JudithButlerandthepublicdimensionofthebody

Anewperspectiveoncriticalpedagogy
JorisVlieghe
(CentreforPhilosophyofEducation,CatholicUniversityLeuven,Vesaliusstraat2,3000Leuven,
Belgium joris.vlieghe@ped.kuleuven.be)

This paper is concerned with the question whether education still can have a critical
voice today. One of the central aims of the traditional conception of education consisted in
raising (young) people to become reflective individuals who are willing to distance
themselvestotheexistingsocietalandpoliticalorder.Aswewillshowshortlythisambition
has lost a lot of its credibility. There are good reasons to doubt whether this goal is still
achievable, first of all because the traditional means to enhance a critical attitude within
pupils, stimulatingtheir selfreflective capacities,contributestothecontinuedexistenceand
strengthening of the current societal and political regime. Therefore, to workourselves free
fromthisdeadlock,weshouldconceiveofanotherformofcriticalattitude.
InthispaperIwouldliketodiscusssomeargumentsJudithButleroffersinhermost
recentwritings inconnectionwiththepossibilitiesof sucha critique(Butler,2004a,2004b,
2005). This is because I believe that Butlers notion of the public dimension of the body
(Butler, 2004a, p.26) and her analysis of human vulnerability grant a new way of thinking
about the public dimension of education: here critique no longer refers to the traditional
conception,butoffersthepossibilityofaviablealternative.SoIhopetoshowthattherecent
oeuvreofJudithButlermightpresentamorethanwelcomeandverymuchoriginalposition
withincriticalpedagogy.
I will first go deeper into the problem why precisely the possibility of critique is a
problemforustoday.SecondlyIwillproposeanotherwayofthinkingaboutcritiqueandtry
toshowhowButlers viewsonembodiment mighthelptoelucidatethisalternative.ThenI
willdiscussanambiguitywithinButlersownworkanddefendthatsheproposesinherlatest
work a conception of the anonymity of the flesh, which is not in line with some of her
previousthoughts,butwhichopensneverthelessanewperspectiveonthecriticaldimension
of education. I will close this paper with some remarks on the originality of this Butlerian
position within the field of philosophy of education in general and critical pedagogy in
particular.

Whyisthecriticaldimensionofeducationaproblemtoday?
TheissueIwouldliketodealwithstartingfromaButlerianperspectiveconcernsthe
questionwhetheritisstillpossibleforeducationtotakeacriticaldistancetothecurrentsocial
and political order. This problem is of a crucial importance for a major western tradition,
withineducation,whichhasputforwardasitscentralaimtheeducationof(young)peopleto
becomecriticalandenlightenedcitizens(Biesta,2006,p.24,Masschelein,2004).
Theclassic idealofBildung(edification,cultivation)camedowntothe ideathatthe
main objective of education is the critical inquiry of the existing social order (Masschelein,
2004). Students were expected to become initiated in a cultural heritage and to acquire the
competencies needed to become bearers of social and political progress. The gebildeter
Mensch(educated(wo)men)referredtotheautonomouscitizen,whodevelopsherinternal
potentialities as far as possible, so that she is willing to take the responsibility for the
optimazation of society, for the continual strive for a better, more equal and harmonious
community. This devotion to an ideal society ascribed a prominent critical role to the
gebildeter Mensch: she, more than anyone else, was expected to assume a critical position.
Thiscriticalpositionimpliedatransformationoftheperson.
This point of view is today no longer tenable. This insight is very well captured by
Theodor Adorno, one of the philosophers who had a major influence on Butlers thought,
when he states that in the modern world Bildung has become Halbbildung. Christiane
Thompsoncommentsonthisideaasfollows:theexperienceof Bildungorlearningdoesnot
predominantlychangethestudentsandtheirpointsofviewanymore.Rather,theprospective
experiencesare intendedtoenhancethe studentsspectrumofassets.[]Bildunghas been
transformedintoameasureoftheindividualscapacityforadaptation.[]Whatislearnedis
no longer significant for ones own life but forms a knowledge that is helpful for our
survival.(Thompson,2006,p.7374)So,inourexposuretotheworld,thereisnoroomfor
arealtransformationofourselves.Wearenolongerchangedbytheeducationalprocessand
thereforethetraditionalidealofBildung hascollapsed.Theonlythingthathappenstousis
thatourpositiongetsconfirmedandstrengthened.Weareneveroutofposition,wearenever
confrontedwithamomentofexposure.Thisisbecausetheideaofexposureisdisqualifiedas
atraumaticexperience.Sotheeducationalprocessdoesntencourageustoquestionourselves
andourpositionwithincurrentsocietalandpoliticalorder.
Otherauthorspointtowardsthesamestructuralimpossibilityofcriticalitywhenthey
statethatwithinourcurrentpracticingofandthinkingabouteducationwe haveallcometo

relatetoourselvesasentrepreneursofourownlives(Masscheleinetal.,2007Brckling,
2007)Thismeansthatthepresentsocialandpoliticalregimeispreservedbytheveryfactthat
allactorsintheeducational field(pupils andstudents,teachersandschools,etc.)aredriven
bythewilltoworkcontinuouslyontheirselvesinordertoconsolidateandoptimizetheirown
position. A logical consequence hereof is that the acquirement of critical competencies,
whichseemstobethemajorgoalofpresenteducation,onlyreaffirmstheexistingorder.An
entrepreneurofherself obviously benefits from the ability to reflect constantly upon her
own position. She is by definition a critical self. The focus of this selfcritique is the
permanent assessment of ones strengths and weaknesses in view of the ongoing
capitalisationofoneslife.Soevenifitistruethatnowadaysthecentralaimofeducation
consists in developing in pupils and students capabilities that have to do with selfreflexion
andcriticalinquiry(insteadoffillingtheirheadswithcontentsanderudition),thesesocalled
criticalattitudesimplyinnowaydistancingoneselffromexistingsocietalorder.
Michel Foucault,anothersourceof inspirationofButler, madeasimilardiagnosisof
ourcurrentsituationandsuggestedweshouldappealtothecategoryoflimitexperience,in
order to work ourselves free from this deadlock (Foucault, 1984). As Butler argues in her
comment on Foucaults text What is Enlightenment?, it is only the experience to be
determined by a historically situated discourse (i.e. the preconditions that make our actual
thinking,speakingandactingmeaningful)thatmightofferthepossibilitytobecomecritical,
totransformourselvesandcurrentsociety(Butler,2002).So,theverypossibilityofresistance
againsttheexistingregimereferstoadimension ofexperience inthe mostpassive senseof
thisword:precariousness,being vulnerable,beingpreparedtobeexposedtosomethingthat
obligesustochangeourlives.Limitexperiencereferstoaneventthatexpropriatesusfrom
ourselves, that confronts us with our own finitude and it is precisely in this way that this
experiencegivesusthepossibilitytocriticizethepresentsocialconditionswefindourselves
in.

JudithButlerandthenontransparencyoftheself
Within this Foucaultian framework experience refers to a critical attitude which has
nothingtodowitharationalorintentionaldeterminationofourselvesandthereforewitha
strengtheningofourownpositionasentrepreneurialselves,butwithamomentofradical
passivity,viz.thepossibilityofexperiencingsomethingthathastheforcetochangeourlives,
tomoveusoutofposition.Thereforeitallcomesdowntoanexistentialmove,ratherthanto
thetakingofafirmposition.

Its precisely here that we can invoke the thinking of Judith Butler, who (at least
partly)claimstobeloyaltothisFoucaultianstance.WhatlinksButlersmostrecentwritings
to the aforementioned discussion is her critique to a prevailing line of thought in western
philosophyconcerningthepossibilitytoassumecriticalresponsibilitytowardsonesownlife,
thelifeofothersandthelifeofcommunity.
Shestatesthattraditionallycriticalityrestsupontheassumptiontogiveafullaccount
ofoneself(Butler,2005).Thisisbecausetraditionallycriticaldistancehasbeendefinedin
termsoftheautonomyofacriticalandrationalsubjectthatseeksforanultimatejustification
forheractions.Tryingtolegitimateourmoralobligationstowardsothersandthecommunity,
we tend to found these in a kind of positive essence of what it means being human or
belongingtoacommunity.Onecanthink hereofthe KantianorHabermasiandefinitionof
transcendental (inter)subjectivity that serves as the starting point to legitimize a critical
positiontowardstheexistingsocial,politicaloreducationalorder:whetherwelikeitornot,a
transcendental analysis of moral practice (Kant) or of the communicative practice
(Habermas), will show that we all have to see ourselves as rational subjects who share the
samehumanessence.
Habermasdemonstratesfor instancethatthewill toaddressspeechtoanotherorthe
willtoparticipateinadiscussionalreadypresupposethatwearebeingswhoareabletolisten
tothe arguments of others and who will have to give up our own particular pointsofview
when confronted with a better argument. When we stay faithful to the demands of
communicativereason,weshouldforsakeanyformofviolenceandaccepttheoutcomeofa
rationaldiscussion.Thisisbecauseviolenceistheblindpursueofourownparticularinterest,
whichistheresultoftheclosingofadeeperintersubjectiveessencethatweshouldrecognize
in ourselves. Either we choose to behave as rational and impartial beings, and then we act
accordingtothecoreof humanityweallshare,orwechoosethepathofviolence,andthen
wesuppressthisuniversalhumanessence,inordertostriveforthefulfilmentofourpersonal
andparticularinterests(Habermas1981).Thisclearcutaccountofwhatweareisauniversal
truth about humanity and offers a firm ground to legitimize or criticize existing society or
educationalpoliciesandpractices.
Regardingtherecentproblemofinternationalterrorism,Habermasstatesthatwecan
rationallydeterminewhatisajustattitudetowardstheunenlightenedcriminalswhoavoid
rationaldiscussionandchoosethecoarsepathofviolence(Habermas2003).Weshouldnever
give in to the blackmail of violence and persist in defending the superiority of rational
discussionanddialogue.Andweshouldwithoutfurtherconsiderationreactagainstthosewho

dontwanttotakethepositionoftheimpartialparticipantofsuchadialogue.Theobjection
thatthis is a typical western approach towardsthis problem is discredited by showing how
this position of the critic is itself contradictory. In uttering her critique she in fact
demonstratesthatHabermasisright:shealsoisparticipatinginarationaldiscussionwhichis
onlypossible becauseallparticipantsbehaveaspeoplethatarewillingtolistentotheother
andtoaccepttheopinionthatshowstobethemostconvincing.Everyonewhowantstolive
in full selftransparency should accept communicative rationality and unconditionally
denounceviolence.
So, within a Habermasian framework, one should always start from accepting a
positiveaccountofwhatmakesusmoralaccountablebeings,i.e.creaturesthatarewillingto
live in a social context. This account furthermore offers a firmly validated and universally
acceptedgroundtoofferasubstantiatedcritiquetowardstheexistingsocietalorder.
Butler argues vehemently against this kind of philosophical position. Following
Adornohere,shelabelsthistypeofdiscoursemoralnarcissism(Butler,2005,p.103).This
position, that seeks to found our moral obligations on the loyalty to our own essence as
rational and autonomous beings, as selftransparent and sovereign lawgivers of ourselves,
could furthermore be considered as a good example of the entrepreneurshipofoneself, I
discussedabove.
Butlerdefendsanotherview,arguingthatitispreciselythenegativeexperienceofour
own radical lacking of such a ground that constitutes our moral and communal bindings.
Moralagencyisgrantedbytheexperiencethatweneverreachthegroundofourownorigins.
Being dependent upon conditions that we cannot fully control constitutes us as moral and
accountablebeings.Butlerclaimsthatthereexistsaninescapableopacitywithinourselves,
whichresultsfromourconstitutionassingularcreatures.Andpreciselytheexperienceofthis
lack of transparency, this consciousness of never being able to give a definitive account of
oneself,turnsusintoresponsiblemoralsubjects(Butler,2005,p.3640Butler,2004a,p.20
and48)..Ifindthatmyveryformationimplicatestheotherinme,thatmyownforeignness
tomyselfis,paradoxically,thesourceofmyethicalconnectionwithothers.(Butler,2004a,
p.46).
Consequently, without any reference to an anthropological essence or to a
transcendental ground, it becomes possible to speak in an alternative way about moral
obligationsandthepossibilityofadoptingacriticalattitude.Shefurtherarguesthatthrough
this limitexperience of our own finitude we are confronted with a world and with others
thatchargeuswithresponsibility.Thustheawarenessofnontransparencydoesnotprivatize

us:thestrangenesswithinusdoesntmakeusprisonersofourselves,butconfrontsuswitha
publicdimension,namelythatwecannotescapeourrelationswith theother(Butler,2004a,p.
22). It should be noted that this is not a plea for a relational ontology (our essence = our
relations to the others), but on the contrary the defence of a philosophy of radical finitude.
Our essence, if it is still possible to use this terminology, should better be described as a
void.NotintheSartriansenseofthenothingnessofabsolutefreedom,butastheexposureto
atranscendencethatforcesustorelatetotheotherinanongratuitousway.

Vulnerability
In the following I will substantiate Butlers claims by looking closely to three
examplesshegivesinheressayViolence,MourningandPolitics.Theimportantthingtosee
isthatshelinksthisnontransparencytimeandagaintothepublicdimensionofhebody.
A first example she analyses is the experience of losing someone whom one was
attachedto.This confrontsuswiththe brutefactthatwearebutwhoweare,thankstoour
dependencyuponaparticularother.Whatsingularisesushastodowiththeuncontrollability
ofoursocialrelations.Thesignificanceofmourning,acentralthemeinthisessay,isthatwe
become aware of something that escapes our own meaninggiving control. [O]ne mourns
when one accepts that by the loss one undergoes one will be changed possibly forever.
Perhaps mourning hastodowith agreeing toundergoatransformation(perhapsoneshould
say submitting to a transformation) the full result of which one cannot know in advance.
(Butler, 2004a, p. 21). So we may find ourselves obliged to others because of the
impossibilitytogiveafullaccountofwhoweare,becauseoftheimpossibilitytobeourown
ground.ThestrikingpointhereisthatButlerconnectsthiswithcorporeality:griefcontains
withinitthepossibilityofapprehendingthefundamentalsocialityofembodiedlife,theways
in which we are from the start, and by virtue of being a bodily being, already given over,
beyond ourselves, implicated in lives that are not our own (Butler, 2004b, p. 22, italics
supplied).
A second example she attends to concerns the passionate resistance one may
experience belonging to a political marginalised minority. In this case one can be outside
oneselfwithangerandindignation.Butlerarguesagainstthewidelyacceptedconvictionthat
reduces political engagement to the desire for a society that safeguards the opportunity for
everyindividualtoberespectedinherownsubjectiverights.Thisliberalandlegalistvision,
commonly shared by feminists and advocates of homosexuals emancipation movements,
misses according to Butler the very point at stake. Because the longing to justice in the

situation of oppressed minorities is [a] disposition of ourselves outside ourselves [which]

seemstofollow frombodily life, from itsvulnerabilityand itsexposure.(Butler,2004a,p.
25).Thereforethepublicsenseofresistanceagainsttheexistingsocialorderisnotfoundedin
a rationalist or individualistic morality, but refers tothe experience of human vulnerability.
This susceptibility is further described as an exposition that has to do with our bodily
incarnation,withtheprecariousnessoflife.Orasshestatesis:thebodyhasitsinvariably
publicdimension(Butler,2004a,p.26).
This is a most innovative insight. Butler departs from the traditional (Arendtian)
definition of the public realm as a space of visibility, which grants autonomy to every
citizenandthepossibilitytodefendherownrights.Thiscommonlysharedvisionfailstodo
justicetopassion andgriefandrage,allofwhichtearus fromourselves,bindustoothers,
transport us, undo us, and implicate us in lives that are not our own, sometimes fatally,
irreversibly. (Butler, 2004b, p. 20) This alternative conception of political community
[which]iswroughtfromsuchties(ibidem)referstohumanembodiment:tobeabodyisto
begivenovertoothers(ibidem).Thecorporealvulnerabilityoneexperiencesconstitutesthe
publicandopensupadifferentconceptionofpolitics(Butler,2004b,p.21).
A third example Butler uses to elucidate her position concerns again the reaction
towardsthetreatofinternationalterrorismandthewaronterror.Shearguesthattheviolent
reactionoftheBushadministrationontheattacksof9/11isaveryquestionableanswertothe
experience of physical vulnerability which was explicitly disclosed when the whole world
witnessedthepowerlessnessof a modern nation attackedbysuicidecommandos.Insteadof
deploying militaryactivitiesthe Americanpeopleshould betteracknowledgetheundeniable
exposuretoviolence,thefragilityoftheirownembodiedexistencesotospeak.Asmaterial
embodied creatures we are exposed to the touching, the gaze and the violence of others
(Butler, 2004a, p.26). This awareness, this experience of expropriationoftheself could
offer a possibility to formulate a nonviolent response to the problem of terrorism.
Consideringourphysicalinterdependencyandtheeverpresentmenaceofinjuryanddeathwe
might change our international policy: remaining exposed to [the] unbearability [of grief]
and not endeavouringtoseekaresolution forgriefthrough violence(Butler,2004a,p.30).
Assuchwe mightengageourselvesto[a]collectiveresponsibility forthephysical livesof
oneanother(Ibidem).
These three examples illustrate how an appeal to a certain kind of experience an
experienceofradicalpassivity,ofexposure,ofexpropriationoftheself mightofferawayto
think differently about the obligation to take up moral and social responsibility: this

experienceestablishesafieldofethicalenmeshmentwithothersandasenseofdisorientation
of the first person (Butler, 2004b, p.25). This kind of experience of finitude furthermore
grants the possibility to think of an alternative conception of critique visvis the given
societalorder.Itspeaksforitselfthatthisexperienceofexpropriationhasnothingtodowith
the reaffirmation of a firm subjective position. Nor does this appeal function as a
metaphysical, anthropological or transcendental ground that lays the groundwork for a
universallyvalidatedcritique.

Corporealityasanonymityoftheflesh
The question remains however why this experience of exposure should refer to a
corporealtypeofvulnerability.ButlerstatestimeandagainthatIamneverfullymyself,as
far as my body is never my own body. I think there is no straightforward answer to this
question, as Butler is never quite clear about this issue and sometimes makes, to my view,
incompatible statementsabouthuman embodiment.Iwill illustratethis bya shiftIdetect
withinButlersownthinkingothissubject.
(1)InherimportantstudyThePsychicLifeofPower(Butler,1997a)Butlerdevelops
aratheroddconceptionofcorporeality.Asshepointsoutintheintroduction,oneofheraims
consists in explaining why we become passionate attached to the subjectivities power
regimeprescribesus.Inthisworksheextendsherpointofviewbygivingananthropological
explanation of this willingness to accept preordered identities in terms of our bodys
fundamentaltendencytowardssurvival.
To understand this, one should remind that all subjectivity is the effect of some
discourse.Wearebutwhowearethankstotheidentitiesascribedtous(andspontaneously
accepted by us) according to a given order of meanings. Power subjectivates in the
doublesenseofthisword:(1)webecomesingularizedbeings(2)byrelatingtoourselvesin
terms that are dominant within a given regime of truth. This is the manner in which Butler
actualises Foucaults thesis that subjectivity can be analysed as the result of a double bind
between totalising and in individualising forms of power (Foucault, 1984): we gain our
identityinsubjection(inthesenseofsubmission).
Now the shortcoming of Foucaults analysis is that he cannot explain according to
which psychological mechanisms subjects become willing to accept certain culturally
determined identities. Therefore one should, so is the central claim of Butler in this book,
understand that a powerregime makes use of our desire to exist as somebody. No subject
emerges without a passionate attachment to those on whom he or she is fundamentally

dependent[].Moreover,thedesiretosurvive,tobe,isapervasivelyexploitabledesire
(Butler, 1997a, p.7). Referring to the crucial passage in Nietzsches Zur Genealogie der
Moralthatmanpreferstowillnothing,tonottowillatall,shestates:Iwouldratherexistin
subordinationthannotexist(Ibidem).Subjectivizationinthesenseofbeingsubjectedisthe
subjectscontinuingconditionofpossibility(Op.Cit.,p.8).
IonlyexistastheresultofsocialandculturalconditionsthatIdidnt invent myself:
topersistinonesownbeingmeanstobegivenoverfromthestarttosocialtermsthatare
never fully ones own. [] Only by persisting in alterity does one persist in ones own
being.Vulnerabletotermsthatonenevermade,onepersistsalways,tosomedegree,through
categories,names,terms,andclassificationsthatmarkaprimaryandinaugurativealienation
insociality.(Butler,1997,p.28).So,theconatusessendi(Spinoza),theinstincttopersistin
myownbeing,myfeartodie,makesitintelligiblewhyIamattachedtomyownsubjection.
Beingthissingularmortalbody,unnegotiatableattachedtomysurvival,Iamexposedtothe
violenceofapublic.
Thisviewonembodimentwhichputamajorstressonbiological vulnerabilityand
exploitability is notwithoutproblems.I mention shortlytwoinconsistencies:first,itwill be
obviousthatButlerhereisaproponentoftheclassicalphilosophicalschemesherejects,viz.:
searching for a solid ground to legitimate morality and critique. The concept of conatus
essendi might be described as a fixed, universal anthropological foundation. It offers us
normative and wellfounded reasons to acceptor, forthat matter,toresist tothe social and
politicalorder.
Second,onecouldwonderifthispositionisnotatypicalcaseofwhatFoucaultcalls
biopolitics:thistermreferstothemodernregimeofpowerthatownsitseffectivenesstothe
interest for our own survival (Foucault, 1976). Therefore the assumption that we are all
fundamentallyobsessedwithperseveringourownbeingcanitselfbeanalysedastheeffectof
a (typical modern) power regime. We are asked to relate to ourselves as spinozistic
subjectivities. But there is no necessity in this anthropological selfdefinition and it is
preciselytheexperiencehereofthatcouldopenacriticaldistance.Soperhapsinviewofour
will to survive being an effect of a particular kind of power we should just refuse to be
obsessedwithselfperseverance(asanormativecriterion,thatis).
(2) Now, in her most recent oeuvre, I think Butler offers another conception of
corporeality whichavoidsthesetwocritiquesandwhich mightatthesametime explainthe
relation between vulnerability, embodiment and the possibility of an alternative critical
attitude. This line of thought is explicitly formulated in her 2002 Adorno Lectures (Butler,

2003), which were reworked in the book Givingan Account of Onself (Butler, 2005). Here
shedevelopsherintuitionsinconfrontationwiththeworkofJeanLaplancheandEmmanuel
Levinas.
Central to Laplanches psychoanalytical elucidation of the human condition is the
considerationthatweareallbornasradicalfragilecreatureswhoarefromtheverybeginning
ofourliveshandedovertothecareofothers(Butler,2005,p.70).Embodimentisacondition
of inescapable vulnerability. There is an undeniable frailty of our body that preexists our
coming in the world as selfconsciousness and selfreflective beings. It is the awareness
hereof that constitutes an experience of radical passivity, an inescapable sense of
expropriation.Thisexperiencealsohasapublicdimension:wehavetoacknowledgeourown
incompletenessandourdependencyuponothers.
Butlerthentriestoelucidatethisexperienceofdesubjectivization,whichdisclosesthe
invariable public dimension of the body, through a reflection on Levinass concept of
corporeality.SheintroducesherreflectionswithapowerfulquotebyBlanchot,viz.:Levinas
speaksofthesubjectivityofthesubject.Ifonewishestousethiswordwhy?Butwhynot?
oneoughtperhapstospeakofasubjectivitywithoutasubject:thewoundedspace,thehurtof
thedying,thealreadydeadbodywhichnoonecouldeverown,oreversayofit,I,mybody
(citedinButler,2005,p.84)
ToexperiencethatInever fullyam/own myownbody(andthatItherefoream/own
therefore never fully myself) plays indeed a major role in Levinass thought. Within his
perspectivethestartingpointformoralityhastodowiththevulnerabilityoftheflesh.Before
its possible for me to choose intentionally to answer or notto answer the appeal the other
addressedtome,Imustalreadybetouchedbythatotherinawaythatescapesallsubjective
control. This dimension of passivity, which predates all intentional initiative of and which
constitutes us as accountable subjects, is time and again described by Levinas in corporeal
terms,e.g.:lautredansnotreproprepeau(theotherbeneathourownskin),unesensibilit
immdiate (an unmediated sensibility), la plus matrielle des matrialits (the most
materialofmateriality),(Ponzio,2004).Moralsensitivityissomethingwhichisgiveninthe
experience of being the inhabitant of a body to which we can never relate in a fully
transparentway.There is strangenessand, as is stated inthequoteofBlanchot,asenseof
anonymity,inherenttoourcorporealcondition,whichdesubjectivizesusandwhichgrantsthe
possibilitytothinkanewthepublicrealm.
Now it is essential to link this anonymity of the flesh to vulnerability, so Butler
argues.ThisisstatedunambiguouslyinthiscommentonLevinas:Violence[]delineatesa

physicalvulnerabilityfromwhichwecannotslipaway,whichwecannotfinallyresolveinthe
name of the subject, but which can provide a way to understand that non of us is fully
bounded,utterlyseparate,but,rather,weareinourskins,givenover,ineachothershand,at
eachothersmercy(GOA101).Asaconsequenceofourcorporealnature,weareexposedto
eachother.Thisisexplicitlyrevealedintheinescapablepossibilitytobehurtbyotherpeople
anexperiencewhichmightbeveryrelevantnowadays,intheageofthecontinuousthreatof
terrorism.
It should be clear then that it doesnt make sense to invoke a private realm of
transparentsubjectivityasastartingpointforthinkingaboutmoralresponsibility,communal
tiesorcriticality.We,asfragilecorporealcreatures,shouldadmitthatthereisacommunity
ofthosewhohavenothingincommon(Lingis,1994),excepttheundeniablefactthatweare
exposedtoeachother,andthatwethereforesharetheburdenofresponsibilityandofcritical
engagementwithexistingsocietalandpoliticalorder.Itisnotmy identity,butpreciselymy
anonymous entanglement in the flesh of the world (MerleauPonty) which obliges me to
assumeanonindifferentstandpoint.
Itisimportanttonoteherethatthisanonymityofthefleshisnotofthesameorder
of a universal, transcendental or anthropological foundation (as it is the case in Kant,
HabermasorSpinoza).OrasButler says herself:AlthoughIam insistingonreferringtoa
common human vulnerability,onethatemerges with life itself,Ialso insiststhatwecannot
recoverthesourceofthisvulnerabilityitprecedestheformationofI.Thisisaconditionof
beinglaidbarefromthestartandwithwhichwecannotargue.(PL31).

Thecriticalroleofeducation
This line of thinking is very relevant to the problem of the public and critical
possibilitiesofeducationandthisnotonlyforthereasonthatitavoidsthetemptationtoutter
a critical voice in the name of some universal and transcendental principle. After all, the
uneasinesswithfoundationaleducationaldiscoursehaswidelyspread.Theproblemwiththe
bulk of recent publications in the domain of this nonfoundational critical pedagogy is that
they, in my opinion, are nevertheless still seeking for a solid beacon to hold on to and
thereforeleavenoroomforarealexperienceofexposure.
A striking example of this is GurZeevs philosophical negativism (GurZeev,
1998, p. 463). Making us aware of the limiting character of hegemonial pedagogical
frameworks and of the immoral consequences implied by practices that pretend to have
universal validity, the road should be cleared foran authentic and extratheoretical thinking

and speaking. The educator should forsake the responsibility to find for once and for ever
justified principles of education, in order to recognize the limitations of his/her own
perspective, so that he/she feels him/herself engaged to create openness for the value of
alternativepointsofview.Onebidsadefinitivefarewelltotheepistemologicalobsession(of
justification) so that education becomes a practice that nurtures itself on the moral
engagement to acknowledge alterity and pluriformity. So one refuses all versions of
educationalviolenceandassuch[thisapproach]deservesthenamecountereducation.While
refusingpositiveutopianismandviolenceitdoesnotabandonthequestfortranscendenceand
forthetotallydifferent(GurZeev,1998,p.484).
ForGurZeevandmanyothersthepublicandcriticaldimensionofeducationresides
inthecareoneassumesfortheotherinherotherness.Thisradicalandirrecoverablealterity
nonetheless functions as an alternative to a transcendental ground, one therefore betrays to
remain attached to. The willingness to respect this otherness seems to stem from the same
motivationorattitudethatis characteristicof foundationaldiscourse.Thecommonly shared
visionofcriticality inthe nameofalterity is justanother formofthe belief in(orneed for)
transcendental principles or (negative) foundations. It is in no way a real alternative. The
dedicationtoothernessoffersaconvincingreasontoactinonewayratherthananother.Even
if this isnt a transcendental ground, it remains to be a solid ground anyway. We place
ourselvesinasafeposition,wehopetobetherightkindofperson(educator)byshowingthe
will to assume the responsibility for the fragile other who is left over to our care. So this
immunizesusagainsttheexperienceofexposurewhichisforButlertheappropriatespaceof
criticality.Thisofcoursedemandsanotherattitude,thatis, notanattitudethatis concerned
withfoundations(orproclaimingtherearenofoundation),butanattitudethathastodowith
thewillingnesstogothroughanexperienceofradicaldispossession.
IwouldlikereferhereagaintothereflectionsofChristianeThompson,Iattendedtoin
the beginning of this paper (Thompson 2005): in this era ofHalbbildung we are no longer
changedbytheeducationalprocess,asitisonlyameansofstrengtheningourownposition.
Thompson furthermoreusesButlers intuitionstodepart fromthiseducational modelofthe
selfdevelopment of the (entrepreneurial) subject, in order to find a reactualised concept of
Bildung:[thisalternativekindof]Bildungnolongerformsacategoryofappropriation.The
boundariesthatbecome manifestsuggestratherawithdrawaloftheselftheexperienceof
theinabilitytodetermineoneselfinrelationtoothersandtheworld.Assuch,Bildunghasto
do with the experience of remaining strangers to ourselves. [] [B]ildung changes from a
conceptof identificationtooneof subversion(Thompson,2005,p.528).Itis importantto

stress here that subversion is not the mere opposite of identification. Subversion is not the
reversalofthefoundationalpointofview,butshouldratherbethoughtofasanattitudewhich
opensanalternativecriticalspaceforeducation.
Whatneedstoberefinedfurtherishowthepublicdimensionofcorporealitygrantsthe
possibility of an alternative form of critique, which stays deaf to the desire to find firm
foundations.Thisappealtovulnerabilityshouldalsodomorethan justchallengethesearch
forsuchfoundations.Ihopetohaveshownthatthiskindofexplorationshouldcontributetoa
conceptionofacriticalpedagogythat mightofferawaytodistanceourselves,aseducators
andstudents,totheexisting(pedagogical)regime.WeshouldtakeBlanchotsconsideration
seriousthatsuchacritical movereferstoanexperienceofsubjectivity,withoutasubject,
anexperienceofthealreadydeadbodywhichnoonecouldeverown,orevensayofit,I,my
body.

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