REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
-versusHONORABLE JUDGE WINLOVE
DUMAYAS OF BRANCH 59,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI, and NICOLAS C.
FLORIO, TIMOTHY D. LEVIELLE,
REBECCA A. ALIVIO, RAMON R.
ORTIZ, FRUMENCIO DEQUITO,
ANER M. ANDA, COLIN J. GEER,
FRUMENCIO DEQUITO, and
JOSUE C. BAES,
Respondents.

CA G.R. NO.
_________________
(Criminal Case No. 131398 For Violation of
RA 1161 as amended by
RA 8282, or the Social
Security Act of 1997)

x--------------------------------------x
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
PETITIONER PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully states:
NATURE OF PETITION
This is a Special Civil Action of Certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court seeking the nullification of the Order issued by the
Honorable Judge Winlove Dumayas of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati Branch 59 (henceforth referred to as Public Respondent) on
27 August 2014 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
herein Petitioner, as well as of the Order of the same court dated 31
July 2012 (sic) dismissing Criminal Case
No. 13-1398 entitled
People of the Philippines vs Nicolas C. Florio et. al. against Private
Respondents. The petition invokes the Honorable Courts exercise of
its constitutional mandate to determine whether there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The petition is
filed, there being no remedy of appeal or any plain, speedy, adequate
remedy, administrative or otherwise, in the ordinary course of law.
Certified true copies of the assailed Order dated 31 July 2012 and 27
August 2014 are respectively attached hereto as ANNEXES A and
B and are made integral parts hereof.

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

THE PARTIES
The Petitioner is the People of the Philippines in whose name
the information in Criminal Case No. 13-1398 was filed. It is
represented in this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General with
office address at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City
where it may be served processes by this Honorable Court.
The Public Respondent Hon. Winlove Dumayas is being
impleaded in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 59, who issued the assailed order.
The Private Respondents are the accused in the criminal case
abovementioned and were directors and/or President of Caltex
(Philippines), Inc. holding the respective positions and addresses
herein below mentioned and who may be served with the processes
of this Honorable Court as follows:
For charges of violations of the SSS Law consisting of nonregistration, non-withholding and non-remittance of contributions per
month committed by Caltex Phils. Inc. from July 2001 to April 2002:
NICOLAS C. FLORIO
COLIN J. GEER
FRUMENCIO DEQUITO
RAMON R. ORTIZ
JOSUE C. BAES

Chairman of the Board/President

c/o Caltex (Philippines), Inc.
6/F 7650 Ayala Avenue, Makati City
Member of the Board and Vice President
c/o Caltex Banaba Housing
Bgy. Sta Rita, Batangas City
Member of the Board
21 Fabella St., B.F. Homes, Paraaque
City
Member of the Board
7-Soliven III, Loyola Grand Villas,
Marikina City
Member of the Board
Blk 1, Lot 18 and 20, San Pedro 6
Subdivision Tandang Sora, Quezon City

For charges of violations of of the SSS Law consisting of nonregistration, non-withholding and non-remittance of contributions per
month committed by Caltex Phils. Inc. from April 2002 to August
2002:
TIMOTHY D. LEVIELLE

Chairman of the Board/President

c/o Caltex (Philippines), Inc.
6/F 7650 Ayala Avenue, Makati City

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

REBECCA A. ALIVIO
FRUMENCIO DEQUITO
RAMON R. ORTIZ
Marikina City
ANER M. ANDA

Member of the Board and Vice President

c/o Caltex Banaba Housing
Bgy. Sta Rita, Batangas City
Member of the Board
21 Fabella St., B.F. Homes, Paraaque
City
Member of the Board
7-Soliven III, Loyola Grand Villas,
Member of the Board
Augusta Drive, Manila
Carmona, Cavite

Southwoods,

CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE

MATERIAL FACTS AND THE CASE
A criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act 1161 as
amended by Republic Act 8282 or otherwise known as the Social
Security Act of 1997 was filed against the private respondents before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati on December 22, 2005.
The complaint was docketed as IS NO. 05-L-14088. Entitled as Ma.
Christia M. Ladioray-Atienza vs Nicolas Florio et. al.. A certified copy
of the complaint and its annexes is hereto attached and made integral
part thereof as ANNEX "C."
Instead of submitting their respective counter-affidavits to the
office of the City Prosecutor (OCP), the private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss through their counsel.1
The OCP dismissed the complaint, which led to matters being
elevated before the Secretary of Justice through a petition for review.
On 11 January 2013, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution
reversing the decision of the OCP. The dispositive portion of said
Department of Justice resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed resolution is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City
Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby directed to
file the information for violation of Section
28(e) in relation to Section 28(f) of Republic
Act No. 1161 as amended by Republic Act No.
8282 against respondents. Report the action
1

Section 3(c)of Rule 112 provides: Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits
and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon
for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with
copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a
counter-affidavit. (emphasis supplied)

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

taken to this Office within ten (10) days from

receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
A certified true copy of the aforecited resolution of the Secretary
of Justice is attached hereto as ANNEX D of this petition.
Consequently, the OCP filed the Information against herein
Private Respondents on 28 May 2013. A certified copy of the
Information as filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is
attached hereto as ANNEX E and made an integral part hereof.
Private Respondents, through counsel, in turn filed a Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Deferment/Suspension
of the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. This motion was opposed by the
Prosecution. Private Respondents then submitted a Manifestation
with an attachment purporting to be an SSS Certificate of Compliance
dated 28 March 2013.
Certified copies of the Motion for
Determination of Probable Cause, the Opposition thereto filed by the
Prosecution and the said Manifestation are attached hereto as
ANNEXES F, G and H, respectively.
On 31 July 2012, the Honorable Public Respondent issued the
assailed Order dismissing the criminal case and on 27 August 2014,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that there is
no probable cause to hold all the accused for
trial and hereby dismisses the instant
complaint against them.
SO ORDERED.
The OCP filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the assailed
order but the same was denied in the Court's order of 27 August
2014. Certified copies of the assailed order are attached as Annex I
and J and made an integral part of the petition.
ARGUMENTS AND GROUNDS RELIED UPON
FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT
THE

PUBLIC

RESPONDENT

COMMITTED
GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE AND DISMISSED THE
CRIMINAL CASE

Respondent judge committed a serious reversible, error,

tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of his jurisdiction when he supplanted his own determination of
probable cause to hold Private Respondents for trial over that of the
Department of Justice which is the primary government agency given
the authority and power to prosecute crimes and offenses.
In the recent case of ALFREDO C. MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC. (G.R. No. 197293,
21 April 2014), the Supreme Court reiterated the difference between
the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand
and the determination of probable cause by the judge on the other, to
wit:
In People v. Castillo and Mejia, this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. xxxxxxx ..
The difference is clear: The executive
determination of probable cause concerns
itself with whether there is enough evidence
to support an Information being filed. The
judicial determination of probable cause, on
the other hand, determines whether a warrant
of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting:
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether
the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are
conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion
about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is
made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation properwhether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore,
whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

is the function of the Prosecutor. (Emphasis

supplied)
While it is within the trial courts discretion to
make an independent assessment of the
evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of
determining whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. The judge does not act as
an appellate court of the prosecutor and has
no capacity to review the prosecutors
determination of probable cause; rather, the
judge makes a determination of probable
cause independent of the prosecutors
finding. (emphases supplied, citations
omitted)
There is, therefore, no doubt as to what the applicable rule is
insofar as the issue of the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor and by the judge is concerned. While the Public
Respondent may choose not to issue a warrant of arrest, in the
absence of a clear showing and finding in the two assailed orders of
Public Respondent that the Information filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati is invalid on its face, or that the Secretary of
Justice, in rendering the Resolution dated 11 January 2013,
committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, said Public
Respondent should respect both the aforementioned Information of
the City Prosecutor and the Resolution of the Department of Justice
and should proceed to the trial of this case. Hence, when the
above cited cases are applied to the facts of the case at bar, the act
of Respondent Judge reversing the determination of the Secretary of
Justice (that probable cause exists and that Private Respondents
should be held for trial for violation of the SSS Law) must be struck
down and nullified.
ASSUMING,

ARGUENDO
AND
WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
MAY
SUBSTITUTE
HIS
OWN
DETERMINATION
AS
TO
THE
EXISTENCE
OR
ABSENCE
OF
PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO TRIAL OVER THAT
OF
THE
DOJ,
STILL,
THE
DETERMINATION MADE WAS NOT
BASED ON THE RESOLUTION AND THE
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

Public Respondent hinges his assailed acts on Section 6 (a) of

Rule 112. However, this rule is expressly clear as to what the RTC
Judge could evaluate and when, to wit.:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been
arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of
this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint of
information.
(emphases supplied)
Under the quoted rule above, when the information is filed, the
RTC Judge is mandated to personally evaluate the resolution
finding probable cause and its supporting evidence for the
purpose of determining whether or not a warrant of arrest should be
issued. The Rule here is very specific as to what should be evaluated
by the RTC Judge only the resolution and its supporting evidence.
This is very important because Public Respondent failed to base his
findings on the resolution and the latters supporting evidence as
mandated above. Instead, the order dismissing the complaint was
based on something else not sanctioned by the Rules. Taking a
cursory look at the Honorable Courts assailed Order quoted below:
After having thoroughly considered the urgent
Motion filed by accused, the Opposition of the
Public Prosecutor and the Reply thereto by
the accused, and pursuant to the duty
imposed upon this Court by Section (a) [sic],
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure to personally evaluate the

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor,

the arguments as well as evidence on
record (page 2, Last Paragraph of the
Order dated 31 July 2012 attached as Annex
B hereof)
It mentions that arguments were likewise evaluated. After
closer scrutiny, it would appear that Public Respondents finding (that
there was no probable cause which led to the eventual dismissal of
the criminal complaint) was BASED NOT ON THE REVIEW OF THE
RESOLUTION and/or ON ITS SUPPORTING EVIDENCE - those that
were presented during the preliminary investigation - but on the socalled ARGUMENTS, which the Public Respondent added as an
item for evaluation on top of those provided by the Rules of Court.
This therefore qualifies the questioned Order contrary to the Rules of
Court.
Furthermore, the Urgent Motion and the subsequent pleadings
filed, the arguments raised therein and any of their attachments
submitted by the Private Respondents counsel are NOT the
evidence contemplated by the Rules that should have been
evaluated by Public Respondent as provided in Section 6 (a) of Rule
112. In fact, these are extraneous or even hearsay documents and
statements since they were not presented during the preliminary
investigation, were not subscribed and sworn to by Private
Respondents/Accused before a prosecutor or an officer authorized to
administer oath and likewise not certified as mandated by Section 3
of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Based on the foregoing, it was not
just a direct violation of the Rules but likewise a grave abuse of
judicial discretion and a palpable deviation from the principles of
justice and fair play.
It is without question that a preliminary investigation was held in
this case, during which, the complainant categorically charged under
oath before the City Prosecution Office all the accused for violation of
the penal provisions of the SSS Law. She attached to her complaintaffidavit (Annex C hereof) all necessary documentary evidence to
prove her accusation, such evidence that would sufficiently indict said
accused for the mala prohibitum crime they were charged with.
On the other hand, it is a fact that ALL the Private Respondents
failed to submit their respective counter-affidavits. This was because
they instead opted to file, through their counsel, a motion to dismiss,
knowing fully-well that Section 3 (c) of Rule 112 prohibits the filing of
such motion in lieu of the mandated counter-affidavits. Hence, it is
therefore safe to declare that there is nothing in the record that
could be considered as a statement or evidence emanating from

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

and presented by any of the Private Respondents which is

subscribed and sworn to and certified by a prosecutor as required in
Section 3 of Rule 112. Hence, there is nothing in the record of this
case that can controvert the categorical accusations of the
complainant.
Even the motion to dismiss that Private Respondents counsel
filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor did not contain any
substantive defense as they grounded their motion on mere
technicalities. This was the reason why, when the Office of the
Secretary of Justice finally threw out the dismissal by reason of
technical arguments on appeal, it found, as a logical consequence,
the existence of probable cause to hold the Private Respondentsaccused for trial for the crime they were charged with. What the
Office of the DOJ Secretary had in its hand when the technical
questions were resolved was a situation where: a) there was an
express and categorical accusation made by complainant (Private
Petitioner) which was supported by solid evidence on one hand; BUT
b) there was nothing submitted in defence of those accused (Private
Respondents) on the other hand, even though they were given the
chance to do so in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Therefore, when the DOJ Secretarys Resolution (Annex D
hereof) was issued and the Information (Annex E hereof) filed in
court, they merely reflected the above facts, making them sufficient
and proper in form and substance. Unfortunately, the DOJ resolution
as well as the Information were never commented on, or discredited,
or even considered by Public Respondent when he issued the two
assailed orders.
ASSUMING,

ARGUENDO
AND
WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE
ASSAILED ORDERS ARE BASED ON
THE
RESOLUTION
AND
THE
EVIDENCES,
THE
ORDERS
ARE
CONTRARY
TO
SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE.

At this point, it would be worthwhile to revisit the assailed

Orders of Public Respondent and see how the latter justified his
finding of absence of probable cause.
As bases for his finding, Public Respondent, on page three,
third paragraph of the assailed Order dated 31 July 2012 (Annex B
hereof), the Honorable Public Respondent found as follows:

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

10

Based on Private Complainants own

admissions, she was an employee of the
Company from July 27, 2001 to September
21, 2002. Similarly Private Complainant
submits that the Company, through its
agent, reported her to the Social Security
Commission, deducted contributions from
her salaries and remitted the same during
her employment in the Company sometime
in July 2002 to September 2002. At most,
this is merely a case of late reporting and
insufficient withholding and remittance of SSS
contributions. Section 28 of the Social
Security Law does not criminally penalize late
reporting, insufficient deduction or remittance.
The SSS Law only requires the defaulting
entity to pay the unpaid contributions plus
three percent (3%) interest per month from the
date the contribution falls due until paid. While
the Public Prosecutor, in Opposition, contends
that the Information only alleged year 2011 to
June 2002 as the relevant period, the Private
Complainant herself complained that
although she was an employee of the
Company until September 2002, she was
registered with the SSS on July 2002 or
months prior to the cessation of her
employment. This case is, therefore, one in
which the accused are being charged with
non-reporting
and
non-deduction
until
September 2002. Indeed, this Court agrees
with the accused that this case is in reality one
for late reporting, which, however, is not
penalized under the SSS Law and is not
subject to criminal prosecution. (emphases
supplied)
From the above-quoted order Public Respondent evidently
decriminalized the act of late reporting. As early as 1969 2, the
Supreme Court already had the occasion to rule that remittance of
contribution to the SSS under Section 22(a) of the Social Security Act
is mandatory and is punihsable by mere delay,3 to wit:
No discretion or alternative is granted
respondent Commission in the enforcement of
2
3

United Christian Missionary Society v. Social Security Commission

Mendoza vs People of the Philippines, August 3, 2010, G.R. 183891.

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

11

the laws mandate that the employer who

fails to comply with his legal obligation to
remit the premiums to the System within
the prescribed period shall pay a penalty
of three 3% per month. The prescribed
penalty is evidently of a punitive character,
provided by the legislature to assure that
employers do not take lightly the States
exercise of the police power in the
implementation of the Republics declared
policy to develop, establish gradually and
perfect a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people throughout
the Philippines and (to) provide protection to
employers against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death.[Section 2,
Social Security Act; Roman Catholic
Archbishop v. Social Security Commission, 1
SCRA 10, January 20, 1961] In this
concept, good faith or bad faith is
rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no
distinction between an employer who
professes good reasons for delaying the
remittance of premiums and another who
deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed
upon him to make such remittance. From the
moment the remittance of premiums due is
delayed, the penalty immediately attaches
to the delayed premium payments by force
of law. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It can thus be seen from the abovecited case that penalty
attaches from the moment the remmittance of premiums due is
delayed. As such, Public Respondent's statement that delay is not
criminally penalized is without basis and in direct contravention of the
law and jurisprudence.
Even if it were true, without admitting, that delay is not
penalized by the SSS Law, it cannot be said that this is a case of
simple delay. Caltex did not, and neither did any of its agents, report
the complainant to the SSS as an employee. It was only after
TWELVE YEARS FROM HER EMPLOYMENT DATE before Caltex
finally decided to report the complainant SSS as an employee. Giving
credence to the statement that this case is one for mere LATE
REPORTING and does not constitute a violation of the SSS Law is
almost incredible on the part of Public Respondent.

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

12

Public Respondent also committed a grave and reversible error

when the Public Respondent relied on the case of Fajardo vs People
of the Philippines and People vs Garcia in declaring that the accused
did not have the requisite intent to perpetrate the act complained of.
Firstly, the case cited by Private Respondent and adopted by
Public Respondent is not for violation of the SSS Law but for violation
of P.D. 1866 or the Law on Illegal Possession of Firearms. In the
adopted cases of Public Respondent, the Court made a distinction
between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act. In
the first, there must be criminal intent. In the second, it is enough that
the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. In the said case, the
Court concluded that for violation of P.D. 1866, there must be intent to
possess or animus possidendi to be convicted of the same. It is
respectfully submitted that this case is not applicable is cases of
violation of our SSS Law. The Court made a distinction between
intent to commit a crime and intent to perpetrate an act because
Section 1 of the P.D. 1866 did not provide specifically who is liable
for unlawful possession of firearms but only makes "any person"
who possesses firearm liable, to wit:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used
or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms of Ammunition. - The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture,
deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of any firearm
or ammunition.
As can be seen from the above provision, the said law did not
provide specifically who is liable. This is in sharp contrast with the
SSS Law which specifically penalizes the managing head, directors
or partners in case of Act be committed by an association,
partnership, corporation or any other institution. There is thus, as
Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection enjoins, 4
. . . no need to resort to statutory construction [for] Section
28(f) of the Social Security Law imposes penalty on:

G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 456, 458.

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

13

(1) the managing head;

(2) directors; or
(3) partners, for offenses committed by a juridical person.
(emphasis supplied)
UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE
DEBEMOS. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish. The SSS law does not distinguish the there is a need to
prove intent to perpetuate the act. To the contrary, the law directly
punishes the directors sans qualification. Observably, the SSS Law
makes the directors accountable for violations of the SSS law. Even
assuming that intent to perpetuate an act is required, the Public
Respondent could not have arrived at this conclusion without going
into a full blown trial.
Secondly, in the case of Romarico J. Mendoza v. People5, it
was already declared by the Supreme Court that failure to comply
with the law being malum prohibitum, intent to commit it or good faith
is immaterial.
Therefore, on the basis of the above discussion, the finding of
the Honorable Court de-criminalizing late reporting and late payment
has no footing in and is contrary to law and jurisprudence. For
whatever its worth, should the reasoning of the Private Respondents
which was adopted by the Honorable Public Respondent prevail, then
that would be tantamount to rendering the law inutile and nugatory.
No one who has committed the prohibited acts could then be held
criminally liable since it could just simply adopt the excuse employed
by herein Private Respondents.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully
pray that the assailed Orders of Public Respondent dated 31 July
2012 and 27 August 2014 be nullified, reversed and set aside and
that, in their stead, a judgment in favor of herein Petitioner be issued,
finding probable cause and remanding the case to the lower court to
hold Private Respondents for trial in Criminal Case No. 13-13998.
Reliefs, equitable and reasonable under the circumstances, are
likewise respectfully prayed for.
Makati City for Manila, December 29, 2014.

G.R. No. 183891, August 3, 2010.

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

14

FLORIN T. HILBAY
Acting Solicitor General
Roll No. 44957
IBP Lifetime No. 08505
MCLE Exemption No. IV-001068; 5-14-2013
MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN
Assistant Solicitor General
Roll No. 33725
IBP Lifetime No. 00253
MCLE Exemption No. IV-000047, 05-16-12
DENNIS O. GO
Associate Solicitor I
Roll No. 63750
IBP Lifetime No. 012822; 05-12-14
Admitted to the bar 05-05-14
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City
Telephone No. 818-6381
EXPLANATION
(Pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
The foregoing Petition for Review is being filed and served by
registered mail, personal service not being practicable due to lack of
personnel.
DENNIS O. GO
Associate Solicitor I
Copy Furnished:
NICOLAS C. FLORIO
COLIN J. GEER
FRUMENCIO DEQUITO
RAMON R. ORTIZ
JOSUE C. BAES

c/o Caltex (Philippines), Inc.

6/F 7650 Ayala Avenue, Makati City
c/o Caltex Banaba Housing
Bgy. Sta Rita, Batangas City
21 Fabella St., B.F. Homes, Paraaque
City
7-Soliven III, Loyola Grand Villas,
Marikina City
Blk 1, Lot 18 and 20, San Pedro 6

PETITION
PP vs. Hon. H. Guanlao, Jr, and M. Ocampo
CA-G.R. No. _________
x--------------------------------------------------x

15

Subdivision Tandang Sora, Quezon City

TIMOTHY D. LEVIELLE
c/o Caltex (Philippines), Inc.
6/F 7650 Ayala Avenue, Makati City
REBECCA A. ALIVIO
c/o Caltex Banaba Housing
Bgy. Sta Rita, Batangas City
ANER M. ANDA
Augusta Drive, Manila Soutwoods
Carmona, Cavite
HON. WINLOVE DUMAYAS c/o The Branch Clerk of Court
Branch 59 Regional Trial Court
Makati City Hall Complex, Makati City
EXPLANATION
Each Respondents copy of this petition is served, and the filing
of this petition is likewise effected, via registered mail for lack of
material time and because of the distance involved between the
offices of Petitioners counsels and those of the Respondents and
the Honorable Courts.