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Nat Hazards (2012) 61:873877

DOI 10.1007/s11069-011-0058-4
SHORT COMMUNICATION

Progressive climate change and disasters:


communicating uncertainty
Shabana Khan Ilan Kelman

Received: 12 November 2011 / Accepted: 3 December 2011 / Published online: 18 December 2011
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Communication of uncertainty gained prominence from risk communication work starting


in (at latest) the 1980s and has increasingly become salient with a growing need to
communicate uncertainty of climate change impacts (USPHS 1995; Nerlich et al. 2010).
Nonetheless, ignorance, apathy and blaming persist in many sectors, from the general
public to specialist scientists, indicating various (mis)understandings of and responses to
uncertainty. The reasons are complicated, but some can be understood by addressing what,
why, whom, how and when uncertainty is communicated.
A major dilemma of communicating uncertainty is that it is more about certainty
(Sandman and Lanard 2011). Failure of uncertainty communication or its misunderstanding may lead to loss of trust, a poor reputation and inadequate response (Sandman and
Lanard 2011). One common misinterpretation of hazard uncertainty is that a 100-year
flood will not happen soon after its recent occurrence. That can reduce public preparedness, and subsequently, a repeated occurrence of such flood could lead to further asset
losses along with loss of trust in risk communication.
A few important dimensions to consider in communicating uncertainty are information
on its (1) source, (2) scale and (3) complexity. While it may seem obvious to communicate
the source of uncertainty, it does not always happen. Disasters such as fires, floods, and
droughtseven earthquakes and tsunami!are misattributed to climate change (Sarewitz
and Pielke 2005). Frequently, the causes of hazards and disasters are portrayed to be
external to the human domain, discounting human actions and vulnerability. For example,
floods are often communicated to be caused by heavy rain or snowmelt without accounting
for the role of human activities changing river morphology and local vulnerability, despite
repeatedly being pointed out in the literature.
S. Khan (&)
Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, India
e-mail: shabana.khan@hotmail.co.nz
I. Kelman
Center for International Climate and Environmental ResearchOslo (CICERO) and Risk Reduction
Education for Disasters (Risk RED), Oslo, Norway
e-mail: ilan_kelman@hotmail.com; ilan_kelman@yahoo.com
URL: http://www.ilankelman.org

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Science has travelled a long path of shifting the cause of hazards and disasters from acts
of deities to acts of nature and then to acts of humans; however, root causes are often not
made clear in communicating uncertainty to the public (Kapur 2010; Hewitt 1983). A
change in communication from floods killed 100 people to 100 people died by not being
able to respond, due to lack of awareness or choices to deal with rising waters shifts
responsibility to humans, implying need for a different response. While the first requires
managing fatalities, the latter questions vulnerability, which could be due to the peoples
own actions or due to actions of others living nearby or far away.
A few messages of uncertainty from news media in 2011 regarding hazards and
disasters, including climate change, communicated similarly to past messages. For
example, 05/09/2011Somalia famine may kill 750,000 (emphasis added)or 20/07/
2011Climate change poses a major threat to future peace and security (emphasis
added) (World News Atlas 2011). In these messages, not only is the source of uncertainty
external, but also the uncertainty around the impacts creates a fear rather than indicating
any scope to overcome the barrier.
Scale (both spatial and temporal) is another aspect of communicating uncertainty. Major
assumed threats from climate change, such as millions migrating across borderseven
when such worries might not be based in reality (Hartmann 2010)are often communicated at the global scale, aggregating the concern, yet remaining distant from the local
vulnerability, impacts and responses. Accordingly, even if higher-level authorities plan, the
scenarios might not be acceptable at the local level for response. This is particularly so
when the risks from climate change have not yet been witnessed by most at the local level
(Nerlich et al. 2010). Therefore, downscaling of such information including uncertainty is
essential for public acceptance, participation and response (Shaw et al. 2009).
Some other hazards, such as volcanic eruptions and epidemics including SARS and avian
flu, have global impacts that peter out after months or years. HIV/AIDS is another example of
a disaster (Oliver-Smith 1986), which is as global and may be as long term as climate change.
It also experiences lack of interest, support and actions from some powerful sectorswhere
fabrication of uncertainty plays an important role (such as disparaging the HIVAIDS link).
High uncertainty of when a specific event may occur, such as an earthquake, or an event of
long temporal distance such as a tsunami, can act as a barrier for response and could increase
vulnerability substantially. Disaster risk reduction for distant hazards is noted to be compromised in the face of day-to-day life challenges (Mileti 1999).
In contrast, regular communication of hazards uncertainties along with occurrence of
disasters in near space and time can increase preparedness. For example, in New Zealand,
tsunami-warning systems were installed by the local council in Waitakere City after the
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (Waitakere City 2008). Meanwhile, in the month following
the Christchurch earthquake of February 2011, a one-third increase occurred in the sale of
survival kits in Wellington (Hall 2011). Although science has taken a leap in accepting
climate change and has started communicating methods of response and adaptation
(Anderson 2011), bringing the uncertainty of climate change close to people for their
active participation and response is still a challenge.
Complexity is the third aspect of communicating uncertainty. Due to the interconnectivity of various social and environmental processes, change in one process could modify
other associated processes and therefore local hazards and vulnerabilities. Communicating
such complexity of uncertainty may help to develop management options such as those
discussed for dealing with complexity in technological hazards (e.g. Perrow 1999). It can
be questioned whether large-scale global disasters lead to more impact on humanity
than the smalleroften local and unreporteddisasters when their impacts are aggregated

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875

(La-Red et al. 2002; Lewis 1984). These risks, if seen as interconnected, including those
from climate change, could help people to see the relationship between their actions and
vulnerability, of themselves or of others, thus hopefully bringing changes accordingly.
Why is communicating uncertainty essential? While uncertainty is known to exist in all
aspects of life, communicating uncertainty of hazards and disasters, including climate change,
is needed to avoid action paralysis due to uncertainty. Using uncertainty as an excuse for no
response has been particularly seen in the case for action regarding climate change and its
influences on other natural hazards. Climate change authors might say that action is needed on,
for example, reducing hurricane vulnerability because of the increasing uncertainty in hurricane
regimes that climate change is projected to bring. However, in reality, the action on hurricane
vulnerabilitywhich is needed now especially in the context of the usual uncertainties
regarding hurricane behaviouris equally poor. Communication of uncertainty with which we
live now and linking that to the uncertainty brought by climate change can help people to see the
interlinked consequences of climate change and other hazards along with possible responses of
reducing vulnerability to current hazards while factoring in futures under climate change.
Another component of uncertainty communication is who is communicating and to
whom. The communication of uncertainties by different agencies shows their diverse
agendas. While science communicates uncertainty with an inclination towards quantification and promoting technocratic responses, policy debates tend to minimise or postpone
response due to uncertainties. Many disaster professionals still support a command-andcontrol approach, telling the public what is good for them, despite authors such as Buckle
et al. (2003) critiquing it and providing alternatives. To enhance public participation,
celebrities are also invited occasionally, but their communication is rarely linked to the
understanding of or decision making around uncertainty. After prominent disasters, their
communication is particularly aimed at raising funds for recovery rather than at mitigating
hazards or reducing vulnerability (NZPA 2011). Similarly, climate change communication
has received some prominence with the involvement of various celebrities as advocates of
the environment (Anderson 2011), but not always for mitigating related hazards.
More often, local people are the main audience for whom the uncertainty communication
is designed. While accusations are frequently made that uncertainty is not well understood by
people, it is less helpful when not all information is provided or understandable to them
(Nerlich et al. 2010). Most scientific materials are available and understandable to a limited
group. Many reports including the IPCC work are freely available online, yet they have a
limited audience due to factors such as language, vocabulary, time or internet constraints.
Noting a hunger for useable information from the public (Glantz 2003), various models and
iconic approaches have been tested and used for disasters (e.g. http://www.riskred.org) and
climate change (e.g. http://www.skepticalscience.com), trying to indicate which uncertainties do and do not exist and how to potentially deal with those uncertainties. However,
considering the constraints of accessibility and limited readership, there is need for modifications in uncertainty communication.
How uncertainty is communicated also affects its reception. Mode, language, metaphor
and channels of communication influence the outcome (Moser 2010; Nerlich et al. 2010).
Historically, disaster communication has been a one-way monologueearlier of deities and
later of the technocracy (Hewitt 1983). Critiques of this approach helped dialogue to come
into play between the role of government and public needs, among other entities, encouraging public consultation for disaster risk reduction including climate change adaptation.
Further developments led to intensive discussion among responders, academics, populations
affected, NGOs, international agencies, policy makers and others. A critique is that many
genuine voices with different legitimate interests and focus might disperse as noise, failing to

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respond to uncertainty coherently. For example, in the United States, many of the bottom-up
voices not only are uncoordinated but also communicate contradictory messages (Moser
2010). That may leave people confused and inhibit proactive response.
Sometimes, uncertainty is fermented by vocabulary with positive, negative or neutral
connotations. Discourses of vulnerability and resilience personify discussions (e.g.
Gaillard 2010). Catastrophism often implies a strong sense of powerless victims of
distress despite research and practice demonstrating how much disaster-affected people
(not victims) can and should be doing for themselves (Hewitt 1983). The negative
connotation of disaster descriptionsincluding some of climate changein public, government and academic studies is noted in critiquing the language of Un i.e. unfortunate,
unknown, unscheduled, unplanned, unavoidable, unexpected, unfamiliar, unprecedented,
etc. (Hewitt 1983; Kapur 2010). These communications are more about the devastating
impacts or apportioning blame, which are not necessarily incorrect, but their effectiveness
can be questioned.
Some studies on hazards and disasters including climate change have attempted to use
more neutral language of risk assessment or risk management. That has not always been
successful in shifting positions away from seeing disasters as unavoidable, uncontrollable,
unexpected and unprecedentedagain the Un languageoften supported by climate
change catastrophism (e.g. see the analysis by Weingart et al. 2000). The extensive damage
in earthquakes in New Zealand and Japan this yeartwo of the most prepared countries
reaffirm this situation.
Other initiatives have explicitly used positive messages, emphasising what actions could
and should be undertaken by people themselves to help themselves (e.g. Bajek et al. 2007;
Flint and Brennan 2006; Maceda et al. 2009; Simpson 2002). Disasters have been seen as
opportunities to reduce vulnerability to future events, but sometimes by government
agencies seeking to implement new acts or policies that bring even more command and
control (Mitchell 2006). A need exists to strategise uncertainty communication for more
positive roles that communities can and should play.
The next aspect is when uncertainty is communicated. The claimed uncertainty of
disaster is frequently communicated during and after its occurrence, while communication
of uncertainty in climate change is ongoing now, before many visible signs that may
manifest in future. It can be argued that while communication after disaster occurrence is
more about its management and recovery, the current opportunity to communicate about
climate change in advance of many impacts provides scope for experimentation on disaster
risk reduction, if communicated together.
One aspect of uncertainty communication is the uncertainty of communication itself,
which has been noted to be a contributory factor towards some disasters. For example, lack
of communication contributed to losses in isolated settlements during Hurricane Mitch
(1998), while significant damage was experienced in Mozambiques floods (2000) and the
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) partly due to the breakdown of communication chains
(Wisner 2011). Therefore, communication of uncertainty has to consider not only various
aspects of uncertainty but also the uncertainty of its communication.

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