G.R. No.

167982

August 13, 2008

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.
MERCEDITAS DE SAHAGUN, MANUELA T. WAQUIZ and RAIDIS J. BASSIG, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 dated April 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78008 which set aside the
Orders dated March 10, 2003 and June 24, 2003 of the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman in OMBADM-0-00-0721.
The material antecedents are as follows:
On November 13, 1992, respondent Raidis J. Bassig, Chief of the Research and Publications Division of
the Intramuros Administration, submitted a Memorandum to then Intramuros Administrator Edda V.
Henson (Henson) recommending that Brand Asia, Ltd. be commissioned to produce a video
documentary for a television program, as well implement a media plan and marketing support services
for Intramuros.
On November 17, 1992, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Intramuros Administration,
composed of respondent Merceditas de Sahagun, as Chairman, with respondent Manuela T. Waquiz and
Dominador C. Ferrer, Jr. (Ferrer), as members, submitted a recommendation to Henson for the approval
of the award of said contract to Brand Asia, Ltd. On the same day, Henson approved the
recommendation and issued a Notice of Award to Brand Asia, Ltd.
On November 23, 1992, a contract of service to produce a video documentary on Intramuros for TV
program airing was executed between Henson and Brand Asia, Ltd. On December 1, 1992, a Notice to
Proceed was issued to Brand Asia, Ltd.
On June 2, 1993, the BAC, with Augusto P. Rustia (Rustia) as additional member, recommended to
Henson the approval of the award of contract for print collaterals to Brand Asia, Ltd. On the same day,
Henson approved the recommendation and issued a Notice of Award/Notice to Proceed to Brand Asia,
Ltd.
On June 22, 1993, a contract of services to produce print collaterals was entered between Henson and
Brand Asia, Ltd.
On March 7, 1995, an anonymous complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission Against Graft
and Corruption (PGAC) against Henson in relation to the contracts entered into with Brand Asia, Ltd.
On November 30, 1995, Henson was dismissed from the service by the Office of the President upon
recommendation of the PGAC which found that the contracts were entered into without the required
public bidding and in violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
On August 8, 1996, an anonymous complaint was filed with the Ombudsman against the BAC in
relation to the latters participation in the contracts with Brand Asia, Ltd. for which Henson was
dismissed from service.
On September 5, 2000, Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) filed criminal and administrative charges
against respondents, along with Ferrer and Rustia, for violation of Section 3 (a) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019
in relation to Section 1 of Executive Order No. 302 and grave misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and gross violation of Rules and Regulations pursuant to the
Administrative
Code
of
1987,
docketed
as
OMB-0-00-1411
and
OMB-ADM-0-00-0721,
respectively.2 OMB-0-00-1411 was dismissed on February 27, 2002 for lack of probable cause. 3
In his proposed Decision4 dated June 19, 2002, Graft Investigation Officer II Joselito P. Fangon
recommended the dismissal of OMB-ADM-0-00-0721.

However, then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo disapproved the recommendation. In an Order 5dated
March 10, 2003, he held that there was substantial evidence to hold respondents administratively
liable since the contracts awarded to Brand Asia, Ltd. failed to go through the required procedure for
public bidding under Executive Order No. 301 dated July 26, 1987. Respondents and Ferrer were found
guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed from service. Rustia was found guilty of simple misconduct
and suspended for six months without pay.
On March 17, 2003, respondents, along with Rustia, filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 6
On June 24, 2003, Ombudsman Marcelo issued an Order7 partially granting the motion for
reconsideration. Respondents and Ferrer were found guilty of the lesser offense of simple misconduct
and suspended for six months without pay. Rustia's suspension was reduced to three months.
Dissatisfied, respondents filed a Petition for Review 8 with the CA assailing the Orders dated March 10,
2003 and June 24, 2003 of the Ombudsman.
On April 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision 9 setting aside the Orders dated March 10, 2003 and June
24, 2003 of the Ombudsman. The CA held that respondents may no longer be prosecuted since the
complaint was filed more than seven years after the imputed acts were committed which was beyond
the one year period provided for by Section 20 (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as
"The Ombudsman Act of 1989"; and that the nature of the function of the Ombudsman was purely
recommendatory and it did not have the power to penalize erring government officials and employees.
The CA relied on the following statement made by the Court in Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman,10 to wit:
x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner [Tapiador] was administratively liable, the
Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government
service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph 3, of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal
of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.11(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues (1) whether Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770
prohibits administrative investigations in cases filed more than one year after commission, and (2)
whether the Ombudsman only has recommendatory, not punitive, powers against erring government
officials and employees.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
The issues in the present case are settled by precedents.
On the first issue, well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not
prescribe.12Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and
employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of
the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics
faith and confidence in our government.13
Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:
SEC. 20. Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary
investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
xxx
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of. (Emphasis supplied)
proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed after one
year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.
In Melchor v. Gironella,14 the Court held that the period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does
not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it

would investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word "may" in the provision is
construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. 15 Where the words of a statute are clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.16
In Filipino v. Macabuhay,17 the Court interpreted Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 in this manner:
Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision [Section 20(5) of RA 6770)],
respondent's complaint is barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one
year after the alleged commission of the acts complained of.
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as
petitioner contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer
discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman
whether or not to conduct an investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after
one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In fine, the
complaint is not barred by prescription.18 (Emphasis supplied)
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word "may" is
directory, the negative phrase "may not" is mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified
by the word "not," becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in character, is not
plausible. It is not supported by jurisprudence on statutory construction.
As the Court recently held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,19 Section 20 of R.A. No.
6770 has been clarified by Administrative Order No. 17, 20 which amended Administrative Order No. 07,
otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 4, Rule III21of the
amended Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman reads:
Section 4. Evaluation. - Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to
determine whether the same may be:
a) dismissed outright for any grounds stated under Section 20 of Republic Act No.
6770, provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall be
discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned;
b) treated as a grievance/request for assistance which may be referred to the Public Assistance
Bureau, this Office, for appropriate action under Section 2, Rule IV of this Rules;
c) referred to other disciplinary authorities under paragraph 2, Section 23, R.A. 6770 for the
taking of appropriate administrative proceedings;
d) referred to the appropriate office/agency or official for the conduct of further fact-finding
investigation; or
e) docketed as an administrative case for the purpose of administrative adjudication by the
Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation of a
complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
Thus, while the complaint herein was filed only on September 5, 2000, or more than seven years after
the commission of the acts imputed against respondents in November 1992 and June 1993, it was
within the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the investigation of the subject complaint.
On the second issue, the authority of the Ombudsman to determine the administrative liability of a
public official or employee, and to direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed is likewise settled.

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court has ruled that the statement in Tapiador that made
reference to the power of the Ombudsman to impose an administrative penalty was merely an obiter
dictum and could not be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court, thus:
x x x [A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of
the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the
administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the
Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient
explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case.
Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from
judicial examination.23 (Emphasis supplied)
In Estarija v. Ranada,24 the Court reiterated its pronouncements in Ledesma and categorically stated:
x x x [T]he Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the
powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section
15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and
employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. To conclude, we hold that Sections
15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers of the
Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this
constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under
Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public
official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
The power of the Ombudsman to directly impose administrative sanctions has been repeatedly
reiterated in the subsequent cases of Barillo v. Gervasio,26 Office of the Ombudsman v.
Madriaga,27Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,28 Balbastro v. Junio,29 Commission on Audit,
Regional Office No. 13, Butuan City v. Hinampas,30 Office of the Ombudsman v. Santiago, 31 Office of the
Ombudsman v. Lisondra,32 and most recently in Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v. Abugan33and
continues to be the controlling doctrine.
In fine, it is already well-settled that the Ombudsman's power as regards the administrative penalty to
be imposed on an erring public officer or employee is not merely recommendatory.
The Ombudsmanhas the power to directly impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary, found to be at fault, within the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority as provided
in the Constitution, R.A. No. 6770, as well as jurisprudence. This power gives the said constitutional
office teeth to render it not merely functional, but also effective. 34
Thus, the CA committed a reversible error in holding that the case had already prescribed and that
the Ombudsman does not have the power to penalize erring government officials and employees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78008 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 24, 2003 of the Office of
the Ombudsman is REINSTATED.

G.R. No. 168617

February 19, 2007

BERNADETTE L. ADASA, petitioner,

vs.
CECILLE S. ABALOS, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Bernadette L. Adasa,
seeks to nullify and set aside the 21 July 2004 Decision 1 and 10 June 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 which nullified the Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The
Resolutions of the DOJ reversed and set aside the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City, which found on reinvestigation probable cause against petitioner, and directed the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to withdraw the information for Estafa against petitioner.
The instant case emanated from the two complaints-affidavits filed by respondent Cecille S. Abalos on
18 January 2001 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, against petitioner for Estafa.
Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through deceit, received and encashed
two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondents knowledge and consent and that
despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the
checks.
On 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she received and encashed the
two checks issued in favor of respondent.
In her Supplemental Affidavit filed on 29 March 2001, petitioner, however, recanted and alleged
instead that it was a certain Bebie Correa who received the two checks which are the subject matter of
the complaints and encashed the same; and that said Bebie Correa left the country after
misappropriating the proceeds of the checks.
On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding
probable cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate Informations for Estafa Thru
Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under Article 315 in relation to Articles
171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Consequently, two separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner docketed as Criminal Cases No.
8781 and No. 8782, raffled to Branches 4 and 5, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, respectively.
This instant petition pertains only to Criminal Case No. 8782.
On 8 June 2001, upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8782 issued an order
directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to conduct a reinvestigation.
After conducting the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution
dated 30 August 2001, affirming the finding of probable cause against petitioner.
Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case No. 8782, petitioner entered an
unconditional plea of not guilty.3
Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner filed a Petition
for Review before the DOJ on 15 October 2001.
In a Resolution dated 11 July 2002, the DOJ reversed and set aside the 30 August 2001 resolution of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for
Estafa against petitioner.
The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a "Motion to
Withdraw Information" on 25 July 2002.
On 26 July 2002, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ arguing
that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No.
70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition
for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the
petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed Section 12
thereof mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of the petition for review before
the DOJ.
In a resolution dated 30 January 2003, the DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration opining that
under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not
precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused has already been
arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language "may" utilized in Section 12 whereby the
Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the
accused has been arraigned.
Meanwhile, on 27 February 2003, the trial court issued an order granting petitioners "Motion to
Withdraw Information" and dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782. No action was taken by respondent or
any party of the case from the said order of dismissal.
Aggrieved by the resolution of the DOJ, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Respondent raised the following issues before the appellate court:
1. Whether or not the Department of Justice gravely abused its discretion in giving due course
to petitioners petition for review despite its having been filed after the latter had already been
arraigned;
2. Whether or not there is probable cause that the crime of estafa has been committed and that
petitioner is probably guilty thereof;
3. Whether or not the petition before the Court of Appeals has been rendered moot and
academic by the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782.
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 21 July 2004 granted respondents petition and reversed the
Resolutions of the DOJ dated 11 July 2002 and 30 January 2003.
In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70
which states "[i]f an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the
petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned," ruled that since

petitioner was arraigned before she filed the petition for review with the DOJ, it was imperative for the
DOJ to dismiss such petition. It added that when petitioner pleaded to the charge, she was deemed to
have waived her right to reinvestigation and right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.
Anent the second issue, the Court of Appeals declared that the existence of probable cause or the lack
of it, cannot be dealt with by it since factual issues are not proper subjects of a Petition for Certiorari.
In disposing of the last issue, the Court of Appeals held that the order of the trial court dismissing the
subject criminal case pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the DOJ did not render the petition moot
and academic. It said that since the trial courts order relied solely on the resolutions of the DOJ, said
order is void as it violated the rule which enjoins the trial court to assess the evidence presented
before it in a motion to dismiss and not to rely solely on the prosecutors averment that the Secretary
of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case.
Dissatisfied by the Court of Appeals ruling, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration setting forth
the following grounds:
1. that the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No. 70 is permissive
and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact that
the accused had been arraigned;
2. that the contemporaneous construction by the Secretary of Justice should be given great
weight and respect;
3. that Section 7 of the Circular applies only to resolutions rendered pursuant to a preliminary
investigation, not on a reinvestigation;
4. that the trial courts order of dismissal of the criminal case has rendered the instant petition
moot and academic;
5. that her arraignment was null and void it being conducted despite her protestations; and
6. that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of her right to preliminary
investigation has been nullified or recalled by virtue of the trial courts order of reinvestigation. 4
The Court of Appeals stood firm by its decision. This time, however, it tried to construe Section 7 side
by side with Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 and attempted to reconcile these two provisions.
According to the appellate court, the phrase "shall not" in paragraph two, first sentence of Section 7 of
subject circular, to wit:
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be
given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
employed in the circular denotes a positive prohibition. Applying the principle in statutory construction
- that when a statute or provision contains words of positive prohibition, such as "shall not," "cannot,"
or "ought not" or which is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise
than designated, that statute or provision is mandatory, thus rendering the provision mandatory it
opined that the subject provision simply means that the Secretary of Justice has no other course of
action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when arraignment of an accused had already taken
place prior to the filing of the petition for review.
On the other hand, reading Section 12 of the same circular which reads:
The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon
motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken; x x x.
the Court of Appeals opined that the permissive word "may" in Section 12 would seem to imply that
the Secretary of Justice has discretion to entertain an appeal notwithstanding the fact that the accused

has been arraigned. This provision should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to
Section 7. The two provisions, taken together, simply meant that when an accused was already
arraigned when the aggrieved party files a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and
should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead dismiss or
deny it outright. The appellate court added that the word "may" in Section 12 should be read as "shall"
or "must" since such construction is absolutely necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the
rule as gathered from the context.
As to the contemporaneous construction of the Secretary of Justice, the Court of Appeals stated that
the same should not be given weight since it was erroneous.
Anent petitioners argument that Section 7 of the questioned circular applies only to original
resolutions that brought about the filing of the corresponding informations in court, but not to
resolutions rendered pursuant to a motion for reinvestigation, the appellate court simply brushed aside
such contention as having no basis in the circular questioned.
It also rejected petitioners protestation that her arraignment was forced upon her since she failed to
present any evidence to substantiate the same.
It is petitioners contention that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of her right to
preliminary investigation has been nullified by virtue of the trial courts order or reinvestigation. On this
score, the Court of Appeals rebuffed such argument stating that there was no "supposed waiver of
preliminary investigation" to speak of for the reason that petitioner had actually undergone preliminary
investigation.
Petitioner remained unconvinced with the explanations of the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition.
Again, petitioner contends that the DOJ can give due course to an appeal or petition for review despite
its having been filed after the accused had already been arraigned. It asserts that the fact of
arraignment of an accused before the filing of an appeal or petition for review before the DOJ "is not at
all relevant" as the DOJ can still take cognizance of the appeal or Petition for Review before it. In
support of this contention, petitioner set her sights on the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Mogul, 5 to
wit:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if
this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation. (Emphasis supplied.)
To bolster her position, petitioner cites Roberts v. Court of Appeals, 6 which stated:
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way
of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating
prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed
in Court. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals7 where this Court declared:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as
far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor
once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which

the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the
discretion of the court.
The Court is unconvinced.
A cursory reading of Crespo v. Mogul reveals that the ruling therein does not concern the issue of an
appeal or petition for review before the DOJ after arraignment. Verily, the pronouncement therein has
to do with the filing of a motion to dismiss and the courts discretion to deny or grant the same. As
correctly pointed out by respondent, the emphasized portion in the Crespo ruling is a parcel of the
entire paragraph which relates to the duty and jurisdiction of the trial court to determine for itself
whether or not to dismiss a case before it, and which states that such duty comes into play regardless
of whether such motion is filed before or after arraignment and upon whose instructions. The allusion
to the Secretary of Justice as reviewing the records of investigation and giving instructions for the filing
of a motion to dismiss in the cited ruling does not take into consideration of whether the appeal or
petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment. Significantly, in the Crespo case,
the accused had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or petition for review was filed before the
DOJ. Undoubtedly, petitioners reliance on the said case is misplaced.
Also unavailing is petitioners invocation of the cases of Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v.
Court of Appeals. As in Crespo v. Mogul, neither Roberts v. Court of Appeals nor Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals took into account of whether the appeal or petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed
after arraignment. Just like in the Crespo case, the accused in both Roberts v. Court of Appeals and
Marcelo v. Court of Appeals had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or petition for review was filed
before the DOJ.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals interpretation of the provisions of DOJ Circular
No. 70 violated three basic rules in statutory construction. First, the rule that the provision that appears
last in the order of position in the rule or regulation must prevail. Second, the rule that the
contemporaneous construction of a statute or regulation by the officers who enforce it should be given
weight. Third, petitioner lifted a portion from Agpalos Statutory Construction 8 where the word "shall"
had been construed as a permissive, and not a mandatory language.
The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an administrative rule 9 of procedure, is
that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to. 10 Since
Section 7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal
or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary.
Petitioners reliance to the statutory principle that "the last in order of position in the rule or regulation
must prevail" is not applicable. In addition to the fact that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 needs no
construction, the cited principle cannot apply because, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
there is no irreconcilable conflict between Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Section 7 of
the circular provides:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition outright if he
finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised
therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. If an information has been filed in court pursuant
to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been
arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice
from exercising his power of review. (Italics supplied.)
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same circular states:
SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed
resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 3 hereof;
(b) That the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided has not been complied with;
(c) That there is no showing of any reversible error;

(d) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it suspends the
proceedings based on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question;
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken;
(f) That the offense has already prescribed; and
(g) That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal. (Emphases supplied.)
It is noteworthy that the principle cited by petitioner reveals that, to find application, the same
presupposes that "one part of the statute cannot be reconciled or harmonized with another part
without nullifying one in favor of the other." In the instant case, however, Section 7 is neither
contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be seen above, Section 7 pertains to the action
on the petition that the DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with
regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.
As aptly observed by respondent, Section 7 specifically applies to a situation on what the DOJ must do
when confronted with an appeal or a petition for review that is either clearly without merit, manifestly
intended to delay, or filed after an accused has already been arraigned, i.e., he may dismiss it outright
if it is patently without merit or manifestly intended to delay, or, if it was filed after the acccused has
already been arraigned, the Secretary shall not give it due course.
Section 12 applies generally to the disposition of an appeal. Under said section, the DOJ may take any
of four actions when disposing an appeal, namely:
1. reverse the appealed resolution;
2. modify the appealed resolution;
3. affirm the appealed resolution;
4. dismiss the appeal altogether, depending on the circumstances and incidents attendant
thereto.
As to the dismissal of a petition for review or an appeal, the grounds are provided for in Section 12 and,
consequently, the DOJ must evaluate the pertinent circumstances and the facts of the case in order to
determine which ground or grounds shall apply.
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for
review due course and must dismiss the same. This is bolstered by the fact that arraignment of the
accused prior to the filing of the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of the grounds for its
dismissal. Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ, noting that the arraignment of an accused prior to the
filing of an appeal or petition for review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12, must go back to
Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein. In other words, the DOJ must not give due course to, and
must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
Likewise, petitioners reliance on the principle of contemporary construction, i.e., the DOJ is not
precluded from entertaining appeals where the accused had already been arraigned, because it
exercises discretionary power, and because it promulgated itself the circular in question, is
unpersuasive. As aptly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:
True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous interpretation or construction by the officers
charged with the enforcement of the rules and regulations it promulgated is entitled to great weight by
the court in the latters construction of such rules and regulations. That does not, however, make such
a construction necessarily controlling or binding. For equally settled is the rule that courts may
disregard contemporaneous construction in instances where the law or rule construed possesses no
ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists, and
where the court has previously given the statute a different interpretation.
If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or administrative officer called upon to
implement it has erroneously applied or executed it, the error may be corrected when the true

construction is ascertained. If a contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the same

must be declared null and void. Such principle should be as it is applied in the case at bar. 11
Petitioners posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of the word "shall" is misplaced.
It is petitioners view that the language of Section 12 is permissive and therefore the mandate in
Section 7 has been transformed into a matter within the discretion of the DOJ. To support this stance,
petitioner cites a portion of Agpalos Statutory Construction which reads:
For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which states that "banks or other
financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to availability of funds xxx,
accept at a discount at not more than two per centum for ten years such (backpay) certificate" implies
not a mandatory, but a discretionary, meaning because of the phrase "subject to availability of funds."
Similarly, the word "shall" in the provision to the effect that a corporation violating the corporation law
"shall, upon such violation being proved, be dissolved by quo warranto proceedings" has been
construed as "may."12
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes apparent that the same is not applicable to
the provision in question. In the cited passage, the word "shall" departed from its mandatory import
connotation because it was connected to certain provisos/conditions: "subject to the availability of
funds" and "upon such violation being proved." No such proviso/condition, however, can be found in
Section 7 of the subject circular. Hence, the word "shall" retains its mandatory import.
At this juncture, the Court of Appeals disquisition in this matter is enlightening:
Indeed, if the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of Justice a discretionary
power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its being outrightly dismissible, such as
when the accused has already been arraigned, or where the crime the accused is being charged with
has already prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has been committed, or that there are legal
or factual grounds warranting dismissal, the result would not only be incongruous but also irrational
and even unjust. For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition
would serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give the second
sentence of Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert
the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice,
but would also render its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory. 13
In her steadfast effort to champion her case, petitioner contends that the issue as to whether the DOJ
rightfully entertained the instant case, despite the arraignment of the accused prior to its filing, has
been rendered moot and academic with the order of dismissal by the trial court dated 27 February
2003. Such contention deserves scant consideration.
It must be stressed that the trial court dismissed the case precisely because of the Resolutions of the
DOJ after it had, in grave abuse of its discretion, took cognizance of the petition for review filed by
petitioner. Having been rendered in grave abuse of its discretion, the Resolutions of the DOJ are void.
As the order of dismissal of the trial court was made pursuant to the void Resolutions of the DOJ, said
order was likewise void. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a void judgment is a complete nullity and
without legal effect, and that all proceedings or actions founded thereon are themselves regarded as
invalid and ineffective for any purpose. 14 That respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration or
appeal from the dismissal order of the trial court is of no moment. Since the dismissal was void, there
was nothing for respondent to oppose.
Petitioner further asserts that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies only to appeals from original
resolution of the City Prosecutor and does not apply in the instant case where an appeal is interposed
by petitioner from the Resolution of the City Prosecutor denying her motion for reinvestigation. This
claim is baseless.1avvphi1.net
A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no qualification given by the same provision to limit its
application to appeals from original resolutions and not to resolutions on reinvestigation. Hence, the
rule stating that "when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish" 15 finds application in this
regard.
Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and void as the same was improvidently conducted.
Again, this contention is without merit. Records reveal that petitioners arraignment was without any

restriction, condition or reservation.16 In fact she was assisted by her counsels Atty. Arthur Abudiente
and Atty. Maglinao when she pleaded to the charge.17
Moreover, the settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived
the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it. 18 This
precept is also applicable in cases of reinvestigation as well as in cases of review of such
reinvestigation. In this case, when petitioner unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she effectively
waived the reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well as the right to appeal the result
thereof to the DOJ Secretary. Thus, with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ Secretary can no
longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because petitioner had already waived or abandoned
the same.
Lastly, while there is authority19 permitting the Court to make its own determination of probable cause,
such, however, cannot be made applicable in the instant case. As earlier stated, the arraignment of
petitioner constitutes a waiver of her right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. Such waiver
is tantamount to a finding of probable cause. For this reason, there is no need for the Court to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause.
Besides, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and be subject of,
a petition for review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. This being the case, this Court
cannot review the evidence adduced by the parties before the prosecutor on the issue of the absence
or presence of probable cause.20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 July 2004 and its
Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION, EMDEN
ENCARNACION and HORATIO AYCARDO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
May the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation,
as mandated by Section 46 of the Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution?
This is the issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). This quasi-judicial body
recognized Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHA) as the sole homeowners' association
in Loyola Grand Villas, a duly registered subdivision in Quezon City and Marikina City that was owned
and developed by Solid Homes, Inc. It revoked the certificates of registration issued to Loyola Grand
Villas homeowners (North) Association Incorporated (the North Association for brevity) and Loyola
Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association Incorporated (the South Association).
LGVHAI was organized on February 8, 1983 as the association of homeowners and residents of the
Loyola Grand Villas. It was registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein
respondent HIGC, as the sole homeowners' organization in the said subdivision under Certificate of
Registration No. 04-197. It was organized by the developer of the subdivision and its first president was
Victorio V. Soliven, himself the owner of the developer. For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not
file its corporate by-laws.
Sometime in 1988, the officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They failed to do so. 2 To the
officers' consternation, they discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision
the North Association and the South Association. According to private respondents, a non-resident
and Soliven himself, respectively headed these associations. They also discovered that these
associations had five (5) registered homeowners each who were also the incorporators, directors and
officers thereof. None of the members of the LGVHAI was listed as member of the North Association
while three (3) members of LGVHAI were listed as members of the South Association. 3 The North
Association was registered with the HIGC on February 13, 1989 under Certificate of Registration No. 041160 covering Phases West II, East III, West III and East IV. It submitted its by-laws on December 20,
1988.
In July, 1989, when Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI, Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of
the legal department of the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two
reasons. First, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and,
second, there was non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the
association's activities. Apparently, this information resulted in the registration of the South Association
with the HIGC on July 27, 1989 covering Phases West I, East I and East II. It filed its by-laws on July 26,
1989.
These developments prompted the officers of the LGVHAI to lodge a complaint with the HIGC. They
questioned the revocation of LGVHAI's certificate of registration without due notice and hearing and
concomitantly prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of registration of the North and South
Associations by reason of the earlier issuance of a certificate of registration in favor of LGVHAI.
On January 26, 1993, after due notice and hearing, private respondents obtained a favorable ruling
from HIGC Hearing Officer Danilo C. Javier who disposed of HIGC Case No. RRM-5-89 as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners
Association, Inc., under Certificate of Registration No. 04-197 as the duly registered and existing
homeowners association for Loyola Grand Villas homeowners, and declaring the Certificates of
Registration of Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. and Loyola Grand Villas

Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. as hereby revoked or cancelled; that the receivership be
terminated and the Receiver is hereby ordered to render an accounting and turn-over to Loyola
Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc., all assets and records of the Association now under
his custody and possession.
The South Association appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC. In its Resolution of September 8,
1993, the Board 4 dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
Rebuffed, the South Association in turn appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising two issues. First,
whether or not LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the
Corporation Code resulted in the automatic dissolution of LGVHAI. Second, whether or not two
homeowners' associations may be authorized by the HIGC in one "sprawling subdivision." However, in
the Decision of August 23, 1994 being assailed here, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of
the HIGC Appeals Board.
In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals held that under the Corporation Code, a private
corporation commences to have corporate existence and juridical personality from the date the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issues a certificate of incorporation under its official seal.
The requirement for the filing of by-laws under Section 46 of the Corporation Code within one month
from official notice of the issuance of the certificate of incorporation presupposes that it is already
incorporated, although it may file its by-laws with its articles of incorporation. Elucidating on the effect
of a delayed filing of by-laws, the Court of Appeals said:
We also find nothing in the provisions cited by the petitioner, i.e., Section 46 and 22,
Corporation Code, or in any other provision of the Code and other laws which provide or at least
imply that failure to file the by-laws results in an automatic dissolution of the corporation. While
Section 46, in prescribing that by-laws must be adopted within the period prescribed therein,
may be interpreted as a mandatory provision, particularly because of the use of the word
"must," its meaning cannot be stretched to support the argument that automatic dissolution
results from non-compliance.
We realize that Section 46 or other provisions of the Corporation Code are silent on the result of
the failure to adopt and file the by-laws within the required period. Thus, Section 46 and other
related provisions of the Corporation Code are to be construed with Section 6 (1) of P.D. 902-A.
This section empowers the SEC to suspend or revoke certificates of registration on the grounds
listed therein. Among the grounds stated is the failure to file by-laws (see also II Campos: The
Corporation Code, 1990 ed., pp. 124-125). Such suspension or revocation, the same section
provides, should be made upon proper notice and hearing. Although P.D. 902-A refers to the
SEC, the same principles and procedures apply to the public respondent HIGC as it exercises its
power to revoke or suspend the certificates of registration or homeowners association. (Section
2 [a], E.O. 535, series 1979, transferred the powers and authorities of the SEC over homeowners
associations to the HIGC.)
We also do not agree with the petitioner's interpretation that Section 46, Corporation Code
prevails over Section 6, P.D. 902-A and that the latter is invalid because it contravenes the
former. There is no basis for such interpretation considering that these two provisions are not
inconsistent with each other. They are, in fact, complementary to each other so that one cannot
be considered as invalidating the other.
The Court of Appeals added that, as there was no showing that the registration of LGVHAI had been
validly revoked, it continued to be the duly registered homeowners' association in the Loyola Grand
Villas. More importantly, the South Association did not dispute the fact that LGVHAI had been organized
and that, thereafter, it transacted business within the period prescribed by law.
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals reiterated its previous ruling 5 that the HIGC has the
authority to order the holding of a referendum to determine which of two contending associations
should represent the entire community, village or subdivision.
Undaunted, the South Association filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. It elevates as sole
issue for resolution the first issue it had raised before the Court of Appeals, i.e., whether or not the
LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code
had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.

Petitioner contends that, since Section 46 uses the word "must" with respect to the filing of by-laws,
noncompliance therewith would result in "self-extinction" either due to non-occurrence of a suspensive
condition or the occurrence of a resolutory condition "under the hypothesis that (by) the issuance of
the certificate of registration alone the corporate personality is deemed already formed." It asserts that
the Corporation Code provides for a "gradation of violations of requirements." Hence, Section 22
mandates that the corporation must be formally organized and should commence transaction within
two years from date of incorporation. Otherwise, the corporation would be deemed dissolved. On the
other hand, if the corporation commences operations but becomes continuously inoperative for five
years, then it may be suspended or its corporate franchise revoked.
Petitioner concedes that Section 46 and the other provisions of the Corporation Code do not provide for
sanctions for non-filing of the by-laws. However, it insists that no sanction need be provided "because
the mandatory nature of the provision is so clear that there can be no doubt about its being an
essential attribute of corporate birth." To petitioner, its submission is buttressed by the facts that the
period for compliance is "spelled out distinctly;" that the certification of the SEC/HIGC must show that
the by-laws are not inconsistent with the Code, and that a copy of the by-laws "has to be attached to
the articles of incorporation." Moreover, no sanction is provided for because "in the first place, no
corporate identity has been completed." Petitioner asserts that "non-provision for remedy or sanction is
itself the tacit proclamation that non-compliance is fatal and no corporate existence had yet evolved,"
and therefore, there was "no need to proclaim its demise." 6 In a bid to convince the Court of its
arguments, petitioner stresses that:
. . . the word MUST is used in Sec. 46 in its universal literal meaning and corollary human
implication its compulsion is integrated in its very essence MUST is always enforceable by
the inevitable consequence that is, "OR ELSE". The use of the word MUST in Sec. 46 is no
exception it means file the by-laws within one month after notice of issuance of certificate of
registration OR ELSE. The OR ELSE, though not specified, is inextricably a part of MUST . Do this
or if you do not you are "Kaput". The importance of the by-laws to corporate existence compels
such meaning for as decreed the by-laws is "the government" of the corporation. Indeed, how
can the corporation do any lawful act as such without by-laws. Surely, no law is indeed to create
chaos. 7
Petitioner asserts that P.D. No. 902-A cannot exceed the scope and power of the Corporation Code
which itself does not provide sanctions for non-filing of by-laws. For the petitioner, it is "not proper to
assess the true meaning of Sec. 46 . . . on an unauthorized provision on such matter contained in the
said decree."
In their comment on the petition, private respondents counter that the requirement of adoption of bylaws is not mandatory. They point to P.D. No. 902-A as having resolved the issue of whether said
requirement is mandatory or merely directory. Citing Chung Ka Bio v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 8 private respondents contend that Section 6(I) of that decree provides that non-filing of by-laws
is only a ground for suspension or revocation of the certificate of registration of corporations and,
therefore, it may not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. Moreover, the adoption and
filing of by-laws is a condition subsequent which does not affect the corporate personality of a
corporation like the LGVHAI. This is so because Section 9 of the Corporation Code provides that the
corporate existence and juridical personality of a corporation begins from the date the SEC issues a
certificate of incorporation under its official seal. Consequently, even if the by-laws have not yet been
filed, a corporation may be considered a de facto corporation. To emphasize the fact the LGVHAI was
registered as the sole homeowners' association in the Loyola Grand Villas, private respondents point
out that membership in the LGVHAI was an "unconditional restriction in the deeds of sale signed by lot
buyers."
In its reply to private respondents' comment on the petition, petitioner reiterates its argument that the
word " must" in Section 46 of the Corporation Code is mandatory. It adds that, before the ruling
in Chung Ka Bio v.Intermediate Appellate Court could be applied to this case, this Court must first
resolve the issue of whether or not the provisions of P.D. No. 902-A prescribing the rules and
regulations to implement the Corporation Code can "rise above and change" the substantive provisions
of the Code.
The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this case
states:

Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1)
month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws for its government not
inconsistent with this Code. For the adoption of by-laws by the corporation, the affirmative vote
of the stockholders representing at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or of at
least a majority of the members, in the case of non-stock corporations, shall be necessary. The
by-laws shall be signed by the stockholders or members voting for them and shall be kept in the
principal office of the corporation, subject to the stockholders or members voting for them and
shall be kept in the principal office of the corporation, subject to inspection of the stockholders
or members during office hours; and a copy thereof, shall be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission which shall be attached to the original articles of incorporation.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, by-laws may be adopted and filed
prior to incorporation; in such case, such by-laws shall be approved and signed by all the
incorporators and submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission, together with the
articles of incorporation.
In all cases, by-laws shall be effective only upon the issuance by the Securities and Exchange
Commission of a certification that the by-laws are not inconsistent with this Code.
The Securities and Exchange Commission shall not accept for filing the by-laws or any
amendment thereto of any bank, banking institution, building and loan association, trust
company, insurance company, public utility, educational institution or other special corporations
governed by special laws, unless accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate government
agency to the effect that such by-laws or amendments are in accordance with law.
As correctly postulated by the petitioner, interpretation of this provision of law begins with the
determination of the meaning and import of the word "must" in this section Ordinarily, the word "must"
connotes an imperative act or operates to impose a duty which may be enforced. 9 It is synonymous
with "ought" which connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. 10 However, the word "must" in a statute,
like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. In this
jurisdiction, the tendency has been to interpret "shall" as the context or a reasonable construction of
the statute in which it is used demands or requires. 11 This is equally true as regards the word "must."
Thus, if the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object
reveals that the legislature intended to use the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should
be given that meaning. 12
In this respect, the following portions of the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa No. 68 are
illuminating:
MR. FUENTEBELLA. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
On page 34, referring to the adoption of by-laws, are we made to understand here, Mr. Speaker,
that by-laws must immediately be filed within one month after the issuance? In other words,
would this be mandatory or directory in character?
MR. MENDOZA. This is mandatory.
MR. FUENTEBELLA. It being mandatory, Mr. Speaker, what would be the effect of the failure of
the corporation to file these by-laws within one month?
MR. MENDOZA. There is a provision in the latter part of the Code which identifies and describes
the consequences of violations of any provision of this Code. One such consequences is the
dissolution of the corporation for its inability, or perhaps, incurring certain penalties.
MR. FUENTEBELLA. But it will not automatically amount to a dissolution of the corporation by
merely failing to file the by-laws within one month. Supposing the corporation was late, say, five
days, what would be the mandatory penalty?
MR. MENDOZA. I do not think it will necessarily result in the automatic or ipso facto dissolution
of the corporation. Perhaps, as in the case, as you suggested, in the case of El Hogar Filipino
where a quo warranto action is brought, one takes into account the gravity of the violation

committed. If the by-laws were late the filing of the by-laws were late by, perhaps, a day or
two, I would suppose that might be a tolerable delay, but if they are delayed over a period of
months as is happening now because of the absence of a clear requirement that by-laws
must be completed within a specified period of time, the corporation must suffer certain
consequences. 13
This exchange of views demonstrates clearly that automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the
by-laws on time was never the intention of the legislature. Moreover, even without resorting to the
records of deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa, the law itself provides the answer to the issue
propounded by petitioner.
Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself
(optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), 14 Section 46 aforequoted reveals the legislative
intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word "must" in the first sentence
thereof. Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws
even prior to incorporation. This provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory
compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws "within one (1) month after receipt of official
notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission." It
necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the "demise" of the
corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the "government" of the corporation but these are
subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and related
statutes. 15 There are in fact cases where by-laws are unnecessary to corporate existence or to the
valid exercise of corporate powers, thus:
In the absence of charter or statutory provisions to the contrary, by-laws are not necessary
either to the existence of a corporation or to the valid exercise of the powers conferred upon it,
certainly in all cases where the charter sufficiently provides for the government of the body; and
even where the governing statute in express terms confers upon the corporation the power to
adopt by-laws, the failure to exercise the power will be ascribed to mere nonaction which will
not render void any acts of the corporation which would otherwise be valid. 16 (Emphasis
supplied.)
As Fletcher aptly puts it:
It has been said that the by-laws of a corporation are the rule of its life, and that until by-laws
have been adopted the corporation may not be able to act for the purposes of its creation, and
that the first and most important duty of the members is to adopt them. This would seem to
follow as a matter of principle from the office and functions of by-laws. Viewed in this light, the
adoption of by-laws is a matter of practical, if not one of legal, necessity. Moreover, the peculiar
circumstances attending the formation of a corporation may impose the obligation to adopt
certain by-laws, as in the case of a close corporation organized for specific purposes. And the
statute or general laws from which the corporation derives its corporate existence may
expressly require it to make and adopt by-laws and specify to some extent what they shall
contain and the manner of their adoption. The mere fact, however, of the existence of power in
the corporation to adopt by-laws does not ordinarily and of necessity make the exercise of such
power essential to its corporate life, or to the validity of any of its acts. 17
Although the Corporation Code requires the filing of by-laws, it does not expressly provide for the
consequences of the non-filing of the same within the period provided for in Section 46. However, such
omission has been rectified by Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the pertinent provisions on the
jurisdiction of the SEC of which state:
Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the
following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) To suspend, or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of
registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by
law, including the following:
xxx xxx xxx

5. Failure to file by-laws within the required period;

xxx xxx xxx
In the exercise of the foregoing authority and jurisdiction of the Commission or by a
Commissioner or by such other bodies, boards, committees and/or any officer as may be
created or designated by the Commission for the purpose. The decision, ruling or order of any
such Commissioner, bodies, boards, committees and/or officer may be appealed to the
Commission sitting en banc within thirty (30) days after receipt by the appellant of notice of
such decision, ruling or order. The Commission shall promulgate rules of procedures to govern
the proceedings, hearings and appeals of cases falling with its jurisdiction.
The aggrieved party may appeal the order, decision or ruling of the Commission sitting en
banc to the Supreme Court by petition for review in accordance with the pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court.
Even under the foregoing express grant of power and authority, there can be no automatic corporate
dissolutionsimply because the incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-laws embodied
in Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There is no outright "demise" of corporate existence. Proper
notice and hearing are cardinal components of due process in any democratic institution, agency or
society. In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission
and remedy the same.
That the failure to file by-laws is not provided for by the Corporation Code but in another law is of no
moment. P.D. No. 902-A, which took effect immediately after its promulgation on March 11, 1976, is
very much apposite to the Code. Accordingly, the provisions abovequoted supply the law governing the
situation in the case at bar, inasmuch as the Corporation Code and P.D. No. 902-A are statutes in pari
materia. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi. Every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 18
As the "rules and regulations or private laws enacted by the corporation to regulate, govern and control
its own actions, affairs and concerns and its stockholders or members and directors and officers with
relation thereto and among themselves in their relation to it," 19 by-laws are indispensable to
corporations in this jurisdiction. These may not be essential to corporate birth but certainly, these are
required by law for an orderly governance and management of corporations. Nonetheless, failure to file
them within the period required by law by no means tolls the automatic dissolution of a corporation.
In this regard, private respondents are correct in relying on the pronouncements of this Court in Chung
Ka Bio v.Intermediate Appellate Court, 20 as follows:
. . . . Moreover, failure to file the by-laws does not automatically operate to dissolve a
corporation but is now considered only a ground for such dissolution.
Section 19 of the Corporation Law, part of which is now Section 22 of the Corporation Code,
provided that the powers of the corporation would cease if it did not formally organize and
commence the transaction of its business or the continuation of its works within two years from
date of its incorporation. Section 20, which has been reproduced with some modifications in
Section 46 of the Corporation Code, expressly declared that "every corporation formed under
this Act, must within one month after the filing of the articles of incorporation with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws." Whether this provision should
be given mandatory or only directory effect remained a controversial question until it became
academic with the adoption of PD 902-A. Under this decree, it is now clear that the failure to file
by-laws within the required period is only a ground for suspension or revocation of the
certificate of registration of corporations.
Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. Under
Section 6(I) of PD 902-A, the SEC is empowered to "suspend or revoke, after proper notice and
hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of a corporation" on the ground inter alia of
"failure to file by-laws within the required period." It is clear from this provision that there must
first of all be a hearing to determine the existence of the ground, and secondly, assuming such
finding, the penalty is not necessarily revocation but may be only suspension of the charter. In
fact, under the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file the by-laws on time may be

penalized merely with the imposition of an administrative fine without affecting the corporate
existence of the erring firm.
It should be stressed in this connection that substantial compliance with conditions subsequent
will suffice to perfect corporate personality. Organization and commencement of transaction of
corporate business are but conditions subsequent and not prerequisites for acquisition of
corporate personality. The adoption and filing of by-laws is also a condition subsequent. Under
Section 19 of the Corporation Code, a Corporation commences its corporate existence and
juridical personality and is deemed incorporated from the date the Securities and Exchange
Commission issues certificate of incorporation under its official seal. This may be done even
before the filing of the by-laws, which under Section 46 of the Corporation Code, must be
adopted "within one month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of
incorporation." 21
That the corporation involved herein is under the supervision of the HIGC does not alter the result of
this case. The HIGC has taken over the specialized functions of the former Home Financing Corporation
by virtue of Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1989. 22 With respect to homeowners
associations, the HIGC shall "exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on
the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . , the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to
the contrary notwithstanding." 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35910 July 21, 1978

PURITA BERSABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan
City, Branch XIV, TAN THAT and ONG PIN TEE, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
On March 23, 1972, petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge of August
4, 1971, October 30, 1971 and March 15, 1972 and to compel said respondent Judge to decide
petitioner's perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the
City Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and
respondents.

Since only questions of law were raised therein, the Court of Appeals, on October 13, 1972, issued a
resolution certifying said case to this Court pursuant to Section 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are as follows:
It appears that private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed an ejectment suit,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6926 in the City Court of Caloocan City, against the petitioner.
A decision was rendered by said Court on November 25, 1970, which decision was
appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court and docketed therein as Civil Case
No. C-2036.
During the pendency of the appeal the respondent court issued on March 23, 1971 an
order which reads:
Pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6031, the Clerk of Court of
Caloocan City, is hereby directed to transmit to this Court within fifteen
(15) days from receipt hereof the transcripts of stenographic notes taken
down during the hearing of this case before the City Court of Caloocan
City, and likewise, counsels for both parties are given thirty (30) days from
receipt of this order within which to file their respective memoranda, and
thereafter, this case shall be deemed submitted for decision by this Court.
which order was apparently received by petitioner on April 17, 1971.
The transcript of stenographic notes not having yet been forwarded to the respondent
court, petitioner filed on May 5, 1971 a 'MOTION EX-PARTE TO SUBMIT MEMORANDUM
WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES TAKEN DURING THE HEARING OF THE CASE BEFORE THE CITY
COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY' which was granted by respondent court on May 7, 1971.
However, before the petitioner could receive any such notice from the respondent court,
the respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1971 which says:
For failure of the defendant-appellant to prosecute her appeal the same is
hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against her.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on September 28, 1971, citing
as a ground the granting of his ex-parte motion to submit memorandum within 30 days
from notice of the submission of the stenographic notes taken before the City Court.
Private respondents filed their opposition to the motion on September 30,1971. In the
meantime, on October 20,1971, petitioner filed her memorandum dated October 18,
1971. On October 30, 1971 the respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Then on January 25, 1972, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for
reconsideration which was likewise denied by the respondent court on March 15, 1972.
Hence this petition.
The sole inquiry in the case at bar can be stated thus: Whether, in the light of the provisions of the
second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure
of an appellant to submit on nine the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower
the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to Prosecute; or, whether it is
mandatory upon said Court to proceed to decide the appealed case on the basis of the evidence and
records transmitted to it, the failure of the appellant to submit a memorandum on time
notwithstanding.
The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence
and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the
parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested ... .
(Emphasis supplied).

The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than
that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on the part of
the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical
concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party
waiving the submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses not to submit the
memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis
of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other words, the Court is
not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his
memorandum, but rather it is the Court's mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the
available evidence and records transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer
discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced
(Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the
Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and
records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument
duly submitted and/or made on request.
Moreover, memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are not essential requirements. They may be
submitted and/or made only if so requested.
Finally, a contrary interpretation would be unjust and dangerous as it may defeat the litigant's right to
appeal
granted
to
him
by
law.
In
the
case
of Republic
vs.
Rodriguez
(L-26056, May 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 378) this Court underscored "the need of proceeding with caution so
that a party may not be deprived of its right to appeal except for weighty reasons." Courts should heed
the
rule
in
Municipality
of
Tiwi,
Albay
vs.
Cirujales
(L-37520, Dec. 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 390, 395), thus:
The appellate court's summary dismissal of the appeal even before receipt of the records
of the appealed case as ordered by it in a prior mandamus case must be set aside as
having been issued precipitously and without an opportunity to consider and appreciate
unavoidable circumstances of record not attributable to petitioners that caused the delay
in the elevation of the records of the case on appeal.
In the instant case, no notice was received by petitioner about the submission of the transcript of the
stenographic notes, so that his 30-day period to submit his memorandum would commence to run.
Only after the expiration of such period can the respondent Judge act on the case by deciding it on the
merits, not by dismissing the appeal of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, THE CHALLENGED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED AUGUST 4, 1971, OCTOBER
30, 1971 AND MARCH 15, 1971 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID AND THE RESPONDENT
COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO DECIDE CIVIL CASE NO. C-2036 ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.

G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161 January 21, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEODORO TAMANI, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and
Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Constancio S. Vitug for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
This is an appeal of defendant Teodoro Tamani y Marinay from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Isabela, (a) sentencing him to "life imprisonment" for the murder of Jose Siyang and ordering him to
indemnify the victim's heirs in the sum of P6,000 and (b) further sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to eight (8) years and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor for the attempted murder of Eduardo Domingo and ordering him
to indemnify the victim in the sum of P2,000 (Crim. Cases Nos. II-192 and II-198).
Issue as to dismissal of the appeal.After the appellant had filed his brief, the Solicitor General filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was forty-seven days late.
Appellant's counsel de oficio did not oppose the motion. Action thereon was "deferred until this case is
considered on the merits". (Resolution of March 7, 1967). The motion to dismiss is reiterated in
appellee's brief. That preliminary question should first be resolved.
The lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was promulgated on February 14, 1963. A copy
thereof was served on his counsel on February 25, 1963. On March 1, 1963 he filed a motion for
reconsideration. It was denied. A copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail on July 13,
1963 on defendant's counsel through his wife. He had eleven days or up to July 24, 1963 within which
to appeal (if the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal should be computed from the date of
notification and not from the date of promulgation of the decision). He filed his notice of appeal only on
September 10, 1963 or forty eight days from July 24th.
Silvestre B. Bello, defendant's counsel, filed a sworn statement, accompanying the notice of appeal. In
that affidavit, he stated that the trial court's order, denying his motion for reconsideration, although
admittedly received by his wife on July 13th, was never brought to his attention and that he came to
know of the order only on September 7th when he verified the expediente of the case and discovered
that an order of denial had been issued. He averred that his wife must have lost the envelope
containing the order.
The trial court opined that the wife's affidavit should have been submitted and that the defendant
should have filed a motion praying that the tardy appeal be given due course.
After considering the gravity of the two penalties imposed on the accused and the earnest plea of
defense counsel, the trial court gave due course to the appeal without prejudice to the right of the
Solicitor General to "raise the question of jurisdiction on the ground of a very much belated appeal".
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed
until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the
defendant or his attorney.
The word "must" in section 6 is synonymous with "ought". It connotes compulsion or mandatoriness.
The clear terms of section 6 leave no room for doubt that the appeal should be effected within fifteen
days from the promulgation of the judgment.
The counsel for appellant Tamani must have so understood that import of section 6 (which is confirmed
by the practice in trial courts) as evinced by the fact that his motion for reconsideration was filed on
March 1st, which was the fifteenth or last day of the reglementary period.

The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of
the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken. The word
"promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" (see section 6 of Rule 120),
while the word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by
the rule of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its
appropriate object", or "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken
distributively" (76 C. J. S. 175).
Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by registered
mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which to file his notice of
appeal and not eleven days. That construction is an application by analogy or in a suppletory character
of the rule governing appeals in civil cases which is embodied in section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.
Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was fifty-eight days late. A regoristic
application of section 6 justifies the dismissal of his appeal, as prayed for by the prosecution.
However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of his
counsel's inadvertence and considering further that the briefs have been submitted, the Court has
resolved to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice (Cf. Marbury vs. Madison, 1
Cranch 135, 2 L. ed. 60, where Chief Justice Marshall discussed the merits of a mandamus action
although the Court held that it had no power to issue that writ).
Uncontroverted facts.There is no dispute that sometime after twilight on the night of June 11, 1953 in
the place called Centro at the commercial street of Angadanan, Isabela, Jose Siyang (Syang), the town
assistant sanitary inspector, was mortally wounded by gunfire. Death resulted from internal
hemorrhage caused by the following four (4) through and through gunshot wounds which followed an
oblique direction from the point of entry to exit:
1. Entry, chest about 2- inches from level of the nipple. Exit, at the back level of twelfth
dorsal vertebrae to the right side.
2. Entry, above right clavicle (suprasternal notch) middle portion. Exit, at the back at the
level of the right angle of scapula.
3. Entry, anterior aspect of left shoulder. Exit, at the back of shoulder about 2- inches
from tip of armpit (left side).
4. Entry, anterior aspect of right forearm middle in slight oblique direction from the point
of entry to exit. (Exh. F. Certificate issued by Pablo H. Gaffud, M.D.).
By means of the same gunfire, an attempt was made to kill Mayor Eduardo Domingo. He sustained a
through and through wound in the palm of his right hand which caused his confinement in the Isabela
Provincial Hospital from June 11 to 22, 1953 (Exh. E, Certificate issued by J. L. Maddela, Sr., Resident
Physician).
More than three years from the time that tragedy transpired, or on October 2 and 3, 1956, appellant
Tamani signed and thumbmarked two sworn statements before the agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), wherein he confessed that he was the one who shot Siyang and Mayor Domingo;
that his companion on the occasion of the shooting was Domingo Cadawan; that on the morning of
June 11, 1953 he and Cadawan were dismissed as policemen and that Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani,
Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los Santos instigated him to liquidate Mayor Domingo (Exh. A and B).
The two statements are in English, a language which Tamani understands (19 tsn II Valencia).
Inasmuch as the crimes, murder and attempted murder, have been proven, meaning that the corpus
delicti had been established, and appellant Tamani had confessed having committed the same, there
should be an airtight case against him. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.An extrajudicial
confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (Same as See. 96, Rule 123, 1940 Rules of
Court).

Tamani's confession is corroborated by the undisputed evidence of the corpus delicti.

However, during the trial, he repudiated his confession. He assailed its voluntariness. He set up the
defense of alibi. Through his principal witness, Francisco Siyang, the father of the deceased Jose
Siyang, he endeavored to prove that the latter was shot by Policemen Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor
Tumaneng. Thus, a simple case, where the extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of
thecorpus delicti, became controversial, complicated and perplexing.
Version of the prosecution.In addition to Tamani's extrajudicial confession (Exh. A and B), the
prosecution offered the testimonies of complainant Domingo, Doctor Pablo H. Gaffud, Juana Vittori Vda.
de Ibarra, Emiteria Ibarra, Ilustre D. Mendoza, Mariano G. Almeda, Teodoro Colobong and Martin
Caniero.
The prosecution's evidence discloses that Domingo was the mayor of Angadanan since 1947. Prior to
June 11, 1953, he was suspended from office by the Governor. During Domingo's suspension, Villamor
Tamani, the vice-mayor, functioned as acting mayor. He appointed as policeman his second cousin,
appellant Teodoro Tamani who was then twenty-four years old. The vice-mayor used to appoint Teodoro
Tamani as policeman whenever Domingo was suspended. Teodoro Tamani resigned as policeman
shortly before June 11th. In the afternoon of June 10th, Domingo was reinstated and he reassumed the
office of mayor.
The reinstatement of Domingo was obviously resented by Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani because it
meant the termination of his tenure as acting mayor. On June 10th Teodoro Tamani and Domingo
Cadawan (also a former policeman like Teodoro Tamani) were summoned for a conference by the vicemayor to his house at Barrio Aniog, Angadanan. Present at the conference were the vice-mayor and his
men, Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los Santos. It was decided at that meeting that Mayor Domingo
should be liquidated. De la Fuente handed to Teodoro Tamani a carbine.
Appellant Tamani and Cadawan spent the night in the vice-mayor's house. On the following morning of
June 11th, Cadawan was sent on a mission to the poblacion of Angadanan to ascertain the
whereabouts of the quarry, Mayor Domingo. At around seven o'clock in the evening, Cadawan returned
to the vice-mayor's house and apprised appellant Tamani that Domingo was in front of the store of
Pedro Pua at the town's commercial street.
Cadawan and Teodoro Tamani proceeded with dispatch to the poblacion, making shortcuts by passing
through the yards of neighboring houses. Tamani carried the carbine. On entering the yard of the house
adjoining Pedro Pua's store, Cadawan stumbled. The resulting noise attracted the attention of the
owner of the house, Mrs. Ibarra, who focused a flashlight at Tamani and, on recognizing him, uttered his
nickname, Doro. She had known Doro since childhood. She saw that he was carrying a gun.
She had just taken her supper. She and her daughter, Emiteria Ibarra, were sitting on the veranda. It
was while chewing her buyo that Mrs. Ibarra heard somebody trip in her yard on the cement floor
intended as the base of a tank. Almost simultaneously, she heard the grunting (ngik-ngik) of her pig.
When she trained her flashlight on the intruder and recognized Doro (appellant Tamani) with a gun and
called him, the latter answered, "Tia" (Aunt).
Mrs. Ibarra saw that Teodoro Tamani passed under the eaves of her house, crossed the bamboo fence
separating her from the vacant lot of Pedro Pua and proceeded to the corner of the vacant lot near the
gate of galvanized iron sheets and the edge of the cemented pavement which was in front of Pedro
Pua's store (see sketch, Exh. C). As appellant Tamani passed the fence, he produced a "cracking noise".
Emiteria Ibarra testified:
Q. Who say (saw) Teodoro Tamani? A. My mother and myself, sir.
Q. What was the appearance of Teodoro Tamani when you saw him after
your mother lighted him with the light of the flashlight? A. When my
mother flashed the flashlight towards him at the same time my mother
called, "Doro" and then he answered "TIA" and he was carrying a firearm,
sir.
Q. Why do you know that when you and your mother heard the cracking of
the fence Teodoro Tamani went inside the fence? A. We know it because

of the cracking of the fence, besides that we saw him proceeded towards
the fence, sir.
Q. After Teodoro Tamani entered that fence as you say, what happened, if
any? A. He proceeded towards the gate of the Chinese, sir.
Q. What happened, if any, after Teodoro Tamani went to that gate? A.
Upon arriving at the gate we heard the gun reports, sir.
Q. How many gun reports, if you remember? A. Maybe eight (8) or nine
(9), sir.
Q. Do you know where the gun reports came from? A. Yes, sir, because I
saw the sparks of the bullets when they were fired, sir.
Q. Did you know who fired? A. I know, sir.
Q. Who? A. Teodoro Tamani, because he was the only one who entered
with a gun, sir (74-75 tsn Jan. 16, 1959).
Q. Who fired? A. Teodoro Tamani, sir.
Q. Why do you say that he was the one who fired? A. Because the gun
reports came from the place where he stood at the gate, sir (77 tsn Jan.
16, 1959).
From the place where Cadawan and Tamani had positioned themselves, they had a good view, through
the holes of the gate, of Mayor Domingo and his group in front of Pua's store (Exh. A). The mayor was
engaged in conversation with a group of persons on the cemented pavement ( pasillo of sidewalk) in
the front of the store in Centro at the town's commercial street. Standing near the wall of the store
were Hermoso Alicam, Liberato Tanam, Primitivo Tallog, Martin Caniero, Toedoro Colobong, Gaspar
Ibarra, Francisco Siyang and Gonzalo Siyang. Mayor Domingo was standing in front of the group,
walking and gesticulating as he talked. Jose Siyang was leaning against a post somewhat apart from
the group (Exh. C, 6 tsn March 3, 1959).
Mayor Domingo was recounting his experience in Manila during his suspension. He was standing on the
culvert which bridged the canal separating the pasillo and the street (See Exh. C). As he talked, he
gestured and swung his hands up and down with palms open, facing Pua's store and his audience. Jose
Siyang, who was apart from the group of listeners, was about two to three meters on Mayor Domingo's
right, leaning one of the post which supported the roof shading the pasillo or cemented pavement. Jose
Siyang was in line with Mayor Domingo while, in contrast, the group of listeners was standing side by
side close to the galvanized iron wall of the store, facing Mayor Domingo who was telling stories.
In the meanwhile, Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan were standing on the vacant lot in close proximity to
the gate of galvanized iron sheets where the pasillo ended. Cadawan opened a hole in the gate, about
three inches in diameter, through which Teodoro Tamani inserted the barrel of the carbine. Tamani fired
at Mayor Domingo who was the target. Jose Siyang, a second cousin of Teodoro Tamani, like Vice-Mayor
Tamani, "was farther on the right side of Mayor Domingo along the line of fire" (Exh. A). Appellant
Tamani fired two volleys. Mrs. Ibarra and her daughter saw from the veranda the flashes of fire emitted
by the carbine of Teodoro Tamani.<re||an1w> They left the veranda and went inside the house.
At the moment the first volley of gunshots was fired, which was between seven and seven-thirty, Mayor
Domingo had raised his right hand. The palm of his right hand was hit. Jose Siyang was also hit.
Domingo and his listeners dispersed and sought refuge inside Pua's store. While Domingo ran for
cover, a second volley was fired. The volley's came from behind the iron gate on the vacant lot or "from
the southwest end" of the cemented pavement behind the gate. While inside the store, Mayor Domingo
heard the moaning of someone in an agony of pain. That person turned out to be Jose Siyang who had
sustained four gunshot wounds and was hovering between life and death. Siyang died before eleven
o'clock that same night.
Constabulary soldiers and peace officers arrived at the scene of the shooting and conducted an
investigation. Mayor Domingo was taken to the provincial hospital. Doctor Gaffud conducted an

autopsy on the body of Jose Siyang in the municipal building. On the following day empty shells were
found by the Constabulary soldiers near the galvanized iron gate (6 tsn. III Calixto).
Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan left the scene of the shooting. They ran, passing the same route that
they had taken in coming, and went direct to the house of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in Barrio Aniog.
Teodoro Tamani stayed overnight in the house of the vice-mayor. Cadawan, who reported to the vicemayor that Mayor Domingo was dead, proceeded to Barrio Clakcab and returned the murder weapon to
Matias de la Fuente.
The trial court accepted the foregoing version as the basis of the judgment of conviction. It noted that
in 1956 when NBI Agent Mariano G. Almeda arranged a confrontation between Teodoro Tamani and
Mrs. Ibarra, she identified him as the person whom she saw in her yard in the evening of June 11, 1953.
During the confrontation, Tamani trembled, became pale and remained silent.
Teodoro Tamani sometime after the shooting went into hiding at Cabagan and Santo Tomas, Isabela,
where he was arrested by Mayor Domingo by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Cases Nos.
245 and 246 of the justice of the peace court of Angadanan (Exh. 3, 4, 5 and 6, 11 tsn March 3, 1959).
Appellant went into hiding although his wife was about to deliver her baby.
As to the motive for shooting Mayor Domingo, Teodoro Tamani explained that Vice-Mayor Villamor
Tamani, his second cousin, ordered the liquidation of the mayor so that he could not assume office and
the vice-mayor would become mayor (Exh. A). Appellant Tamani was chosen to execute that task
because he had lost his job as policeman when Mayor Domingo was reinstated (Exh. A, p. 2).
On the other hand, Mayor Domingo said that when Teodoro Tamani was still a policeman, the mayor
had scolded him for not reporting for work and for working as cook of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani and
plowing his field. The other motive was that since Teodoro Tamani is a relative of the vice-mayor, who
was a "political enemy" of the mayor, he (appellant Tamani) could act as a policeman when the vicemayor became mayor after the elimination of the incumbent mayor (11 tsn March 3, 1959).
On the credibility of the prosecution eyewitness, Mrs. Ibarra, the trial judge made the following
findings:
The Court concentrated attention on the attitude and observed the gestures, features,
demeanor and manner of testifying and the emphasis, gestures and inflection of the
voice of prosecution witness Juana Vitorri de Ibarra during all the time she was on the
witness stand in the direct and cross-examination, and her answers were prompt,
concise, responsive to interrogatories, outspoken, and entirely devoid of evasion or any
semblance of shuffling, and her entire testimony was given with calm, self-possession,
an erect front, and unhesitating accent. The Court is convinced of her sincerity and
credibility and the truthfulness of her testimony, in great contrast with defendant's
manner of testifying. (pp. 859-60, Record).
The trial court concluded that the intended victim was Mayor Domingo and not Jose Siyang.
Appellant's version and contentions.In this appeal appellant's counsel de oficio argues that the trial
court erred (1) in disbelieving Tamani's alibi; (2) in assuming that his extrajudicial confession was
voluntary; (3) in not giving credence to the testimony of defense witness Francisco Siyang, that his son,
Jose Siyang, was shot by Policemen Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor Tumaneng; (4) in giving credence to
circumstantial evidence, and (5) in the alternative, in not holding that appellant Tamani committed the
complex crime of homicide with lesiones grave.
Appellant Tamani, having abjured his confession, gave the following version of the case by means of his
testimony and the testimony of his other witness, Francisco Siyang(Syang):
Francisco Siyang was the father of Jose Siyang, the town sanitary inspector, who with his wife and four
children, resided with Francisco Siyang at his house in Centro, Angadanan. Francisco Siyang is an uncle
of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani. At around six-thirty in the evening of June 11, 1953 Venancio Respicio
dropped at the house of Jose Siyang and invited him for a walk. Francisco Siyang followed his son to the
store of Pedro Pua which was around four blocks from their house.

Francisco Siyang noticed that Jose Siyang was in front of Pua's store with Mayor Domingo, Policemen
Alfonso Gomez, Gaspar Ibarra, Graciano Manguelod and Melchor Tumaneng, teachers Primitivo Tallog,
Teodoro Colobong and Martin Caniero, Mariano Dalodad (a barber) and Juaning Aliangan, a farmer. Jose
Siyang was leaning against a post, obliquely at the right of Mayor Domingo. Francisco Siyang allegedly
approached Jose and told him that his wife and children were waiting for him so that they could take
supper. Jose answered "yes, father".
While Francisco Siyang and Jose Siyang were standing side by side in front of Pua's store, Mayor
Domingo made a signal by stretching and raising his hand with open palm and bringing it down.
Suddenly, Policeman Ibarra, who was standing in front of Jose Siyang, fired his carbine at the latter,
hitting Jose Siyang in the chest. Policeman Tumaneng followed by firing with his carbine successive
shots at Jose Siyang, hitting the latter in the breast. Tumaneng was on the right side of Ibarra, obliquely
facing Jose Siyang.
After Jose Siyang fell, Francisco Siyang went to his succor and raised him. Jose Siyang told his father:
"Father, I am dying, my children." When Jose Siyang was brought to the municipal building, he was
breathing feebly. He could not talk anymore. He expired in the municipal building. His body was
brought home by Francisco Siyang.
In the morning of June 12th, Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani with some Constabulary soldiers arrived at the
house of Francisco Siyang while the remains of Jose Siyang still lay in state. After the burial of Jose
Siyang in the afternoon, a Constabulary sergeant investigated Francisco Siyang and took him to Ilagan,
where he was further investigated. He gave a sworn statement accusing Ibarra and Tumaneng of
having killed Jose Siyang (Exh. 1).
On the basis of that statement, a criminal complaint for the murder of Jose Siyang was filed on June 20,
1953 by Constabulary Lieutenant Tomas P. Gonzales in the justice of the peace court of Angadanan
against Venancio Respicio and Policemen Ibarra, Tumaneng and Manguelod (Exh. 2, Crim. Case No.
244). The complaint was dismissed on August 12, 1953.
Other complaints for the murder of Jose Siyang and for frustrated murder perpetrated on Mayor
Domingo were filed in the justice of the peace court against Villamor Tamani, Teodoro Tamani, Domingo
Cadawan, Rufino de los Santos and Matias de la Fuente but they were later dismiss (Exh. 3 to 6, Crim.
Cases Nos. 245 and 246).
In October, 1956 Mariano G. Almeda of the NBI headed a team of agents that investigated the shooting
of Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. Francisco Siyang was investigated orally in Ilagan by Almeda. The
investigation was interrupted by former Congressman Samuel Reyes. It was not finished.
Appellant Tamani, in support of his alibi, testified that Jose Siyang was his second cousin. Tamani was a
resident of Centro in the poblacion of Angadanan. At around three o'clock in the afternoon of June 11,
1953 he was in the house of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. He wanted a recommendation
for a job in the Angadanan Sawmill. The place known as Centro in the poblacion, where Pedro Pua's
store is located, is around two kilometers from Barrio Aniog. Vice-Mayor Tamani gave to Teodoro Tamani
the recommendation between four and five o'clock. The vice-mayor prevailed upon Teodoro Tamani to
stay and they agreed to go to town on the following day.
So, Teodoro Tamani slept in the house of his cousin, the vice-mayor, on the night of June 11th. On the
morning of June 12th, Vice-Mayor Tamani and Teodoro Tamani went together to Centro in the poblacion.
When they reached Centro, they learned of Jose Siyang's death, for which reason they viewed his body
in the house of Francisco Siyang. They arrived at Siyang's house at around eight and eight-thirty in the
morning. They learned that Jose Siyang was shot in front of Pedro Pua's store.
Teodoro Tamani did not go to the Angadanan Sawmill on June 12th. He delivered the letter of
recommendation on June 13th to the manager of the sawmill. He worked in the sawmill as laborer for
two weeks only. He resigned due to the heavy work. He could not remember the name of the manager
of the sawmill.
He denied that he shot Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. He did not participate in the commission of
the crime. He said that he was in the house of Vice-Mayor Tamani on the night of June 11th.

On October 2, 1956 NBI Agent Almeda picked him up from his house for questioning in connection with
the shooting of Siyang and Mayor Domingo. Almeda was accompanied by Alfonso Salvador, a
Constabulary soldier. Tamani was brought to the municipal building. From there, he was taken to Ilagan.
He was brought by Almeda to the provincial jail at Calamagui, Isabela, where he (Tamani) was delivered
to Pedro Tamayo, a prisoner who was acted as mayor of the cell (brigada). Tamani was formally
received by the provincial guard from Almeda at around six and six-thirty in the evening of October
2nd.
Upon delivering Tamani to Tamayo, Almeda allegedly told Tamayo: "Bahala kayo rian, Tamayo, at ako
ang bahala sa iyo". Twenty minutes later, Pedro Tamayo, Juanito Dassig, Juan Pecano, Ernesto
Castaeda and other convicts started maltreating Tamani. The alleged maltreatment consisted of the
following:
First, they ordered Tamani to squat on the cemented floor inside the cell (brigada).
Second, after squatting on the cement floor, they ordered Tamani to stand and then
started boxing him for one hour.
Third, they removed all his clothings and put Tamani inside a drum where prisoners
dropped their human waste. He was required to stay inside the drum for five minutes,
after which they brought him out and poured on him water to was his body from the
human waste.
Fourth, they made Tamani pulverized pepper and they placed the pulverized pepper in
his anus, penis and testicles.
Tamani was maltreated because the tormentors wanted him to admit that he was the one who shot
Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. As he could not endure the maltreatment he admitted he had shot
Siyang and Domingo. The maltreatment was stopped after he made the admission.
Around ten to ten-thirty on that same night, Almeda returned to the jail and asked Tamayo: "Does he
admit now?" Tamayo answered in the affirmative. Almeda then took Tamani out of the jail and brought
him to the second floor of Puring's Restaurant. Almeda called for NBI Agent No. 101 who came out of a
room with a typewriter. Agent No. 101 placed his typewriter on a table. Almeda told Tamani "Now, I am
going to take your statement that you shot Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo."
At first Tamani told Almeda that he knew nothing about the shooting because he was in Barrio Aniog
when Domingo and Siyang were shot. Thereupon, Almeda told Tamani not to deny the shooting
because Juana Vitorri Vda. de Ibarra recognized him when he stumbled before the shooting at a place
near the fence between the lots of Pedro Pua and Mrs. Ibarra. Tamani maintained his innocence about
the shooting.
Thereafter, Almeda and NBI Agent No. 101 slapped the face of Tamani. They brought him to a toilet.
They pushed his head into the toilet bowl (iniodoro). They held his hair and pushed his face toward the
mouth of the toilet bowl for five minutes. When Tamani could not endure the torture anymore, he told
Almeda that he would admit the crime. Almeda and Agent No. 101 brought Tamani to the table on the
second floor of Puring's Restaurant. Almeda told Tamani: "You better admit now that you shot the two
victims, that you took the gun from Matias de la Fuente and that Villamor Tamani and Rufino de los
Santos are the masterminds".
Tamani admitted that version for fear that he would again be maltreated. His affidavit, Exhibit A, was
signed at Puring's Restaurant on the night of October 2, 1956. The contents of Exhibit A "are all the
versions of Director Almeda". Tamani admitted his signature and thumbmarks in Exhibit A. On the
following morning of October 3rd, Almeda and Agent No. 101 brought back Tamani to the jail.
Tamani admits that he signed Exhibit B also, his supplementary confession. However, he insists that he
signed it on the night of October 2nd and not on October 3rd. He said that he never excluded Domingo
Cadawan and that he never incriminated himself as the triggerman. He might have signed Exhibit B in
connection with his signing of Exhibit A on the night of October 2nd because when he signed Exhibit A,
there were several sheets of paper which he signed and thumbmarked. He allegedly did not know the
contents of Exhibit B when he affixed his signature thereon. He says that the incriminatory statements
in Exhibits A and B are not true. (See pp. 3-4, 17-28, Appellant's Brief).

The trial court rejected the foregoing version of the defense after noting the improbabilities in Francisco
Siyang's testimony and after concluding that the appellant had not overcome the presumption that his
confession was voluntarily executed.
The shooting incident was undoubtedly another episode in the political rivalry between Mayor Domingo
and Vice-Mayor Tamani. That circumstance has given a political complexion to these two cases. It may
explain why the evidence has become muddled, if not baffling. It was to be expected that, to suit the
ulterior motivations of the contending parties there would be same insidious manipulation of the
evidence.
Thus, on June 12th, the day following the shooting and before Jose Siyang was interred, Constabulary
soldiers, accompanied by Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani, investigated Francisco Siyang (51-52 tsn Aug.
26, 1960). On June 14, 1953, or four days after the shooting and while Mayor Domingo was in the
hospital, Francisco Siyang (the uncle of Villamor Tamani and the star witness for the defense and the
father of the victim, Jose Siyang) executed an affidavit in Ilagan about the shooting. He made it appear
in that statement that Patrolmen Ibarra and Tumaneng, two followers of Mayor Domingo, were the
killers of Jose Siyang and that they commenced to shoot Siyang when Mayor Domingo made a
prearranged signal (Exh. 1).
As already noted, on the basis of that affidavit, Constabulary Lieutenant Tomas P. Gonzales filed in the
justice of the peace court of Angadanan a complaint for murder against Policemen Ibarra, Tumaneng
and Manguelod and one Venancio Respicio, an alleged nephew of the mayor (Exh. 2, Crim. Case No.
244). According to Francisco Siyang's affidavit, Respicio, a compadre of Jose Siyang, acted as decoy in
bringing Jose Siyang to the place where he was assassinated. Domingo repeatedly denied that Respicio
was his relative by consanguinity or affinity. Francisco Siyang made it appear that his son was
murdered because he testified against Domingo in the case where the latter was charged with theft.
Because of that theft case Domingo was suspended. That murder complaint (Exh. 2) against the
followers of Mayor Domingo was dismissed.
After the mayor was released from the hospital, he and the chief of police investigated the shooting.
The chief of the police filed a complaint for murder dated July 8, 1953 against Vice-Mayor Tamani,
Teodoro Tamani, Rufino de los Santos, Matias de la Fuente, Arsenio Dayang and Medardo Tamani.
The complaint was amended by including Domingo Cadawan as a defendant and excluding Dayang
and Medardo Tamani (Exh. 3 and 4, Crim. Case No. 245). For the shooting of Mayor Domingo, a
complaint for frustrated murder was filed by the chief of police against the same persons (Exh. 5 and 6,
Crim. Case No. 246).
Both complaints were dismissed apparently for lack of evidence. As the shooting was unsolved crime,
the intervention of the NBI became necessary.
On June 4, 1956 Francisco Siyang executed an affidavit in Ilagan before NBI Agent No. 39. He deviated
from his 1953 affidavit by naming Melchor Tumaneng alone ("Melchor Tomines") as the assassin of his
son, Jose Siyang. He stuck to his original theory that Mayor Domingo masterminded the assassination
of his son (Exh. G).
As already noted, four months later, or on October 2 and 3, 1956, an NBI investigating team headed by
Mariano G. Almeda, a lawyer and an assistant to the NBI Director, secured a confession from appellant
Teodoro Tamani that he, with the assistance of Domingo Cadawan, shot Mayor Domingo and Jose
Siyang (Exh. A and B). It may be assumed that the NBI was asked to handle the case so that political
considerations would not color and influence the course and outcome of the investigation.
Before Tamani executed his confession, Almeda and his agents, assisted by Constabulary soldiers,
interviewed several persons in Angadanan and made an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime.
They investigated Mrs. Ibarra and her daughter. They learned that Teodoro Tamani had entered Mrs.
Ibarra's yard and was recognized by her and that, immediately thereafter, she heard gunshots from the
direction where Tamani had posted himself. Thus, Tamani became a prime suspect. He was
apprehended and brought to the house of Mrs. Ibarra for a confrontation. Almeda testified:
Q. What did you do, if any, when Teodoro Tamani was brought to the house
of Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra? A. In the presence of Juana Vittori Vda.
de Ibarra and her daughter I confronted them and asked Juana Vittori Vda.

de Ibarra and her daughter whether they knew Teodoro Tamani and both
claimed that he is the very same fellow who entered the yard that night
with a gun and also they heard shots from the direction of the said
accused Teodoro Tamani after which Teodoro Tamani was trembling and he
became pale.
Q. And did Teodoro Tamani say anything when he was pointed out by Juana
Vittori Vda. de Ibarra and her daughter? A. He did not utter anything. He
simply became pale and trembling. (16 tsn June 12, 1958, II Valencia).
Tamani's confession (Exh. A and B) was the basis of the information for murder and frustrated murder
against him in these two cases.
Findings: Appellant Tamani's defense of alibi, which can be fabricated with facility, cannot be given
serious consideration. Assuming that he was in Barrio Aniog in the afternoon and night of June 11th, it
was physically possible for him to be at the scene of the shooting at the time that it was perpetrated
and return to the house of Vice-Mayor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. That place was only two kilometers from
the store of Pedro Pua. The victim was shot in front of the store.
The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must be such as to preclude the possibility of the
presence of the accused at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. "The accused must show that he was at some other place for such period of time that it
was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its
commission" (People vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17, 1969, 2 SCRA 764, 768).
Appellant's alibi does not satisfy that basic requirement. Moreover, it was not corroborated by ViceMayor Tamani or by any other person. Its concocted character is manifest.
Appellant Tamani argues that he signed his confession, Exhibit A, because he was tortured or
maltreated. He claim that he does not remember having signed his supplementary confession (Exh. B)
although he admits the authenticity of his signature and thumbmark therein.
NBI Agents Almeda and Mendoza testified that Tamani's sworn statements were freely executed.
Tamani's testimony on the alleged maltreatment was not corroborated. As correctly noted by the
Solicitor General, certain details in the confession, which only Tamani could have supplied, are
indications of its voluntariness and give it spontaneity and coherence.
Those details are (a) that Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan conferred with Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in
the latter's house at Aniog at three o'clock in the afternoon of the day preceding the shooting; (b) that
Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los Santos were present at the conference and it was decided to
liquidate Mayor Domingo to enable the vice mayor to act as mayor; (c) that De la Fuente handed to
Tamani and Cadawan the carbine to be used in the killing; (d) that Cadawan and Tamani slept in the
vice-mayor's house on the night of June 10, 1953; (e) that Cadawan went to the poblacion in the
morning of June 11th in order to ascertain the whereabouts of Mayor Domingo; (f) that Cadawan
returned in the afternoon and informed Tamani that Domingo was at Pua's store; (g) that Cadawan
stumbled in the yard of Mrs. Ibarra; (h) that after firing the shots, the two returned to the vice-mayor's
house; (i) that Teodoro Tamani slept in the house of the vice-mayor after the assassination; (j) that Jose
Siyang was standing on the right side of Mayor Domingo "along the line of fire"; (k) that Jose Siyang
was his second cousin and the second cousin of the vice-mayor and (l) that the hole in the gate was
three inches in diameter.
Those circumstances might not have been known if the confession had been executed under duress.
NBI Agents Almeda and Mendoza could not have manufactured all these details.
There is one significant inconsistency in appellant Tamani's testimony on March 26, 1962 which impairs
his credibility. He claimed that his supplementary confession, Exh. B, was translate to him in Tagalog
but that he did not understand Tagalog on or before October 3, 1956 (117 tsn I Valencia). However,
when he testified on January 11, 1962 and he was asked to repeat what NBI Agent Almeda told in
Tagalog to the prisoner, Pedro Tamayo, Tamani was able to repeat verbatim the word: "Bahala kayo rian
Tamayo at ako ang bahala sa iyo" (83 tsn II Calixto). He repeated the same Tagalog words in the later
part of his testimony (86 tsn) and at the hearing on April 5, 1962 (127 tsn I Valencia).

Agent Almeda testified that appellant Tamani understands English, being a former policeman, and that
Tamani read Exhibit B, which is in English and which NBI Agent Mendoza translated to him in Ilocano.
Tamani did not deny that he knows English. His petition to this Court that he be granted bail, which
petition bears his signature, is in English. (See Rollo).
There is no merit in appellant Tamani's contention that the trial court erred in not giving credence to
the testimony of Francisco Siyang (Syang) that Jose Siyang was shot by policemen Ibarra and
Tumaneng, the latter being allegedly a houseboy of Mayor Domingo. The inconsistencies on vital
details in Siyang's two affidavits and his testimony signify that he deliberately perverted the truth. His
testimony exhibits the earmarks of untrustworthiness. It was squarely refuted by Martin Caniero and
Teodoro Colobong. It should be underscored that Francisco Siyang is the uncle of the vice-mayor (58
tsn Aug. 26, 1960).
In his 1953 affidavit (Exh. 1) he declared that Policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng shot his son, Jose
Siyang, whereas, in his 1965 affidavit (Exh. G) he alleged that only Tumaneng (Tomines) shot his son.
Francisco Siyang, a farmer, was already seventy-six years old when he testified in 1960. On direct
examination he testified that his son was shot in the breast by Gaspar Ibarra, who was immediately
followed by Melchor Tumaneng. Tumaneng allegedly hit Jose Siyang in the left part of the breast below
the clavicle (48 tsn I Valencia). That was also Francisco Siyang's declaration in his 1953 affidavit (Exh.
1): that Ibarra fired first.
However, Francisco Siyang on cross-examination testified differently. He declared that Tumaneng fired
first and that the second shot was fired by Ibarra. Francisco Siyang said that he was sure that
Tumaneng fired first at his son (89, 92, 93 tsn I Valencia). The following is an example of his confusing
testimony:
Q. How many shots did Gaspar Ibarra fire at your son? A. Only one, sir.
Q. Who fired the two first shots, if you know? A. Melchor Tumaneng, sir.
Q. Did you actually see or not the two successive shots at your son? A. I
saw him, sir.
Q. Who fired the other two shots which according to you your son was hit
by five (5) gunshots A. Gaspar Ibarra, sir.
Q. Do you mean to say that Gaspar Ibarra fired first one shot and then two
shots, all in all three shots? A. Gaspar Ibarra fired only one, sir. (93 tsn I
Valencia).
Q. Who was the first who shot your son, according to you? A. Melchor
Tumaneng.
Q. Where was Melchor Tumaneng at the moment he shot you? A. He
was at the gate of the fence.
Q. But he was inside with the group of persons at the media de agua of
the store of Pedro Pua. Is it? A. Yes, sir (21 tsn I Calixto).
NBI Agent Almeda, after investigating Francisco Siyang, found his theory incredible. Almeda did not
believe that Francisco Siyang could have seen or identified the assailant who was behind the fence.
According to Almeda, Francisco Siyang merely suspected certain person as the killers of his son. He
could not identify positively the killers.
Other grave inconsistencies in Francisco Siyang's affidavits and testimony are discussed in the trial
court's decision.
Appellant Tamani further contends that the trial court erred in relying on thirteen circumstances in
order to convince itself that Tamani was the culprit. Among those circumstances are that Tamani went
into hiding sometime after the shooting and that the motive for the attempted murder of Mayor

Domingo was to prevent his reinstatement and to enable the vice-mayor to become permanent mayor
and ensure that appellant Tamani would again become a policemen.
Judge Pedro C. Quinto's painstaking analysis of the evidence and his conscientious scrutiny of the
discrepancies in the testimony and affidavits of Francisco Siyang demonstrate that the guilt of Tamani
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. A thorough perusal of the record leads to the conclusion
that the trial court did not commit the errors imputed to it by the appellant.
The act of shooting Siyang at a distance, without the least expectation on his part that he would be
assaulted, is murder because of the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia).
Appellant Tamani deliberately employed a mode of execution which tended directly and specially to
ensure the consummation of the killing without any risk to himself arising from the defense which the
victim could have made (Par. 16, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). Siyang, unarmed and without any
intimation that the gunshots intended for Mayor Domingo would hit him, was not in a position to
defend himself against the unseen assailant. Treachery may be appreciated even if there was a
mistake as to the victim (People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307).
As to Mayor Domingo, the accused was not able to perform all the acts of execution which would
consummate the killing (Art. 6, Revised Penal Code). The accused was not able to do so, not because of
his spontaneous desistance but because he failed to inflict on the mayor a mortal wound. The mayor
was able to avoid the second volley by taking refuge in the store of Pedro Pua. But there is no doubt
that the accused was animated by the intent to kill and that the shooting was perpetrated in a
treacherous manner. Hence, the offense against the mayor is attempted murder (People vs. Kalalo, 59
Phil. 715).
The alternative contention of appellant Tamani that should be convicted of the complex crime of
homicide with lesiones graves is not well-taken. As already pointed out, the killing of Siyang cannot be
characterized as homicide. It was qualified by treachery. There was intent to kill in the shooting of the
mayor. So, the wound inflicted on him cannot be regarded as a mere physical injury. It was overt act
manifesting the willful design of the accused to liquidate the mayor.
The infliction of the four fatal gunshot wounds on Siyang and of the wound in the palm of the mayor's
right hand was not the result of a single act.<re||an1w> The injuries were the consequences of
two volley of gunshots. Hence, the assaults on Siyang and the mayor cannot be categorized as a
complex crime.
To convict the accused of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder would result in the
imposition of the death penalty. That eventuality would be worse for him.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed on the appellant for the killing of Siyang. (Arts. 64 [1] and 248, Revised Penal Code). The use
of the term "life imprisonment" is not proper (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Zaldivar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Barredo, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988

MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Balagtas P. Ilagan for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accusedappellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the
Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial
conference in the Trial Court. The facts stipulated upon read:
a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case;
b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before
January 21, 1981;
c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741, dated
January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05;
d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera;
e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of
collection;
f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same was
dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed;
g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in this
case.
At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of Exhibits
"A," "B" and "C." At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the
right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of
Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of
conviction. 1
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that:
The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial
Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the
basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pretrial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.
Finding the petition meritorious, we resolved to give due course.
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this
case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused
unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis
supplied]

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words
and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory
(McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory
character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced
(Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal statutes
whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against
the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25,
1983, 125 SCRA 648).
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of
Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the
Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not
sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements
of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of
Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence
be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by
consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or reopened (Natividad
vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered
RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for
further reception of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-55151 March 17, 1981

DAVID AGUILA, EDITA BUENO, EVELITO ELENTO, RESURRECTION INTING, ANTONIO LIM and
WILFREDO
CABARDO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MELECIO A. GENATO and DOMINADOR B. BORJE, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The principal issue raised in this certiorari petition with a prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a Restraining Order,
which had the effect of allowing private respondent, Dominador B. Borje, to retain his position as
member of the Board of Directors of the Misamis Occidental Electric Cooperative, Inc ., (MOELCI II)
Succintly stated, the pertinent facts follow:
Petitioners David Aguila and Edita Bueno are the Deputy Administrator and Director for Cooperative
Development, respectively, of the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Petitioner Evelito Elento is the Acting General Manager of MOELCI II, while petitioners Ressurrection
Inting, Antonio Lim and Wilfredo Cabardo, are members of its Board of Directors.
Private respondent Dominador B. Borje, representing the North District of Ozamiz City, was elected
Director of MOELCI II, to hold office as such for three years starting March 25, 1979.
Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 269 (second paragraph) provides:
The provision of any law or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, an officer or
employee of the government shag be eligible for membership in any cooperative if he
meets the qualifications therefor and he shall not be precluded from being elected to or
holding any Position therein, or from receiving such compensation or fee in relation
thereto as may be authorized by the by-laws; Provided That elective officers of the
government, except barrio captains and councilors, shall be ineligible to become officers
and/or directors of any cooperative, ... (emphasis supplied)
Section 3, Article IV of the By-laws of MOELCI II also explicitly states:
Section 3. Qualifications. ... No person shall be eligible to become or to remain a Board
member of the Cooperative who
xxx xxx xxx
(c) holds an elective office in the government above the level of a Barangay Captain
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied)
On 4 January 1980, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City in the 30 January 1980 local elections.
On 7 January 1980, the NEA, through Administrator Pedro G. Dumol, issued Memorandum No. 18 to the
effect that all officials and employees of electric cooperatives who run for public office, win and assume

office, shall be considered The Memorandum was issued pursuant to the authority granted under PD
No. 1645, amending PD No. 269, reading.
10. ... the NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations ... in the exercise of
its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrower,
supervised or control entities (Sec. 5, amending Sec. 10 of P.D. No. 269). 1
On January 1980, the NEA Deputy Administrator sent a telegram to the Acting General Manager of
MOELCI II stating that should private respondent Borje be elected to the Sangguniang Bayan, he shall
be considered resigned from his position as Director for the North District of Ozamiz City, Private
respondent moved reconsideration and requested that he be allowed to serve the unexpired term of
his office in accordance with PD No. 269. Reconsideration was denied by NEA on 7 February 1980.
On 3 March 1980, private respondent filed a Petition for "Prohibition, mandamus & Construction of
Legal Provisions with Preliminary Injunction and Damages" against petitioners before the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II (Spec. Case No. 0511), seeking a declaration of entitlement
to remain and to serve his unexpired term as Director of MOELCI II until March, 1982.
On 3 March 1980, having won the election, private respondent assumed office and began discharging
his functions.
On the same date, 3 March 1980, respondent Judge issued, ex- parte, a temporary restraining Order
commanding petitioners considering private respondent as resigned, and, instead, to snow him to
retain his position as member of the Board of Directors of MOELCI IIpending hearing. 2
Petitioners moved to dismiss and to dissolve the Restraining Order alleging lack of cause of action and
invoking section 21 of PD No. 269 (supra), section 3, Article IV of the by laws OF MOELCI II(supra), as
well as section 24 of PD No. 269 providing that:
... The by-laws shall prescribe the number of directors their qualifications other than
those prescribed in this Decree, the manner of holding meetings of the board and of
electing successors to directors who shall resign, die or otherwise be incapable of acting.
The bylaws may also provide for the removal of directors from office and for the election
of their successors ...
On 24 March 1980, respondent Judge lifted and dissolved the Restraining Order,
next day, 25 March 1980. 4

only to restore it the

In their Motion seeking reconsideration of the Order of 25 March 1980, petitioners stressed that NEA
possessed the power and authority to promulgate Memorandum No 18, and that, similarly, the Board
of Directors of MOELCI IIhad the power to implement the same under PD No. 269, as amended by PD
1645.
Petitioners filed their Answer on 6 April 1980 reiterating the grounds in their Motion to Dismiss.
On 8 May 1980, vacation Judge Celso Largo reconsidered the Order of respondent Judge, dated 25
March 1980, and dissolved the Restraining Order. 5
On 10 May 1980, the Board of Directors of MOELCI II held a special meeting and passed Resolution No.
121, S-80, implementing NEA Circular No. 18 and declaring private respondent's position as member of
the Board of Directors of MOELCI II vacant.
On 6 June 1980, upon a Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge set aside the Order of the
vacation Judge, dated 8 May 1980, in effect reviving the Restraining Order, on the ground that, as
"councilor" of Ozamiz City, section 21 of PD No. 269 itself exempts private respondent from the
prohibition imposed on elective officials to become Directors of electric cooperatives. 6
Hence, this Petition filed on 29 September 1980 by petitioners, through the Solicitor General,
advancing the view that Courts of First Instance have no jurisdiction to issue a Restraining Order and
that respondent Judge had committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the same.

On 10 October 1980 we required respondents to submit an Answer and issued a Restraining Order
enjoining respondents from enforcing the Order of the Court a quo dated 6 June 1980 and from
conducting further proceedings in the case below. Private respondent Borje has filed his Answer,
petitioners have submitted their Reply, and on 2 February 1981, we resolved to give due course to the
Petition and to consider the case submitted for decision.
We find that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
issuing the various Restraining Orders, the last of which was dated 6 June 1980. Private respondent has
shown no clear and explicit right to the position of Director of MOELCI IIand is, therefore, not entitled to
a Restraining Order, which partook of the nature of a mandatory Injunction, commanding as it did that
private respondent be retained in his position as such Director. By having been elected member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City, private respondent rendered himself ineligible to continue
serving as a Director of MOELCI IIby virtue of the clear mandate of PD No. 269 providing that except for
"barrio captains and councilors", elective officials are ineligible to become officers and/or directors of
any cooperative. It is clear to us that the term barrio modifies both captains and councilors. Further,
the MOELCI II, by-laws explicitly state that no person can remain a member of the Board if he "holds an
elective office above the level of barrio captain.
Private respondent's argument that PD 269 (sec. 21) does not prohibit Board members of a
cooperatives from continuing in their position prior to their election, and that pursuant to section 24 of
PD No. 269 he is entitled, as Director, to hold office for the term for which he is erected and until his
successor is elected and qualified," is untenable. Eligibility to an office should be construed as of a
continuing nature and must exist at the commencement of the term and during occupancy of the
office. The fact that private respondent may have been qualified at the time he assumed the
Directorship is not sufficient to entitle him to continue holding office, if during the continuance of his
incumbency he ceases to be qualified. Private respondent was qualified to become a director of
MOELCI II at the time of the commencement of his term, but his election as member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City, and his subsequent assumption of office, disqualified him to
continue as such.
Moreover, it should be recalled that when respondent Judge issued the Restraining Order of 6 June
1980. NEA Memorandum Circular No. 18 had already been implemented by the MOELCI Board in the
latter's Resolution No. 121, passed on 10 May 1980, declaring the position of private respondent, as
Director, vacant. Strictly speaking, therefore, there was no longer any position which private
respondent could retain.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the Restraining Order, dated 6 June 1980, the said Order is hereby annulled and
set aside, and the Petition in Special Civil Case No. 05IIof the Court below hereby ordered dismissed.
The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3655

April 28, 1951

MIGUEL M. RAMOS AND AURORA V. ARGOSINO, petitioners,

vs.
VALENTINA VILLAVERDE, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3656

April 28, 1951.

MIGUEL M. RAMOS AND AURORA V. ARGOSINO, petitioners,

vs.
PAULA FLORIDO, ET AL., respondents.
Alfredo Bonus and Lorenzo S. Navarro for petitioners.
Zosimo D. Tanalega for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals involves the validity of the sales of two
parcels of land for payment of taxes.
Briefly, the facts are these: Prior to March, 1939, Perfecto Reyes and Valentina Villaverde were the
registered owners of lot No. 1904 and Juan Jorque of lot No. 3439, both of Lopez (Quezon) cadastre.
Having been forfeited for delinquency in the payment of taxes, these lots were sold at public auction to
Agapito Vergara, the first for P10 and the last for P100. Vergara subsequently conveyed both lots for
P3,000 each to the spouses Miguel M. Ramos and Aurora V. Argosino.
In 1947, these spouses filed petitions in the above-mentioned cadastral case alleging that the owner's
duplicate certificates of title covering the two parcels had been lost and praying that new ones be
issued in lieu thereof in their favor. After a joint hearing, both petitions were granted in an order which
is now the subject of appeal, over the objections of the registered owners.
The legality of the sales is impugned on the grounds, among others not essential to the case, that said
sales were not advertised in a newspaper nor was notice thereof sent to the owners by registered mail.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the law in force at the time of the sales in question, March, 1939,
was not Commonwealth Act No. 470, Section 35, as erroneously supposed by the parties and the court

a quo, but Section 41 of Act No. 3995. The latter Act remained in operation until December 31, 1939,
according to the express provision of Section 33 of Commonwealth Act No. 470.
Section 41, supra, provided, among other things, that announcement of sale of confiscated real
property at public auction "shall be made by publishing a notice once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation published in the province, if there be any," and further that
"a copy of the notice shall be forthwith sent by registered mail to the deliquent taxpayer at his
residence if known to said treasurer." These requirements were varied by Commonwealth Act No. 470,
which makes publication of notice in a newspaper discretionary with the provincial treasurer and
authorizes the treasurer, also in his discretion, to send such notice to the owner either by registered
mail or by messenger.
By "newspaper of general circulation published in the province" was meant, in our opinion, one printed
and not merely circulated herein. The purchasers of the lots in question admit that no publication of the
notice in a newspaper was accomplished. However, they assert that there was no newspaper published
or printed in Quezon Province, and now they ask for a new trial, explaining that their failure to adduce
proof on this core in the court below arose from the erroneous belief on their part as well on the part of
the Court of First Instance, that in March, 1939, when the sales are effected, the procedure outlined in
Section 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 470 already governed, Act which, as has been seen, makes
announcement of the sale in a newspaper optional with the provincial treasurer.
The view we take of the second ground of objection, to be presently stated, makes it unnecessary to
decide the first, or to grant a new hearing.
It is conceded that no notices by registered mail were sent to the deliquent taxpayers. What the
purchasers understood to prove was that notices were transmitted by messengers. The Court of
Appeals made no definite findings on whether personal notices were dispatched, as claimed, or
received by the sendees. The only evidence on the subject was furnished by the municipal treasurer
and not by the messengers themselves. Needless to say, the treasurer was not in a position to and did
not affirm positively that the messengers actually handed the notices to the parties for whom they
were intended, or left them at their places of residence.
However the case may be, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that notice by registered
mail, as ordained by Act No. 3995, was mandatory and excluded any other mode of service. Had this
not been the case, it would have been superflous for the Legislature to add in the subsequent law
Commonwealth Act No. 470 the sending of notice by messenger as an alternate means of
notification. Furthermore, we think there is much to the contention that as, the sale of property for tax
deliquency is in derogation of property rights and due process, the prescribed steps must be followed
strictly.
We are constrained to affirm, as we hereby affirm, the decision of the Court of Appeals, without special
findings as to cost of this appeal.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.