KOHA SUMMARY #116

Front Page: A STEP BACKWARD GOING FORWARD

Date: 18 September 1996

SURVEY

"THE SIGNATURE OF POLITICAL SUCCESS"

by KOHA's Survey Team

The Rugova-Milosevic agreement signed on September 1 was accepted with euphoria by the
public in Kosova that day. Some days later, the expressions of the doubts as well as the
criticism by certain public personalities addressed top the LDK and president Rugova started.
Even, all changes were grounded on the possibility for the implementation of this agreement,
as well as the technical problems that would stall its implementation. And not only this, there
was also doubt about the signed document.

The postures are still unclear. Some think that the signature of the agreement is the loss of the
independence of Kosova and the beginning of the return of Albanians in the Serbian system,
meanwhile in other circles, close to Rugova, this agreement is interpreted as proof of the
victory of the politics lead in the past years. There has still not been any open declaration of
the public about this issue. In order to find out what is the disposition of the public, the
KOHA Survey Team interviewed 259 citizens of Prishtina.

The question we asked was defined in a way to evade any statement about the eventual
victory or loss of any of the sides, but make it an evaluation of the act of the agreement as
Rugova's political success or failure.

The number of the surveyed who consider this agreement as Rugova's success makes almost
the absolute majority - 75,26%. The ones that consider this agreement as his political failure
make up only 11,58% of the interviewed. But, the number of those who have no opinion at all
makes up 13,12% of the interviewed.

The signature of the agreement is complicated in the technical sense, i.e., the organization of
the 3+3 group meetings which should finally implement it. The dynamics of the meeting is
still unknown as well as the dates in which these groups should end their activities, for these
meetings have no deadline. Will this agreement be implemented till the end of the month, it
remains an open issue. Therefore, we asked the surveyed whether they think that the signature
of the agreement can be achieved till the end of the month. The ones that are convinced about
its implementation till the end of the month make up 26,64%. The number of those that
believe that the agreement will be implemented, but later is bigger - 57,9%. The ones that
believe that the agreement will not be realized make the minority (11,19%). In 62,07% of
those who think that the agreement will not be implemented believe that this will be due to

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
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the lack of definition of the points of the agreement, while 37,95% of them believe that the
agreement will not be implemented because the Serbian side doesn't respect what it signs.

During this survey, we enabled our participants to express their opinion about the statements
of the public personalities that expressed their negative opinions about this agreement. Some
of them evaluated this agreement as "the violation of the will of the people", "Falling back to
cultural autonomy", "accepting the Serbian system", etc. We asked the surveyed whether
these postures were realistic or not, and 16,60% of them think that these postures are realistic,
23,93% are non-realistic, meanwhile 47,99% of them believe that this is only an expression
of political disagreement. 11,36% of them have undefined postures.

On the other hand, this agreement seems to be only the beginning of the negotiations that
would include other issues, such as are information, health-care, etc., as a chain reaction for
the normalization of life in Kosova. Therefore, it could happen that new agreements will
follow. The number of those that believe this makes up 70,27%. This is maybe natural
knowing that the agreement reached between Rugova and Milosevic will accelerate the
discussion about health-care, because the Faculty of Medicine is nothing else but a complex
of clinics in which students work together with their teachers. Only 12,35% think the
contrary. 17,37% have no specific opinion.

The results of the survey in Prishtina show that the agreements signed between Rugova and
Milosevic has the support of the majority of the citizens, for they consider it as Rugova's
political success. Even despite the fact that the students have not gone back yet to school and
the day when they should go back is not determined yet, and any forecast is needless,
nevertheless the public strongly believes that the return will not take place within this month.
When this fact is taken into consideration and it is placed in the context of the evaluations of
the signing of the agreement as Rugova's political success, then it is easy to draw the
conclusion that the declaration of these citizens is not the result of an euphoria but of a
constant conviction.

In regard to the statements of the interviewed, the survey has produced difference between
those people with university degrees and the rest. The best illustration is that of the evaluation
of this agreement as Rugova's success or failure. 100% of the interviewed with lower
qualifications believe that this is his full success, while in the category of the professionals
with university degrees, 85% of them shared this opinion. On the other hand, 81% of the
people with lower qualifications believe that the agreement will be implemented within this
month, 29,31% of people with high school diplomas thought so, while in the case of the
university graduates that number was less than 20% (19,69%).

Anyhow, the agreement was signed, its technical realization remains to be achieved,
accompanied by the evaluations of the public about the political success and the convictions
about the initiation of the new negotiations to follow.

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KOSOVA

FROM ABNORMAL TO NORMAL REPRESSION?

by DUKAGJIN GORANI / Prishtina

Today, six years after the people's exhaustion in houses-schools at the outskirts of the towns,
no one finds the strength to claim in public that it was precisely because of the "political
debate" that our children were expelled from school buildings; that because of these
"debates", over 150 thousand people were dismissed; and that these political "debates" incited
the punishing expeditions throughout Kosova in search of the invented Albanian weapons.

How did it happen then that the unprecedented police repression of Serbia was formulated in
the recent Rugova-Milosevic agreement as an issue outside the "political debate"?

"The normalization of the situation in Kosova" - whose first step toward is this agreement,
people say - seems to be the most popular syntagma of our political couloirs. Itself, this
sentence carries something magic, irrefutable for a people that has lived six years in totally
abnormal conditions, without jobs and without schools. For the people and its exhaustion it is
not hard to outline the societal priorities - and here, normalization of life has no rival
whatsoever. Over 400,000 emigrated and totally unemployed Albanians consider it to be as
an undisputable priority. And, maybe, this will be the denominator of the signature of this
agreement, which although stated to be unconditional - and that formally should not be
considered a (political) step forward towards the solution of Kosova's problem- caused the
conceptual hesitation within two opposite opinions within two totally opposite postures
towards the solution of Kosova's problem:

- that the normalization of life in Kosova should come with the solution of Kosova's
status;

- or, that the statutory issue must be postponed for next debates, after the gradual
decrease if repression by letting Albanians go back to a normal social life.

The insisting on solving the status as the primary issue and as source of all people's
misfortune was the political program of the LDK and a definite posture of the President of the
Republic of Kosova, Ibrahim Rugova. From this angle, all postures contrary to this one, in
these six years of political pluralism, were defined as autonomist and defeatist. There were
quite many of those, starting from Demaçi's "Balkania" up to confederacies within the FRY.

Today, it is said that by signing the agreement with Milosevic, Rugova has changed the
political course of the Albanians. And, that by placing the fate of the Albanian students
outside political frames he won big social victory. But, there are also those who believe that
he entered an insecure diplomatic path towards the possible compromise on the status of
tomorrow.

On one hand, the repression against Albanian education reached the highest level of the
Serbian violence in Kosova and almost the "basic" mistake of Milosevic's regime during the
attempts to subjugate Kosova Albanians. Consequently, on the other hand, the Albanian
politics in Kosova held the educational system as their strongest political card in front of the
international instances - it was the harshest illustration of an unbearable repression. All

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international organizations, when reporting about the situation in Kosova, stated that the
situation of the Albanian education was a basic violation of the human rights of a community.
Today, a part of international observers in Kosova and outside consider the signature of this
agreement - as an pre-electoral amendment of a basic mistake by Belgrade- as a big civilizing
achievement in the Balkans, the interruption of Serb repression and a big political point
gained by Albanians.

Today, two weeks later, the specific weight of the problem of the status of Kosova would be
much bigger if it would be solved within the "repressive package", and in no way just
partially. Also, according to these analyses, those who claim that the international community
was the one to congratulate both sides of the reached agreement, must be reminded that none
of the relevant political instances in the world, the EU or the State Department, e.g., has ever
pronounced itself in favor of the independence of Kosova, but rather as an indivisible part of
Serbia, i.e., FRY.

It was precisely the "normalization of life" through "political gradation" that was aimed at as
the final solution to Kosova's problem. On the other hand, if there were international forces
that could have hesitated about Kosova's status within Serbia, then they probably took into
consideration the vital aspects of life that were ruined by force - when again, education was
considered a priority.

From this aspect, the fulfilment of the norms of the "normalization of life" - an option of the
signed document - on one hand can create a less tense atmosphere. However, it could also
imply the parallel decrease of the (ever more smaller) interest of the world for the solution of
Kosova's main problem - it's status. Therefore, through this "de-construction", the Albanian
question in the Balkans could slowly be transferred to the caseload of people without a solved
status, but that have a "normal life". This process could last forever. In other words, this could
also sound as an irony, to go down from abnormal to normal repression - towards the level of
bearable repression, towards the "conflict of a lower intensity".

In Kosova today, it is hard to find a person that would justify the continuation of the
educational system in the dark cellars in the outskirts of the towns. This was proven by the
burst of euphoria after the news was broken. Done. But, a new dilemma arises. Was the
political timing right? Talks about education started in Geneva in 1992 and the suggestions
that arose were more or less similar to the ones stipulated in this agreement. Further on, as the
chairman of the Parliamentarian Party, Bajram Kosumi, says, Gert Arens had a much higher
mediating position than Monsignor Paglia. What was reached with this agreement that was
not comprised in the old proposal? Four years were lost in the meantime. Someone will say
the unconditional release of the school buildings. Maybe, but also very undetermined.

The majority of political observers and analysts consider that the document's biggest failure is
the fact that it contains no date for its implementation. The sceptical Albanian convictions can
be illustrated in one sentence expressed by Demaçi: "Milosevic will deceive us again".

There are also rumors about the problems that arose inside the LDK one day after the
agreement was published, about the fact that it was unclear whether the accord also foresaw
the return of Albanian university students to their faculties. And, this was almost a tragic and
comic reason for the delegation presided by Fehmi Agani to go to Belgrade to clarify the
ambiguity "Albanska deca i omladina" (the Serbian translation of the document) and"

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Albanian students" (the text in English) with the new Minister of Information of Serbia,
Aleksandar Tijanic.

Further on, judging based on the statements made by Rexhep Qosja, Adem Demaçi, Bajram
Kosumi and Bujar Bukoshi, the agreement can be considered a success for Rugova, but not
for the political course of the Albanians. In these postures, the so popular notion of the LDK,
"secret diplomacy" is also understood as the institutionalization of political authoritarianism.
Thus, when we asked why weren't the Parliamentarian commissions or the governmental
organs consulted, we were told at the LDK that "the parliament doesn't function" and that "the
government is not here". And that it was precisely the "secret diplomacy" that derived this
political success. Although, each Friday, in the press conference, we get reports about the
continuous activity of the parliamentarian commissions of the Parliament, which from now
on then, really doesn't function.

It is hard to ignore that these interesting approaches towards diplomacy devaluated the little
political institutions of the Republic of Kosova. It seems that today, more than ever, the fate
of the political will of the Kosova Albanians fully depends of the diplomatic plots within the
seat of the Writers' Association of Kosova. If similar signatures will come - and they are
expected to come - then they will unconditionally help cementing the actual leading
nomenclature of the LDK (on its own).

Despite the fact that such "normalization" can always be followed by comments that these
don't imply the solution of Kosova's status, the political postures after this agreement proved
that the LDK insists on becoming the only leading nucleus with the exclusive right to execute
the people's will.

If this agreement has presented the Government, the parliamentarian commissions and other
political parties as full political outsiders - their further existence as a policy-making center
becomes a decoration. "They could exist, but not necessarily", seems to be the message of our
secret negotiators.

With his signature, Rugova has changed the tables of the Albanian political course, but also
set a deadline to his credibility as a leader. Now, all in Kosova wish to know when? When
will children be allowed to go back to school? We will see whom will time work for.

In the meantime, Albanian students remain where they have been in the past six years. All
know that they will go back to school one day. But don't know what day...

KOSOVA

A POLITICAL GROUP FOR A NON-POLITICAL AGREEMENT

by ASTRIT SALIHU / Prishtina

The Serbian Minister of Education appeared once again with another interview, this time in
"Nasa Borba", in which he, among others, announced that the comeback of Albanian students
to the school premises will end "next year". Therefore, for the time being, it is expected that
the 3+3 groups meet and agree upon the technical realization of the agreement. The Serbian

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government was appointed Ratomir Vico, Dobrosav Bijeletic and Goran Percevic as members
of its delegation. At first sight, nothing unusual, for the Serbian government is only attaining
to the obligations it took by signing the agreement. And this agreement states that the groups
must be established and that the whole agreement is excluded from any "political conditions".
Such a formulation of the Rugova-Milosevic agreement should determine the formation of
the working groups for the implementation of the agreement with people that belong to
education or at least by people that are acquainted with the infrastructure of education in
Kosova.

If we know what are the functions that Ratomir Vico has had so far, and especially Goran
Percevic, then the impression is that the Serbian side is giving it political color to this
agreement, and especially its realization. Naturally, the agreement cannot be taken out from
the political context, for it has been reached among politicians or the leaders of two people,
its consequences are political, therefore we can't abstract its reflections on the political
processes in the future and the solution of Kosova's question.

However, the technical realization should have been only the concretization of a reached
political agreement. The Serbian trio in its present composition as well as the possibility to
discuss modalities without any deadlines in sight, can lead towards many obstacles. The
politicization attracts the issue of financing, the seal-stamps, curricula, in one word, the Serb
jurisdiction. If we have in mind that the Albanian school has ben working outside its premises
since six years ago, because of the mentioned reasons, then, any imposition for the realization
of the agreement for the return to school premises could last too long and face many
obstacles.

Maybe these are only suppositions, but if one has in mind that the negotiating party is the
Serb one, nothing should be excluded.

INTERVIEW

BAJRAM KOSUMI, Chairman of the Parliamentarian Party of Kosova

EVEN AGREEMENTS CAN LEAD TO WAR!

Interviewed by DUKAGJIN GORANI / Prishtina

KOHA: When did you find out about the secret conversations between Belgrade and
Prishtina and what is your opinion about the Rugova-Milosevic agreement?

KOSUMI: I would initially evaluate the agreement dualistically: the procedural part and the
content of the agreement.

All political parties in Kosova declared that they were not informed about the existence or the
flow of the conversations. We as a party that formally participates in the non-constituted
parliament were not informed either. Not even the MPs , members of the parliamentarian
groups had been informed about it. I stress this, because extra-parliamentarian parties could
have been not informed - but, the commissions are no opposition in this context. Further on,
the Government of the Republic of Kosova was not informed either. Not even after the

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signing of the agreement were the parliamentarian commissions convened to be informed
about this act. All I know, I found out from the media.

KOHA: What do you think about "secret diplomacy"?

KOSUMI: I believe that all have understood this notion. However, I doubt that something can
be called secret if the journalists of "Telegraf" and "Nasa Borba" know something far earlier
than the Albanian political parties, especially in this regard. This is no secret diplomacy.

The truth is, the majority of us knew that there were secret conversations between Belgrade
and Prishtina. However, this was a private knowledge, discussed in the cafes, and not
officially, as it should have been. There can't be any secret diplomacy if our main institutions
are not informed about this diplomacy. This is a de-institutional act of the President and this
is undisputable! We have voted for him, we can support him if he is our president. We also
consider that the creation of an institution, a small but independent from Serbia, is a big step
towards our independence. However, all activities outside the institutions, the marginalization
of the institutions is one step farther from freedom. We must learn to either make secret or
public diplomacy. But, the institutions we have created, we can't ignore. They must be part of
it.

KOHA: How accurate this document is, according to you?

KOSUMI: I think that both sides have signed a document proving that they haven't agreed
upon a thing. Absolutely! First, the main act was signed, and then start the dilemmas whether
and where it should be implemented and where not! Another thing is the lack of
consultations with the experts. I believe that such statements/declarations must be prepared by
experts. Each sentence, each word should have its significance. Thus we would have evaded
the ridiculous situations like the one about the comeback or not of the university students.

We still haven't it clear whether this is a statement or an agreement. If this agreement is

realized, I believe that this is a political loss for the Albanians, and this is undisputable. But,
maybe we could win something: children would evade studying in the cellars of our outskirts.
Since we are referring to Albanians students, this victory could be enough. Politically we
would lose, but the students would gain. I admit this. But, all the rest will harm us.

First of all, I will mention the lack of international supervision during the realization of the
agreement. The whole politics of President Rugova is based on this point. No one can oblige
the Government of Serbia to free the premises in a determined period of time. It can do it for
a week, two, but also a year. We are lacking a deadline, and this is very dangerous. According
to this statement, the premises will be released based on the ascertainment of the 3+3 groups
in one week, one year or ten years. Serbia's minister of education declared that the premises
will be at the disposal of the Albanians next year. This is just stalling.

KOHA: What do you think about the future work of the commissions?

KOSUMI: This agreement foresees the creation of the 3+3 groups, and there can be even
worse options: special groups for different levels of education. Something seems almost
certain: the commission will discuss each school apart, each classroom apart and maybe even
each desk and chair apart! Thus, the whole level of dialogue about the Albanian education

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will be reduced to the level of the principals of the schools and the police, that will determine
whose will the desk and chair be!

I believe that the agreement that does not determine these issues is against the interest of the
Albanian party.

In regard to the political background of this agreement. The Kosova Group at ICFY, led by
ambassador Arens had offered something quite similar through partial solutions. In the
diplomatic hierarchy, Arens represented a higher level than e.g., Carl Bildt or Sant' Egidio.
The proposal then was refused by all political parties and Rugova himself.

KOHA: Four years later came Bildt's package...

KOSUMI: And what happens? In the name of the EU, he offers a similar plan with a lower
level of creativity, nevertheless. The political parties were not shown the proposal, and I don't
know whether it was accepted or not, although there were rumors that Rugova had accepted
it. In the tactics of the Albanian politics, a big change has taken place. If it is positive or
negative, remains to be seen. I personally believe it is negative. I believe that the solution of
this problem too would have been solved once the key problem is solved. The consequences
can't be eliminated without eliminating the cause. So far, this was the posture of the Albanian
political parties. Rugova changed this posture without prior consultations with any institution
or party.

KOHA: However, many political observers consider this to be a political success.

KOSUMI: These kind of conversations can create only a hallucination, that the situation is
calming down. These can't solve the problem.

I believe that Milosevic and Serbia have gained from this agreement on the diplomatic plane.
I believe that Milosevic was pressured to sign this agreement. He sold us our human rights as
political concessions and now his new image in the world will be that of a man who is giving
up repression in Kosova, which is not true. He is only fulfilling the basic obligations any state
has. The second reason is that he wanted to activate his dead economy with loans from
abroad. He is fighting to lift the outer-wall sanctions knowing that one of the conditions is
Kosova. He tries to do this by little steps.

KOHA: Should polarizations in Kosova be expected following September 1?

KOSUMI: Maybe what I am about to say will not be understood well by the readers, however
I believe that such an agreement and any other that may follow, without a strong international
supervisor can create conditions for huge unrest in Kosova. I fear that such steps can take us
to war in Kosova. Milosevic, with such steps, is tricking the Serb opinion that he has started
solving the Kosova problem. He is far away from it. His purpose is to keep Kosova under
occupation. On the other hand, he manages to deceive the Albanians, by allegedly proving
that he is willing to sign agreements with the international presence.

On the other hand, the LDK has started propagating that this kind of resistance will give us
freedom. The LDK evaluated this agreement as the success of its policy. This is a very
dangerous deception for both Albanians and Serbs. I don't doubt that the day in which the
Albanians will lose faith in their parties, will come. One part will maybe subdue to the

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situation, but the other could take another path, a very dangerous one, not only for Albanians
but all the rest.

RHODOS

THE ISLAND OF THE THIRD OPTIONS

by VETON SURROI / Rhodos

Following a two days debate, Albanians and Serbs gathered in Rhodos found out many things
that should be still clarified. However, strangely enough, three things have become clear: that
there is an Albanian question in the Balkans, that the "Albanian space" exists, but it would be
dangerous to make its territorial unification and that the question of Kosova, as the most
sensitive part of the Albanian question should be solved according to the principle of self-
determination.

If there is a fruitful theoretical result from the debate in the Rhodos Conference organized by
the largest German private Foundation, Bertelsmann (financed by the medial giant of the
same name), then the three described principles would be that. In order to come to these
conclusions, both sides have used the arguments they have presented hundreds of times so
far. The Serbs said: the Kosova question is part of the historic sensibility of the Serbian
people, that Albanians wish for secession and the creation of Greater Albania, something that
will alter the Balkans' balance of forces, and that Albanians with their attitude are preventing
the process of democratization of Serbia. The Albanians claimed: the Albanian people is a
divided one, and that after the disintegration of Yugoslavia the partition has multiplied, and
that the Albanian people in Kosova has the right to decide whom will it live with in Kosova,
and that Serbia has no other argument but violence.

Naturally, these two positions have been presented in this article in a simplified way, but
more or less cover the debate.

In fact, as the presenter of the introductory statement in this meeting, in relation to the
political relations between Albania and the Albanians in the "FRY" and Macedonia, I myself
was facing the dilemma whether I should go into more details. I decided to draw this part of
the debate towards the essence of the present political relations among Albanians. First, they
are multi-centric, because historically there was never only one political center for Albanians.
Therefore, we are divided in the Tirana-Prishtina-Shkup (Tetova) triangle, and this influences
quite a lot the attitude of the Albanians as a whole in the Balkans, as well as their individual
behaviour in the regions where they live. This will for sure influence also the form of finding
the solution for the Albanian question (differing from Serbs and Croats, Albanians officially
don't ask for the change of the borders by force), and the eventual solution to use the inter-
Albanian cooperation as a test of inter-Balkans cooperation.

One participant of the meeting elaborated the war scenario, that according to other
participants meant a wider Balkans confrontation. According to the presenter of the scenario,
Albanians would find themselves in a very difficult situation, not only warring, but also in the
aspect of the refugees: so far, only Pakistan and New Zealand replied to UNHCR's survey on
the eventual refugees from Kosova, willing to accept a restricted quota of refugees. Here too,

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nevertheless, the Albanian-Serbs differences became evident: while Serbs evaluated that the
present political dynamics are going towards the cooling down of the tensions and escaping
war, Albanians feel that the threat of war is not over yet, and this in this case, it would be a
factor of unification of the Albanian activities - towards the physical defense of Albanians.
Albanians from Macedonia and the whole state of Albania will be involved too.

If there is no war, and if the present situation is not that of peace, therefore, if we are not
neither in peace nor in war, what will be future of the Albanian question? According to the
organizers of this meeting, the future situation of Albanians should be evaluated according to
the sample of Kosova. What will happen in Kosova will influence; largely the developments
in Macedonia, where, as evaluated in the debate, Albanians have come to the point of no
return towards the realization of their rights that derive from the concept of a people with
equal rights.

But, what happens with Kosova? The organizers, according to the experience of the studies
made so far, perceive three possible scenarios. One, no solutions for a long period of time.
Two, find a solution by applying the new notion of self-determination but without secession,
i.e., have Kosova remain in the FRY with broad self-organizing rights. And three, Kosova be
independent.

These three possible scenarios, for the organizers of the meeting, are at the same time inciters
for the creation of three working groups. The three should be comprised of Albanians, Serbs
and West-Europeans (Americans) in order to detail the modalities for the functioning of the
three options. When the groups will finish their work, there would be a plenary meeting that
would discuss the results of the work. Deadline: next spring. The time in which, both Serbs
and Albanians agree, the opening of the issue of the political status of Kosova is expected.

CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION

THE THREE PHASES OF A PROVISIONAL SOLUTION

by LINDITA IMAMI / Washington

The Center for Preventive Action is the new initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations, an
NGO seated in New York, organized last week in Washington a discussion about the
situation in Southern Balkans and at the same time presented its first report with
recommendations to ease the tensions in Kosova and stabilize the situation in Macedonia.

The director of the center Barnett Rubin, stated at the beginning that the Center's task is to
draw the attention and make analyses about the ignored conflicts in the world in order to
incite the international organizations, NGOs and governmental organizations to do something
before they become violent conflicts. Rubin stated that the Center decided to concentrate on
Southern Balkans, i.e. in Kosova, Macedonia and Albania, since there has been no open
conflict, but serious incidents that remained behind the big conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia.

He also stressed the importance of this region for the stability in Europe and added that there
is a possibility to solve problems. Rubin added that the report is the result of three visits of
the working groups to the region, of meetings with officials, experts and members of other

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communities in the conflict, studies and consultations with experts of the region and analyses
of the working group based on the main principles for the solution of the conflict.

During the formulation of the recommendations, the working group started from the principle
that the stability in this region must be grounded on the full respect of the Helsinki principles.

The recommendations of the group have been comprised in a report titled: Towards a
Comprehensive Peace in Southeast Europe (Conflict prevention in the South Balkans).

The main recommendations are the following: the USA should appoint a special envoy for
issues not comprised in the Dayton Agreement, as is the question of Kosova, other ethnic
issues in Serbia and Macedonia, as well as intensify diplomatic initiatives, private and public
in Macedonia and keep up with the "outer wall sanctions" against FRY as long as a
substantial progress in the solution of the Kosova conflict is reached. As regards Macedonia,
the group recommends the cooperation of the Macedonian government, other governments,
NGOs and international organizations to solve the ethnic problems in Macedonia, in
accordance with the principles of a civil pluralist society. In its special recommendations for
Macedonia, the group suggests the expansion of the possibilities for the education of
Albanians, the electoral reform, the strengthening of the local administration and the
continuous improvement of the relations between Macedonia and Albania.

Special recommendations for Kosova - since according to the group "both parties are far away
from reaching the agreement about the final status of Kosova, the group suggests the
achievement of a provisional solution that would decrease the tension and will create a new
situation in which the discussions would take place. The group recommend three phases:

- undertake measures to increase the mutual trust between the parties;

- dialogue and negotiations, and

- an agreement for the provisional solution of the conflict.

In the first category, the group suggests the Serbian government puts an end to the violation
of human rights in Kosova (including police repression, political imprisonments and the
confiscation of passports), allow the free press and allow the return of the OSCE mission to
Kosova.

In reference to the Kosovan party, the report states the urge for the Albanian side to reiterate
their peaceful policy, reiterate the rights of the Serbs in Kosova, to calmly communicate their
willingness to postpone the discussion about independence until the conversations on easing
the tension start. According to this group, both parties could be assisted by a third party and
the international factors.

The CPA is of the opinion that a provisional agreement can be reached without asking the
parties to change anything about their postures on the final status of Kosova. As an example
of such an agreement, the panellists suggested the re-opening of the schools in Kosova by the
Serbian government and the participation of Albanians in the political institutions of the FRY
(and not of Serbia). At the end of the recommendations, the group mentions the economic
efforts ( a corridor of transportation between the east and the west), thus connecting the
countries of the Balkans and as a path towards their integration in Europe.

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In the last week's discussion, the participants highly evaluated the recent agreement reached
between Belgrade and Prishtina about education in Kosova. Panellists are of the opinion that
many things remain to be clarified by the 3+3 group, as is the issue of the curricula and
financing, but in general evaluated that this is "the first and important step in the right
direction".

Seymour Topping, head of the working group of the CPA on the Balkans and one of the
editors in "The New York Times", stated the importance of extending this agreement to the
participation of Albanians in the police, jurisidiction and all media. He stated during his last
visit to the region (August '96), he had noticed the flexibility and willingness of both sides to
make concessions and undertake concrete measures.

Asked about how serious this agreement is, for contradictory information is arriving from
Prishtina and while Belgrade is known for not respecting what it signs, Barnett Rubin,
replied: "It is necessary to stress that the importance of the implementation of the agreement
and its success will depend on its implementation. Regardless of the reasons of the Serbian
side to have chosen to get into this agreement, it is important that it respects this and any
other possible agreement. When it comes to the solution of Kosova's status, we have no
posture, this is up to the parties to agree upon".

CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION

PRINCIPLED COMPROMISE

The impressions of the delegation of the Council on Foreign Relations published in

Barnett Rubin's report, in the meetings with Albanian political activists in Kosova.

During its visit to Prishtina, coming from Belgrade, the delegation of the Council on Foreign
relations met with the members of the executive committee of the LDK, including Fehmi
Agani, Hydajet Hyseni, Rexhep Ismajli and Naip Zeka. Their postures and positions initially
offered little space for optimism about the change of the tensed political situation.

Agani's presentation was direct, stressing that the main posture of the LDK was independence
and not autonomy. He illustrated this with a thorough explanation about the history of
Yugoslavia from the beginning of this century and the Albanian position in it.

Although the interpretation of the '74 Constitution had been brought up in discussions in
Macedonia and Albania, the members of the LDK considered its discussion essentially
unimportant. They simply insisted on the fact that Yugoslavia ceased to exist and that the
FRY is actually a illegitimate state. According to them, FRY was established through illegal
means, including in its composition Kosova without the will of the Albanians. They repeated
their statements about the full sovereignty over the whole territory of the province.

The members of the executive committee expressed quite conflictive postures about the step-
by-step approach and compromise. They wished to present themselves ready for compromise,
but only in principle. During the discussion, they never gave up on their main posture -
independence. They stressed that international presence in Kosova before starting any
conversations would be welcome. However, they expressed their doubt for such presence

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didn't prevent the conflict in the past, therefore all future presence should be accompanied by
the "demilitarization of the region and the establishment of the civil administration" It became
clear that when they said civil, they meant local Albanian administration.

They were very careful to stress that the movement towards the solution can't convert into the
form of Kosova as an integral part of Serbia. "We know that there will be gradual movement.
But, we believe that gradual things can't start with one act that would confirm Kosova as an
internal part of Serbia". The resistance towards being part of Serbia would extend towards the
ideas of democratic Serbia. "A democratic Serbia would recognize the Albanians the right to
self-determination. The test of that Serbia would be reflected in the posture towards Kosova's
self-determination".

LDK has converted into a deep nationalist leadership. Its chairman, Ibrahim Rugova, has
considerable international prestige, as the result of the organization and keeping the course of
the peaceful movement for independence, refusing the way back to violence. The members of
the leadership of the LDK reported that their party had established an international network of
supporters and that it was ready to gather considerable funds from their emigrated
compatriots. Inside Kosova, it had created a network of parallel institutions that stressed the
boycott of the Albanian population towards the Serbian official institutions.

Invited by the LDK, members of the delegation visited some alternative Albanian schools. A
high school the delegation visited, worked under extremely difficult conditions. It was
crowded (850 students used 12 class-rooms in three shifts). The students were sitting on the
ground beside one-another during the classes of math and history, also attended by our
delegation. There is an enormous lack of school books and other materials, that was
accompanied by lack of teaching staff.

Nevertheless, the expressed conviction of the Albanian activists during the formal meetings
of the delegation were in full contrasts with the wish for "normalization" expressed privately
by a Kosovan in the dinner offered by the LDK. In this context, the "normalization" would be
defined as a full reinstallation of the political rights of Kosova under the provisions of the '74
Constitution. Some Kosovans, including this participant, consider that the normalization of
the system of education should be of central importance and could represent a step forward
towards the political solution. The delegation had restricted possibilities to examine the
opinions different to those of the LDK.

The meeting with the local Serb authorities implied nothing more than a reiteration of official
postures heard at the Foreign Affairs Ministry and from the Serbian President in Belgrade.

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EDITORIAL

THE LOUDSPEAKER, THE BUTTERFLY AND OTHER THINGS

by VETON SURROI

THE TRAVEL OF THE MUSIC BOX

A singer from Albania, in advanced pregnancy, visited Prishtina together with a colleague of
hers. The latter arranged a series of public presentations in front of the local public in a
restaurant that just had opened in Prishtina and combined the path of learning what Kosova
was like with assuring financial security on their way back and forth. On the critical night,
during the exploitation of the vocal blessing that she had given the colleague, the loud-
speaker that was standing above started an unnatural and unpredictable fall and ended
crashing against her head.

The pregnant singer looked at the painful grimace of her colleague that was just hit by the
loudspeaker, and showed solidarity with her shock although she was not hit by the speaker.
The pregnancy just increased the shock, it hastened the biological watch and shortened the
time for the delivery of the baby she was carrying. The child was born that night, and some
ten hours later, the former pregnant singer sang again in front of the public gathered in the
restaurant, occasionally glancing at the loudspeaker.

Lesson: loudspeakers carry emotions.

THE LAST RUSTLING

A colleague of mine was meditating about the transcendency of the human expression or
thought, centring his eyes on the passers-by of a cafe, holding a lit cigarette with one hand
and drinking coffee with the other. In a situation of full mental and physical preoccupation, he
felt a slight rustling, felt, as it is said, by writers when they come up with an idea that has to
be put on paper, or the scientist that discovers the unknown missing element that completes
the equation.

The colleague probably thought that this had happened to him, and he stood up. During the
day, he hadn't noticed any genial idea had come to his mind, but rather that he was gradually
paying less attention to what the others were telling him. And this situation continued the
next day too, when the colleague started eliminating all the attention to human expression. He
had managed to understand about the transcendency or non-transcendency of the human
expression. They had another path and would not enter his mind.

The rustling, nevertheless, didn't disappear and my colleague finally understood that it will
not go away unless he visits the doctor and removes the butterfly that had entered inside one
of his ears the day before.

Lesson: concentration is a precondition for a clear mind and filthy ears.

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THE QUESTION

There is no man with a information, be it the most superficial, that doesn't wonder when and
how will the Kosova question be solved, and whether the Rugova-Milosevic signatures are
the beginning of the solution. If all the prognoses made since 1990 are to be collected,
together with the public evaluations made about this agreement, then it would become evident
that the questions keep being the same, as well as the answers. All the other things have
moved, but the questions and the answers. Even the loudspeaker and the butterfly.

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