SANGGUNIAN NG MGA MAG-AARAL NG MGA

PAARALANG LOYOLA NG ATENEO DE MANILA

STUDENT JUDICIAL COURT

BETWEEN

JULIA DARYL S. LENARZ

First Petitioner
KJERRIMYR R. ANDRES
Second Petitioner
ATENEO DEBATE SOCIETY
Third Petitioner

AND

Court:

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Respondent

Pepito C.M., Gaite, Pineda, Segismundo, Sta. Isabel, and Villaruel MM.

Counsel: Paulina Blanca Robles for Third Petitioner

Issued: February 26, 2015
Citation: 2015 SJC 2

PER CURIAM.
[1]

This cause originates from a consolidation of three petitions: the Petition for Review

and Permanent Injunction (first petition) (No. 1503) filed by Julia Daryl S. Lenarz (First
Petitioner), the Petition for Review (second petition) (No. 1504) filed by Kjerrimyr R.
Andres (Second Petitioner), and the Petition for Injunction (third petition) (No. 1506)
filed by the Ateneo Debate Society (Third Petitioner). All three petitions were filed on
February 24, 2015. The Commission on Elections (Commission) filed its reply (first
reply) (No. 1505) to the first and second petitions on February 24, 2015. On February 25,
2015, the Third Petitioner filed a revised version of their petition, stating certain errors were
made in the computation of data they presented in the original one. On the same day, the
Commission filed its reply to the third petition (second reply) (No. 1507).
[2]

The issue before the Court is the extension of the voting period for the Sanggunian

general elections. Voting took place on February 17, 18, 20, and 23, 2015. On February 23
the Commission extended the voting period until February 24. In summary, all three petitions

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2015 SJC 2

assail that extension. The extension was provided for by Memorandum No. 201527 (Memo
201527) issued by the Commission on February 23, 2015. During the same day, the
Commission also issued Memorandum No. 201528 (Memo 201528) stating the rationale
for the extension. The Commission states that problems with manpower left some voting
stations unmanned during the original election period causing an adverse effect on voter
turnout.
[3]

On February 25, 2015 the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order and Subpoena

Duces Tecum to the Commission while judgment on the issue of the extension was pending.
The Court ordered the Commission to hold the release of the results of the general elections
and to furnish it with information on the unmanned voting stations.
Summary of the issues
[4]

In summary, the First Petitioner argues:

(1) that Memo 201528 failed to substantiate that the unmanned voting stations during
the voting period necessitated an extension in the voting period.
(2) that the extension provided for by Memo 201527 violates the Electoral Code.
(3) that Memo 201527 does not carry the force of law as it was made as a
memorandum rather than as a resolution.

[5]

In summary, the Second Petitioner argues:

(1) that the Commission has not been transparent due to the vagueness of Memo
201528 as to the reason why the voting period was extended.
(2) that the Commission may have extended the voting period in response to the
imminent failure to reach the voter quota.
(3) that witnesses have seen members of the Sanggunian and those running for
Sanggunian offices present within the immediate vicinity of the Commissions
base of operations at the closing of elections on February 23, 2015 at 6:00 p.m.

[6]

In summary, the Third Petitioner argues:

(1) that the extension of the voting period violates the Electoral Code.

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(2) that the original voting period was already sufficient time to attain the quota and
that the extension period is unnecessary.
(3) that the extension period is arbitrary and is a grave abuse of discretion that is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission.
[7]

The Court identifies the following converging points of contention among the three

petitions:
(1) whether the Commissions action of extending the voting period is constitutional
and within its jurisdiction.
(2) whether the Commissions rationale of the unmanned voting stations constitute
an acceptable reason to extend the voting period.
[8]

The Court also identifies the following separate, distinct issues raised by the

petitioners:
(1) whether the Commissions action of extending the voting period through a
memorandum instead of a resolution does not make the action carry the force of
law.
(2) whether the Commissions extension of the voting period was done simply in
response to the apparent imminent failure to reach the voter quota.
(3) whether the sanctity of the ballot has been compromised due to the presence of
non-officers of the Commission within the immediate vicinity of the
Commissions base of operations after the closing of the elections.
I. RATIONALE OF THE EXTENSION
[9]

Both the First and Second Petitioner argue that Memo 201527 violated Art. VIII Sec.

2(b) of the Electoral as it extended the voting period to more than four hours. On the one
hand, the First Petitioner argues that the extension promulgated by Memo 201527 constituted
a period of seven and a half hours, beyond the four hours prescribed by the Electoral Code.
On the other hand, the Third Petitioner cites a certain Art. VIII Sec. 1(b) of the Electoral
Code which it says states: the ATENEO COMELEC can only extend voting hours for a

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maximum of four (4) hours past the time stated in the resolution.1 The Court points out that
what is stated by Art. VIII Sec. 1(b) of the Electoral Code, as currently in force, does not
correspond to the quotation provided by the Third Petitioner. Furthermore, nowhere in the
Electoral Code can the provision quoted by the Third Petitioner be found.
[10]

Art. VIII Sec. 2 of the Electoral Code states:

VIII. Casting of Votes
Section 2. Time
(a) The casting of votes shall begin at 9:00 AM and end at 5:00 PM.
Voters can vote only during this period. However, the Ateneo
COMELEC has the option to extend the period for voting if the need
arises.
(b) The Ateneo COMELEC can only extend voting hours for a
maximum of four (4) hours past the time stated.
(c) Election period for voters under the JTA program shall start at 9:00
am of the first day of the Election Period and shall end at 5:00 pm of the
last day of the said period (official AISIS date and time).

The Commission states that as paragraph (b) uses the term hours, hours would pertain to
allowable hours per day whereas period would mean the entire voting period allowable.
The Commission argues that since paragraph (b) does not state voting period but rather
voting hours, then it is within its power to extend the voting period as provided for by
Memo 201527.
[11]

Basing from what the First Petitioner and the Commission argue, the Court finds two

main competing interpretations of this particular provision. By stating that the seven and a
half hour extension violated the Electoral Code, the First Petitioner appears to argue that
paragraphs (a) and (b) mean that casting of votes would begin at 9:00 a.m. of the first day of
and end at 5:00 p.m. of the last day of the voting period and that any extensions beyond that
particular point in time, 5:00 p.m., may not exceed four hours, regardless of which day it is
placed under. The Commission, on the other hand, sees the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. limit as
applying to the number of hours within any particular day in the voting period which would
make the four hour extension limit as also applicable to any and all days within the voting
period.
[12]

The Court, for its part, finds the provision as relatively straightforward. The Court

first points out that paragraph (a) and (b) are under a section titled Time which, in its view,

Third petition (No. 1506)

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points to the intent of this provision as being concerned with time. The Court reads the
particular provision in the context of its plain, everyday meaning which would mean that this
provision covers not the issue of the duration of voting in terms of days but simply the
duration of voting within a particular day. The Court finds that Art. VIII Sec. 2(a) provides
the time where voting can take place for days within the voting period. Furthermore, the
Court finds that paragraph (b) provides that on any particular day in the voting period, the
Commission can extend for a maximum of four hours should the need arise. Therefore the
Court finds that this particular provision in the Electoral Code covers not the duration of the
voting period in terms of days, but rather the duration in terms of hours within a particular
day. The Court thus agrees with the Commission on this particular issue.
[13]

The Court recognizes the fact that such an interpretation of Art. VIII Sec. 2 of the

Electoral Code would lead to the deduction that the Electoral Code does not provide
restrictions on the Commission as to the duration of the voting period in terms of days. The
Court points out Art. XV Sec. 3(a) of the Constitution which provides that officers of the
Sanggunian, with the exception of Freshman Officers, shall be elected by the student body
not earlier than sixty days and not later than thirty days before the end of the school year.2
The Court finds this as the only provision that expressly restricts the Commission with
respect to the voting period. However, the Court also recognizes the fact that this will lead to
the rather absurd possibility that the Commission can theoretically conduct the voting period
for a length of thirty-one days. It is the opinion of this Court that while such provision of the
Constitution does provide a relatively broad discretion to the Commission, such discretion
should be exercised by the Commission with due diligence and not to the point that such
discretion is abused.
II. ON THE ISSUE OF THE EXTENSION
OF THE VOTING PERIOD ITSELF
[14]

The Court now considers the petitioners arguments on the Commissions rationale

for extending the voting period. The First Petitioner argues that the justification presented
by the Commission is not enough to necessitate an extension of the elections.3 He argues
that the Commission failed to show how the problems in manpower the Commission had

2
3

Art. XV Sec. 3(a) of the Constitution.

First petition (No. 1503).

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translated to its need to extend the election4 He argues that the rationale of unattended
voting stations is not enough reason for the extension and that the original four-day voting
period already provided sufficient time for the student body to vote. Furthermore, the First
Petitioner questions the timing of the extension. He argues that the Commission should have
been aware of the problems of manpower in the voting stations at least during the second or
third day of the election. The Petitioner posits that the timing of the extension, made after the
closing of the voting stations, may be simply an attempt to reach the voter quota.
[15]

The Second Petitioner similarly argues that the Commission failed to substantiate its

rationale for the extension of the voting period, pointing out that apparent brevity of the
Commissions reasoning. The Second Petitioner also questions the timing of the extension,
stating that it might have been done simply in response to the need to reach the voter quota.
[16]

The Third Petitioner first states that based on observational research, the average time

it takes to vote is 1.76 minutes. With the Commission allotting seven and a half hours of
voting per day, for four days, and with six voting stations each with three voting booths, the
Commission had a total of 540 hours or 32,400 minutes to accommodate students. The Third
Petitioner then argues that, theoretically, this allows for a maximum of 18,340 students to
vote and only 0.71 days to accommodate the quota of 3,255 votes. The Third Petitioner
further argues that the Commissions rationale of unmanned voting stations still cannot
substantiate the need to extend the voting period as the original voting period of four days
was already enough time to accommodate the required quota of 3,255 votes.
[17]

The Court sees this data presented by the Third Petitioner, in particular the 540-hour

figure, as representing the maximum capacity of the Commissions operations in handling the
casting of the votes. The Court of course recognizes the multiplicity of factors that could
affect this theoretical, highly optimistic scenario. For the Commission to actually have the
capacity to supervise the elections for a complete 540 hours, it should be operating on a
continuous, uninterrupted basis from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. for every election day, for every
voting station, and for every voting booth in each station. While this data implies that the
Commission could certainly accommodate the student body in a much shorter amount of time
compared to even the original voting period, the Court does not see this as representing

First petition (No. 1503).

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anything near what happens in the actual operations of the Commission. Again, the Court
points out the factors that potentially affects the Commissions operations (i.e. software erros,
emergency situations, etc.). Beyond the discrete act of operating the computer terminal to
actually cast a vote, there are several other additional but required procedures such as the
identification of the student-voter through his or her ID, the retrieval of the polling officer of
the password for the computer terminal, and the queue itself where students may need to wait
before they are accommodated by a voting booth. All of these add considerable variation on
each voting stations potential efficiency. Furthermore, the information the Court has
gathered from submissions of the Commission shows that the Commissions operations
during the elections were far from the scenario the Third Petitioner posits.
[18]

On February 25, 2015 the Commission submitted the sign-up record for poll officers

and the attendance sheet for poll officers. The sign-up record represented the number of
hours that the Commission can expect voting stations would be supervised. With voting
stations requiring two poll officers to operate (with the exception of one based on the sign-up
record), the Court counted the number of time slots where no one signed up; these are the
time slots when the voting station can be expected to be unmanned and thus unavailable. The
following table presents the computation. Column 1 shows the dates for the original voting
period while Column 2 shows the number of hours, based on the sign-up record, that the
Commission can expect voting stations to be unmanned on a particular day.

Row 1
Row 2
Row 3
Row 4
Row 5
Row 6
[19]

Column
1
Election
Date
Feb. 17
Feb. 18
Feb. 20
Feb. 23
TOTAL

Column
2
No. of
Hours
32.0
20.0
20.0
17.0
89.0

On the other hand, the attendance report the Commission submitted represented the

actual number of hours voting stations were unmanned. The report was in the form of eight
handwritten sheets consisting of the poll officers names, the duration of their shifts, and their
signatures. The Commission has noted that the primary purpose of the attendance record was
to track volunteer hours and thus not all sheets were labeled with the location of the voting

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station, with the exception of one sheet that was identified as being the record for the voting
station at the Rizal Library. That particular sheet is represented in the following table as
Station 2. In lieu of the other voting stations, the Court has simply identified them by
numbers. While the Court finds the report suffering from defects in form and structure that
hampers the ability to clearly and promptly interpret it, the Court nonetheless finds even from
a conservative analysis of the report that there were a considerable number of hours where
voting stations were unmanned. The figures in the table below represent the number of hours
where no attendance record could be found. The cells filled in with x represent the number
of hours that the Court already discounted from the computation due to the inability to fully
substantiate the lack of attendance records for them. Column 8, Rows 2 to 5 represent the
total number of hours voting stations were unmanned for a particular day in the original
voting period. Columns 2 to 7, Row 6 represent the total number of hours a particular voting
station was unmanned for the entire duration of the original voting period.
Column Column Column Column Column
1
2
3
4
5
Election Station Station Station Station
Row 1
Date
1
2
3
4
Row 2 Feb. 17
6.0
x
3.5
6.5
Row 3 Feb. 18
4.5
x
3.0
2.5
Row 4 Feb. 20
1.5
4.0
3.5
4.5
Row 5 Feb. 23
3.0
4.0
0.5
6.5
Row 6 TOTAL
15.0
8.0
10.5
20.0
(Station 2 represents the voting station at the Rizal Library)
[20]

Column
6
Station
5
4.5
4.0
2.5
0.5
11.5

Column Column
7
8
Station
TOTAL
6
x
20.5
x
14.0
x
16.0
x
14.5
x
65.0

From the preceding table, it can be seen that there was at least a total of 65 hours in

the duration of the original voting period that voting stations were unmanned. A reading of
the figures under Columns 2 to 7, Rows 2 to 5 show that at least nine of those represent four
or more hours (these figures are set in italics). This would mean that in the duration of the
original voting period, there were nine instances were a particular voting station in a
particular day was unmanned for half or more than half of the daily allotted time for voting,
basing from an operation period of 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
[21]

While the Court acknowledges that the Commission has been rather unaccountable in

their delay to substantiate their rationale for the extension of the voting period, the Court
nonetheless finds merit in the Commissions rationale of the problem of unmanned voting

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booths. The Court finds the Commissions action of extending the voting period as a valid
recourse to what it perceives, and what the Court similarly finds, as the substantial problem
of the unmanned voting stations.
III. ON THE ISSUE OF THE VOTER QUOTA
AND THE RIGHT TO ABSTAIN
[22]

In connection to the assailing the Commissions rationale for extending the voting

period, the petitioners argue that the extension is somehow motivated by apparent and
imminent failure to reach the voter quota. First of all, the Court finds this as rather
speculative. As pointed out in para. 21, while the Court does acknowledge that the
Commission may not have been as prompt in pointing out the problem of the unmanned
voting stations, it nonetheless finds the Commissions extension of the voting period as a
valid recourse to such a problem. Furthermore, while the Court recognizes the right of the
student-voter to abstain from an electoral exercise, it does not find merit in the argument that
an extension of the voting period constitutes an encroachment of the student-voters right to
not vote at all. The Court emphasizes that, as enshrined in the Constitution, student-voters
certainly have the right to refrain from voting in any electoral exercise if they see it fit. The
Court does not see the extension of the voting period as constituting a direct harm to this
right, especially if such an extension is due to other reasons that the Court finds meritorious.
IV. ON THE ISSUE OF ISSUING A MEMORANDUM
INSTEAD OF RESOLUTION
[23]

The First Petitioner argues that the Commissions action does not carry the force of

law as the action was promulgated through a memorandum instead of a resolution. The First
Petitioner cites Art. XIV Sec. 3 of the Constitution which states that the Commission should
promulgate rules and regulations, instructions, and directives by virtue of a resolution.
[24]

The Court agrees with the First Petitioner that the Commissions action of extending

the voting period should have been promulgated by virtue of a resolution and not a
memorandum. The Court agrees that, the two documents differ substantially in meaning and
in purpose. Even if the Court were to consider the possibility of mere semantics between the
use of the word memo instead of resolution, the Court accepts the First Petitioner's argument.
A resolution, in nature, is a course of action directed to promulgating a decision, the context

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2015 SJC 2

of which the decision was made, the justifications for a decision as well as the pertinent legal
provisions. As such, it rules that the memorandum promulgated by the Commission does not
have content adequate enough to be considered a resolution. The issuance of a memorandum
rather than a resolution effectively nullifies the legality of the Commissions action.
V. ON THE SANCTITY OF THE BALLOT
[25]

The Second Petitioner states that Witnesses have seen other people, including

members of the Sanggunian and those running for Sanggunian offices, in the immediate
vicinity of Comelec base of operations immediately after the closing of elections at 6:00 PM,
February 23, 2015.5 While the Commission has acknowledged, they have stated that the
concern of the non-officers were about the voter turnout. The Commission assured that the
sanctity of the ballot was not compromised.
[26]

The Court finds the Second Petitioners statement pointing to witnesses that saw

non-officers in the vicinity of the Commissions base of operations as rather obscure.

Without further substantiation on part of the Second Petitioner as to the specifics of this
particular incident, the Court cannot find merit in this particular argument.
VI. ON THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
[27]

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on February 25, 2015 is hereby

lifted. The Commission may now release the results of the general elections with the
application of this judgment.
VII. SUMMARY OF THE COURTS JUDGMENT
[28]

The Court does not find the Memo 201527 in violation of the Electoral Code or the

Constitution (see para. 13).

[29]

The Court finds the Commissions action of extending the voting period as a valid

recourse to the problem of unmanned voting booths (see para. 21).

Second petition (No. 1504)

Judgment

[30]

11

2015 SJC 2

The Court does not find the Commissions extension of the voting period as harming

the student-voters right to absention (see para. 22).

[31]

The Court finds a failure of the Commission to qualify their action of extending the

voting period as a resolution. The Court hereby declares Memo 201507 null and void. All
votes cast on Feb 24 are hereby invalidated (see para. 24).
[32]

The Temporary Restraining Order issued to the Commission on February 25, 2015 is

hereby lifted (see para. 27). The Commission may now release the results of the Sanggunian
general elections excluding the votes cast during the extension period (see paras. 13 and 21).