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G.R. No.

L-5060

January 26, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or caused to
be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the
municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30
and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is
no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the
provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the
municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse
except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded
cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title
in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said
treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer
unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a
permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human
consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him,
and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, brands,
knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of identification
of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on which such permit is
issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the record, together with date of
permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial
treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner, together with
date of permit.

neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that
municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2)
expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such
permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the
killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and examined apart
from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse"
may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section
30, and the words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption" and the words "killing
for food" in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as
limiting and restricting merely the words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But
upon a reading of the whole Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its
enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the
recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides
an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle
throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and
invalidates all transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in
the municipality where the contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or
persons unlawfully in possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to
make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose
of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting as it
does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the Islands, would
be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the
production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this
especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal
slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human
consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the
municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office
of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will readily
be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the brands and marks of
identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons
unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering
them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing
themselves to the danger of detection incident to the bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse,
where the brands and other identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.

SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing
for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred
pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive
other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for
in section 30.

It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained
in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human
consumptionin a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases
of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse,

It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the "killing for
food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition is clearly included in
the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption anywhere; but it is not
improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was expressly and specifically
mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event

that some of the municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the
passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same conclusion. One
of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos
fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. A construction which
would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal
slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so
manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the
language of the statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is
clearly susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to make effective the
provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him
on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant
contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is
not unfit "for agricultural work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of
the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the statute
constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing
for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the
State. But whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary
modifications understood, the language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of
Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the question involved was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting
and penalizing the taking or carrying away by any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand,
from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the property for
public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be
so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the community."
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao owners in
these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute; and that, without
inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation
of which detracts from their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their exclusive possession
and control of their property, so that if the regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the
statute, in so far as these regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine
Bill relied on be appellant; but we are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right
and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to
entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restrain of an injurious private use of
the property, which the legislature had authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra)
was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion, in distinguishing the
exercise of the right of eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every
holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied
liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the
community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.

This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be
done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to is
rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its
boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests
to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent
domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be
determental to the public welfare. And we think that an examination of the general provisions of the statute in
relation to the public interest which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides,
leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership
by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but,
strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police
power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to every species of
property within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had
threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy, eighty,
and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the
principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the
fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they were infected struck an almost
vital blow at the material welfare of the country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the
production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the
impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the
fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country could easily be
made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of the Islands
was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the people, and in many
provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for
existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the immediate
needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the United States as a
relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces where the need
was most pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the
crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft
purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural community
material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the work animals
upon which such a community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of
the products of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to increase the supply
of these animals by importation, but, as appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for the future
depended largely on the conservation of those animals which had been spared from the ravages of the
diseased, and their redistribution throughout the Islands where the need for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and applications of
preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved in some degree
successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the gradual increase and
redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of supply
and demand, will ultimately results in practically relieving those sections which suffered most by the loss of
their work animals.

As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to five fold
or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted prove entirely
successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall
have more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of
cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special
law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by roving bands;
and it must be assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands
necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and registration
of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the
provisions of the statute touching the branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing
the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of
the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and
penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the
due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right
of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of
animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and records
of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the material welfare and
future prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept
away the work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law under consideration, but that the
very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled
by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can
be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals,
even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate
and proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power
rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police
regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the
provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of
that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to
include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction
or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance.
Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to
decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path
of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome
food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of
public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to
certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those
afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the
suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling
houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require,
but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.
S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In
other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals
are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to
protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so
doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this
"general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature
to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as
natural persons are concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may be
exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may
conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are
infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the
public authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it,
where the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State,
but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the interference or
destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or
destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a
pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here the individual is
in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The
establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages within which buildings
constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in some cases, be
equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose have been
sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be established for the general good,
even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on soil which constitutes
private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to
forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that
effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other
persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the
legislature have authority" to impose.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of
circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and
unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public
safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards which prove, in the
advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of becoming so,
are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery purposes.
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States clearly indicate
the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of
the statute in question being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the
Philippine Bill, which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law," a provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United
States, and is found in substance in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

substantial remedy for the protection of their property, thereby, in effect, depriving them of their property
without due process of law, and (b) they attempt to diminish the jurisdiction of the courts, as conferred upon
them by Acts Nos. 136 and 190, which jurisdiction was ratified and confirmed by the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902.

December 21, 1915

G.R. No. 10572


FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
TRENT, J.:
The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies
from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described
in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339 , effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any
sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or
billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to
secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted soon after the commencement of this action.
This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to two main questions; (1) that relating to the power of the
court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax complained of, and (2) that relating to the validity of
those provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, conferring power upon the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the
sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the Government. The sections of Act
No. 2339, which bear directly upon the subject, are 139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the use of an
injunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax; the second provides a remedy for any wrong in
connection with such taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive, thereby precluding the remedy by
injunction, which remedy is claimed to be constitutional. The two sections, then, involve the right of a
dissatisfied taxpayers to use an exceptional remedy to test the validity of any tax or to determine any other
question connected therewith, and the question whether the remedy by injunction is exceptional.
Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual remedies. The origin and history of
the writ of injunction show that it has always been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as
distinguished from the common course of the law to redress evils after they have been consummated. No
injunction issues as of course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and when there is no adequate
remedy at law. The Government does, by section 139 and 140, take away the preventive remedy of injunction,
if it ever existed, and leaves the taxpayer, in a contest with it, the same ordinary remedial actions which prevail
between citizen and citizen. The Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, contends that there is no
provisions of the paramount law which prohibits such a course. While, on the other hand, counsel for plaintiffs
urge that the two sections are unconstitutional because (a) they attempt to deprive aggrieved taxpayers of all

In the first place, it has been suggested that section 139 does not apply to the tax in question because the
section, in speaking of a "tax," means only legal taxes; and that an illegal tax (the one complained of) is not a
tax, and, therefore, does not fall within the inhibition of the section, and may be restrained by injunction. There
is no force in this suggestion. The inhibition applies to all internal revenue taxes imposes, or authorized to be
imposed, by Act No. 2339. (Snyder vs. Marks, 109 U.S., 189.) And, furthermore, the mere fact that a tax is
illegal, or that the law, by virtue of which it is imposed, is unconstitutional, does not authorize a court of equity
to restrain its collection by injunction. There must be a further showing that there are special circumstances
which bring the case under some well recognized head of equity jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury,
multiplicity of suits, or a cloud upon title to real estate will result, and also that there is, as we have indicated,
no adequate remedy at law. This is the settled law in the United States, even in the absence of statutory
enactments such as sections 139 and 140. (Hannewinkle vs. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown, 82 U.S., 547;
Indiana Mfg. Co. vs. Koehne, 188 U.S., 681; Ohio Tax cases, 232 U. S., 576, 587; Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R.
Co. vs. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S., 32; Shelton vs. Plat, 139 U.S., 591; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.
S., 575.) Therefore, this branch of the case must be controlled by sections 139 and 140, unless the same be
held unconstitutional, and consequently, null and void.
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the
constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a
solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation
and application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising
their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never
declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in
pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the
Constitution of the United States, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the
statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the
integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity
until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary
pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve
the doubt in favor of its validity. (6 Ruling Case Law, secs. 71, 72, and 73, and cases cited therein.)
It is also the settled law in the United States that "due process of law" does not always require, in respect to
the Government, the same process that is required between citizens, though it generally implies and includes
regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some well settled course of judicial
proceedings. The case with which we are dealing is in point. A citizen's property, both real and personal, may
be taken, and usually is taken, by the government in payment of its taxes without any judicial proceedings
whatever. In this country, as well as in the United States, the officer charged with the collection of taxes is
authorized to seize and sell the property of delinquent taxpayers without applying to the courts for assistance,
and the constitutionality of the law authorizing this procedure never has been seriously questioned. (City of
Philadelphia vs. [Diehl] The Collector, 5 Wall., 720; Nicholl vs. U.S., 7 Wall., 122, and cases cited.) This must
necessarily be the course, because it is upon taxation that the Government chiefly relies to obtain the means
to carry on its operations, and it is of the utmost importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection
of the taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little as possible. No government could exist if
every litigious man were permitted to delay the collection of its taxes. This principle of public policy must be
constantly borne in mind in determining cases such as the one under consideration.
With these principles to guide us, we will proceed to inquire whether there is any merit in the two propositions
insisted upon by counsel for the plaintiffs. Section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides: "That no law shall be
enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the law."
The origin and history of these provisions are well-known. They are found in substance in the Constitution of
the United States and in that of ever state in the Union.
Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, effective since 1867, provides that: "No suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court."
Section 139, with which we have been dealing, reads: "No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to
restrain the collection of any internal-revenue tax."

A comparison of these two sections show that they are essentially the same. Both expressly prohibit the
restraining of taxes by injunction. If the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly and definitely held that
the provisions of section 3224 do not violate the "due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" clauses
in the Constitution, we would be going too far to hold that section 139 violates those same provisions in the
Philippine Bill. That the Supreme Court of the United States has so held, cannot be doubted.

or occupations taxed under that act, and all industrial taxes and stamp taxes imposed under the Spanish
regime were eliminated, but the industrial tax was continued in force until January 1, 1905. This Internal
Revenue Law did not take away from municipal councils, provincial boards, and the Municipal Board of the city
of Manila the power to impose taxes upon real estate. This Act (No. 1189), with its amendments, was repealed
by Act No. 2339, an act "revising and consolidating the laws relative to internal revenue."

In Cheatham vs. United States (92 U.S., 85,89) which involved the validity of an income tax levied by an act of
Congress prior to the one in issue in the case of Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (157 U.S., 429) the
court, through Mr. Justice Miller, said: "If there existed in the courts, state or National, any general power of
impeding or controlling the collection of taxes, or relieving the hardship incident to taxation, the very existence
of the government might be placed in the power of a hostile judiciary. (Dows vs. The City of Chicago, 11 Wall.,
108.) While a free course of remonstrance and appeal is allowed within the departments before the money is
finally exacted, the General Government has wisely made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs
or of internal revenue, a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom the tax is
assessed. In the internal revenue branch it has further prescribed that no such suit shall be brought until the
remedy by appeal has been tried; and, if brought after this, it must be within six months after the decision on
the appeal. We regard this as a condition on which alone the government consents to litigate the lawfulness of
the original tax. It is not a hard condition. Few governments have conceded such a right on any condition. If
the compliance with this condition requires the party aggrieved to pay the money, he must do it."

Section 84 of Act No. 82 provides that "No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed
under this act until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against him, . . . ."

Again, in State Railroad Tax Cases (92 U.S., 575, 613), the court said: "That there might be no
misunderstanding of the universality of this principle, it was expressly enacted, in 1867, that "no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court." (Rev, Stat.,
sec. 3224.) And though this was intended to apply alone to taxes levied by the United States, it shows the
sense of Congress of the evils to be feared if courts of justice could, in any case, interfere with the process of
collecting taxes on which the government depends for its continued existence. It is a wise policy. It is founded
in the simple philosophy derived from the experience of ages, that the payment of taxes has to be enforced by
summary and stringent means against a reluctant and often adverse sentiment; and to do this successfully,
other instrumentalities and other modes of procedure are necessary, than those which belong to courts of
justice."
And again, in Snyder vs. Marks (109 U.S., 189), the court said: "The remedy of a suit to recover back the tax
after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden. The remedy so given is
exclusive, and no other remedy can be substituted for it. Such has been the current of decisions in the Circuit
Courts of the United States, and we are satisfied it is a correct view of the law."
In the consideration of the plaintiffs' second proposition, we will attempt to show (1) that the Philippine courts
never have had, since the American occupation, the power to restrain by injunction the collection of any tax
imposed by the Insular Government for its own purpose and benefit, and (2) that assuming that our courts had
or have such power, this power has not been diminished or curtailed by sections 139 and 140.
We will first review briefly the former and present systems of taxation. Upon the American occupation of the
Philippine, there was found a fairly complete system of taxation. This system was continued in force by the
military authorities, with but few changes, until the Civil Government assumed charge of the subject. The
principal sources of revenue under the Spanish regime were derived from customs receipts, the so-called
industrial taxes, the urbana taxes, the stamp tax, the personal cedula tax, and the sale of the public domain.
The industrial and urbana taxes constituted practically an income tax of some 5 per cent on the net income of
persons engaged in industrial and commercial pursuits and on the income of owners of improved city property.
The sale of stamped paper and adhesive stamp tax. The cedula tax was a graduated tax, ranging from nothing
up to P37.50. The revenue derived from the sale of the public domain was not considered a tax. The American
authorities at once abolished the cedula tax, but later restored it in a modified form, charging for each cedula
twenty centavos, an amount which was supposed to be just sufficient to cover the cost of issuance. The
urbana tax was abolished by Act No. 223 , effective September 6, 1901.
The "Municipal Code" (Act No. 82) and the Provincial Government Act (No. 83), both enacted in 1901,
authorize municipal councils and provincial boards to impose an ad valorem tax on real estate. The Municipal
Code did not apply to the city of Manila. This city was given a special charter (Act No. 183 ), effective August
30, 1901; Under this charter the Municipal Board of Manila is authorized and empowered to impose taxes
upon real estate and, like municipal councils, to license and regulate certain occupations. Customs matters
were completely reorganized by Act No. 355, effective at the port of Manila on February 7, 1902, and at other
ports in the Philippine Islands the day after the receipt of a certified copy of the Act. The Internal Revenue Law
of 1904 (Act No. 1189), repealed all existing laws, ordinances, etc., imposing taxes upon the persons, objects,

This inhibition was inserted in section 17 of Act No. 83 and applies to taxes imposed by provincial boards. The
inhibition was not inserted in the Manila Charter until the passage of Act No. 1793, effective October 12, 1907.
Act No. 355 expressly makes the payment of the exactions claimed a condition precedent to a resort to the
courts by dissatisfied importers. Section 52 of Act No. 1189 provides "That no courts shall have authority to
grant an injunction restraining the collection of any taxes imposed by virtue of the provisions of this Act, but the
remedy of the taxpayer who claims that he is unjustly assessed or taxed shall be by payment under protest of
the sum claimed from him by the Collector of Internal Revenue and by action to recover back the sum claimed
to have been illegally collected."
Sections 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339 contain, as we have indicated, the same prohibition and remedy. The
result is that the courts have been expressly forbidden, in every act creating or imposing taxes or imposts
enacted by the legislative body of the Philippines since the American occupation, to entertain any suit assailing
the validity of any tax or impost thus imposed until the tax shall have been paid under protest. The only taxes
which have not been brought within the express inhibition were those included in that part of the old Spanish
system which completely disappeared on or before January 1, 1905, and possibly the old customs duties
which disappeared in February, 1902.
Section 56 of the Organic Act (No. 136), effective June 16, 1901, provides that "Courts of First Instance shall
have original jurisdiction:
x x x2. In all civil actions which involve the ... legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, . . . .x x x
7. Said courts and their judges, or any of them, shall have power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts, in the
manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), effective October 1, 1901, which deals with the
subject of injunctions, are sections 162 to 172, inclusive. Injunctions, as here defined, are of two kinds;
preliminary and final. The former may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and
before final judgment, and the latter at the termination of the trial as the relief or part of the relief prayed for
(sec. 162). Any judge of the Supreme Court may grant a preliminary injunction in any action pending in that
court or in any Court of First Instance. A preliminary injunction may also be granted by a judge of the Court of
First Instance in actions pending in his district in which he has original jurisdiction (sec. 163). But such
injunctions may be granted only when the complaint shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded
(sec. 166), and before a final or permanent injunction can be granted, it must appear upon the trial of the
action that the plaintiff is entitled to have commission or continuance of the acts complained of perpetually
restrained (sec. 171). These provisions authorize the institution in Courts of First Instance of what are known
as "injunction suits," the sole object of which is to obtain the issuance of a final injunction. They also authorize
the granting of injunctions as aiders in ordinary civil actions. We have defined in Davesa vs.Arbes (13 Phil.
Rep., 273), an injunction to be "A "special remedy" adopted in that code (Act 190) from American practice, and
originally borrowed from English legal procedure, which was there issued by the authority and under the seal
of a court of equity, and limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is sought, to those cases where there
is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law,"which will not be granted while the rights between the
parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be
done,"which cannot be compensated in damages . . .
By paragraph 2 of section 56 of Act No. 136 , supra, and the provisions of the various subsequent Acts
heretofore mentioned, the Insular Government has consented to litigate with aggrieved persons the validity of
any original tax or impost imposed by it on condition that this be done in ordinary civil actions after the taxes or
exactions shall have been paid. But it is said that paragraph 2 confers original jurisdiction upon Courts of First
Instance to hear and determine "all civil actions" which involve the validity of any tax, impost or assessment,
and that if the all-inclusive words "all" and "any" be given their natural and unrestricted meaning, no action
wherein that question is involved can arise over which such courts do not have jurisdiction. (Barrameda vs.
Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44.) This is true. But the term "civil actions" had its well defined meaning at the time the

paragraph was enacted. The same legislative body which enacted paragraph 2 on June 16, 1901, had, just a
few months prior to that time, defined the only kind of action in which the legality of any tax imposed by it might
be assailed. (Sec. 84, Act 82, enacted January 31, 1901, and sec. 17, Act No. 83, enacted February 6, 1901.)
That kind of action being payment of the tax under protest and an ordinary suit to recover and no other, there
can be no doubt that Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over all such actions. The subsequent
legislation on the same subject shows clearly that the Commission, in enacting paragraph 2, supra, did not
intend to change or modify in any way section 84 of Act No. 82 and section 17 of Act No. 83, but, on the
contrary, it was intended that "civil actions," mentioned in said paragraph, should be understood to mean, in so
far as testing the legality of taxes were concerned, only those of the kind and character provided for in the two
sections above mentioned. It is also urged that the power to restrain by injunction the collection of taxes or
imposts is conferred upon Courts of First Instance by paragraph 7 of section 56, supra. This paragraph does
empower those courts to grant injunctions, both preliminary and final, in any civil action pending in their
districts, provided always, that the complaint shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded.
Injunction suits, such as the one at bar, are "civil actions," but of a special or extraordinary character. It cannot
be said that the Commission intended to give a broader or different meaning to the word "action," used in
Chapter 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in connection with injunctions, than it gave to the same word found in
paragraph 2 of section 56 of the Organic Act. The Insular Government, in exercising the power conferred upon
it by the Congress of the United States, has declared that the citizens and residents of this country shall pay
certain specified taxes and imposts. The power to tax necessarily carries with it the power to collect the taxes.
This being true, the weight of authority supports the proposition that the Government may fix the conditions
upon which it will consent to litigate the validity of its original taxes. (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U.S., 69.)
We must, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 and 7 of section 56 of Act No. 136, construed in the light of the
prior and subsequent legislation to which we have referred, and the legislative and judicial history of the same
subject in the United States with which the Commission was familiar, do not empower Courts of firs Instance to
interfere by injunction with the collection of the taxes in question in this case.
If we are in error as to the scope of paragraph 2 and 7, supra, and the Commission did intend to confer the
power upon the courts to restrain the collection of taxes, it does not necessarily follow that this power or
jurisdiction has been taken away by section 139 of Act No. 2339, for the reason that all agree that an
injunction will not issue in any case if there is an adequate remedy at law. The very nature of the writ itself
prevents its issuance under such circumstances. Legislation forbidding the issuing of injunctions in such cases
is unnecessary. So the only question to be here determined is whether the remedy provided for in section 140
of Act No. 2339 is adequate. If it is, the writs which form the basis of this appeal should not have been issued.
If this is the correct view, the authority to issue injunctions will not have been taken away by section 139, but
rendered inoperative only by reason of an adequate remedy having been made available.
The legislative body of the Philippine Islands has declared from the beginning (Act No. 82) that payment under
protest and suit to recover is an adequate remedy to test the legality of any tax or impost, and that this remedy
is exclusive. Can we say that the remedy is not adequate or that it is not exclusive, or both? The plaintiffs in
the case at bar are the first, in so far as we are aware, to question either the adequacy or exclusiveness of this
remedy. We will refer to a few cases in the United States where statutes similar to sections 139 and 140 have
been construed and applied.
In May, 1874, one Bloomstein presented a petition to the circuit court sitting in Nashville, Tennessee, stating
that his real and personal property had been assessed for state taxes in the year 1872 to the amount of
$132.60; that he tendered to the collector this amount in "funds receivable by law for such purposes;" and that
the collector refused to receive the same. He prayed for an alternative writ of mandamus to compel the
collector to receive the bills in payment for such taxes, or to show cause to the contrary. To this petition the
collector, in his answer, set up the defense that the petitioner's suit was expressly prohibited by the Act of the
General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, passed in 1873. The petition was dismissed and the relief
prayed for refused. An appeal to the supreme court of the State resulted in the affirmance of the judgment of
the lower court. The case was then carried to the Supreme Court of the United States (Tennessee vs. Sneed,
96 U. S., 69), where the judgment was again affirmed.
The two sections of the Act of [March 21,] 1873, drawn in question in that cases, read as follows:
1. That in all cases in which an officer, charged by law with the collection of revenue due the State, shall
institute any proceeding, or take any steps for the collection of the same, alleged or claimed to be due by said
officer from any citizen, the party against whom the proceeding or step is taken shall, if he conceives the same
to be unjust or illegal, or against any statute or clause of the Constitution of the State, pay the same under
protest; and, upon his making said payment, the officer or collector shall pay such revenue into the State

Treasury, giving notice at the time of payment to the Comptroller that the same was paid under protest; and
the party paying said revenue may, at any time within thirty days after making said payment, and not longer
thereafter, sue the said officer having collected said sum, for the recovery thereof. And the same may be tried
in any court having the jurisdiction of the amount and parties; and, if it be determined that the same was
wrongfully collected, as not being due from said party to the State, for any reason going to the merits of the
same, then the court trying the case may certify of record that the same was wrongfully paid and ought to be
refunded; and thereupon the Comptroller shall issue his warrant for the same, which shall be paid in
preference to other claims on the Treasury.
2. That there shall be no other remedy, in any case of the collection of revenue, or attempt to collect revenue
illegally, or attempt to collect revenue in funds only receivable by said officer under the law, the same being
other or different funds than such as the tax payer may tender, or claim the right to pay, than that above
provided; and no writ for the prevention of the collection of any revenue claimed, or to hinder or delay the
collection of the same, shall in anywise issue, either injunction, supersedeas, prohibition, or any other writ or
process whatever; but in all cases in which, for any reason, any person shall claim that the tax so collected
was wrongfully or illegally collected, the remedy for said party shall be as above provided, and in no other
manner."
In discussing the adequacy of the remedy provided by the Tennessee Legislature, as above set forth, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the case just cited, said: "This remedy is simple and effective. A suit at
law to recover money unlawfully exacted is as speedy, as easily tried, and less complicated than a proceeding
by mandamus. ... In revenue cases, whether arising upon its (United States) Internal Revenue Laws or those
providing for the collection of duties upon foreign imports, it (United States) adopts the rule prescribed by the
State of Tennessee. It requires the contestant to pay the amount as fixed by the Government, and gives him
power to sue the collector, and in such suit to test the legality of the tax. There is nothing illegal or even harsh
in this. It is a wise and reasonable precaution for the security of the Government."
Thomas C. Platt commenced an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Tennessee to restrain the collection of a license tax from the company which he represented. The defense
was that sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, supra, prohibited the bringing of that suit. This case also reached
the Supreme Court of the United States. (Shelton vs. Platt, 139 U. 591.) In speaking of the inhibitory
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, the court said: "This Act has been sanctioned and applied by
the Courts of Tennessee. (Nashville vs. Smith, 86 Tenn., 213; Louisville & N. R. Co. vs. State, 8 Heisk., 663,
804.) It is, as counsel observe, similar to the Act of Congress forbidding suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of taxes under the Internal Revenue Laws, in respect to which this court held that the
remedy by suit to recover back the tax after payment, provided for by the Statute, was exclusive. (Snyder vs.
Marks, of this character has been called for by the embarrassments resulting from the improvident
employment of the writ of injunction in arresting the collection of the public revenue; and, even in its absence,
the strong arm of the court of chancery ought not to be interposed in that direction except where resort to that
court is grounded upon the settled principles which govern its jurisdiction."
In Louisville & N.R. Co. vs. State (8 Heisk. [64 Tenn.], 663, 804), cited by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Shelton vs. Platt, supra, the court said: "It was urged that this statute (sections 1 and 2 of the Act of
1873, supra) is unconstitutional and void, as it deprives the citizen of the remedy by certiorari, guaranteed by
the organic law."
By the 10th section of the sixth article of the Constitution, [Tennessee] it is provided that: "The judges or
justices of inferior courts of law and equity shall have power in all civil cases to issue writs ofcertiorari, to
remove any cause, or the transcript of the record thereof, from any inferior jurisdiction into such court of law,
on sufficient cause, supported by oath or affirmation."
The court held the act valid as not being in conflict with these provisions of the State constitution.
In Eddy vs. The Township of Lee (73 Mich., 123), the complainants sought to enjoin the collection of certain
taxes for the year 1886. The defendants, in support of their demurrer, insisted that the remedy by injunction
had been taken away by section 107 of the Act of 1885, which section reads as follows: "No injunction shall
issue to stay proceedings for the assessment or collection of taxes under this Act."
It was claimed by the complainants that the above quoted provisions of the Act of 1885 were unconstitutional
and void as being in conflict with article 6, sec. 8, of the Constitution, which provides that: "The circuit courts
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not
prohibited by law. ... They shall also have power to issue writs ofhabeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo
warranto, certiorari, and other writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees."

Mr. Justice Champlin, speaking for the court, said: "I have no doubt that the Legislature has the constitutional
authority, where it has provided a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law to recover back taxes illegally
assessed and collected, to take away the remedy by injunction to restrain their collection."
Section 9 of the Philippine Bill reads in part as follows: "That the Supreme Court and the Courts of First
Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power
of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure."
It will be seen that this section has not taken away from the Philippine Government the power to change the
practice and method of procedure. If sections 139 and 140, considered together, and this must always be
done, are nothing more than a mode of procedure, then it would seem that the Legislature did not exceed its
constitutional authority in enacting them. Conceding for the moment that the duly authorized procedure for the
determination of the validity of any tax, impost, or assessment was by injunction suits and that this method
was available to aggrieved taxpayers prior to the passage of Act No. 2339, may the Legislature change this
method of procedure? That the Legislature has the power to do this, there can be no doubt, provided some
other adequate remedy is substituted in lieu thereof. In speaking of the modes of enforcing rights created by
contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Tennessee vs. Sneed, supra, said: "The rule seems to
be that in modes of proceedings and of forms to enforce the contract the Legislature has the control, and may
enlarge, limit or alter them, provided that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it with conditions and
restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right."
In that case the petitioner urged that the Acts of 1873 were laws impairing the obligation of the contract
contained in the charter of the Bank of Tennessee, which contract was entered into with the State in 1838. It
was claimed that this was done by placing such impediments and obstructions in the way of its enforcement,
thereby so impairing the remedies as practically to render the obligation of no value. In disposing of this
contention, the court said: "If we assume that prior to 1873 the relator had authority to prosecute his claim
against the State by mandamus, and that by the statutes of that year the further use of that form was
prohibited to him, the question remains. whether an effectual remedy was left to him or provided for him. We
think the regulation of the statute gave him an abundant means of enforcing such right as he possessed. It
provided that he might pay his claim to the collector under protest, giving notice thereof to the Comptroller of
the Treasury; that at any time within thirty days thereafter he might sue the officer making the collection; that
the case should be tried by any court having jurisdiction and, if found in favor of the plaintiff on the merits, the
court should certify that the same was wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded and the Comptroller should
thereupon issue his warrant therefor, which should be paid in preference to other claim on the Treasury."
But great stress is laid upon the fact that the plaintiffs in the case under consideration are unable to pay the
taxes assessed against them and that if the law is enforced, they will be compelled to suspend business. This
point may be best answered by quoting from the case of Youngblood vs. Sexton (32 Mich., 406), wherein
Judge Cooley, speaking for the court, said: "But if this consideration is sufficient to justify the transfer of a
controversy from a court of law to a court of equity, then every controversy where money is demanded may be
made the subject of equitable cognizance. To enforce against a dealer a promissory note may in some cases
as effectually break up his business as to collect from him a tax of equal amount. This is not what is known to
the law as irreparable injury. The courts have never recognized the consequences of the mere enforcement of
a money demand as falling within that category."
Certain specified sections of Act No. 2339 were amended by Act No. 2432, enacted December 23, 1914,
effective January 1, 1915, by imposing increased and additional taxes. Act No. 2432 was amended, were
ratified by the Congress of the United States on March 4, 1915. The opposition manifested against the taxes
imposed by Acts Nos. 2339 and 2432 is a matter of local history. A great many business men thought the
taxes thus imposed were too high. If the collection of the new taxes on signs, signboards, and billboards may
be restrained, we see no well-founded reason why injunctions cannot be granted restraining the collection of
all or at least a number of the other increased taxes. The fact that this may be done, shows the wisdom of the
Legislature in denying the use of the writ of injunction to restrain the collection of any tax imposed by the Acts.
When this was done, an equitable remedy was made available to all dissatisfied taxpayers.
The question now arises whether, the case being one of which the court below had no jurisdiction, this court,
on appeal, shall proceed to express an opinion upon the validity of provisions of subsection (b) of section 100
of Act No. 2339, imposing the taxes complained of. As a general rule, an opinion on the merits of a
controversy ought to be declined when the court is powerless to give the relief demanded. But it is claimed
that this case is, in many particulars, exceptional. It is true that it has been argued on the merits, and there is
no reason for any suggestion or suspicion that it is not a bona fide controversy. The legal points involved in the

merits have been presented with force, clearness, and great ability by the learned counsel of both sides. If the
law assailed were still in force, we would feel that an opinion on its validity would be justifiable, but, as the
amendment became effective on January 1, 1915, we think it advisable to proceed no further with this branch
of the case.
The next question arises in connection with the supplementary complaint, the object of which is to enjoin the
Collector of Internal Revenue from removing certain billboards, the property of the plaintiffs located upon
private lands in the Province of Rizal. The plaintiffs allege that the billboards here in question "in no sense
constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of
any persons." The defendant denies these allegations in his answer and claims that after due investigation
made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, he "decided that the billboard complained of
was and still is offensive to the sight, and is otherwise a nuisance." The plaintiffs proved by Mr. Churchill that
the "billboards were quite a distance from the road and that they were strongly built, not dangerous to the
safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals
of the community." The defendant presented no testimony upon this point. In the agreed statement of facts
submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned were and still are offensive to the
sight."
The pertinent provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339 read: "If after due investigation the
Collector of Internal Revenue shall decide that any sign, signboard, or billboard displayed or exposed to public
view is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance, he may by summary order direct the removal of such
sign, signboard, or billboard, and if same is not removed within ten days after he has issued such order he my
himself cause its removal, and the sign, signboard, or billboard shall thereupon be forfeited to the
Government, and the owner thereof charged with the expenses of the removal so effected. When the sign,
signboard, or billboard ordered to be removed as herein provided shall not comply with the provisions of the
general regulations of the Collector of Internal Revenue, no rebate or refund shall be allowed for any portion of
a year for which the tax may have been paid. Otherwise, the Collector of Internal Revenue may in his
discretion make a proportionate refund of the tax for the portion of the year remaining for which the taxes were
paid. An appeal may be had from the order of the Collector of Internal Revenue to the Secretary of Finance
and Justice whose decision thereon shall be final."
The Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, says: "The question which the case presents under this
head for determination, resolves itself into this inquiry: Is the suppression of advertising signs displayed or
exposed to public view, which are admittedly offensive to the sight, conducive to the public interest?"
And cunsel for the plaintiffs states the question thus: "We contend that that portion of section 100 of Act No.
2339, empowering the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if objectionable to the
sight, is unconstitutional, as constituting a deprivation of property without due process of law."
From the position taken by counsel for both sides, it is clear that our inquiry is limited to the question whether
the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government; for
all property is held subject to that power.
As a consequence of the foregoing, all discussion and authorities cited, which go to the power of the state to
authorize administrative officers to find, as a fact, that legitimate trades, callings, and businesses are, under
certain circumstances, statutory nuisances, and whether the procedure prescribed for this purpose is due
process of law, are foreign to the issue here presented.
There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles
which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously
and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment
of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper
consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The
courts cannot substitute their own views for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature. In
Munn vs. Illinois (94 U.S., 113), the United States Supreme Court states the rule thus: "If no state of
circumstances could exist to justify such statute, then we may declare this one void because in excess of the
legislative power of this state; but if it could, we must presume it did. Of the propriety of legislative interference,
within the scope of the legislative power, a legislature is the exclusive judge."
This rule very fully discussed and declared in Powell vs. Pennsylvania (127 U.S., 678) "oleo-margarine"
case. (See also Crowley vs. Christensen, 137 U.S., 86, 87; Camfield vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 518.) While the state
may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily

vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interest of the public require, but what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests; yet, its determination in these matters is not final or conclusive,
but is subject to the supervision of the courts. (Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U.S., 133.) Can it be said judicially that
signs, signboards, and billboards, which are admittedly offensive to the sight, are not with the category of
things which interfere with the public safety, welfare, and comfort, and therefore beyond the reach of the police
power of the Philippine Government?

It was said in Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 85), per Shaw, C.J., that: "It is much easier to perceive and realize
the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its
exercise." In Stone vs. Mississippi (101 U.S., 814), it was said: "Many attempts have been made in this court
and elsewhere to define the police power, but never with entire success. It is always easier to determine
whether a particular case comes within the general scope of the power, than to give an abstract definition of
the power itself, which will be in all respects accurate."

The numerous attempts which have been made to limit by definition the scope of the police power are only
interesting as illustrating its rapid extension within comparatively recent years to points heretofore deemed
entirely within the field of private liberty and property rights. Blackstone's definition of the police power was as
follows: "The due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the state, like
members of a well governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good
neigborhood, and good manners, to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations."
(Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 162.)

Other courts have held the same vow of efforts to evolve a satisfactory definition of the police power.
Manifestly, definitions which fail to anticipate cases properly within the scope of the police power are deficient.
It is necessary, therefore, to confine our discussion to the principle involved and determine whether the cases
as they come up are within that principle. The basic idea of civil polity in the United States is that government
should interfere with individual effort only to the extent necessary to preserve a healthy social and economic
condition of the country. State interference with the use of private property may be exercised in three ways.
First, through the power of taxation, second, through the power of eminent domain, and third, through the
police power. Buy the first method it is assumed that the individual receives the equivalent of the tax in the
form of protection and benefit he receives from the government as such. By the second method he receives
the market value of the property taken from him. But under the third method the benefits he derived are only
such as may arise from the maintenance of a healthy economic standard of society and is often referred to
asdamnum absque injuria. (Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. 232 Pa., 141; Bemis vs. Guirl Drainage Co., 182 Ind.,
36.) There was a time when state interference with the use of private property under the guise of the police
power was practically confined to the suppression of common nuisances. At the present day, however,
industry is organized along lines which make it possible for large combinations of capital to profit at the
expense of the socio-economic progress of the nation by controlling prices and dictating to industrial workers
wages and conditions of labor. Not only this but the universal use of mechanical contrivances by producers
and common carriers has enormously increased the toll of human life and limb in the production and
distribution of consumption goods. To the extent that these businesses affect not only the public health, safety,
and morals, but also the general social and economic life of the nation, it has been and will continue to be
necessary for the state to interfere by regulation. By so doing, it is true that the enjoyment of private property is
interfered with in no small degree and in ways that would have been considered entirely unnecessary in years
gone by. The regulation of rates charged by common carriers, for instance, or the limitation of hours of work in
industrial establishments have only a very indirect bearing upon the public health, safety, and morals, but do
bear directly upon social and economic conditions. To permit each individual unit of society to feel that his
industry will bring a fair return; to see that his work shall be done under conditions that will not either
immediately or eventually ruin his health; to prevent the artificial inflation of prices of the things which are
necessary for his physical well being are matters which the individual is no longer capable of attending to
himself. It is within the province of the police power to render assistance to the people to the extent that may
be necessary to safeguard these rights. Hence, laws providing for the regulation of wages and hours of labor
of coal miners (Rail & River Coal Co. vs. Taylor, 234 U.S., 224); requiring payment of employees of railroads
and other industrial concerns in legal tender and requiring salaries to be paid semimonthly (Erie R.R. Co. vs.
Williams, 233 U.S., 685); providing a maximum number of hours of labor for women (Miller vs.Wilson, U.S.
Sup. Ct. [Feb. 23, 1915], Adv. Opns., p. 342); prohibiting child labor (Sturges & Burn vs. Beauchamp, 231
U.S., 320); restricting the hours of labor in public laundries (In re Wong Wing, 167 Cal., 109); limiting hours of
labor in industrial establishment generally (State vs. Bunting, 71 Ore., 259); Sunday Closing Laws (State vs.
Nicholls [Ore., 1915], 151 Pac., 473; People vs.C. Klinck Packing Co. [N.Y., 1915], 108 N. E., 278; Hiller vs.
State [Md., 1914], 92 Atl., 842; State vs. Penny, 42 Mont., 118; City of Springfield vs. Richter, 257 Ill., 578, 580;
State vs.Hondros [S.C., 1915], 84 S.E., 781); have all been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power.
Again, workmen's compensation laws have been quite generally upheld. These statutes discard the common
law theory that employers are not liable for industrial accidents and make them responsible for all accidents
resulting from trade risks, it being considered that such accidents are a legitimate charge against production
and that the employer by controlling the prices of his product may shift the burden to the community. Laws
requiring state banks to join in establishing a depositors' guarantee fund have also been upheld by the Federal
Supreme Court in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U. S., 104), and Assaria State Bank vs. Dolley (219 U.S.,
121).

Chanceller Kent considered the police power the authority of the state "to regulate unwholesome trades,
slaughter houses, operations offensive to the senses." Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts defined it as
follows: "The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects
of the same." (Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush., 53.)
In the case of Butchers' Union Slaughter-house, etc. Co. vs. Crescent City Live Stock Landing, etc. Co. (111
U.S., 746), it was suggested that the public health and public morals are matters of legislative concern of
which the legislature cannot divest itself. (See State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash., 581, where
these definitions are collated.)
In Champer vs. Greencastle (138 Ind., 339), it was said: "The police power of the State, so far, has not
received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state
functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and
morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law." (Quoted with
approval in Hopkins vs. Richmond [Va., 1915], 86 S.E., 139.)
In Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. ([1911] 232 Pa., 141), it was said: "The police power of the state is difficult of
definition, but it has been held by the courts to be the right to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace,
health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which does not encroach on a like
power vested in congress or state legislatures by the federal constitution, or does not violate the provisions of
the organic law; and it has been expressly held that the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution was
not designed to interfere with the exercise of that power by the state."
In People vs. Brazee ([Mich., 1914], 149 N.W., 1053), it was said: "It [the police power] has for its object the
improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view
to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set
any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time
to time as varying social conditions demand correction."
In 8 Cyc., 863, it is said: "Police power is the name given to that inherent sovereignty which it is the right and
duty of the government or its agents to exercise whenever public policy, in a broad sense, demands, for the
benefit of society at large, regulations to guard its morals, safety, health, order or to insure in any respect such
economic conditions as an advancing civilization of a high complex character requires." (As quoted with
approval in Stettler vs. O'Hara [1914], 69 Ore, 519.)
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has said in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U.S. [1911],
575: "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put
forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant
opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."
This statement, recent as it is, has been quoted with approval by several courts. (Cunningham vs.
Northwestern Imp. Co. [1911], 44 Mont., 180; State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash., 581; McDavid
vs. Bank of Bay Minette [Ala., 1915], 69 Sou., 452; Hopkins vs. City of Richmond [Va., 1915], 86 S.E., 139;
State vs. Philipps [Miss. 1915], 67 Sou., 651.)

Offensive noises and smells have been for a long time considered susceptible of suppression in thickly
populated districts. Barring livery stables from such locations was approved of in Reinman vs.Little Rock (U.S.
Sup. Ct. [Apr. 5, 1915], U.S. Adv. Opns., p. 511). And a municipal ordinance was recently upheld (People vs.
Ericsson, 263 Ill., 368), which prohibited the location of garages within two hundred feet of any hospital,
church, or school, or in any block used exclusively for residential purposes, unless the consent of the majority
of the property owners be obtained. Such statutes as these are usually upheld on the theory of safeguarding
the public health. But we apprehend that in point of fact they have little bearing upon the health of the normal
person, but a great deal to do with his physical comfort and convenience and not a little to do with his peace of

mind. Without entering into the realm of psychology, we think it quite demonstrable that sight is as valuable to
a human being as any of his other senses, and that the proper ministration to this sense conduces as much to
his contentment as the care bestowed upon the senses of hearing or smell, and probably as much as both
together. Objects may be offensive to the eye as well as to the nose or ear. Man's esthetic feelings are
constantly being appealed to through his sense of sight. Large investments have been made in theaters and
other forms of amusement, in paintings and spectacular displays, the success of which depends in great part
upon the appeal made through the sense of sight. Moving picture shows could not possible without the sense
of sight. Governments have spent millions on parks and boulevards and other forms of civic beauty, the first
aim of which is to appeal to the sense of sight. Why, then, should the Government not interpose to protect
from annoyance this most valuable of man's senses as readily as to protect him from offensive noises and
smells?

The advertising industry is a legitimate one. It is at the same time a cause and an effect of the great industrial
age through which the world is now passing. Millions are spent each year in this manner to guide the
consumer to the articles which he needs. The sense of sight is the primary essential to advertising success.
Billboard advertising, as it is now conducted, is a comparatively recent form of advertising. It is conducted out
of doors and along the arteries of travel, and compels attention by the strategic locations of the boards, which
obstruct the range of vision at points where travelers are most likely to direct their eyes. Beautiful landscapes
are marred or may not be seen at all by the traveler because of the gaudy array of posters announcing a
particular kind of breakfast food, or underwear, the coming of a circus, an incomparable soap, nostrums or
medicines for the curing of all the ills to which the flesh is heir, etc. It is quite natural for people to protest
against this indiscriminate and wholesale use of the landscape by advertisers and the intrusion of tradesmen
upon their hours of leisure and relaxation from work. Outdoor life must lose much of its charm and pleasure if
this form of advertising is permitted to continue unhampered until it converts the streets and highways into
veritable canyons through which the world must travel in going to work or in search of outdoor pleasure.
The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon the use of private property as it does upon the
use of the channels of travel used by the general public. Suppose that the owner of private property, who so
vigorously objects to the restriction of this form of advertising, should require the advertiser to paste his
posters upon the billboards so that they would face the interior of the property instead of the exterior. Billboard
advertising would die a natural death if this were done, and its real dependency not upon the unrestricted use
of private property but upon the unrestricted use of the public highways is at once apparent. Ostensibly
located on private property, the real and sole value of the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares.
Hence, we conceive that the regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private
property as it is a regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares.
We would not be understood as saying that billboard advertising is not a legitimate business any more than we
would say that a livery stable or an automobile garage is not. Even a billboard is more sightly than piles of
rubbish or an open sewer. But all these businesses are offensive to the senses under certain conditions.
It has been urged against ministering to the sense of sight that tastes are so diversified that there is no safe
standard of legislation in this direction. We answer in the language of the Supreme Court in Noble State Bank
vs. Haskell (219 U.S., 104), and which has already been adopted by several state courts (see supra), that "the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderating opinion" demands such legislation. The agitation against the
unrestrained development of the billboard business has produced results in nearly all the countries of Europe.
(Ency. Britannica, vol. 1, pp. 237-240.) Many drastic ordinances and state laws have been passed in the
United States seeking to make the business amenable to regulation. But their regulation in the United states is
hampered by what we conceive an unwarranted restriction upon the scope of the police power by the courts. If
the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if
the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches
upon such territory is amenable to the police power. A source of annoyance and irritation to the public does not
minister to the comfort and convenience of the public. And we are of the opinion that the prevailing sentiment
is manifestly against the erection of billboards which are offensive to the sight.
We do not consider that we are in conflict with the decision in Eubank vs. Richmond (226 U.S., 137), where a
municipal ordinance establishing a building line to which property owners must conform was held
unconstitutional. As we have pointed out, billboard advertising is not so much a use of private property as it is
a use of the public thoroughfares. It derives its value to the power solely because the posters are exposed to
the public gaze. It may well be that the state may not require private property owners to conform to a building
line, but may prescribe the conditions under which they shall make use of the adjoining streets and highways.

Nor is the law in question to be held invalid as denying equal protection of the laws. In Keokee Coke Co. vs.
Taylor (234 U.S., 224), it was said: "It is more pressed that the act discriminates unconstitutionally against
certain classes. But while there are differences of opinion as to the degree and kind of discrimination permitted
by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions that a statute aimed at what is deemed
an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up
and enumerating other instances to which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the court can see.
That is for the legislature to judge unless the case is very clear."
But we have not overlooked the fact that we are not in harmony with the highest courts of a number of the
states in the American Union upon this point. Those courts being of the opinion that statutes which are
prompted and inspired by esthetic considerations merely, having for their sole purpose the promotion and
gratification of the esthetic sense, and not the promotion or protection of the public safety, the public peace
and good order of society, must be held invalid and contrary to constitutional provisions holding inviolate the
rights of private property. Or, in other words, the police power cannot interfere with private property rights for
purely esthetic purposes. The courts, taking this view, rest their decisions upon the proposition that the
esthetic sense is disassociated entirely from any relation to the public health, morals, comfort, or general
welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of the state. But we are of the opinion, as above indicated,
that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not
disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a
well recognized principle to further application. (Fruend on Police Power, p. 166.)
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed upon the
merits, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR A REHEARING, JANUARY 24, 1916.
TRENT, J.:
Counsel for the plaintiffs call our attention to the case of Ex parte Young (209 U.S., 123); and say that they are
of the opinion that this case "is the absolutely determinative of the question of jurisdiction in injunctions of this
kind." We did not refer to this case in our former opinion because we were satisfied that the reasoning of the
case is not applicable to section 100 (b), 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339. The principles announced in the Young
case are stated as follows: "It may therefore be said that when the penalties for disobedience are by fines so
enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and its officers from resorting to the
courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is the same as if the law in terms prohibited the company
from seeking judicial construction of laws which deeply affect its rights.
It is urged that there is no principle upon which to base the claim that a person is entitled to disobey a statute
at least once, for the purpose of testing its validity without subjecting himself to the penalties for disobedience
provided by the statute in case it is valid. This is not an accurate statement of the case. Ordinarily a law
creating offenses in the nature of misdemeanors or felonies relates to a subject over which the jurisdiction of
the legislature is complete in any event. In these case, however, of the establishment of certain rates without
any hearing, the validity of such rates necessarily depends upon whether they are high enough to permit at
least some return upon the investment (how much it is not now necessary to state), and an inquiry as to that
fact is a proper subject of judicial investigation. If it turns out that the rates are too low for that purpose, then
they are illegal. Now, to impose upon a party interested the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of such a
question (no prior hearing having ever been given) only upon the condition that, if unsuccessful, he must suffer
imprisonment and pay fines as provided in these acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts,
and thus prevent any hearing upon the question whether the rates as provided by the acts are not too low, and
therefore invalid. The distinction is obvious between a case where the validity of the acts depends upon the
existence of a fact which can be determined only after investigation of a very complicated and technical
character, and the ordinary case of a statute upon a subject requiring no such investigation and over which the
jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event.
An examination of the sections of our Internal Revenue Law and of the circumstances under which and the
purposes for which they were enacted, will show that, unlike the statutes under consideration in the above
cited case, their enactment involved no attempt on the part of the Legislature to prevent dissatisfied taxpayers
"from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation;" no effort to prevent any inquiry as to their
validity. While section 139 does prevent the testing of the validity of subsection (b) of section 100 in injunction
suits instituted for the purpose of restraining the collection of internal revenue taxes, section 140 provides a
complete remedy for that purpose. And furthermore, the validity of subsection (b) does not depend upon "the

existence of a fact which can be determined only after investigation of a very complicated and technical
character," but the jurisdiction of the Legislature over the subject with which the subsection deals "is complete
in any event." The judgment of the court in the Young case rests upon the proposition that the aggrieved
parties had no adequate remedy at law.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed the case for want of
jurisdiction because the suit was one against the State, which was prohibited by the Tennessee Legislature.
The Supreme Court of the United States took jurisdiction of the controversy for the reasons above quoted and
sustained the Act of 1899 as a revenue law.

Neither did we overlook the case of General Oil Co. vs. Crain (209 U.S., 211), decided the same day and
citing Ex parte Young, supra. In that case the plaintiff was a Tennessee corporation, with its principal place of
business in Memphis, Tennessee. It was engaged in the manufacture and sale of coal oil, etc. Its wells and
plant were located in Pennsylvania and Ohio. Memphis was not only its place of business, at which place it
sold oil to the residents of Tennessee, but also a distributing point to which oils were shipped from
Pennsylvania and Ohio and unloaded into various tanks for the purpose of being forwarded to the Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi customers. Notwithstanding the fact that the company separated its oils, which
were designated to meet the requirements of the orders from those States, from the oils for sale in Tennessee,
the defendant insisted that he had a right, under the Act of the Tennessee Legislature, approved April 21,
1899, to inspect all the oils unlocated in Memphis, whether for sale in that State or not, and charge and collect
for such inspection a regular fee of twenty-five cents per barrel. The company, being advised that the
defendant had no such right, instituted this action in the inferior States court for the purpose of enjoining the
defendant, upon the grounds stated in the bill, from inspecting or attempting to inspect its oils. Upon trial, the
preliminary injunction which had been granted at the commencement of the action, was continued in force.
Upon appeal, the supreme court of the State of Tennessee decided that the suit was one against the State and
reversed the judgment of the Chancellor. In the Supreme Court of the United States, where the case was
reviewed upon a writ of error, the contentions of the parties were stated by the court as follows: "It is
contended by defendant in error that this court is without jurisdiction because no matter sought to be litigated
by plaintiff in error was determined by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The court simply held, it is paid, that,
under the laws of the State, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for any purpose. And it is insisted "hat
this holding involved no Federal question, but only the powers and jurisdiction of the courts of the State of
Tennessee, in respect to which the Supreme Court of Tennessee is the final arbiter."

The case of Tennessee vs. Sneed (96 U.S., 69), and Shelton vs. Platt (139 U.S., 591), relied upon in our
former opinion, were not cited in General Oil Co. vs. Crain, supra, because the questions presented and the
statutes under consideration were entirely different. The Act approved March 31, 1873, expressly prohibits the
courts from restraining the collection of any tax, leaving the dissatisfied taxpayer to his exclusive remedy
payment under protest and suit to recover while the Act approved February 28, 1873, prohibits suits against
the State.

Opposing these contentions, plaintiff in error urges that whether a suit is one against a State cannot depend
upon the declaration of a statute, but depends upon the essential nature ofthe suit, and that the Supreme
Court recognized that the statute "aded nothing to the axiomatic principle that the State, as a sovereign, is not
subject to suit save by its own consent."And it is hence insisted that the court by dismissing the bill gave effect
to the law which was attacked. It is further insisted that the bill undoubtedly present rights under the
Constitution of the United States and conditions which entitle plaintiff in error to an injunction for the protection
of such rights, and that a statute of the State which operates to deny such rights, or such relief, `is itself in
conflict with the Constitution of the United States."
That statute of Tennessee, which the supreme court of that State construed and held to be prohibitory of the
suit, was an act passed February 28, 1873, which provides: "That no court in the State of Tennessee has, nor
shall hereafter have, any power, jurisdiction, or authority to entertain any suit against the State, or any officer
acting by the authority of the State, with a view to reach the State, its treasury, funds or property; and all such
suits now pending, or hereafter brought, shall be dismissed as to the State, or such officer, on motion, plea or
demurrer of the law officer of the State, or counsel employed by the State."
The Supreme Court of the United States, after reviewing many cases, said: "Necessarily, to give adequate
protection to constitutional rights a distinction must be made between valid and invalid state laws, as
determining the character of the suit against state officers. And the suit at bar illustrates the necessity. If a suit
against state officer is precluded in the national courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and
may be forbidden by a State to its courts, as it is contended in the case at bar that it may be, without power of
review by this court, it must be evident that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many
provisions of the Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be
nullified as to much of its operation. ... It being then the right of a party to be protected against a law which
violates a constitutional right, whether by its terms or the manner of its enforcement, it is manifest that a
decision which denies such protection gives effect to the law, and the decision is reviewable by this court."
The court then proceeded to consider whether the law of 1899 would, if administered against the oils in
question, violate any constitutional right of the plaintiff and after finding and adjudging that the oils were not in
movement through the States, that they had reached the destination of their first shipment, and were held
there, not in necessary delay at means of transportation but for the business purposes and profit of the
company, and resting its judgment upon the taxing power of the State, affirmed the decree of the supreme
court of the State of Tennessee.

In upholding the statute which authorizes the removal of signboards or billboards upon the sole ground that
they are offensive to the sight, we recognized the fact that we are not in harmony with various state courts in
the American Union. We have just examined the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois in the
recent case (October [December], 1914) of Thomas Cusack Co.vs. City of Chicago (267 Ill., 344), wherein the
court upheld the validity of a municipal ordinances, which reads as follows: "707. Frontage consents required.
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to erect or construct any bill-board or sign-board in any
block on any public street in which one-half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for
residence purposes, without first obtaining the consent, in writing, of the owners or duly authorized agents of
said owners owning a majority of the frontage of the property, on both sides of the street, in the block in which
such bill-board or sign-board is to be erected, constructed or located. Such written consent shall be filed with
the commissioner of buildings before a permit shall be issued for the erection, construction or location of such
bill-board or sign-board."
The evidence which the Illinois court relied upon was the danger of fires, the fact that billboards promote the
commission of various immoral and filthy acts by disorderly persons, and the inadequate police protection
furnished to residential districts. The last objection has no virtue unless one or the other of the other objections
are valid. If the billboard industry does, in fact, promote such municipal evils to noticeable extent, it seems a
curious inconsistency that a majority of the property owners on a given block may legalize the business.
However, the decision is undoubtedly a considerable advance over the views taken by other high courts in the
United States and distinguishes several Illinois decisions. It is an advance because it permits the suppression
of billboards where they are undesirable. The ordinance which the court approved will no doubt cause the
virtual suppression of the business in the residential districts. Hence, it is recognized that under certain
circumstances billboards may be suppressed as an unlawful use of private property. Logically, it would seem
that the premise of fact relied upon is not very solid. Objections to the billboard upon police, sanitary, and
moral grounds have been, as pointed out by counsel for Churchill and Tait, duly considered by numerous high
courts in the United States, and, with one exception, have been rejected as without foundation. The exception
is the Supreme Court of Missouri, which advances practically the same line of reasoning as has the Illinois
court in this recent case. (St. Louis Gunning Advt. Co. vs. City of St. Louis, 137 S. W., 929.) In fact, the Illinois
court, in Haller Sign Works vs. Physical Culture Training School (249 Ill., 436), "distinguished" in the recent
case, said: "There is nothing inherently dangerous to the health or safety of the public in structures that are
properly erected for advertising purposes."
If a billboard is so constructed as to offer no room for objections on sanitary or moral grounds, it would seem
that the ordinance above quoted would have to be sustained upon the very grounds which we have advanced
in sustaining our own statute.
It might be well to note that billboard legislation in the United States is attempting to eradicate a business
which has already been firmly established. This business was allowed to expand unchecked until its very
extent called attention to its objectionable features. In the Philippine Islands such legislation has almost
anticipated the business, which is not yet of such proportions that it can be said to be fairly established. It may
be that the courts in the United States have committed themselves to a course of decisions with respect to
billboard advertising, the full consequences of which were not perceived for the reason that the development
of the business has been so recent that the objectionable features of it did not present themselves clearly to
the courts nor to the people. We, in this country, have the benefit of the experience of the people of the United
States and may make our legislation preventive rather than corrective. There are in this country, moreover, on
every hand in those districts where Spanish civilization has held sway for so many centuries, examples of
architecture now belonging to a past age, and which are attractive not only to the residents of the country but
to visitors. If the billboard industry is permitted without constraint or control to hide these historic sites from the
passerby, the country will be less attractive to the tourist and the people will suffer a district economic loss.

The motion for a rehearing is therefore denied.

On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of
Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First
Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as
well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it
hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the
accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal
attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.
We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.

G.R. No. L-12172

August 29, 1958

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-appellants
Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of
Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that
destroys the view of the public plaza.
It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of
the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as
follows:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.
SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for
each repair permit issued.
SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the
violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less
than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys
the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of
the owner of the building or house.
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)
Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant
Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building
adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was
denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public
plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but
again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of
the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having
been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.

A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has absolute discretion to
issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the
mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or
refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The
ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of
building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or
prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71;
Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392)
The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested thereby in the
respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the city is to be
granted. Thus the city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to
some and deny it others; to refuse the application of one landowner or lessee and to grant that of
another, when for all material purposes, the two applying for precisely the same privileges under
the same circumstances. The danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary
discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications
whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which
its validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights under our government do not depend for their
existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread. Ordinances which thus invest a city council
with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored
few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its
impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
As was said in City of Richmond vs. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112,28 N. E. 312, 314 13 L. R. A. 587, 28
Am. St. Rep. 180: "It seems from the foregoing authorities to be well established that municipal
ordinances placing restrictions upon lawful conduct or the lawful use of property must, in order to
be valid, specify the rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct or business; and must
admit of the exercise of the privilege of all citizens alike who will comply with such rules and
conditions; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of any
arbitrary discrimination by the municipal authorities between citizens who will so comply. (Schloss
Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE (2d), pp. 394-395).
It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building
"destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in fact,
the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was predicated on the ground that
the proposed building would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public
highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the
modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness
of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the
State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may
not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the
case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands
condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from
the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the
municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is
that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright
confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117
ALR. 1110, 1116).
A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is
confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. (Sundlum vs. Zoning
Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114).
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it cannot be
said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of
zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without compensation, such
principle finds no support in the genius of our government nor in the principles of justice as we
known them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property
remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should bear the
cost of reasonable compensation for such property under the rules of law governing the
condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E.
827) (Emphasis supplied.)
The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under section 2243, par. (c), of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This section provides:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council shall
have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a
fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos
for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the
provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the municipal council to require the
issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and
prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there is absolutely no
showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set
standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the
ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express
authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.
We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence,
the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.

March 7, 1919
G.R. No. 14078
RUBI, ET AL. (Manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.


Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.

MALCOLM, J.:

In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia
[1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion
(relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to
introduce the present opinion? This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest
interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they
have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now
to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the
facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the
"non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It
is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:

The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of
Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of
this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. ? With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants
are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an
approved by the provincial board.

"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which
read as follows:

"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board.

SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. ? Any non-Christian who shall refuse to
comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one
hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.

"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it

The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of
this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of
1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically
relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.

"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to
the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary
of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao
on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February
21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145
of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and
Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in
sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the
governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized
customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and
are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro
but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by
the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required
by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This,
therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.

Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its
proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with
reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the
attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on
the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI,
Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on
February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568.
Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order
that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in
harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to
use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success,
our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain
assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and
forty-six ? all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings
it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from
one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and
wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human
necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our
kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and
governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to
deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those
who would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in
settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to pay
taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we
hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the
encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title.

LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. lands,
and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can
have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY
THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall not
be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that
no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously
so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR
COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove the pueblos
or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or
the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or
consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private
interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the
change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon
the judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion; if
there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the
town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less
than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who
should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by
Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on
January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December
17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS,"
AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in the reducciones
and towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and
associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious

and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and
the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them
with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the
goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the
imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated
in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law
within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards
the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among
them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be
a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less
advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral part
of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience
and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which
living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material
advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the
same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the
non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission
of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the
Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important
question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary
fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the
principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to
complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in
those which have not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account the
prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect
and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have
proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves important
interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the
illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern
Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the
Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I
have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the
submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing
such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the
following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the common
law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of
the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races ? which may be divided into three
classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a
home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and
the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans ? shall be published in their respective dialects, and the
officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of
having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day
of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.

3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means
which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement
already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be
none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of
communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that
this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the
same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in
the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the
inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity
shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and
which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their
homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed
precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based
upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties
affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the
products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same
price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the
others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which
shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indios shall
be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally
wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by
this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots
the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families;
concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem
most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and
customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to
whether they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty
who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of
their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax)
for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such
officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in return,
have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads
which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these
towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and
cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the
towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the
peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April,
committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the
Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction
with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the
term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and
cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military
headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such
operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my
authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall

give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of
the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of the
Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or
permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the
foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and
missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about
due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for
dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines
was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and
ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions
have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest
should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by
Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this
end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine
Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction
over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that
part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority
theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the
Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province,
Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the
passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec.
16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general
supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed
senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the
territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission
and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the
Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the
Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro

Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act;
Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408,
the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548,
549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua
(Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the
Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. ? AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE
MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial
governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these
Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess
of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act
providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized,
when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a
period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and
control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall
be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced
sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to
sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical
limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby
expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in
the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage. Enacted, December 4, 1902. All of these special laws, with
the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and
embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code
of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions. These different laws, if they of the
non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the
methods to be followed for their advancement. C. TERMINOLOGY. The terms made use of by these laws,
organic and statutory, are found in varying forms. "Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President
McKinley's instruction to the Commission. The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "nonChristian tribes." These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones
Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of nonChristian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there
can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551. "Non-Christian
people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu
of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be
found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426,
Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well

as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission. The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term
"non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561,
Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.) D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN." If
we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a
religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and nonChristians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there
could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zu?iga,
"Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr.
N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898,
vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.) Not content with the
apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true meaning. In one sense,
the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many laws.
Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory"
of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar
recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the
Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts
applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Section
2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this article,
preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces.
The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and
Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers
of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not
granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description. It is well-known that within
the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians and some of whom are not
Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.) If the
religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The
reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular
province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of
civilization of the inhabitants. At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic
words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the
Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an
exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."'
(See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third
session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future
political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp.
346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.) The
idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to
legislative, judicial, and executive authority. The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667,
and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For
instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with
reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing
about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity." As authority of a judicial nature is the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil. 434). The
question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code
concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes
use of the following language: . . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal
marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without
compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the
accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance. Of much more
moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to interpret and enforce
the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to
the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the
Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized
under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the GovernorGeneral and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows: Sir: Within the past few months,
the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-Christian but have recently been
baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396
and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians. It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for
the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which
will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all
of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory,

but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious
belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under
the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code. The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself
change the degree of civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is
performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your
province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity. The determining
factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularly organized
municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to
which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly. I have discussed this matter
with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the
necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial Government
Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.) The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a
member of this court, has the following to say on the subject: As far as names are concerned the classification
is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better classification has as yet been made the present classification
should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of
the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather
than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law
invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. Another official who was concerned with
the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives
to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was
requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214): The
internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. The
Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some
form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has
interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are
exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc.,
are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other
words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not
he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is
associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not
come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a nonChristian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of
Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This
Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc.,
residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to
the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands,
and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula
taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized
people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject
thereto. (Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD, Collector of Internal Revenue. On September 17, 1910, the Collector of
Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all
provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads: In view of the many questions that have been raised by
provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in
from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine
Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is
hereby published for the information of all concerned: Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are
so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized
mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of nonChristian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . . Whenever
any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal
relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body politic,
he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that
community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and
other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the
delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching
the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as
the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former
years. In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is
subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor
even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his

mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as
members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since,
even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth
are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes. Very
respectfully, (Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL, Collector of Internal Revenue, Approved: (Sgd.) GREGORIO
ARANETA, Secretary of Finance and Justice. The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by
Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of
Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and
Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327. The subject has
come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of the
Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The
precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian?
By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same
lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avance?a, after
quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes: In conformity with the above quoted
constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in
purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution
under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon
the law until a court shall hold otherwise. Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says: With respect
to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative code
which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all
non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers
to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed
residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . . The Philippine Commission in
denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian
tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to
establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties
which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation
employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines. The phrase 'non-Christian
inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should
be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the
evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and
unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual. The Official Census of 1903, in the
portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian
Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of
the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio
Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and
Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands,
prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is,
"Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms
refers to culture and not to religion. In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and
different executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to
religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a
law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. E. THE
MANGUIANES. The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine
Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of
Mindoro. Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres
de Rozas de Filipinas, says: In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer,"
"pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but
nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt
this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages
shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still
exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be
the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in
whose language they were called the "ancients." The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have
considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful,
timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no
desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the
Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.) III. COMPARATIVE ? THE AMERICAN INDIANS. Reference
was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the

Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the socalled non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United
States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an
investigation of the American-Indian policy. From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the
Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the
United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to
determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore
mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing
the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on ? "This act avowedly contemplates the
preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object
by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists." A leading case which discusses the status of
the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S. 375). Reference is herein made to the
clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief
history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in
Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows: The relation of the Indian tribes living within
the borders of the United States, both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has
always been an anomalous one and of a complex character. Following the policy of the European
Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the
Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to
the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate
title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples
without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or
the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this
could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a
purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They
were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal
relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws
of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided. The opinion then continues: It seems to us that
this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.
The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for
their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them
and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This
has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they
dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because
it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes. In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S.
28) the question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that
Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of
New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with
guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of
the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to
restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only
does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but longcontinued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the
United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and
protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or
territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state." With reference to laws
affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of
Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the
jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S. 488; U.S. vs.
Celestine [1909], 215 U.S. 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers
[1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S. 218;
Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S. 553; Wallace vs. Adams
[1907], 204 U.S. 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S. 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S.

286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.)
Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority
to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full
protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S. 577.) All this borne out by longcontinued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions. The only case which is
even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of
United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas
corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians,
formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians
who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had
some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had
adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own
exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and
without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their
liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators
are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form
a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory ? had departed therefrom without
permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army
had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian
Territory. The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas
corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and
hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged
the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in
its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the
government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian
tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon
the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in
the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power
rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as
follows: The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude: 1. that an Indian is a 'person'
within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under
color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws
of the United States. 2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military
department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws therefore. 3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the
Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do. 4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of
expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And, 5. Being
restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the
relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered. As far as the first point is concerned, the
decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and
a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such,
entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so
decide. As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States,
that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any
previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain
on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form
the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and
executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the
segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States. IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS. A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. The first constitutional
objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so
attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full
responsibility. That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated
in his instance. The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge
Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and

conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs.
Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard
([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.)
The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case. Is not all this exactly
what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative
Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the
provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this
"necessary"? The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S. 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out
of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the
United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the
Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the
management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said:
"We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before
saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the
rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as
wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of
special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative
authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions
of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S. 598.) There is another aspect of the
question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial
practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial
governor and the provincial board. Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state? Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to
provincial official and a department head. B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION The attorney de officio, for
petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients, says that ? "The statute is
perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can
express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that
the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their
religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional." Counsel's premise once being conceded, his
arguments is answerable ? the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial
construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this
constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the
long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to
religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the
term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious
differences. C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. The third
constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the Commission, the
Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution ? and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo
vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S. 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian
as for the Christian. The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus: Every man may claim
the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other.
(Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.) Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized
licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal
and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can
understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from
us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not
do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.) Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted

license to ac according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the
equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S. 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly
freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common
good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the
rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for
all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use
his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . .
. There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and
rightfully dispute the authority of any human government ? especially of any free government existing under a
written Constitution ? to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered
society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of
his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by
reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S. 11.) Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason
and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.) Civil Liberty may be said to
mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful
enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are
necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue
any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential
to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right
to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion. In general, it
may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.
(There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627;
Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S. 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S. 578; State vs. Kreutzberg
[1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.) One thought which runs through all these different conceptions
of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty
regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every
man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint
by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises
without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must
yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health,
or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs.
Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S. 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.) None of the
rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the
argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic
literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due
process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances,
even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the
discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of
Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced
by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and
justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S. 516.) "Due process of
law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that
it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil. 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on
circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909],
212 U.S. 82.) The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be
purely arbitrary in nature. We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made
later on. D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner
relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of

Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude
exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible
that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States,
has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment
for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a
condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S. 1.) The term
of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no
matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S. 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next
must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER. Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note
at this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and
that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education,
and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S. 27.) What we are
not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power. "The
police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs.
Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely
attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go
beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right
of the individual. The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to
exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can
be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and
that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the
foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil. 580; U.S. vs.
Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil. 245.) With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us,
before finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section.
If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated. F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The preamble of
the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered,
assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes
was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao
reservation and of the motives for its selection, the following: To inform himself of the conditions of those
Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a
trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made
in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the
boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after
the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less
than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development. Of
course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be expected.
But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the press: "It is not
deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the
influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to
educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a
wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them." The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the nonChristian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration ? "the advancement of the non-Christian
elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is
carried on by the adoption of the following measures: (a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby
people of seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities. (b)
The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by
the non-Christian people. (c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate
their development and the extention of government control. (d) Construction of roads and trials between one
place and another among non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain

amicable relations among them and with the Christian people. (e) Pursuance of the development of natural
economic resources, especially agriculture. ( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment
of private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu. The Secretary adds: To attain the end desired,
work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people. These people are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of
civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild
habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the
control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse,
educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In
short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to
economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country.
(See Report of the Department for 1917.) The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish
friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial,
and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674
in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the nonChristian people in the following unequivocal terms: It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes
to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and
foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material,
economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering
permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian
elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.) May the Manguianes not be considered, as
are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise
Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable
for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of
these people? In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is
evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for
the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a
reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and
morals ? was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing
under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the
Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be
gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances
voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the
manguianes. Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that
the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and
they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all
the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are
citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State. In so far
as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the
law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and
persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes
are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and
not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and
its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order. Waste
lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing. To quote again from the
instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior: Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the
influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction ? burning and

destroying the forests and making illegal cai?gins thereon.


Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and
damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these
people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for
which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their
ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or

if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those


who may want to abuse them. There is no doubt in my mind
that this people a right conception of liberty and does not
practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as
the right to do anything they will ? going from one place to
another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal cai?gins thereon. Not knowing what true
liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they
allege that they are being deprived thereof without due
process of law? xxx xxx xxx But does the Constitutional
guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who
do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not
practise liberty in a rightful way? To say that it does will mean
to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar,
that the Government should not adopt any measures looking
to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people should be let along in
the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without
even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its
true and noble sense. In dealing with the backward
population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been
placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure
was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and
with national conscience. xxx xxx xxx The national legislation
on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and
more towards the education and civilization of such people
and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people
under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging
and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far
distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of
what has already been accomplished which has been winning
the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give
up the noble work simply because a certain element,
believing that their personal interests would be injured by
such a measure has come forward and challenged the
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of

civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and


even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of
ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there
has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to
successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time
will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the
works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens.
They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and
become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay
challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward
brothers. The manguianes in question have been directed to
live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and
guided to improve their living conditions. They are being
made to understand that they object of the government is to
organize them politically into fixed and permanent
communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their
children are being educated in a school especially
established for them. In short, everything is being done from
them in order that their advancement in civilization and
material prosperity may be assured.
tainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them
slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for
another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no
involuntary servitude. But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places
under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a
nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another
as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the
nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public
lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public
lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the
interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of
the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always
long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not
make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to
naught. G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION. Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to
answer specific objections and to reach a general conclusion. In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has
the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain
localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat.
at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion.
Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and
other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question. It is said that, if we hold this section
to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of
unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would
naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not
motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to
carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus

confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always
open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no
particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should
not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose. The question is
above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the individual
members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the
very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor
now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an
issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain
the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited.
As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of
the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine. The doctrines of
laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory, are of
the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of
governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches
of the government in this progressive march. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power,
the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual
exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. Further, one cannot hold that
the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is

can
one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go
back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. As
a point which has been left for the end of this decision and
which, in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that
section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should
assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a
late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs.
Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes: We
can seen objection to the application of public policy as a
ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before
the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory,
when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a
prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies
furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the
court believes will best promote the public welfare in its
probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public
policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to
forecast its influence in all possible contingencies.
Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason
and a true sense of justice may dictate." Our attempt at
giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the
so-called non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize
that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in
the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor

unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach


the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal
before the law, all must be approximately equal in
intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful
country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions
must be developed. The public policy of the Government of
the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the
Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill
this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we
have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the
judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch,
be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered
case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts
whenever political ideas are the moving consideration.
Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly
famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal
contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson
[1911], 222 U.S. 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave
questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a
chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a
view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy,
and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no
narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception
which will make the courts as progressive and effective a
force as are the other departments of the Government. We
are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him the
equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further
of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is
a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat
analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of
their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is
the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against
petitioners. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avance?a,
JJ., concur.

2145 of the Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he is a "non-Christian"
as that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express no opinion on that question at this time.
Separate Opinions CARSON, J., concurring: I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice
Malcolm as set forth in the prevailing, opinion. The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled
signification when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied to "tribes," "people,"
or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces throughout the Islands. Justice
Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this connection in our statute-book, denote the
'low grace of civilization" of the individuals included in the class to which they are applied. To this I would add
that the tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribes is, or is not of the "non-Christian" are,
and throughout the period of American occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of
advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community." (Cf. letter of
Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17, 1910, and set out in the principal opinion.) The legislative
and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of civilization to which a
specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraces with the
descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of
civilization which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to,
and enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial,
which control the conduct of the admitted civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a made of life, furthermore, which
does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the
tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may
be brought in contact with members of the tribe. So the standard of civilization to which any given number or
group of inhabitants of particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group, must be
found to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced within the
statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normally result
in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at
any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they
reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of
a apart from that maintain by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or
general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in contact. The
contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the statute, the writ should issue
because of the failure to give these petitioners, as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes affected
by the reconcentration order, an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the
question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such
an order. If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had attained that degree of
civilization which would have made it practicable to serve notice upon, and give an opportunity for a real
hearing, to all the members of the tribe affected by the order, it may well be doubted whether the provincial
board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been justified in its enforcement By what proceeding known
to the law, or to be specially adopted in a particular case, could the offices of any province provide for a
genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a reconcentration order upon a head-hunting tribe in the north of the
Island of Luzon; or upon one of the nomadic tribes whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao,
and whose individual members have no fixed or known place of residence, or upon the fifteen thousand
Manguianes roaming in the wilds of Mindoro. Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should
be consulted, after the practice in the United States when tribes or groups of American Indians have been
placed upon reservations; but since non-Christian head men and chiefs in the Philippines have no lawful
authority to bind their acts or their consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing, would have the same
force whether the issuance of a reconcentration order was or was not preceded by a pow-wow of this kind.
The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such orders rests upon analogous
principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom or action of children and persons of unsound minds is
restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general welfare. The power rests
upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is properly exercised only where certain individuals or
groups of individual are found to be of such a low grade of civilization that their own wishes cannot be
permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence. The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of
these Islands, and the special and necessarily paternal attitude assume toward them by the Insular
Government is well illustrated by the following provisions found in the Administrative Code of 1917: SEC. 705.
Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian tribes). ? It shall be the duty of the Bureau of nonChristian tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by nonChristian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid, and completely manner the
moral, material, economic, social and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of all the Christian and nonChristian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. ?
There shall be maintained in the provincial treasuries of the respective specially organized provinces a special
fund to be known as the township and settlement fund, which shall be available, exclusively, for expenditures
for the benefit of the townships and settlements of the province, and non-Christian inhabitants of the province,
upon approval of the Secretary of the Interior. As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real
question as to the jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to review the action
of the administrative authorities in the enforcement of reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section

JOHNSON, J., dissenting: I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That fact
is not denied. I cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the humblest citizen of his just liberty without
a hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to a
hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty.

MOIR, J., dissenting: I dissent. I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of justice
will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing may strong dissent from the opinion of
Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into
the question in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and human side of the case as it
presents itself to my mind. The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the Provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native
habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there,
or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from the resolution of the
provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which
about three hundred manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prision at Calapan, solely because he
escaped from the reservation. The Manguianes used out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that
they are deprived of their liberty in violation of law. The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return
to the writ copied in the majority opinion which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro with the prior
approval of his act by the Department Secretary ordered the placing of the petitioners and others on a
reservation. The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very low in culture. They
have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are
peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 (?). The manguianes have
shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have no progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any for of municipal government." It may be
well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of Mindoro (not including smaller islands
which together make the Province of Mindoro) has an area of 3,851 square miles and a populations of 28, 361
of which 7, 369 are wild or uncivilized tribes (Manguianes). This appears to be the total Mangyan population of
the province. The total population was less than seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407). The
Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered. It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by
Christian Filipinos along the coast and by Manguianes. The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys,
fishing and hunting at will long before Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the water of Cebu. They
have made little or no progress in the ways of civilization. "They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic
people," whom the Government of the Philippines Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of
civilization and progress. The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for those who
like Dadalos do not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing them section 2759 provides the punishment.
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions, but only the fundamental one will
be considered by me. It is that the sections of the Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted in the majority
opinion, are in violation of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which
reads as follows: That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws. It is not
necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected by that provision. The Attorney-General
argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar to that accorded the Indians in the United
States, and reference is made all through the court's decision to the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court with reference to the Indians. It is not considered necessary to go into these cases for the simple reason
that all the Indians nations in the United States were considered as separate nations and all acts taken in
regard to them were the result of separate treaties made by the United States Government with the Indian
nations, and, incompliance with these treaties, reservations were set apart for them on which they lived and
were protected form intrusion and molestation by white men. Some these reservations were larger than the
Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but in thousands of square miles. The Manguianes
are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of the Philippine Islands by which they
have agreed to live within a certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the
Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other
citizen of this country. And when the provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them
from their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he deprived them of
their rights and their liberty without due process of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law.
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines."
They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want it or not. They
are backward and deficient in culture and must be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and
"bought under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation. Are these petitioners charged with any crime?

There is no mention in the return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been
committed by these "peacefully, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people." A memorandum of the Secretary of the
Interior of the Philippine Islands is copied in extenso in the majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of
their offense which is that ? Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they
(the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction ? burning and destroying the forests and making
illegal cai?gins thereon. No bringing any benefit to the State but, instead, injuring and damaging its interests,
what will ultimately become of those people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are
not fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of their
ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them. There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right
conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do
anything they will ? going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal cai?gins thereon. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can
they are being deprived thereof without due process of law? xxx xxx xxx But does the constitutional guaranty
that "no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law" apply to a class of persons who do
not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way? To say that it does will
mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in
the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement
of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people be let alone in the mountains and in a
permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and
noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed
in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was
adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience. xxx xxx xxx The national
legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the education and
civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. There appear to be two intimations or charges in this
memorandum; one is that the Manguianes destroy the forest by making a cai?gin. What is a "cai?gin?" Simply
this. These people move their camp or place of abode frequently and when they do move to a new place, it is
necessary to clear the land in order to plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut down the smaller
trees and burn these around the larger ones, killing them, so that they can plant their crops. The fires never
spread in the tropical undergrowth of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within the cai?gin are killed and
crops are planted and harvested. This land may be abandoned later on ? due to superstition, to a lack of game
in the neighborhood, to poor crops from exhausted fertility, or to a natural desire to move on. Granting that the
Manguianes do make cai?gins or clear lands in spots and then abandon them for the more fertile lands, which
every man knows to be just over the hills, we cannot see that they are committing such a great abuse as to
justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land ? for incarceration it is and nothing less. The second
intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to the state and on account of their ignorance
they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by
those who want to abuse them." They have never been a burden to the state and never will be. They have not
committed crimes and, when they do, let the law punish them." The authorities are anticipating too much from
these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people." Their history does not demonstrate that we must
expect them to commit crimes and jail them to prevent the possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those want to abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected to
involuntary servitude when left free to roam their native hills and gain a livelihood as they have been
accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they will be if closely confined on a narrow reservation from which
they may not escape without facing a term in jail? Is not more likely that they will be glad to exchange their
"freedom" on a small reservation for the great boon of binding themselves and their children to the more
fortunate Christian Filipinos who will feed them and clothe them in return of their services.? It think it not only
probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be subjected to involuntary personal servitude if their
freedom is limited as it has been. How will they live? There may be persons who are willing to lend them
money with which to buy food on the promise that they will work for them. And if they accept the loan and do
not work for the lender we have another law on the statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run
their necks, and they may be fined not more than two hundred pesos or imprisonment for not exceeding six
months or both, and when the sentence expires they must again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work
will again go to jail, and this maybe repeated till they are too old to work and are cast adrift. The manguianes
have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It does not appear they were ever consulted about
their reconcentration. It does not appear that they had any hearing or were allowed to make any defense. It
seems they were gathered here and there whenever found by the authorities of the law and forcibly placed
upon the reservation, because they are "non-Christian," and because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it
be clear there is no discrimination because of religion. The term "non-Christian" means one who is not a
Christian Filipino, but it also means any of the so-called "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These
non-Christian tribes are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others, about one
millions souls all together. Some of them, like the Moros, Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made great progress in
civilization. The have beautiful fields reclaimed by hard labor ? they have herds of cattle and horses and some
few of them are well educated. Some of the non-Christians, like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the
scale of civilization, but they are one and all "non-Christians," as the term is used and understood in law and in
fact. All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be taken from their homes and
herded on a reservation at the instance of the provincial governor, with the prior approval of the department

head. To state such a monstrous proposition is to show the wickedness and illegality of the section of the law
under which these people are restrained of their liberty. But it is argued that there is no probability of the
department head ever giving his approval to such a crime, but the fact that he can do it and has done it in the
present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The arbitrary and unrestricted power to do harm should
be the measure by which a law's legality is tested and not the probability of doing harm. It has been said that
this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no arbitrary body of individuals; that the
constitutional principles upon which our government and its institutions rest do not leave room for the play and
action of purely personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these
provisions which the people have, the through the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all
control exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal protection
clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government; it was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary
spoliation of property. As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable
classification, or which singles out any particular individuals or class as the subject of hostile and
discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and
especially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further discussion. (Vol.
4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.) When we consider the nature and the theory of our
institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of
purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for its is the author and
source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law
is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere,
and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment,
exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of
constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the
blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth "may be a government of law and not of
men." For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material
right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country
where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 374.) It is said
that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. But it has never
been brought before this court for determination of its constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives
of the lawmakers if the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due
process law, it is void. In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145
of the Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law, but
will in all probability deprive them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a seminomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines of a reservation is to
invite disease an suffering and death. From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a
crime of title less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a
wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied,
malaria infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields ? than it would be to order their
decapitation en masse. There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in
exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat
and reconcentrated on a reservation ? in effect an open air jail ? then so may the Ifugaos, so may the
Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros. There are "nonChristian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior
approval of the head of the department, have the power under this law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of
their different provinces form their homes and put them on a reservation for "their own good and the general
good of the Philippines," and the court will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine
Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may be, subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial
governor. And who would be safe? After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor
decide that some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation. No
matter what his education and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the
court might be in a distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final. The case of
the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the majority opinion, should be quoted at length.
District Judge Dundy said: During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering the laws of
my country, I have never been called upon to hear or decide a case that appealed so strongly to my sympathy
as the one now under consideration. On the one side, we have a few of the remnants of a once numerous and
powerful, but now weak, insignificant, unlettered, and generally despised race; and the other, we have the
representative of one of the most powerful, most enlightened, and most christianized nations of modern times.
On the one side, we have the representatives of this wasted race coming into this national tribunal of ours,
asking for justice and liberty to enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and to pursue the arts of peace,
which have made us great and happy as a nation; on the other side, we have this magnificent, if not
magnanimous, government, resisting this application with the determination of sending these people back to

the country which is to them less desirable perpetual imprisonment in their own native land. But I think it is
creditable to the heart and mind of the brave and distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to say
that he has no sort of sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear a part so
conspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I think it not improper to say that, if the strongest
possible sympathy could give the relators title to freedom, they would have been restored to liberty the
moment the arguments in their behalf were closed. no examination or further thought would then have been
necessary or expedient. But in a country where liberty is regulated by law, something more satisfactory and
enduring than mere sympathy must furnish and constitute the rule and basis of judicial action. It follows that
this case must be examined and decided on principles of law, and that unless the relators are entitled to their
discharge under the constitution or laws of the United States, or some treaty, they must be remanded to the
custody of the officer who caused their arrest, to be returned to the Indian Territory which they left without the
consent of the government. On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five others, during
the session of the court held at that time of Lincoln, presented their petition, duly verified, praying for the
allowance of a writ of habeas corpus and their final discharged from custody thereunder. The petition alleges,
in substance, that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians now
located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely
severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then
endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general
government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the
United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook.
The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April, and, the distance between the place
where the writ was made returnable and the place where the relators were confined being more than twenty
miles, ten days were alloted in which to make return. On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the
authority for the arrest and detention is therein shown. The substance of the return to the writ, and the
additional statement since filed, is that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca
Tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a reservation situated in some place within the limits of the
indian Territory ? had departed therefrom without permission from the government; and, at the request of the
secretary of the interior, the general of the army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest
and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused
the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian reservation, and that they were in his custody for the purpose
of being returned to the Indian Territory. It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the
relators had withdrawn and severed, for all time, their connection with the tribe to which they belonged; and
upon this point alone was there any testimony produced by either party hereto. The other matter stated in the
petition and the return to the writ are conceded to be true; so that the questions to be determined are purely
questions of law. On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the Ponca tribe of
Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of the Niobrara river and west of the Missouri, was set apart
for the permanent home of the aid Indians, in which the government agreed to protect them during their good
behaviour. But just when or how, or why, or under what circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in
Dakota and went to the Indian Territory does not appear. xxx xxx xxx A question of much greater importance
remains for consideration, which, when determined, will be decisive of this whole controversy. This relates to
the right of the government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to a
point in the Indian Territory from which it is alleged the Indians escaped. I am not vain enough to think that I
can do full justice to a question like the one under consideration. But, as the mater furnishes so much valuable
material for discussion, and so much food for reflection, I shall try to present it as viewed from my own
standpoint, without reference to consequences or criticisms, which, though not specially invited, will be sure to
follow. xxx xxx xxx On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general Indian appropriation bill,
and in it we find a provision authorizing the secretary of the interior to use $25,000 for the removal of the
Poncas to the Indian Territory, and providing them a home therein, with consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.) xxx
xxx xxx The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and cultivated a portion of the same, until
two or three years ago, when they removed therefrom, but whether by force or otherwise does not appear. At
all event, we find a portion of them, including the relators, located at some point in the Indian Territory. There,
the testimony seems to show, is where the trouble commenced. Standing Bear, the principal witness, states
that out of five hundred and eighty-one Indians who went from the reservation in Dakota to the Indian Territory,
one hundred and fifty-eight died within a year or so, and a great proportion of the others were sick and
disabled, caused, in a great measure, no doubt, from change of climate; and to save himself and the survivors
of his wasted family, and the feeble remnant of his little band of followers, he determined to leave the Indian
Territory and return to his old home, where, to use his own language, "he might live and die in peace, and be
buried with his fathers." He also stated that he informed the agent of their final purpose to leave, never to
return, and that he and his followers had finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection with the
Ponca tribe of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band of Indians, and to cut loose from the
government, go to work, become self-sustaining, and adopt the habits and customs of a higher civilization. To
accomplish what would seem to be a desirable and laudable purpose, all who were able to do so went to work
to earn a living. The Omaha Indians, who speak the same language, and with whom many of the Poncas have
long continued to intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to make them selfsustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when thus employed, that they were arrested by
order of the government, for the purpose of being taken back to the Indian Territory. They claim to be unable to
see the justice, or reason, or wisdom, or necessity, of removing them by force from their own native plains and

blood relations to a far-off country, in which they can see little but new-made graves opening for their
reception. The land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love of home and native land
was strong enough in the minds of these people to induce them to brave every peril to return and live and die
where they had been reared. The bones of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to repose in the land they
hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully preserved and protected and formed a part of what was to
them melancholy procession homeward. Such instances of parental affections, and such love home and
native land, may be heathen in origin, but it seems to that they are not unlike Christian in principle. And the
court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the United States and in violation of their right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and ordered their release from custody. This case is very similarly
to the case of Standing Bear and others. I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained
of their liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protection of the law, and order the respondents
immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.

G.R. No. L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and
GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is
and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth,
such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its
validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu,
who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City
of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of
such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the
promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying
taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more
than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was
at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its
being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate
motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made
to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which would require the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence,
wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex,
the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,

relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up
and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative,
with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or
the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process
grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and
uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against selfincrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining
room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second
class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a
person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of
the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of
the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once
again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8,
1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the
City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the
challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and
proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain
of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that
the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September
28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del
Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the
City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar
Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue
and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of
the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels
in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City
Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661,
662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides

inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent
Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid
by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.1wph1.t
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the
Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable
American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by
petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for
petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they
considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to the
alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here
being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter,
to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted
by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged
ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of
authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of
the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption
of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice
Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the
people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject
and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it
is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has
been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the
matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable
and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence
of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant
to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process
guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically
aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading
decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare. 6 Negatively put,
police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority.
It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the
power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more
specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the
enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set
forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged
failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to
petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the
increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain
particulars, its alleged vagueness.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the
stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The
challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose,
in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated
to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in
the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore
that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues
eloquently for it.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance
for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to
pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far
back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or
regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful
occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power
to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much
wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number
of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in
the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the
latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. 23

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a license tax for and regulating
the maintenance or operation of public dance halls; 9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and
monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays; 13 prohibiting the
operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium
joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used, 15 all of which are intended to protect public
morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police
power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial
of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question
of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard
to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural
and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from
the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy
the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason
and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought." 18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." 20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. 21

Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by
the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other
day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of
1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation
that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform. 25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing
licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it
were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with
this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that
the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood
because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As
was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which
may result from the legal exercise of that power." 27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be
viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises
could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or
oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It
is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term

is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and
the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license.
The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x
x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of
said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention
even in contractual relations affected with public interest. 31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the
liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles
of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the
gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or
uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age
and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining
whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of
the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join
him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel
is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would
require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a
full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void
on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General
Construction Co.33 toAdderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a
statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the
situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities
about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with
such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered
a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987


RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION
IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me
first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by
transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No.
626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos
and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the
following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see
fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.
Signed by Marcos
(SGD
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above
measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ
of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise
by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* which upheld the trial court, ** and
he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
3

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the
penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent
and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The
question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette
before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of
law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and

orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This
simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need
to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's
trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming
the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply,
to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for
fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench,
especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a
new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the
purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately
on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue
decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of
any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to
question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted
discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate
occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable
language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of
the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept
ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of
1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who
forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was
felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying
down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best
virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every
situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they
confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the
meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection
open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of
the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more
and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would
thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment
of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty
of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in
1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that
every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open
hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other
side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is
only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached
based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides
complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the
problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full
appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance
or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be
dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying
commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this
guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land,"
which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as
"the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."
It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken
zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of
admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as
long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions
action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad
dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and
lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious
and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled
without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such
instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the
three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of
society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after
he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is
virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the
property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the
greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the
basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.
The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present
conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who
rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the
worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the
government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration,
branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required
permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid
police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An
epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute

decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the
scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly,
necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that
the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter
of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership,
to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a
desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power
of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's
tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order
No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no
doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male
and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving
those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order,
we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful
method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The
object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot
be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to
reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities,
usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine
and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which

was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that
summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not
necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission
of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and
the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There
certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in
a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the
violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone
would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they
do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly
meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by
those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is
ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY
OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.
Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see
fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities
for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they
and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there
is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse,
is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate.
The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it.
It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive
order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact,
and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question
the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case
would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have
become afait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the
matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its
obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of
relinquished rights.

The City Legal Officer for respondents-appeliees.

GANCAYCO, J.:
At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below:
ORDINANCE--640
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR
CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS
TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR
OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND
TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED
FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET
xxx xxx xxx
Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled, that:
SECTION 1It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or
corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other
public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between
seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets
intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets.
SECTION 2Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon
conviction be punished by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00)
but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an imprisonment of not less
than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6) MONTHS or both such firm and
imprisonment in the discretion of the Court.

If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the Manager,
Agent or Representative of such firm or corporation.
SECTION 3This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval.
Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya and Dalisay
Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No.
640, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as
Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. 1
Upon motion of the petitioners, 2 a temporary restraining order was issued on July 14, 1969 by the court a quo
enjoining the respondent City of Butuan and its officials from enforcing Ordinance No. 640. 3 On July 29, 1969,
respondents filed their answer sustaining the validity of the ordinance. 4
On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts. 5 On June 4, 1973, the respondent court
rendered its decision, 6 the dispositive part of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor of the
respondents and against the petitioners, as follows:
1. Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid: Provided,
however, that the fine for a single offense shall not exceed TWO HUNDRED PESOS,
as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of Rep. Act No. 523;
2. Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and;
3. Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners.
4. SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 8 of the decision of the court a quo which was denied in a
resolution of the said court dated November 10, 1973. 9
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and
an invalid exercise of police power.
Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as
provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states:

xxx xxx xxx


Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking
the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law, which provides:
(nn) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and
such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this Act, and to fix the penalties for the violation of the ordinances,
which shall not exceed a two hundred peso fine or six months imprisonment, or both
such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for
theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places of amusement has
been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. But the question which needs to be resolved is
this: does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these
places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare
clause as invoked by the City?
This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct interference by the local government
with the operation of theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the prices of admission to
these places. Previous decisions of this Court involved the power to impose license fees upon businesses of
this nature as a corollary to the power of the local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required
moviehouses or theaters to increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees
have been held to be invalid for these impositions were considered as not merely license fees but taxes for
purposes of revenue and not regulation which the cities have no power to exact, 10 unless expressly granted
by its charter. 11
Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 12 where the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the
power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions
and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the
mode in which the business shall be exercised.
While in a New York case, 13 an ordinance which regulates the business of selling admission tickets to public
exhibitions or performances by virtue of the power of cities under the General City Law "to maintain order,
enforce the laws, protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of
the inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for any of said purposes, to regulate and license
occupations" was considered not to be within the scope of any duty or power implied in the charter. It was held
therein that the power of regulation of public exhibitions and places of amusement within the city granted by
the charter does not carry with it any authority to interfere with the price of admission to such places or the
resale of tickets or tokens of admission.

xxx xxx xxx

In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of
public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by
the local government. 14 Thus, in People v. Chan, 15 an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run
cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a
valid exercise of police power. Still in another case, 16 the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod
prohibiting admission of two or more persons in moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of
only one ticket was sustained as a valid regulatory police measure not only in the interest of preventing fraud
in so far as municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety, and the
general welfare.

(n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . . theaters,
theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and all other performances
and places of amusements ...

The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its
power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the
general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance.

Sec. 15. General powers and duties of the Board Except as otherwise provided by
law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall
have the following legislative powers:

To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires
an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 17 The legislature may not, under
the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper
exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. 18
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being
oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to
enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for
just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.
In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 19 this Court held:
The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power,
Inasmuch as the same generally entails a curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or
the property of persons, which are protected and even guaranteed by the Constitution,
the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the
prescriptions of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Constitution
of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights the police power measure must be
reasonable. In other words, individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise
of police power to the extent only and only to the extent--that may be fairly required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640?
A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal Board when the ordinance in question was
passed shows that a certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had taken into account the
complaints of parents that for them to pay the full price of admission for their children is too financially
burdensome.
The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not spell out its raison d'etre in all
probability the respondents were impelled by the awareness that children are entitled to share in the joys of
their elders, but that considering that, apart from size, children between the ages of seven and twelve cannot
fully grasp the nuance of movies or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances, the
admission prices with respect to them ought to be reduced. 19a
We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to
secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but
what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. 20 The methods or means used to protect
the public health, morals, safety or welfare, must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of
the police power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitralily
invaded by the legislative department. 21
We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. 22 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on
the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as
they would for themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the
parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not
only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it.
Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already
experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off
their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a
safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that

birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all
practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business
of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public
health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect the youth from the pernicious practice of
movie operators and other public exhibitions promoters or the like of demanding equal price for their
admission tickets along with the adults. This practice is allegedly repugnant and unconscionable to the interest
of the City in the furtherance of the prosperity, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and the general wellbeing of its inhabitants.
There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely
conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his
venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact,
no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if
he buys a ticket to such performances.
Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is reasonable and necessary to lessen the
economic burden of parents whose minor children are lured by the attractive nuisance being maintained by the
petitioners. Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by
movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission.
They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults. The supposition of the trial court that
because of their age children cannot fully grasp the nuances of such entertainment as adults do fails to
convince Us that the reduction in admission ticket price is justifiable. In fact, by the very claim of respondent
that movies and the like are attractive nuisances, it is difficult to comprehend why the municipal board passed
the subject ordinance. How can the municipal authorities consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet
encourage parents and children to patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children? Perhaps,
there is some ,truth to the argument of petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental to the public good and
the general welfare of society for it encourages children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than
attend to their studies in school or be in their homes.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged
from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid
compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. For after all, these movie house and
theater operators cannot be compelled to exhibit any particular kind of film except those films which may be
dictated by public demand and those which are restricted by censorship laws. So instead of children being
able to share in the joys of their elders as envisioned by the trial court, there will be a dearth of wholesome
and educational movies for them to enjoy.
There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United States
which upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of
the state to interfere in this regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the
theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired
the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. 23 Such
ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the
original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also,
necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary
in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at
such price as he can obtain. 24 So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of
amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state constitution securing
the right of property. 25
In Collister vs. Hayman, 26 it was held:

The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed with a
public interest, was without a franchise to accommodate the public, and they had the
right to control it, the same as the proprietors of any other business, subject to such
obligations as were placed upon them by statute. Unlike a carrier of passengers, for
instance, with a franchise from the state, and hence under obligation to transport
anyone who applies and to continue the business year in and year out, the proprietors
of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no one can make a lawful
complaint. They can charge what they choose for admission to their theater. They can
limit the number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect the price of
admission at the door. They can preserve order and enforce quiet while the
performance is going on. They can make it a part of the contract and condition of
admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the ticket that no one shall
be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted,
or that a woman cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the
like. The proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of
admission in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged
to buy a ticket or make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is
made, the minds of the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser impliedly
promises to perform it.
In Tyson and Bro. United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. Banton, 27 the United States Supreme Court held:
... And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility; and quite
as certainly, its activities are not such that their enjoyment can be regarded under any
conditions from the point of view of an emergency.
The interest of the public in theaters and other places of entertainment may be more
nearly, and with better reason, assimilated to the like interest in provision stores and
markets and in the rental of houses and apartments for residence purposes; although
in importance it fails below such an interest in the proportion that food and shelter are
of more moment than amusement or instruction. As we have shown there is no
legislative power to fix the prices of provisions or clothing, or the rental charges for
houses and apartments, in the absence of some controlling emergency; and we are
unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a different
rule in respect of amusements and entertainment ...

provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with
even by the exercise of police power. 33 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and
operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their
property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent
attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the
proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission
they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. 36
Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This
maybe the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or
unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. 37 The
exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 38
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume
that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown
that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld
as valid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Separate opinion

We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and conclusions of American courts. In this jurisdiction,
legislation had been passed controlling the prices of goods commodities and drugs during periods of
emergency,28 limiting the net profits of public utility 29 as well as regulating rentals of residential apartments for
a limited period, 30 as a matter of national policy in the interest of public health and safety, economic security
and the general welfare of the people. And these laws cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being
violative of the due process clause.
However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions. In no sense could
these businesses be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to
interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and
exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been
considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse.
Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the
prevailing cultural traits are considerable. 31 People of all ages flock to movie houses, games and other public
exhibitions for recreation and relaxation. The government realizing their importance has seen it fit to enact
censorship laws to regulate the movie industry.32 Their aesthetic entertainment and even educational values
cannot be underestimated. Even police measures regulating the operation of these businesses have been
upheld in order to safeguard public health and safety.
Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must
be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its

The issue before the Court is a simple one. Does Butuan City have the power to compel theatre owners to
charge only half fares for children below twelve even as they charge all other moviegoers full prices for
admission into moviehouses?
Instead of nullifying the municipal ordinance through a broad and sweeping justification of property rights, I
believe, however, that we should do so on a more limited ground directly bearing on the issue.
I find no rational basis for classifying children as a distinct group insofar as paying for admission into a
moviehouse is concerned. There is absolutely no pretense that the municipal ordinance is intended to protect
children, enhance their morals, promote their health, safeguard their safety, improve their education, or
otherwise promote the general welfare. In fact, the effect of the ordinance may be the opposite.
With the price of movie tickets suddenly within the reach of many children, they may neglect their studies or
use money intended for food or school supplies to enter moviehouses. Movie owners who are compelled to
accept half prices for a newly increased group of young patrons will be tempted to allow them to enter
moviehouses indiscriminately, including those where scenes of violence, crime, or even sex are portrayed.
Addiction of the young to movie going is definitely injurious to their health.
The avowed purpose of the ordinance--to ease the burden of costs for parents who have to shell out the same
amount of money for the admission of their children as they would for themselves is not covered by police

power. If the city cannot compel refreshment parlors to charge half-prices for hamburgers, soft drinks, pizzas,
or cakes consumed by children by what authority can it impose the obligation of similarly easing parents'
burdens upon the owners of moviehouses?
As discussed by the minority opinion, the legislature may not., under the guise of protecting the public interest,
arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. The imposition enacted by the municipal board of Butuan City has not been justified by its
proponents as a restriction necessary for public health or public welfare. No reasonable relationship has been
shown between a valid purpose and the proper means to accomplish it.
I hesitate, however, to make a brief for owners of theatres and expound a laissez faire approach insofar as
their businesses are concerned. Movie houses may not be public utilities but as places of entertainment
affected with a certain degree of public interest, they are subject to reasonable regulation. That regulation is
stronger and more restrictive than that of regular or ordinary businesses.
The following citation for instance, is pure obiter insofar as half-prices for minors are concerned:
... [T]he proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no one can
make lawful complaint. They can charge what they choose for admission to their
theater. They can limit the number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect
the price of admission at the door. They can preserve order and enforce quiet while the
performance is going on. They can make it a part of the contract and a condition of
admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the ticket that no one shall
be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted,
or that a woman cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the
like. The proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of
admission in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged
to buy a ticket or make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is
made, the minds of the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser impliedly
promises to perform it. (Collister v. Hayman, 76 N.E. 20,183 N.Y. 250, 253, 1 L.R.A.
[N.S.] 1188, 11 Am. St. Rep. 740, An Cas. 344).
I see no reason at this time why we should pass upon situations that are not before us or warn municipal
governments beforehand to avoid enacting certain regulations when nobody knows exactly what
circumstances may call for those regulations.
For instance,
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of
the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable
consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe
the performance on condition that he behaves properly (Law of the State.

.... A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
interfered with even by the exercise of police power. (Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556,
182 P. 530) A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of
a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens
of their property rights (Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac, 3 SCRA 816).
The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due
process clause (Tyson and Bro.--United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. v. Banton, supra).
Hence the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own
way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that
ally person who did not approve could stay away (Ibid, citing v. Clifford v. Brandon, 2
Campb. 358, 368.).
may be interpreted as carte blanche for movie owners to practically ignore municipal regulation and do as they
please.
More appropriate to my maid is to state that while tile Butuan City ordinance is invalid, it does not necessarily
follow that all forms of regulation are proscribed.
We have ruled in People v. Chan (65 Phil. 612):
In the first place, it must be noted that there can be no doubt that the City of Manila
exercises police power, by delegation and that in the exercise of that power it is
authorized to enact ordinances for, the regulation of the operation of theatres and
cinematographs (sec. 2444(m) and (ee) of the Revised Administrative Code: U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218; U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245).
On April 17, 1935, Ordinance No. 2347 was approved. In section 1 it provides that all
first run theatres or cinematographs should register their seating capacity with the City
Treasurer, and in section 1 it prohibits the sale of tickets in said theatres or
cinematographs in excess of their registered seating capacity.
Before the approval of Ordinance No. 2347, Ordinance No. 2188, approved on July 22,
1933, was in force, section 1 of which divides cinematographs into three different
classes: first, second and third. The first class includes those located on certain and
specified streets like Rosario, Escolta, etc., which exhibit films for the first time; those
belonging to the second class are those which, not being located on said streets, also
exhibit films for the first time, and those which, being located on said streets, regularly
show films for the second time or which have the exclusive right to show secondhand
films; and the third class comprehends all those which are not included in the first and
second classes.
xxx xxx xxx

Screen and Radio by Marchetti, 1939, ec., page 268). Such ticket, therefore,
represents a right, positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms
of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which
represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner
thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary y in the contract by which he
obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such
price as he can obtain Ibids, citing Ex-parte Quarg, 84 Pac., 766,149 Cal. 79, 80, 5
L.R.A. [N.S], 183, 117 Am. St. Rep. 11 5, 9 Ann. Ca. 747; Also People v. Steele, 231,
III. 340, 344, 14 R.A. [N.S.] 361, 121 Am. St. Rep. 321, 83 N.E. 236). ....
xxx xxx xxx

To the foregoing must be added, and this is of common knowledge, that the films which
are shown for the first time attract a large attendance, and the theatre or
cinematograph, whether it is first or second class, presenting shows for the first time,
would be suffocatingly overcrowded if the number of tickets were not limited. This is the
reason for the prohibition of the sale of tickets in excess of the seating capacity. The
prohibition applies with equal force wherever the same reason exists, that is, to first
and second class theatres which show films for the first time. (at pp. 612- 613)
There being a rational basis for the restriction of sales of tickets beyond seating capacity, the ordinance is
perfectly valid.
The same is true for the situation found in Samson v. Mayor of Bacolod City (60 SCRA 274):

When it is further remembered that insofar as movie houses and other places of
amusement are concerned. (According to Section 17[1] of the City Charter of Bacolod,
Commonwealth Act No. 326 119381: 'To regulate and fix the amount of the fees for the
following: ... theatres, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions,
circuses and all other performances and places of amusements ....") the least doubt
cannot be entertained as to the validity of a measure prohibiting a proprietor, lessee or
operator of an amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission
ticket, not only in the interest of preventing fraud insofar as municipal taxes are
concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety and the general
welfare. (Cf. People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 [1938]). An American Supreme Court
decision, Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, (204 US 359 [1907] the opinion being
penned by Justice Harlan is equally illuminating: 'The statute is only a regulation of
places of public entertainment and amusement upon terms of equal and exact justice
to everyone holding a ticket of admission, and who is not, at the time, under the
influence of liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd and immoral character. .... Such
a regulation, in itself just, is likewise promotive of peace and good order among those
who attend places of public entertainment and amusement. It is neither an arbitrary
exertion of the state's inherent or governmental power, nor a violation of any right
secured by the constitution of the United States. (at pp. 363-364).
The City of Butuan tries to justify the challenged ordinance by invoking police power. The invocation is
improper. The definitions of police power, including its exercise based on the general welfare clause, are
emphasized to show that the respondents' arguments have no merit
Police power is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. For a municipal
corporation to exercise police power, there must be a legislative grant which
necessarily also sets the limits for the exercise of the power.
In the Philippines, the grant of authority to the municipality to exercise police power is
embodied in Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, otherwise known as the
General Welfare Clause. Chartered cities are granted similar authority in their
respective charters

I find no rational basis for classifying children as a distinct group insofar as paying for admission into a
moviehouse is concerned. There is absolutely no pretense that the municipal ordinance is intended to protect
children, enhance their morals, promote their health, safeguard their safety, improve their education, or
otherwise promote the general welfare. In fact, the effect of the ordinance may be the opposite.
With the price of movie tickets suddenly within the reach of many children, they may neglect their studies or
use money intended for food or school supplies to enter moviehouses. Movie owners who are compelled to
accept half prices for a newly increased group of young patrons will be tempted to allow them to enter
moviehouses indiscriminately, including those where scenes of violence, crime, or even sex are portrayed.
Addiction of the young to movie going is definitely injurious to their health.
The avowed purpose of the ordinance--to ease the burden of costs for parents who have to shell out the same
amount of money for the admission of their children as they would for themselves is not covered by police
power. If the city cannot compel refreshment parlors to charge half-prices for hamburgers, soft drinks, pizzas,
or cakes consumed by children by what authority can it impose the obligation of similarly easing parents'
burdens upon the owners of moviehouses?
As discussed by the minority opinion, the legislature may not., under the guise of protecting the public interest,
arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. The imposition enacted by the municipal board of Butuan City has not been justified by its
proponents as a restriction necessary for public health or public welfare. No reasonable relationship has been
shown between a valid purpose and the proper means to accomplish it.
I hesitate, however, to make a brief for owners of theatres and expound a laissez faire approach insofar as
their businesses are concerned. Movie houses may not be public utilities but as places of entertainment
affected with a certain degree of public interest, they are subject to reasonable regulation. That regulation is
stronger and more restrictive than that of regular or ordinary businesses.
The following citation for instance, is pure obiter insofar as half-prices for minors are concerned:
... [T]he proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no one can
make lawful complaint. They can charge what they choose for admission to their
theater. They can limit the number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect
the price of admission at the door. They can preserve order and enforce quiet while the
performance is going on. They can make it a part of the contract and a condition of
admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the ticket that no one shall
be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted,
or that a woman cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the
like. The proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of
admission in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged
to buy a ticket or make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is
made, the minds of the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser impliedly
promises to perform it. (Collister v. Hayman, 76 N.E. 20,183 N.Y. 250, 253, 1 L.R.A.
[N.S.] 1188, 11 Am. St. Rep. 740, An Cas. 344).

The general welfare clause has two branches. The first authorizes the municipal
council to enact such ordinances and make such regulations not repugnant to law, as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon the municipal council by law. The second branch authorizes the municipality to
enact such ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein. (U.S. v. Salaveria 39 Phil. 103).
This Court has generally been liberal in sustaining municipal action based on the general welfare clause. In
the case before us, however, there appears to be no basis for sustaining the ordinance even on a generous
interpretation of the general welfare clause.
Separate Opinions

I see no reason at this time why we should pass upon situations that are not before us or warn municipal
governments beforehand to avoid enacting certain regulations when nobody knows exactly what
circumstances may call for those regulations.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Separate opinion


For instance,
The issue before the Court is a simple one. Does Butuan City have the power to compel theatre owners to
charge only half fares for children below twelve even as they charge all other moviegoers full prices for
admission into moviehouses?
Instead of nullifying the municipal ordinance through a broad and sweeping justification of property rights, I
believe, however, that we should do so on a more limited ground directly bearing on the issue.

A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of
the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable
consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe
the performance on condition that he behaves properly (Law of the State.

Screen and Radio by Marchetti, 1939, ec., page 268). Such ticket, therefore,
represents a right, positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms
of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which
represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner
thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary y in the contract by which he
obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such
price as he can obtain Ibids, citing Ex-parte Quarg, 84 Pac., 766,149 Cal. 79, 80, 5
L.R.A. [N.S], 183, 117 Am. St. Rep. 11 5, 9 Ann. Ca. 747; Also People v. Steele, 231,
III. 340, 344, 14 R.A. [N.S.] 361, 121 Am. St. Rep. 321, 83 N.E. 236). ....

To the foregoing must be added, and this is of common knowledge, that the films which
are shown for the first time attract a large attendance, and the theatre or
cinematograph, whether it is first or second class, presenting shows for the first time,
would be suffocatingly overcrowded if the number of tickets were not limited. This is the
reason for the prohibition of the sale of tickets in excess of the seating capacity. The
prohibition applies with equal force wherever the same reason exists, that is, to first
and second class theatres which show films for the first time. (at pp. 612- 613)
There being a rational basis for the restriction of sales of tickets beyond seating capacity, the ordinance is
perfectly valid.

xxx xxx xxx


The same is true for the situation found in Samson v. Mayor of Bacolod City (60 SCRA 274):
.... A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
interfered with even by the exercise of police power. (Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556,
182 P. 530) A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of
a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens
of their property rights (Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac, 3 SCRA 816).
The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due
process clause (Tyson and Bro.--United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. v. Banton, supra).
Hence the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own
way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that
ally person who did not approve could stay away (Ibid, citing v. Clifford v. Brandon, 2
Campb. 358, 368.).
may be interpreted as carte blanche for movie owners to practically ignore municipal regulation and do as they
please.
More appropriate to my maid is to state that while tile Butuan City ordinance is invalid, it does not necessarily
follow that all forms of regulation are proscribed.

When it is further remembered that insofar as movie houses and other places of
amusement are concerned. (According to Section 17[1] of the City Charter of Bacolod,
Commonwealth Act No. 326 119381: 'To regulate and fix the amount of the fees for the
following: ... theatres, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions,
circuses and all other performances and places of amusements ....") the least doubt
cannot be entertained as to the validity of a measure prohibiting a proprietor, lessee or
operator of an amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission
ticket, not only in the interest of preventing fraud insofar as municipal taxes are
concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety and the general
welfare. (Cf. People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 [1938]). An American Supreme Court
decision, Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, (204 US 359 [1907] the opinion being
penned by Justice Harlan is equally illuminating: 'The statute is only a regulation of
places of public entertainment and amusement upon terms of equal and exact justice
to everyone holding a ticket of admission, and who is not, at the time, under the
influence of liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd and immoral character. .... Such
a regulation, in itself just, is likewise promotive of peace and good order among those
who attend places of public entertainment and amusement. It is neither an arbitrary
exertion of the state's inherent or governmental power, nor a violation of any right
secured by the constitution of the United States. (at pp. 363-364).

We have ruled in People v. Chan (65 Phil. 612):


In the first place, it must be noted that there can be no doubt that the City of Manila
exercises police power, by delegation and that in the exercise of that power it is
authorized to enact ordinances for, the regulation of the operation of theatres and
cinematographs (sec. 2444(m) and (ee) of the Revised Administrative Code: U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218; U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245).
On April 17, 1935, Ordinance No. 2347 was approved. In section 1 it provides that all
first run theatres or cinematographs should register their seating capacity with the City
Treasurer, and in section 1 it prohibits the sale of tickets in said theatres or
cinematographs in excess of their registered seating capacity.
Before the approval of Ordinance No. 2347, Ordinance No. 2188, approved on July 22,
1933, was in force, section 1 of which divides cinematographs into three different
classes: first, second and third. The first class includes those located on certain and
specified streets like Rosario, Escolta, etc., which exhibit films for the first time; those
belonging to the second class are those which, not being located on said streets, also
exhibit films for the first time, and those which, being located on said streets, regularly
show films for the second time or which have the exclusive right to show secondhand
films; and the third class comprehends all those which are not included in the first and
second classes.
xxx xxx xxx

The City of Butuan tries to justify the challenged ordinance by invoking police power. The invocation is
improper. The definitions of police power, including its exercise based on the general welfare clause, are
emphasized to show that the respondents' arguments have no merit
Police power is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. For a municipal
corporation to exercise police power, there must be a legislative grant which
necessarily also sets the limits for the exercise of the power.
In the Philippines, the grant of authority to the municipality to exercise police power is
embodied in Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, otherwise known as the
General Welfare Clause. Chartered cities are granted similar authority in their
respective charters
The general welfare clause has two branches. The first authorizes the municipal
council to enact such ordinances and make such regulations not repugnant to law, as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon the municipal council by law. The second branch authorizes the municipality to
enact such ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein. (U.S. v. Salaveria 39 Phil. 103).

This Court has generally been liberal in sustaining municipal action based on the general welfare clause. In
the case before us, however, there appears to be no basis for sustaining the ordinance even on a generous
interpretation of the general welfare clause.

The petition was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court but because of the constitutional
questions involved it was transferred to the Court en banc. On August 30, 1988, the Court granted the
petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order and instructed the respondents to cease and desist from
conducting a public auction sale of the lands in question. After the Solicitor General and the private respondent
had filed their comments and the petitioners their reply, the Court gave due course to the petition and ordered
the parties to file simultaneous memoranda. Upon compliance by the parties, the case was deemed submitted.
The petitioners contend that the private respondent is now estopped from contesting the validity of the decree.
In support of this contention, it cites the recent case of Mendoza v. Agrix Marketing, Inc., 1 where the
constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1717 was also raised but not resolved. The Court, after noting that the
petitioners had already filed their claims with the AGRIX Claims Committee created by the decree, had simply
dismissed the petition on the ground of estoppel.
The petitioners stress that in the case at bar the private respondent also invoked the provisions of Pres.
Decree No. 1717 by filing a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee. Failing to get results, it sought to
foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by AGRIX in its favor, which had been extinguished by the
decree. It was only when the petitioners challenged the foreclosure on the basis of Sec. 4 (1) of the decree,
that the private respondent attacked the validity of the provision. At that stage, however, consistent with
Mendoza, the private respondent was already estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the decree.
The Court does not agree that the principle of estoppel is applicable.

[G.R. Nos. 84132-33 : December 10, 1990.]


192 SCRA 257
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND NEW AGRIX, INC., Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS
BANK, THE EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF and GODOFREDO QUILING, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of
Calamba, Laguna, Respondents.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

This case involves the constitutionality of a presidential decree which, like all other issuances of President
Marcos during his regime, was at that time regarded as sacrosanct. It is only now, in a freer atmosphere, that
his acts are being tested by the touchstone of the fundamental law that even then was supposed to limit
presidential action.: rd
The particular enactment in question is Pres. Decree No. 1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix
Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Company. The law outlined the
procedure for filing claims against the Agrix companies and created a Claims Committee to process these
claims. Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is Sec. 4(1) thereof providing that "all
mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby
extinguished."
Earlier, the Agrix Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans
Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978, over three (3) parcels of land situated in Los Baos, Laguna.
During the existence of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. It was for the expressed purpose of salvaging
this and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos.
Pursuant thereto, the private respondent filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee for the payment of its
loan credit. In the meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the National Development Company, petitioners herein,
invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for the
cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor of the private respondent. For its part, the private respondent took
steps to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, prompting the petitioners to file a second case with the same
court to stop the foreclosure. The two cases were consolidated.
After the submission by the parties of their respective pleadings, the trial court rendered the impugned
decision. Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero annulled not only the challenged provision, viz., Sec. 4 (1), but the
entire Pres. Decree No. 1717 on the grounds that: (1) the presidential exercise of legislative power was a
violation of the principle of separation of powers; (2) the law impaired the obligation of contracts; and (3) the
decree violated the equal protection clause. The motion for reconsideration of this decision having been
denied, the present petition was filed.: rd

It is not denied that the private respondent did file a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee pursuant to this
decree. It must be noted, however, that this was done in 1980, when President Marcos was the absolute ruler
of this country and his decrees were the absolute law. Any judicial challenge to them would have been futile,
not to say foolhardy. The private respondent, no less than the rest of the nation, was aware of that reality and
knew it had no choice under the circumstances but to conform.: nad
It is true that there were a few venturesome souls who dared to question the dictator's decisions before the
courts of justice then. The record will show, however, that not a single act or issuance of President Marcos
was ever declared unconstitutional, not even by the highest court, as long as he was in power. To rule now
that the private respondent is estopped for having abided with the decree instead of boldly assailing it is to
close our eyes to a cynical fact of life during that repressive time.
This case must be distinguished from Mendoza, where the petitioners, after filing their claims with the AGRIX
Claims Committee, received in settlement thereof shares of stock valued at P40,000.00 without protest or
reservation. The herein private respondent has not been paid a single centavo on its claim, which was kept
pending for more than seven years for alleged lack of supporting papers. Significantly, the validity of that claim
was not questioned by the petitioner when it sought to restrain the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by
the private respondent. The petitioner limited itself to the argument that the private respondent was estopped
from questioning the decree because of its earlier compliance with its provisions.
Independently of these observations, there is the consideration that an affront to the Constitution cannot be
allowed to continue existing simply because of procedural inhibitions that exalt form over substance.
The Court is especially disturbed by Section 4(1) of the decree, quoted above, extinguishing all mortgages and
other liens attaching to the assets of AGRIX. It also notes, with equal concern, the restriction in Subsection (ii)
thereof that all "unsecured obligations shall not bear interest" and in Subsection (iii) that "all accrued interests,
penalties or charges as of date hereof pertaining to the obligations, whether secured or unsecured, shall not
be recognized."
These provisions must be read with the Bill of Rights, where it is clearly provided in Section 1 that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due course of law nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law" and in Section 10 that "no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
In defending the decree, the petitioners argue that property rights, like all rights, are subject to regulation
under the police power for the promotion of the common welfare. The contention is that this inherent power of
the state may be exercised at any time for this purpose so long as the taking of the property right, even if
based on contract, is done with due process of law.
This argument is an over-simplification of the problem before us. The police power is not a panacea for all
constitutional maladies. Neither does its mere invocation conjure an instant and automatic justification for
every act of the government depriving a person of his life, liberty or property.
A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
In more familiar words, a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
should justify the interference of the state; and b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 2

Applying these criteria to the case at bar, the Court finds first of all that the interests of the public are not
sufficiently involved to warrant the interference of the government with the private contracts of AGRIX. The
decree speaks vaguely of the "public, particularly the small investors," who would be prejudiced if the
corporation were not to be assisted. However, the record does not state how many there are of such investors,
and who they are, and why they are being preferred to the private respondent and other creditors of AGRIX
with vested property rights.:-cralaw
The public interest supposedly involved is not identified or explained. It has not been shown that by the
creation of the New Agrix, Inc. and the extinction of the property rights of the creditors of AGRIX, the interests
of the public as a whole, as distinguished from those of a particular class, would be promoted or protected.
The indispensable link to the welfare of the greater number has not been established. On the contrary, it would
appear that the decree was issued only to favor a special group of investors who, for reasons not given, have
been preferred to the legitimate creditors of AGRIX.

contracts are of that nature. But as already observed, the contracts of loan and mortgage executed by AGRIX
are purely private transactions and have not been shown to be affected with public interest. There was
therefore no warrant to amend their provisions and deprive the private respondent of its vested property rights.
It is worth noting that only recently in the case of the Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, 6 we
sustained the preference in payment of a mortgage creditor as against the argument that the claims of
laborers should take precedence over all other claims, including those of the government. In arriving at this
ruling, the Court recognized the mortgage lien as a property right protected by the due process and contract
clauses notwithstanding the argument that the amendment in Section 110 of the Labor Code was a proper
exercise of the police power.: nad
The Court reaffirms and applies that ruling in the case at bar.

Assuming there is a valid public interest involved, the Court still finds that the means employed to rehabilitate
AGRIX fall far short of the requirement that they shall not be unduly oppressive. The oppressiveness is patent
on the face of the decree. The right to property in all mortgages, liens, interests, penalties and charges owing
to the creditors of AGRIX is arbitrarily destroyed. No consideration is paid for the extinction of the mortgage
rights. The accrued interests and other charges are simply rejected by the decree. The right to property is
dissolved by legislative fiat without regard to the private interest violated and, worse, in favor of another private
interest.

Our finding, in sum, is that Pres. Decree No. 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in
conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the
mortgage and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of AGRIX
constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured
creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal protection clause. Moreover, the new
corporation, being neither owned nor controlled by the Government, should have been created only by general
and not special law. And insofar as the decree also interferes with purely private agreements without any
demonstrated connection with the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the
contract.

A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the protection of the Bill of
Rights. So do interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once they
accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to another without
compensation and any known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the
Constitution.

With the above pronouncements, we feel there is no more need to rule on the authority of President Marcos to
promulgate Pres. Decree No. 1717 under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Even if he had such
authority, the decree must fall just the same because of its violation of the Bill of Rights.

And not only is there arbitrary taking, there is discrimination as well. In extinguishing the mortgage and other
liens, the decree lumps the secured creditors with the unsecured creditors and places them on the same level
in the prosecution of their respective claims. In this respect, all of them are considered unsecured creditors.
The only concession given to the secured creditors is that their loans are allowed to earn interest from the date
of the decree, but that still does not justify the cancellation of the interests earned before that date. Such
interests, whether due to the secured or the unsecured creditors, are all extinguished by the decree. Even
assuming such cancellation to be valid, we still cannot see why all kinds of creditors, regardless of security,
are treated alike.
Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike, both in the
privileges conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all persons or things differently situated should
be treated differently. In the case at bar, persons differently situated are similarly treated, in disregard of the
principle that there should be equality only among equals.- nad
One may also well wonder why AGRIX was singled out for government help, among other corporations where
the stockholders or investors were also swindled. It is not clear why other companies entitled to similar
concern were not similarly treated. And surely, the stockholders of the private respondent, whose mortgage
lien had been cancelled and legitimate claims to accrued interests rejected, were no less deserving of
protection, which they did not get. The decree operated, to use the words of a celebrated case, 3 "with an evil
eye and an uneven hand."
On top of all this, New Agrix, Inc. was created by special decree notwithstanding the provision of Article XIV,
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, that:
SEC. 4. The Batasang Pambansa shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. 4
The new corporation is neither owned nor controlled by the government. The National Development
Corporation was merely required to extend a loan of not more than P10,000,000.00 to New Agrix, Inc. Pending
payment thereof, NDC would undertake the management of the corporation, but with the obligation of making
periodic reports to the Agrix board of directors. After payment of the loan, the said board can then appoint its
own management. The stocks of the new corporation are to be issued to the old investors and stockholders of
AGRIX upon proof of their claims against the abolished corporation. They shall then be the owners of the new
corporation. New Agrix, Inc. is entirely private and so should have been organized under the Corporation Law
in accordance with the above-cited constitutional provision.
The Court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between AGRIX and the private
respondent without justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the
principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered
congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of the greater number. 5 Most present-day

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Pres. Decree No. 1717 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
temporary restraining order dated August 30, 1988, is LIFTED. Costs against the petitioners.- nad
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979


LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as
Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his
capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D.
Aquino for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in
this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the
rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of nondelegation of legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the
requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents
Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L.
Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public
Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a
constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor

could the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an
exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of
Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December
2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in
land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways
without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization
(U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.
No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices;
[Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets
and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or
drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning
device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the
base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30)
minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or
driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the
front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall
cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to
registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than
15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to
effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as
are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was
amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby
amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner
to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning
device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner
shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There
was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10,
1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of
suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor
vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension
and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until
August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of
Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor
vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from whatever source and
that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said
administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the
device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached
to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of
payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in
conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate
implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and
Communications. 10

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v.
Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments
adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court
Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to
move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as
of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court. 16

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well
serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as
amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land
transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the
provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He
contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of
the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14are unlawful and unconstitutional
and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the
part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November
15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that
they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle
car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in
paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction
No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission
Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due
process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise
oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that
said allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative
Defenses of this Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of
grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in
demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing
rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of
legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what
respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They
are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968
Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was
a signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language
calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of
Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat,
its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the
outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the
police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was
stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons
and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the
doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth
in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that
sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative
power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice
Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly
pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even
to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs
that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation.
What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague

and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen
or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police
power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence
indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our
attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the
validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found
nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid
obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought
to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in
his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and
regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to
rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders
of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject
clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific
method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption
of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the
statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As
was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical
information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be
defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of
nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor
vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not
backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no
doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of
petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning devices to prevent
another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could
likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the
issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive
Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural
claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for
exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was
exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not
an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking
lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3)
"built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum
lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from
this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed
on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled
which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate
advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it
a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus
increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the
Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in
Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning
device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip
their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from
whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even
personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the
specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning
device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make
manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so
sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more subtle
racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that
unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable
degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of
Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32
7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power,
the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he
entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate
word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass
upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the
province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense.
That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the
observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts
merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to
Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the
law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that
only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a
statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated
the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last
offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain
unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged
provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be
sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally
without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with
authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion.
An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is
public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to
adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.'
He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by
the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority
non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being
assumed." 34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration.
The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization
(U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.
No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; *
* * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept
of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of
international morality.

set forth in her probationary employment contract. 2 She then filed on 13 November 1990 with the Arbitration
Branch of the National Capital Region of the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with reinstatement, back
wages, and damages against the hotel and its former general manager, Peter Grieder. 3 The case was
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-06059-90.
On 23 December 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 4 in favor of the private respondent. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the dismissal of complainant Gina G. Castro by
respondents to have been illegally effected;

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any
attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual
observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what
was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the
constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and
adequately argued."38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to
a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

2. Ordering respondents to immediately reinstate complainant


to her former position or substantially equivalent position
without loss of seniority rights including the payment of
backwages in the amount of Eighty-Eight Thousand Six
Hundred Twenty Pesos (P88,620.00);
3. Respondents are further ordered to pay the amount of Two
Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P2,800.00) for unpaid 13th
month pay and Nine Thousand One Hundred Forty-Two Pesos
(P9,142.00) as ten (10%) per cent attorney's fees, which is
equivalent to ten (10%) per cent of the awards herein;

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.

4. As to the claims for damages, the same is hereby ordered


dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
G.R. No. 110027 November 16, 1994

Malang and Duka Law Offices for private respondent.

The petitioner received a copy of the decision on 28 January 1992. On


7 February 1992, within the 10-day reglementary period, it filed an appeal 6 to the NLRC alleging therein that
the Labor Arbiter committed abuse of discretion and serious error in his findings of fact and conclusions of law.
It also claimed that the Labor Arbiter erred in ruling that the monthly salary of the private respondent is
P7,000.00 when it should have been P3,403.00. Also, on
7 February 1992, it filed an Omnibus Motion For Extension Of Time To File Surety Bond And To Reduce
Amount Of Bond 7since by reason of the above error as to the monthly salary, the back salaries should only
have been P40,836.00 and not P88,620.00 and the 13th-month pay should only have been P1,134.00 and not
P2,800.00. Thus, the total amount due the private respondent should only be P41,970 and not P91,420.00.
This motion was not resolved by the Labor Arbiter.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On 17 February 1992, the private respondent filed a motion for the execution of the decision 8 on the ground
that the petitioner did not file the memorandum of appeal and appeal bond and that the order of reinstatement
was immediately executory. This motion was likewise not resolved.

MARANAW HOTEL RESORT CORPORATION (CENTURY PARK SHERATON MANILA), petitioner,


vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GINA G. CASTRO, respondents.
Cabochan, Reyes & Capones for petitioner.

This special civil action of certiorari raises the issue of whether the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the payroll reinstatement of an employee despite its
resolution reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declaring that there was no illegal dismissal.
The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are in the main not disputed.
On 16 June 1990, private respondent Gina G. Castro was hired on a probationary basis for six months as a
guest relations officer of the Century Park Sheraton Hotel, a five-star hotel located at Malate, Manila, owned
by the petitioner. 1 On 10 November 1990, she was dismissed on the ground of failure to meet the standards

On 14 July 1992, the petitioner filed a surety bond in the amount of P100,562.00 9 to answer for the monetary
award based on the erroneous computation by the Labor Arbiter. 10
In its resolution of 25 March 1993, 11 the NLRC (Second Division) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that there was no illegal dismissal but rather a failure of
the private respondent to comply with the petitioner's standards for permanent employment. It then made the
following observations:
It appears however that on March 13, 1992, complainant filed a Motion For Execution
Pending Appeal which motion was inadvertently not acted upon.

Article 223 of the Labor Code provides among others, as follows:


In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even
pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to
work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer
shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein.
(Emphasis supplied).
In view of the aforequoted provision, complainant should be considered on payroll
reinstatement, as of the date of the filing of the Motion For Execution up to the date of
the promulgation of this Resolution and thus pay [sic] her salaries corresponding to that
period based on P4,800.00 a month which was her salary at the time of her dismissal.
and ultimately decreed thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit.
However, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant Gina C. Castro her
salaries corresponding to the period March 13, 1992 up to the date of the promulgation
of this Resolution computed at P4,800.00 per month.
SO ORDERED. 12
Its motion for partial reconsideration 13 seeking to delete the portion of the decision ordering it to pay the
private respondent the sum of P4,800.00 per month from 13 March 1992 up to 25 March 1993 having been
denied by the NLRC for lack of merit, 14 the petitioner filed the instant case raising the sole issue of whether
the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in decreeing the payroll reinstatement of the private respondent and
ordering the petitioner to pay the private respondent.
It maintains that the filing of the motion for execution pending appeal did not entitle the private respondent to
payroll reinstatement because this is an option granted to the employer by Article 223 of the Labor Code and
the operative act therefor is the exercise by the employer of such option upon the service upon it of the writ of
execution for the reinstatement of the private respondent. In the instant case, the motion for execution was not
acted upon and no writ of execution was issued. Hence, there was no occasion for the petitioner to exercise its
option and the NLRC's order was, in effect, an order for the payment of salary to a party for the period during
which she did not work, which is violative of the rule of "no work, no pay." Moreover, the order is inconsistent
with the ruling that the private respondent was validly dismissed.

In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment 17 filed on 12 October 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintains that the assailed resolution of the NLRC is not in accordance with law. It prays that the NLRC be
given a new period within which to file its comment, which we granted.
In its comment 18 filed on 14 March 1994, the NLRC contends that its challenged resolution is correct.
It must be stressed that the private respondent did not challenge the resolution of the NLRC reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissing her complaint for illegal dismissal and it is only in this action that
she questioned the timeliness of the petitioner's appeal to the NLRC. We have ruled that the issue of the
timeliness of an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC may not be raised for the first time
before this Court.19 The proper step that the private respondent should have taken was to file with the NLRC a
motion to dismiss the appeal and to remand the records on the ground that the decision had become final and
executory. 20
The sole issue thus presented for our determination is whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in holding that the private respondent should be considered as reinstated in the payroll from the
filing of the motion for execution on 13 March 1992 until the promulgation of its resolution and, as a necessary
consequence, ordering the petitioner to pay the private respondent her salaries corresponding to the period
from 13 March 1992 up to 25 March 1993 when its resolution was promulgated.
We agree with the petitioner that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion. The petition should thus be
granted.
The resolution of the issue is found in the third paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code which reads:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work
under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. (emphasis
supplied).
This paragraph was inserted by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989. In Aris
(Phil.) Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 21 we sustained its constitutionality as an exercise of the
police power of the state and further ruled that since appeal is a privilege of statutory origin, the law may
validly prescribe limitations or qualifications thereto or provide relief to the prevailing party in the event an
appeal is interposed by the losing party.
It is clear from Article 223 that if execution pending appeal is granted, the employee concerned shall be
admitted back to work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation. However,
instead of doing so, the employer is granted the option to merely reinstate the employee in the payroll. This
would simply mean that although not admitted back to work, the employee would nevertheless be included in
the payroll and entitled to receive her salary and other benefits as if she were in fact working.

We required the respondents to comment on the petition.


In her comment 15 filed on 14 September 1993, the private respondent side-steps the merits of the issue raised
in the petition; instead, she assails the validity of the NLRC resolution and prays that the same be declared
null and void because the petitioner's appeal to the NLRC was not perfected on time due to the petitioner's
failure to put up the required surety bond within the 10-day reglementary period. She further asks that the case
be remanded to the NLRC for the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The petitioner controverts
these claims in its reply. 16

It must be stressed, however, that although the reinstatement aspect of the decision is immediately executory,
it does not follow that it is self-executory. There must be a writ of execution which may be issued motu
proprio or on motion of an interested party. Article 224 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or medarbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party,
issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes
final and executory. . . . (emphasis supplied)

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule VIII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC also provides:
The Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator, or the Regional Director, or his duly authorized
hearing officer of origin shall, motu proprio or upon motion of any interested party,
issue a writ of execution on a judgment only within five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory . . . . No motion for execution shall be entertained nor a
writ be issued unless the Labor Arbiter is in possession of the records of the case
which shall include an entry of judgment. (emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, the Labor Arbiter neither issued motu proprio a writ of execution to enforce the
reinstatement aspect of his decision nor acted on the private respondent's motion for execution filed on 13
March 1992. The NLRC did not also resolve it prior to the promulgation of its decision more than a year later
or on 23 March 1993. The pleadings before us do not show that the private respondent had filed a motion to
resolve the motion for execution or that she had, by any other means, called the attention of the NLRC to such
motion for execution. The private respondent may therefore be deemed to have abandoned her motion for
execution pending appeal.
In the absence then of an order for the issuance of a writ of execution 22 on the reinstatement aspect of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the petitioner was under no legal obligation to admit back to work the private
respondent under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to her dismissal or, at the petitioner's option, to
merely reinstate her in the payroll. An option is a right of election to exercise a privilege, 23 and the option in
Article 223 of the Labor Code is exclusively granted to the employer. The event that gives rise for its exercise
is not the reinstatement decree of a Labor Arbiter, but the writ for its execution commanding the employer to
reinstate the employee, while the final act which compels the employer to exercise the option is the service
upon it of the writ of execution when, instead of admitting the employee back to his work, the employer
chooses to reinstate the employee in the payroll only. If the employer does not exercise this option, it must
forthwith admit the employee back to work, otherwise it may be punished for contempt. 24
This option is based on practical considerations. The employer may insist that the dismissal of the employee
was for a just and valid cause and the latter's presence within its premises is intolerable by any standard; or
such presence would be inimical to its interest or would demoralize the co-employees. Thus, while payroll
reinstatement would in fact be unacceptable because it sanctions the payment of salaries to one not rendering
service, it may still be the lesser evil compared to the intolerable presence in the workplace of an unwanted
employee.
Since in the instant case no occasion arose for the petitioner to exercise its option under Article 223 of the
Labor Code with respect to the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it ordered that the private respondent should be considered reinstated in the
payroll from the filing of her motion for execution until the promulgation of its resolution on 25 March 1993. As
correctly contended by the Office of the Solicitor General, the NLRC "arrogated unto itself the right to choose
whether to admit the dismissed employee back to work or to reinstate her in the payroll, which right properly
pertains to the employer." 25 Worse, the NLRC resolution granted the unresolved motion for execution which
had been effectively abandoned through the private respondent's inaction and which, for obvious reasons,
could no longer be properly resolved in a resolution finally disposing the appeal. And since the resolution
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed for lack of merit the private respondent's complaint
for illegal dismissal, the rationale for the order of payroll reinstatement is beyond us.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission of 25 March 1993 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-06059-90 is modified by deleting the portion
thereof ordering the petitioner to pay the private respondent her salaries corresponding to the period from 13
March 1992 up to the date of the promulgation of the resolution. The rest shall stand.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 123880. February 23, 1999]
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORPORATION, (Owner of Century Park Sheraton
Manila), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EDDIE
DAMALERIO, respondents.

DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeks to annul and
set aside the Decision, dated September 18, 1995, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) [1], and
the Order[2], dated January 30, 1996, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration in NLRC-NCR-CA No.
005642-93, on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
On April 2, 1992, Eddie Damalerio (Damalerio), a room attendant of the Century Park Sheraton Hotel,
operated by Maranaw Hotel and Resort Corporation, was seen by hotel guest Jamie Glaser (Glaser) with left
hand inside the latter's suitcase. Confronted with what he was doing, Damalerio explained that he was trying
to tidy up the room. Not satisfied with the explanation of Damalerio, Glaser lodged a written complaint before
William D. Despuig, shift-in-charge of security of the hotel. Glaser also reported that Damalerio had previously
asked from him souvenirs, cassettes, and other giveaways. The complaint was later brought by Despuig to
the attention of Major Eddie Buluran, chief of Security of the hotel.
On April 3, 1992, Damalerio was given a Disciplinary Action Notice (DAN). The next day, an
administrative hearing was conducted on the matter. Among those present at the hearing were: 1) Lourdes
Ricardo (room attendant), 2) Angelito Torres (floor supervisor), 3) Major Eddie Buluran (chief of security), 4)
Susan Dino (Personnel representative), 5) Alfredo San Gabriel (senior floor supervisor) and 6) Ben Hur
Amador (union representative).
Taking the witness stand on his own behalf, Damalerio denied the accusation against him, theorizing
that when he found the room of Glaser in disarray, and was about to make the bed, he noticed some
belongings, such as socks and T-shirts of the said hotel guest scattered around, so much so that he thought of
placing the same in his luggage. While doing so, Glaser arrived. When asked by the latter if something was
wrong, he (Damalerio) said "I'm just cleaning your room," and Glaser remarked, "Good work," and then, the
two of them chatted about Glaser's concert at the Araneta Coliseum.
On April 13, 1992, Damalerio received a memorandum [3] issued by Alfredo San Gabriel, Sr., Floor
Supervisor, bearing the approval of Nicolas R. Kirit, Executive Housekeeper, stating that he (Damalerio) was
found to have committed qualified theft in violation of House Rule No. 1, Section 3 of Hotel Rules and
Regulations. The same memorandum served as a notice of termination of his employment.
On May 19,1992, Damalerio filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal against the
petitioner.
On August 20, 1993, after the parties had sent in their position papers, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J.
Diosana decided the case; disposing, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the dismissal of complainant to be illegal and ordering
the respondents to reinstate him to his former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and
with backwages from April 15, 1992 when he was preventively suspended up to actual reinstatement and
other benefits, including but not limited to his share in the charges and/or tips which he failed to receive, and
all other CBA benefits that have accrued since his dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
From the aforesaid Labor Arbiter's disposition, the petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which modified the
appealed decision by giving petitioner the option of paying Damalerio a separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month pay for every year of service, instead of reinstating him.
On November 22, 1995, petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail. NLRC
denied the same on January 30, 1996.

Undaunted, petitioner has come to this Court via the present petition; posing the questions:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO
ADDUCE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS VERSION OF THE INCIDENT,
CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD INELUCTABLY SHOWS
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT REVERSING THAT PORTION OF
THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO PAY
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HIS SHARE IN THE SERVICE CHARGE WHICH WAS
COLLECTED DURING THE TIME HE WAS NOT WORKING IN THE HOTEL.
The petition is barren of merit.
Petitioner's theory that Damalerio was caught committing qualified theft in flagrante delicto is anemic of
evidentiary support. Records disclose petitioner's failure to substantiate such imputation against him. During
the investigation presided over by the Labor Arbiter, Damalerio narrated a plausible and satisfactory
explanation for his behavior complained of. According to him, he was then cleaning the hotel room of Glaser,
and while in the process of placing inside the luggage the personal belongings of Glaser scattered near the
bed, the latter entered the room. Glaser did not bother to testify as all his things were intact.
Although it was not completely proper for Damalerio to be touching the things of a hotel guest while
cleaning the hotel rooms, personal belongings of hotel guests being off-limits to roomboys, under the
attendant facts and circumstances, we believe that the dismissal of Damalerio was unwarranted. To be sure,
the investigation held by the hotel security people did not unearth enough evidence of culpability. It bears
repeating that subject hotel guest lost nothing. Albeit petitioner may have reasons to doubt the honesty and

trustworthiness of Damalerio, as a result of what happened, absent sufficient proof of guilt, he (Damalerio),
who is a rank-and-file employee, cannot be legally dismissed. [4] Unsubstantiated suspicions and baseless
conclusions by employers are not legal justification for dismissing employees. The burden of proving the
existence of a valid and authorized cause of termination is on the employer.[5] Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the employee, in keeping with the principle of social justice enshrined in the Constitution. [6]
All things studiedly considered and viewed in proper perspective, the dismissal of Damalerio, under the
premises, cannot be countenanced.
As regards the share of Damalerio in the service charges collected during the period of his preventive
suspension, the same form part of his earnings, and his dismissal having been adjudged to be illegal, he is
entitled not only to full backwages but also to other benefits, including a just share in the service charges, to
be computed from the start of his preventive suspension until his reinstatement.
However, mindful of the animosity and strained relations between the parties, emanating from this
litigation, we uphold the ruling a quo that in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay may be given to the private
respondent, at the rate of one (1) month pay for every year of service. Should petitioner opt in favor of
separation pay, the private respondent shall no longer be entitled to share in the service charges collected
during his preventive suspension.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Court affirms the questioned Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission, to be implemented according to law and this disposition. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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