58. AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO.

L82380; 29 APR 1988]

Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture
entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and
other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of
the
intended
film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian
have
developed
a
script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction
and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family
in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising
or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the
name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was
filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance
of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his
family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to
Enrile.
Hence
the
appeal.
Issue:

Whether

or

Not

freedom

of

expression

was

violated.

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to

film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in
theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial
activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for
availing
of
freedom
of
speech
and
of
expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not

exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent

trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There
was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any
right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The
subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public
concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a
"public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at
least,
their
right
to
privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between
the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of
privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed
motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
events.

63. IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [259 SCRA 529; G.R.
NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"
aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The
program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines
and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures
and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121
and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on
the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed
to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128
which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A.
Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of
the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no
indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner
also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner
to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its
TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer,
respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to

Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the
literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the
Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible.
The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not
constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression.
Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption
of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.
RTCs ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. attack is different from
offend any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the
criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to
interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and
beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers,
especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion
prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board
cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom
of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling
ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate
and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of
the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the
clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves
the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be
measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil
apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as
to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or

lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial

function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a
Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly
administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

71. PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5
OCT 1989]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign
initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements
of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western
Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later
burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M.
Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several
officers
and
members
of
various
student
organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy"
magazines
published
and
co-edited
by
plaintiff
Leo
Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as
superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to
enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs
magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that
the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not
per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an
Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy
Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary
injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case
was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was
valid.
This
was
affirmed
by
the
CA.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of
the
petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the
right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to
public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and
sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say,
that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but
rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any
constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is
"whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may
fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men
as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be
decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not
shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to
carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court
provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search
warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and
that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be
seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil
substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene.
The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judges
sound discretion;

73. REYES VS. BAGATSING [125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful
march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon,
starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once
there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be
held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of
such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition
based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases
Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the

exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the
necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally.
However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent
intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to
infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of
people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be
issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area
where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may
be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was
granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a
permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of
Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies
within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or
chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to
peaceably
assemble
violated.
Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly
carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to
parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent
on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear andpresent
danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the
peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing
public
questions.
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges,
immunities,
rights,
and
liberties
of
citizens.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation
and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not
follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his
denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit
to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the
public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private
place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time

to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be

valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that
the clear andpresent danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
Notice is given to applicants for the denial.

74. MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21

MAY 1984]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on
August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they
held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the
basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such
gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with
the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life
Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered
by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were
asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for
holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were
informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to
explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture,
and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of
illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit
granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The
penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action
and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to
peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They
would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious
language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school

premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary
action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder
or
invasion
of
the
rights
of
others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed
students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state,
has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is
accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The
peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an
advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that
may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If
the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from
its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions
as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there
be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.

75. BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA [488 SCRA 226; G.R.
NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue.
BAYANs rally was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested
and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and
violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful
assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was
to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M.
Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to
several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a
multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to
proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and
prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed,
causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of
1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and
14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of
rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy announced
on
Sept.
21,
2005.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a
public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to
the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and
petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a
permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its
provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding
the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard
of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for
being
vague
and
for
lack
of
publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to
assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of
securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to
this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to
deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present
danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for
a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly,
otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy,
they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even
before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or
executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the
maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates theConstitution as it
causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably
assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails
traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or
undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-

neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public

assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny
a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of
a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not
a
content-basedregulation
because
it
covers
all
rallies.
Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in
peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by
theConstitution , is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place andmanner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause
does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to
protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not
relevant
to
theregulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our
legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents
to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of
maximum
tolerance,
this
was
declared
null
and
void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to
take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at
least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of
the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to
the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise
the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of
acity or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.