Philosophy of Law

Two Essays
Alice Hume
Student Number: 306061120
Philosophy of Law LAWS6308
Professor Wojciech Sadurski
July 2014
Word Count: 2128 for first question; 1859 for second question.

Table of Contents
Philosophy of Law .................................................................................................................... 1
Two Essays ............................................................................................................................ 1
Question 1 ................................................................................................................................ 2
In 1958, H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller discussed the concept of law in post World War II
Germany and the revival of natural law as exemplified by Gustav Radbruchs theory.
Here, I give my assessment as to whom I believe is more convincing ............................ 2
1.

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 2

2.

Hart v Fuller on how Germany coped, by legal means, with the horrors of its past ....................... 4
a. Herbert Hart .................................................................................................................................... 4
b. Lon Fuller ........................................................................................................................................ 4
c. The debate ........................................................................................................................................ 5

3.

Gustav Radbruch and the revival of Natural Law in Germany after World War II ........................8

4.

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 10

Question 2 ............................................................................................................................... 11
Rights as Trumps is it a useful metaphor? .................................................................... 11
1.

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................11

2.

Rights as Trumps .............................................................................................................................. 12

3.

Two interesting cases ........................................................................................................................ 15

a. The cook, the cleaner and the trumping of diplomatic immunity .............................................. 15
b. France and the Burqa where does liberty come into it? .......................................................... 16

4.

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 17

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Alice Hume
Student number: 306061120
Philosophy of Law
Professor Wojciech Sadurski
July 2014

Philosophy of Law
Two Essays
1. In the discussion between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller about the concept of law,
arising out of post-World War II dilemmas in Germany about how to cope, by
legal means, with the horrors of the past, whose arguments are more convincing
to you? When developing your assessment, summarise the debate, looking also
at the revival of natural law as exemplified by a theory of Gustav Radbruch.

2. Rights as Trumps is it a useful metaphor to use in order to account for the

meaning and effect of legal rights? Discuss its usefulness (and/or show its
weaknesses) in two or three different spheres of law.

Philosophy of Law

Question 1
In 1958, H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller discussed the concept of law in post
World War II Germany and the revival of natural law as exemplified by
Gustav Radbruchs theory. Here, I give my assessment as to whom I believe
is more convincing

1. Introduction
Legal positivists, such as H.L.A. Hart, believe that law is law, but can the term law
apply to rules so abhorrent, so interminably and morally wrong such as the enactments
of the Nazis during their 12 year reign of terror in Germany during the 1930s and 40s?
This was the question faced by the International Military Court in Nuremberg, German
courts and its legislature in 1945 after the fall of Berlin and the end of the Second World
War. In dealing with it, judges found themselves in the unenviable position of having to
decide which side of the philosophical coin they believed would help Germany, its
institutions and people, cope with the horrors of their immediate past and rectify the
wrongs of the Third Reich.
In examining this debate, I will focus on the famous discussion that took place between
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller in the Harvard Law Review in 19581 where they assessed

H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harvard Law Review,
(1958), pages 615-657.
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Germanys decision to enact retrospective legislation to deal with Nazi war crimes,
which were not, in fact, crimes at all during Hitlers reign. Furthermore, Hart and Fuller
dealt with the revival of Natural law which the German courts relied upon to justify the
way they adjudicated Nazi crimes and in particular the theory espoused by Gustav
Radbruch, one of the most influential German legal philosophers of the twentieth
century, who redefined his position on legal certainty in light of the Nazi atrocities.
Radbruchs formula, as it became known, declares that when statutory rules reach a
level of extreme and intolerable injustice, they cease to be law. 2
I will argue that Fuller, together with Radbruch, provides a better response to the
dilemma posed when there is extreme conflict between statute and justice. I believe
both philosophers walk a middle line, incorporating both morality and positivity, hence
justice and legal certainty, thereby providing a vehicle capable of delivering justice in the
wake of extremely unjust rule whilst maintaining the rule of law.

2 Gustav

Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, (1946), translated by

Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson and published in Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, pages 1-11, page 7.
Philosophy of Law

2. Hart v Fuller on how Germany coped, by legal means, with the horrors of its past
a. Herbert Hart
Herbert Hart (1907-1992) was a well-known and respected British legal philosopher,
Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University and author. His most famous work,
The Concept of Law was published in 1961 and developed a sophisticated view of legal
positivism, distinguishing between primary and secondary rules, in particular
enumerating three of the latter: the Rule of Recognition, Change and Adjudication.3
Hart strongly believed that morality and law were separate and that there was not
necessarily a relationship between legal systems and notion of justice or morality a
legal system can function effectively though it is neither just nor moral.
b. Lon Fuller
Lon Fuller (1902-1978) was a noted American legal philosopher, Professor of Law at
Harvard University and author. He most famous work, The Morality of Law, was
published in 1964. In it, he discusses the connection between morality and law, opening
with an entertaining story about a fictitious King Rex, who attempts to rule his kingdom,
but is unable to do so effectively due to his inability to make the rules of the kingdom
clear, understandable and stable. Fuller contends that the purpose of law is to subject
human conduct to rules and lays down eight principles to do so, arguing that they

H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 1961, pages 89-93.

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represent the internal morality of law4 and that compliance with them result in just
laws and help to avoid arbitrary, evil and unjust ones.
c. The debate
In 1958, the two professors engaged in a debate on law and morality in the Harvard
Law Review, with particular focus on Hitlers Nazi regime and its totalitarian rule of law
followed by the role of Radbruchs formula and the German courts reliance on it to
justify their approach in invalidating Hitlers rule of law, rebuilding Germanys legal
system and retrospectively punishing Nazis who had committed atrocities during
Hitlers reign. This piece is of significant importance in framing the modern conflict
between legal positivism and natural law.
Hart argued against the application of Radbruchs formula to rebuild Germanys judicial
system as he believed this solution would cloak the true nature of the problems5 and
not address the fact that the conviction of Nazi criminals was a moral quandary for the
courts. The question being, do you retrospectively punish the person who has
committed a gravely immoral act or do you let them go, as their act had been legal at
the time? Here Hart distinguished between the invalidity of a law and its morality
acknowledging that in extreme circumstances, a choice between evils may have to be

L.L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law A reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harvard Law
Review 630, 1958, page 645.
5 H.L.A. Hart, above n1 at 619-20.
4

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made and thereby preferring the view that laws may be law but too evil to be obeyed6
as a course of action.
Fuller replied by firstly saying that Harts distinction between the Germans obligation
to obey the law and their obligation to act morally during the Nazi regime lacked
congruence and merit. He naturally went on to argue for incorporating morality into
the law, stating that there must be a relationship between order (law) and good order
(morality) to enable law to be effective, obeyed and, ultimately, just. Fuller suggests that
Hart fails to give credence to the internal morality of law 7 and furthermore, criticises
Harts beloved legal positivism by saying that it is unable to give any coherent meaning
to the moral obligation of fidelity to law8. Fuller thereby defended Radbruchs formula
and his natural law approach to post-war German justice and to demoting Nazi law:9
To me there is nothing shocking in saying that a dictatorship which clothes itself
with a tinsel of legal form can so far depart from the morality of order, from the
inner morality of law itself, that it ceases to be a legal system. 10
Hart and Fuller both agreed, however, on enacting a retrospective statute to punish Nazi
perpetrators. Where they differed was on the question of what the German courts ought
to do in cases in which the legislator had remained silent. Hart believed that it was

Hart, above n1 at 620.

L.L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law A reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harvard Law
Review 630, 1958, page 645.
8 L.L. Fuller, Ibid at 656.
9 Frank Haldemann, above nError! Bookmark not defined. at 171.
10 L.L. Fuller, above n7 at 660.
6
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worse to convict a grudge informer without a retrospective law than to let them go
unpunished,11 whereas Fuller saw the recourse to invalidity as the only real option open
to the courts as he believed interpreting Nazi law according to conventional
interpretive principles was morally unacceptable.12
The basis of Hart and Fullers different views was the underlying concepts of law on
which they relied. Hart argued in terms of a positivist theory, separating morality and
law whereas Fuller adopted a natural law position whereby morality must infuse the law
in order to attain just rules. Radbruch similarly argued that morality must provide a
constraint on law and that consequently, Nazi law never even attained the status of law
due to their obscenely unjust nature. He illustrated his point with the grudge informer
cases, stating that a person who used the oppressive laws of the Nazi regime to remove
an enemy was guilty of murder, as were the judges who decided the case as it was a
perversion of law irreconcilable with the principles of justice.13
In my opinion, Hart and his positivist analysis fails to address the issue of substantive
justice in the wake of the legal challenges left by an unjust regime. Furthermore, it
provides no solution, merely a procedural argument for retrospective legislation without
dealing with the issue of legal validity. Fuller, on the other hand, addresses legal

J. Rivers, The Interpretation and Invalidity of Unjust Laws, 1999, in Recrafting the Rule of
Law: The Limits of Legal Order, Ed. D. Dyzenhaus, 40-65, Oxford, Hart.
12 L.L. Fuller, above n7 at 655.
13 Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, (1946), translated by
Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson and published in Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, pages 1-11, page 10.
11

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certainty together with justice and notions of fairness, which is far more palatable and
thoughtful given the extreme actions of the Third Reich.
3. Gustav Radbruch and the revival of Natural Law in Germany after World War II
Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949) is one of the twentieth centurys most respected
philosophers, as well as one of Germanys greatest academics. He served as Minister for
Justice during the Weimar Republic where his most important contribution was the
Draft of a General German Code of Criminal Law in 1922, which included the abolition
of the death penalty.14 In 1926, Radbruch accepted a professorship at Heidelberg
University. Sadly, following the ascension of the Nazi party to power in January 1933
and their rapid and sweeping changes to the legal system, Radbruch was deemed
politically unreliable and removed from his post at Heidelberg in April 1933. 15 The
next 12 years would prove to have a great impact on Radbruchs life and views.
In 1946, during the aftermath of the fall of Berlin and the end of World War II and the
beginning of the massive undertaking by Germany and the Allies to rebuild
Deutschland, its institutions, cities and wrecked economy, Gustav Radbruch wrote:
Positivism, with its credo a law is a law, has in fact rendered the German legal
profession defenceless against laws of arbitrary and criminal content.16

Stanley L. Paulson, On the Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruchs Post-War

Papers, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006), pages 17-40, page 23.
15 Ibid at 26.
16 Gustav Radbruch, above n13, page 6.
14

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Radbruch is accused of changing his position on legal certainty in his post World War II
writings, but many have argued that it is merely a correction of his earlier work of 1932
and his emphasis on legal certainty.17 In Radbruchs seminal post-war article, he writes
legal certainty is not the only value that law must effectuate, nor is it the decisive value.
Alongside legal certainty, there are two other values: utility (purposiveness) and
justice.18 Radbruch stands back from his previous assertion that certainty is most
important, claiming that it takes a curious middle place between the other two values
because it is required not only for the public benefit but also for justice.19
Radbruch, in his most famous formula, went on to distinguish between ordinary times
where legal certainty must prevail and the extraordinary times, such as Nazi rule, where
the time to prioritise justice becomes paramount:
The conflict between justice and legal certainty may well be resolved in this way:
The positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when
its content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the conflict between
statute and justice reaches such an intolerable degree that the statute as flawed
law (unrichtiges Recht), must yield to justice. It is impossible to draw a sharper
line between cases of statutory lawlessness and statutes that are valid despite
their flaws. One line of distinction, however, can be drawn with utmost clarity:

Radbruchs 1932 work Part II as quoted in Weismann, P., A Question of Morals? Gustav
Radbruchs Approach towards Law, The Student Journal of Law, Issue 3, January 2012, page
5.
18 Gustav Radbruch, above n13 at 13.
19 Gustav Radbruch, above n13 at 14.
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Where there is not even an attempt at justice, where equality, the core of justice,
is deliberately betrayed in the issuance of positive law, then the statute is not
merely flawed law, it lacks completely the very nature of law. For law, including
positive law, cannot be otherwise defined than as a system and an institution
whose very meaning is to serve justice.20
In this, Radbruch tailors a theory that incorporates both positive and natural law,
morality and separability.
4. Conclusion
I believe Lon Fullers arguments supporting a Natural law position and the use of
Radbruchs formula to rebuild Germanys desecrated legal system following 12 years of
Nazi rule is the more convincing in the Hart v Fuller debate. In extraordinary times,
notions of justice and therefore morality must infuse the law in order to restore faith in
the system and the people running it and to avoid the catastrophe and maniacal
abomination that was the Third Reich.

20

Gustav Radbruch, above n13 at 14-15.

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Question 2
Rights as Trumps is it a useful metaphor?

1. Introduction
Ronald Dworkins conceptualisation of rights as trumps demands that the holders of
such rights are treated in a certain way, or that those holders are permitted to do certain
things or act in certain ways, even if social good would best be served by doing
otherwise. Most philosophers agree that rights have a special normative force, even if
there are debates about the actual function of rights, and that rights provide reasons
that override other categories of reasons or policies. As Mill wrote in relation to the
right to free expression being a trump: If all mankind minus one were of one opinion,
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the
power, would be in silencing mankind.21 This may be true, but I think I have doubts
about conceptualising rights this way and would argue that there is a more balanced and
proportional way to view them. Hence, although the metaphor is useful, it is flawed.
Having said that, Dworkins metaphor can be interpreted in a more measured way, as I
will explain below, which would be in line with my preference for a more balanced and
proportional view of rights.

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859, page 20; page reference in the text is to the reprint in J.
Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, S. Collini (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989, page 20.
21

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2. Rights as Trumps
But why do rights have this special and overwhelming force? Surely such power must be
tempered? One way of reducing the seemingly unfettered power of a right is by
combining it with an obligation. As Sreenivasan notes, there must be a duty tied to the
right so that A has a claim against B only if B has a duty to A.22 But what if the duty is
weak? Does that presuppose that the consequential right is also weak? In Dworkins
analysis, rights always trump non-right objectives, but he also recognises that where
there is a conflict of rights, one right can have a higher priority than another. If that is
the case, however, how can Dworkin say that rights are trumps at all?
And does that mean there is a right that trumps all others? Is there a so-called ace of
rights?23 I, for one, do not think so. It has been suggested, however, that the right of
all persons not to be made the victim of a homicidal project may be such an absolute
right,24 however one can think of situations where the infringement of this right would
be warranted. For example, if the US airforce had brought down American Airlines 11
and United Airlines 175 before they had the chance to fly into the World Trade Centre on
11 September 2001, the inevitable death of those passengers only, may have been worth
the moral wringing of hands and lawsuits in order to save the additional 3,000 people at
work in the building that day.

Sreenivasan, G., Duties and Their Direction, Ethics, 120 Vol. 3, 2010, pages 465494.
Wenar, Leif, "Rights", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/>.
24 Gewirth, A., Are There any Absolute Rights? 1981, in Waldron 1984, pages 81109
22

23

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In Dworkins piece, Taking Rights Seriously, he writes:

Individual rights are political trumps held by the individuals. Individuals have
rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for
denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient
justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them.25
To aid with the understanding of the meaning behind rights as trumps it is important
to consider the three underlying principles that Dworkin takes into account in his work.
The first is equal concern and respect, the second is the belief of truth in interpretation
whereby different views about the concepts such as rights and democracy seriously, and
the third is concern for human dignity.26
Dworkin does not argue that rights are unregulated interests, just that there may be
strong right which could trump a countervailing interest. But surely this may lead to an
incredibly self-interested society, one where individual rights trump or mean more
than the collective good.27 The flip side is equally dangerous, in that, asking the state to
impose well-being on its citizens can also have disastrous consequences. There may be a
middle way, however, where collective goals that are largely considered universal could
be imposed on the community, for example, ones relating to education, health and
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1978, Harvard University Press, page xi.
Ajey Sangai, Trump Rights or Right Trumps? Understanding Dworkins rights as trumps
thesis, 4 March 2013,
http://searchingtherightanswer.wordpress.com/2013/03/04/trump-rights-or-rightstrump-understanding-dworkins-rights-as-trumps-thesis/
27 Robin West, Rights, Harms and Duties: A Response to Justice for Hedgehogs, 90 Boston
University Law Review 819 (2010).
25
26

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13

security. This could be compatible with Dworkins metaphor, as giving the community
the tools to be educated, healthy and secure arguably allows people to make informed
democratic decisions that benefit both the individual as well as the community.28
How then, should rights be regulated? This is perhaps where the underlying principle of
equal concern and respect, which Dworkin champions, becomes important. It would
mean that the state must make decisions treating all citizens with equal concern and
respect. Dworkin differentiates, however, between utilitarianisms treatment of some as
more equal than others based on external preferences and his version of equality
whereby the marginalised are empowered. For example, Dworkin believes that
affirmative action is ok as it merely helps to create a democratic working environment,
thus is not at odds with his rights as trumps theory.
But what about when rights compete? How does one balance these interests? Dworkin
describes it thus: we must recognise as competing rights only the rights of other
members of the society as individuals.29 In which case, a bigger trump may trounce a
smaller one. Furthermore, there may be situations where governments can curtail the
freedoms and rights of its citizens in times of extreme and impending danger, for
example, increasing security restrictions in light of a terrorist attack. This lends itself to
the idea that the word trump indicates a situation that is more rare than usual, more
special than common. This is where trumping contrasts with balancing it takes the

28
29

Ajey Sangai, above n26.

Ronald Dworkin, above n25, at 194.

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collective good into consideration but allows individuals the freedom and protection to
live in a safe and healthy democracy.
3. Two interesting cases
a. The cook, the cleaner and the trumping of diplomatic immunity
In the interesting case of Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan30, EU
employment rights law trumped diplomatic immunity. The facts of the case were that a
cook at the Sudanese embassy in London and a member of the domestic staff of the
Libyan embassy in London, made claims arising out of their employment, in particular,
their dismissal in 2012. Both embassies met their claims with pleas of State Immunity
under the State Immunity Act 1978 (SIA) which were upheld by two separate
Employment Tribunals.31
The chef and the cleaner appealed these decisions on the basis that they were denied the
right to a fair trial, hence infringing Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and relying on the decisions of the Strasbourg court to support this assertion. 32
Furthermore, their lawyers argued that to the extent their claims fell within EU law, the
SIA should be disapplied. As the claims also fell under the Working Time Directive and
the prohibition on racial discrimination, they were within the scope of EU law, hence

[2013] UKEAT 0401_12_0410 4 October 2013.

Rosalind English, EU employment rights law trumps diplomatic immunity what next? 15
October 2013, http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/10/15/eu-employment-rights-lawtrumps-diplomatic-immunity-act-what-next/.
32 Cudak v Lithuania (2010) 51 EHRR 15; and Sabeh el Leil v France (2012) 54 EHRR 14.
30
31

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Justice Langstaff presiding was bound to disapply domestic law in conflict with it even
though the dispute was private.
The case was a complicated one given that there were sections of the UK Human Rights
Act 1998 (HRA) which conflicted with the EU Charter, however, ultimately Langstaff J
held that the HRA may not permit the disapplication of any statutory provision by any
tribunal in the UK but EU law requires it where it concerns the material scope of EU
law. He acknowledged the difficulties presented by allowing EU law principles to have a
horizontal effect between individuals, especially in undermining legal certainty, however
believed that by remedying unlawful discrimination, it was justified.
b. France and the Burqa where does liberty come into it?
An arguably more complex case, in terms of which rights trump which, arose in the
recent decision, on 1 July 2014, at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg,
S.A.S. v France (application no. 43835/11, ECHR 191 (2014)). 33 The Court upheld
Frances ban on wearing the burqa or niqab in public, ruling that the 2010 law on
religious headgear does not breach Muslim womens human rights. Specifically, the
Court ruled unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 8 (right to respect
for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights, no violation
of Article 9 (right to respect for freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and also,
no violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention.
French ban on the wearing in public of clothing designed to conceal ones face does not
breach the Convention, Press Release from the European Court of Human Rights, 1 July
2014.
33

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The Court justified their view, and essentially, prioritised another concern over the
rights asserted by the 24 year old French national of Muslim devotion by emphasising
that respect for the conditions of living together was a legitimate aim for the measure
at issue and that, particularly as the State had a lot of room for manoeuvre (a wide
margin of appreciation) as regards this general policy question on which there were
significant differences of opinion, the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2010 did
not breach the Convention.34
4. Conclusion
I imagine that Dworkin would have loved the S.A.S. v France case as his theory was not
only invoked but took centre stage in the Courts reasoning. But does this really bode
well for our future? As one French prosecutor criticised, the extension of the penal
sphere into more areas of civic life is unwelcome and mocked that if a thing shocks or
annoys us, make it a crime! and also says that it creates an unacceptable precedent to
let the legislature decide how one should dress.35 In most of Dworkins reasoning,
rights as trumps is useful and makes sense, however the French case perhaps
demonstrates the weakness in the metaphor where the need for it to be tempered
becomes apparent. In any case, rights as trumps may only be useful where the arbiter of
which right is trumping what is doing so to ultimately protect the interests of autonomy,

Ibid.
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2010/08/10/l-illusionrepresive_1397484_3232.html; and http://www.spikedonline.com/newsite/article/burqa-ban-drawing-a-veil-over-liberty/15324#.U959dF64llJ
34
35

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liberty or dignity, rather than policing the kinds of justifications governments can act on
in different spheres of private life.

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Bibliography
1. Ajey Sangai, Trump Rights or Right Trumps? Understanding Dworkins rights
as trumps thesis, 4 March 2013,
http://searchingtherightanswer.wordpress.com/2013/03/04/trump-rights-orrights-trump-understanding-dworkins-rights-as-trumps-thesis/
2. BGHSt 2, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen (Federal
Court of Justice for Criminal Matters), 1952, page 234 at 238.
3. Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, 1978, Harvard University Press.
4. European Court of Human Rights, French ban on the wearing in public of
clothing designed to conceal ones face does not breach the Convention, 1 July
2014.
5. Frank Haldemann, Gustav Radbruch v Hans Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law,
Ratio Juris, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 2005, pages 162-78.
6. Fuller, L.L. Positivism and Fidelity to Law A reply to Professor Hart, 71
Harvard Law Review 630, 1958.
7. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harvard Law
Review, (1958), pages 593-629.
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the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, Ed. D. Dyzenhaus, 40-65, Oxford,
Hart
11. Leawoods, H., Gustav Radbruch: An Extraordinary Legal Philosopher, 2
Journal of Law and Policy 489, 2000, pages 489-515.
12. Mill, J.S., On Liberty, 1859, page 20; page reference in the text is to the reprint in
J. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, S. Collini (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989

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13. Paulson, Stanley L., On the Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruchs
Post-War Papers, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006), pages
17-40.
14. Radbruch, G., Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, (1946),
translated by Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson and published
in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, pages 1-11Haldemann, F.,
Gustav Radbruch vs. Hans Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law, 18 Ratio Juris 2, June
2005, pages 162-78.
15. Rosalind English, EU employment rights law trumps diplomatic immunity
what next? 15 October 2013, http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/10/15/euemployment-rights-law-trumps-diplomatic-immunity-act-what-next/.
16. Sreenivasan, G., Duties and Their Direction, Ethics, 120 Vol. 3, 2010, pages 465
494.
17. Waldron, J., (ed.), Theories of Rights, 1984, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
18. Weismann, P., A Question of Morals? Gustav Radbruchs Approach towards
Law, The Student Journal of Law, Issue 3, January 2012.
19. Wenar, Leif, "Rights", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/>.

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