
Can
it
connection
real
experience,
between the
facts themselves,
them by the
connection,
that
between
which
is,
and which
act of apprehension
"
facts
actually
of its
subsists
The only
serious obstacle
to this position
way
is
the
of
no reason
all
is
for
among
of a quality implies
that in the content itself differences are present, and that the
quality in question
rest of the content.
relations are, it
may
is
distinguished,
be
said,
two
sides of one
act.
of related parts.
'
But
is
a relation anything,'
2
212
it
G.
'
will be asked,
DAWES
HICKS.
relation,
related
terms and
blance,
coexistence,
the separation
of
and the
the
abstract
by no means necessitates
like,
from the
conceptions of difference,
facts that are different, or
may
ever,
and
discriminate
A from B
and
to application of the
idea
to
otherwise
unrelated
elements.
ment
abstract
of cognition in a
of a
definiteness, independently of
so as requiring a
relatedness.
If,
content as presented
any discriminating
however,
act of
mind
activity,
and
to bring about
that tendency,
from
in their
if
we construe
an act of
apprehension
discriminating, then we shall find reason for reverting the
the act
of
as
the
outset
213
the conditions
of
and enable us
the
we
so
But
knowledge of
world of
fact.
it
is
what
is
is
possible
upon the
nature which
different
as
may
configurations
assigning
all
of
matter.
own
right,
and we can as
to mechanical as
as
little
life of
of reality than
helpful
to
try to
I find it
apprehends.
conceive of processes of consciousness as
it
214
connected with certain configurations of matter in space somewhat after the manner in which physical qualities, such as green
or blue, are thus connected. We know not what ultimately the
mode
215
IX.
SYMPOSIUM BY
By
1.
THERE
asked what
what
S.
is
it
passivity.
is
ALEXANDER.
may
be intended
when we are
mean
We may
from
is
the
commonly do speak
and
it is
sensation.
The question
of the
consciousness of
separate
is
know how
realise for
of
far I
am
or
myself what
them follow me
in
am
my
this discussion.
216
me
Let
the
in
way
its
which
two
of
movements and
strains,
especially in thinking,
of the eyes,
is
change
tend to
one error
This
second
is
You may
ideas
you may
an idea against a limit and the
sion
this.
but
privileged
external thing.
is
itself,
The
of
like.
Here again
it must
But
I acknowledge
be understood that ideas in this account of the matter must be
whenever you had ideas ABC replaced continuously by ABCD that that was also the only experience
But I see now that this
of activity that you could have.
consider that
is
impossible,
lies
ABC
ABCD.
217
ABC
event
content, as
from
if
the consciousness
of
is enough to show
must be found in some
have said
activity
itself.
As mental
if you
mental
like to call them so, presentations) you may study the
process indirectly by studying the object, and so may delude
(or,
yourself into
The
first
which
"
"
out to enjoy it
there is an
idea present here of
something to bask in, but though I am conscious of bodily
activity I feel myself mentally passive rather than mentally
drives
active.
me
The second
working out
of
an
interest,
and
it
sudden
but
makes
an interesting sensation or a
it
218
I discover in
my own
feeling of
activity
e.g.,
in desire, or
My mind begins
AND STOUT.
to
move
e.g.,
is
There appears
thus to be present in my consciousness of activity not merely an
"
"
as such appears
incipient or nascent movement (and an idea
to
me
on
its
mental side nothing but such a nascent movefulfilled, but a complexity of other
When
tendencies.
Hence the
feeling of activity,
working out of an
taneous.
which
is
At
interest,
which tends
to go with
the
of
warm
bath, or indulging
direction of
my
less clearly
apprehended alternatives, it
it is that activity and
Hence
same
which, as
we say,
the conclusion
or, in
is
forced
upon
us,
where we
feel
219
make up our
Hence,
too,
we can
passivity
is
is
activity
because of
its
am
aware
have what
What happens
of these
must
in
a whole interest
call
desire
is
at
inference, perception,
sensa-
When
work,
my mind moves
by several
converging lines of tendency. As I pass from stage to stageof a train of ideas, I feel the change of direction from oneThe simpler the condition the morethought to another.
difficult is
verifiable.
Sometimes
is
there
and
it
through helping
Thu&
myself out by reference to my external movements.
I can verify that in enjoying a hot bath my mind goes on
moving
and
perceptual
handling
of
the
the
object
perceived,
for
responding to
it
in
220
AND STOUT.
and more
the brain.
particularly in
myself by locating
"
as
it
make
clearer
it
when a
my
to
brain.
great thought
along the
all the cheek."
The second phrase describes
a
but
in
all
consequence,
only
my thoughts, little or great and
of all kinds, I verify the description that they strike along
Tennyson says
brain and flushes
the
Now
brain.
thought
strikes
know what my
that I
brain
I feel
is,
my
my
It
body.
is
is
in time
and
space.
always qualified
must
In other words,
my
mental
When
change my
thoughts from one topic to another, I have an experience
which I can only compare to the shifting of the pieces of glass
a kaleidoscope when it is turned, and this experience is
signs,
call
signs
of
direction.
^^^tJ^m
I
'
"fofr
^y^
not the same as the movements of the eyes in which, with me,
is
movements
when made
definite
can distinguish perfectly well from the movements, simple or complex, which I have described as mental,
changing their direction with the subject matter, but always
Now
what
and
makes
one
is
different,
Moreover,
must go on
mean
activity, I
and that
to
activities^
am
I say I
221
conscious of this
is
consciousness,
recent inquiries which result in the declaration that consciousness does not exist, but I think the doctrine erroneous.
which
it
is
The most
difficult
to determine
upon
That
admitted.
it)
But
what
is
called (I take
my
is still
psychical,
and
If I resolutely divest
plexity.
my mind
upon what
nowhere
is
It seemed to me
found except in the external object.
time that we might describe consciousness as a sort of
at-
one
thrill,
differs,
but
its coefficient
of
like
222
'character in
it
It has
only a
direction which varies with the object that excites the conscious
activity.
To
consideration.
for
and the
desired,
like,
every
object
perceived,
more or
there correspond
imagined,
less
compli-
explaining in a different
What
(1)
way
am
is,
in the
usual
tantamount
"
ence
is
pain, I
am
My
nothing
is
that consciousness
conation and
or
two
verifications of this
of
others.
of
is
else.
The second
thoughts,
as,
for
is
The passion
line is
or interest with
is
him
into a
new mental
223
path, and
it is
him
mainly when
that he attributes his new thoughts to outside influences to
which he is passive. My last instance shall be that of split-off
the antecedent motions are concealed from
Where an organism
consciousness.
ceases to
work completely
for
may
fail
of
mental activity and yet at the same time may very well excite
activity or consciousness in connection with other portions of
the same system.
(2) It follows,
things as
secondly,
There
consciousness.
that all
consciousness
no difference
is
between
is
self-]
these
two
if
ness of consciousness.
lies,
for there is
no
we
when we take
self to
and which
it
aware
mental activity
of
intimacy
is
connected.
and
But whether
objects.
The conscious
sciousness
upon
its
it
self
objects.
is
is
We
self.
'
224
AND STOUT.
and
is
it
is
It consists
a property of a certain highly developed organism.
of reaction, of course unique in kind, of this organism upon
objects
which
affect
It is strictly
it.
comparable to
life,
also a
is
But in so far as
part of the organism which is employed.
these functions are vital, we have to say that the body exhibits
a new quality not found in lower material systems, and the new
quality
is life.
is also
a conscious
one (I do not know where, if at all, the difference in organic structure between a conscious and a living organism is to be found,
but suppose that it has a brain), such an organism exhibits not
life
scious process
organisms, a
as
is
new
life.
As
among
whose structure is so
physical objects certain physical objects
of
their
functions
are
not purely physiocertain
that
developed
logical
it is
a function
There
which uses
it* as
225
an instrument
life
its
psychical thing
is
mental
But
activity.
I can
find in it
no
some of
his successors
is
But
called
would be
to go further
draw back,
in this discussion I
made no
why
difference
itself,
As
be thought that consciousness may be an activity and yet there need not be a
consciousness of it. This is really impossible.
If consciousness
to the first of these phrases,
it
may
is itself
activity
(e,g.,
is
conscious.
The other
an
from
undeveloped
it
uses,"
but
226
distinct.
On
intended),
if
AND STOUT.
it is
is
what
is
my
is
attention as I attend to
my
by psychological
possessed
what
I cannot attend to
interest
when
I can only
I write.
contrive
When
make
to
the
appear to turn
only because I
am
of the expression
This might be expressed
by saying that consciousness or mental activity can never be a
I agree with this, but I think that the fact is
presentation.
it is
considering
it
by help
it.
2.
By JAMES WARD.
embody
all
and yet
it,
main
the
which
his position
and mine
is
agree
that,
'
in itself one
By
this I
stood, attention
now
now
to presentations,
to sensory presentations,
now
to representations
and
now
to motor,
so on.
When
this
'
when
'
direction
it is
227
is
activity in the
narrower sense
is
can
I see
how
when
It is true that
and
else."
Nor
to such a thesis.
up
and nothing
do not
is
attention
is
non-
But the
receptive, affective,
and
still distinct,
distinguished them.*
has himself
But there we
part.
"
f
simple and unique can neither be described nor defined^ r^f^
in any terms.
We may indicate it and designate it; and since >'
in any case it cannot be absolutely isolated, we may succeed in
what
is
best described as
"
movement
is
"
it
literal
movement
to
which we
mean
P2
228
AND STOUT.
Movement,
complete inactivity or
when
there
is
some
acceleration,
history of this
concept of
anthropomorphism
of
we
is
only
to say,
The
thinking
pre-scientific
down
to
its
completely eliminated. I take it that nobody nowadays attributes activity to colliding bodies or to an electric discharge.
the
moon
lights the
sun as suppose
circulation, respira-
of nerves
of which we are more or less dimly aware.
But these we recognise as but the collateral consequences of
mental activity.
There are also other literal movements
due to the so-called voluntary muscles, which are the direct
outcome of mental activity, intentional movements.
Still
system
its
attention.
The source
of
this
figure is doubtless to
be
etc.
But mental
activity,
strictly distinguished
motions
And
"
from
its
correlated to actual
any
and more particularly in the brain."
seems to play hide and seek with us in a strange
or intended,
collateral
229
is
at
rate
in the organism
this fact
If,
"
"
kaleidoscopic
that I
at
any rate
To begin them,
we
in one place
Alexander
find Professor
"
saying
always I am conscious of moving from one point to
another." This seems to suggest the activity of attention as I
should understand it, " my consciousness as one and the same
:
keeps the promise to our ear and breaks it to our hope. For
"
Now that I
presently we find Professor Alexander saying
:
know what my
brain
occur in time
in the
is,
I feel
my
and space."
of
is felt
as occurring
mental activity
what
is it
we have an
of
movement
objective physical
it
in the light of
what
is
as
"
an instrument,"
etc.
There
is
much
me
is
hopelessly
230
bewildering, but
it
would take
my
indicate
main
AND STOUT.
far
can
to
enough
difficulty.
is
to stop.
he proposes to leave
us.
are all
term
"
things
understood
is
Pythagorean
not clear.
is
theorem
with
along
It
blue
green is a
to be handed
if
'
'
phenomenon
On
the
the supe-
intellectual
"
spirit
them
"
taken together," does one become the property or
things are
mena.
"Well, of course
And
much.
"
definitely describ-
*
parallel case, I suppose, would be found in those physicists who
sympathise with the hypothesis recently advanced that ions are only
electric charges and that mass does not exist.
"
metaphysics,"
but
immediately
psychology he unsays
(moment
231
it
he
"
again.
When
desire
drawn
has
the edge of
back
into
appear to turn a
or attention, into
am
an
it
by
considering
help of the expression of it or the object (or content) of it."
But the former is not " mental activity itself," and the latter
"
"
I cannot
has nothing to do with the mind." So after all
attend to my attention as I attend to what I write." Perhaps
am
reading
I agree with
my own
it
meaning into
entirely;
this
when
say that
mere consciousness
"
to
consciousness
the
of
activity
is
deserves examination.
what
incidentally,
and
it
* At the same
time, Professor Alexander animadverts on the
mysterious indescribable activity which Berkeley and some of his successors are supposed to have found.
Unfortunately, no references are
given to Berkeley's works, and his deluded successes are not named. So
far as I know, Berkeley never attempted to describe activity at all he only
insists that volition is the only activity of which we have any experience.
:
i,
says
Professor
232
To put
entirely.
it
in
my own way
what
Bradley appears to be
AND STOUT.
in
psychology, Mr.
as
implies
the
subject-object relation
to
which
What
confess, as obscure
how such a
consciousness begins.*
lies,
continuity.
object seems to
me unmeaning
is
so likewise a feeling
feels.
which no
be no reflexion
first
acts, acts
and
feels,
the
and
is,
"
so-called
any
internal perception
"
that,
abundantly evident, implies a long course of
intellectual construction.
Surely, however, the absence of self-
for
it
is
consciousness
*
vol.
is
no proof
Let us
now
ii,
which was
tion of the
two
priority of activity.
233
means
and simply
But we have
is."*
"
"
stitute their
Why
Elsewhere, in discussing
and how can we call it a
?
"
it is
to
explanation
back on the
fall
'
potential/
for
if
that,
'
'
'
'
'
'potential'
may become
may
the
"
activity that is
phenomenon.
between
He
us.
asks
"
...
failed
"
:
first
later
throughout
to get
occurs to
him
that
Herein
What
is
lies
in distinction
on,"
an
and
from what
complains
intelligible
it
that
reply."
as it
is
he
It
it
has
never
p. 459.
234
AND STOUT.
on
But
to
experience
ception of
distinct
and that
any rate
I think it
Later
from
it
at
its
the
on,
of
call
to the
name.
This percept
we may
an
subject
an internal perloosely
and
but
in
this
acting
feeling,
perception and
object the subject immediately acts and feels
was true
was entitled
would be more
call presenta-
The phrase a
We may
talk of
"
"
and
reflexion, it
act and
*'
feel,
may come
not simply to be a
but to know
itself
as
self,
not simply to
felt.
takes this experience as elementary, " you will find a man who
has never made a serious attempt to decompose it or ever
"
Whereresolutely faced the question as to what it contains."*
"
ever you meet a psychologist," I have replied, who essays to
resolve himself and his experiences wholly into content or
phenomena, there you find a man who, because he can't see his
own
eyes,
The
motive-power."
itself
it is
trying to explain.
p. 116.
By CARVETH READ.
3.
IT
is
paradox
commonest
of
us,
235
that
and
consciousness
activity
the
are
to all
It is
of noetic experience
common
use
but
now Realism
or,
more
of experience.
Strict limitation of it to
form or process
is
difficult.
For
new
my own
Realism, so far as
it
236
in
fact,
STOUT.
as equivalent to noetic
is,
AND
There
Berkleyan Idealism.
be
true.
sky as
is
known
and
this
consciousness
is
is
seems to
me
a paradox
not consciousness
is
to
but
a contra-
Now, what
diction.
is
term, or a
phenomenon
or a representation.
phenomenon
perceived in space it is
;
if
If
of the
object,
movements)
all that
it
is
region of experience
which
is
There
is
also
a kind of experience,
if
may
usually, in
we have an
it
is
normally
phenomenon,
is not even in time.
but consciousness
is
not a
it
It has no
any kind,
and both space and time are constructions within it. The subjectivity of experience is equally profound and inexhaustible.
There
tion.
ascertainable limits of
the meaning and all the value of direct cogniIt responds to every modification of cognition.
It is
lie
all
seen or thought
And if we pause upon any object and call the meaning of
into the light of attention, our subjectivity is in no way
it
own
value.
To
treat
new
the
object has
known
its
is
object or
phenomenon
its
as
237
is a gratuitous surrender to commonsense and to the less intelligent students of physical science,
who have never advanced a single argument to justify their
something independent
who
everyone's
and
it
we
may
will look.
we do not
it if
look, or
if
Heaven knows.
There certainly
Where
no science of
is
it.
is
waking world
We
to
is
it
often
exists for
present
sense of the inadequacy of merely human
speech leads others to add the prepositions together, and to
But all
declare that it is present to and for consciousness.
consciousness.
two
which can be
to
There
is
only one thing, the known world. The least pernicious preOne is tempted to
positions in this connection are in and of.
"
"
content
"
in this use
of
matter of consciousness
urge that
"
what
is
"
it,
and
is better.
to
"
and so are
content of conscious-
ness
is
consciousness
itself,
all
them.
It
is,
treats
any other
conscious
more particularly
238
STOUT.
of the brain.
is
AND
of that study
which gives
to
"
rise
The simpler
content."
lines of
is,
communication between
may
known.
But what
it is
in the brain
the body
itself
sciousness
is
is
a consciousness-construction, so as to abolish
is
difficulty that
as consciousness.
may
"
God is everywhere "
heresy) of saying that
"
rather, he urged, we must declare that all things are present to
direction
of
Now
God."
which
may
known without
this sub-
same sensation at
different times
but
is
never wanting.
And
and conation.
in this
way we may
interpret the
"
subject-
object relation."
are
marginal
marginal
in
reflection
so that percepts
as objects
ideas
are
focal
reflec-
We
jective.
call
some
of
and conation are marginal, and are always subcannot separate these elements of experience and
Now,
239
consciousness
identical.
as to Activity,
change of experience
is
me
seems to
it
same thing
be, in its
most
as change of experience.
All
to
activity of consciousness
and we may
and odours
the
how
of
all
their purposes;
and back of
a subjective crowd
America) there
and impulses. The physical factors of this scene
impress me with a sense of force, which makes me keep out
and at the same time I attribute them to
of their way
all this (as they say in
is
of feelings
The causes
causes.
it
what
Do
and
is
in the subjective
crowd
They
my
ideas
of feelings
all
seem
to
is
much
less easily
AND STOUT.
240
lished, turnings of
and
But
far away.
in all this
I find
The consciousness of
activity
the
like
is,
is,
This
is,
for the
most
all
its
peculiar way, a
momentary
It
processes.
indeed, to
its totality.
the content in
sciousness,
physical,
reflection of
it,
is
possible,
such activity in a
of
highly symbolic in
by
momentary
term
the
reflection
"
self-consciousness."
of
enters,
course,
as
But
this
and character
But
"
consciousness of activity
means
"
is
naturally a narrower
"
"
notion than
it
thinking
my
body
thinks.
It is true that
when a man
is
all
his thoughts,
and
it is
the
his individuality
be said
may
"
241
an
is
affair of distinctions
The expanse
passive.
distinctions.
of the
sky or the
of the street
traffic
is
trumpery
doomed
reflect
to fly over
with scorn
how
all
such
these are experiences of self-activity, or activities of the psychophysical organism and the poetical reflection on trumpery
;
But no
choice, as Professor
Conation
is
is
a character of
much
as it is marginal.
But to
separate conation from the matter of consciousness is possible
only on condition of limiting such matter to objects (things and
feeling
images)
not, namely, in as
is
excite.
of
feelings
activity
is
may
be small.
242
Thus
STOUT.
paper.
that
AND
far
if
my own
hand,
would be impossible
it
much
to say
Ward's
to Professor
has
is, however, one point at which he
agreed with Professor Alexander, which to me seems question-
There
criticisms.
able,
namely,
whether
conation
is
resolvable
He
into
strain
Professor
1906).
identical
be done
it
appears to
me
more
correctly, to the
the best of
my judgment,
"
"
tendency
for, to
The consciousness
243
for
my own
part, I
4._ By
G. F. STOUT.
AGREE substantially with Dr. Ward in his criticism of Professor Alexander's paper and Mr. Bradley 's views, and the points
I
my
to
me
attempting to
therefore only
sufficient as
a basis of discussion
or
shall
Professor Alexander's
general position.
his statement that
connexion between
mental
activity,
is
Now, from
is
consciousness."
inasmuch as
it is
is
so called,
comes before the mind as something to be interpreted by developing its implications and connexions within a
Q 2
than
itself.
It
244
AND STOUT.
From
this
side,
also, Professor
is
known
he said
with
particular,
statement
his
self-consciousness."
For
that
"
consciousness
all
is
not
object.
is
Professor
In the
what looks
what
is
like
"
"
regard
"
itself
content of
whatever
is
in
first place, it
We
explicit inconsistency.
'
consciousness
under
an
and
it
is
phenomena
and
content of consciousness
'
is
consciousness
on activity by
a discussion
"
to say
"
Professor
or thought
of,
"
representation
Eead includes
he must
so that
as
contents
of
and therefore as
245
of them.
position,
or time.
For,
if
we adhere
consciousness and
its
strictly
content,
this
to the
only means
in space
identification
of
that, besides
Nor am
I helped
and
the
further
statement
that
are
time
themselves
space
by
contents of consciousness. For, abiding by the identification of
consciousness and its content, all that can be logically deduced
from
is
that
consciousness.
It
this
required here.
Again,
if
known
But
it is
so only if
it.
that
we already assume
This seems to
consciousness.
is
The
"
being
Every-
real question is
is
me
every relation must have two terms, and the fact that one
term a enters into the relation is not distinguishable from the
fact that the other term b enters into it.
Again, I do not find Professor Head's appeal to physiological
psychology at
all helpful.
his
"
itself is
246
We
existing in space.
to inform us of this.
"
transcendental object."
selves to
mere
involving, as
And
even
if
we
confine our-
it
What
these
large
cannot, of
course,
questions further in
There
distinction
is
is
that
other.
phenomena
are objects of
direct attention,
conation.
my
to apply to
is
marginal.
247
But
The question
essentially relevant.
waive
wish to raise
this.
is
To me
still
become phenomena
be
Subject and
hoping, and
Being
Object.
dissatisfied,
attending, desiring,
fearing, all
dissatisfied, to
or fear.
The
as subjective.
of
the
know
it.
independent
supposed
to
Professor Read
I
of Activity.
is
distinction,
special
for
comment
he proposes
licence
we may
and
three
and
quite
may
be
points
his
dis-
self-activity
his
view
effort
"
change
of
and
As
motor sensation.
to call all
My
is
it,
which we
in
select
consciousness.
we know
as
manner
his
view of the
regards the
first
experience" activity of
Whatever
we
ought,
we mean by
passivity.
activity
would
term mental
AVhen the
"
activity to
mind
amount
runs,"
of
we must
tossed in a blanket, it is
the same
it is
confine the
calls self-activity.
;
but when
it is
248
As
regards
utmost
mean
effort,
exertion,
activity
we
that what
Professor
AND STOUT.
may
be
"
small."
in spite of the
very inconvenient
restriction of the use of the word, and not at all consonant with
activity at
all.
is
ordinary usage.
in
finding.
Activity
distinction
is to
failure.
motor sensation
felt as
is
conation
difficult to isolate
By no means
but some of
it
abstract analysis.
is,
Now,
vague residuum,
by
I simply put one question.
How are the muscle, joint, and
tendon- sensations which are identical with or proportionate to
conative consciousness distinguished from other muscle, joint,
and tendon-sensations ? The difference in their nature is far
On what
physiological conditions
surmised to depend
5.
Reply ly
can the
distinction
be
S.
ALEXANDER.
difference from
me
on questions of
These I desire to correct, gratefully acknowledging criticisms which compel me to speak more accurately,
though not to change my mind.
of
my
meaning.
First of
all,
^possesses a character
fact
in^
NATURE OF MENTAL
11IK
the
like
universe,
red as a colour^ I
redness or
may
But as
life.
249
ACTIVITY.
justifiably connect
may
describe
mental activity or
attempted to
The mere
do.
fact that
Again, and
describable.
is
we can
to
enough
show
to be
it
though mental
complexities
it is
simple in sensation,
it
occurring in various
more complex
in percep-
tion,
grades of complexity.
is
This
is
really
to
the
having
a misapprehension.
When
quite
it
at
all,
and when
say that
I feel
mean only
that
it
my
is
at
why
should what
experience of
is
felt
as occurring in the
mental activity?
why
I venture
to plead
that
so,
we
we
'
250
should only ask if they are so, and if we find this is the case,
make our account accordingly. To me the matter is one of fact,
and
my own
description.
need not
that in locating
my
mental activity in my brain I am using my acquired knowledge of brain, and not direct inspection. But apart from this,
when I say that mental process is located in movements of the
brain, I
am
under which
When,
am
Mr.
transitions (I forgive
him
writing
therefore,
when
is
Ward
about
ments
new property
brain with a
of
movement
consciousness.
There
in the
is
no
thing which
is
At every
mechanical.
point that I
come
Ward it
ground. He
is
complains of
and
I thought,
and think,
it all
important to be so prepared by
path through
This path I think I dimly see; I also think I see
Mr. Ward out of the path.
I wish that the hand I can
the bog.
phenomenon again
How
without
carefully
defining
I describe the
mind
its
meaning.
it were
as if
251
to be a
is
to
phenomenon must be an
suppose that the only
Again, when
symbolical.
to
it
these
me
the
is
are, I
is
merely
business of
mean only
that
it is its
far as
that
something
I say that
All
are
for
things
sensations,
conceptions
perceptions,
of
one
of
mind
as a thing,
and
somewhat
made
up
body and mind, I do not mean that mind may exist apart
from body on the contrary, mind is the property of a certain
of
kind of body.
Next, Mr.
Ward
refuses to assent to
my
propo-
sition, that the only things mental are conation and feeling.
There
is,
Now, here
There
is,
but
it
is
a conation,
As
to feeling,
But
is all.
my
tion;
feeling
and at present
it
seems to
me
'
252
AND STOUT.
But now,
1
this
my
and complexity,
is
evoked.
But the
relation of cognition
The
conscious
of
property of consciousness.
admit and
is
You
one of reaction.
the one
is
mind
reagent,
is,
the only
which
is
insist that
things
But the
to things.
rela-
as physical activity.
we
And
mind.
At any
in mind,
rate,
as regards
may
observe by the
is
Locke, and I
same thing
the
easily recognisable in
Hume
way
category
of
of
particular
mind
is
nothing but
common mind
am
guilty of
it
This
_'.">:'
That it
has referred in the appended note.*
paradox at all is with me, at present, an intuition, and
living continually, without satisfying myself, to express
tration,
terms which
things,
A and
When B
1.
and
B; B
calls forth
at the
is
physical,
A is
am
it
in
is this.
Here
are
two
a mental reaction in A,
no
is
A is conscious
A be myself.
of
Let
of itself.
tion, the
of
"
in the phrase
"
am aware of
myself,"
is
the
"
of
"
On
the
'
still
knowledge,
What
to the
occasion of the
is to
Man, what,
in this context,
do we mean by
Man
'
'
is,
Who
or
we answer,
Do we mean Some one
able, for the purpose in hand, to dissociate himself entirely from the
matter under consideration, so as to arrive at a trustworthy, because an
than ours ? I imagine that various theories are to be criticised, and others
formulated or adumbrated. Does this involve mental activity or no ?
"
There are, of course, many cases when what belongs to us, and can
only in a secondary sense be identified with us, is and must be discussed
by us. But how do we propose to discuss and decide on the nature of
that which alone discusses and decides ?
Is there not something
'
circular
'
in this process
including,
"
that,
mind.'
we are, does not our use of mind throw us back into the
same perplexity which the discussion is to remove ? Do we not need a
yet anonymous third factor a speaker, in fact, who can detach himself
from mind in discussing its nature ? "
'
For, as
'
'
'
'
'
254
AND STOUT.
"
"
of apposition, as in Locke's phrase,
the idea of a sensation j
"
"
when I am aware of the tree, the " of is the " of of reference
and
it feels itself,
and
it
is
of the world of
which
it is
aware.
all
know
there
may
But the
ness.
series,
and when
go on to three terms
two
my
head begins
to spin.
is
my
others.
is
Of
thus
course, I
left
call
and
familiarity.
It
things.
The problems
of
activity
right,
am
over,
knowledge.
own
up
in
memory,
how
I can
of the existence of
by
the
If I
to
we should refrain
what we know to be true,
of
255
just because
accurately to
reflect the
We
depersonalise
we
find in the
whole of our experience, and not asking what must be, nor
seeking for logical connection where we only find juxtaposition,
try to confine ourselves to
6.
FIGURE
to
what we
see.
yourselves
my
astonishment
that seemed to
series of propositions
me
at
finding
self-evident
that
may
be
been accustomed to
Phenomena and
had
trust.
representations,
say,
are
contents of
They
all
therefore consciousness
space or time. On the contrary, space and time are constructions or arrangements of phenomena or representations in
This is intuitively clear. If it be objected
consciousness.
that,
at
any
rate,
consciousness
the
is
is
the
totality
of
related
what
no consciousness of nothing.
is
is
consciousness
What
known
we can know it.
self-evident to me.
is
Again, the
is
identical
256
is
AND STOUT.
no such relation
I see no analogy
bread and the elaboration of cognitions.
of
My
body
But
to
consciousness.
directly
I did not
Stout says
my
deduction
is
the thought-reference of
knows nothing
it
in
Professor
"
the knowledge
whole
throughout
development,
a content derived from sensuous
its
"
'
it
calls
in analysis.
of material things
resolves the
consciousness.
body
as
known
Physiological Psychology
am
and I
into
material thing as
the.
known
justified in saying
rawest material of
an
"
or
indicative
transcendental object
course, that the
is
orectic
in
is,
phenomenon
a transcendental object.'
must distinguish the knowledge of a thing as such
is
Professor Alexander
what Kant
presentation, to
But we
refer
my
judgment,"
have
because
the
raw materials
opinion,
by what
of sensation are
I agree, of
very different
pains give
trouble
to
me
trouble.
as
psychologists,
In
fact,
all
differences of opinion as to
I incline to regard it
directly attended
But whether
to.
feeling
become phenomena
do not know. The case reminds
me
excursions.
what
it is.
a conation so as to study
it, it
attention,
of Poincar^'s frequent
if
that, if
now
forward
it
257
and
this effort
is
marginal.
All change of experience is activity of consciousness, because
there is no such thing as passivity, just as there is physically
no such thing as rest. But the couple active, passive is not
made
thereby
useless:
it
mined by
interest in
activity.
example) to think
an end.
That
is
when
trying to
"
for brevity) are such as the
these sensations (I say " muscle
and there
are small
and
is
not very
much
else
258
November
4th, 1907.
Chair.
carried unanimously.
Professor R.
Dawes
Russell,
replied.
of
259
April
4th, 1908.
May
Dr. T.
Percy
Epistemological Levels."
Chairman, Dr. G. Dawes
replied.
June
1st,
1908.
June
12th,
Dr. G.
1908,
at Trinity
Dawes Hicks,
E.
Alexander, Mr. H. W. Carr, Mr. Sydney Waterlow, Miss
C. Jones, Mr. R. D. Hicks, Professor Carveth Read, Dr. Hubert
Mr.
J.
S.
J. L.
Myers, Mr. E.
W. Hobson,
R 2
260
July 2nd, 1908.
ensuing Session,
re-elected Auditors.
of
the
for his
261
e
262
NAME.
This Society shall be called " THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY," or, for a short title,
I.
"
THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOCIETY."
OBJECTS.
The
Vice-President.
SUBSCRIPTION.
IV.
first
ADMISSION OF MEMBERS.
V.
Any
ARISTOTELIAN
officer
think
if
they
263
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
their nomination
when
ELECTION OF OFFICERS.
VII. The President, three Vice- Presidents, Treasurer, and
Secretary shall be elected by ballot at the last meeting in each
Should a vacancy occur at any other time, the Society
session.
shall ballot at the earliest
all
meeting
to
fill
the members.
VIII.
first
Monday
shall be
on the
to June, unless
whenever
BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.
BUSINESS OF MEETINGS.
X.
Except
at the first
meeting in each
session,
when the
member may
264
PROCEEDINGS.
BUSINESS RESOLUTIONS.
present.
VISITORS.
XIII.
Visitors
may
be
introduced
to
the
meetings
by
members.
AMENDMENTS.
when they
shall be voted
upon
265
LIST OF OFFICERS
THIRTIETH SESSION,
1908-1909.
PRESIDENT.
SAMUEL ALEXANDER,
M.A., LL.D.
VICE-PRESIDENTS.
RIGHT HON.
R. B.
HALDANE,
to 1907).
(President, 1907 to
1908).
TREASURER.
T.
PERCY NUNN,
M.A., D.Sc.
HONORARY SECRETARY.
H.
Albemarle
Street,
W.
1899.
Prof. J.
1889.
J.
1880.
Prof.
W.
1899.
member 1900).
M. H. DZIBWICKI, 11, Pijarska, Cracow, Austria.
Hon. WILLIAM T. HARRIS, LL.D., Washington, United States.
Prof. WILLIAM JAMES, M.D., Cambridge, Mass., United States.
EDMUND MONTGOMERY, LL.D., Liendo Plantation, Hempstrad, Texas.
1880.
Prof.
(elected hon.
1891.
1881.
1883.
A.
SBNIEB,
member
1899.
Prof. E. B.
M.D., Ph.D.,
1902).
States.
266
MEMBERS.
Elected.
1885.
Prof.
1908.
Eight Hon.
1906.
1907.
1888.
Hanever Square.
H. W. BLUNT, M.A., 183, Woodstock Road, Oxford.
Prof. BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., rice-President, The Heath
1907.
1893.
1886.
4,
George
Street,
Cottage, Oxshott.
1883.
1906.
Prof. A.
1890.
1889.
1908.
1895.
1906.
1881.
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1895.
A.
Prof. J.
1906.
1893.
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1901.
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1897.
Prof.
1896.
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1,
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1830.
Street,
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W.
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Conduit
267
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Miss
1896.
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1900.
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1900.
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1908.
K.
1905.
1892.
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Lane, Cambridge.
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1888.
1887.
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W.
Andrews
N.B.
1904.
1907.
1907.
Club,
268
Elected.
near Oxford.
1900.
Prof. C. B.
1886.
1902.
1896.
1897.
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