Chile Assessment

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, Chile

Date Posted: 22-May-2014
UPDATED
Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South America
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Contents
Chile At A Glance
Recent Developments and Key Challenges
Risk Pointers
A campaign by militants of the Mapuche
indigenous Amerindian community to disrupt
forestry operations in the central-southern
regions of the country is likely to continue.
Popular protests are likely to continue in the
short term, particularly around the issue of
education.
Chile is susceptible to earthquakes and
volcanic eruptions, both of which occur
frequently, but are generally well-managed by
good emergency planning and efficient response
services.
Long-standing and unresolved terrestrial
and maritime border disputes with its northern
neighbours, Peru and Bolivia, are unlikely to
generate military conflict.
Organised crime is much less prevalent in
Chile than in other South American countries and
is likely to remain so in the five-year outlook.
Ratings Change Assessment
Military Overview
Chile At A Glance
Area:
756,626 km2
Language:
Spanish
Religion:
Roman Catholic
Time Zone:
GMT -4
Population:
17,269,525 (World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011)
Neighbours:
Argentina, Bolivia, Peru
Capital City:
Santiago
Primary Port:
San Antonio
Primary Airport:
Santiago International - Arturo Merino Bentez
Currency:
Peso (CLP)
Recent Developments and Key Challenges

Context: Chile is South America's regional exception, a stable and increasingly prosperous democracy with a well-educated
population, a robust economy, and, by any measurement, enviably low levels of corruption and crime. A long, divisive, and frequently
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brutal period of military rule under General Augusto Pinochet (1973-90) was followed by a well-managed transition to stable democratic
governance. Pinochet's death in December 2006 marked a definitive break from the autocratic past as the military withdrew completely
from political life. Economically, the country has performed strongly since the years of military rule, and it remains one of the safest
investment climates in the hemisphere, particularly since joining the OECD in January 2010. Nevertheless, the robust economy masks
sharp inequalities: the rural indigenous Amerindian population is particularly poor, and sporadic ethnic unrest continues to affect the
south-central Araucana region. Michelle Bachelet (2006-10, 2014-) returned for a second term in office in March 2014 after four years
of governance by Sebastin Piera. His Coalition for Change (Coalicin por el Cambio) administration was the first conservative
government to be elected since the end of the dictatorship. Bachelet comfortably won a second round presidential run-off against
Coalition for Change candidate Evelyn Matthei in December 2013 with 62.1% of the vote. Her New Majority (Nueva Mayora) coalition
also performed well, securing 67 of 120 seats in the House of Deputies and 21 of 38 seats in the Senate.
Challenges: Chile is a country largely devoid of serious security risks. However, an ongoing area of concern for the new government
and business interests is the campaign by militants of the Mapuche indigenous Amerindian community to disrupt forestry operations in
the central-southern regions of the country, particularly Araucana. Mapuche activists have burnt commercial forests and industrial
plantations, sabotaged machinery, and blocked roads on numerous occasions since the mid-1990s. During her election campaign and
following her inauguration, Bachelet made a number of gestures to the Mapuche community including vowing to stop the use of antiterror legislation to prosecute Mapuche activists. She has also supported talks between Mapuche community leaders and the new
regional government in Araucana. However, she is unlikely to agree to land reform and greater autonomy for Chile's indigenous
community, key issues for Mapuche activists. Organised crime is much less prevalent in Chile than in other South American countries,
but is still a concern, with recent years witnessing an increase in the flow of firearms to Chilean criminal groups and an increase in
armed robberies. Drug abuse is on the rise (particularly cocaine consumption), reflecting both the growth of an affluent middle class,
and an increased through-flow of cocaine from Colombia and Peru. A small terrorist risk exists from unstructured anarchist groups,
which are believed to be responsible for a string of low-level and non-lethal bomb attacks in the capital Santiago since January 2006,
and there is a low but present risk of future small-scale bomb attacks in Santiago, aimed predominantly at financial institutions and
business interests.
Risk Pointers
A campaign by militants of the Mapuche indigenous Amerindian community to disrupt forestry operations in the centralsouthern regions of the country is likely to continue.
An ongoing campaign by Mapuche militants against large landowners and forestry firms in the central-southern region of Araucana is
likely to continue despite the election of President Michelle Bachelet. High-profile incidents since the beginning of 2013 include an
arson attack on two grounded helicopters providing services to forestry firm Mininco in December 2013, numerous arson attacks
against vehicles and machinery owned by forestry or agriculture firms, including one incident in which six vehicles were damaged or
destroyed; and the derailment of a cargo train in April 2013. In the same period, at least two helicopters have come under attack while
attempting to combat forest fires.
Country risk implications - crime; social cohesion: Mapuche militancy is likely to continue despite the election of Bachelet. During
her election campaign, Bachelet vowed to tackle a major point of contention for the Mapuche community by ending the use of anti-terror
legislation to prosecute Mapuche militants. She has also supported dialogue between members of the indigenous community and the
new regional government in Araucana. However, the fundamental drivers of the conflict, namely land rights and autonomy, have yet to
be addressed comprehensively. It is unlikely that Bachelet will agree to a radical plan of land re-distribution at the expense of
landowners or adopt measures that threaten the integrity of the state. As such, it is probable that sporadic acts of violence and
sabotage will continue in the medium term, disrupting business operations, and contributing to hostility between indigenous Mapuches
and local landowners and business owners.
Popular protests are likely to continue in the short term, particularly around the issue of education.
For a country that enjoys a high degree of social cohesion and good social development indicators, public protest is a surprisingly
present risk factor for government stability, regardless of the political colour of the administration in power. Moreover, public protest has
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a tendency to rapidly turn violent, given the frequently heavy-handed tactics of the carabineros para-miltary police in countering
potentially riotous situations. Student protest in Chile is a particularly recurrent element within public life, with funding arrangements the
main focus. Bachelet has vowed to fundamentally reform the education sector by introducing free, universal higher education, to be
funded, in part, by an increase in corporation tax. With protest marches able to rally anything from a few thousand to hundreds of
thousands of participants, the potential for disorder is significant, although the Chilean security services remain equal to the task of
maintaining overall order.
Country risk implications - crime; social cohesion: Despite the election of Bachelet, student-led protests are likely to continue. The
head of the University of Chile Student Federation (Federacin de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile: FECH), Melissa Seplveda,
warned that Bachelet's election will not halt the protests. However, student movement organisers are likely to give the president
breathing space as they evaluate the government's education proposals. The development of the legislation is likely to offer plenty of
opportunity for further protests, particularly if student groups feel excluded from the process. Furthermore, given that the government
lacks the 57% majority needed in Congress to pass the reform, it will have to seek support from the opposition. If such support is
conditional on watering down aspects of the reform, further protests are likely.
Chile is susceptible to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, both of which occur frequently, but are generally well-managed by
good emergency planning and efficient response services.
On 27 February 2010, Chile suffered an 8.8-magnitude earthquake that caused widespread infrastructure damage and an official death
toll of 527 across many central regions, particularly in Bo Bo and the country's second city of Concepcin. Outbreaks of looting in
affected cities initially overwhelmed the police, leading then-president Michelle Bachelet to impose a curfew and order 10,000 troops to
be deployed to enforce public security. Although the scenes of looting and vandalism shocked a country that had long prided itself on its
orderliness and civilisation, security was rapidly restored after an initially uneven government response, and an efficient reconstruction
operation swung into action. On 1 April 2014, an 8.2-magnitude earthquake hit the north of Chile. A state of catastrophe was declared
in the regions of Arica, Parinacota, and Tarapac. Six people lost their lives, while 900,000 were temporarily evacuated from coastal
areas.
Country risk implications - infrastructure; robustness of the economy: The relative frequency of natural disasters in Chile
increases the risk of infrastructure damage and burdens the economy with high reconstruction costs. Nevertheless, confidence in
Chile's ability to weather disasters is high, a point outlined by the international financial markets' confidence in Chile's resilience, which
was highlighted in June 2010 when Chile became the only country in Latin America to receive an AA bond investment rating from
ratings agency Moody's, despite the effects of the earthquake. Reconstruction of public infrastructure has been swift, comprehensive,
and efficient, and has even had positive spin-offs in terms of job creation and infrastructure improvements.
Long-standing and unresolved terrestrial and maritime border disputes with its northern neighbours, Peru and Bolivia, are
unlikely to generate military conflict.
In April 2013, the Bolivian government presented a case against Chile at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague,
Netherlands, relating to the dispute. The ICJ is yet to decide whether it will hear the case. If it does, there is no obligation for Chile to
respect the ruling. Separately, in January 2014, the ICJ published its ruling on the Chile-Peru maritime border dispute. The ruling
requires Chile to cede approximately 20,000 square kilometres of maritime territory to Peru. However, Chile retains sovereignty over
the first 80 nautical miles due west of the border, meaning it will keep control of key fishing resources located near the coast. Both
countries have said they will respect the ICJ's decision and are co-operating to implement the ruling.
Country risk implications - involvement of multilateral institutions; regional relations: The Bolivian sea access dispute is not set
to disappear any time soon, although relations between Chile and Bolivia are likely to improve under a left-of-centre Bachelet
administration. Bachelet was able to manage the Bolivian sea-access issue with careful diplomacy during her first administration.
Meanwhile, relations between Chile and Peru have gradually normailsed over the last decade. The good faith shown by both countries
in the lead-up to, and following, the ICJ's ruling on the maritime border suggests this process will continue. Both governments were able
to interpret the ruling as a success. Chile will retain the majority of its fishing resources in the disputed areas, while Peru has scored a
symbolic victory by being granted around 70% of the disputed area.
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Organised crime is much less prevalent in Chile than in other South American countries and is likely to remain so in the fiveyear outlook.
Nevertheless, it is still a concern, with recent years witnessing an increase in the flow of firearms to Chilean criminal groups and an
increase in armed robberies. Overall, crime rates have risen in the last two decades, but they remain extremely low by regional and
even global standards, while the paramilitary carabineros are arguably the most effective and least corruptible law enforcement agency
in Latin America. Violent street crime is substantially below regional levels, and Chile enjoys the lowest murder rate in Latin America (at
3.7 per 100,000 inhabitants according to the United Nations). Chile is primarily a transit country for drug trafficking due to its welldeveloped infrastructure, although its status as one of the most industrially developed countries in Latin America means that many
precursor chemicals are sourced from Chile. A small terrorist risk exists from unstructured anarchist groups, which are believed to be
responsible for a string of low-level and non-lethal bomb attacks in Santiago since January 2006, and there is a low but present risk of
future small-scale bomb attacks in the capital, aimed predominantly at financial institutions and business interests.
Country risk implications - crime: The professionalism of Chile's state security forces limits the potential impact of criminal activity in
the country. Despite the existence of a domestic market for illegal drugs, and the use of Chilean ports to export cocaine originating from
neighbouring Bolivia and Peru, there is only a limited presence of organised criminal groups, reducing the probability of violence
associated with the illegal drugs trade.
Ratings Change Assessment
Chile's political environment has remained stable in recent years, with slight improvements in military and security stability, and political
ratings in 2012. However, student protests and ongoing tensions with Bolivia regarding access to the sea have led to a small drop in
both social and external stability. The impact of such changes is minor, and overall the country remains by far the most stable within the
region - a trend that is likely to continue in the medium term.
Military Overview
The Chilean armed forces have transformed into the region's most capable military forces, both in training, force composition, logistics
as in the general quality of their materiel. Their technical capabilities as well as local industrial capacity to service the majority of its
equipment is far superior to any other country in the region. Chile has been pushing its armed forces to reach NATO standards and is
able to conduct domestic and external operations to a high degree.
Re-equipping and re-organizing units has been a priority, while it continues to contribute to international peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations it considers to be of vital importance for regional economic development and trade.
Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2014
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SECURITY, Chile
Date Posted: 29-Oct-2014
UPDATED
SECURITY
Contents
Major Threats
Terrorism and Insurgency
Political
Anarchist groups
Ethnic
Mapuche activism
Crime Overview
Trafficking
Drug
Arms
People
Extortion
Kidnapping
Major Threats
A border dispute between Chile and Bolivia is unlikely to lead to war; Peru and Chile have agreed to implement an ICJ ruling
on their maritime border, reducing war risks. Relations between Chile and Bolivia have deteriorated markedly but are unlikely to
lead to military conflict. The deterioration has culminated in Bolivia's decision, on 24 April 2013, to take Chile to the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) over its claim to sovereignty over land in northern Chile that was lost in the 1879-83 War of the Pacific. The Bolivian
government presented its written case in April 2014, but a ruling on the dispute is not expected for years. Given Chile's military
superiority, Bolivia has so far centred its policy on economic and diplomatic rather than military measures, such as restricting natural
gas exports to Chile. The election to the Chilean presidency of Michelle Bachelet, whose political views are more closely aligned to
those of President Evo Morales of Bolivia, is likely to slightly improve diplomatic relations. The overall risk of inter-state war is very low.
Despite this, there have been isolated incidents involving both armies at the countries' border. In January 2013, three Bolivian soldiers
were detained in northern Chile for entering the country without permission and were held in Chile for over a month. Morales described
them as "political hostages", a charge rejected by Chile. In 2012, 13 Bolivian soldiers were detained in Chile during a similar incident.
Chile's relations with Peru are also historically poor as a consequence of the same War of the Pacific. However, diplomatic relations
have improved in recent years, with the countries jointly founding the Pacific Alliance trade bloc in 2012, and dropping trade tariffs on
bilateral trade in 2013. In January 2014, the ICJ issued a ruling on a long-running dispute over the countries' maritime border, handing
21,000 square kilometres of Chilean sea to Peru. The ruling was widely viewed as balanced and both parties vowed to abide by it.
While the ruling is being implemented, fishing vessels in the area are likely to face moderate risks of seizure from the navies of either
country. Again, the overall risks of inter-state war are very low.
Chile and Argentina enjoy vastly improved military relations from the near-war between the countries at the end of the 1970s, when
both had military governments. Chile has supported Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands/Las Malvinas and the risk of war between
the countries is very low.
Disruptive student protests are likely to continue until the government passes its education reform package. Student-led antigovernment demonstrations have been the primary source of unrest in Chile since 2011. Although the protests have resulted in only
one fatality as of August 2014, the demonstrations usually end in violence, with the use of water cannon and tear gas by the police.
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Businesses located along Alameda Avenue (officially known as Liberator Bernardo O'Higgins Avenue) and near Plaza Italia in the
capital, Santiago, face the highest collateral damage risk. Bank branches have suffered damage during protests. The protests pose a
high risk of damage to government property, particularly Transantiago public buses. The election of President Bachelet appears to have
appeased the Chilean Student Confederation (Confederacin de Estudiantes de Chile: CONFECH) with the promise of education
reform. However, student protests are likely to continue until the reform is implemented and escalate if there are delays to its passage.
Specific days of the year can produce mobilisations that frequently turn violent, resulting in damage to property. These include: 29
March (the 'Day of the Young Combatant'); 1 May (Workers' Day); 21 May (the president's state-of-the-nation address in Valparaiso);
and around 11 September, the anniversary of the 1973 military coup.
Farmers, environmentalists, miners, and indigenous activists have also staged joint protests as their causes have converged. Outside
Santiago, protesters from the Aysn Social Movement (MPSRA) erected roadblocks in Puerto Aysn (Aysn), effectively shutting down
the small city in March 2012. The northern city of Calama has become a focus for protests by miners and militant sympathisers seeking
a redistribution of Chile's mineral wealth. So has the northern Huasco valley, which the state has attempted to develop as an industrial
zone.
Mapuche indigenous activists are likely to continue anti-government protests calling for land rights and an end to the application of the
anti-terrorism law. Mapuche-led protests are most likely in Santiago, Concepcin (Bo Bo region), and Temuco (Araucana region).
Additionally, small extremist Mapuche groups have engaged in roadblocks affecting cargo, primarily in the Araucana region. Activists
have targeted forestry company assets, police outposts, and, on several occasions, helicopters being used to extinguish forest fires.
Highway routes 5 (Pan American Highway), 181, 182, and inter-city roads R-49, R-50, R-86, and R-90 face the highest risk of arson,
cargo disruption, and theft. The risk is highest near the town of Ercilla, 85 km north of Temuco on the Pan American Highway.
Forestry firms and cargo are at risk of arson attacks by Mapuche extremists in Araucana; anarchist IED attacks are a minor
threat in Santiago. The low-intensity violence carried out by pro-Mapuche activists in Araucana is likely to continue over the next 12
months at a lower level than during President Piera's administration. According to the Barometer of Conflicts with Indigenous
Connotations (Barometro de Conflictos con Connotacin Indgena) produced by the Cross-sector Union of Araucana (Multigremial De
Araucana), indigenous-related conflicts in the region increased from 31 in 2008 to 309 in 2012, although these subsequently fell to just
over 200 in 2013. The conciliatory approach being adopted by the Bachelet administration, which combines moves to promote greater
political participation for the country's indigenous communities and a softer approach towards security, is likely to contribute to a
reduction in Mapuche-related violence, particularly in actions provoked by perceptions of state injustice or use of force by the security
forces. Mapuche extremists are likely to engage in arson, vandalism and shooting attacks. Primary targets include plantations, farm
buildings, machinery, vehicles, and helicopters owned or used by agricultural firms or forestry companies such as Arauco SA, Bosques
Cautn, Masisa SA Mininco SA, and Volterra SA. The municipalities with the highest number of indigenous-linked violent incidents
during the first quarter of 2014 were Ercilla (21), Angol (19), and Collipulli (13) according to the same report. These three municipalities
are located in the north of the region within a 30-kilometre (km) radius of each other. The risk of Mapuche attacks does also extend
northwards in the neighbouring Bo Bo region.
Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks attributed to anarchist groups are a threat in Santiago. The IEDs employed by anarchists are
small and tend to cause minor property damage against their targets. A number of low-level, anarchist-style groups have been
responsible for a series of small-scale IED attacks, predominantly in Santiago, since 2005. Around 200 IEDs have been planted since
that year. Most of the groups appear to consist of no more than a handful of members, are often leaderless and disorganised, and on
many occasions appear to carry out a single attack before retreating into obscurity. Two IED attacks against the Santiago metro in July
and September 2014 suggest that the target set for those responsible for these attacks has expanded to include public transport
infrastructure. Typical targets include banks, barracks, churches, company offices, courthouses, embassies, political party
headquarters, and other government buildings. Although IED attacks against these assets are normally timed to avoid mass casualties,
the two metro attacks, the second of which injured 14 people, suggest not all perpetrators respect the zero casualty approach usually
adopted by those responsible for the bombings.
Chile's minor role as an export hub for Peruvian and Bolivian cocaine is likely to persist, although this is unlikely to produce
high levels of violence. Cocaine from the Andes is trafficked through Chile towards the European Union, the United States, and ports
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in Asia, although Chile is not as significant a transit country as those on South America's eastern coast. Its status as a US trade partner,
reinforced by a free-trade agreement, means that shipments and packages originating from Chile are often subject to less rigorous
customs checks than those from other South American countries. Chile is also an important source of precursor chemicals for cocaine
production, which are both transited through Chile towards the major production areas in the Andes and sourced from the country's
well-developed petrochemical industry. Although drug-trafficking overall is not a major security threat in Chile and the country's law
enforcement has one of the best records for drug seizures in South America, a recent increase in seizures, particularly of cocaine
paste, suggests that the problem could be growing, albeit at a manageable level compared to its regional neighbours.
Terrorism and Insurgency
There is a small risk of low-level terrorist attacks in Chile. Anarchist-style groups have been responsible for a series of small-scale nonlethal bomb attacks, predominantly in the capital Santiago, the frequency of which has increased since 2006. These groups draw
inspiration from the left-wing urban guerrilla groups of the 1960s and 1970s that offered resistance to the military dictatorships of the
Southern Cone, but their current concerns are generally orientated more towards single-issue grievances. Attacks have mainly targeted
financial institutions, company headquarters, embassies, and police stations, and most have left no victims. In March 2008, a previously
unknown anarchist group - calling itself Merciless Armed Column of Jean-Marc Rouillan (a jailed French guerrilla) - bombed a Chilean
branch of the Banco de Crdito e Inversiones (BC) financial institution in Santiago. The explosion destroyed most of the first floor of the
bank as well as an ATM machine. A communiqu issued in the aftermath of the attack spoke in favour of "Mapuche forces", radical
representatives of Chile's largest indigenous community, and condemned the act of accumulating wealth, attacking the upper class.
Subsequent bomb scares have ensued, but with no major consequences.
In July 2010, the authorities formalised legal proceedings against Roberto Gajardo Rubilar, detained by officers from the Special Police
Investigation Brigade (Brigada de Investigaciones Policiales Especiales: BIPE) on 6 July for allegedly being in possession of bombmaking material. Of particular interest will be any link to Mauricio Morales, an anarchist killed on 22 May 2009 when the bomb he was
carrying exploded prematurely. Morales' device was believed to be similar to those manufactured by Gajardo. In November 2011, an
anarchist group under the name Comando Autnomo Voltaire Argandoa/FAI-FRI claimed to have carried out a bomb attack on the
Chilean media corporation Copesa. This was followed, later that November, by the detonation of an explosive device targeting a branch
of the Chilean state financial institution BancoEstado, which damaged ATMs and shattered the windows of the office. Concerning
international terrorist organisations, the US-led war on terrorism prompted the Chilean government to investigate a large Arab business
community in the ZOFRI duty-free zone of the northern port of Iquique. The activities of Lebanese traders from Iquique in the tri-border
area between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina were particularly scrutinised, since it was initially considered a possible regional hub for
terrorist financing activities. In May 2010, Chilean security forces detained a Pakistani national, Muhammad Saif-ur-Rehman Khan, who
was in Chile to study tourism. His visa to the US had been revoked, and when he was invited to the US embassy in Santiago to be told
so, traces of Tetryl, a substance used to activate explosives, were found on him. He has since been released on bail. Apart from Islamic
terrorist threats, there have been periodic concerns about the presence of Colombian guerrillas in Chile, which have been suspected of
collaborating with Mapuche groups, although there is no evidence to confirm these suspicions.
Political
Anarchist groups
A number of low-level, anarchist-style groups have been responsible for a series of small-scale bomb attacks since 2005,
predominantly in Santiago. These groups may draw some inspiration from the left-wing urban guerrilla groups of the 1960s and 1970s
that offered resistance to the military dictatorships of the Southern Cone, but they appear to be anti-systemic and anarchic in their
views, rather than leftist. Most of the groups appear to consist of no more than a handful of members, are often leaderless and
disorganized, and on many occasions appear to carry out a single attack before retreating back into obscurity. Targets have included
police stations, embassies, company headquarters, and banks. Most of the bombs are planted at night and are clearly intended to
cause damage rather than casualties. The low-risk nature of the attacks means that they represent an ongoing and difficult threat for
the security services to counter, although the infrequency and small-scale of their attacks also indicates that they do not constitute a
wider threat to state stability.
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Police and security services appeared to have made a major breakthrough in stopping the attacks when they arrested 14 anarchist
suspects in August 2010, shortly after the case had been passed to a new prosecutor. Officers from the Special Police Investigation
Brigade (Brigada de Investigaciones Policiales Especiales: BIPE) raided three premises in Santiago and two in the coastal city of
Valparaiso, seizing suspected bomb-making equipment including fire extinguishers, timers, and gunpowder. It was hoped that the
arrests would halt the bombings but, on 4 October 2011, the case against the 14 suspects largely collapsed and most of the charges
were dropped. The attacks continued unabated in 2013, often targeting BancoEstado branches.
The bomb attacks have caused minor injuries but no deaths to passersby. However, on 22 May 2009, an anarchist, Mauricio Morales,
was killed when the bomb he was carrying in a rucksack exploded prematurely. On 1 June 2011, another anarchist, Luciano Pitronello,
was critically injured when a device he was holding exploded prematurely. In August 2012, Pitronello was found guilty of firearms
possession but, to the frustration of prosecutors, was cleared of terrorism charges. In late 2011, police arrested a 38-year-old
sociologist, Hans Niemeyer, in the process of planting a bomb outside a bank, offering hope once again of a breakthrough in the
investigation. He was sentenced to five years in jail in July 2013.
Solving the string of anarchist bombings would remove a source of embarrassment for the Chilean police, generally considered to be
the most professional in Latin America but previously frustrated in this investigation, and would also eliminate the only serious (if
extremely low-level) terrorist-style threat in otherwise well-ordered Santiago.
Ethnic
Mapuche activism
Chile has no major organised non-state armed groups. Nevertheless, activists of the indigenous Mapuche community - a preColumbian Amerindian people inhabiting the south-central Araucana region of Chile - have previously engaged in acts of violence in
support of their claims to have territory returned to them that had been taken by the Chilean state. This activity has generally been lowlevel, consisting mainly of attacks on foreign companies owning land in the area, and has invited a sporadically overbearing state
response that has included use of controversial anti-terrorism legislation and the deaths of Mapuche activists at the hand of security
forces. The activity remains mainly concentrated in traditional Mapuche areas, with occasional demonstrations in Santiago in support of
Mapuche claims. These protests currently show no signs of mutating into a more organised or national movement that would constitute
a broader threat to the state. In recent years, the Mapuche have garnered greater interest and support from outside Chile. International
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and movements advocating separatism or greater autonomy for minorities elsewhere in the
world have taken up their cause. Reports frequently surface in the Chilean media of links between the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco
(CAM), a small, loosely organised Mapuche militant group, and the Basque separatist group ETA. Similar claims have linked the CAM
with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Little in the way of evidence has been produced to support these
claims. On current trends, the efficient Chilean security apparatus remains equal to the task of monitoring the activists and preventing a
wider spread of militancy.
Crime Overview
Public security remains one of the main concerns of the population. Indeed, surveys conducted by Paz Ciudadana (Citizens' Peace), a
research foundation, show that since 2003 it has been the number-one preoccupation for Chileans, above education, health, and
employment. However, during 2011 worries over crime were somewhat eclipsed by concerns over education. In part, this reflects a fall
since 2007 in both the number of crimes reported and the perceived incidence of crime. Figures published by the Carabineros suggest
this trend is continuing. Major crimes fell 0.7% in January and February 2014, suggesting that ongoing efforts by the authorities are
proving successful.
Although Chile and its capital Santiago are still among the safest parts of Latin America, relatively high levels of inequality continue to
have a negative impact on crime statistics. Since the middle of the 2000s, public perceptions of crime are that levels have been steadily
rising, although there is some evidence to suggest these views are changing and Chileans are feeling slightly more secure. The country
has the lowest murder rate in Latin America, at 3.1 per 100,000 inhabitants according to UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2013 homicide
report, and is therefore safer than many developed countries, including the United States. Kidnapping and extortion are almost unheard
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of, and the government has sought to address growing public concerns about crime by substantial increases in the budget for policing.
The former government implemented an annual 7.2% rise in the budget for the Carabineros in 2012 and pledged to increase the
number of police officers on the streets by 10,000 between 2010 and 2014. It said that in 2012, for the first time, there were three
Carabineros for every 1,000 inhabitants in the country.
In August 2010, then-president Sebastin Piera presented Chile's public security plan for 2010-14. Accompanied by Minister of the
Interior Rodrigo Hinzpeter, Piera publicly launched the 'Safe Chile' plan in the Moneda presidential palace. The plan has three basic
components: a crime analysis centre; a programme to promote peaceful neighbourhoods; and a national security fund. The intention
was to cut the total number of households suffering from crime, and to bring down the quantity of offences committed in public spaces,
both by the end of 2013.
In March 2014, Paz Ciudadana published research showing that 38.9% of people had been victims of crime in 2013, down from a peak
of 40.5% in 2004 but higher than the 30.8% registered in 2000. Armed robberies represent one of the few areas where crime levels are
more pronounced, and Chile suffers regular attacks on automated cash machines (ATMs). The thefts target petrol stations and shops
and the groups' modus operandi is to drag the machine from its base by tying it to a vehicle. The gangs subsequently load the ATMs
into the vehicles, or attempt to open the money drawers of the machines.
The Chilean police and Carabineros have a good reputation for efficiency and incorruptibility, and are active in the training of other, less
well-equipped Latin American security forces. However, their standing in the eyes of the public suffered during 2011 and 2012 due to a
perception that their policing of the student and other social protests had often been heavy-handed. Opinion polls consistently showed
that confidence in the force, while still high by regional standards, had fallen significantly. In August 2011, a police officer shot dead a
16-year-old boy in Santiago during a night of protests. In September 2011, the head of the force, General Eduardo Gordon, resigned
amid allegations that Carabineros had tampered with a witness statement taken after a car accident in which Gordon's son was
involved.
Police in recent years have also noted a surge in drug abuse, coinciding with a flood of cheap cocaine and other coca derivatives (such
as the cheap but highly addictive 'paco') into the country, as well as the appearance of heroin from Colombia. Unemployment and
immigration from neighbouring countries have also been factors in the growth of prostitution, drug dealing, and associated street crime.
The 8.8-magnitude earthquake that struck the south-central regions of the country in February 2010 served as a reminder that public
order can rapidly deteriorate into crime and near-anarchy following a natural disaster (to which Chile is prone). On 28 February 2010,
then-president Bachelet was forced to impose a curfew in various towns in the Bo Bo region, seeking to curtail looting that followed the
27 February earthquake. The quake's effects were particularly severe in Chile's second city Concepcin, where houses, offices, roads,
and bridges were destroyed. Outbreaks of looting initially overwhelmed the police, who were unable to prevent widespread ransacking
of stores, and the disorder led Bachelet to declare a state of indefinite curfew in the affected area. Reinforcements to Carabineros and
army personnel in the area were also ordered, with 10,000 troops immediately deployed, including 1,500 in Concepcin.
Former president Piera, who took office in March 2010, strongly criticised Bachelet for not declaring a state of catastrophe sooner and
for not initially deploying the military to maintain order. Bachelet's reluctance was explicable because of the shadows of Chile's recent
authoritarian history, with many on the left uncomfortable with the concept of soldiers patrolling in a civilian policing capacity.
Nevertheless, the scale of the disorder was such that it quickly became evident that military support would be needed to restore order.
In the event of a repeat of a natural disaster similar to the 2010 earthquake, it is likely that the lessons would be remembered and there
would be no hesitation on the part of the government - of whichever political hue - to use the military to prevent outbreaks of crime and
disorder. This was proven following an 8.2-magnitude earthquake in northern Chile in April 2014. Bachelet immediately declared a state
of catastrophe in the affected regions and deployed the armed forces to prevent outbreaks of looting.
Trafficking
Drug
Cocaine from the Andes is trafficked through Chile towards the European Union, the United States, and ports in Asia, although Chile is
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not as significant a transit country as those on South America's eastern coast. The country's principal attraction for drug traffickers is its
well-developed infrastructure, facilitating the swift transit of cargoes. Chile's status as a US trade partner, reinforced by a free-trade
agreement (FTA), means that shipments and packages originating from the country are often subject to less rigorous customs checks
than those from some other South American countries. Chile is also an important source of precursor chemicals for cocaine production,
which are transited through Chile towards the major production areas in the Andes and sourced from the country's well-developed
petrochemical industry. Although drug trafficking overall is not a major security threat in Chile and the country's law enforcement has
one of the best records for drug seizures in South America, a recent increase in seizures, particularly of cocaine paste, suggests that
the problem could be growing, albeit at a manageable level compared with its regional neighbours. Almost 40 tonnes of illicit drugs
were seized by the authorities in 2013, compared to 27.3 tonnes in 2012. The majority of seizures were cocaine and marijuana.
The administration of then-president Bachelet sought to step up action against drug trafficking. It awarded European aerospace
corporation EADS a contract to provide the Carabineros police with aircraft with sensors for border surveillance flights. In October 2011,
the government of Bachelet's successor, Sebastin Piera, launched a plan to tackle drug trafficking along the country's land borders
with Peru and Bolivia, as well as along its northern coast. The Northern Frontier initiative will receive an investment of CLP35 billion
through to 2014 and will be focused on the regions of Arica-Parinacota, Tarapac, and Antofagasta. Of the 12 cocaine seizures from
containerised cargo in the first half of 2011, all but two involved cocaine from lowland Bolivia transiting through the northern Chilean
port of Arica. The programme will involve a co-ordinated effort by the ministries of the interior and defence, as well as the police,
investigative police, armed forces, customs and directorate-general of maritime territory, and merchant marine and livestock service.
In September 2011, members of Chile's OS-7 Carabineros anti-drug police seized over 400 kg of drugs in the northern region of
Antofagasta, approximately 1,130 km north of the capital, Santiago. According to an official report, authorities seized 94 kg of cocaine
and 318 kg of marijuana. The police unit arrested three suspects, and seized four cell phones and USD472,000 in cash. Seizures such
as this illustrate how the drug trafficking problem is principally concentrated in the north of the country, although this is not exclusively
the case. An earlier operation, in August 2011, by Chile's investigative police (Polica de Investigaciones de Chile: PDI) led to the arrest
of multiple members of international drug-trafficking gangs and the seizure of 112 kg of drugs in parallel operations under the banner of
"Operation Pyramid". In the first operation, anti-drugs agents of the PDI detained two suspects conducting an illegal drug transaction in
San Felipe, in the Valparaiso Region - 88 km northwest of the capital Santiago - and seized 12.62 kg of cocaine hydrochloride. As part
of the same investigation, the PDI arrested three other suspects alleged by police to be members of an international criminal
organisation linked to trafficking cocaine from the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz to Santiago and the city of Villarica in the Araucana
region. In addition, the PDI arrested two people and seized 100.7 kg of marijuana in the town of Llay Llay in the Valparaiso region. In
July 2013, the Carabineros seized almost 26 tonnes of marijuana in the northern city of Calama in the Atacama region. In November
that year, four Carabineros, including the head of the anti-drug unit in the northern region of Arica, were arrested on suspicion of trying
to traffic 1.1 tonnes of marijuana from Bolivia.
Arms
Although arms trafficking was common under the military dictatorship, largely connected to General Pinochet, the trade is now carried
out primarily by members of transnational organisations rather than Chilean nationals. There have been some signs of an increase in
small-arms trafficking, with the appearance of a growing number of illegal assault rifles manufactured both in Russia and Eastern
European countries, primarily in the hands of drug-trafficking organisations operating in Santiago and other major cities.
The ownership of registered arms is legal in Chile, but the state has tightened restrictions on where they can be purchased. As a result,
the number of new gun registrations has fallen. By 2013, there were nearly 758,593 firearms registered in Chile, according to the
Direccin General de Movilizacin Nacional.
People
People trafficking is not a serious problem in Chile, but exists at a low level. In May 2011, police in Paraguay arrested two people
suspected of human trafficking linked to forced labour in Chile. The two people, who were arrested in the capital Asuncin, were
suspected of recruiting Paraguayans to work in Chile and then forcing them to work as slaves in a vineyard on the outskirts of the town
of Santa Ana. Some 45 Paraguayan workers were also rescued as part of the operation.
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Extortion
Extortion is not a relevant concern for foreign investors. Incidents are almost negligible.
Kidnapping
Kidnapping used to be virtually unheard of in Chile, but in recent years rising numbers of incidents have been reported. Express
kidnappings have become more frequent, wherein the victim is often taken to an ATM machine and then released. It is, however, still
extremely rare for business people to be kidnapped in the country. Despite the low risk, a high-profile kidnapping case in October 2003
involved an executive from British American Tobacco (BAT). The case fed fears about public safety, but the risk of abduction remains
low in Chile, especially if compared with that of Mexico or Venezuela.
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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, Chile

UPDATED
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Contents
Leadership
Political Profiles
President Michelle Bachelet
Former president Sebastin Piera
Leadership
Title
Name
Appointed
President
Michelle BACHELET
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Finance
Alberto ARENAS de Mesa
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Heraldo MUOZ Valenzuela
11_Mar_2014
Minister of National Defence
Jorge BURGOS Varela
11_Mar_2014
Minister of the Economy, Development and

Tourism
Luis Felipe CSPEDES
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Justice
Jos Antonio GMEZ Urrutia
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Labour and Social Provision
Javiera BLANCO Surez
11_Mar_2014
Minister of the Interior and Public Security
Rodrigo PEAILILLO Briceo
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Transport and

Telecommunications
Andrs GMEZ-LOBO Echenique
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Energy
Mximo PACHECO Matte
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Health
Helia MOLINA Milman
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Mining
Aurora WILLIAMS Baussa
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Education (Mineduc)
Nicols EYZAGUIRRE Guzmn
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Agriculture
Carlos FURCHE Guajardo
11_Mar_2014
Minister for National Assets
Vctor OSORIO Reyes
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Public Works
Alberto UNDURRAGA Vicua
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Social Development
Mara Fernanda VILLEGAS Acevedo
11_Mar_2014
Minister of the Environment
Pablo BADENIER Martnez
11_Mar_2014
President of the National Council of Culture

and the Arts
Claudia BARATTINI Contreras
11_Mar_2014
Minister of Housing and Urban Planning
Paulina SABALL Astaburuaga
11_Mar_2014
Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power
Political Profiles
President Michelle Bachelet
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Bachelet, born on 29 September 1951, was Chile's first female head of government and, before that, was the first female defence
minister. A qualified paediatrician, Bachelet also has extensive international post-graduate qualifications in political sciences and
military strategy, including an honorary scholarship from the Inter-American Defence College in Washington DC, US.
Michelle Bachelet is the daughter of Alberto Bachelet, a Chilean Air Force general and an associate of Salvador Allende at the time of
the 1973 military coup. Alberto was imprisoned after the coup on charges of sedition and treason. In prison, he was tortured and
mistreated, and died of a heart attack aged 49. Michelle Bachelet and her mother were also briefly detained, before being released and
allowed to go into exile, first in Australia, then in East Germany. After returning to Chile in 1979, Michelle Bachelet graduated from the
University of Chile in 1982 with an MD in surgery, after which she carried out research at the Roberto del Ro children's hospital and
worked with several non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Following the return to democracy in 1990, she worked in the Ministry of
Health, before pursuing her interest in civil-military relations and studying military strategy at the Academia Nacional de Estudios
Polticos y Estratgicos (ANEPE) and the Inter-American Defence College.
Throughout most of the 1990s, Michelle Bachelet worked with successive governments as an adviser on both health and defence
issues. Bachelet was appointed defence minister in January 2002, following nearly two years as health minister in Ricardo Lagos'
Socialist Concertacin government. She became the presidential candidate for the ruling centre-left coalition in May 2005, after former
minister of foreign relations Maria Soledad lvear from the PDC party declined to compete. The full weight of Concertacin support
then swung behind Bachelet. With the vote of the right-wing Alianza coalition split between two candidates, Bachelet's victory was
considered a safe bet in December 2005. Yet, although she gained the most votes in the first-round ballot, she failed to win a majority
over the two right-wing candidates, necessitating a run-off. Bachelet eventually defeated Piera in the second round on 15 January
2006, and was sworn in as president on 11 March 2006.
Bachelet pledged that her government would focus on social development, with efforts aimed at continuing economic growth while
ensuring that all sectors of society benefit through a process of social integration. However, Bachelet enjoyed a shorter-than-expected
honeymoon period, with widespread riots by students from May to June 2006 hampering her efforts to fulfil her promise of passing 33
legislative measures in her first 100 days. The riots were mishandled; early protests were largely ignored by the authorities, while police
management of the ensuing uprisings attracted accusations of brutality. Bachelet's legislative agenda also ran into problems, with little
progress on the highly publicised issues of electoral reform, pensions, and labour protection. The introduction of a new public transport
system in Santiago in February 2007 generated widespread criticism, causing Bachelet's popularity rating to fall from 55% to 43%
between February and March that year.
Transport problems in Santiago had been somewhat rectified by the end of 2008, but a series of low-level corruption scandals and an
ongoing perception that Bachelet's administration was indecisive and running out of steam contributed to consistently low approval
ratings of less than 40% by the end of the year. Moreover, in October 2008, her Concertacin suffered its first nationwide electoral
defeat since the return of democracy, when municipal elections re-instated a majority of Alianza mayors in the country's regional
capitals. The defeat appeared to show a strengthening opposition positioning itself for the presidential elections in 2009, for which
Bachelet was ineligible to stand.
However, Bachelet's popularity rebounded strongly in 2009 following her widely praised handling of the impact of the global economic
crisis. The country pulled through the worst of the crisis thanks to the introduction of a USD4 billion fiscal stimulus package and
targeted social welfare spending. However, Bachelet's personal popularity did not translate into electoral support for the Concertacin,
with the right-wing opposition regaining power in 2010 for the first time since Pinochet withdrew from power in 1990.
Bachelet left office with an approval rating of 83%, the highest for any Chilean president since the return to democracy. She worked for
the United Nations in New York until March 2013, when she announced that she would run again for the presidency. In June 2013, she
won a primary election within her New Majority (Nueva Mayora) coalition with ease, taking more than 70% of the vote. Campaigning on
a more radical left-wing agenda than during her first term, she went on to win the first round of the presidential contest on 17 November
2013 with 47% of the vote, nearly double that of her nearest rival, Evelyn Matthei. However, Bachelet's failure to win an outright majority
meant the election was decided in a run-off between Bachelet and Matthei on 15 December. Bachelet won it comfortably with around
62% of the vote and is due to be sworn in as Chilean president on 11 March 2014. She will be the first Chilean president since 1952 to
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return to the presidential palace for a second term.

Former president Sebastin Piera
Piera, born on 1 December 1949, comes from a family with long-standing ties to the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demcrata
Cristiano de Chile: PDC). His father, who was a minister in the government of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-70), was also one of the
founders of the PDC. Although Piera has been active in politics for many years, he is better known as a wealthy entrepreneur and
industrialist. As a businessman and politician well known for introducing credit cards to Chile, he represents the more moderate side of
Chile's rightist coalition.
An economist by profession, Piera completed his Master's and doctorate degrees at Harvard University in the United States. Famous
for his numerous assets (an airline, a television channel, and a football team), which he divested on assuming the presidency, his more
recent entrepreneurial activities followed a stint at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Politically, after initially supporting the PDC, Piera turned more to the right and became a member of the National Party and Avanzada
Nacional, the forerunners of National Renewal (RN). He held several positions in the military government headed by General Augusto
Pinochet, mainly in the Ministry of Economy and also in handling state-owned companies before their privatisation. He caused much
astonishment in 1988 when he publicly called for a "no" vote in a referendum on extending the Pinochet government.
Piera became the president of the National Renewal (Renovacin Nacional: RN) party in 2004 and used that as a platform to launch
his own presidential candidacy in parallel to Joaqun Lavin's, thereby splitting the right-wing vote. He performed better than Lavin in the
first-round election in December 2005, but lost to Bachelet in the second round.
Despite seeing his public support decline by five percentage points in 2007, Piera remained the most influential figure on the Chilean
right. Having managed to bring the alliance parties together in a cohesive force, he led the revival of the coalition's fortunes at the
October 2008 municipal elections when mayoral gains represented the first nationwide win for the right since the end of military rule. He
then secured his position as the opposition front-runner for the presidential elections in 2009 as a single candidate for both the RN and
Independent Democratic Union (Unin Democratica Independiente: UDI), running under the rebranded Coalition for Change (Coalicin
por el Cambio). In the first-round elections, he won a convincing majority, securing more than 44% of the vote against 29% for the
Concertacin coalition's Frei. In the run-off, he won 52% of the vote over Frei's 48%. He assumed office on 11 March 2010.
After a momentous and generally successful first year in power, marked by the recovery from the February 2010 earthquake and the
rescue (watched around the world) of 33 miners trapped underground in the Atacama Desert, Piera's popularity slumped in 2011. This
downturn followed in the wake of large-scale student protests in favour of education reform and the eruption of numerous other social
and political demands, many dating from long before Piera assumed office. Piera has been accused of populism and failing to
delegate to his ministers. He responded by withdrawing from the public spotlight somewhat and reshuffling his cabinet, shifting the
balance away from technocrats towards more seasoned politicians. His approval rating recovered slightly, helped by his government's
adept handling of the economy, but has failed to surpass 35%. His (and his government's) unpopularity was blamed in part for the
right's comprehensive defeat in the parliamentary and presidential elections of November and December 2013. Despite this, Piera has
hinted that he might seek re-election in 2017 at the head of a regenerated centre-right alliance.
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INTERNAL AFFAIRS, Chile

UPDATED
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Contents
Political Summary
Political Outlook
Government Stability
Party Data
Opposition Prospects and Programme
Political Parties
Christian Democratic Party (Partido
Demcrata Cristiano de Chile: PDC)
Socialist Party (Partido Socialista: PS)
Party for Democracy (Partido por la
Democraca: PPD)
National Renewal (Renovacin Nacional:
RN)
Independent Democratic Union (Unin
Democratica Independiente: UDI)
Communist Party of Chile (Partido
Comunista de Chile: PCC)
Historical Context
Republican origins and military rule
Democratisation in the 1990s
The Pinochet legacy
Ricardo Lagos (2000-06)
Michelle Bachelet (2006-10)
Historical context
Civil Society Overview
Constitution
Executive
Legislature
Judiciary
Regional and Local Institutions
Political Summary
Presidential elections
Next contest: 2017 November; Last contest: 17 November and 15 December 2013.
Legislative elections (Lower chamber)
Next contest: 2017 November; Last contest: 17 November 2013.
President:
Michelle Bachelet (since 11 March 2014)
Minister of the Interior and Public Security:
Rodrigo Peailillo Briceo (since 11 March 2014)
Minister of Foreign Affairs:
Heraldo Muoz Valenzuela (since 11 March 2014)
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Political Outlook
Addressing societal inequality while maintaining a pro-business environment for investors are the key challenges for
President Michelle Bachelet. Michelle Bachelet assumed office as Chile's president on 11 March 2014, after winning a second round
run-off in December 2013 with 62.1% of the vote. The president enjoys a majority in both houses of parliament. In the 120-seat lower
house, her centre-left New Majority (Nueva Mayora) coalition has 68 seats, to the 48 of the centre-right Alianza coalition. In the 38-seat
Senate, New Majority has 21 seats to Alliance's 16. As such, and unlike in her 2006-10 presidential term, Bachelet is able to pass basic
legislation without needing to negotiate with other congressional groups.
The second Bachelet government is likely to be less business friendly than her first (2006-10). She faces increasing pressure
from the student movement, environmental campaigners, union leaders, and the political left to enact radical policies to address Chile's
deep economic inequalities. Policies to address this issue include a fiscal reform package that will increase corporation tax, an
education reform aimed at providing free universal higher education, and legislation strengthening the role of trade unions. However,
the president heads a coalition that, from 1990 to 2010, implemented free-market policies that resulted in strong inflows of foreign direct
investment (FDI). Therefore, even as Chile moves leftwards, the country's sound institutions should ensure it remains among Latin
America's most politically stable nations.
Bachelet has a majority in both houses of the new parliament. Bachelet came to power under the banner of the New Majority
coalition, which includes the Socialist Party, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Communist Party, and a number of smaller leftist
parties. In the 120-seat lower house, the New Majority has 68 seats to the opposition Alianza coalition's 49. In the 38-seat Senate, it
has 21 seats to the Alianza coalition's 16. Bachelet will therefore be able to push through basic legislation without the need to negotiate.
However, in Chile, governments need super-majorities - either four-sevenths, three-fifths, or two-thirds - to secure approval for major
changes to the constitution, voting system, or to nationalise sectors of the economy, such as the mining industry. The New Majority
does not have the most basic super-majority in either house (although it should be able to secure one with ease in the lower house due
to the support of leftist independents). Despite her more leftist agenda, Bachelet heads a coalition that, from 1990 to 2010,
implemented free-market policies that resulted in strong inflows of FDI. This pro-business approach continued during former president
Sebastin Piera's government. Even if Chile moves leftwards, the country's sound institutions should ensure it remains among Latin
America's most politically stable nations. Bachelet took office just as the Chilean economic cycle was slowing. The central bank has
warned that growth could fall below 4% in 2014 after averaging 5.4% over the past four years.
Government Stability
Democratic governance is strong and deeply entrenched in Chile, providing high levels of government stability. Since the
restoration of democracy in 1990, the authority of democratically elected administrations has been respected in Chile. State institutions
enjoy strong support from most sectors of society, including the armed forces, which have stayed out of direct political activities since
the restoration of democracy. Incoming president Michele Bachelet enjoys high levels of personal popularity, thus boosting her political
capital in the one year outlook.
The composition of the Chilean congress may frustrate the current administrations ability to pass legislation in the one-year
outlook. Chiles bicameral legislature, composed of a 120-member chamber of deputies and 38-member Senate, is aligned under a
Nueva Mayora coalition majority in both houses. The coalition has 68 deputies and 21 senators, allowing it to pass legislation needing
a simple majority, but complicating the task of passing legislation needing higher thresholds, such as the two thirds needed for planned
constitutional reform.
Party Data
Parliament Summary
Party abbr.
Party name
Seats
Chamber of Deputies (Lower chamber)
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NM
New Majority, led by Concertacin - Coalition of 67

Parties for Democracy (Christian Democratic
Party - PDC, Party for Democracy - PPD, Radical
Social Democratic Party - PRSD, and Socialist
Party of Chile - PS)
Alianza
Alliance for Chile (Independent Democratic Union 49

- UDI and National Renewal - RN)
Ind
Independents
PRO
If You Want It, Chile Changes (led by the

Progressive Party)
Senate (Upper chamber)

NM
New Majority, led by Concertacin - Coalition of 21

Parties for Democracy (Christian Democratic
Party - PDC, Party for Democracy - PPD, Radical
Social Democratic Party - PRSD, and Socialist
Party of Chile - PS)
Alianza
Alliance for Chile (Independent Democratic Union 16

- UDI and National Renewal - RN)
Ind
Independents
Data reflects seat distribution following last election

Opposition Prospects and Programme

The centre-right opposition is likely to undergo a period of retribution and realignment. Following its chaotic and sometimes
acrimonious election campaign of 2013, which culminated in a defeat for its candidate Evelyn Matthei in the presidential run-off in
December, the centre-right coalition, the Alianza, is likely to undergo a transformation. Relations between the two parties in the
coalition, National Renewal (Renovacin Nacional: RN) and the larger and more conservative Independent Democratic Union (Unin
Democratica Independiente: UDI), are fraught. RN increased its representation in parliament but Matthei was punished by voters for the
unpopularity of the incumbent centre-right government of former president Sebastin Piera, who struggled with natural disasters, a
fragmented Congress, and a Concertacin-dominated Senate during his four years in office. His government failed to shake off the
spectre of being the first right-of-centre administration since the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-90), despite embracing
relatively progressive reforms, including increased social spending on the poorest sectors of society. Nevertheless, Piera's approval
rating, although low, crept upwards in late 2013 and he has hinted he may seek re-election at the head of a rejuvenated centre-right
bloc in the presidential election of late 2017.
President Michelle Bachelet begins her second term with a high approval rating. Bachelet left office in 2010 with 84% approval
ratings and although her popularity has diminished she remains clearly the most popular politician in the country. A poll by the Centre
for Public studies in October 2013 showed she had an approval rating of 61% and she won the first round of the presidential election
the following month with 47% of the vote - almost twice as much as her nearest rival. She went on to win the second round run-off
comfortably. Her centre-left New Majority (Nueva Mayora) coalition is less popular but still enjoys a working majority in both the
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, following a solid showing in the parliamentary election of November 2013.
Opposition profile
Main opposition forces
Alianza coalition
Opposition strength
Moderate, lost control of the lower house in the 2013 general election .
Prospects in forthcoming election
Moderate.
Extent of policy differentiation
Moderate, greater focus on promoting business-friendly policies.
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Political Parties
Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demcrata Cristiano de Chile: PDC)
Established after the merger of several centre and centre-left liberal Christian parties in the late 1950s, the PDC dominated politics for
most of the 1960s and then re-emerged as the dominant governing coalition party following the return to democratic elections in 1989.
After supplying two presidents during the 1990s, the PDC began to lose its way towards the end of the decade, ceding ground to the
more leftist Socialist and Democracy parties. It remains the most centrist party within the New Majority (Nueva Mayora) coalition, the
successor to the Concertacin coalition that ruled Chile for 20 years until 2010. The New Majority assumed power in March 2014. The
defeat of a PDC candidate, Eduardo Frei, in the presidential election in January 2010 was another blow to the party's stature. Frei was
widely viewed as an uninspiring, if experienced, candidate. However, the party did reasonably well in the parliamentary election of
November 2013, increasing its representation from 19 to 21 seats in the 120-seat Chamber of Deputies.
Socialist Party (Partido Socialista: PS)
Established during the global depression of the 1930s, the PS represented workers and left-wing political thinkers and activists looking
for social change and fairer distribution of wealth. After three decades of changing fortunes, in the late 1960s the party had the support
of about one-third of the population, enough to put Salvador Allende in the Presidential Palace in 1970. The following three turbulent
years sowed the seeds of discontent among the wealthy and middle classes, who, with some assistance from the US, convinced the
Chilean Armed Forces to seize power, which they duly did on 11 September 1973.
The socialists were outlawed throughout the dictatorship years, but re-emerged in the late 1980s as part of a popular movement calling
for a plebiscite on the military government of General Augusto Pinochet. When Pinochet lost the poll, the socialists became an
important partner in the coalition government that replaced him, though overwhelmed by the more moderate Christian Democrats. The
gradual erosion of the latter's support base, from both left and right, helped the socialists lever Ricardo Lagos, a founder of the
democratic movement and later a high-profile figure in the governments of presidents Patricio Aylwin and Frei, into the presidency in
2000. The PS reasserted its dominance in the Concertacin government with Michelle Bachelet's victory in the December 2005
presidential election. The party of former president Salvador Allende is now predominantly moderate-leftist in its orientation and
integrated within the New Majority. In Bachelet, the party provided Chile with its second consecutive socialist president. She left office in
2010 with an approval rating of over 70% and returned to win the presidential election in late 2013 with 62.1% of the vote. She was
sworn in on 11 March 2014. Following the concurrent parliamentary elections, the socialists control 15 of 120 seats in the Chamber of
Deputies and six in the Senate.
Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democraca: PPD)
Created to bring together democratic political forces in the late 1980s, the PPD considers itself a stronghold of progressive economic
thinking and social innovation. During its first years of existence and the first decade after the recovery of democracy, the party was
subsidiary to the PS within the Concertacin, but it began to act more autonomously. PPD manoeuvres to select the Concertacin
presidential candidate ahead of the 2005 election were aimed at gaining key offices inside the future administration, and the party
eventually swung its support behind Bachelet, the PS candidate. The PPD was dissatisfied with its low representation in Bachelet's
cabinet and, as a result, there was growing antagonism between the PPD and the PS. The party's president is Jaime Quintana, who
assumed the position when the capable, and relatively youthful Carolina Toh resigned to run for mayor of Santiago. Toh won that
contest in October 2012, contrary to expectations, and has been tipped as a potential future president.
National Renewal (Renovacin Nacional: RN)
Created in 1987 through an alliance of the National Union, the Independent Democratic Union (Unin Democratica Independiente:
UDI), and the National Workers Front, the modern RN party was historically the junior partner in the right-wing coalition with the UDI,
which split from the RN after a dispute in 1988. The RN's president is Carlos Larran, but its leading figure is former Chilean president
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Sebastian Piera (2010-14), a successful businessman and former senator. He has moved the party gradually to the centre and away
from the UDI.
RN's platform is built on the idea that the neo-liberal reforms introduced during the military regime should be further developed in
tandem with more socially liberal policies. Although offering some support to the Concertacin on issues such as abortion, divorce, and
constitutional reform, it tended to side with its Alianza partners in parliament.
During 2008, Piera worked gradually to reach out to a wider range of potential political allies, including regionalist parties and even
disaffected members of the Concertacin, principally among the Christian Democrats. His aim was to move outside the traditional limits
imposed by the two-coalition system and relocate the RN more firmly in the political centre with a wider range of potential supporters.
His overtures were largely successful, and, by the end of the year, the UDI threw its weight behind him as the sole Alianza candidate to
contest the presidential election in December 2009. He did this successfully, with the Alianza rebranded as the Coalition for Change
(Coalicin por el Cambio), winning 44% of the first round in December 2009 and 53% in the 17 January 2010 run-offs to take the
presidency in March 2010. His achievement meant he became the first democratically elected conservative head of government in
Chile in more than 50 years.
Despite the centre-right leaning of the RN and its need to include its coalition partner, the UDI, Piera surprised many political
commentators in Chile by embarking on a socially liberal programme that involved the extension of social welfare payments to poor
families and support for initiatives on rights for same-sex partners. He also named a cabinet for his upcoming administration that
included prominent independents and technocrats who were notable for their economic expertise. Twelve of his initial cabinet were
independents, with nine aligned to the two parties of the Coalition for Change and one (Jaime Ravinet as minister of defence) from the
opposition Christian Democrats, part of the losing Concertacin alliance. However, Ravinet resigned within the first year of government
and, facing criticism that his ministers lacked political experience, Piera reshuffled his cabinet in mid-2011, bringing in seasoned
campaigners from the conservative UDI, notably Minister of Economy Pablo Longueira and Minister Secretary General of Government
Andrs Chadwick. He restructured his cabinet again following municipal elections in October 2012, allowing Minister of Public Works
Laurence Golborne and Minister of Defence Andrs Allamand to leave their posts to concentrate on their bids for the presidency. In the
event, neither candidacy prospered.
Independent Democratic Union (Unin Democratica Independiente: UDI)
The UDI is Chile's most conservative mainstream party, although its work in the poor neighbourhoods of Santiago and other depressed
parts of the country has earned it a popular appeal that crosses the traditional divide between left and right. It stands for radical neoliberal economics and traditional family values, and enjoys the tacit support of the leadership of both the Catholic Church and the armed
forces. Nevertheless, by December 2008, it was prepared to accept the more socially liberal Piera of the RN as a single presidential
candidate to represent the Alianza (subsequently rebranded the Coalition for Change) in the 2009 presidential elections, despite
Piera's moves to drive his party closer to the centre while marginalising the more hardline elements of the UDI. In the presidential
election campaign of 2013, the UDI initially backed Laurence Golborne, an independent. When he stood down due to financial
scandals, the UDI backed Pablo Longueira, a party stalwart. But in July 2013, he abruptly withdrew his candidacy, saying he was
suffering from depression. The UDI's third candidate, Evelyn Matthei, took up the baton and contested the election in
November/December 2013. She secured 37.8% in the second round run-off while Bachelet secured 62.1%. In the parliamentary vote,
the UDI was the biggest loser among Chile's political parties. It lost 10 seats in the 120-seat Chamber of Deputies although it remains
the largest party in the Senate with 28 seats.
Communist Party of Chile (Partido Comunista de Chile: PCC)
The PCC was among the first Communist parties formed in the region, and is enjoying a modest revival. Three of its members gained
election to the Chamber of Deputies in December 2009 and took up their seats in March 2010, the first time the PCC had enjoyed
representation since the return of democracy to Chile. It took over 6% of the vote in municipal elections in October 2012, its best
performance for 16 years. In the parliamentary election of November 2013 it doubled its representation in the Chamber of Deputies to
six seats. Its most high-profile deputy, Camila Vallejo, gained considerable popularity and acclaim as the president of the University of
Chile Student Federation (Federacin de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile: FECH) and leader of the student protest movement in
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2011.
Historical Context
Republican origins and military rule
Chile has enjoyed greater domestic stability than its neighbours since gaining full independence from Spain in 1818. After a brief
authoritarian period, it emerged as a small but effective oligarchic republic that competed very successfully within the region throughout
the 19th century.
From the 1920s, politics became progressively more open, bringing increased internal contention within a broadly democratic system of
government. Ideological fragmentation gradually increased, reaching its height with the election of Salvador Allende's populist
government by a narrow margin in 1970. Allende's contentious and economically ruinous rule was ended by a military coup on 11
September 1973 and a period of repression followed in its wake.
The authoritarian regime of General Pinochet lasted until 1990. It received much international criticism and faced a persistent domestic
guerrilla movement, yet this era also witnessed the introduction of a pioneering neo-liberal development model that paved the way to
strong and sustained economic development in the 1990s.
Democratisation in the 1990s
In a 1988 plebiscite, General Pinochet sought popular support for a further eight-year rule, but his plans backfired when voters rejected
it, setting off a process of carefully planned democratisation. Civilian government resumed in 1990 after elections brought victory for the
Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin and the Concertacin coalition. The new democratic regime remained constrained by Pinochet's
1980 constitution and other deals reached with the military, including the general's continued tenure as commander of the armed forces
until 1997.
As Pinochet prepared to relinquish his military command and assume a lifetime seat in the Senate, intense debate arose in the
legislature and in public over his new role. The debate was symptomatic of wider disagreements in Chilean politics over the pace and
style of the transition from military to civilian rule.
Frei, the Christian Democrat who succeeded Aylwin as president in 1993, attempted to balance the interests of reformers with those of
the armed forces, a strategy that became increasingly difficult as the Pinochet affair polarised the two sides. At the same time, Chile's
working class became increasingly intolerant of spiralling unemployment and the deteriorating economy after the 1998 recession. The
Christian Democrats in the ruling coalition began to lose ground to the socialists.
With Chile facing a fragmenting ruling coalition, a presidential election between a socialist and a right-wing candidate, a contracting
economy, and a dissatisfied military, there was growing fear among some of Chile's population that the country was heading into a
similar situation as the one that brought about the Pinochet regime. Although this fear proved unfounded, the election of the socialist
candidate Lagos to replace Frei in 2000 showed a distinct move to the left and the country seemed to be returning to the tripartite
political segmentation into leftists, rightists, and socialists that existed before Allende's election.
The Pinochet legacy
General Pinochet's retirement as head of the armed forces and his detention in the UK in 1998 forced Chilean society to address some
of the unanswered and painful questions remaining from his 1973-90 dictatorship. Although the majority wants to let history pass, there
are deep divisions in Chilean society that constantly threaten to resurface as societal, constitutional, and economic pressures mount.
Attempts to prosecute Pinochet helped re-awaken right-wing extremism in Chile. The Fatherland and Liberty National Front (Frente
Nacionalista Patria y Libertad: FNPL), a right-wing group prominent under the Allende regime that disbanded following Pinochet's coup
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in 1973, re-emerged in October 1999. The group promised violent acts against Spanish and UK commercial and diplomatic interests,
but in the end these amounted to a few firebombs thrown at Spanish banks after working hours.
Pinochet spent 18 months in detention in the UK. After his eventual release and return to Chile in March 2000, the issue maintained
prominence as human rights lawyers and eventually public prosecutors sought to have Pinochet stand trial.
In December 2000, the former dictator was declared fit to stand trial and was placed under house arrest only for the Supreme Court to
overturn the arrest order a few days later. More medical tests and questioning by Judge Juan Guzmn, including over the Caravan of
Death (a group of officers who toured Chile carrying out executions), ensued in early 2001.
In March 2001, the Santiago Appeals Court finally ordered that Pinochet should stand trial, but on reduced charges that only included
complicity in murders and kidnappings rather than orchestrating them. Even so, human rights campaigners eagerly anticipated the
moment when the former dictator would be fingerprinted and have his mug shot taken.
Nevertheless, Pinochet's lawyers persisted and on 9 July 2001 the Santiago Appeals Court suspended the 76 charges against him on
grounds of incapacity to defend himself. As the ruling could not be appealed, this supposedly freed Pinochet from further action.
In 2004, efforts to bring him to trial were renewed, with Pinochet facing charges not only for his role in Operation Condor (an alliance
between military dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s to crackdown on leftist opposition) but also for a possible case of illegal
enrichment and tax evasion after discovery of his accounts in the US Riggs Bank. A complex net of front companies and bank accounts
in Panama and the Cayman Islands have also been discovered, allegedly to hide the origin of the money. That, together with the
publication in November 2004 of the Valech Report on cases of Illegal detentions and torture committed during Pinochet's government
between September 1973 and March 1990, helped to further diminish his remaining support.
Pinochet died in December 2006. Although denied a state funeral, he was buried with full military honours.
Ricardo Lagos (2000-06)
After coming to power, Lagos attempted to preserve Chile's reputation as a market-based, open, well-run economy, while at the same
time promoting increased social spending to help the poor. He achieved extensive improvements in infrastructure and transport, and
instigated a process of constitutional reform. The legal battle over Pinochet's immunity from prosecution created political tensions
throughout his term in office. Lagos' more assertive approach in relations with the armed forces also came under threat since both the
army and the navy expressed their opposition to any trial.
In August 2000, the government was seriously shaken by a scandal involving astronomical and sometimes illegal severance payments
made to directors of state-owned companies who were laid off in the transition from the Frei administration. The scandal provoked
further squabbles among members of the Concertacin coalition. Lagos was forced to water down labour reforms, which were
approved by congress at the end of 2001, and was also compelled to do the same with more radical parts of new legislation aimed at
curbing tax evasion among the very wealthy.
In foreign affairs, Lagos' principal achievement was the signing of free-trade agreements (FTAs) with the US, the EU, South Korea,
China, and Singapore. Lagos left office in March 2006 with an approval rating above 70%.
Michelle Bachelet (2006-10)
Bachelet's first year in office was overshadowed by a series of corruption scandals relating to members and former members of the
Concertacin coalition. Although Bachelet was not herself implicated, the scandals damaged Chile's previously clean image in the eyes
of international investors and encouraged Bachelet to introduce a wide-ranging anti-corruption initiative.
The first serious problem faced by Bachelet's administration was a series of protests and strikes by students of public secondary
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schools, held between May and July 2006. The students, who were protesting the low quality of public education, were joined by
teachers' organisations and other trade unions. Bachelet initially refused to negotiate, but later allowed the education ministry to enter
discussions with the student leaders. However, the ministry had limited scope to offer concessions and the students quickly lost
patience, returning to street protests and sparking heavy-handed intervention by the carabieros.
Bachelet was also damaged by the disastrous teething problems of a new transport system in Santiago, which saw large areas of the
capital city gridlocked following its introduction in February 2007. Teachers' strikes in June 2008 and a further general public workers'
industrial action in November 2008 underlined a sense that the Bachelet administration was on the back foot and increasingly adrift,
and, in October 2008, voters in municipal elections swung towards the opposition as they elected Alianza mayors in 8 of Chile's 14
regional capitals. By the end of the year, Bachelet's approval rating had fallen below 40%.
However, Bachelet rebounded strongly in early 2009 thanks to her handling of the impact of the global economic crisis on Chile. Having
successfully introduced a USD4 billion fiscal stimulus package and measures to target social welfare spending at the poorest sectors of
society, her popularity returned to high levels. Leaving power in 2010, her approval rating stood at more than 70% - the highest of any
modern Chilean leader. She took up a job at the UN in New York before returning to Chile in 2013 to successfully contest the
presidential election, winning the second round with 62.1% of the vote. She is the first Chilean president to successfully seek re-election
since 1952.
Historical context
Date
Event
1810
Chile declares independence from Spain.
1818
Chile gains full independence.
1831
New constitution and the advent of an oligarchic republic.
1891
Civil war between the president and Congress.
1920-25
Presidency of Arturo Alessandri.
1927-31
Presidency of Carlos Ibez del Campo.
1931
Political chaos; 10 governments in one year.
1932-38
Second presidency of Alessandri.
1952-58
Second presidency of Ibez del Campo.
1964
Eduardo Frei Montalva defeats Salvador Allende to become president.
1970
Allende elected president.
1973
Military coup; General Augusto Pinochet seizes power.
1980
New constitution promulgated and approved by electorate.
1988
Plebiscite rejects prolongation of Pinochet presidency.
1989
Patricio Aylwin elected president.
1990
Military rule ends.
1993
Frei replaces Aylwin in free elections.
1998
General Pinochet steps down as armed forces' commander (March).

Pinochet detained in UK on Spanish arrest warrant charging him with
human rights violations (November).
1999
Run-off presidential election between socialist Ricardo Lagos and Joaquin

Lavn, the right-wing candidate, after neither candidate secures a majority
in the first round (December).
2000
Lagos wins presidential election by a 5% margin (January).

Pinochet freed in London and returns to Chile (March).
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2001
Report on the fate of 17% of the disappeared greeted with scepticism amid
allegations of evasiveness on the part of the armed forces (January).
Congress formally abolishes the death penalty (March).
Lagos eliminates a clause in the State Security Law that granted highranking civilian and military officials the official right to sue journalists and
empowered judges to ban books and magazines (May).
2003
Lagos unveils a compensation package for victims of the Pinochet regime

(August).
Growing labour unrest culminates in the first general strike for 17 years
(August).
An (FTA) with the US is finally ratified by the Chilean Parliament (early
November), after an FTA with the EU came into force in February.
2004
Lagos agrees to a US request for the deployment of an army battalion in

Haiti in a bid to raise Chile's international standing (March).
Pinochet is stripped of his immunity from prosecution by the appeals court
(May).
An expanded Chilean force, integrated with elements of the three services
and police, is sent to Haiti as part of the Brazil-led UN mission. The
decision is strongly questioned by right-wing parties in the Chilean
legislature, but Lagos is able to win support for the mission (June).
The Supreme Court ratifies the removal of Pinochet's immunity from
prosecution (August).
Constitutional reform is approved by the Senate, abolishing non-elected
senators and restoring the president's power to dismiss the heads of the
armed forces (October).
The Valech report into human rights abuses under the dictatorship is
released (November).
2005
Pinochet is stripped of immunity regarding his financial crimes (June).

Pinochet's wife and son are arrested in connection with investigations into
secret bank accounts (August).
Bachelet leads the polls in the first round, ahead of Sebastian Piera but
still requiring a second round run-off (December).
2006
Bachelet wins the presidency with 54% of the vote in the second round
run-off (January).
Bachelet is inaugurated and appointed a new cabinet, of which half the
ministers are female (March).
Month-long student riots provoke criticism of the government's handling of
the situation and a decline in Bachelet's popularity (June).
Bachelet reshuffles her cabinet (July).
Augusto Pinochet dies, sparking spontaneous demonstrations and
celebrations across the country (December).
2007
A lower than expected 3% economic growth for 2006 leads to widespread

criticism of the Bachelet administration for its handling of the economy
(January).
Chaotic implementation of a new public transport system in Santiago
results in gridlock in large areas of the city and greater metropolitan area.
Bachelet's popularity drops by 12% in one month (February-March).
Bachelet's approval ratings fall to 40% (December).
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2008
Bachelet appoints veteran Christian Democrat Edmundo Perez Yoma as

the new minister of the interior in a bid to invigorate her government
(January).
Teachers and students go on strike against a proposed new general
education law (June).
General strike fails to paralyse economic activity as anticipated (August).
Mapuche protest march in Santiago attracts several thousand participants
(October).
Municipal elections show a swing to the Alianza as 8 of 14 regional
capitals returned Alianza mayors (October).
Further general strike of public workers lasting four days achieves its goal
of a 10% wage rise for workers (November).
2009
Bachelet oversees the widely praised introduction of a USD4 billion fiscal

stimulus package and targeted social welfare spending (January).
Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs receives the details of the case
presented by Peru in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague
(March).
Violence accompanies protests by Mapuche activists in Araucana,
leading to one death (August).
Chilean government denies involvement in espionage against Peru
following the arrest of a Peruvian air force NCO for allegedly spying for
Santiago (November).
Sebastin Piera of the centre-right Coalition for Change wins first-round
presidential elections with 44% of the vote (December).
2010
Piera wins the presidential run-off (January).

Chile becomes the first country in South America to join the OECD
(January).
An 8.8-magnitude earthquake strikes the country, forcing a temporary
suspension of normal politics (February).
Moody's grants Chile AA bond investment rating, the only country in Latin
America (June).
Hunger strike by 34 Mapuche political prisoners prompts government to
relax rules on use of anti-terrorism legislation in trials of Mapuche activists
(July-October)
2011
Student protests begin over government's education reform plans (May).

Piera reshuffles cabinet to bring in ministers with political experience
(July).
Two-week stoppage at Escondida copper mine (July-August).
Small-scale explosive attacks target banks and a media corporation
(November).
2012
The government cedes ground in municipal elections. It takes 37% of the

vote to the Concertacin's 43% and loses the key seats of Central
Santiago and Providencia in the capital.
2013
Chile marks the 40th anniversary of Pinochet's coup (September).

Bachelet wins the first round of the presidential election with 47% of the
vote and the second round with 62.1%. Her coalition wins a majority of
seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (November).
Bachelet wins a presidential run-off against Evelyn Matthei (December).
2014
Bachelet is inaugurated as president for the second time (March).

A state of catastrophe is declared in the north of Chile following an 8.2magnitude earthquake (April).
Civil Society Overview

The most powerful interest groups in the country are the armed forces and the dynamic private sector, which also has significant
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political links to the old regime. Labour unions play a somewhat reduced role, their allegiance divided between the Christian Democrats
and the parties further to the left. Only about 13% of Chilean workers belong to a trade union, well below the Latin American average of
25%. About a quarter of Chile's unions are affiliated to the main trade union federation, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT).
The Roman Catholic Church remains an important but waning force, frequently influencing executive decision-making and
congressional voting, particularly in ethical debates about marriage, family, abortion, and education. Chile was one of the last countries
in the world to legalise divorce, in 2004, after several years of discussions and despite strong opposition from the Catholic Church.
Abortion remains illegal in all circumstances, making Chile one of the most restrictive legal regimes against the procedure in the world.
However, a series of high-profile paedophile scandals within the Catholic Church eroded the church's standing dramatically in 2011. A
poll conducted by Latinobarmetro showed confidence in the Church plummeted from 62% in 2010 to 38% in 2011, the lowest level in
Latin America. The extent to which Chile will therefore retain its reputation for social conservatism remains to be seen, as activists
pressure the old guard - and the Church in particular - to accept new initiatives on issues such as abortion and homosexuality.
President Michelle Bachelet favours a relaxation in the abortion law, allowing abortion in cases of rape or when the mother's life is at
risk. She also supports gay marriage, which is still outlawed in Chile. However, while she may seek to implement reforms on these
issues during her 2014-18 government, she will face opposition not only from the political right but also from the Christian Democrats
within her own coalition.
Constitution
The 1980 constitution of the Republic of Chile established a presidential system of government consisting of the three completely
independent branches: executive, legislature, and judiciary. Congress was dissolved after the military coup in September 1973 and
reinstated on 11 March 1990 following the defeat of General Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite. At that time, the constitution was amended
to ease the passage of future reforms regarded by some as necessary to complete the transition to democracy.
In late 2005, Congress approved constitutional reforms abolishing the positions of designated senators (often proposed by the military)
and senators-for-life, and restored the presidential power to remove the heads of the armed forces. The armed forces were also
relieved of their responsibility as "institutional guarantors".
President Michelle Bachelet has stated that she wishes to reform the constitution, although as of 15 April 2014, she had yet to publish
concrete proposals on the matter.
Executive
Executive power is vested in the president as head of state and government. The president is directly elected for a four-year period with
no right of re-election for a second consecutive term. Unless one candidate obtains an absolute majority of valid ballots, a second runoff election is held between the two candidates with the largest number of votes. The president designates an unelected cabinet of
ministers to assist in the execution of his or her duties.
Legislature
Chile has a bicameral National Congress, made up of the upper house of a 38-member Senate elected by popular vote and a 120member Chamber of Deputies. The elected senators serve an eight-year term, with half of the seats contested every four years.
Members of the lower house serve four-year terms. Since 1987, Congress has sat in the historic port city of Valparaso. Voters are
registered automatically upon turning 18 and, following a change in the law in 2012, voting is now voluntary.
Judiciary
Chile's independent judiciary is made up of the Supreme Court, regional Courts of Appeal, and local tribunals. The highest court, the
Supreme Court, consists of 20 members appointed for life by the president with the backing of a two-thirds majority of the Senate,
which elects a president from its number every three years. Retirement is at the age of 75 at the latest. The 16 regional Courts of
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Appeal have jurisdictions over one or more provinces and the majority of the tribunals of appeal have four judges, although the largest,
Santiago, has 25. Judges of these courts are selected by the president from a list submitted by the Supreme Court and are also eligible
to serve until they reach the age of 75.
In 2000, an extensive reform of the judicial system was initiated, with the most significant transformations involving the criminal courts.
Where judges were previously responsible for investigating cases as well as handing down rulings, a newly created autonomous body,
the Office of the Prosecutor, is now dedicated to public criminal prosecution. This gives its attorneys the power to investigate crimes
and co-ordinate the various police forces in the investigation process, as well as prepare and serve indictments before the criminal
courts when necessary.
Regional and Local Institutions
Chile is divided into 15 administrative regions, each headed by a presidentially appointed intendant. Regions are further divided into
provinces, headed by a governor, who again is appointed by the president. Regional councillors are directly elected for four-year terms.
At the local level the country is divided into communes, which are administered by local municipal authorities comprising a mayor and a
municipal council. Municipal authorities are elected for four-year terms.
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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, Chile

UPDATED
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Contents
Outlook
Overview
Bilateral
United States
Americas
Multilateral
Global Organisations
Historical Context
Historical context
Outlook
The conclusion of international arbitration over a maritime border dispute with Peru is unlikely to negatively affect bilateral
relations. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), based in The Hague (Netherlands), is due to give its ruling on a maritime border
dispute between Chile and Peru on an undisclosed date in mid-2013. Despite initial diplomatic tensions over the maritime dispute bilateral co-operation mechanisms were suspended by Chile in 2008 following Peru's claim at the ICJ - relations have since
progressively improved. Both countries have said they will respect the ICJ ruling. Furthermore, the 2+2 mechanism, which involves the
regular meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and defence, is set to resume in May 2013 following an agreement between the countries
in January. As such, it is unlikely that the court ruling will destabilise relations between Chile and Peru, which remain focused on
deepening economic integration both bilaterally and through the Pacific Alliance trading bloc.
Bolivia's decision to take its maritime border dispute to the ICJ is having a negative impact on bilateral relations and will
continue to do so in the one-year outlook. Since March 2011, Bolivia has threatened to bring its longstanding sea access case
against Chile to the ICJ for arbitration. The case refers to Bolivia's loss of over 400 km of coastline following its defeat in the 1879-83
war of the Pacific between Chile, Bolivia, and Peru. By March 2013, the threat had escalated as Bolivia's Congress voted unanimously
to support President Evo Morales' decision to seek ICJ arbitration. Then Chilean president Sebastin Piera condemned Bolivia's
move, claiming that the sea access dispute was resolved in a 1904 treaty between both countries. As Bolivia moved towards lodging a
case at the ICJ, relations between both countries deteriorated. Morales has threatened to encourage Bolivian trade to be exported via
Peru rather than Chile. Although the situation is highly unlikely to escalate into a military crisis, tit-for-tat trade and diplomatic restrictions
are expected in the coming year.
Progress in the creation of the Pacific Alliance trade bloc is likely to improve economic and political relations with other
member countries and extra-regional states. In January 2013, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico - the founding members of the
Pacific Alliance trade bloc - agreed to have a customs tariff agreement that would cover at least 90% of goods traded within the bloc by
31 March 2013. The agreement provided evidence that the trade bloc project, which was formally established in June 2012, has the
political support needed on a national level to advance rapidly. It is likely that the bloc will become the most dynamic economic
integration project in Latin America, given the failure of the region's other major integration project, Mercosur, to agree on a common
trade position on global markets, a point that has impeded the conclusion of extra-regional trade agreements. Given that Chile is not a
member of Mercosur, the ascent of the Pacific Alliance as the region's main trading bloc is likely to give Chile a stronger voice in the
region.
Overview
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In seeking to play a more influential role in international affairs, successive Chilean governments have been able to separate Chile's
robust economic and trade power from the political and economic troubles that periodically sweep across South America. Chile's past
tenure as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council, alongside increased participation in international peacekeeping
operations, most notably in Haiti, has enhanced its global reputation. In October 2013 it was elected for a further two-year term on the
UN Security Council, a position it assumed on 1 January 2014.
Nevertheless, Chile has historically been a reticent player in regional affairs, seeking to promote its international presence through
bilateral agreements that respond to its national interests rather than pro-active engagement in regional mechanisms. It is not a full
member of two of the biggest South American trade blocs, the Southern Common Market (Mercado Comn del Sur: MERCOSUR) and
the Andean Community, although in June 2012 it founded a new and potentially promising trading bloc, the Pacific Alliance (Alianza del
Pacfico, alongside Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Chile also embraced the May 2008 creation of the Union of South American Nations
(Unin de Naciones Suramericanas: UNASUR), and then-Chilean president Michelle Bachelet subsequently became pro tempore
president of the nascent union. The appointment in May 2005 of former Chilean foreign and interior minister Jos Miguel Insulza as
general secretary of the Organization of American States (OAS), after overcoming strong opposition from the US Department of State
thanks to his socialist credentials, was also a major achievement for Chilean foreign policy. In 2012, Chile held the first presidency of
the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeos: CELAC), established
in Caracas, Venezuela, in December 2011. It hosted a CELAC-European Union summit in Santiago in January 2013.
In regional terms, Chile's historic rivalry with Argentina has largely dissipated - the territorial dispute over the Beagle Channel that
almost brought the two countries to war in 1978 has been settled, as have all other territorial disputes between them. Relations with
neighbouring Peru have been problematic, with periodic flare-ups of nationalist sentiment on both sides caused by a maritime territorial
dispute that dates back to the 1879-84 War of the Pacific. However, relations have normalised over the last decade. In January 2014,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, Netherlands, published its ruling on the Chile-Peru maritime border dispute. The
ruling requires Chile to cede approximately 20,000 square kilometres of maritime territory to Peru. However, Chile retains sovereignty
over the first 80 nautical miles due west of the border, meaning it will keep control of key fishing resources located near the coast. Both
countries have said they will respect the ICJ's decision and are co-operating to implement the ruling. A related territorial dispute with
Bolivia, which also harks back to the same 19th century war, revolves around Bolivian claims for an 'exit to the sea' ('salida al mar'),
since Bolivia effectively became landlocked when it lost its only coastline to Chile. In April 2013, the Bolivian government presented a
case against Chile at the ICJ relating to the dispute. The ICJ is yet to decide whether it will hear the case. If it does, there is no
obligation for Chile to respect the ruling.
Bilateral
United States
Chile's relations with the United States have been completely restored since the Allende-Pinochet hiatus and economic ties between
the two countries are robust. The main feature of this strong relationship is Chile's privileged status, in relation to its regional
neighbours, in both trade negotiations and advanced weapons deals with the US.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was for some time a complicating factor in relations with the US, which has demanded special
treatment for American troops from friendly governments in the form of exemptions from ICC jurisdiction. Washington has bolstered its
demands by threatening to withdraw military aid and co-operation from countries not willing to sign the exemption. The threat of
reprisals was difficult to ignore for the Chilean government, which has invested heavily in the acquisition of advanced combat aircraft
from the US, but on 29 June 2009 Chile finally ratified the Treaty of Rome (which created the ICC), becoming the last country in South
America to do so and the 109th in the world. The treaty came into force in Chile on 1 September 2009.
The US won a major contract for the re-armament of the Chilean Air Force and, in January 2002, Lagos signed a formal order for the
purchase of 10 F-16 fighter aircraft. This was the first time the US had allowed the sale of sophisticated fighter planes to a Latin
American country in 20 years, but fears over a potential regional arms race prevented the inclusion of advanced medium range air-toair missiles (AMRAAM) in the deal.
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In 2003 and 2004, the US offered to sell three surplus Spruance-class destroyers to the Chilean Navy, but the offer was declined. In the
face of a rival bid by the Dutch government, the US reduced the price of the destroyers and sought to link a sale to an offer of the
AEGIS Combat System for retrofit in the surplus destroyers. Chile finally decided to buy Dutch and British frigates, but the fact that
those ships are armed mainly with US weapons indicates Santiago's willingness to accept a greater dependence on Washington in
defence matters.
Washington's initial refusal to sell AMRAAM beyond visual range (BVR) missiles for the F-16 fighter aircraft, as well as more modern
missiles for the Dutch frigates, revived memories of the ban applied by Washington to military sales to Chile in the late 1970s. The
situation reinforced the belief, deeply inculcated in Chilean military circles, that the US was not a reliable partner in security issues.
Nevertheless, Washington subsequently shifted position, following the Chilean government's decision to deploy troops under a UN
force in Haiti in March 2004.
Chile and the US signed a free-trade agreement (FTA) in 2003 and a double taxation treaty in 2010, although the latter has yet to come
into force. The US has criticised Chile for its perceived lax attitude towards copyright infringement. Since 2006, Chile has been on a US
blacklist of countries it regards as having a poor record in this area. The US has criticised Chile's system of allowing local companies to
produce pharmaceutical generics that violate patents. In a bid to address these criticisms, Chile established an intellectual property
crimes unit as part of the police force in 2008.
Americas
Relations with Argentina
Chile's previously tense relationship with Argentina improved greatly following the democratisation of the 1980s and early 1990s. The
Beagle Channel dispute was resolved in 1985 through Vatican mediation and the last of many other border problems settled as a result
of bilateral negotiation. In December 1998, the two countries marked the end of a series of historic border disputes by settling the
delineation of the continental glaciers on the two countries' far southern borders. Soon afterwards, a mining treaty was signed that set
out the rules for the extraction of minerals that straddle the common border. In December 2008, Bachelet and her Argentine counterpart
President Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner met in Punta Arenas to celebrate the 30 years of peace between the two countries since the
1978 conflict that brought them to the brink of war.
Argentine foreign policy has been largely benign under its democratic governments, eliciting growing reciprocity from the Chilean side
despite lingering suspicion within the armed forces and ongoing resentment within the Argentine military about Chile's role in supporting
the UK during the 1982 Falklands (Malvinas) War. A dynamic new trans-Andean trade and investment relationship has developed
within the context of MERCOSUR, although this suffered in 2002 because of the economic collapse in Argentina and has subsequently
been undermined by political tensions within MERCOSUR and the emergence of UNASUR as a potential replacement for regional
trade blocs.
Talks at the end of the 1990s also resulted in agreements with respect to various confidence-building measures, including the initiation
of joint military manoeuvres and an agreement on a common method of calculating defence spending. In 2002, Chile and Argentina
agreed on the joint deployment of forces in UN peace operations, starting with the integration of Chilean Army and Marine troops in the
Argentine battalion deployed in Cyprus in 2003. However, Chile's decision to purchase more advanced hardware (starting with frontline
fighter aircraft) contrasted with the relative penury of the Argentine Armed Forces. Military co-operation between the two countries is
arguably now greater and more institutionalised than between any other South American countries, witnessed in 2008 through the
holding of joint training exercises by the Cruz del Sur force in the southern winter and a pandemic response exercise held in Chile in
November that year.
Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, Chile has been generally supportive of Argentine claims against the UK regarding the
Falkland Islands, although its desire to maintain good relations with both Argentina and the UK means it seeks to maintain a policy of
disengagement. This balance was upset in 1998 when General Augusto Pinochet was detained in the UK. Flight connections between
Chile and the Falklands were suspended in 1999, both as a gesture of gratitude for Argentine support for demands for freedom for the
former dictator and to exert pressure on the British. Flights were restored in 2000, but on the condition that monthly flights must stop in
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a southern airport in Argentina, Rio Gallegos. The balance tipped further in Argentina's favour in August 2004, when a visit to the
Chilean southern port city of Punta Arenas by Falklands patrol boat HMS Leeds was suspended, allegedly following a request from the
Argentine government.
The incomplete but ongoing demarcation of sovereign boundaries in the southern glacier area of Campos de Hielo remains a potential
threat, albeit very low risk, to bilateral relations. Dialogue between both governments led to a partition agreement in the late 1990s, but
strong opposition within the Argentine legislature prevented the ratification of the accord. As a result, both governments agreed to put
the subject aside, waiting for better political conditions to resume talks. Some elements of government and the armed forces in Chile
have expressed concerns regarding Argentine plans for the development of its military, collectively known as Plan Ejrcito Argentino
2025. The plans, endorsed by the administration of former president Nstor Kirchner, call for a redeployment of army units to defend
water reservoirs as national resources. One of the three main reservoirs to be defended is Campos de Hielo.
Energy security has, in the past, been a source of tension between the two countries. From the 1990s until the end of the 2000s, Chile
imported most of its natural gas from Argentina. However, as Argentina faced growing domestic demand, it reduced supplies to Chile
and, in some cases, reneged on supply contracts. With Argentina no longer a reliable long-term supplier of natural gas, the Chilean
government has actively looked for alternative and more sustainable sources of energy.
Overall, good relations between both countries are now well-entrenched and the threat of further disputes leading to the possibility of
conflict is now negligible. Shared concerns resulting from the UK's decision to submit a rights claim to the UN Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) for a 1 million square km area of seabed off the coast of the British Antarctic Territory have
prompted discussions between Chile and Argentina about increasing co-operation and co-ordination on Antarctic security. The two
countries have, since the return of democracy in Chile in 1990, generally co-operated on Antarctic politics.
Recent disputes between the two countries have centred on their shared legacy of human rights abuses during the 1970s and 1980s. In
2010, Argentina refused a Chilean request to extradite a Chilean former Marxist guerrilla leader, Galvarino Apablaza, to Chile to stand
trial in connection with the 1991 assassination of Chilean right-wing ideologue Jaime Guzmn. Buenos Aires' decision triggered
protests outside the Argentine embassy in Santiago. In August 2011, Argentina requested the extradition from Chile of an Argentine
judge, Otilio Romano, to stand trial in Argentina on 103 charges of human rights abuses. The Chilean authorities extradited him in
September 2013.
The volatile economic environment in Argentina has also had a slightly negative impact on relations with Chile. In June 2012, Argentina
abruptly terminated the double taxation agreement between the two countries. In August 2013, the Argentine national airport regulator
ordered Chilean airline LAN to vacate its hangar at the Jorge Newbery airport in Buenos Aires, saying such a move was in Argentina's
national interest. LAN protested against the order, saying it jeopardised its domestic operations in Argentina. In September 2013 the
airline won a six-month reprieve while a long-term solution is found.
Relations with Bolivia
Chile's relationship with Bolivia has deteriorated in recent years, culminating in Bolivia's decision in April 2013 to take Chile to the ICJ
over access to the Pacific Ocean. However, Bolivia - which has serious domestic problems and limited military capabilities - does not
pose any significant military threat. Bilateral relations have formally been in abeyance since 1978, although they exist in practice due to
the need to co-operate over issues such as trade, security, and regional integration.
The main cause of disagreement between the two countries has, since the 1879-84 War of the Pacific, been landlocked Bolivia's
access to the ocean. Bolivia and Peru, which were united by a secret treaty of mutual military assistance, declared war on Chile. Both
countries were defeated after four years of conflict and forced to cede important portions of their territories in subsequent treaties.
Bolivia lost all of its coastal territories under a treaty signed in 1904. Full diplomatic relations have not been re-instated since their
suspension in 1978.
The issue of Bolivia's access to the Pacific resurfaced in 2002, when the governments of both countries were due to give the green light
to a private-sector project to pipe natural gas from Bolivia's abundant supplies to the Chilean coast, where it was to be liquefied and
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shipped to Mexico and the US. Although Chile was the cheaper and more convenient option for the pipeline, several groups inside
Bolivia favoured exporting the gas through Peru instead, owing to long-standing resentment over Chile's possession of previously
Bolivian territory. The Bolivian government, then headed by Gonzalo Snchez de Lozada, favoured the Chilean alternative, and even
discussed the possibility of normalising relations and signing a bilateral FTA with the Chilean government. However, public opposition
to the Chilean plan, coupled with tensions caused by a deteriorating economic situation, toppled Lozada in October 2003. Since then
the pipeline discussions have been in limbo, while bilateral relations have remained delicate. In April 2013, the Bolivian government
presented a case against Chile at the international Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, Netherlands, relating to the dispute. The ICJ is
yet to decide whether it will hear the case. If it does, there is no obligation for Chile to respect the ruling.
Despite sea access remaining a major issue for Bolivia, bilateral contact improved during 2006-07, and there were talks about the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, Chile was concerned by an agreement signed between Bolivia and Venezuela
regarding defence and military co-operation. This agreement achieved little more than the deployment of Venezuelan military advisers
to Bolivia, principally to assist in the implementation of military-led development projects in agricultural and other fields. However, there
has also been some Venezuelan funding for the reinforcement of Bolivian military posts on the border with Chile, including the disputed
area of the Silala River. Bilateral relations were tested briefly in June 2011, when Chile arrested 14 armed Bolivian soldiers who had
entered Chile illegally. Chilean authorities accused the soldiers of involvement in the theft of all-terrain vehicles in Chile. The charges
were later dropped and the soldiers returned to Bolivia.
In June 2007, Bolivian president Evo Morales disclosed a 13-point plan, previously discussed with the Chilean government, that could
include the acquisition of a port on the Chilean Pacific coast and a corridor from Bolivia, without transfer of sovereign control. The plan
was disclosed just a few weeks after Lima made clear it would exert its right of veto if any territory previously owned by Peru was ceded
by Chile to Bolivia. As the new plans, which are a substantial departure from previous Bolivian demands, do not consider a transfer of
sovereignty, Peru would have no right to veto them if they come to fruition.
In late 2008, Chile earned Bolivian goodwill by hosting a crisis meeting of UNASUR in Santiago to discuss the domestic stand-off
between President Morales and the governors of his eastern provinces. Under Chilean stewardship, the meeting was an early success
for the nascent UNASUR, demonstrating the region's increasing ability to solve its own problems on its own terms, and Bachelet's
diplomatic footwork helped to sidestep problems that could have been caused by the overzealousness of Venezuelan president Hugo
Chvez.
Despite coming from distinct political ideologies, the former Chilean government of President Sebastin Piera, which came to power in
March 2010, began its term under good relations with Bolivia. Chile has explored solutions involving a corridor along the border with
Peru - which under the clauses of a 1929 treaty would need approval from the Peruvian authorities - or the allocation of a port on its
northern coast. Delegations met in La Paz in July 2010 to resume discussions over the 13-point plan, with both sides underlining the
need for closer ties. However, from 2012, relations started to deteriorate. In June of that year, Morales declared the 1904 treaty "dead"
and threatened to take his country's case to the ICJ. In January 2013, Morales and Piera had a public argument over the issue at the
CELAC summit in Santiago. Three months later, Morales finally fulfilled his threat to take Chile to the ICJ. In May 2013, Chile
celebrated the centenary of the inauguration of the Arica-La Paz railway, built by the Chileans early in the 20th century to compensate
Bolivia for the loss of its territory. But Bolivia refused to join the celebration and has accused Chile of failing to maintain its stretch of the
railway line.
Relations between the two nations are likely to be smoother now that Socialist Michelle Bachelet has resumed power in Chile - her
ideology is closer to Morales' than Piera's was - but no significant breakthrough is likely until the ICJ issues its verdict in several years,
Relations with Peru
After signing a number of symbolic accords in the second half of the 1990s, Peru and Chile stepped up the pace of political and
economic co-operation after 2000, seeking to avoid the periodic flare-ups in bilateral tension that have occurred since the War of the
Pacific in 1879. In July 2001, they inaugurated a so-called Permanent Committee on Political Co-ordination and Consultation, with the
aim of consolidating the newfound trust between the two countries by working more closely on matters of regional defence and the
preservation of democracy. Both countries have since agreed to standardise their methods of calculating defence spending, after a
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similar deal was reached with Argentina. They have also co-operated on eradicating the large numbers of landmines laid on either side
of their common border, a process that opened with symbolic controlled explosions of some of the devices on both sides of the border.
The two countries allowed a Norwegian non-governmental organisation (NGO) to clear the mines along the most sensitive section of
their common border in late 2012.
Ollanta Humala's victory in the Peruvian presidential elections of 2011 raised fears in Chile that bilateral relations would once again
deteriorate, but Humala, who visited Santiago shortly after his election victory, has appeared more interested in improving relations than
ratcheting up rhetoric. In June 2012, the countries became two of the founding members of the Pacific Alliance trading bloc. They have
eliminated many trade tariffs between their two nations, have a free trade agreement in place and enjoy increasingly close economic
ties. Several big Chilean retail chains have important investments in Peru.
In January 2014, the ICJ published it ruling on the Chile-Peru maritime border dispute. The ruling requires Chile to cede approximately
20,000 square kilometres of maritime territory to Peru. However, Chile retains sovereignty over the first 80 nautical miles due west of
the border, meaning it will keep control of key fishing resources located near the coast. Both countries have said they will respect the
ICJ's decision and are co-operating to implement the ruling.
Relations with Brazil
Chile has historically maintained a special strategic link with Brazil, as a counterweight to Argentine power in the region. However, as
relations with Argentina have improved the strategic link with Brazil has become less important and the economic dimension of the
relationship has received much more attention. Chile is the biggest Latin American investor in Brazil with a stock of investment worth
USD12.6 billion at the end of 2012. The two countries have signed a series of accords covering a variety of economic and trade issues,
although Chile's impetus in setting up the Pacific Alliance was poorly received by some in Brazil, who view the Alliance as a direct
challenge to MERCOSUR. Despite that, the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti has provided an opportunity for Brazil and Chile to work
together in the military and diplomatic domains.
Multilateral
Global Organisations
Chile has tended go it alone rather than immerse itself in regional initiatives, and is expected to do the same during the coming years,
making domestic issues the top priority on the agenda. However, the territorial disputes with Peru and Bolivia will continue to pose
challenges in the future. Chile's impressive economic credentials have enabled it to secure bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs) when
weaker economies have felt it necessary to negotiate as a bloc. However, Chile holds an associate membership in MERCOSUR, the
common market between Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, and now Venezuela. Chile participates in MERCOSUR's Political
Consultation and Coordination Forum. In December 2004, Chile rejoined the Andean Community (CAN) as an observer, almost three
decades after the authoritarian Pinochet regime withdrew the country from the sub-regional bloc. Holding the pro-tempore presidency of
the UNASUR from mid-2008 to mid-2009, Chile's leadership was instrumental in involving UNASUR as a mediator in the peace talks
between the Bolivian government and the opposition prefects in September 2008. Chile is an advocate of UN reform, supporting
Brazil's bid for a place on the Security Council. For two years from 1 January 2014 it will have a non-permanent seat on the UN Security
Council. It is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) group and has held full World Trade Organization (WTO)
membership since 1995. Chile joined the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in January 2010,
becoming the first South American country to be admitted to the group. Under former president Piera, Chile signed further FTAs and
maintained a strong presence in economic international forums.
Historical Context
Historical context
Date
Event
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1978-1979
Beagle Channel dispute with Argentina.
1984
Treaty with Argentina settles dispute over islands in Beagle Channel.
1996
Chile becomes an associate member of MERCOSUR.
1997
President Frei makes a state visit to Washington to push for negotiations to

bring Chile into NAFTA (February).
1998
Augusto Pinochet's detention in the UK on a Spanish warrant sparks a

crisis among the three governments involved (November-December).
Chile and Argentina sign a treaty resolving a border contention over the
continental ice shelf. This marks the end of a series of border disputes
remaining from an 1881 pact (December).
2000
UK allows Pinochet to return to Chile (March).

Talks are held with Spain aimed at rebuilding relationship (June).
2001
Chile and the US agree to speed up the negotiation of an FTA (January).

Chile orders 10 F-16 fighter aircraft from the US at an estimated cost of
USD600 million (January).
Chile and Peru meet to discuss ways to harmonise levels of defence
spending in an attempt to dispel fears about an impending arms race in the
region (October).
2002
Chile's decision to purchase 10 F-16 fighter aircraft attracts vociferous

criticism from its neighbours, especially Peru (January).
After two years of negotiations, Chile and the EU agree in principle a
broad pact on liberalised trade and political co-operation (May).
Chile and the US finally sign an FTA after 12 rounds of negotiations
(December).
2003
FTA with the EU ratified (February).

US Congress ratifies bilateral FTA (July).
2004
Ricardo Lagos sends troops to Haiti in response to a US request for

military involvement (March).
Troop deployment in Haiti is increased under the UN mandate, and a
former Chilean foreign minister, Juan Gabriel Valds, is appointed Chief
UN delegate in Haiti (July).
Chile hosts the APEC conference in Santiago and initiates free trade
discussions with Japan and China (November).
2005
Jos Miguel Insulza is officially selected as general secretary of the OAS

(May).
Foreign Minister Ignacio Walker announces that Chile will sign up to the
International Criminal Court (June).
Former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori is arrested in Santiago,
sparking a debate about whether to extradite him to Peru (November).
Military co-operation with Peru is suspended, following a diplomatic spat
over Fujimori and the unresolved maritime border (November).
2006
Chile and Argentina set up a joint military force to work together on

peacekeeping missions, marking a symbolic rapprochement between the
militaries of the two formerly antagonistic countries (April).
2007
Headquarters of the joint Chilean-Argentine peacekeeping task force is

inaugurated at Buenos Aires (September).
After receiving requests from the governments of Italy and the US, the
Chilean government decided to expand plans to deploy troops to Kosovo
(October).
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2008
Peru files a lawsuit at ICJ over maritime boundaries dispute (January).

Special meeting of UNASUR is held in Santiago to discuss the Bolivian
internal crisis (September).
Joint pandemic response exercise held with Argentine military in southern
Chile (November).
Peruvian president apologises to Chile after the then-head of Peruvian
army is quoted as saying he would like to kill all Chileans entering Peru
(November).
2009
Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs receives the details of the case

presented by Peru in the ICJ in The Hague (March).
Chile signs up to membership of the South American Defence Council
(March).
Citing Chilean acquisition of 18 secondhand F-16 aircraft from the
Netherlands, Peruvian Prime Minister Yehude Simn backs proposals for
modernisation of the Peruvian Armed Forces (May).
Chilean government denies being involved in espionage against Peru
following the arrest of a Peruvian air force NCO for allegedly spying for
Santiago (November).
2010
Earthquake measuring 8.8 magnitude leads Chile to accept emergency

relief from various regional and other countries (February).
Police detains a Pakistani national under anti-terrorism laws following
discovery of explosive traces on his clothing. He is later released without
charge (May).
Negotiations with Bolivia are resumed over a range of issues, including
the "access to the sea" dispute (July).
Argentina refuses to extradite Chilean former Marxist guerrilla Galvarino
Apabalaz to Chile to stand trial, triggering protests by Chilean rightists
outside the Argentine embassy in Santiago (September).
2011
Peruvian president-elect Ollanta Humala visits Santiago and strikes a

moderate tone in meetings with Chilean officials, allaying fears of a
deterioration in bilateral relations (June).
Chile arrests 14 armed Bolivian soldiers who had entered Chile illegally
(June). It accuses the soldiers of involvement in the theft of all-terrain
vehicles in Chile. The charges are later dropped and the soldiers return to
Bolivia.
Faced with a Peruvian demand for a revision of the maritime boundary
between the two countries, Chile presents its counter-arguments to the ICJ
in The Hague (July).
2012
Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Colombia formally launch the Pacific Alliance at a
ceremony at the Paranal Observatory in northern Chile (June).
Chile begins the pro-tempore presidency of CELAC, a grouping of Latin
American states established in late 2011.
Bolivian President Morales states that the 1904 treaty that gave Bolivian
coastal land to Chile is "dead" and threatens to take his country's case to
the ICJ (June).
Chile and Peru contract a Norwegian NGO to clear landmines along the
most sensitive area of their common border in what is seen as a sign of
improving bilateral relations (November).
2013
Bolivia takes Chile to the ICJ over its territorial dispute (April).
Chile, Colombia Mexico and Peru agree to scrap 90% of their
merchandise tariffs at a summit of the Pacific Alliance trading bloc in Cali,
Colombia (May).
2014
The ICJ ruled that Chile should cede 20,000 square kilometres of sea to
Peru but can keep key fishing grounds (January).
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GEOGRAPHY, Chile
UPDATED
GEOGRAPHY
Overview
Chile is a long, slender country, occupying much of the South American continent's southern Pacific coastline. Argentina borders the
country to the east, Bolivia to the northeast, and Peru to the north. Its longest border is with Argentina (5,150 km), followed by Bolivia
(861 km) and Peru (160 km). The capital, Santiago, lies in the centre of the country, only about 50 km from the Argentine border. Chile
has a strategic location relative to the sea lanes between the Atlantic and Pacific: the Strait of Magellan, the Beagle Channel, and the
Drake Passage.
Chile is 25 times as long as it is wide. The extension over such latitude is largely responsible for the country's very varied geography
and climate. The national territory includes a number of islands, including the Isla de Pascua/Rapa Ni (Easter Island) and the Islas
Juan Fernndez. These islands, lying to the west and south of the mainland, are either sparsely inhabited or wholly uninhabited. Chile
also claims a portion of Antarctic territory, between 53 and 90 degrees west.
The far north is a high plateau that extends southwards from Bolivia. The Atacama desert occupies much of the northern part of the
country; it follows the coastline for hundreds of kilometres. Farther south a mountain range emerges near the littoral that runs parallel to
the enormous Andes mountain chain, which comprises the country's eastern border. In between these is a fertile valley region inhabited
by the vast bulk of the population. Still farther on, the coastal range plunges into the sea, creating a large number of islands and
bringing the Andes near the shore. In the extreme south and on the Chilean portion of Tierra del Fuego there are some patches of
flatter land.
Just over one-fifth of land in Chile consists of forests and woodland. Meadows and pastures occupy 16% of the country's land area and
arable land accounts for 7%. There is about 12,650 sq km of irrigated land in the country. In central areas, the soil tends to be fertile
and well irrigated. Important crops in the country include wheat and sugar, as well as oats, barley, rice, beans, lentils, maize, and
chickpeas. Livestock farming is concentrated in the southern and northern areas of the country. The centre of the country is a fruitgrowing area, while the main wheat areas tend to be located towards the south. Chile is highly urbanised; 86% of the population live in
urban areas.
Data
Climate Data
Concepcion
Avg. Temperature (C)
Dew Point
Rainfall
Max
Min
(mm)
Jul-Sep
23
11
12
Oct-Dec
17
15
Jan-Mar
15
26
Apr-Jun
20
18
Source: NCDC, IHS
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NATURAL RESOURCES, Chile

Date Posted: 15-Aug-2013
UPDATED
NATURAL RESOURCES
Contents
MAJOR NATURAL RESOURCES
Oil and Natural Gas Reserves
Oil
Natural gas
Minerals
Water Supply
Land Use
Food Supply
Energy
MAJOR NATURAL RESOURCES

Chile's major resources are copper, timber, iron ore, nitrates, precious metals and molybdenum.
Oil and Natural Gas Reserves
Oil reserves
150 million barrels (proven, 2010)
Natural gas reserves
100 billion m3 (proven, 2010)
Oil
Petroleum was discovered around Magellanes in southern Chile in 1945. Most of the country's oil is still extracted from the offshore
fields at the Strait of Magellan, and from onshore fields at Tierra del Fuego. Production in 2010 averaged around 10,600 barrels per day
(bpd), while consumption reached 302,000 bpd. Chile imports about 90% of its petroleum requirements, making the country vulnerable
to high international prices.
Natural gas
Natural gas production, the bulk of which comes from the Magellanes field, has fallen steadily since the 1970s. Most of its 1.35 billion
m3 production supplies a single Methanex plant in the far south, which is due to relocate to the United States by 2014 due to the high
price of Chilean gas. Record amounts are now imported to meet an annual consumption of 2.84 billion m3.
From the 1990s until the middle of the 2000s, Chile imported significant quantities of natural gas from Argentina, mainly for use in
generating plants producing electricity. However, Argentina then diverted to meet its own domestic demand. This, coupled with Bolivia's
politically-motivated refusal to sell natural gas to Chile because of ongoing territorial sovereignty disputes, has forced Chile to diversify
its sources of energy imports. In 2009 it inaugurated two coastal liquid natural gas terminals, at Quinteros in central Chile and
Mejillones in the north, allowing it to import natural gas from Asia and the Caribbean. In the meantime, the Chilean government is
funding research on possible natural gas reserves in the country's territorial waters.
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Minerals
Its mineral wealth is Chile's most valuable natural resource and the foundation of the country's economy. Copper alone accounts for
about 50% of Chile's foreign exchange earnings and is the country's key export commodity. The country has 30% of the world's copper
reserves and is the world's leading copper producer. Moreover, high copper prices since 1999 have brought the government a revenue
windfall. In early 2011, the copper price hit an all time record of USD4.60 per lb and averaged USD4 per lb for the year. Although it
eased during 2012 it remains at around USD3.50, well above its historical average. Investment of profits from copper sales in a social
and economic stabilisation fund has allowed Chile to build significant reserves to help see the country through leaner times.
State-owned miner Codelco accounts for around a third of national production, around half of it from its Codelco Norte division which
includes Chuquicamata, the world's largest opencast copper mine. Codelco's other major mines are Andina and El Teniente in central
Chile. In the private sector, BHP Billiton's Escondida is the world's most productive copper mine, accounting for 9% of Chile's output,
while the newer and rapidly expanding Collahuasi mine (jointly owned by Xstrata and Anglo American) accounts for around 7%.
New investments in gold mining may establish Chile among the world's top ten gold producers. As of 2009. it was 17th in the world with
an annual production of 41 tonnes. State mining body Cochilco forecasts that volume to rise to 120 tonnes by 2017. Lithium production
is also expected to expand rapidly as the demand for lithium batteries increases. Chile already accounts for 43% of global lithium
production capacity and is home to 21% of the world's lithium reserves. The government has embarked on a process of opening up the
lithium industry to new players.
Nitrates of soda, iodine and potassium salts (the latter being by-products of the nitrates) are exploited in the Atacama deserts, as is iron
ore. Other minerals found in more limited quantities include lignite, coal, molybdenum, manganese, zinc, lead, silver and gold. Forestry
is an important sector, and the country has some 2.3 million hectares under plantation. Rapidly growing radiata pine and eucalyptus are
the main timber supplies for pulp and sawn wood.
Water Supply
Approximately 91% of the population has access to sanitation services, and some 95% of the population has access to safe drinking
water. Rural water supplies are sometimes of poor quality but Santiago's water is relatively clean. The majority of water and sanitation
companies that build and operate drinking water and sewage facilities have been privatised. The state retains a small holding in three
water companies but reduced those stakes in 2010 and 2011 with the aim of divesting itself of them completely. Access to water for
agriculture and mining is becoming an increasingly contentious issue in northern Chile, where rainfall is minimal.
Land Use
Approximately one-fifth of Chile's land area is covered by forest or woodland. Meadows and pastures occupy 16% of the land, and
arable land accounts for 7% of the country's territory.
Food Supply
Sugar beet and wheat are the country's primary food crop products; maize, potatoes and fruits are also important. Some growers are
converting from traditional crops as they cannot compete with foreign competitors such as Argentina. In their place extensive fruit and
vegetable production has developed, much of it for export.
The wine industry is well-developed and caters for both domestic consumption and a diversified and lucrative export market.
Chile's extraordinarily long coastline allows for one of the largest wild fish catches in the world, although it has diminished from a peak
of over 7 million tonnes a year in the early 1990s to around 3.5 million tonnes now. Fishing, salmon included, generated export earnings
of USD3.2 billion in 2011. Chile is the second biggest producer of salmon in the world, behind Norway, despite being hit by a crisis in
2007-2008 caused by the Infectious Salmon Anaemia (ISA) virus, previously unknown in Chile.
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Energy
Chile, more than any other country in South America, suffers from a chronic energy shortfall. It produces only modest amounts of oil
and natural gas and furthermore, its economy is heavily dependent on the energy-intensive mining industry. The country's problems are
exacerbated by its poor relations with neighbouring Bolivia, which refuses to sell natural gas to Chile due a long-standing border
dispute. Since the early 2000s, a consensus has emerged that securing energy supplies is a prerequisite for national development. By
2020, Chile estimates it will need to double its electricity supply to meet growing demand from an increasingly affluent population and
an expanding industrial base.
The electricity distribution system is divided into two grids, the central-southern SIC and the northern SING, with the northern grid
largely reliant on thermally-generated power and counting on the mining industry as its biggest consumers. The central-southern grid is
around 60% hydroelectric, although this fluctuates significantly according to reservoir levels, and serves the main population centres.
The southern section of the grid was damaged by the earthquake of February 2010, resulting in a major power cut a month after the
quake, plunging most of the country into darkness. Another major outage in 2011 underlined the need for a modernisation of the grid. A
marginal cost system is used to determine the price of electricity. Prices are considerably higher than elsewhere in the continent.
In a bid to address its energy shortfall, Chile has considered the nuclear option, but the country's seismic instability and the lessons
learned from the Japanese earthquake of 2011 have effectively ruled this out, at least in the medium term. Instead, Chile has turned to
imports of liquid natural gas, allowing it to diversify its gas suppliers. A new generation of coal-fired power plants is being rolled out and
the construction of new hydroelectric plants is being considered.
One of the proposed long-term solutions is HidroAysn, a project involving Spanish company Endesa and its Chilean partner Colbun to
build a large hydroelectric complex over the Baker and Pascua rivers in southern Chile. This would generate more than 18,000 gigawatt
hours of power a year, around a third of current consumption, but has prompted vehement public opposition, resulting in sizeable
protest marches in Santiago. Not only would the plan involve the flooding of 5,900 hectares of land in Patagonia, it would also require
the construction of one of the longest transmission lines in the world to transport power to Santiago and the industrial hinterland. By late
2012, HidroAysn had received preliminary government approval but faced numerous legal challenges and looked increasingly unlikely
to ever come into being. The construction of the transmission line had not been approved and in May 2012, Colbun said it would not
seek such approval until it received more clarity from the government on its energy strategy.
In the absence of a consensus to construct either the hydroelectric plants in Aysn or nuclear plants, Chile is likely to turn to new coalfired power stations to meet its growing energy demands, although this too has proved problematic. In August 2012, Chile's Supreme
Court blocked the construction of the Castilla coal-fired plant in northern Chile on environmental grounds. The plant would have added
2,100 megawatts, or 13% of Chile's current generating capacity, to the grid, serving the booming mining industry in the Atacama region.
It was the second-biggest proposed energy project in the country, behind HidroAysn. Environmentalists have called for further
investment in small hydroelectric schemes, viewed as more palatable to the public than HidroAysn, and in non-conventional
renewable energy (NCRE). Chile has tremendous potential for NCRE projects, be they solar, wind, tidal or geothermal. However, costs
make them prohibitively expensive in the short term, and even in the medium term they are unlikely to contribute much to solving the
country's energy problems. The government initially set an ambitious (and non-binding) target of generating 20% of the country's
energy from NCRE sources by 2020, but has since rowed back to a more realistic goal of 10% by the same year.
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DEMOGRAPHY, Chile
UPDATED
DEMOGRAPHY
Contents
Demographic Data
Ethnic Groups
Language
Health and Medical
Demographic Data
Births and Deaths, 2010
Birth rate (per 1,000 population)
14.7
Death rate (per 1,000 population)
5.4
Female life expectancy at birth (years)
81.5
Male life expectancy at birth (years)
75.5
Source: United Nations
Ethnic Groups
Chile's population is principally of European descent, with a small minority of indigenous peoples and a large minority of mixed-race
mestizos. Later immigration from Europe was relatively small but socially significant. Amerinidian descendants are more numerous
among the poorer sectors of the population. Several indigenous communities remain, principally the Mapuche of the south-central
region of Araucana, and it has been estimated that about 80% of the population has some indigenous lineage.
Language
Spanish is the predominant language, although some indigenous languages are still spoken (Aymar in the northern border regions
near Bolivia and the Mapuche language Mapudungun in the south-central region of Araucana). A Polynesian dialect is spoken on
Easter Island. There are some small German-speaking enclaves in the south, where there are descendants from Bavarian immigrants
who came to Chile in the late 19th century. There are also Slavic-speaking enclaves in Antofagasta and Punta Arenas, where
communities of immigrants from Yugoslavia settled after the First World War.
English is spoken and understood among a large part of the educated and business classes and is increasingly popular among the
younger generations.
Health and Medical
Life expectancy in Chile is relatively high and health facilities are excellent in the major cities, although they are of variable standard
elsewhere. The left-centrist governments that ruled from 1990 to 2010 reformed the public health system with the aim of guaranteeing
access to full medical care to every citizen not covered by the expensive private health care system. About 80% of the population relies
on state-subsidised health care. The infant mortality rate is nine per 1,000 live births, and there are approximately 1.09 physicians per
1,000 inhabitants.
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UNAIDS estimated that in 2009 around 39,000 adults aged 15 or over in Chile were living with HIV, giving a prevalence rate of around
0.4%.
Air pollution is a significant problem in Santiago during the winter months of June to September, and can cause respiratory problems.
There have been cases of dengue fever reported on Easter Island, which belongs to Chile, and several outbreaks of the Hantavirus,
carried by rats in urban and semi-urban areas. Chile was one of the countries worst affected by the outbreak of the AH1N1 virus (swine
flu) in 2009. The first case was recorded in May of that year and the health ministry said at least 79 people died as a result of the virus,
the effects of which were exacerbated by its outbreak at the onset of the southern hemisphere winter.
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INFRASTRUCTURE, Chile
Date Posted: 16-Apr-2014
UPDATED
INFRASTRUCTURE
Contents
Overview
Roads
Railways
Waterways
Airports
Civil Airlines
LAN (Linea Aerea Nacional)
Ports
Telecommunications
Overview
Before the earthquake on 27 February 2010, the transport infrastructure in Chile was adequate and was expected to improve over the
next few years as the government targeted the highway network for increased private investment. According to then-minister of public
works Sergio Bitar, Chile was expected to award USD4-billion-worth of infrastructure contracts through 2011. However, the destruction
caused by the tremor inevitably translated into an increase in public spending. Chile's former president Sebastin Piera launched a
reconstruction plan known as "Levantemos Chile" (Rise, Chile) after taking office in 2010. The reconstruction plan has counted on
involvement from the private sector and has been funded with tax and mining royalties' increases.
Roads
Around one-quarter of Chile's 80,000-km road network is paved. The road network is good in urban areas and fair throughout most of
the country, although the best-served region is that around the capital Santiago and the Central Valley. By contrast, minor roads in
many rural areas are poor. The road network does not extend fully into the southern Patagonian region, which is accessed either by air
or by road from neighbouring Argentina, although the state is progressing with plans to improve and extend the Carretera Austral, the
southern highway that runs south from Puerto Montt.
In May 2012, the government unveiled a plan to connect the southern island of Chilo with the mainland via a road bridge, 3 km in
length, at a cost of USD740 billion. The bridge is due to be completed in 2019.
The February 2010 earthquake destroyed or damaged many roads, bridges, and flyovers throughout central and southern-central areas
of the country, as well as causing lesser damage in and around Santiago itself, but almost all of that infrastructure has since been
repaired.
Railways
Chilean State Railways (Empresa de los Ferrocarriles del Estado: EFE), operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport and
Telecommunications, is responsible for 2,831 km of 1,676 mm gauge railway and 402 km of 1,000 mm gauge railway. Of this network,
1,317 km is electrified at three kV DC. Train operators are private but the infrastructure remains in state hands. Private sector lines
supplement the public railway system.
Studies for reopening the Trans-Andean rail link between Valparaso and Mendoza, a provincial city on the Argentine side of the Andes
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mountains, started in 2002 and are still on the table. This would be a costly project and require heavy foreign private sector investment,
but the Chilean government has promoted it on the grounds of economic integration. The current plan, presented for consideration in
2008, is to tunnel at low altitude to ensure the line is not blocked by snow during the winter. However, this would mean the tunnel would
have to be approximately 23 km in length. The ministry estimates the cost at USD100 million per kilometre. The plan has yet to be
formally approved. A project linking Concepcin, the main city and industrial port in the south, with the major Atlantic port of Baha
Blanca in Argentina, has also been mooted.
The Santiago Metropolitan area, home to one-third of the country's population, has an extensive, integrated transport system. There are
five underground/overground metro lines with a combined extension of 103 km. Work has begun on two more lines, which will add a
further 37 km to the network at a combined cost of USD2.8 billion. The first of the new lines is due to be completed in late 2016 and the
second in 2018. The metro carries around 2.3 million passengers a day. In February 2007, the government launched Transantiago, a
complete overhaul of the city's transport network, aimed at regulating bus routes and timetables, and integrating bus routes with the
metro. The project was initially highly problematic, but most of those problems have now been resolved.
The small passenger railway network connecting Valparaso with Via del Mar was modernised between 2003 and 2006, with secondhand equipment imported from Spain and the construction of new rail infrastructure and a new network of well-equipped stations.
Waterways
Very little of Chile's river system is navigable for commercial purposes.
Airports
Chile has 390 usable airports, 297 of which have permanently surfaced runways. None of Chile's airports have runways longer than
3,659 m. Santiago airport increasingly suffers from overcrowding and is being expanded, with work on the first phase of the expansion
project due to end in 2014. Work will begin in 2015 on a second terminal capable of handling an additional 29 million visitors a year.
Chile's air traffic control network is the best in South America, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) published
in 2007.
Civil Airlines
LAN (Linea Aerea Nacional)
LAN (previously LAN Chile) was founded in 1929 as a state airline, with the state selling 51% of its share in 1989 to SAS (Scandinavian
Airlines) and a conglomerate of national investors. This process of privatisation ended in 1994, and in 2000 LAN joined the OneWorld
alliance. LAN operates affiliates as LAN Airlines, LAN Express, LAN Peru, LAN Ecuador, LAN Argentina, and LAN Cargo. In June
2012, LAN completed a merger with Brazilian airline TAM to become the largest airline in Latin America and among the top 15 in the
world in sales terms, serving 150 destinations in 22 countries. LATAM, as the new airline is known, is one of the three largest airlines in
the world in terms of market capitalization.
LAN has a fleet of 118 aircraft, spread between Airbus A340-300, Boeing 767-300 ER/ER, Airbus A320-200, Airbus A319, Airbus A318,
while LAN Cargo operates 13 aircraft. Its main hub is the Comodoro Arturo Merino Bentez International Airport in Santiago, but it has
substantial operations across the continent.
LAN has a deserved reputation as the safest and most efficient airline in Latin America.
Ports
Chile has a number of important ports, including San Antonio, Antofagasta, Arica, Puerto Montt, Punta Arenas, Talcahuano, and
Valparaso. A major new commercial port has been built at Mejillones, near Antofagasta to serve copper export shipments. In addition
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to state ports, several mining companies operate their own private ports to process copper shipments. These include Puerto Coloso,
which serves the Escondida mine, Punta Padrones (Candelaria mine), Puerto Ventanas (Andina and Los Bronces mines), and Puerto
Patache (Collahuasi mine).
Telecommunications
The telecommunications sector in Chile is one of the most modern and developed in the Latin American region. The liberalisation of all
telecoms markets has created a highly competitive environment. This has reduced the projected profit margins that new entrants are
likely to enjoy, particularly in basic services. Recent market trends have shown moves towards consolidation in the mobile, cable TV,
and the long-distance markets.
Chile has access to two Atlantic Ocean INTELSATs and three domestic satellites as well as two international fibre-optic loops. In
addition, Chile successfully launched its first full-scale military satellite in December 2011. Domestic communications, both land and
mobile, are served by a range of competing, wide-ranging and efficient networks.
According to the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadstica: INE), in 2010 there were 19,388,000 registered mobile
telephones in Chile, representing a penetration rate of 1.13 telephones per inhabitant. Public telephones have meanwhile declined,
from one per 815 citizens in 2004 to one per 993 in 2009.
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ECONOMY, Chile
UPDATED
ECONOMY
Contents
Economic Outlook
Data
Demographics and Labour Market
Key Sectors
Trade Profile
Economic Outlook
We estimate the Chilean long-term trend rate of growth in the neighborhood of 4.6%. The labor force is expected to increase
around 0.5% on average in the long term. Although the growth in the working population is expected to decline, the rate of participation
in the labor force should increase over the forecast horizon, especially the participation of women-which remains almost constant at
below 49%-remains low with respect to the observed experience in industrialized countries. To achieve this, labor regulation reforms
should be introduced, to bring more flexibility into the labor market.
Labor is relatively abundant in Chile as in most Latin American countries, so the long-term key driver of growth is investmentthe accumulation of physical capital. Chile's labor force amounts to 8.4 million, representing about 60% of the working-age
population. Of the total labor force employed-around 7.9 million-around 21% are in commerce, 12% in manufacturing, 8% in agriculture,
9% in construction, 8% in education, 8% in transport and communication, 3% labor in mining, and the remainder work in other activities
and services. The lack of flexibility (i.e., firms cannot easily lay off workers during recessions) makes businesses more cautious about
hiring new workers even under strong growth conditions. The labor force grew at an average rate of 3.3% in 2009-13. The productivity
factor and labor supply projections, combined with the ratio of fixed investment to GDP, yield a long-term growth rate in the
neighborhood of 4.6%.
Most of the determinants of long-term growth in Chile remain healthy. The fixed investment-to-GDP ratio averaged 24.0% in 200913. In addition, the wide participation of the private sector and rising levels of investment in machinery and equipment have led to
improvements in capital-use efficiency. The massive earthquake that hit the country in late February 2010, despite the initial negative
shock caused by capital destruction, brought the opportunity to replace old with new infrastructure, which in the medium-to-long term
will benefit the country. Indeed, even though the economic cost of the natural disaster mounted to very significant levels, it has not
threatened the macroeconomic stability of the country. Chile's solid institutions, its low level of public debt, and the savings the country
accumulated during years of booming copper prices have contributed to the recovery. In recent years, the investment environment has
been supported by the continued implementation of sound policies based on the inflation-targeting monetary policy program, a floating
exchange rate, the structural fiscal surplus rule, and trade liberalization, as well as a robust financial system. Nevertheless, to increase
productivity, it is necessary to make further enhancements in human capital accumulation and to bring more efficiency into the financial
and labor markets.
Still, a number of structural issues will continue to prevent long-term growth above 5%. Since 2004, Chile has faced disruptions
in natural gas supply from its only source, neighboring Argentina. Although the effect of such events is moderated by the fact that threefourths of firms that use natural gas have converted their plants to alternative energies, according to the Chilean central bank, gas
shortages and higher energy prices yielded a loss of 1.0-2.6 percentage points in the growth rate of the manufacturing industry in
recent years. Energy supply will remain a conditioning factor for economic growth. Another structural issue regarding long-term growth
is the limited diversification of Chilean exports. Export earnings rely heavily on natural resources, essentially mining (copper), and then
on forestry, industrialized products, fish, and fruits. To achieve higher sustainable growth rates, Chile should expand its exportable
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base. This will occur in time, as gains from trade liberalization materialize. At last, improvements in income distribution are required to
support continued domestic demand growth.
Data
Chile: Top-10 Sectors Ranked by Value Added
2013 Level
2014 Percent Change
Percent Share of GDP
(Bil. US$)
(Real terms)
(Nominal terms)
1. Mining of metals & stone
35.4
1.6
13.9
2. Iron & steel
27.5
-6.4
10.8
3. Construction
21.3
2.8
8.4
4. Real estate
18.2
1.4
7.2
5. Business services
17.1
3.5
6.7
6. Retail trade - total
13.5
2.1
5.3
7. Education
12.9
3.3
5.1
8. Public Admin. & Defense
12.4
3.7
4.9
9. Wholesale trade
9.9
1.8
3.9
10. Health and social services
9.7
3.0
3.8
Top-10 Total
177.8
69.9
Source: World Industry Service, IHS Global Insight, Inc.

Updated: 16 Oct 2014
Chile: Major Trading Partners, 2013

EXPORTS
IMPORTS
Country
Billions of USD
Percent Share
Country
Billions of USD
Percent Share
China
19.1
24.9
United States
16.1
20.3
United States
9.8
12.8
China
15.6
19.7
Japan
7.6
9.9
Brazil
5.1
6.5
Brazil
4.4
5.8
Argentina
3.9
5.0
South Korea
4.2
5.5
Germany
3.2
4.0
Netherlands
2.5
3.3
South Korea
2.8
3.5
India
2.2
2.9
Mexico
2.5
3.2
Peru
1.9
2.5
Ecuador
2.5
3.2
Bolivia
1.7
2.2
Japan
2.5
3.1
Italy
1.6
2.1
France
2.2
2.8
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade
Chile: Major Trading Partners, 2000

EXPORTS
IMPORTS
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Country
Billions of USD
Percent Share
Country
Billions of USD
Percent Share
United States
3.2
16.8
United States
3.3
17.8
Japan
2.5
13.2
Argentina
2.9
15.5
United Kingdom
1.1
5.6
Brazil
1.3
7.2
Brazil
1.0
4.9
China
1.0
5.1
China
0.9
4.7
Japan
0.7
3.8
Mexico
0.8
4.2
Germany
0.6
3.3
Italy
0.8
4.2
Mexico
0.6
3.3
South Korea
0.8
4.1
South Korea
0.5
2.9
Argentina
0.6
3.3
Canada
0.5
2.8
France
0.6
3.3
France
0.4
2.4
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade
Demographics and Labour Market

According to estimates based on the 2002 census, Chile has a population of 16.76 million, the seventh-largest in Latin America
after Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru. Although infant mortality rates have fallen, population growth has been
trending lower as a result of falling birth rates. Nevertheless, the age profile of the population is relatively young. The national average
age is slightly above 30 years old. About 85% of the country's population lives in urban areas, with 40% living in Greater Santiago. In
relation to income distribution, according to statistics from Chilean think tank CAS Informtica, Chile's top-10 richest percentile
possesses 47% of the country's wealth. Moreover, some 6.2% of the country populates the upper economic income bracket, 15% the
middle bracket, 21% the lower middle, 38% the lower bracket, and 20% the extreme poor. Per-capita GDP is currently estimated at
USD15,400.
The Chilean labor force amounts to 8.3 million, among which 7.8 million are employed. Of the total labor force employed, around
20% are in commerce, 11% in manufacturing, 10% work in agriculture, 9% are in financial services, 7% are in transport and
communication, 9% work in construction, 3% labor in mining, and the remaining in other activities and services. The Labor and Finance
authorities are working together to introduce modifications to labor laws and regulations to bring flexibility to the labor market. Some
alternatives under consideration include the reduction of payout limits and the increase in the coverage of unemployment assistance.
The lack of flexibility (i.e., firms cannot easily lay off workers during recessions) makes businesses more cautious about hiring new
workers even under strong growth conditions. Self-employed people account for 20% of total employment; according to the National
Institute of Statistics (INE), an individual is employed if he or she worked at least one hour during the week the survey was conducted,
which translates into hidden underemployment in official statistics.
Key Sectors
Mining: Chile has considerable mineral resources. The country is the global leader in copper production, with an estimated annual
total production of 5.07 million. Second to copper is the production of iron, followed by silver, molybdenum, gold, zinc, manganese,
and lead. Chile's exports are supported by the output of a well-developed industry, which uses state-of-the-art production technology,
particularly in copper mining. Mining production will continue to lead Chile's economy with significant foreign and domestic investment
in developing new mines and modernizing and expanding existing ones. The state-owned mining company, CODELCO, is the world's
largest copper producer, but privately owned mines (including those with international ownership) account for about half of Chile's
copper production and look to increase their share of the market steadily.
Forestry: Chile has extensive forests, estimated at some 15.5 million hectares (38.3 million acres), or about 20.7% of the total land
area. The establishment of radiata pine and eucalyptus plantations, largely as a result of government assistance, has helped Chile to
become an important supplier of paper and wood products to overseas markets. Chile is a major source of hardwood in the temperate
zone, softwoods include alerce, araucaria, and manio; hardwoods include alamo, laural, lenga, and olivillo. Native forests are as yet
underutilized and could become an important factor in Chile's growing competitiveness. Most wood products from Chile are exported
as logs, chips, and lumber.
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Fishing: Fishing expanded rapidly starting in the late 1970s. By 1983, Chile was ranked fifth in the world in catch tonnage and had
become the world's leading exporter of fish meal. Despite naturally caused year-to-year variations, the volume of the total fish catch
had increased over the long term. Total fish caught is estimated at around 4 million tons. Chile's General Fishing Law encourages
investment in commercial fishing by ensuring the conservation of hydrobiological resources, by protecting against overfishing, by
reserving for traditional fishermen an exclusive eight-kilometer strip of coastal waters, and by promoting fishing research. Fish
products constitute an important portion of Chilean industrial exports.
Trade Profile
In the last decade, China has displaced the US as Chile's main destination for exports, accounting for over 23% of total exports. Next
are Japan and the US, which represent 11% each of Chilean total exports, followed by regional neighbour Brazil (5.5%). The US is still
Chile's main supplier of imports, accounting for over 20% of the total, followed by China with almost 17% of total imports. Neighbour
countries Brazil and Argentina supply over 8% and 6% of Chile's imports, respectively. Chile's export earnings are dominated by mining
products (around 64% of all exports), followed by industrial goods (about 28%), and agriculture, forestry, and fish (6.3%). In turn, Chile's
imports are dominated by intermediate goods (around 53% of the total), followed by consumption goods and capital goods, which
account for around 23% and 17% of the total, respectively.
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SECURITY AND FOREIGN FORCES, Chile

Date Posted: 16-Apr-2014
UPDATED
SECURITY AND FOREIGN FORCES

Contents
Overview
Police
Carabineros
Assessment
Organisation
Chain of Command
Training
Polica de Investigaciones (PDI)
Organisation
Chain of command
Overview
There are two separate national law enforcement bodies in Chile: the Cuerpo de Carabineros, an armed gendarmerie force, and the
Polica de Investigaciones (Investigative Police), a plain-clothes organisation comparable to the US Federal Bureau of Investigations.
Both organisations are currently subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, which co-ordinates with the Ministry of the Interior, although
there have been proposals to bring them completely under the control of the Ministry of the Interior.
According to the provisions of the 1980 constitution, the police are referred to as the "Forces of Order and Public Security", their role
being defined as the maintenance of law and order.
Police
Carabineros
Assessment
The Carabineros are a uniformed, national police force with paramilitary reserve functions. In addition to their normal law enforcement
and allied functions, they perform extensive civic action work, including the provision of medical and dental services to the populations
of the less developed regions of the country and the protection of forests and wildlife. The Carabineros maintain nationwide coverage,
having a presence in all major, and most minor, population centres.
The Cuerpo de Carabineros has in recent years taken part in UN peacekeeping operations: detachments were sent to El Salvador in
the 1990s, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 2000s, and officers are currently deployed in Haiti, where they are helping to train
the local police and perform some law enforcement support duties. Chilean Carabineros also train police forces from other Latin
American countries.
The Carabineros have a deserved reputation as being the most professional and least corruptible police force in Latin America.
However, their standing in the eyes of the public suffered during 2011 and 2012 because of a perception that their policing of social
protests, particularly student demonstrations, had often been heavy-handed. Opinion polls consistently showed that confidence in the
force, while still high by regional standards, had fallen significantly. In August 2011, a police officer shot dead a 16-year-old boy in
Santiago during a night of protests. In September 2011, the head of the force, General Eduardo Gordon, resigned amid allegations that
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Carabineros had tampered with a witness statement taken after a car accident in which Gordon's son was involved. Further recent
scandals will also likely further damage public perception as several arrests have been made in relation to corruption in drug smuggling
rings.
Organisation
The Carabineros are divided into three zones - northern, central, and southern. Within these zones, prefectures are split into subprefectures; under the sub-prefectures are commissariats (comisaras), sub-commissariats (sub-comisaras), and a range of further
subdivisions including detachments (destacamentos).
Operationally, the sub-directorate general of the Carabineros reports to the directorate general, and is sub-divided into 15 further
directorates general. These comprise: the national directorate of intelligence; the national directorate of security and public order; the
national directorate of personnel; the national directorate of logistics; the directorate of planning and development; the directorate of
justice; the directorate of finance; the directorate of family protection; the directorate of private security and firearms control; the
directorate of crime investigation and drugs; the directorate of borders and specialised services; the directorate of education; the
directorate of welfare; the directorate of health; and the directorate of sanitation. Administratively, policing in Chile's 15 regions and the
Metropolitan zone falls under the national directorate of security and public order.
The Cuerpo de Carabineros is also responsible for customs control and provides the Presidential Guard. Separate prefectures deal with
the air police and radio patrol. The Special Operations Group (Grupo de Operaciones Especiales: GOPE) is a battalion-sized special
forces unit with small squads deployed around the country.
In addition to normal police equipment, the Carabineros have a range of light infantry weapons and MOWAG Roland armoured
personnel carriers at their disposal. The establishment also includes marine and air sections that jointly operate small patrol and rescue
craft, plus about 30 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
The air elements are under the command of a separate prefecture, the Prefectura Aeropolicial, which operates eight MBB BO
105CBS/LSA-3, four Agusta A109 Power, four Eurocopter EC120 Colibri, one BK 117B-1 and two Bell 206B JetRanger helicopters, in
addition to a Cessna U206G fixed-wing aircraft.
Chain of Command
A director general oversees the Carabineros. As of April 2014, General Gustavo Gonzlez held this position.
Training
The Cuerpo de Carabineros officers' academy is located at Nunoa, in Santiago. The main training establishments for personnel are
located at Los Cerrillos, Santiago, but there are secondary training centres for new personnel entries in each of the zones. The
Mountain and Border Guards are located in Ovalle, in the Coquimbo's region.
Recruitment is entirely voluntary. Applicants are of a high standard, being required to have attained a certain educational level and to
pass not only exacting physical examinations but also searching psychological tests. The Cuerpo de Carabineros has its own officer
academy, specialist school, non-commissioned officer school and staff officers school. Most of them are located at Los Cerrillos,
Santiago. The Mountain and Border Guard School, located in Ovalle, in the Coquimbo region, trains specialists in mountaineering and
border guards.
Following evidence of an increase in the involvement of Carabineros personnel in criminal activities since 2005, a new and revised
system for the screening of new applicants for recruitment was implemented. Corruption within the Carabineros nevertheless remains
lower than in other Latin American law enforcement bodies.
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Polica de Investigaciones (PDI)

The PDI is a plain-clothes civilian investigative agency engaged primarily in the detection and investigation of crime. It functions in close
collaboration with Interpol and with the intelligence services of the army, navy, and air force. The Gabinete de Identificacin (a national
register) which provides all identification cards and passports, is not part of Investigaciones but of the Ministry of Justice, although it
works closely with the civilian police. The PDI is found mainly in the larger population centres, such as provincial capitals and at ports,
airports, and border crossing points.
Although it maintains high operational standards and low levels of corruption by regional standards, the PDI does not have the same
reputation for incorruptibility as the Carabineros. At least 230 members of the force, some of them holding high-level positions inside
the force, have been dismissed for involvement in criminal activities, mostly drug-related, since the early 1990s. In 2014, four
Carabineros, including the head of the anti-drug unit in the northern region of Arica, were arrested on suspicion of trying to traffic 1.1
tonnes of marijuana from Bolivia.
Organisation
Functionally, the PDI is divided into a number of departments dealing with administration, personnel, foreign and internal police, health,
welfare, and justice. The force also includes an air police brigade (responsible for airport surveillance), and the forensic medicine
laboratory, plus a special units prefecture that comprises six brigades dealing with fraud, murder, robberies, vehicle theft, vice, and
women's affairs.
The PDI has expanded, from 5,000 personnel at the end of the 1990s to a current establishment of around 8,000. The increase has
been achieved by the opening of a special entry system aimed at recruiting young graduates from higher education. These intakes
undergo a one-year course - shorter than the normal three-year course for undergraduate recruits - before deployment.
The organisation is engaged primarily in the detection and investigation of crime. With its headquarters in Santiago, the PDI also has
subdivisions in the provinces of Antofagasta, La Serena, Valparaso, Talca, Concepcin, Temuco, and Valdivia and functions
throughout the country in support of the Carabineros.
Chain of command
Under the 1980 Constitution, the PDI is controlled by the Ministry of Defence through a PDI under-secretariat traditionally led by a
retired military general. This was changed through a constitutional reform in 2004, allowing for the appointment of a civilian
undersecretary.
The chain of command of the PDI runs from the director general through a deputy director to the inspectors in charge of the provincial
sub-stations. As of April 2014, the director general was Marcos Vsquez Meza.
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NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS, Chile

UPDATED
Non-State Armed Groups

Contents
Overview
TOTAL STRENGTH
Mapuche activism
Anarchist groups
Overview
TOTAL STRENGTH
Unknown
Mapuche activism
Chile has no major organised non-state armed groups. Nevertheless, activists of the indigenous Mapuche community - a preColumbian Amerindian people inhabiting the south-central Araucana region of Chile - have previously engaged in acts of violence in
support of their claims to have territory returned to them which was taken by the Chilean state. This activity has generally been lowlevel, consisting mainly of attacks on foreign companies owning land in the area, and has invited a sporadically overbearing state
response that has included use of controversial anti-terrorism legislation and the deaths of Mapuche activists at the hand of security
forces. The activity remains mainly concentrated in traditional Mapuche areas, with occasional demonstrations in Santiago in support of
Mapuche claims. These protests currently show no signs of mutating into a more organised or national movement that would constitute
a broader threat to the state. In recent years, the Mapuche have garnered greater interest and support from outside Chile. International
NGOs and movements advocating separatism or greater autonomy for minorities elsewhere in the world have taken up their cause.
Reports frequently surface in the Chilean media of links between the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAN), a small, loosely organised
Mapuche militant group, and the Basque separatist group ETA. Similar claims have linked the CAN with the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Little in the way of evidence has been produced to support these claims. On current trends, the
efficient Chilean security apparatus remains equal to the task of monitoring the activists and preventing a wider spread of militancy.
Anarchist groups
A number of low-level, anarchist-style groups have been responsible for a series of small-scale bomb attacks since 2005,
predominantly in Santiago. These groups may draw some inspiration from the left-wing urban guerrilla groups of the 1960s and 1970s
that offered resistance to the military dictatorships of the Southern Cone, but they appear to be anti-systemic and anarchic in their
views, rather than leftist. Most of the groups appear to consist of no more than a handful of members, are often leaderless and
disorganised and on many occasions appear to carry out a single attack before retreating back into obscurity. Targets have included
police stations, embassies, company headquarters and banks. Most of the bombs are planted at night and are clearly intended to cause
damage rather than casualties. The low-risk nature of the attacks means that they represent an ongoing and difficult threat for the
security services to counter, although the infrequency and small-scale of their attacks also indicates that they do not constitute a wider
threat to state stability.
Police and security services appeared to have made a major breakthrough in stopping the attacks when they arrested 14 anarchist
suspects in August 2010, shortly after the case had ben passed to a new prosecutor. Officers from the Special Police Investigation
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Brigade (Brigada de Investigaciones Policiales Especiales: BIPE) raided three premises in Santiago and two in the coastal city of
Valparaiso, seizing suspected bomb-making equipment including fire extinguishers, timers and gunpowder. It was hoped that the
arrests would halt the bombings but on 4 October, 2011, the case against the 14 suspects largely collapsed and most of the charges
were dropped. The attacks continued unabated in 2012.
The bomb attacks have caused minor injuries but no deaths to passersby. However, on 22 May 2009, an anarchist, Mauricio Morales,
was killed when the bomb he was carrying in a rucksack exploded prematurely. On 1 June 2011, another anarchist, Luciano Pitronello,
was critically injured when a device he was holding exploded prematurely. In August 2012 Pitronello was found guilty of firearms
possession but, to the frustration of prosecutors, was cleared of terrorism charges. In late 2011, police arrested a 38-year-old
sociologist, Hans Niemeyer, in the process of planting a bomb outside a bank, offering hope once again of a breakthrough in the
investigation.
Solving the string of anarchist bombings would remove a source of embarrassment for the Chilean police, generally considered to be
the most professional in Latin America but previously frustrated in this investigation, and would also eliminate the only serious (if
extremely low-level) terrorist-style threat in otherwise well-ordered Santiago.
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MAPS, Chile
Date Posted: 20-Jul-2011
UPDATED
Maps
Military
Coastal territory of Bolivia and Peru annexed by Chile in the War of the Pacific
1152409
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DEFENCE BUDGET, Chile

UPDATED
DEFENCE BUDGET OVERVIEW

SUMMARY - DEFENCE BUDGET AND MANPOWER
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total Defence 7.586

Budget Constant 2014
USD billion
5.616
6.208
5.610
6.065
6.566
7.161
7.712
Total Defence 3754.749

Budget -
2779.522
3072.654
2776.835
3002.007
3249.715
3,544.537
3,817.172
Constant 2014
local billion
Total Regular
Forces
70,300
70,680
70,680
78,500
78,500
79,000
79,500
79,500
Budget per
manpower
(Constant
2014 USD)
107,908.687
79,451.925
87,831.006
71,467.920
77,263.228
83,109.180
90,078.911
97,007.507
% GDP
2.928%
2.053%
2.179%
1.885%
1.945%
2.011%
2.095%
2.156%
Having peaked at 2.9% of GDP in 2011, IHS Jane's expects that Chile's defence budget will continue its downward trend in 2014,
although this fall in proportional spending (to 1.9% of GDP) is not predicted to continue into 2015. Reforms to Chile's Ley Reservada del
Cobre (Copper Reserve Law), which is responsible for the majority of Chile's military procurement budget, will likely result in some
disruption as new budgeting regimes are established, contributing to a lower absolute spend than in 2013. Growth in defence spending
will be moderate, remaining close to 9% AGR to 2018. This reflects rising costs of modernisation, greater stability and transparency in
budgeting and increasing attention on low-level insurgency in the capital, but also an end to the volatile copper revenues which
financed large expansions in the budgets of 2010 and 2011.
The previous decade's reductions in Chilean military manpower have begun to be reversed, with active personnel numbering 78,500 in
2014. Although Chilean Armed Forces retain the right to use conscription to supplement professional recruitment, their goal of meeting
requirements entirely through voluntary recruits has often been met in recent years. Disruptions to recruitment have been known to
occur however, with the call-up of nearly 57,000 teenagers prompting criticism in 2011.
DEFENCE BUDGET TRENDS
President Piera has pushed for military spending reforms. These include increased transparency and elimination of the use of
copper revenues to fund military procurement.
Chile's president, Sebastian Piera, took office in March 2010 and set about to make significant changes in defence spending. He
called for more transparency in how defence money is spent, leading to some friction between the uniformed services and the defence
minister. In February 2011, Piera directed that the method of funding the military be changed. Through 2010, the military received 10%
of the copper export sales which provided them the bulk of their modernisation funds. This meant that long-range programmes could
not be assured since funding was dependent on market dynamics. The new plan calls for the military to have a strategic modernisation
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plan that can be stabilised and implemented over the course of 10 or more years.
Chile's defence acquisition regime has been in a state of transition for several years, with new measures to reform Chile's approach to
military procurement beginning under Chile's previous president, Sebastin Piera. Mr Piera took office in March 2010 and resolved to
tackle the opaque assignment of revenues from Corporacin Nacional del Cobre de Chile (COLDECO) for the purchasing of military
hardware. COLDECO has been subject to annual levies of 10% on its sales since the introduction of the copper reserve law (Law No.
13,196) in 1958 by President Carlos Ibez del Campo.
Although President Piera succeeded in securing limits to the copper reserve law, the collection of 10% of COLDECO's sales
continues, with a guaranteed minimum of around USD200 million being provided to each service of the armed forces annually. While
the costs of military personnel, operations, maintenance and some investment is included in the annually published Public Sector
Budget Act, a significant amount of military expenditure funded through the copper reserve law remains undisclosed. Purchases made
using these funds require approval from the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Ministries of Defence and Finance, as well as of
the President.
Proceeds of Law 13,196 not spent by the military have since 2011 been accumulated in the Fondo de Contingencia Estratgico (FCE),
or Strategic Contingency Fund, another source of off-budget funding for military purchases. The fund, administered by the Ministry of
Finance, is likely to be worth close to USD5 billion in early 2014.
President Piera's drive for more transparency in defence budgeting is likely to continue under his successor, Michelle Bachelet, who
herself attempted to repeal the copper reserve law during her pervious term as president from 2006-2010. Despite draft legislation
submitted during the Piera administration foundering in the upper house, it has been reported that Ms Bachelet's government will
again seek to reform military procurement. It is likely that rather than repealing the copper reserve law outright, it will seek to establish
an upper limit to military spending, as well as removing the current lower limit.
President Bachelet's pursuit of military procurement reform comes alongside a stated intention to reduce the annual military
procurement budget. In itself this is not expected to result in dramatic reductions in procurement spending, but alongside uncertainty
and continued political negotiating over the future of the copper reserve law, Chile's military procurement budget is likely to see
noticeable restraint in the short term. This trend has been reinforced by governments' increased willingness to use copper law funds for
non-military purchases, especially to assist with recovery from natural disasters, which Chile has suffered several of in recent years. As
a result, following a marked fall in 2014, procurement spending is expected to see fluctuating growth, with the 2013 high of USD1.36
billion not expected to be reached again until 2018. The proportion of the full defence budget dedicated to procurement, 22.1% in 2013,
is predicted to fall to 18.3% in 2018.
Despite the likelihood of change to one of its major procurement instruments, Chile continues towards its goal of military modernisation,
with several of its capabilities expected to see improvement in the medium to long term. The country has recently expressed interest in
various types of non-combat fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and is prioritising a substantial expansion of the capabilities of its Army
Aviation Brigade (Brigada de Aviacin del Ejrcito: BAVE), focusing on expanding rotary-wing and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
fleets. Inventories of F-16s and Leopard 2A4 MBTs, which may be upgraded in the medium term, also represent potential major
opportunities.
Like all operators of modern armed forces, Chile's ability to spend on procurement, operations and maintenance and research is
constrained somewhat due to its high personnel expenditure. Although personnel costs are included within the Ministry of Defence's
official budget, further spending on soldiers' welfare, pensions and healthcare costs are contained within a discrete fund called Caja de
Previsin de la Defensa Nacional (CAPREDENA), or Provident Fund for National Defence, which is governed by the Ministry of Labour
& Social Welfare. In 2014 expenditure related to CAPREDENA is expected to account for over USD1.5 billion of Chile's defence
expenditure. This comes in addition to the regular payroll costs of the services. Overall expenditure on military personnel takes up
51.7% of Chile's defence budget in 2014.
Nevertheless, Chile's military personnel expenditure, while rising in absolute terms, is expected to fall as a proportion of its overall
military spend. In a period of restricted procurement expansion, this comes as a result mainly of an increasing operations and
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maintenance burden, developing due to the increasing sophistication of platforms and systems operated by the Chilean Armed Forces.
The rising level of funding available to service and supply Chile's Armed Forces will provide strong drivers for the market, even as
disruption to existing procurement procedures lead Chile to become more restrained in its acquisition decisions.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Chile is not a key recipient of US Foreign Military Assistance
The bulk of Chile's arms imports come from Western Europe and the United States.
Chile receives a small amount of aid (USD1-2 million annually), primarily from the United States in the form of International Education
and Training (IMET). This is principally because Chile is judged to have the means to provide for its own security.
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ARMED FORCES, Chile

Date Posted: 28-Jul-2014
UPDATED
ARMED FORCES
Contents
Summary
Assessment
Joint Forces Interoperability
Force Projection
Force Readiness
Force Sustainment
Adaptability
Doctrine and strategy
Current Doctrine
Evaluation
Civil-Military Relations
Defence structure
Military Service
Training
Chain of command
Advisory Bodies
Logistics
Communications
Military Transport
Engineering Services
Munition Services
Summary
Total strength
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Active personnel
78,500
43,800
11,600
19,500
3,600
Reserves
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown
Assessment
The Chilean armed forces have been transformed into the region's most capable military, in training, force composition, logistics, and
equipment. Indeed, Chile has been pushing its armed forces to reach NATO standards in terms of capability and to some extent this
has been achieved. In addition, the country's industrial capacity is far superior to that of its neighbours, which allows it to service the
majority of its own equipment.
In June 2012, the government released its 2012-2024 National Defence and Security Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad y
Defensa 2012-2024: ENSYD), which laid out the future of Chile's defence policy. A cornerstone of the new policy was the establishment
of a set of rules for the interaction of military and civilian agencies in internal security, counter-narcotics, cyber security, and disaster
relief operations. The strategy aimed to promote international co-operation and "broad security" to address "new threats". The strategy
also outlined a desire to strengthen "military abilities without increasing military forces or military measures".
Joint Forces Interoperability
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Tri-Service Interoperability
As the result of reforms undertaken in 2010, the joint chief of staff now has direct control over all forces employed overseas as well as
all units in the event of an external war. This was the last of a series of reforms designed to create a modern and joint military
organisation. Jointness was also heavily emphasised in the 2012-2024 ENSYD document.
Multinational Interoperability
The Chilean armed forces contribute to several UN peacekeeping operations and in December 2008 engaged with Argentina to stand
up Latin America's first peacekeeping force, known as the Cruz del Sur (Southern Cross) Force.
Chilean forces also participate in a variety of joint exercises with their Argentine peers. The small annual joint exercises in Antarctic are
especially noteworthy because the two countries have competing territorial claims to a large portion of the Antarctic Peninsula.
The Chilean armed forces are also specifically trained and organised to operate alongside US and NATO forces in any environment.
Force Projection
The armed forces are able to deploy forces of division size in an offensive role to neighbouring countries. On a global scale, the Chilean
armed forces have the capability to support a brigade strength force deployed overseas and are working to expand this capability up to
division level. To this end, the navy is investing in the expansion and modernisation of its amphibious warfare capabilities through the
acquisition of a second amphibious assault ship while the air force is seeking to procure additional tankers and medium transports to
assist projection efforts.
Force Readiness
Chile contributes to the UN Standby forces Arrangements System (UNSAS) with the following forces:
Six helicopters (comprising two each from the army aviation, navy, and air force);
A missile-armed frigate (with the intention of adding a second such frigate in the near future);
An embarked helicopter, an amphibious assault ship; and
A mechanised infantry battalion composed of army and marine corps units.
The marine corps is in the process of reinforcing its Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade (Brigada Anfibia Expedicionaria: BAE), which is
the main power projection arm of the navy.
Force Sustainment
Aside from those forces making up the skeleton cadres of the peacetime armed forces, no effective reserve organisation exists in the
army, despite it being the main recipient of conscripts. Navy fleet crews are made up entirely of professional personnel. Only the air
force and marine corps maintain permanently organised and regularly trained reserves in order to bolster facility defence forces and
coastal artillery units in the event of a crises or emergency.
On the completion of their training, conscripts are required to serve in the Active Reserve for a period of 12 years and then in the
Second Reserve until the age of 44.
Adaptability
The Chilean armed forces are re-equipping and reorganising to better respond to threats as well as contribute to regional stability
through peacekeeping operations. The marines and navy are evolving into highly deployable forces capable of international force
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projection. The army is also reorganising to strengthen its presence in the northern border areas with Bolivia and Peru. All Chilean
armed forces are adapting to a growing requirement to provide disaster or emergency relief operations.
Doctrine and strategy
With a length of approximately 4,800 km from north to south and a width from west to east averaging less than 160 km between the
Pacific Ocean and the crest of the Andes, Chile faces a geostrategic dilemma. Thus, like Israel, Chile lacks the geographic space to
allow for defence in depth and manoeuvre by interior lines. Not surprisingly, Israeli military doctrines appear to have had a major impact
on Chilean military thinking since the 1970s.
Current Doctrine
Current doctrine incorporates European influences, specifically British doctrine in the navy and German doctrine in the army, as well as
US influences in the air force.
Evaluation
The current Chilean doctrine has been established in line with its defence policy and is coherent with its security necessities, power
projection ambitions, and international co-operation plans. However, the Chilean armed forces' doctrine is trying to catch up with the
rapid pace of equipment modernisation.
Civil-Military Relations
Although the transfer of power from the military to an elected civilian government in 1990 was smooth, tensions between civilian
politicians and the military persist. In particular, the military is resisting pressure to bring to trial personnel accused of human-rights
violations following the 1973 coup.
The traditional budgetary conflicts between military and civilian planners have also been exacerbated by allegations that defence
expenditure is excessive, given the absence of any immediate external threat.
Defence structure
The 1980 constitution defines the role of the armed forces as the defence of the country and the guarantee of 'institutional' order. As in
many South American countries, this role is deemed to extend to the defence of national institutions against internal as well as external
threats. Since the 1990s, the armed forces have increasingly recognised participation in international peacekeeping operations as a
major role.
All three armed forces engage in military civic action programmes, particularly in the under-populated extreme northern and southern
portions of the country. Engineer units of the army engage in road construction and maintenance. The navy provides life-saving and
emergency transportation services, in addition to maintaining navigational aids and regulating the activities of the merchant marine. The
air force provides emergency transportation and a meteorological service and plays a major role in disaster relief. It also exercises a
regulatory function for civil aviation and the administration of airports.
All three services combine to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date cartographic service of the national territory and seas, and
provide medical services for the civilian population in the vicinity of their bases in the less developed regions of the country.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is no longer in charge of citizen security and law enforcement as the undersecretaries for the
Carabineros and the Investigative Police were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security in July 2011.
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Military Service
Conscription is being replaced by voluntary military service aimed at creating a full professional military force. In 2007, all 16,050 new
recruits were volunteers and no conscripts needed to be drafted.
Training
Each of the armed forces maintains its own complex of training establishments, which are of uniformly high quality and attract large
numbers of students not just from other Latin American countries but also from such countries as the United States, Germany, Spain,
Israel, and Taiwan.
In addition to the training and staff academy establishments maintained by each of the individual armed forces, there is the Academy of
Political and Strategic Studies (Academia Nacional de Estudios Polticos y Estratgicos: ANEPE), a tri-service, university-level
educational establishment maintained by the MoD. Both military officers and civilian staff from the defence and foreign relations
ministries take ANEPE courses.
The Chilean Army currently trains new recruits within each regiment. The largest drawback of this type of training is that the quality of
training varies in each regiment. A commission is currently assessing whether or not to recommend a change from regimental to depot
training. Switching to depot training would ensure that all recruits are trained to the same standards and in one place before being
assigned to regiments or other units.
The three armed forces have an educational programme aimed at providing enlisted personnel with useful skills for their return to
civilian life.
Chain of command
Minister of Defence:
Jorge Burgos Varela
Commander-in-Chief, Army:
General Juan Miguel de la Fuente-Alba Poblete
Commander-in-Chief, Navy:
Admiral Enrique Larraaga Martin
Commander-in-Chief, Air Force:
General Jorge Rojas vila
Joint Chief of Staff:
Jos Miguel Romero Aguirre
The president is constitutionally empowered to appoint the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. Although the 1980 constitution
does not give the president the ability to remove these officials, constitutional amendments approved by the Chilean Senate in late
2004 restored this power, giving the government more control over the military.
Subsequently, in January 2010 the Chilean Senate approved a law that abolished the under secretariats of the army, navy, and air
force in the MoD. Instead, two under secretariats were created: the under secretariat of defence and the under secretariat for the armed
forces. The reform also established a joint chief of staff that is appointed directly by the president from among the division generals,
vice-admirals, or air brigadiers. However, the joint chief of staff does not out-rank the commanders of the army, navy, or air force and is
therefore primarily in charge of co-ordinating joint forces' development.
Advisory Bodies
There are a bewildering number of advisory bodies dealing with national defence and security. Principal among these, according to the
1980 constitution, is the National Security Council. This consists of the president, the president of the senate, the president of the
supreme court, the controller general, the three armed forces commanders-in-chief, and the director general of the Cuerpo de
Carabineros (Chile's uniformed national police) as voting members, in addition to the ministers of the interior, foreign affairs, national
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defence, and treasury and economy as non-voting advisory members. The chief of the national defence staff acts as ex-officio
secretary.
Performing similar functions and deriving its existence from the 1959 constitution is the Upper Council of National Defence which,
despite its title, enjoys no primacy over the National Security Council. This 'upper council' consists of the president, the ministers of the
interior, foreign affairs, national defence, treasury and economy, the three armed forces commanders-in-chief, the chief of the national
defence staff, and the director general of frontiers. It is a policy-making body, concerned with the defence budget and acquisitions in
connection with security and needs assessment.
Two other bodies, the functions of which are specifically limited to the advisory level, are the Politico-Strategic Advisory Council and the
Internal Security Advisory Council. The former consists of six military and four civilian members and is entrusted with forward planning
for the defence and external security of the state. The latter, which consists of the minister of the interior and seven military members,
deals with internal security planning.
Logistics
Communications
The national defence staff has a subordinate directorate for telecommunications, electronic warfare, and information technology that is
in charge of advising the joint chiefs of staff on these matters. Each of the services has its own subordinate communications systems
with the army's Telecommunications Command being the largest.
Military Transport
Each service is responsible for its own transport capabilities. Attempts to create intra-service procurement programmes for transport
capabilities have not succeeded. The Army's Logistics Division is the largest organisation and implemented a satellite control system for
its entire land fleet in 2010.
Engineering Services
Depot-level maintenance in the army is provided by the new Maintenance Division, which co-ordinates division-level maintenance with
four logistics regiments and maintenance areas in each of four armoured brigades.
The state-owned Arms and Ordnance Factory (Fbrica de Armas y Municiones del Ejrcito: FAMAE) has the ability to provide most of
the military's major overhaul service requirements, as well as upgrade engineering vehicles.
The recently created Emergency Task Force is subordinate to the army's V Division and has most of the heavier engineering vehicles
on strength.
Munition Services
FAMAE provides for most of the munition production, storage and transport capabilities, including local production of 5.56 mm, 7.62
mm, mortar rounds up to 160 mm, and 81 mm rockets. Each of the brigades has specialised logistics platoons and there are six minewarfare companies that have been deployed to demine the border with Peru.
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ARMY, Chile
Date Posted: 24-Mar-2014
UPDATED
ARMY
Contents
Summary
Assessment
Adaptability
Sustainment
Readiness
Deployments, tasks, and operations
Role and deployment
Recent and current operations
Command and control
Organisation
Order of Battle
Special forces
Army aviation order of battle
Operational art and tactical doctrine
Bases
Training
Training areas
Military exercises
Equipment in service
Armour
Artillery
Anti-tank weapons
Air defence weapons
Infantry weapons
Army aviation
Summary
Strength
43,800
Infantry
Reinforced Regiment 11
Infantry Regiment 9
Military Police Regiment x 1
Armour
Armoured Brigade 4
Artillery
Artillery Regiment 3
Special forces
Brigade 1
Engineers
Engineer Battalion 3
Mountain Engineer Company 2
Engineer Company 6
Engineer Regiment 1
Support
Logistics Regiment 5
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Telecommunications Regiment 2
Assessment
The Chilean Army is in the final stages of a profound modernisation programme that began in 2002 and has already created a very
capable and mobile force. As part of this programme, Chile has procured 172 Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks (MBTs) as well as YPR765 and Marder 1A3 armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs). This has given Chile the largest and most advanced armoured force in
South America.
The Chilean Army's transformation has led to the establishment of four new armoured brigades all of them capable of deploying outside
its borders, as well as subsidiary logistics and protection units. It has moved from the concept of a territorial defence force to an
operational force, capable of performing multiple roles and projecting power. The army's primary fighting force now comprises 4
armoured brigades, 11 reinforced regiments, 9 infantry regiments, 3 artillery regiments, and a Special Operations Brigade.
Adaptability
The 2010 natural disasters that hit Chile outlined a need for the armed forces to have additional disaster relief equipment and protocols
in place. Since then, the army has established a competent support service that can assist in natural disaster relief operations.
However, the army's principal focus continues to be on conventional land warfare operations.
Sustainment
The Chilean Army has an adequate support infrastructure in place to provide repair and maintenance services. However, the army's
fixed-wing transport fleet is in need of replacement, something made clear when the army was unable to fulfil all of its assigned
transport missions during a November 2012 joint exercise because all of its Airbus (formerly CASA) CN235s and C212s were grounded
due to lack of maintenance and spares.
The reserve system was first installed in 1978 and was modified in 1998 to comprise a National Reserve and a Military Reserve. The
National Reserve, in theory, includes all citizens while the Military Reserve comprises Chilean citizens ages 18 to 40 years. All of the
citizens in this Military Reserve with military training or prior service are obliged to register at a military reserve centre, while all other
citizens will be called up in case of an emergency to receive military training under a mobilisation order.
Readiness
The Chilean Army's VI Division on its northern border is by far the best equipped and maintains the highest level of readiness.
The army contributes to the Cruz del Sur (Southern Cross) land forces component, which consists of two joint mechanised infantry
battalions, a commando group, and a joint command staff. Army Aviation contributes to the air component, with two helicopters
assigned for rapid reaction duties.
The army has established a new operational readiness measurement system that evaluates each combined arms unit to ensure that
equipment, logistics, and personnel numbers are sufficient.
Role and deployment
The 1980 constitution defines the role of the armed forces as the defence of the country and the guarantee of 'institutional' order. In the
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case of the army, this mission is interpreted primarily as the defence of the country's land frontiers and the preservation of the integrity
and security of national territory against both external and internal threats.
As at 31 January 2014, Chile contributed to the following UN peacekeeping operations:
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH): 707 troops and 14 police;
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP): 14 troops;
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP): two experts on mission; and
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) (Middle East): three experts on mission.
The Chilean Army has participated extensively in UN peacekeeping operations, but primarily only as observers. In 2000, the service
took a more committed approach, deploying a flight detachment with three helicopters, crews, and ground support personnel in East
Timor. Personnel have also been deployed under Argentine command in the Cyprus buffer zone since April 2003. The largest
contribution is now to the mission in Haiti.
Command and control
Commander-in-Chief, Army:
General Juan Miguel de la Fuente-Alba Poblete
Chief of Joint General Staff, Army
Division General Hernan Mardones Rios
Chief of Staff, Army:
Division General Bosco Pesse Quappe
Commander Land Operations:
Division General Daniel Arancibia Clavel
Commander of Force Support
Division General Miguel Muoz Faras
Commander Education and Doctrine:
Division General Humberto Oviedo Arriagada
The president is constitutionally empowered to appoint the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces and the director general of the
Carabineros (Chile's militarised national police force), whose appointments are limited to four years. There is also the unique position of
deputy commander-in-chief of the army, which dates from the presidency of Augusto Pinochet (who ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990) and
enjoys no institutional legal status.
There is a Joint General Staff (Estado Mayor Conjunto), which is an advisory body. The title of chief of the National Defence Staff
rotates biennially between the army, navy, and air force. Each of the armed forces also maintains its own General Staff, which carries
out classic General Staff functions with regard to its own service.
The recently established Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Comando Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas: CSFA) is primarily a
co-ordinating body, concerned with introducing the maximum possible degree of standardisation in procurement policies and the
elimination of duplication of effort at the administrative level. This has largely superseded the former council of commanders-in-chief
(Junta de Comandantes en Jefe), an entity established under the 1959 constitution and consisting of the three armed forces'
commanders-in-chief, together with the chief of the National Defence Staff.
Finally, the Superior National Defence Council (Consejo Superior De Defensa Nacional), set up in 1942, consists of the ministers of
national defence, foreign affairs, and the treasury; the sub-secretaries of national defence for the army, navy, and air force; the
commanders-in-chief of the army, navy, and air force; the chief of the National Defence Staff; and the chiefs of staff of the army, navy,
and air force. It is a policy-making body largely concerned with defence budgeting and the acquisition of defence material, the functions
of which have been largely subsumed by the new CSFA.
Under the commander-in-chief of the army comes the deputy commander-in-chief, to whom the General Staff, the commanders of
major units and formations, the army's functional directorates (including the Military Institutes Command), and the General Inspectorate
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all report directly.

In 2004, the army established a new Land Operations Command (Comando de Operaciones Terrestres: COT) along the lines of similar
organisations existing within the navy and air force. The COT is based in Concepcin, in central Chile, and oversees the capabilities
and readiness of all front-line operational units.
Organisation
Chile's armed forces are in the process of extensively restructuring and modernising their personnel and capabilities to meet current
and future threats. The main organisational change has seen the creation of a brigade structure instead of the previous territorial
divisions. Divisions remain in place as administrative units, but operational forces are at the brigade and reinforced regiment level.
Six reorganised divisions - the Unidades Operacionales Principales - replaced the former seven divisions. Distributed from north to
south, the divisions are based in:
Iquique (VI Division);
Antofagasta (I Division);
Santiago (II Motorised Division);
Valdivia (III Mountain Division);
Coyhaique (IV Division); and
Punta Arenas (V Division).
Of note, the III Mountain Division has responsibility for all mountain operations from the Andes in the north to Osorno in the south.
Force Support Command (CAF) is tasked with providing operational units with maintenance and logistics to ensure they can carry out
their assigned tasks. CAF is composed of the Logistics Division, Maintenance Division, Army Engineer Command, Army
Telecommunications Command, and Army Infrastructure Command.
Order of Battle
Number
HQ
Area of Responsibility
Area 1
Antofagasta
Antofagasta, Atacama
Area 2
Santiago
Coquimbo, Aconcagua, Valparaso, Santiago,

O'Higgins, Colchagua
Area 3
Valdivia
Cautn, Valdivia, Llanquihue
Area 4
Coyhaique
Chilo, Aysn
Area 5
Punta Arenas
Magallanes
Area 6
Iquique
Tarapac
Unit
Base
Type
1st Reinforced Regiment "Calama"
Calama
Infantry
15th Infantry Battalion "Calama"
Calama
Infantry
1st Engineer Battalion "Atacama"
Calama
Engineer
10th Artillery Group "Borogoo"
Calama
Artillery
3rd Armoured Brigade "La Concepcin"
Antofagasta
I Division (HQ Antofagasta)
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7th Infantry Battalion "Esmeralda"
Antofagusta
Infantry
8th Armoured Group "Exploradores"
Antofagusta
Armour
5th Artillery Group "Antofagasta
Antofagusta
Artillery
10th Engineer Company "Potoneros"
Antofagusta
Engineering
7th Telecommunications Company
Antofagusta
Telecommunications
Armoured Scout Platoon
Antofagusta
Scout
23rd Infantry Regiment "Copiap"
Copiap
Infantry
23rd Infantry Battalion "Copiap"
Copiap
Infantry
1st Logistics Regiment "Tocopilla"
Antofagasta
Logistics
Unit
Base
Type
7th Reinforced Regiment "Chacabuco"
HQ Concepcion
Multirole
6th Infantry Battalion "Chacabuco"
Concepcion
Infantry
3rd Artillery Group "Silva Renard"
Concepcion
Artillery
3rd Motorised Telecommunications Company

"Curic"
Concepcion
Telecommunications
4th Divisional Logistic Company "Concepcin"
Concepcion
Logistics
Military Police Company
Concepcion
Military Police
1st Infantry Regiment "Buin"
Santiago
Infantry
1st Mechanised Infantry Battalion
Santiago
Infantry
Missile Group
Santiago
Artillery
2nd Infantry Regiment "Maipo"
Valparaiso
Infantry
2nd Mechanised Infantry Battalion
Valparaiso
Infantry
9th Infantry Regiment "Chilln"
Chilln
Infantry
9th Infantry Battalion
Chilln
Infantry
Anti-Tank Company
Chilln
Anti-Tank
12th Infantry Regiment "Sangra"
Puerto Varas
Infantry
12th Infantry Battalion "Sangra"
Puerto Varas
Infantry
Anti-Tank Company
Puerto Varas
Anti-Tank
19th Infantry Regiment "Colchagua"
San Fernando
Infantry
19th Mountain Infantry Battalion "Colchagua"
San Fernando
Infantry
21st Infantry Regiment "Coquimbo"
La Serena
Infantry
21st Infantry Battalion "Coquimbo"
La Serena
Infantry
1st Artillery Regiment "Tacna"
Santiago
Artillery
1st Artillery Group "Tacna"
Santiago
Artillery
Base
Type
II Motorised Division (HQ Santiago)
III Mountain Division (HQ Valdivia)

Unit
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3rd Reinforced Regiment "Yungay"
Los Andes
18th Mountain Infantry Battalion "Guardia Vieja"
Los Andes
Mountain Infantry
2nd Artillery Group "Arica"
Los Andes
Artillery
2nd Mountain Engineer Company "Puente Alto"
Antofagusta
Mountain Engineering
9th Reinforced Regiment "Arauco"
HQ Osorno
13th Mountain Infantry Battalion "Andalin"
Osorno
Mountain Infantry
4th Motorised Engineer Battalion "Arauco"
Osorno
Engineering
Mounted Squadron
Osorno
Mounted Squadron
17th Reinforced Regiment "Los Angeles"
Los Angeles
17th Mountain Infantry Battalion "Tarpellanca"
Los Angeles
Mountain Infantry
3rd Engineer Company "Los Angeles"
Los Angeles
Engineering
Military Police Section
Los Angeles
Military Police
Land Exploration Platoon
Los Angeles
Reconnaissance
8th Infantry Regiment "Tucapel"
Temuco
Infantry
8th Mountain Infantry Battalion "Tucapel"
Temuco
Infantry
16th Infantry Regiment "Talca"
Talca
Infantry
Mountain Infantry Battalion
Talca
Infantry
3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment "Husares"
Angol
Ceremonial
Mounted Cavalry Battalion
Angol
Ceremonial
2nd Artillery Regiment "Maturana"
La Union
Artillery
11th Artillery Group "Aldunate"
La Union
Artillery
3rd Divisionary Logistics Regiment "Victoria" Victoria
Logistics
4th Logistics Battalion "Victoria"
Victoria
Logistics
4th Telecommunications Regiment

"Membrillar"
Valdivia
Telecommunications
4th Telecommunications Battalion "Membrillar"
Valdivia
Telecommunications
Unit
Base
Type
14th Reinforced Regiment "Aysn"
HQ Coyhaique
26th Motorised Infantry Battalion "Aysen"
Coyhaique
Motorised Infantry
8th Telecommunications Company "Coyhaique"
Coyhaique
Telecommunications
Anti-Tank Company
Coyhaique
Anti-Tank
Military Police Platoon
Coyhaique
Military Police
IV Division (HQ Coyhaique)
8th Artillery Regiment "San Carlos de Ancud" Coyhaique
Artillery
8th Artillery Group "San Carlos de Ancud"
Coyhaique
Artillery
Independent Scout Squadron "Chaitn"
Coyhaique
Armour
Land Scout Platoon
Coyhaique
Reconnaissance
4th Divisional Logistics Company

"Coyahique"
Coyhaique
Logistics
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8th Engineer Regiment "Chilo"
Aysn
Engineering
8th Engineer Battalion "Chilo"
Aysn
Engineering
Unit
Base
Type
4th Armoured Brigade "Chorrillos"
HQ Punta Arenas
25th Mechanised Infantry Battalion "El Roble"
Punta Arenas
Mechanised Infantry
7th Artillery Group "Wood"
Punta Arenas
Artillery
6th Tank Group "Dragones"
Punta Arenas
Armour
11th Mechanised Engineers Company

"Tehuelches"
Punta Arenas
Mechanised Engineering
Air Defence Platoon
Punta Arenas
Air Defence
Punta Arenas
Armoured Reconnaissance
10th Reinforced Regiment "Pudeto"
Punta Arenas
Infantry Battalion
Punta Arenas
Infantry
5th Engineering Battalion "Punta Arenas"
Punta Arenas
Engineering
5th Telecommunications Battalion "Patagonia"
Punta Arenas
Telecommunications
5th Commando Company "Lientur"
Punta Arenas
Special Forces
Anti-Tank Company "Pelantaru"
Punta Arenas
Anti-Tank
Military Police
Punta Arenas
Military Police
5th Reinforced Regiment "Lanceros"
Ultima Esperanza
12th Artillery Group "Magallanes"
Ultima Esperanza
Artillery
Tank Squadron
Ultima Esperanza
Armour
Mechanised Infantry Company
Ultima Esperanza
Infantry
5th Divisional Logistics Regiment

"Magallanes"
Punta Arenas
5th Logistics Battalion "Magallanes"
Punta Arenas
Logistics
Maintenance Company
Punta Arenas
Maintenance
Military Police
Punta Arenas
Military Police
11th Reinforced Regiment "Caupolicn"
HQ Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego - Porvenir
11th Infantry Battalion "Caupolicn"
Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego
Infantry
13th Artillery Group "Tierra del Fuego"
Artillery
Anti-Tank Company
Anti-Tank
V Division (HQ Punta Areanas)
Emergency Task Force

Transport Section
Supply Section
Engineering Section
PARME - High Mountain Rescue Patrol
Air Platoon
Firefighting Brigade (Structure only)
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Division VI
Unit
Base
Role
1st Armoured Brigade "Coraceros"
HQ Arica
28th Infantry Battalion "Bulnes"
Arica
Infantry
9th Armoured Cavalry Group "Vencedores"
Arica
Armour
4th Artillery Group "Miraflores"
Arica
Artillery
9th Engineer Company "Zapadores"
Arica
Engineering
10th Telecommunications Company "San Marcos Arica

de Arica"
Telecommunications
Anti-Tank Missile Company
Arica
Anti-Tank
Anti-Aircraft Battery
Arica
Air Defence
Arica
Reconnaissance
Maintenance and Supply Company
Arica
Logistics
2nd Armoured Brigade "Cazadores"
HQ Iquique
5th Mechanised Infantry Battalion

"Carampangue"
Iquique
Mechanised Infantry
7th Armoured Cavalry Group "Guas"
Iquique
Armour
9th Artillery Group "Salvo"
Iquique
Artillery
7th Engineer Company "Aconcagua"
Iquique
Engineering
Independent Logistics Company
Iquique
Logistics
Commando Company "Iquique"
Iquique
n/a
Iquique
Reconnaissance
4th Reinforced Regiment "Rancagua"
Arica
4th Motorised Infantry Battalion "Rancagua"
Arica
Motorised Infantry
6th Artillery Group "Dolores"
Arica
Artillery
6th Engineer Battalion "Azapa"
Arica
Engineer
Humanitarian De-mining Unit
Arica
Mine Warfare
24th Reinforced Regiment "Huamachuco"
HQ Putre, Arica
24th Motorised Infantry Battalion "Huamachuco"
Putre, Arica
Motorised Infantry
14th Artillery Group "Parinacota"
Putre, Arica
Artillery
Anti-Tank Company
Putre, Arica
Anti-Tank
Independent Logistics Company
Putre, Arica
Logistics
Land Exploration Platoon
Putre, Arica
Reconnaissance
6th Divisional Logistics Regiment "Pisagua"
HQ Arica
Logistics
6th Telecommunications Regiment
HQ Pozo Almonte
Telecommunications
"Tarapac"
Special forces
In December 2006, the Special Operations Brigade "Lautaro" (Brigada de Operaciones Especiales: BOE) was the first unit to
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reorganise under the new brigade structure. This was accomplished on 25 December 2006. The brigade has its headquarters in Colina,
at the Campo Militar Peldehue "General Oscar Escudero". The subordinate units include a paratroop battalion, a special forces group, a
special mountain forces group, a commando group, a logistics unit, and a telecommunications unit.
Special Operations Brigade (BOE)
Unit
Base
Type
1st Paratroop Battalion "Pelantaru"
HQ Arica
Airborne
Army Special Forces Group
Special Forces
Special Mountain Forces Group
Special Forces
12th Commando Company
Special Forces
Logistics Company
Logistics
Telecommunications Unit
Communications
Army aviation order of battle

Army Aviation Brigade (BAVE)
Unit
Base
Type
Role
Aircraft Battalion `La

Independencia'
Rancagua
(all types)
Army Support
Aviation Section I
Antofagasta
(various types)
Army Support
Aviation Section III
Valdivia
(various types)
Army Support
Aviation Section IV
Coyhaiqu
(various types)
Army Support
Aviation Section V
Punta Arenas
(various types)
Army Support
Aviation Section VI
Arica
(various types)
Army Support
Rancagua
Hawk XP
Training
Helicopter Battalion "Germania"

Aviation Maintenance and Supply
Battalion
Airport Company
Army Aviation School (ESCAVE)

Despite an influx of US equipment and training assistance from the early 1940s onwards, the Chilean Army remains the most
'Prussianised' in Latin America. Current tactical and operational doctrines are heavily influenced by those of Germany, appropriately
modified for different geographic and climatic conditions where applicable. In 2006 it began to implement changes to its traditional
doctrine and established a Centre for the Study of Lessons Learned in order to institutionalise the assessment of best practices.
Bases
Santiago
(33 25' 31" S; 7033' 59" W)
Antofagasta
(23 37' 26" S; 7024' 05" W)
Concepcin
(36 48' 53" S; 7301x' 45" W)
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Punta Arenas
(53 08' 52" S; 70 54' 23" W)
Arica
(18 29' 14" S; 70 19' 19" W)
Iquique
(20 14' 38" S; 70 08' 18" W)
Valdivia
(39 49' 27" S; 73 12' 48" W)
Coyhaique
(45 33' 49" S; 72 03' 52" W)
Major military concentrations are in the vicinities of the above areas.

Training
Major training establishments include:
The Escuela Militar General Bernardo O'Higgins (Officer School),
The Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG) - Staff College, and
The Escuela de Suboficiales y Clases (Non-Commissioned Officer School), all located at Santiago;
The Infantry School at San Bernardo;
The Mountain Warfare School at Rio Blanco;
The Special Forces School at La Colina;
The Armoured Forces School at Antofagasta;
The Artillery School at Linares;
The Engineers School at Tejas Verdes; and
The Signals School at Santiago.
Each of the above, with the exception of the ESG, includes a demonstration unit of approximately regiment or battalion size, which
together form the Schools Division. This is potentially an additional manoeuvre division available to the army.
Additional institutions include the Army Aviation School; the Escuela Politcnica Militar, a post-graduate school for engineering; the
Female Military School (Escuela Militar Feminina); and the Physical Education School (Escuela de Educacin Fsica), all of which are
located in Santiago.
In 2009 the Armoured Cavalry School was renamed the Armour Manoeuvre Training Centre (Centro de Entrenamiento de Combate
Acorazado: CECOMBAC) and transferred from Quillota to Iquique, taking over modern installations for training on the new Leopard 2A4
MBTs and Marder 1A3 armoured fleets.
There is also a joint training centre for peace operations attached to the Staff College.
Officer candidates must successfully complete the four-year course at the Escuela Militar General Bernardo O'Higgins, before
commissioning as ensigns (a probationary rank below that of second lieutenant). Officers must complete an additional course at the
ESG to qualify for promotion to field rank or appointment to the General Staff.
Training areas
The primary training areas of the Chilean Army are in the vicinity of Santiago, Porvenir, Punta Arenas, Puerto Natales, and Antofagasta.
Military exercises
In May 2013, the army conducted 'Volcano V', an exercise that simulated a response to a natural disaster in the Biobio region of central
Chile.
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In November 2012, the Buin Regiment deployed troops and a Puma helicopter to Puerto Belgrano naval base in Argentina to
participate in a joint peacekeeping exercise with Argentine forces.
From 15-21 October 2012, the I Division engaged in the 'Tokicura III' combined arms exercise, which included live fire exercises with
Spike missiles, artillery, and armoured formations.
Armour
Type
Manufacturer
Role
Original total
In service
First delivery
Leopard IV
Krauss-Maffei
Wegmann
Main Battle Tank
220
1221
1999
Leopard 2A4
Krauss-Maffei
Wegmann
Main Battle Tank
172
172
2007
Marder 1A3
Rheinmetall
Landsysteme
Infantry Fighting Vehicle 200
1731
2009
YPR-765
SABIEX
Infantry Fighting Vehicle 139
139
2007
M113A1
BAE Systems
Armoured Personnel
Carrier
229
100
1997
M113A2
BAE Systems
Armoured Personnel
Carrier
656
381
1996
Piranha (6 6)
MOWAG
Armoured Personnel
Carrier
145
106
1983
Piranha (8 8)
Carden under license

from MOWAG
Armoured Personnel
Carrier
50
22
1992
Piranha (6 6)
MOWAG
Mortar Carrier
50
50
1986
M108 VBCL
SABIEX
Command Post
21
21
2009
Original total
In service
First delivery
1. Additional vehicles in storage.
Artillery
Type
Manufacturer
Role
155 mm M109A3
RUAG
Self-Propelled Howitzer 24
24
2006
155 mm M109A5
BAE Systems
Self-Propelled Howitzer 12
12
2013
155 mm Soltam M-71
Soltam Systems Limited Towed Howitzer
12
12
1984
105 mm M101/33
Rock Island Arsenal
Towed Howitzer
86
86
1961
105 mm Model 56 / G5
Oto Melara SpA
Pack Howitzer
54
54
1965
120 mm M-120
FAMAE
Mortar
125
80
n/a
120 mm Soltam M-65
Soltam Systems Ltd
Mortar
40
40
1980
81 mm M29
Watervliet Arsenal
Mortar
n/a
n/a
n/a
120 mm
Esperanza y Cia SA
Mortar
24
24
2000
160 mm LAR-160
IMI
Multiple Rocket
Launcher
1994
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Anti-tank weapons
Type
Manufacturer
Role
Original total
In service
First delivery
84 mm Carl Gustav
Saab Bofors Dynamics
Rocket Launcher
n/a
n/a
n/a
Spike LR
Rafael
Anti-Tank Missile
2200
2000
2008
Armbrust
Singapore
Technologies Kinetics
Anti-Tank Guided
Weapon
n/a
n/a
n/a
M72A3
Nammo Talley Inc
Lightweight Anti-Armour n/a

Weapon
n/a
n/a
106 mm M40A1
Watervliet Arsenal
Recoilless Rifle
n/a
n/a
n/a
57 mm M18
n/a
Rocket Launcher
n/a
n/a
n/a
82 mm B-300
IMI
Man-Portable AntiArmour System
n/a
n/a
n/a
Type
Manufacturer
Role
Original total
In service
First delivery
Aspic
Thales
Self-Propelled Surface- 12
to-Air Missile
12
1997
Barak/ADAMS1
Rafael Advanced
Defence Systems
Self-Propelled Surface- n/a

to-Air Missile
n/a
n/a
40 mm L/70
Bofors Defence
Anti-Aircraft Gun
n/a
n/a
n/a
20 mm GA-C04
Rheinmetall
Light Anti-Aircraft Gun
n/a
n/a
n/a
20 mm Rh-202
Rheinmetall
40
40
n/a
20 mm TCM-20
IAI

(Twin)
36
362
n/a
M167 Vulcan
General Dynamics
Towed Anti-Aircraft Gun 34
34
1999
Air defence weapons
1. Taken and modified from the Leander-type frigates on decommissioning and now operated by the army as surface-to-air missiles. Believed to be
located near the Talcahuano base.
2. 14 TCM-20 guns are mounted on Piranha 6 6 chassis.
Infantry weapons
Type
Role
9 mm FN 35
Pistol
9 mm Beretta M92
Pistol
9 mm SIG P220
Pistol
9 mm Walther P1
Pistol
0.38 Famae
Pistol
7.62 mm FN-FAL
Rifle
7.62 mm G3
Assault Rifle
5.56 mm M16A1
Assault Rifle
5.56 mm HK33
Assault Rifle
7.62 mm SIG 542
Assault Rifle
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7.62 mm SIG 510
Assault Rifle
12.7 mm Barrett M82A1
Semi-Automatic Rifle
9 mm Uzi
Sub-Machine Gun
9 mm SAF
Sub-Machine Gun
9 mm HK MP5
Sub-Machine Gun
9 mm Beretta M12S
Sub-Machine Gun
7.62 mm H&K21
General-Purpose Machine Gun
7.62 mm SIG 710-3
7.62 mm FN-FAL/HB
7.62 mm M60
7.62 mm MG42/59
0.5 Browning M2HB
Heavy Machine Gun
Army aviation
Fixed wing
Platform
family
Platform
variant
Synonym Synonym NATO

Manufact Primary Primary Secondar Secondar Original
1
2
reporting urer
role
role
y role
y role
total
name
(general) (specific) (seneral) (specific)
Estimate
d in
service
First
delivery
date
CN-235
CN-235 M -
Airtech
Logistics
Transport -
1989
C212
C212
Series
300
Airbus
Military
Logistics
Transport -
1997
Cessna
208
Caravan
208
Cessna
Logistics
Utility
1998
Cessna
Skymaste 337
r
Skymaste
r
Cessna
C4ISR
Communi cations
1978
Rotary wing
Platform
family
Platform
variant

1
2
reporting urer
role
role
y role
y role
total
name
(general) (specific) (general) (specific)
Estimate
d in
service
First
delivery
date
MD 500
MD 530F
Lifter
MD
Combat
Helicopter
s
Attack
19
13
1990
AS 332
AS 332B
Super
Puma
Eurocopte Logistics
r
Utility
n/a
1983
AS 355
AS 355F
Ecureuil 2 -
Eurocopte Logistics
r
Utility
2003
AS 332
AS 532
Cougar
Eurocopte Logistics
r
Utility
12
2009
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AS 332
AS
332ALe
Cougar
Eurocopte Logistics
r
Utility
2014
SA 330
Puma
SA 330L
Puma
Eurocopte Logistics
r
Utility
12
1978
AS 350
AS 350B
Ecureuil
Eurocopte C4ISR
r
Surveillan ce/reconn
aissance
2002
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AIR FORCE, Chile

UPDATED
AIR FORCE
Contents
Summary
Assessment
Adaptability
Readiness
Role and deployment
Command and control
Organisation
Order of battle
Bases
Training
Training Areas
Military Exercises
Air Force
Summary
STRENGTH
11,580
Fixed Wing
Primary Role (General)
Number of Units
Unit Type
Combat
41
Group
Logistics
52
Group
C4ISR
Group
Trainer
Group
1. Includes one mixed group with combat and logistics aircraft, including rotary-wing logistics assets.
2. Two groups also have aircraft assigned a C4ISR role. Four of the five groups also have rotary-wing assets.
Rotary Wing
Number of Units
Unit Type
Logistics
Group
Assessment
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The Chilean Air Force (Fuerza Area de Chile: FACh) is enjoying the benefits of a long modernisation programme that has moulded its
inventory into an effective and balanced force. Over the past few years it has acquired new fighters (F-16 Fighting Falcons), trainers
(EMB-314 Super Tucanos), tactical helicopters (Bell 412EPs), and tanker aircraft (KC-135E Stratotankers). Looking ahead, the FACh is
in the process of procuring additional transport aircraft and is pursuing the acquisition of new medium helicopters. In addition,
enhancement of the air defence system is anticipated.
A fleet of 45 Lockheed Martin F-16 multirole fighters and 10 older F-5s comprise the FACh's primary combat capability. The F-16 fleet
includes new-build and second-hand Dutch aircraft. Delivery of the new F-16s was completed in 2005-06, while the second-hand
aircraft arrived between 2006 and 2011. The nuclear strike and HARM anti-radiation missile capabilities were removed from the Dutch
aircraft before being handed over. The F-5s and F-16s can employ beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missiles such as the Derby and
AIM-120. Looking further ahead, current plans call for the selection and procurement of a new multirole fighter in about 2015.
There is some concern about the need to modernise and expand airborne early warning (AEW) capabilities, which currently relies on
the Condor - a single Boeing 707 equipped with the IAI Phalcon AEW system. This is not expected to remain operational much beyond
2015. Options include the acquisition of a new system - such as the Swedish Erieye - and the modernisation of the Phalcon system.
Adaptability
Overall, the FACh remains focused on conventional capabilities, but retains the ability to perform other roles, such as counterinsurgency (COIN) and tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
Readiness
There is no rapid reaction force. The main reaction capability in an emergency would be assets allocated to the existing air brigades. F16s form the first line of defence against an international threat from the air.
Role and deployment
The roles of the FACh are defined as: defence of national airspace; tactical and logistical support for the army and navy; and disaster
relief, including search and rescue (SAR) and casualty evacuation.
There are presently about 50 air force personnel and four Bell UH-1Hs deployed to support the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH). The helicopter detachment operates from the international airport at Port-au-Prince. The total Chilean contribution to
MINUSTAH from all services at the end of January 2014 was 721 persons.
Command and control
Commander-in-Chief, Air Force:
General Jorge Rojas vila
Chief of Staff:
Lieutenant General Don Jorge Robles Mella
Inspector General:
Lieutenant General Arturo Silva Lopez
Commander of Combat Command:
Lieutenant General Maximilano Larraechea Loeser
Commander of Personnel Command:
Lieutenant General Leopoldo Moya Navarro
Commander of Logistics Command:
Lieutenant General Lorenzo Villalon Del Fierro
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The commander-in-chief of the air force is directly responsible to the minister of defence and exercises control of the General Staff, to
which the various functional commands and directorates report. In addition, this post also directly controls operational units of the
FACh.
Chile: Higher Levels of Command for Air Force

0528159
Organisation
The FACh is the world's fourth-oldest independent military air arm, a status of which it is justifiably proud. The original separate air arms
of the army and navy were consolidated to create the Fuerza Area de Chile in March 1930.
The FACh is currently composed of three functional commands - combat, personnel, and logistics. Operational resources in the combat
command are deployed between five air brigades. The air brigade is the main operational formation, with each being composed of one
to three subordinate task-oriented, aircraft-operating groups, of which there are 11 in total. Each brigade also possesses an anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) element and a radar group.
The I Air Brigade is responsible for controlling airspace between the country's northern border and the Rio Loa; II Air Brigade is
responsible for airspace between Vallenar and Los ngeles; III Air Brigade between Los ngeles and Campo de Hielo; IV Air Brigade
between the Patagonian Ice Fields and the South Pole; and V Air Brigade for airspace between the Rio Loa and Vallenar.
The artillery groups of the AAA Regiment are equipped with Mistral and Javelin surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), plus Oerlikon GAI-001
single and FAMIL FAM-2M twin 20 mm AA gun systems. Artillery Groups 23 and 24 also have Oerlikon K-63 twin 35 mm gun systems.
Each AAA group has a Mygale fire-control system, which is based on the French Samantha truck-mounted radar. The 23rd and 24th
AAA Groups also have integrated Mygale/Aspic SAM systems based on the Samantha radar interception and guidance system and
truck-mounted Aspic quadruple Matra SAM systems.
Air force ground defence units are equipped with the Israeli Galil rifle, light automatic weapons, and the locally produced VTP-2 and
Carancho airfield defence vehicles. There are plans to establish a two-tier air defence system, which is expected to comprise the
Avenger SP short-range SAM and a medium-range ground-launched AMRAAM.
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Combat Command controls the Air Brigades, which possess the majority of the FACh's flying equipment, and also operates the FASAT
Charlie satellite that was launched in December 2011 and is managed by the Aerophotogrametric Service (Servicio Aerofotogramtrico:
SAF).
Personnel Command (Comando de Personal) controls the Captain Manuel Avalos Prado Aviation School (Escuela de Aviacin Capitn
Manuel Avalos Prado), the Specialists' School, the Air War Academy (Academia de Guerra Area), and the Air Polytechnic Academy
(Academia Politcnica Area). All of these establishments are located at El Bosque, Santiago. The command is assigned training
aircraft such as the T-35, in addition to aerobatic aircraft and gliders.
Logistics Command (Comando Logistico) controls the non-flying Supply and Maintenance Wings, both also headquartered at El
Bosque. These wings are responsible for upkeep and supply of weapons, electronic systems, and infrastructure, as well as routine
maintenance support for operations and activities. No aircraft are assigned to this organisation.
Order of battle
Combat Command
Unit
Base
I Air Brigade
Los Cndores Air Base, Diego

Aracena International Airport,
Iquique
Type
Role
Aviation Group 1
Los Cndores
A-36 Toqui (Halcn)
Tactics Training
Aviation Group 1
Los Cndores
Super Tucano
Tactics Training
Aviation Group 2
Los Cndores
C212-200
Transport
Aviation Group 2
Los Cndores
Bell 412 EP
Utility
Aviation Group 3
Los Cndores
F-16C
Fighter - Multirole
Aviation Group 3
Los Cndores
F-16D
Continuation Training
Communications and Detection

Group 34
Los Cndores
Radar
Air Defence
Anti-Aircraft Defence Group 24
Los Cndores
AAA
Air Defence
II Air Brigade
Pudahuel Air Base, Benitez

International Airport, Santiago
Aviation Group 9
Pudahuel
Iroquois
Utility
Aviation Group 9
Pudahuel
Bell 412EP
Utility
Aviation Group 9
Pudahuel
JetRanger
Training
Aviation Group 10
Pudahuel
C-130 Hercules
Transport
Aviation Group 10
Pudahuel
KC-135E Stratotanker
Tanker / Transport
Aviation Group 10
Pudahuel
Boeing 767-300ER
Transport
Airborne Early Warning Squadron / Pudahuel

Aviation Group 10
Phalcon (707 Condor)
AEW / Electronic Intelligence
Presidential Squadron / Aviation

Group 10
Pudahuel
Boeing 737
VIP / Transport
Presidential Squadron / Aviation

Group 10
Pudahuel
Gulfstream IV
VIP / Transport
Radar
Air Defence
Telecommunications and Detection Pudahuel

Group 32
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AA Artillery and Special Forces

Regiment
Pudahuel
AAA
Air Defence / Special Forces
Aerophotogrammetric Service
Pudahuel
Learjet 35A
Survey / Mapping
Aerophotogrammetric Service
Pudahuel
Twin Otter 100
Survey / Mapping
III Air Brigade
El Tepual Air Base, Puerto Montt
Aviation Group 5
El Tepual
Citation CJ1
Communications
Aviation Group 5
El Tepual
Twin Otter
Utility
Aviation Group 5
El Tepual
S-70A Black Hawk
Utility / Communications /
Observation
Aviation Group 5
El Tepual
UH-1H Iroquois
Utility / Communications / Search

and Rescue
Aviation Group 5
Mataveri Airport (Easter Island)
O-2A
Communications / Observation
Radar
Air Defence
AAA
Air Defence
Chabunco
Twin Otter 300
Utility
Chabunco
Bell 412SP
Communications / Search and

Rescue
Aviation Group 12
Chabunco
F-5E
Air Defence / Attack
Aviation Group 12
Chabunco
F-5F
Antarctic Exploration Group 19
Antarctic Air Base1
Twin Otter
Utility / Transport
Antarctic Exploration Group 19
Antarctic Air Base1
Bell 412EP
Utility

Group 33
Chabunco
Radar
Air Defence
Chabunco
AAA
Air Defence
Telecommunications and Detection El Tepual

Group 35
IV Air Brigade
El Tepual
Chabunco Air Base, Presidente
Carlos Ibez del Campo
International Airport, Punta
Arenas
Aviation Group 6
Aviation Group 6
V Air Brigade
Cerro Moreno Air Base,

Antofagasta
Aviation Group 7
Cerro Moreno
F-16AM
Fighter - Multirole
Aviation Group 7
Cerro Moreno
F-16BM
Aviation Group 8
Cerro Moreno
F-16AM
Fighter - Multirole
Aviation Group 8
Cerro Moreno
F-16BM
Aviation Group 8
Cerro Moreno
C212-300
Transport
Aviation Group 8
Cerro Moreno
Bell 412

Rescue
Aviation Group 8
Cerro Moreno
Bell 412SP

Rescue
Aviation Group 8
Cerro Moreno
Bell 412EP

Rescue
Cerro Moreno
Radar
Air Defence

Group 31
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Cerro Moreno
AAA
Air Defence
1. BAA Teniente Rodolfo Marsh Martin, King George Island; uses aircraft and helicopters detached from the mainland.
Personnel Command
Unit
Base
Type
Role
Captain Manuel Avalos Prado

Aviation School
EI Bosque
T-35 Pilln
Basic Training
Captain Manuel Avalos Prado

Aviation School
EI Bosque
PA-28 Dakota
Basic Training
Aerobatic Display Squadron 'Los

Halcons'
EI Bosque
Extra 300L
Display Flying
Glider Squadron
Vitacura
Bird Dog
Glider Tug
Glider Squadron
Vitacura
Blanik
Sport Flying
Glider Squadron
Vitacura
Super Blanik
Sport Flying

The FACh owes its early independent existence to the activities of UK training missions in the 1920s. As with the army and navy, it
carried over certain German influences and traditions from the services from which it formed. However, it has subsequently been
receptive to the influence of a succession of US missions, which were active from the early 1940s onwards. Tactical and operational
doctrines also reflect strong Israeli influence.
Bases
Base Name
Synonym
Longitude
Region
Total
Number of
Runways
Runway
Number
Approximate Elevation
Length (m)
(m)
Surface
Cerro Moreno Cerro Moreno -23.444728

Air Base
Salida Airport
-70.445150
Antofagasta
2270
103
Paved
Chabunco Air Presidente

-53.001181
Base
Carlos Ibez
del Campo
International
Airport
-70.863368
Magallanes
3
and Antartica
Chilena
2788
39
Paved
2408
43
Paved
1655
38
Paved
El Bosque
-33.561667
-70.688333
Santiago
Metropolitan
1725
567
Paved
El Tepual Air
Base
-41.438497
-73.093914
Los Lagos
2375
91
Paved
-20.535000
-70.181111
Tarapaca
3242
21
Paved
Los Cndores Diego

Air Base
Aracena
International
Airport
Latitude
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Matavari
Airport
(Easter
Island)
Mataveri
International
Airport
-27.164444
-109.422500
Easter Island 1
3225
69
Paved
Pudahuel Air
Base
-33.388403
-70.785841
Santiago
Metropolitan
3804
477
Paved
3196
482
Paved
Vitacura
Airport
-33.380592
-70.581332
Santiago
Metropolitan
730
689
Paved
In addition to these bases, there are also landing strips capable of accommodating transport aircraft and helicopters at the Antarctic
research facilities of Teniente Rodolfo Marsh Martin (62 11' 29" S; 58 59' 14" W) and Luis Carvajal (67 45' 40" S; 68 54' 50" W).
The facility at Quintero (32 47' 03" S; 71 31' 26" W) in the Valparaso Region of central Chile is being reactivated, with a new 2,750 m
(9,000 ft) runway having been constructed in 2011-12.
Training
Training is the responsibility of the Education Division, which was established in 1999 to co-ordinate and oversee the activities of all
training establishments. At the present time, these comprise:
The Captain Manuel Avalos Prado Aviation School at El Bosque, Santiago, which offers a basic three-year course to officer cadets,
followed by two years of specialised training. This training is carried out either in operational units (flying officers) or at the
Aeronautical Polytechnic Academy (technical officers);
The Air Warfare Academy, which provide prerequisite courses for appointment to the Air General Staff or promotion to senior rank;
The Air Force Specialists' School, which provides a two-year course for NCOs; and
The NCO Finishing School (EPS), which provides training for lower ranks as well as basic training of conscripts.
Training Areas
Most training takes place in the vicinity of Santiago, with operational conversion at Cerro Moreno, Antofagasta. Some training activities
involving rotary-winged craft are likely to be transferred to the reactivated base at Quinteros.
Military Exercises
'Salitre' is part of a circuit of multinational exercises that includes 'Cruzex' in Brazil and 'Ceibo' in Argentina. Exercise 'Salitre III' took
place in November to December 2012. Aircraft and personnel from the air forces of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the United States, and
Uruguay took part in the exercise, which focused on planning and co-ordinating ground attack and interdiction operations.
In October 2012, taking advantage of in-flight refuelling support from a KC-135E, three F-16s of Aviation Group 3 deployed from Los
Condores to Kelly Field, Texas, in order to undertake several days of joint training with F-16s of the Texas Air National Guard's 149th
Fighter Wing. This was the first such deployment undertaken by combat elements of the Chilean Air Force and appears to have been
extremely successful.
Air Force
Fixed Wing
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Platform
Family
Platform
Variant

1
2
Reportin
g Name

urer
Role
Role
y Role
y Role
Total
(General) (Specific) (General) (Specific)
Estimate
d In
Service
First
Delivery
Date
F-16
Fighting
Falcon
F-16A
EPAF
mid-life
upgrade
F-16AM
Lockheed Combat
Martin
Multirole
29
28
2006
F-16
Fighting
Falcon
F-16B
EPAF
mid-life
upgrade
F-16BM
Lockheed Combat
Martin
Multirole
2006
F-16
Fighting
Falcon
F-16C
Lockheed Combat
Martin
Multirole
2005
F-16
Fighting
Falcon
F-16D
Lockheed Combat
Martin
Multirole
2005
F-5
F-5F
Tiger II
Northrop Combat
Grumman
Multirole
15
10
1976
KC-135
KC-135E
Stratotank
er
Boeing
Tanker
Logistics
Transport 3
31
2010
C-130
Hercules
C-130B
Lockheed Logistics
Martin
Transport -
1992
C-130
Hercules
C-130H
Lockheed Logistics
Martin
Transport -
1972
Boeing
767
767300ER
Boeing
Logistics
Transport -
2008
C212
C212
Series
200
Airbus
Military
Logistics
Transport -
1994
C212
C212
Series
300
Airbus
Military
Logistics
Transport -
1997
Skymaste O-2A
r
Cessna
Logistics
Utility
1997
PA-28
PA-28236
Dakota
Piper
Logistics
Utility
20
1980
DHC-6
DHC-6
Twin Otter Series
100
Viking
Logistics
Utility
1967
DHC-6
DHC-6
Twin Otter Series
300
Viking
Logistics
Utility
12
1978
707-385C Condor
Boeing
C4ISR
Airborne
early
warning
1995
Boeing
707
Logistics
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SR22
SR22 T
Cirrus
C4ISR
Surveillan ce/reconn
aissance
2013
F-5
F-5F
Tiger II
Northrop Trainer
Grumman
Operation al
1976
C-101
Aviojet
A-36
Halcn
Aviojet
Enaer
Trainer
Advanced -
22
1986
EMB-314
EMB-314
Super
Tucano
Embraer
Trainer
Basic
12
12
2009
Cessna
525
Citation
525
525
Citation
CJ1
Cessna
Trainer
Basic
2001
T-35
T-35A
Pilln
Enaer
Trainer
Basic
34
122
1985
20
203
1985
T-35
T-35B
Pilln
Enaer
Trainer
Basic
L-13
Blanik
L-13
Blanik
LET
Trainer
Basic
General
aviation
Recreatio n/a
n
n/a
L-23
Super
Blanik
L-23
Super
Blanik
LET
Trainer
Basic
General
aviation
Recreatio 5
n
1996
Gulfstrea
m IV
Gulfstrea
m IV
G-1159C
Gulfstrea
m
General
aviation
Executive -
2000
Boeing
737
737
737-58N
Boeing
General
aviation
Executive -
1997
Boeing
737
737300QC
737330QC
Boeing
General
aviation
Executive -
2001
L-19 Bird
Dog
L-19A
Bird Dog
Cessna
General
aviation
Recreatio n
1954
Learjet 35 35A
Learjet
General
aviation
Scientific
1976
EA-300
Extra
General
aviation
Sport/aero batic
2002
EA-300L
1. Total includes one in storage.

2. Total includes at least three examples in storage.
3. Total includes two in storage.
Rotary Wing
Platform
Family
Platform
Variant

1
2
Reportin
g Name

urer
Role
Role
y Role
y Role
Total
Estimate
d In
Service
First
Delivery
Date
S-70A
Black
Hawk
S-70A
S-70A-39 -
Sikorsky
Logistics
Utility
1998
UH-1
UH-1H
Bell
Logistics
Utility
301
12
1966
Bell 412
Bell 412
Bell
Logistics
Utility
2000
Bell 412
Bell
412SP
Bell
Logistics
Utility
2001
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Bell 412
Bell
412EP
Bell
Logistics
Utility
12
12
2009
Bell 206
206B-3
JetRanger III
Bell
Trainer
Basic
1996
1. Total excludes six obtained from United States in 2003 as source of spare parts.
Missiles
System Variant
Manufacturer
AIM-9J Sidewinder
Lockheed Martin
Air-to-Air
AIM-9M Sidewinder
Raytheon
Air-to-Air
AIM-120B AMRAAM
Raytheon
Air-to-Air
Python III
Rafael
Air-to-Air
Python IV
Rafael
Air-to-Air
Derby
Rafael
Air-to-Air
Shafrir II
Rafael
Air-to-Air
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NAVY, Chile
UPDATED
NAVY
Contents
Summary
Assessment
Adaptability
Sustainment
Readiness
Role and Deployment
Recent and Current Operations
Command and control
Organisation
Surface Action Group
Submarine Force
Amphibious and Transport Command
Marine Corps
Special Forces Command
Naval Aviation
Naval Aviation Order of Battle
Coast Guard
Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine
Bases
Training
Training Areas
Military Exercises
Submarines
Surface Fleet
Auxiliaries
Coast Guard
Marine Corps
Missiles
Naval Aviation
Summary
STRENGTH
23,100 (includes 3,600 marines; 1,600 coast guard)
SUBMARINES
4
FRIGATES
8
OFFSHORE PATROL VESSELS
2
PATROL CRAFT
5
FAST ATTACK CRAFT - MISSILE
5
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS
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Assessment
Chile's long coastline gives it a maritime territory larger than its land surface area, and consequently, the country has a strong naval
tradition. After the completion of a decade-long modernisation programme that has seen the delivery of new submarines and ocean
patrol vessels, as well as second-hand, yet highly capable, frigates, the fleet of the Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile) is now the most
modern in the region.
At the core of the surface combatant fleet are eight frigates, all of which were acquired from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands
and put into service between 2003 and 2008. These are supplemented by nine patrol craft for duties closer to shore, with another
vessel due to enter service in 2014. Of note, the national coast guard is a part of the navy and operates large number of smaller patrol
craft.
The submarine inventory includes two new Scorpenes and two older Type 209s, which are being upgraded to include some of the
same systems as the new boats. Meanwhile, the procurement of a former-French landing ship dock (LSD) in 2011 has significantly
enhanced Chile's expeditionary capabilities and it is expected that another ship of the same type will be acquired in the near future. The
combat capability for this expeditionary force is provided by a 1,400-strong Marine Infantry Brigade. The navy also operates about 50
aircraft, including fixed-wing assets for maritime patrol and helicopters.
Chile has also developed local infrastructure for upgrading naval vessels to such an extent that it can service other navies.
Adaptability
The Chilean Navy is transforming itself to better provide forces for power projection as well as regional co-operation initiatives. Its fleet
is well balanced between assets geared towards conventional operations and those that are intended to undertake operations other
than war. The new LSD in particular is a highly flexible asset that can be used across the spectrum of operations, from forced entry to
humanitarian relief.
Sustainment
With the April 2013 entry into service of a second fleet replenishment tanker, the Chilean Navy now has the required capability to
reliably sustain its naval units at sea.
There is a Naval Reserve Organisation that is formed from retired personnel from the officer and enlisted ranks. There is also an Officer
Reserve Association that receives refresher training on a constant basis.
Readiness
The navy commits a single frigate, an embarked helicopter, and a marine infantry company to the bi-national Cruz del Sur (Southern
Cross) peacekeeping force. The navy is able to provide a second frigate and marine company if required.
Separately, the marine corps is in the process of reinforcing its Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade (Brigada Anfibia Expedicionaria:
BAE) with modern artillery, mobility, and armour.
Role and Deployment
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The role of the Chilean Navy, as outlined in an official document entitled The Three Vectors Strategy, is:
The surveillance and defence of the country's territorial seas;
The defence of the country's maritime interests, in particular its ports, the coastal zone, the maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
and maritime lines of communication;
Life saving and the maintenance of navigational aids; and
The defence and the logistic support of Chile's southern region, its Antarctic bases, and its island territories.
In short, the Chilean Navy is tasked with exerting control over a maritime zone triangle formed between the north and south extremes of
the country's land territory and Easter Island in the Pacific Ocean.
The bulk of the surface combatant fleet is normally based at Valparaso for operational purposes, and its main logistic base is at
Talcahuano, where there is a comprehensive network of repair and maintenance facilities with docks and several workshops. The
submarine force and the transport force are both normally based at Talcahuano. There are two missile craft squadrons (known as North
and South), based at Iquique and Punta Arenas. The remaining vessels, including a patrol craft-type vessel, several armed tugs and
some minor patrol vessels, auxiliaries and service craft, are distributed among the naval zones and districts.
The navy divides the coastline into five naval zones:
1st Naval Zone (HQ Valparaso)
Extends from Topocalma Point to 26 south. It contains most of Chile's training establishments, including the Arturo Prat Naval
Academy, Naval War Academy, and Supply School, all at Valparaso, and the School of Operations, Armaments School, School of
Marine Engineering, and Marine Corps School, all at Vina del Mar.
2nd Naval Zone (HQ Talcahuano)
Extends from Topocalma Point to 47 south. It contains the Submarine School, the Seamen's School, and the Naval Artisans' School.
3rd Naval Zone (HQ Punta Arenas)
Extends from 47 south to the South Pole. It includes the Beagle Channel Naval District, with its headquarters at Puerto Williams. A
new naval dockyard is under construction at Bahia Catalina.
4th Naval Zone (HQ Iquique)
Extends from the Peruvian frontier to 26 south. This zone corresponds to the former Northern Naval District, which until recently
formed part of the 1st Naval Zone.
5th Naval Zone (HQ Puerto Montt)
This zone was created in December 2009. It includes the Chilo Naval District, which used to be part of the 2nd Naval Zone. It also
includes the regions of Los Lagos and Del General Carlos Ibaez del Campo
Recent and Current Operations
The Chilean Navy has traditionally contributed to UN peacekeeping operations by sending only observers, but a marine corps platoon
was deployed to Cyprus along with the Argentine battalion under the UN flag in April 2003. In addition, a 167-strong marine reinforced
infantry company deployed in Haiti in June 2004 as part of an expanded Chilean force combining elements of the three services and
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the uniformed police. As of 2014, Chile is still contributing to both the Cyprus and Haiti missions, although the exact navy contribution is
not available.
Command and control
Commander-in-Chief, Navy:
Admiral Enrique Larraaga Martin
Chief of Naval Staff:
Vice Admiral Cristin de la Maza Riquelme
Chief of Naval Operations:
Vice Admiral Julio Leiva Molina
Director General Personnel:
Vice Admiral Francisco Garcia-Huidobro Campos
Commander, Fleet:
Rear Admiral Rodrigo lvarez Aguirre
Under the minister of defence, the Chilean Navy has its own commander-in-chief to whom the Naval General Staff and the various
functional directorates - those of the fleet, the five Naval Zones, the marine corps, naval aviation, and the coast guard - are directly
subordinate.
Organisation
Surface Action Group
The Chilean Navy's major operational unit is the Escuadra Nacional (National Squadron), a surface action group based in Valparaiso
and consisting of:
Three Cochrane (Type 23)-class frigates;
One Broadsword (Type 22)-class frigate;
Two Latorre (Type L)-class frigates;
Two Blanco Encalada (Type M)-class frigates;
Two fleet oilers (including one Henry J Kaiser-class tanker); and
One fleet tug (ice-strengthened).
An embarked squadron is equipped with Eurocopter AS 532C helicopters armed with surface and anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
weapons including Exocet anti-ship missiles. This squadron is permanently subordinated to the Escuadra Nacional.
Submarine Force
The submarine force forms a separate operational command. It consists of two Scorpene-class boats, two Type 209-1400 submarines,
and a former Royal Swedish Navy minelaying and command ship.
The submarine force has an administratively subordinated group of underwater commandos, the Agrupacin de Buzos Tcticos. This
force is organised and trained along the lines of the US Navy SEALS.
Amphibious and Transport Command
The Amphibious and Naval Command is responsible for all naval transport support vessels, including logistics and amphibious assault.
The transport force took delivery of the former Foudre landing platform dock (LPD) in 2011. It joined the two Batral-class landing ship
tanks (LSTs) that remained in service after the early retirement of the Valdivia LST in January 2011. The navy is reportedly interested in
procuring a second Foudre-class ship, which will significantly boost the service's amphibious warfare capabilities.
Marine Corps
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The marines are trained and organised to support three very different roles: projecting naval power, defending the Chilean coast, and
providing security and law enforcement in Chile's naval zones and ports.
This force has changed dramatically in recent years, with the decision to acquire a former French LPD, which paved the way for the rise
of an amphibious expeditionary brigade. Procurement of the second Foudre-class ship will further enhance the marine's power
projection capabilities.
Power projection is entrusted to the new 1,400-strong Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade, which is able to embark and deploy for long
periods of time and is trained to operate alongside army units. The brigade is composed of two infantry, one combat support, and one
logistics support battalions. The Combat Support Battalion includes all the fire and tactical support elements, comprising a field artillery
group armed with 105 mm KH-178 and 155 mm Denel G4 howitzers, an anti-tank company to be armed with Rafael's Spike-Medium
Range missiles, a combat engineer company, and a company of armoured amphibious transports to be equipped with AAV7s from BAE
Systems Land Systems.
Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade
Unit
Base
Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade HQ Command Tumbes, Talcauano
Type
HQ
Company
Marine Infantry Battalion No.21 "Miller"
Fort Aguayo, Concon, Valparaiso
Infantry
Marine Infantry Battalion No.31 "Aldea"
Fort O'Higgins, Tumbes, Talcahuano
Infantry
Combat Support Battalion No.41 "Hurtado"
Tumbes, Talcahuano
Artillery and mechanised support
Combat Support Logistics Battalion No.51

"Olave"
Tumbes, Talcahuano
Logistics
Outside of the brigade, there are two other units in the Marine Infantry. These are:
Marine Detachment No. 1 Lynch: Based at Fort Condell at Iquique in northern Chile, this unit focuses on long-range artillery and coastal
defence. It is equipped with 14 155 mm Soltam M-71 towed howitzers and an Excalibur battery (four launchers) armed with MBDA MM
38 and MM 40 Exocet anti-ship missiles.
Marine Detachment No. 4 Cochrane: Based at Punta Arenas near the Strait of Magellan, its focus is on amphibious operations in inner
waters and arctic conditions. The unit also has long-range artillery and coastal defence elements similar to those of Lynch but of lesser
size.
Special Forces Command
This command includes the Naval Tactical Divers (Buzos Tactico) and 51st Marines Commandos Group. These units share training
facilities and equipment, and can operate together, although they remain distinctive entities.
Naval Aviation
Naval Aviation Command is organised operationally into two groups, each comprising elements of the force's three operational
squadrons and one training squadron:
General Purpose Squadron VG-1: Equipped with three Airbus Military C212 Aviocars, one VIP-configured Lockheed Martin P-3A
Orion, and one Embraer EMB-111 Bandeirante in a transport role;
Helicopter Squadron VH-1: Equipped with five Eurocopter AS 532 Cougar maritime strike helicopters armed with Exocet AM 39 antiship missiles, seven Aerospatiale HH-65 search and rescue (SAR) helicopters (operated by the coast guard), two Eurocopter AS 332L
Super Puma, and four Bell 206B utility and liaison helicopters, as well as MBB BO 105 helicopters;
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Maritime Reconnaissance Squadron VP-1: Equipped with three P-3 Orions, six Airbus Military C295 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA),
and two EMB-111s; and
Training Squadron VT-1: Equipped with seven Pilatus PC-7 aircraft (which can be armed with guns and rockets to perform in a light
strike role) and nine Cessna O-2A Super Skymaster aircraft.
The principal naval air base, Base Aeronaval Vina del Mar, is located at Torquemada, 20 km to the north of Vina del Mar city. There are
also minor bases at Punta Arenas and Puerto Williams.
Naval Aviation Order of Battle
Unit
Base
Type
Role
Naval Reconnaissance Squadron-1 Via del Mar
P-3A Orion
Maritime Patrol
EMB-111AN
Maritime Patrol
C295MPA
Maritime Patrol
UP-3A Orion
Utility Transport
General Purpose Squadron-1
Via del Mar
C212
Transport
Via del Mar
EMB-110CN
Communications / Utility
Via del Mar
O-2A Skymaster
Communications / Utility
General Purpose Helicopter

Squadron-1
Via del Mar
BO 105
Communications / SAR
General Purpose Helicopter

Squadron-1
Via del Mar
UH-57B JetRanger
Communications / Training
Attack Helicopter Squadron-1
Via del Mar
SH-32 Cougar
Anti-Submarine Warfare / ASV

Attack
Attack Helicopter Squadron-1
Via del Mar
Super Puma
Transport / SAR
Training Squadron-1
Via del Mar
PC-7
Training
Primera Zona
Via del Mar
BO 105
Segunda Zona
Talcahuano
BO 105
Segunda Zona
Talcahuano
O-2A
Segunda Zona
Puerto Montt
BO 105
Segunda Zona
Puerto Montt
O-2A Skymaster
Tercera Zona
Punta Arenas
EMB-111AN
Tercera Zona
Punta Arenas
C212
Tercera Zona
Punta Arenas
BO 105
Cuarta Zona
Iquique
EMB-111AN
Cuarta Zona
Iquique
O-2A Skymaster
Cuarta Zona
Iquique
BO 105
Quinta Zona
Puerto Montt
HH-65 Dauphin
Quinta Zona
Puerto Montt
BO 105
Quinta Zona
Puerto Montt
O-2A
Comandancia de Aviacin Naval
Zonas Navales (Comandancia en

Jefe de la Armada)
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Note:
Naval zones are assigned one aircraft of each type on detachment from Naval Aviation Command.
Coast Guard
The coast guard is an integral part of the navy. It has approximately 1,600 personnel. In addition to seagoing, coastal and inshore patrol
vessels, the service also operates a floating medical-dental clinic and an air-sea rescue launch, based at Easter Island. Chile accepts
responsibility for maritime SAR within 2,000 miles (3,200 km) of the western coastline, maintaining SAR co-ordination centres at
Iquique, Valparaso, Talcahuano, Puerto Montt, and Punta Arenas.
As none of its vessels are suitable for deep-sea patrol or rescue work, the coast guard can call on the ships and aircraft of the navy,
and in particular its helicopters, for support when necessary.
Since 2008, the coast guard has undertaken a slow replacement of its ageing port patrol boats, acquiring new Defender-class and
Defender Archangel-class fast patrol boats. The various port captains also maintain and man 10 large and about 50 small lifeboats for
inshore rescue.
Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine
From its earliest days, the Chilean Navy has shown a strong British influence. Subsequent US influences have only partially diluted this.
Although US tactical and operational doctrines are accepted, in many respects the contemporary Chilean Navy remains more British
than those of many Commonwealth navies.
Tactical and operational doctrine is dominated by the Mar Presencial concept, which operates on the assumption that a country's
interests frequently lie beyond the limits of its 200-mile EEZ. Therefore, this area should be monitored and protected.
Bases
Operator Service
Base Name
Synonyms
Latitude
Longitude
Region
Level of Precision
Navy
Dawson Island
-53.835371
-70.447155
Tierra del Fuego
Confirmed Location
Navy
Iquique
-20.204915
-70.148011
Tarapac
Confirmed Location
Navy
Puerto Montt
-41.480004
-72.953670
Los Lagos
Confirmed Location
Navy
Puerto Williams
-54.933187
-67.610076
Magellan Chilean
Antarctica Region
Confirmed Location
Navy
Punta Arenas
-53.123611
-70.861667
Magellan Chilean
Antarctica Region
Confirmed Location
Navy
Talcahuano
-36.698333
-73.106944
Biobo
Confirmed Location
Navy
Valparaso
-33.029722
-71.624167
Valparaiso
Confirmed Location
Naval Aviation
Via del Mar
Torquemada
-32.949167
-71.480000
Valparaiso
Confirmed Location
Valparaso, headquarters of the 1st Naval Zone, is the navy's main operational base. It houses many of the naval schools and a
relatively minor repair yard. Neighbouring Via del Mar houses additional training establishments and the HQ of the naval air arm.
Talcahuano, headquarters of the 2nd Naval Zone, is the navy's primary base. It houses additional naval schools, a major repair yard,
and a submarine base.
Punta Arenas, headquarters of the 3rd Naval Zone, is also an important naval base, having a slipway, repair facilities, and a naval air
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station (Almirante Von Schroeders).

Iquique, the headquarters of the 4th Naval Zone, has a small naval base.
Puerto Montt was inaugurated as the 5th Naval Zone in December 2009.
Other smaller bases are at Puerto Williams (Beagle Channel) and at Dawson island in the Magellan Straits (Guardiamarina Zanartu),
the last of which houses both a small naval base and a naval air station.
Training
The Arturo Prat Naval Academy provides a five-year course for naval officer cadets. Officers must complete post-graduate courses at
the Naval War Academy for promotion to flag rank or for appointment to the naval General Staff. Selected petty officers may qualify for
commissioned rank by completing a two-year course at the Naval Academy, but they are ineligible for promotion beyond the rank of
captain. Officers and enlisted personnel receive their specialised training at the navy's comprehensive network of specialist schools,
which are now being reorganised into a naval polytechnic academy.
Training Areas
Major training areas are all either in the Valparaso/Via del Mar area or at Talcahuano. For training of officers in handling tactical
operations at sea, there is a tactical training centre in Valparaso equipped with simulators and other computer support equipment. The
Marine Infantry Basic Training Centre is located at Talcahuano.
For operational or tactical training and exercises, the fleet takes advantage of Chile's long and varied coast, but it has also begun
regularly exercising deep in the Pacific Ocean around Easter Island.
Military Exercises
Chile is a regular participant in the biennial US-sponsored Rim of the Pacific ('RIMPAC') exercise. The latest iteration, 'RIMPAC 2012',
was held from June to August 2012 and included 22 participating countries, 42 surface ships, 6 submarines and more than 200 aircraft.
Chile's contribution included the frigate Almirante Lynch.
Chile was a founding participant (alongside the United States and Panama) in the 'PANAMAX' exercise series, which is focused on
reinforcing the security of the Panama Channel and its approaches in the face of threats posed by piracy, organised crime and
terrorism.
In August 2013, the Chilean and Argentine navies engaged in the joint 'Viekaren XIII' exercise to patrol the Beagle Channel.
In August 2012, a unit from the No.2 Marine Detachment "Miller" deployed to participate in a joint exercise with the Argentine Marine
Battalion No.2 (BIM2) at Baterias in Argentina.
Submarines
Class
Scorpne
Manufacturer
Role
DCN Cherbourg / IZAR Attack
Original Total
In Service
Commissioned
21
2005
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Thomson (Type
209/1400)
Howaldtswerke
Attack
1984
1. The submarine Carrera was damaged in collision with the frigate Condell off Valparaiso on 18 July 2014. It is expected to be out of service for up to
12 months for repairs.
Surface Fleet
Class
Manufacturer
Role
Original Total
In Service
Commissioned
Latorre (Type L)
Koninklijke
Maatschappij De
Schelde
Frigate
19861
Blanco Encalada (Type Koninklijke

M)
Maatschappij De
Schelde
Frigate
19922
Broadsword class (Type Swan Hunter

22)
Shipbuilders
Frigate
19883
Cochrane (Type 23)
Yarrow Shipbuilders /
Swan Hunter
Shipbuilder
Frigate
19904
Casma (Saar 4)
Haifa Shipyard
Fast Attack Craft Missile
19745
Riquelme (Tiger) (Type CMN Cherbourg

148)
Fast Attack Craft Missile
26
1974
Taitao / Micalvi
ASMAR
Patrol Craft - Large
47
1993
Piloto Pardo
ASMAR
Patrol Vessel - Offshore 2
2008
Ona
ASENAV
Patrol Craft
1992
Foudre
DCN
Landing Ship - Dock
1990
Maipo (Batral)
ASMAR
Landing Ship - Tank

(Hospital)
1983
CDIC
n/a
Landing Craft - Tank
18
n/a
CTM
n/a
Landing Craft Mechanised
28
n/a
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Both transferred to Chile in 2006.

Transferred to Chile in 2006 and 2007.
Transferred by the United Kingdom in 2003.
Transferred from the United Kingdom and recommissioned between 2006 and 2008.
Transferred from Israel in 1979, 1981, and two in 1997.
Vessels being decommissioned beginning in 2012, with the most recent leaving service in March 2014.
PMD-74 Cirujano Videla was converted in 2006 into a medical ship and PSH-77 Cabrales converted for hydrographical research.
Ex-French vessels transferred to Chile in 2012 along with the Foudre-class LPD.
Auxiliaries
Class
Manufacturer
Role
Original Total
In Service
Commissioned
Araucano
Uddevallavarvet AB
Replenishment Ship
19851
Almirante Montt
Avondale Shipyards
Replenishment Ship
19872
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lvsborg
Karlskronavarvet
Submarine Support
Ship
19713
Taitao / Micalvi
ASMAR
Medical Support
14
1994
Taitao / Micalvi
ASMAR
Hydrographical
Research
14
1996
Cabo de Hornos
ASMAR
Oceanographic
Research Ship
2013
Aquiles
ASMAR
Transport Ship
1988
n/a
ASMAR
Harbour Transport
1968
George Slight (Vigilant) J. Pattje
Buoy Tender
19706
Veritas
Aukra Bruk
Fleet Tug
1973
Esmeralda
Bazn
Sail Training Ship
1954
1. Built as an oil transport vessel. Subsequently acquired by a Chilean commercial operator, which then sold it to the Chilean Navy in 2010. Entered
service with the navy in mid-April 2013 after conversion work.
2. Transferred from the US and recommissioned 2010.
3. Former buoy tender transferred from Sweden in 1996 and recommissioned in 1997.
4. Converted patrol vessel.
5. Includes floating dock Marinero Gutierrez, built in 1991.
6. Ex-UK vessel recommissioned in 1997.
Coast Guard
Class
Manufacturer
Role
Original Total
In Service
Commissioned
Archangel
SAFE Boats
International
Patrol Boat - Fast
22
22
2008
Defender
SAFE Boats
International
Patrol Boat - Fast
17
151
2007
Protector
ASMAR / FBM Marine
18
18
1989
Rodman 800
Rodman Polyships
18
15
1996
Type 44
n/a
n/a2
Grumete Diaz (Dabur)
IAI Haifa
Patrol Craft - Coastal
10
1991
1. Remaining two were expected to be delivered by the end of 2013 but this has yet to be confirmed.
2. Acquired from the US and recommissioned on 31 May 2001. Original commissioning date not known.
Marine Corps
Armour
Type
Manufacturer
Role
Original Total
In Service
First Delivery
13
1995
FV101 Scorpion
BAE Systems
Light Tank
261
FV104 Samaritan
BAE Systems
Command Post
1995
FV105 Sultan
BAE Systems
Command Post
2009
Bv 206
BAE Systems
Utility
40
30
n/a
PVP
Panhard
Protected Patrol
15
15
2010
1. Includes 15 delivered from 2008 from Spanish Army of which only 13 put in service.
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Artillery
Type
Manufacturer
Role
Original Total
In Service
First Delivery
155 mm G-4
Denel
Towed Howitzer
32
121
1998
105 mm KH-178
KIA Machine & Tool
Towed Howitzer
16
16
1991
Excalibur2
MBDA
Coastal Defence
System
n/a
81 mm
n/a
Mortar
n/a
n/a
n/a
1. The other 20 stored.

2. Comprises two MM 38 or two MM 40 Exocet missile tubes mounted on a towed platform.
Anti-tank Weapons
Type
Manufacturer
Role
Original Total
In Service
First Delivery
AT4
Saab Bofors Dynamics

AB
Light Anti-Armour
Weapon
n/a
n/a
n/a
Type
Manufacturer
Role
Original Total
In Service
First Delivery
Mistral
MBDA
Man-Portable Surfaceto-Air Missile
30
301
2012
20 mm
Oerlikon
Anti-Aircraft Gun
n/a
n/a
n/a
35 mm
Oerlikon
Anti-Aircraft Gun
n/a
n/a
n/a
Air Defence Weapons
1. Some to equip the Sargento Aldea and others for marine corps units.
Infantry Weapons
Type
Role
HK33
Assault Rifle
M16A1
Assault Rifle
M16A2
Assault Rifle
n/a
Light Machine Gun
Missiles
Type
Manufacturer
Role
MM 38 Exocet
Aerospatiale Matra
Anti-Ship Attack
MM 38 Exocet
Aerospatiale Matra
Anti-Ship Attack
Gabriel
IAI
Anti-Ship Attack
RGM-84 Harpoon
Boeing
Anti-Ship Attack
Seawolf
MBDA
Anti-Air Missile
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Barak
IAI
Anti-Air Missile
Sea Sparrow
Raytheon
Anti-Air Missile
SM-1 Standard
Raytheon
Anti-Air Missile
Naval Aviation
Fixed Wing
Platform
Family
Platform
Variant

1
2
Reportin
g Name

urer
Role
Role
y Role
y Role
Total
Estimate
d In
Service
First
Delivery
Date
C212
C212
Series
100
Airbus
Military
P-3 Orion P-3A
UP-3A
Orion
C295
C295ACH -
P-3 Orion P-3A
P-3ACH
Orion
EMB-110
EMB-111
Bandeiran P-111
te
C295
PC-7
Transport -
1978
Lockheed Logistics
Martin
Utility
1993
Airbus
Military
Maritime
Patrol
Maritime
Anti3
submarine
2011
Lockheed Maritime
Martin
Patrol
Maritime
Anti6
submarine
1993
Embraer
Maritime
Patrol
1977
C295MPA Persuader /ASW
Airbus
Military
Maritime
Patrol
Maritime
Anti3
submarine
2010
PC-7
C295
Skymaste O-2A
r
Logistics
Turbo
Trainer
Pilatus
Trainer
Basic
Combat
Light
attack
10
1980
Cessna
Trainer
Basic
Maritime
Patrol
10
1998

urer
Role
Role
y Role
y Role
Total
Estimate
d In
Service
First
Delivery
Date
Rotary Wing
Platform
Family
Platform
Variant

1
2
Reportin
g Name
AS 332
AS 532SC Cougar
SH-32
Eurocopte Maritime
r
Patrol
Maritime
Anti8
submarine
1991
AS 365
Dauphin
HH-65A
Dauphin
Eurocopte Logistics
r
Search
and
rescue
71
2006
Bell 206
206B
JetRanger -
Bell
Logistics
Utility
1970
AS 332
AS 332L1 Super
Puma
SH-32
Eurocopte Logistics
r
Utility
Logistics
Search
and
Rescue
2012
BO 105
BO 105C
Eurocopte Logistics
r
Utility
1991
UH-05
1. Operated by the coast guard.
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Missiles
System Variant
Manufacturer
MM38 Exocet
Aerospatiale Matra
Anti-Ship
Gabriel
IAI
Anti-Ship
RGM-84 Harpoon
Boeing
Anti-Ship
System Variant
Manufacturer
Seawolf
MBDA
Surface-to-Air
Barak
IAI
Surface-to-Air
Sea Sparrow
Raytheon
Surface-to-Air
SM-1 Standard
Raytheon
Surface-to-Air
Air Defence Weapons
ihs.com
PROCUREMENT, Chile
Date Posted: 08-Aug-2014
UPDATED
PROCUREMENT
Contents
Assessment
Procurement Reform
Procurement Sources
Army procurement
Armour
Light vehicles
Artillery
Anti-tank
Air defence
Infantry
Engineer vehicles
C4ISR
Army aviation
Air force procurement
Combat
Transport
Utility helicopters
C4ISR
Missiles and weapon systems
Unmanned aerial vehicles
Trainer
Navy procurement
Submarines
Frigates
Fast Attack Craft
Patrol Vessels
Amphibious Forces
Auxiliaries
Naval Aviation
Marine Corps
Assessment
Chile's equipment modernisation and replacement rate has been the highest in Latin America and has included all branches of the
military. The Chilean military plans to spend USD11 billion on new equipment from 2014 to 2020. However, President Michelle
Bachelet, who began her second term in March 2014, announced her government would cut back that expense significantly. Bachelet
expects a more conservative procurement budget of around USD300 million per year.
That said, substantial procurement can still be expected. During Bachelet's tenure as defence minister (2002-04) and her first term as
president (2006-10), Chile procured a significant amount of mostly second-hand equipment from US and NATO sources. This included
frigates, fighters, tankers, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, helicopters, and anti-tank missiles.
Key Figures (millions of constant 2013 USD millions)
2014 (est)
2013
2012
2011
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Total defence expenditure
3,668
3,730
3,538
3,607
Total procurement
expenditure (billions)
626
633
597
605
Procurement Reform
In March 2011, the Chilean Defence Ministry established the Council of Defence Investments (Consejo de Inversiones en Defensa:
CID) in line with the decision to reform its defence procurement system. The new body is tasked with assessing the military forces'
procurement projects. It includes the undersecretaries of defence and armed forces, the heads of the three services, and the chief of
the defence joint staff. Assessment criteria consider the contribution of the projects to the military services' capabilities - as required by
their tasks and roles - as well as the projects' financial viability. The council has the power to ask the services to revise or modify their
projects. The assessment process ends with the issuing of a report that contains recommendations from the CID to the minister of
defence, who then makes final decisions in consultation with the chief of government. It is expected that the CID will administer a trust
of roughly USD5 billion between 2012 and 2015.
Separately, Michelle Bachelet, in her previous role as Chile's defence minister, attempted to instil the concept of 'jointness' in the armed
forces, including in their procurement proceedings. To that end, she ordered a study of joint basic operational requirements for
helicopters in the armed forces. This study aimed at developing joint programmes for rotary-wing aircraft procurement, which would be
expected to yield financial and operational advantages. However, this experimental programme failed, with the three services selecting
different platforms for their needs. Minor joint procurement efforts in the areas of command and control and mini-unmanned aerial
vehicles are being administered by the Defence Ministry, although there is no overarching attempt at significant joint procurement for
the time being.
Procurement Sources
During the regime of Augusto Pinochet, which lasted from 1973 to 1990, all three services suffered from the international embargo on
the sale of military equipment to Chile. The navy and air force in particular found themselves with progressively obsolete and
inadequate equipment inventories. These difficulties stimulated the development of a local defence industry.
Since the advent of Chilean democracy, the combination of reopened markets with local industry capabilities has made the country's
defence market one of the most attractive in South America. From 2000 to 2010, Chile was the region's top arms importer. The recent
major foreign suppliers of defence material to Chile have been Israel, Brazil, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, the United States,
Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Army procurement
Armour
The Chilean armoured forces in the past few years have been completely modernised and re-equipped with a large package of secondhand vehicles obtained from Germany and the Netherlands, comprising Leopard 2A4 MBTs and YPR-765 and Marder 1A3 AIFVs.
Main battle tanks
The Chilean Army has acquired 172 Leopard 2A4 MBTs from surplus German stocks. Chile officially received its first batch of the
refurbished Leopard 2 MBTs in November 2007 at a ceremony in Germany, although the tanks did not begin to arrive to Chile until
2008. Initially only 140 were to be inducted into service and another 32 unrefurbished tanks were to be used for spares, but the army
subsequently decided to put all 172 into service. As 20% of the Leopard 2s are usually undergoing maintenance at any one time, the
additional tanks help to maintain availability at about 140 tanks. Of note, the Leopard 2s have a special upgrade package to better
enable operations at high altitudes without adversely impacting service life.
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The Leopard 2s equip the army's armoured brigades deployed in northern Chile. They have replaced the old M41 Walker Bulldogs and
allowed the storage of some Leopard 1 MBTs. The Leopard 2 procurement has also allowed the redeployment of about 120 Leopard 1s
to southern Chile, where they replaced French-built AMX-30 tanks. Chile had procured 220 Leopard 1Vs from the Netherlands between
1997 and 2001. These have experienced maintenance problems due to the desert conditions in northern Chile and only those in the
best condition have been retained.
The Chilean Army has now stopped seeking any further Leopard 1 upgrades and plans to retire the fleet by 2015. As part of this
divestment, Chile has offered 60 Leopard 1s to Colombia and 30 to Ecuador. In addition, Chile is reportedly undergoing negotiations to
acquire an additional 80 to 92 Leopard 2A5s, probably from the Netherlands.
Infantry fighting vehicles
Chile ordered 139 SABIEX YPR-765 AIFVs from Belgium in 2006. Delivery of the final 50 of these vehicles took place in early 2013.
The Leopard 2 procurement created problems for mechanised infantry and supporting units, as their slower YPR-765 AIFVs and M113
armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were unable to keep pace with the faster MBTs. To amend this, 237 Marder A3 AIFVs were
ordered from German Army stocks beginning in 2008. The first vehicles began to reach Chile in 2009 and deliveries continued until
2013. The Chilean Army has reportedly put 173 into service while using the remainder for spares.
Light armoured vehicles
The state-owned military arsenal and ordnance factory (Fbricas y Maestranzas del Ejrcito: FAMAE) has produced (under licence)
more than 200 MOWAG Piranha light armoured vehicles in infantry transport and mortar carrier versions for the Chilean Army. The
MOWAG mortar carriers are also being upgraded with a new locally developed navigation and fire control system.
Armoured personnel carriers
More than 400 of the Chilean Army's M113 APCs are being upgraded to M113A2 standard and receiving new weapons, such as a
turret with an Oerlikon 25 mm gun or Mk 19 40 mm grenade launcher.
Light vehicles
Delivery of an initial batch of 100 new-build 44 all-terrain high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), reportedly including
anti-tank versions with TOW-2A anti-tank guided weapons, was completed early in 2007 and the delivery of a second batch of 100 is in
progress. These HMMWVs form the basis of the scout and anti-tank units. A third 100-vehicle batch is destined for Chile's Marine
Corps.
The army also concluded negotiations with Land Rover in early 2010 to procure a second tranche of 107 Defender light vehicles.
Artillery
Self-propelled Artillery
Chile received 12 refurbished US Army surplus M109A3 howitzers during 2009. The Chilean Army also received supporting equipment,
including a number of artillery location radars - AN/TPQ-37(V)3 Firefinder units from US surplus - and ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting
Radar) units from Saab Microwave. The package also included 18 M113A2 APCs to provide security, 24 M548A2 munition vehicles,
and 4 HMMWVs. The M109A3s replace the service's ageing Mk F.3 155 mm self-propelled howitzers and augment a batch of 24
M109A3s acquired in 2006 from Switzerland through RUAG.
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In order to provide these with command, fire support, and munitions vehicles, Chile has acquired a batch of 21 M108 VBCL command
vehicles from Belgium. These were former 105 mm self-propelled howitzers modified by the Belgian Army to serve as munition and
artillery support vehicles. They were delivered in 2008.
The army is scheduled to receive 12 M109A5 155 mm self-propelled guns from the United States. These are being refurbished and
upgraded through a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract with BAE Systems via the US government. A BAE Systems spokesperson
told IHS Jane's that the contractor is upgrading the self-propelled howitzers with an improved lock system, a digital fire control system
and a more powerful engine. The work will integrate digital data connectivity as well as gun positioning and navigation systems, which
are intended to improve response time during calls for fire and enhance the vehicle's survivability. Deliveries were due to be completed
by the end of 2013 but whether this was accomplished has not been confirmed.
Multiple rocket launchers
The Israel Military Industries LAR-160 light artillery rocket system, acquired in the 1980s, is being upgraded with new locally developed
fire control and training systems. The Chilean Army acquired surplus Israeli rockets in 2007 and FAMAE has also begun to co-produce
160 mm Mk IV rockets for the LAR system.
Towed artillery
A programme to modernise the army's old US-supplied 105 mm M101 towed howitzers with upgrade kits provided by the UK's Royal
Ordnance (now part of BAE Systems) and RDM Technology of the Netherlands has been completed. In its upgraded form, the M101
howitzer, fitted with a 33 calibre barrel, can fire a standard high-explosive M1 projectile to a maximum range of 11,900 m or an
extended range M1 (ERM1) projectile, with RO663A2 zone 2 charge, to a maximum range of 19,200 m. The upgrade is known as the
M101/33.
The acquisition of an unspecified number of Atmos truck-mounted 155 mm guns is being negotiated with Israeli company Soltam.
Anti-tank
In August 2011, the army received a delivery of anti-tank munitions produced by Saab Bofors Dynamics. The weapons include an
unspecified number of high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) FFV551 and FFV441B munitions for man-portable, reusable 84 mm Carl Gustav
anti-tank rocket launchers. The material equips armoured brigades deployed in northern Chile near the borders with Bolivia and Peru.
In addition, the army acquired a batch of 90 Rafael Spike-Long Range missiles in 2008.
Air defence
Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
Chile ordered 30 Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems, with the first 4 delivered in 2008. Delivery of the remaining 26
Gepards stalled as the Chilean Army was not satisfied with the system. The four delivered systems were returned in 2011.
Forward area air defence
In June 2010, it was announced that Chile had requested three forward area air defence (FAAD) command-and-control intelligence
systems from the United States as part of a USD105 million FMS deal that includes the Avenger self-propelled air defence system
using the Stinger RMP Block I and AN/MPQ-64F1 Sentinel radars. Chile also asked for 3 single-channel ground and airborne radio
systems; vehicle dual long-range radio systems (AN/VRC-92E); 14 enhanced position location reporting systems; radio transmitters; 3
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FAAD force operations systems air and missile defence workstations; spare and repair parts; and support, training and logistics
equipment and services. The principal contractors will be ITT Industries, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon.
Infantry
The army is scheduled to acquire up to 15,000 new 5.56 mm assault rifles and is reportedly considering either the Heckler & Koch
G36V or the Colt M4A1.
Engineer vehicles
Project Pisagua, designed to establish an engineer support capability for the armoured forces, has been completed. Six vehicles based
on the Leopard 1 chassis, including bridgelayers and combat engineer support vehicles, were acquired in Germany. Those vehicles,
together with five bridge transports that were built in Chile also using the Leopard 1 chassis, have been equipped with a locally
developed GPS-based navigation system.
C4ISR
The army is in the process of implementing a command, control, and communications (C3) system for its armoured brigades,
specifically in northern Chile.
A different programme envisages the procurement of early warning systems of an undisclosed type or classification for the northern
border. It is very likely that these are Thales Ground Master 400 air surveillance radars, procured in 2011.
Army aviation
Chile has begun a modernisation programme to substantially upgrade the capabilities of the Army Aviation Brigade (Brigada de
Aviacin del Ejrcito: BAVE). The effort is focusing on upgrading the rotary-wing and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) fleet. The brigade
requires attack, assault, medium transport, and light scout helicopters.
Combat helicopters
The Eurocopter EC 635, Bell 470AH, and Boeing AH-6i Little Bird are under consideration for the attack helicopter requirement outlined
by the National Security and Defence Strategy 2012-2024. The main requirement will be for helicopters able to operate in high
mountain conditions, where the current fleet of ageing MD 530F helicopters are reportedly struggling. The helicopters are to have an
anti-tank capability and will be assigned as organic elements of the armoured brigades. It is expected that up to 12 helicopters will be
procured. Reports in early 2013 that the army was considering procuring either new or second hand Boeing AH-64 Apache attack
helicopters have been discounted.
Transport and utility helicopters
The army in 2009 selected the Eurocopter AS 532 Cougar in preference to the Mil Mi-17 to serve as its medium transport helicopter,
placing an order for eight examples. These began to arrive in 2010 and delivery has been completed. The army bought an additional
Cougar in late 2012, an AS 532ALe Cougar Mk 1 variant. This was delivered to the Chilean Army Aviation Brigade in March 2014.
Three more Cougars of this type were also ordered in 2013 and the first of these is expected to be handed over in 2015. Plans envision
a future fleet of at least 24 medium transport helicopters to support deployment of an airmobile infantry brigade.
In 2009, the army signed a USD20 million contract with IAR Brasov for the upgrade of four of its SA-330L Puma medium lift helicopters.
In 2011, IAR Brasov re-delivered three upgraded Pumas with new Makila engines, tail rotors, additional fuel tanks, glass cockpits,
chaff/flare dispensers, and electronic countermeasures. Despite the investment, the army decided in 2011 to standardise on the AS 532
Cougar and now plans to sell its upgraded Pumas.
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In May 2012, the Chilean Army sought assistance from the Colombian Army in the training of flight crews, leading to speculation that
the army would procure a batch of Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawks in the near future. The requirement became more formalised in
November 2012 when it was announced that the army was seeking medium multirole helicopters to perform assault and transport
duties. These 12 new helicopters are intended to add to the current fleet of Cougar, Super Puma, and Puma helicopters. However, no
Black Hawks had been ordered as of late 2013.
Transport and utility fixed-wing aircraft
The army's three Airbus C212-100 Aviocar transport aircraft were retired in November 2012 and there were no plans to replace them as
part of the National Security and Defence Strategy 2012-2024. However, in a November 2012 joint exercise, the army was unable to
fulfil all of its assigned fixed-wing transport missions since all of its CN235s and C212s were grounded due to lack of maintenance and
spares. As a result, the Chilean Army is now set to launch a tender for the acquisition of up to eight tactical transport aircraft to replace
its CN235 and C212 platforms. Candidates include the Airbus C295, as it is already in service with the navy and is being eyed by the air
force, and the Alenia Aermacchi C-27J Spartan. The requirement has been qualified at 'urgent', although IHS Jane's now understands
that approval of the procurement plans has been postponed. A contract for the aircraft was originally intended to be finalised in August
2013. The aircraft will largely support the deployment of a new airmobile brigade being formed for operations in the mountainous
Andean region.
Training aircraft
The BAVE closed a tender to procure an unspecified number of basic training aircraft on 1 July 2014, although a winner has yet to be
announced. The new aircraft is meant to replace the Cessna R172K Hawk XP II basic trainers at the Army Aviation School in
Rancagua, which were retired from service in June 2013. The BAVE originally procured 18 Hawk XP IIs in 1977 and used them for
training and liaison.
In 2009, Chile inaugurated the Army Simulation and Modelling Centre (Centro de Modelacin y Simulacin Ejercito: CEMSE), which is
developing a mini-UAV. In 2012, CEMSE presented the Lascar mini-UAV, which is capable of carrying a small synthetic aperture radar
and operating over a range of 30 km. Lascar weighs 14 kg has a 2 hour endurance and is transported by a HMMWV. It is designed
primarily for disaster relief support operations and tactical reconnaissance. It is not clear yet how many, if any, the army has ordered or
when deliveries are expected.
In 2013, the army announced an order valued at USD3 million for an unspecified number of BlueBird Spylite mini-UAVs.
Air force procurement
Combat
Delivery of new and second-hand F-16 Fighting Falcons since 2005 has significantly enhanced the Chilean Air Force's combat
capability and allowed retirement of the Elkan (Mirage 5) and Pantera (Mirage 50). In addition to 10 new-build F-16Cs and F-16Ds,
Chile purchased two separate lots of 18 surplus aircraft from the Netherlands. The FACh received its final batch of surplus Dutch
Lockheed Martin F-16s at the end of September 2011.
Transport
Procurement of the Airbus Military A400M was considered in order to address Chile's airlift requirement, but plans to purchase this type
were abandoned in 2006. Chile was subsequently reported to be contemplating the purchase of up to five second-hand Lockheed
Martin C-130s. It now appears that at least two are en route, these being former US Marine Corps KC-130Rs. The first of these is
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expected to be delivered by the end of 2014 after refurbishment.

In addition, it looks likely that Chile will obtain six examples of the Brazilian Embraer KC-390 twin-turbofan medium transport. To that
end, a memorandum of intent was signed on 24 August 2010 by the defence ministers of Brazil and Chile, culminating in a May 2012
agreement between ENAER of Chile and Embraer covering participation in the manufacturing programme.
Airlift capability received a welcome boost in August 2008 with delivery of a Boeing 767-300ER. This is primarily used as a strategic
transport in support of Chilean peacekeeping deployments around the world. The aircraft was acquired second-hand from Euro-Atlantic
Airways of Portugal. A second Boeing 767 is reportedly required for the strategic transport role.
Tanker/transport
The FACh has acquired three former US Air Force KC-135E Stratotankers, the first of which was delivered to Santiago on 18 February
2010 to join Air Group 10. It was followed by the second aircraft in 2011, with the final example being handed over in March 2012.
Shortly afterwards, it emerged that discussions between the FACh and Boeing were under way regarding the acquisition of more KC135Es, although this has yet to result in a contract.
Utility helicopters
The FACh had selected the Mi-17V-5 to fulfil a requirement for a medium lift helicopter and was expected to finalise an order for five
examples by March 2010. However, negotiations were interrupted as the helicopter was originally intended to be mainly used by the
FACh for SAR and disaster relief operations, giving it a primarily civilian application. This was problematic since funds allocated through
the Copper Law stipulate that they are to be used exclusively for military purposes, which led to a re-drafting of the requirement.
Negotiations subsequently resumed as the helicopters are now expected to conduct tactical transport, military cargo, and SAR
missions.
However, this deal may still have fallen through, since there is no evidence of any Mi-17s having yet been delivered. Moreover, reports
in August 2012 suggested that the Chilean government was seeking to purchase an additional five or six Black Hawk helicopters. In
that regard, a new competition was is expected to be launched to obtain a new medium helicopter for use in Antarctica and the Andes
regions. It subsequently emerged that the Sikorsky S-70I Black Hawk appeared to be the favoured type.
C4ISR
One of the most important requirements the FACh still needs to address is the modernisation of its AEW capability. At least three
aircraft are needed in order to have two available at any time, with the third undergoing maintenance, repair, overhaul, or being held in
reserve.
The only AEW platform presently in service is a second-hand Boeing 707 that was modified to Phalcon standard by IAI and ELTA in
Israel during the early 1990s. However, this platform is nearing the end of its useful life.
The Saab Erieye system has been evaluated as a replacement and it seems the FACh is interested in a smaller and more compact
platform than the Boeing 707, which could result in adoption of the Saab 2000/Erieye combination.
Another type that is evidently under consideration is the AEW version of the Airbus Military C295, with the FACh receiving a briefing on
this project in early 2011.
A modest increase in surveillance capability came with the delivery of two Cirrus SR 22 T light aircraft in May 2013. These are fitted
with day and night observation equipment and are apparently tasked with monitoring the northern border area in order to prevent
narcotics trafficking. When the original order was announced, mention was made of a third example, but it is not known if this has yet
been delivered.
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Missiles and weapon systems

Surface-to-air missiles
The Chilean Air Force is in the process of acquiring three batteries of the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System
(NASAMS 2). The NASAMS 2 will be used to protect the country's two major air force bases as well as the army's armoured, mobilereinforced brigades. The contract was signed during February 2011, although as early 2014 there are no indications that the system
has been delivered.
NASAMS 2 comprises a fire control system developed and produced by Norway's Kongsberg Defence and includes the surfacelaunched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (SL-AMRAAM) version of the Raytheon AIM-120 medium-range air-to-air missile
fitted in a six-cell launcher. The system also incorporates a 3-D radar. Of note, some of the batteries to be procured by Chile will be
mounted on M113 tracked armoured personnel carriers refurbished by local group Fbricas y Maestranzas del Ejrcito.
In May 2011, Chile became the first export customer for the Hermes 900 medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) from Israeli manufacturer Elbit. Chile ordered three UAVs on an unknown delivery timetable. The deal includes a ground
control station and support equipment as well as the UAV's electro-optical payloads. The machines will be operated by the FACh in
reconnaissance and surveillance support roles over land and coastal areas.
According to local sources, Chile hopes to ultimately procure between six and nine Hermes 900s, depending on upcoming budget
priorities. These are apparently intended to equip reconnaissance platoons operating in support of the mechanised infantry components
of reinforced brigades. The Hermes 900 has a maximum take-off weight of 970 kg (2,138 lb), is able to carry a payload of 300 kg, can
operate up to about 9,140 m (30,000 ft), and has an endurance of up to 30 hours.
Trainer
Chile has a requirement for 12-16 examples of a new lead-in fighter trainer/light fighter to replace the A-36 Toqui. In January 2013,
Chilean Minister of Defence Rodrigo Hinzpeter informed the air force that a budget of USD200 million had been allocated to purchase
12 advanced jet trainers under the Chilean Future Advanced Trainer Programme. A formal request for information was expected to be
issued in 2013, although this plan appears to have been abandoned by the middle of that year and the new timetable is uncertain.
A new basic trainer is also in prospect, following signature of an agreement by the defence ministers of Argentina and Chile in late April
2010. This will initially entail studies into the possibility of undertaking joint development of an aircraft to replace the T-34B Mentor
(Argentina) and the T-35 Pilln (Chile). In the event of this design progressing to production, the aircraft will be built in both countries. In
the meantime, the first of six new T-35B Pilln basic trainers was delivered on 8 March 2013, these presumably being acquired as
attrition replacements.
Navy procurement
Submarines
Type 209 Submarines
Two Type 209/1400 diesel-electric submarines, Thomson and Simpson, were commissioned in 1984. The boats have been well
maintained with regular refits and upgrades.
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As plans to replace the entire Chilean fleet of submarines with Scorpene-class boats have been cancelled, the two Type 209/1400s
now in service are being put through a mid-life update programme that will equip them with some features of the Scorpene-class boats.
Upgrades will include the Submarine Tactical Integrated Combat System (SUBTICS) and the capability to launch Whitehead Alenia
Sistemi Subacquei (WASS) Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes. The work will also extend the life of the Type 209 boats until 2023-25.
The Simpson was the first to receive treatment at the Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada (ASMAR) shipyards and was returned to
service in June 2012.
Scorpene Submarines
Two Scorpene-class submarines, Carrera and O'Higgins, were delivered in 2005. The boats are fitted with SUBTICS, a variety of
sensors, and six launch tubes. Armament includes the WASS Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes and the MBDA SM39 Exocet
underwater launch version of the Exocet anti-shipping missile.
The Chilean Navy is reportedly undertaking talks with Spanish communications company Indra for the installation of a satellite
communications system in its Scorpene-class submarines. This would enhance the submarine's communication capabilities
considerably, being able to transmit data on the X-band.
Frigates
A 1998 plan for the local production of up to eight new 3,800 to 4,000 tonne frigates was cancelled in February 2002, as the programme
was deemed too expensive. These were to replace the ageing County destroyers and Leander frigates.
The navy instead sought to acquire the same number of frigates on the second-hand market. This led first to the acquisition of the exRoyal Navy HMS Sheffield (a Type 22 Batch 2 frigate) - Almirante Williams in Chilean service. This was followed by the acquisition of
two Type L and two Type M-class frigates from the Netherlands and then three ex-Royal Navy Type 23 frigates. All of these vessels
were handed over by 2008, allowing the replacement of the entire County/Leander fleet in service with the Escuadra Nacional.
All frigates currently in Chilean service are armed with Boeing RGM-84D Harpoon surface-to-surface anti-ship missiles. Self-defence
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) comprise a mix of Raytheon's RIM-7P Sea Sparrow (on the ex-Dutch ships), MBDA's GWS-26 Mod 1
Sea Wolf (on the Type 23 frigates), and the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI)/Rafael Barak-1 (on Almirante Williams). Studies have
recommended replacement of all three systems with MBDA's Vertical Launch MICA short-range, ground-based air defence system, but
no programme to achieve this is in place.
Broadsword-class
A Type 22 Batch 2 frigate, ex-HMS Sheffield, was delivered from the UK Royal Navy in 2003 and rechristened Almirante Williams.
The ship concluded an extensive modernisation programme in 2009. The upgrade included a modernised combat management system
and the retrofit of a 76 mm medium calibre naval gun. Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles were also fitted, superseding a 2004 proposal
to retain an inventory of Exocet MM40 anti-ship missiles and install some of these on the Almirante Williams. The Type 22 frigate was
originally equipped with MM38 Exocet missiles, which were removed prior to transfer in 2003.
Also installed was a vertical launch system (VLS) for IAI Barak air defence missiles. This superseded earlier plans to retain the ship's
GWS 25 six-round launchers and purchase Seawolf Block 2 missiles. Two Elta EL/M-2221GM I-/J/-/K-band target tracking and
illumination radars were fitted to provide fire control for the Barak missiles.
Other work included expansion of communication facilities and living spaces to allow for the embarkation of a task force command
element.
Type 23-class
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The Type 23 frigates Almirante Cochrane (ex-HMS Norfolk), Almirante Lynch (ex-HMS Grafton), and Almirante Condell (ex-HMS
Marlborough) were recommissioned into the Chilean Navy in 2006, 2007, and 2008 respectively. The ships are currently undergoing an
upgrade programme that includes installation of the Thales Sonar 2087 active/passive variable-depth sonar system. This sonar allows
detection of submarines while they are still outside the range that would allow them to attack the ship.
Chile had a longstanding interest in this specific towed sonar array. However, the British government initially refused to waive
restrictions whereby the systems could only be exported to NATO members and other allied countries. However, the UK government
authorised the sonar array's export to Chile in early 2011 on the understanding that it will increase the interoperability of Chile's naval
forces in NATO-led international operations.
Type L-class
The Chilean Navy has two ex-Dutch Navy L-class air-defence frigates (Capitn Prat and Almirante Latorre), both of which were
commissioned in 1986. They are armed with Raytheon Standard Missile-1 (SM-1) air defence missiles, which provide a long-range air
defence capability that is unique in South America. Replacement of these missiles with SM-2s is under consideration.
Type M-class
There are two M-class frigates in service with the Chilean Navy - the Almirante Blanco Encalada and Almirante Riveros. The ships have
had their flight decks and hangars modified to accommodate the heavier maritime helicopters used by the Chilean Navy.
Future Frigates
Almirante Williams and the two L-class frigates will need to be replaced at some point after 2020. The Chilean Navy has already
launched an analysis of alternatives. Shipbuilders approached with requests for information include BAE Systems (United Kingdom) for
its Type 26 Global Combat Ship; DCNS (France) for its Aquitaine-class (FREMM) frigate; Damen Schelde (the Netherlands) for the De
Zeven Provincin-class frigates; ThyssenKrupp (Germany) for the F124 Sachsen-class air defence frigates; and Navantia (Spain) for its
lvaro de Bazn-derivative air warfare destroyer.
In addition, the South Korean government is actively promoting the indigenous KDX-II and KDX-III warship designs in Chile.
Fast Attack Craft
Saar 4 class
Chile procured its first Saar 4 missile FAC from Israel in 1979 and a second in 1981. Two more were acquired in 1997 but one was
cannibalised for spares within one year. The command and fire control systems of the remaining three Saar 4 craft have been
upgraded. The craft's primary armament is the Gabriel I or II missile although one has received a new Exocet system. All of the vessels
have undergone some maintenance that will extend their service lives beyond 2020. The craft are assigned to the missile boat
command based at Iquique in Northern Chile.
Type 148 (Tiger) class
The first pair of Type 148 missile FAC were transferred from Germany in 1997 and another four in 1998, although two of these did not
enter service but were instead a source of spares. One vessel was decommissioned in December 2012 and another in March 2014,
leaving two in service. The craft are armed with MM38 Exocet missiles. Plans to improve air defence capabilities fitting the MBDA
Mistral SAMs to all fast attack vessels are under consideration.
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Patrol Vessels
Piloto Pardo-class
The Chilean Navy has two locally built offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) based on Fassmer's OPV-80 design. The first-of-class, Piloto
Pardo, was delivered in June 2008 and second-of-class, Policarpo Toro, commissioned at the end of August 2009. A third vessel is
under construction and expected to join the fleet in mid-2014.
The Piloto Pardo-class vessels are able to achieve a speed of 20 kt and have a range of 8,600 n miles (at 12 kt). They have a crew size
of 34. Facilities are provided to embark a medium helicopter and two 7 m PUMAR rigid-inflatable boats. Additionally, they are armed
with a single 40 mm/70 medium calibre naval gun and multiple machine guns. The third vessel, Marinero Fuentealba, has been
modified to have a larger rung (76 mm) and a reinforced hull for patrol operations in Antarctic summer ice.
A further two OPVs are planned in order to make a class of five vessels, providing one vessel to each of the five regional commands.
There had been reports of a sixth vessel, although these remain unconfirmed. Having the additional vessel would be useful to maintain
coverage during refit and overhaul periods.
The Piloto Pardo class features sufficient margins in space and stability to be fitted with anti-ship missiles, more powerful sensors, and
other upgrades. They have also proven to be good blue water vessels, with excellent seakeeping and good range, and thus could
undertake a range of missions.
Ona-class
In July 2011, the Chilean Navy acquired a single Protector-type patrol craft (named the Ona class), which had been built by ASMAR in
1992 but was used for fisheries protection by a civilian agency. The craft replaced LEP 1601 Ona, which was retired after 30 years of
service.
Taitao class
There are four Taitao-class (also known as Micalvi-class) patrol craft still in service and carrying out a maritime patrol role. One of the
Taitao-class patrol vessels has been converted into a medical-dental support ship (PMD Cirujano Videla) and another one (PSH
Cabrales) into a hydrographic research vessel.
Amphibious Forces
Landing Ship - Dock
The navy officially took ownership of the ex-French Navy LPD Foudre in a ceremony at Toulon Naval Base, France, in December 2011.
Renamed LSDH Sargento Aldea, the 12,600-tonne vessel arrived in Chile in March 2012. It replaced the 40-year-old US-built LST
Valdivia, which had been retired by the Chilean Navy in late 2010 as the local naval shipyard - damaged by an earthquake and tsunami
- had been unable to undertake a much needed refit and doing the work abroad was deemed too costly. The Sargento Aldea provides
the navy with a significant increase in amphibious lift and can also support humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations.
The 168 m vessel features a floodable stern well-deck and flight-deck space for four medium helicopters, in addition to a 500 m hospital
area with two operating theatres and beds for 47 patients. In Chilean service, the Sargento Aldea is expected to be capable of
deploying a marine brigade comprising 1,200 troops, 80 fire support and utility vehicles, and 1,800 tonnes of supplies to a location up to
10 days sailing from base. The previous LST could carry only a marine infantry battalion.
The commander-in-chief of the navy had previously confirmed that the service hoped to acquire two LPD-type amphibious assault ships
to ensure continuous availability of at least one vessel. Reports in June 2013 indicate that the Chilean Navy has requested funding to
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purchase the Foudre's sister ship, Siroco, from France. This acquisition would be logical since operating two vessels of the class would
reduce costs.
Auxiliaries
The navy in mid-April 2013 accepted into service a second fleet replenishment ship, A0 53 Araucano. The new fleet support vessel
joins AO 52 Almirante Montt, a Henry J. Kaiser-class tanker transferred from the US Navy in 2010. Araucano can carry 22,000 m of
liquid cargo, including diesel oil, aviation fuel, and water. In 2011, it was fitted with a station to provide replenishment support to other
ships under way at sea. Araucano's entry into service satisfies the Chilean Navy's sustainment needs, which requires two
replenishment tankers.
Chile also has a submarine support vessel, a 2,700-tonne former Royal Swedish Navy minelaying and command ship that was
acquired in 1997 and rechristened Almirante Merino.
Naval Aviation
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
The navy received and inducted into service three Airbus Military C295 Persuader MPA between 2010 and 2011. The aircraft are fitted
with the manufacturer's Fully Integrated Tactical System (FITS), an Elta EL/M-2022 maritime synthetic aperture radar, a FLIR Systems
electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) system, and a weapons capability comprising light torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, including the AGM84 Harpoon. Plans for an additional five C-295s have not been cancelled, but remain on hold.
The other MPA in Chilean naval service is the P-3A. Out of eight P-3As (including six UP-3As) originally procured by Chile, two were
cannibalised, three are used for maritime patrol, and three are being upgraded for ASW. These ASW aircraft will receive the Elta EL/M2022 radar but not carry any weapons. The first of these upgraded aircraft is now back in service with a second now receiving its
upgrade. In addition, the Chilean Navy is launching a life-extension programme for its Lockheed Martin P-3A Orion MPAs, which will
keep the aircraft operational until 2030. Two of these recently underwent a modernisation programme and were fitted with a new
tactical suite built around Elta's EL/M-2022A SAR maritime radar. The new programme will start with the unmodernised aircraft, which
will receive the same tactical suite as the other two as well as new wings, engine upgrades, and the integration of AGM-84 anti-shipping
missile
The Chilean Navy uses Cessna O-2 light aircraft for littoral patrol. However, they are not well-suited to the role and replacements are
being sought. Reports emerged in early August 2013 that two aircraft types are being assessed to assume the role. These are the
Vulcanair AP.68TP and the Tecnam P2006T, both of which are twin-engine, turbo-prop aircraft. The maritime version of the P2006T is
equipped with the Selex Galileo Seaspray 5000E radar and other systems to enable search operations at night and in adverse weather
and has a data downlinked to a ground station so the aircraft crew comprises only two pilots. The number to be acquired is expected to
be between five and eight aircraft, with a final procurement decision expected as soon as the end of 2013.
Anti-submarine and Anti-Surface Helicopters
The Chilean Navy has five embarked AS 532 Cougar (known locally as SH-32) maritime helicopters, the first of which was delivered in
1991. These are armed with AM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles and light ASW torpedoes, and are fitted with a tactical suite that includes a
360 radar and dipping sonar. In March 2012, the Spanish government authorised the transfer of 94 MK 46 Mod 2 torpedoes from its
own stocks to the Chilean Navy for use by the Cougar fleet.
Utility Helicopters
In May 2012, the Chilean Navy took delivery of two AS 332L Super Puma medium-lift helicopters. The helicopters will be used for
transportation and SAR missions, thereby allowing the Cougars to focus on the combat role.
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Three Eurocopter AS 365F Dauphins were acquired from commercial, second-hand sources and delivered between 2005 and 2007.
Meanwhile, the navy acquired four ex-Irish Air Corps AS 365F Dauphin 2 helicopters in 2008. The helicopters are operated from coastal
bases and ships at sea, undertaking tasks such as SAR, liaison, and transport. A further three to five Dauphins were to be acquired
from second-hand sources but the project was cancelled in 2010, as larger helicopters with longer range were required.
Looking ahead, the navy needs to replace the ageing fleet of eight Bell 206 JetRangers and MBB Bo 105 light helicopters currently in
use on liaison and training duties.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
There are plans to procure unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for shipboard use. However, while the Boeing/Insitu ScanEagle was
tested between 2010 and 2011 and assessed in very satisfactory terms, an acquisition programme has yet to be confirmed. In addition,
under Project Sea Ray (Mantarraya), the navy has commissioned RDM, a local company, to design and produce a tactical UAV to be
used for coastal patrol. Meanwhile, a light, man-portable UAV, most likely the Elbit Skylark 1 already selected by the army, is to be
procured for the Marine Corps.
Marine Corps
Armour
The Chilean Marine Corps currently has no armoured amphibious vehicles to mount opposed landing operations. The only amphibious
vehicle in the inventory is the BAE Hagglunds Bv206, which is not suitable for such operations.
However, local trade press reports state that Chile has signed an agreement to procure 12 surplus US Marine Corps AAV7A1 vehicles,
comprising 10 AAV7A1 APC variants, a AAVC7 A1 command vehicle, and a AAVR7 A1 recovery vehicle. Negotiations have been
underway since 2010. The reports state that the vehicles will be upgraded to the Reliability, Availability, Maintainability/Rebuild to
Standard (RAM/RS) by BAE Systems Global Combat Systems before delivery in 2014. Other unconfirmed reports in the local press
suggest there may be a requirement for a further 20 vehicles to equip 2 reinforced infantry battalions with a modest amphibious assault
capability.
Chile purchased 12 Scorpions second hand from the United Kingdom in 1995, which now equip a Marine Light Tank squadron tasked
with an armed reconnaissance and support role. Three Samaritans were also bought for use as command vehicles. In addition, in mid2008, the marines acquired 15 FV101 Scorpions second-hand from the Spanish Navy, as well as a single FV105 Sultan command
post. The light tanks had received a mid-life update during the 1990s, which included a new diesel engine and an improved fire control
system. Chile deployed 13 into service.
In August 2009, the Marine Corps ordered 15 Panhard Petit Vhicule Protg (PVP) 44 light tactical armoured vehicles for use as part
of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Deliveries began in 2010. A TC80 protected manned turret is included on the APC
variant. The vehicle base has been raised by 150 mm and mine protection increased to STANAG 4569 Level 2A.
The Marine Corps also has 30 BAE Systems Bv 206 tracked, articulated transport vehicles, built locally under licence by Industrias
Cardoen. Some of these are used as artillery tractors to tow some of the KH-178 105 mm howitzers equipping the field artillery
batteries.
Coastal Artillery
The coastal defence capabilities of the Marine Corps have also been upgraded. Excalibur, an Exocet MM 40 coastal defence missile
battery originally deployed by the Royal Navy at Gibraltar, was procured in the early 1990s from the United Kingdom. It was
subsequently locally 'cloned' by the Chilean Navy, using surplus MM 38 missiles and radars. There are at least two similar batteries
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deployed in addition to the original Excalibur, all of them manned by marines.

A batch of 32 South African-made Denel G4 155 mm howitzers was bought in 1996 to replace elderly US-made M114s received at the
end of the Second World War. Only 12 of the G4 guns are in service, with the rest being kept in storage.
Air Defence
In 2012, the navy received a batch of about 30 Mistral man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) from MBDA. Some of the Mistral
missiles are intended to equip the amphibious assault ship Sargento Aldea and others will equip the air defence component of the
Marine Corps Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade. While the Mistral has been in the inventory of the Chilean Army and Air Force since
the early 1990s, the Chilean Marine Corps has been without a MANPADS since the retirement of its Shorts Blowpipes at around the
same time.
Light Weapons
The 5.56 mm HK33A2 assault rifle is the standard rifle for front-line infantry units. However, the 5.56 mm FN Herstal SCAR-L and
SCAR-H was selected in 2013 to replace the HK33. An initial order for 1,800 was placed in July 2013 and total procurement will
probably reach 3,500. Other light weapons include Singapore Industries light machine guns and 81 mm mortars at section and
company level. Meanwhile, support units are armed with M16A1 and M16A2 rifles.
IHS Jane's sources said in May 2010 that an unspecified number of AT4 light anti-armour weapons were delivered to the marines.
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STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEM, Chile

UPDATED
Strategic Weapon Systems

Contents
Assessment
Ballistic missiles
Missile defence
Information warfare
Cyber Warfare
Space warfare
Nuclear Capabilities
Stated Government Policy
Actual Capabilities
Biological Capabilities
Actual Capabilities
Chemical Capabilities
Actual Capabilities
Assessment
Chile has no strategic weapons and has demonstrated no intent to acquire any such capabilities. However, the country is acquiring an
air defence system that will have the ability to counter strategic missiles to some extent.
Ballistic missiles
Chile has no ballistic missile systems.
Missile defence
The Chilean Air Force is in the process of acquiring three batteries of the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System
(NASAMS 2) for air base defence, especially on its northern border with Peru. The contract was signed during February 2011, although
as late 2013 there are no indications that the system has been delivered. The NASAMS 2 uses the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range
Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), although tests have demonstrated that it can also fire an Evolved SeaSparrow Missile, which would
provide the system with a greater capability against missiles.
Information warfare
Cyber Warfare
Threat Landscape
Chile's 2012-2024 National Defence and Security Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad y Defensa 2012-2024: ENSYD), which
was released in June 2012, highlighted the possible impact of a cyber attack against Chile's military systems, which are amongst the
most modern in Latin America. The ENSYD also noted that major public and private sector organisations suffered approximately 400
cyber attacks per month, although no further detail was provided.
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The ENSYD recognises that the anticipation and containment of threats in cyberspace is a national priority. To this end, it tasks the
government with strengthening the country's national intelligence system to provide timely information in the face of cyber attack. The
ENSYD specifically states that the armed forces are expected to provide cyber security and that it is necessary to develop robust
information technology skills to neutralise cyber attacks against vital defence systems. The ENSYD charges Chile's Joint Chief of Staff
with leading and co-ordinating the development of this military capability.
Space warfare
On 7 August 2008, the Chilean Ministry of Defence (MoD) signed a USD72 million contract with EADS Astrium for the development and
launch of a joint civilian-military satellite under the Earth Observation Satellite System (Sistema Satelital de Observacin Terrestre:
SSOT) programme. Originally, the satellite was scheduled to be in service from early 2010 but the launch did not take place until
December 2011. The satellite is named FASat Charlie and is operated by the Chilean Air Force's Aero-Photogrammetric Service
(Servicio Aerofotogramtrico: SAF).
Nuclear Capabilities
Chile acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. It has been a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
since 1966. Chile signed the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in 1995 and the Additional Protocol in 2002. In addition, Chile signed the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) in 1967.
Actual Capabilities
Chile has no nuclear weapons and no nuclear power programme, although it is laying the foundation to allow for such a programme in
the future and the country is facing rising energy demands. The Chilean Ministry of Energy has estimated that a power-generating
reactor could be operational by 2024 at the absolute earliest. Any development of a nuclear weapons programme on top of this would
theoretically take longer still to establish.
Currently, the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission has two nuclear studies centres, including two experimental reactors, although only
one is critical. The government is also studying the possibility of building nuclear reactors, developing a national knowledge base in the
field of nuclear power, and improving the institutional framework that would allow for a nuclear programme. It has also signed nuclear
energy co-operation agreements with France and the United States.
There is strong geological evidence that Chile has sufficient uranium deposits for any national nuclear programme and uranium
prospecting is being undertaken in the north part of the country.
Biological Capabilities
Chile ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1980. It also ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol with reservations,
although these were officially rescinded in 1991.
Actual Capabilities
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There is no evidence that Chile has ever had biological weapons.

Chemical Capabilities
Chile ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in July 1996. In addition, Chile is an active participant in the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the implementing body of the CWC. For example, as a member of the OPCW's
Executive Council, Chile approved the decision adopted on 15 November 2013 on the requirements and intermediate deadlines for the
destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and the facilities for producing them. The country has continued to maintain an active profile
against chemical weapons proliferation.
Chile is a full member of the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), which seeks to strengthen and improve chemicals
management worldwide. The ICCA represents chemical manufacturers and producers all over the world.
Actual Capabilities
There is no evidence that Chile has ever had chemical weapons.

Chile Assessment

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, Chile

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South America

17,269,525 (World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011)

Argentina, Bolivia, Peru

Santiago International - Arturo Merino Bentez

Recent Developments and Key Challenges

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South America

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, Chile

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South America

Alberto ARENAS de Mesa

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Heraldo MUOZ Valenzuela

Minister of National Defence

Jorge BURGOS Varela

Minister of the Economy, Development and

Luis Felipe CSPEDES

Jos Antonio GMEZ Urrutia

Minister of Labour and Social Provision

Javiera BLANCO Surez

Minister of the Interior and Public Security

Rodrigo PEAILILLO Briceo

Minister of Transport and

Andrs GMEZ-LOBO Echenique

Mximo PACHECO Matte

Helia MOLINA Milman

Aurora WILLIAMS Baussa

Minister of Education (Mineduc)

Nicols EYZAGUIRRE Guzmn

Carlos FURCHE Guajardo

Minister for National Assets

Vctor OSORIO Reyes

Minister of Public Works

Alberto UNDURRAGA Vicua

Minister of Social Development

Mara Fernanda VILLEGAS Acevedo

Minister of the Environment

Pablo BADENIER Martnez

President of the National Council of Culture

Claudia BARATTINI Contreras

Minister of Housing and Urban Planning

Paulina SABALL Astaburuaga

Source: IHS and CIRCA People in Power

return to the presidential palace for a second term.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS, Chile

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South America

Chamber of Deputies (Lower chamber)

New Majority, led by Concertacin - Coalition of 67

Alliance for Chile (Independent Democratic Union 49

If You Want It, Chile Changes (led by the

Senate (Upper chamber)

New Majority, led by Concertacin - Coalition of 21

Alliance for Chile (Independent Democratic Union 16

Data reflects seat distribution following last election

Opposition Prospects and Programme

Prospects in forthcoming election

Extent of policy differentiation

Moderate, greater focus on promoting business-friendly policies.

Chile declares independence from Spain.

Chile gains full independence.

New constitution and the advent of an oligarchic republic.

Civil war between the president and Congress.

Presidency of Arturo Alessandri.

Presidency of Carlos Ibez del Campo.