2/10/2014

ETHICS LECTURES
The Space Shuttle Challenger Tragedy An
Overview
MAE 175a
3rd ethics lecture
Sources: http://www.tsgc.utexas.edu/archive/general/ethics/shuttle.html
http://www.engineering.com
Presidential commission report
http://www.aerospaceweb.org
http://onlineethics.org/moral/boisjoly/RB-intro.html

Despite concerns, under

pressure of media and
management: Launch

Wind blowing down and

along liquid hydrogen tank is
very cold
Engineers at launch point
thermal imaging camera at
aft field joint, measure
temperature of -13C (8 F)
Ice inspection team also
concerned
These people were unaware of
teleconference before launch

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Partial failure
during launch

Black puffs of
smoke from
right aft SRB
joint
Sealed up with
Al2O3 after a
very short leak

Excessive wind
shear dooms
mission

Highest wind
shear ever
recorded ~ 1
minute into flight
Attitude control
and wind lurch
vehicle
Seals re-open,
allowing flame to
jet from SRB

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Hot gases
impinge on
H2 tank

Tank melts,
liquid H2
vaporizes
O2 tank fails,
orbiter
engulfed in
flame
Orbiter spins,
loading causes
structural
failure

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Ethics lecture focus: Challenger Disaster,

Mission-51L
Showing of 3rd video

Ethics lecture focus: Challenger Disaster,

Mission-51L
Wrap up after 3rd video

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Reflections
Role of the engineer
Role of the manager-engineer (important)
Can sometimes best translate engineering judgment and
experience into decisions
Organization and Communication
Complicated, closed- and open- meetings in levels
NASA management decision to proceed due to LACK
of data (and possibly lack of judgment?)
Reversal of older cautionary procedures
Pressure of superiors (white house, media)

The ethical dilemma

What could NASA management have done differently?

What, if anything, could their subordinates have done differently?
Does it change your opinion to know that NASA was considering a
new vendor for the SRBs (and Morton Thiokol knew this)?
What should Roger Boisjoly have done differently (if anything)?
In answering this question, keep in mind that, at his age, the
prospect of finding a new job if he was fired was slim. He also had
a family to support.
What do you (the students) see as your future engineering
professional responsibilities in relation to both being loyal to
management and protecting the public welfare?

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Bibiography
(to go with suggested references at the beginning)

Feynman, Richard Phillips. What Do You Care What Other People Think: Further Adventures of a Curious
Character. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub, ISBN 0553347845, Dec 1992. Reference added by request of
Sharath Bulusu, as being pertinent and excellent reading - 8-25-00.
Lewis, Richard S.Challenger: The Final Voyage. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
McConnell, Malcolm.Challenger: A Major Malfunction. Garden City: Doubleday, 1987.
Trento, Joseph J.Prescription for Disaster, New York: Crown, c1987.
United States Congress House Committee on Science and Technology.Investigation of the Challenger
Accident: Hearings before the Committee on Science and Technology, US House of Representatives, NinetyNinth Congress, Second session .... Washington: US G.P.O., 1986.
United States Congress House Committee on Science and Technology.Investigation of the Challenger
Accident: Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth
Congress, Second session. Washington: US G.P.O., 1986.
United States Congress House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. NASA's Response to the
Committee's Investigation of the "Challenger" Accident: Hearing before the Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, First session, February 26, 1987.
Washington: US G.P.O., 1987.
United States Congress Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on
Science, Technology, and Space. Space Shuttle Accident: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science,
Technology, and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate,
Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second session, on space shuttle accident and the Rogers Commission report,
February 18, June 10, and 17, 1986. Washington: US G.P.O., 1986.