Milla vs Pp

Facts:
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial Officer of private respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc. (MPI). In
March 2003, Milla represented himself as a real estate developer from Ines Anderson Development Corporation,
which was engaged in selling business properties in Makati, and offered to sell MPI a property therein located. For
this purpose, he showed Lopez a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title registered in the name of spouses Farley
and Jocelyn Handog (Sps. Handog), as well as a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by the spouses in
favor of Milla. Since Lopez was convinced by Millas authority, MPI purchased the property for P2 million After
receiving the check, Milla gave Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 March 2003 executed by Sps.
Handog in favor of MPI and (2) an original Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT After receiving the check, Milla gave
Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 March 2003 executed by Sps. Handog in favor of MPI and (2)
an original Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT Milla then gave Regino Acosta (Acosta), Lopezs partner, a copy of the
new Certificate of Title to the property registered in the name of MPI but did not furnish the latter with the receipts
for the transfer taxes and other costs incurred in the transfer of the property. This failure to turn over the receipts
prompted Lopez to check with the Register of Deeds, where he discovered that (1) the Certificate of Title given to
them by Milla could not be found therein; (2) there was no transfer of the property from Sps. Handog to MPI; and
(3) TCT No. 218777 was registered in the name of a certain Matilde M. Tolentino.
Consequently, Lopez demanded the return of the amount of P2 million from Milla, , who then issued Equitable PCI
Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 dated 20 and 23 May 2003, respectively, in the amount of P1 million each.
However, these checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. When Milla ignored the
demand letter sent by Lopez, the latter, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the MPI Board of Directors, filed
a Complaint against the former on 4 August 2003. On 27 and 29 October 2003, two Informations for Estafa Thru
Falsification of Public Documents were filed against Milla and were raffled to the Regional Trial Court.
After the prosecution rested its case, Milla filed, with leave of court, his Demurrer to Evidence.[9] In its Order dated
26 January 2006, RTC Br. 146 denied the demurrer and ordered him to present evidence, but he failed to do so
despite having been granted ample opportunity.[10] Though the court considered his right to present evidence to
have been consequently waived, it nevertheless allowed him to file a memorandum. RTC Br. 146 found Milla guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.
CA affirmed RTC
Issue: whether or not Milla was deprived of due process because of negligence of counsel?
Decision: No
Held:
Milla was not deprived of due process.
Milla argues that the negligence of his former counsel, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), deprived him of
due process. Specifically, he states that after the prosecution had rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, and that the former was never advised by the latter of the demurrer. Thus, Milla was purportedly surprised
to discover that RTC Br. 146 had already rendered judgment finding him guilty, and that it had issued a warrant for
his arrest. Atty. Mendoza filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Motion for New Trial, which Milla claims to
have been denied by the trial court for being an inappropriate remedy, thus, demonstrating his counsel s negligence.
These contentions cannot be given any merit.
The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client, and it is only in instances wherein the negligence is
so gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to the aggrieved client.[20] In this case, Milla was able to
file a Demurrer to Evidence, and upon the trial courts denial thereof, was allowed to present evidence.[21] Because
of his failure to do so, RTC Br. 146 was justified in considering that he had waived his right thereto. Nevertheless,
the trial court still allowed him to submit a memorandum in the interest of justice. Further, contrary to his assertion
that RTC Br. 146 denied the Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest thereafter filed by his former counsel, a reading of
the 2 August 2007 Order of RTC Br. 146 reveals that it partially denied the Omnibus Motion for New Trial and
Recall of Warrant of Arrest, but granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Avail of Remedies under the Rules of
Court, allowing him to file an appeal and lifting his warrant of arrest.

It can be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that Milla was given opportunities to defend his case and was
granted concomitant reliefs. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his former counsel were so
gross and palpable to have deprived him of due process.

Pp vs Rio
Facts (regarding counsel de officio):
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his
poverty.
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action recommended was for the Court to ascertain from the
accused-appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial court, whether he desired the appointment of a counsel de
oficio on appeal, in view of the reasons stated by him for the withdrawal of his appeal, and inasmuch as poverty
should not preclude anyone from pursuing a cause. It was also recommended that the clerk of court of the trial court
be required by the Court to submit the response of the accused-appellant along with a certificate of compliance with
the duty imposed on him 2 by Section 13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the trial court
upon the presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal case, to ascertain from the appellant, if he is confined in
prison, whether he desires the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Supreme Court to appoint a counsel to defend him
de oficio and to transmit with the record, upon a form to be prepared by the clerk of the appellate court, a certificate
of compliance with this duty and of the response of the appellant to his inquiry.
Issue: whether or not legal assistance should be given to accused?
Decision: yes
Held (dont know if this is from SC or lower court, basta ito ang reason lol):
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the Court in a resolution dated 1 October 1990, denied the
appellant's motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant for, as
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal that the only reason
offered by him for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de parte on account
of his poverty, a reason which should not preclude anyone from seeking justice in any forum.
It seems that the accused-appellant was unaware that this Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his
appeal pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional mandate provided in Section
11 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel
Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is
required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be
poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the
rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have more

in law." 9 Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its
scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over another
Facts (case regarding rape of the child):
The above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will. After relieving herself but
before she could raise her panty, the accused entered the bathroom with his body already exposed, held Wilma's
hands, and ordered her in a loud voice to lie down and when she resisted, the accused got mad and ordered her to lie
down.
The medical report also showed that Wilma is "in a non-virgin state physicially."
The accused's defense was anchored on alibi. Thus, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
rape.
Issue: whether or not accused is guilty of rape?
Decision: yes
Held:
Alibi is inherently a weak defense, easy of fabrication especially between parents and children, husband and wife,
and other relatives and even among those not related to each other. For such defense to prosper, the accused must
prove that it was not possible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 28
In the present case, where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, in this case the accused's
brother Amado, it deserves but scant consideration. 29 Moreover, the Court notes the fact that while the accusedappellant had another brother and sister living in Manila besides the complainant's mother, those two never came to
his aid. Were the accused the innocent man he claims to be, these siblings would have readily helped in his defense.
The testimony of his other brother Amado alone cannot raise the necessary doubt to acquit him as against the
evidence presented by the prosecution.
Furthermore, it would be hard to believe that a female, especially a twelve-year old child, would undergo the
expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, not to mention suffer the scandal, embarrassment and
humiliation such action inevitably invites, as wen as allow an examination of her private parts if her motive were not
to bring to justice the person who had abused her. A victim of rape will not come out in the open if her motive were
not to obtain justice. 30
It is harder still to believe that the mother of a child of twelve will abuse her child and make her undergo the trauma
of a public trial only to punish someone, let alone a brother, for leaving her without the services of an unpaid helper
were it not with the aim to seek justice for her child. Nobody in his right mind could possibly wish to stamp his child
falsely with the stigma that follows a rape.